UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. WILLIAM M. SORIANO G.R. No.

182072, 19
June 2013
FACTS:
Soriano was hired by petitioner on probationary basis as legal assistant of
the company. On a certain day, 8 days prior to the completion of his six
months probationary period, the Department head informed him that he
was being terminated from employment due to the companys cost-cutting
measures. He allegedly asked for a thirty-day notice but his termination
was ordered to be effective immediately. Thus, he was left with no choice
but to leave the company. Petitioner, however, denied the allegations of
respondent and claimed instead that prior to his employment, respondent
was informed of the standards required for regularization. Univac also
said that Soriano abandoned his work due to his plan of reviewing for the
bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probationary employees dismissal is with a valid ground
considering he was not informed of the standards required for
regularization.

RULING:
No. It is primordial that at the start of the probationary period, the
standards for regularization be made known to the probationary
employee. In this case, as held by the CA, petitioner failed to present
adequate evidence to substantiate its claim that respondent was apprised
of said standards. It is evident from the LA and NLRC decisions that they
merely relied on surmises and presumptions in concluding that
respondent should have known the standards considering his educational
background as a law graduate. Equally important is the requirement that
in order to invoke failure to meet the probationary standards as a
justification for dismissal, the employer must show how these standards
have been applied to the subject employee. In this case, aside from its
bare allegation, it was not shown that a performance evaluation was
conducted to prove that his performance was indeed unsatisfactory.
Indeed, the power of the employer to terminate a probationary employee
is subject to three limitations, namely: (1) it must be exercised in
accordance with the specific requirements of the contract; (2) the
dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith,
not feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law; and (3) there
must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal. In this case, not only
did petitioner fail to show that respondent was apprised of the standards

for regularization but it was likewise not shown how these standards had
been applied in his case.
Pursuant to well-settled doctrine, petitioners failure to specify the
reasonable standards by which respondents alleged poor performance
was evaluated as well as to prove that such standards were made known
to him at the start of his employment, makes respondent a regular
employee. In other words, because of this omission on the part of
petitioner, respondent is deemed to have been hired from day one as a
regular employee.

NATHANIEL N. DONGON vs. RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC.,

G.R. No. 163431, 28 August 2013
FACTS:
Tanduays security guard called the attention of private respondent as to the fact th
at Mr. Villaruz was not wearing an I.D. Card. Petitioner, then, assured the guard that
he will secure a special permission from the management to warrant the orderly rel
ease of goods. Instead of complying with his compromise, he lent his I.D. Card to Vill
aruz; and by reason of such misrepresentation , private respondent and Mr. Villaruz
got a clearance from Tanduay for the release of the goods. However, the security gu
ard, who saw the misrepresentation committed by private respondent and Mr. Villar
uz, accosted them and reported the matter to the management of Tanduay. He was
then dismissed.
Petitioner submits that his dismissal was a penalty too harsh and disproportionate t
o his supposed violation; and that his dismissal was inappropriate due to the violatio
n being his first infraction that was even committed in good faith and without malice
.
Rapid Movers argues, however, that the strict implementation of company rules and
regulations should be accorded respect as a valid exercise of its management prero
gative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer can dismiss an employee by virtue of its managerial pr
erogative considering that it was established that the employees act did not constit
ute just cause provided by the Labor Code.
RULING:
No. It is true that an employer is given wide latitude of discretion in managing its ow
n affairs. The broad discretion includes the implementation of company rules and re
gulations and the imposition of disciplinary measures on its employees. But the exer
cise of a management prerogative like this is not limitless, but hemmed in by good f
aith and a due consideration of the rights of the worker. In this light, the manageme
nt prerogative will be upheld for as long as it is not wielded as an implement to circu
mvent the laws and oppress labor. The discipline exacted by the employer should fu
rther consider the employees length of service and the number of infractions durin

g his employment. The employer should never forget that always at stake in discipli
ning its employee are not only his position but also his livelihood, and that he may a
lso have a family entirely dependent on his earnings.
Furthermore, petitioner was not guilty of willful disobedience; hence, his dismissal w
as illegal. For willful disobedience to be a ground, it is required that: (a) the conduct
of the employee must be willful or intentional; and (b) the order the employee violat
ed must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pert
ain to the duties that he had been engaged to discharge. Willfulness must be attend
ed by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employees act inconsi
stent with proper subordination. It is implied that in every act of willful disobedience
, the erring employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to the business interest
of the employer. In the case at bar, he neither benefitted from it, nor thereby prejudi
ced the business interest of Rapid Movers but was intended to benefit Rapid Movers.
NORMAN YABUT vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY G.R. No. 190436, 16 January 2012

FACTS:
Meralco Inspection Office claimed discovering shunting wires installed on the meter
base registered under petitioner Yabuts name. These wires allegedly allowed power
transmission to the petitioners residence despite the fact that Meralco had earlier
disconnected his electrical service due to his failure to pay his electric bills. LA said
he was illegally dismissed since the act imputed upon Yabut was not related to the
performance of his duties as a Meralco employee, but as a customer of the
companys electric business.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee is illegally dismissed when the act he has done which
caused his dismissal benefited him as a customer and not as an employee.

RULING:
No. While the installation of the shunted wires benefited the herein petitioner as a
customer of Meralco, his act cannot be fully severed from his status as the
respondents employee.
The requirement for a just cause was satisfied in this case for violation of Meralcos
Company Code on Employee Discipline for his act is classified as an act of

dishonesty, and for the existence of just cause under Article 282 (a), (c), (d) and (e)
of the Labor Code.
The act clearly relates to the petitioners performance of his duties given his
position as branch field representative who is equipped with knowledge on meter
operations, and who has the duty to test electric meters and handle customers
violations of contract. Instead of protecting the companys interest, the petitioner
himself used his knowledge to illegally obtain electric power from Meralco. His
involvement in this incident deems him no longer fit to continue performing his
functions for respondent-company.
We emphasize that dismissal of a dishonest employee is to the best interest not
only of the management but also of labor. As a measure of self-protection against
acts inimical to its interest, a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees.
An employer cannot be compelled to continue employing an employee guilty of acts
inimical to the employers interest, justifying loss of confidence in him.
SAMPAGUITA AUTO TRANSPORT CORPORATION NLRC and EFREN I. SAGAD G.R. No.
197384, 30 January 2013

FACTS:
Sagad alleged that on May 14, 2006, the company hired him as a regular bus driver,
not as a probationary employee as the company claimed. He disowned his
purported signature on the contract of probationary Employment submitted in
evidence by the company. He maintained that his signature was forged. He further
alleged that on November 5, 2006, he was dismissed by the company for allegedly
conniving with conductor Vitola in issuing tickets outside their assigned route.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a probationary employee attains regular status considering he is not
terminated upon the expiration of his contract.

RULING:

Yes. After a review of the records, Sagad was dismissed, not as a probationary
employee, but as one who had attained regular status.
Independently of the discussions of the LA, NLRC, and CA about the alleged foregery
of Sagads signature in the contract and even if the Court were to consider that
Sagad went through a probationary period, the records indicate that he was
retained even beyond the expiration of his supposed probationary employment on
October 14, 2006. As the NLRC noted, Sagad claimed that he was dismissed by the
company on November 5, 2006, after he was accused of conniving with conductor
Vitola in issuing tickets outside their assigned route. The company never refuted
this particular assertion of Sagad and its silence can only mean that Sagad
remained in employment until November 4, 2006, thereby attaining regular status
as of that date. Under the law, an employee who is allowed to work after a
probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
SAMPAGUITA GARMENTS CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) and EMILIA B. SANTOS G.R. No. 102406, June 17,
1994

FACTS:
Santos allegedly attempted to bring out piece of cloth and was dismissed. He then
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the labor arbiter sustained the company.
However, his decision was reversed by the NLRC, which ordered her reinstatement
with back wages from the time of her illegal suspension until her actual
reinstatement. Meantime, the petitioner had also filed a criminal action against
Santos for the same offense in the Municipal Trial Court of Caloocan City. After trial,
she was found guilty. This decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, CA, and
SC. The decisions in both cases became final and executory and the corresponding
entries of judgment were eventually made.
Subsequently, Santos moved for the execution of the NLRC decision. The petitioner
opposed, invoking her conviction in the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not order of reinstatement of an employee which has long been final
and executory is proper considering the employee is convicted in a criminal case.
HELD:
It is true that once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be
disturbed except only for the correction of clerical errors or where supervening
events render its execution impossible or unjust. In the latter event, the interested

party may ask the court to modify the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the
facts.
There is no dispute in the case at bar that the decision of the respondent NLRC
ordering the private respondents reinstatement with back wages had indeed
become final and executory. Even so, we find, in light of the subsequent
developments, that the NLRC was not correct in sustaining the implementation of
that decision. In Heirs of Francisco Guballa, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held
that the power of the NLRC to issue a writ of execution carries with it the right to
look into the correctness of the execution of the decision and to consider
supervening events that may affect such execution.
The affirmance by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of the private
respondents conviction for theft is justification enough for the NLRC to exercise this
authority and suspend the execution of its decision. Such conviction, which was also
upheld by the Supreme Court, is a supervening cause that rendered unjust and
inequitable the decision mandating the private respondents reinstatement, and
with back wages to boot.
https://sunnyandthelaw.wordpress.com/category/labor-relations/page/26/

SAMPAGUITA GARMENTS CORP. vs. NLRC 233 SCRA 260 FACT : An employee was
terminated by his employer on the ground of theft. He stole company property. The
management filed also a case of theft against the employee. But in the meantime
the employee also filed a labor case against the employer for illegal dismissal and
prayed for reinstatement with back wages. After hearing, the NLRC ruled that there
was illegal termination and ordered the reinstatement of the employee and
payment of backwages. The NLRC decision became final. In the meantime, the
accused was convicted in the criminal case for theft and ordered to go to prison.
ISSUE : What happens now to the final judgment of the NLRC reinstating the
employee?
HELD : An employees conviction for theft, which was affirmed by the RTC and the
CA, is a SUPERVENING CAUSE that renders unjust and inequitable the NLRC decision
mandating the employees reinstatement with backwages. Take note however that
for the supervening event to apply, the supervening event must happen after the
judgment has become final and executory. Not that the supervening event
happened while the case was going on. If the case is going on and something
happened which you believe would make the decision against you unfair, your duty
is to bring it to the attention of the court so that the court deciding the case would
take that into consideration. In the case o
Case Digest: Century Iron & Chua v. Banas
G.R. No. 184116 : June 19, 2013
CENTURY IRON WORKS, INC. and BENITO CHUA,Petitioners,v. ELETO B.
BANAS,Respondent.
BRION,J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Eleto B. Banas worked at petitioner Century Iron beginning July 5,
2000until his dismissal on June 18, 2002.Bas responded to his dismissal by filing a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and money claims.
According to Century Iron, Bas worked as an inventory comptroller
Sometime in 2002, Century Iron received letters of complaint from its gas suppliers
regarding alleged massive shortage of empty gas cylinders.In the investigation that
Century Iron conducted in response to the letters, it found that Bas failed to make a
report of the missing cylinders. On May 14, 2002, Century Iron required Bas to
explain within 48 hours from receipt of its letter why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for loss of trust and confidence and for gross and habitual neglect
of duty.On May 31, 2002, Century Iron issued a Memorandum requiring Bas to
attend a hearing regarding the missing cylinders.Bas subsequently appeared at the
hearing to air his side.
On June 17, 2002, Century Iron, through Personnel Officer Mr. Virgilio T. Baga,
terminated Bas services on grounds of loss of trust and confidence, and habitual
and gross neglect of duty.The termination was effective June 18, 2002.
In his defense, Bas alleged that he merely worked as an inventory clerk who is not
responsible for the lost cylinders. Therefore, he cannot be terminated on the ground
of loss of confidence.
Labor Arbiter (LA) Joel S. Lustria ruled that Bas was illegally dismissed. The LA did
not believe Century Irons assertions that Bas worked as an inventory comptroller
and that he was grossly and habitually neglectful of his duties. The evidence on
record shows that Bas was an inventory clerk whose duties were merely to conduct
inventory and to submit his report to the personnel officer. As an inventory clerk, it
was not his duty to receive the missing items
On appeal by Century Iron, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
affirmed the LAs ruling in toto.
On January 31, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC decision. It agreed
with the lower tribunals finding that Bas was merely an inventory clerk. It, however,
ruled that Bas was afforded due process. It held that Bas had been given ample
opportunity to air his side during the hearing, pointing out that the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard.
ISSUE: Whether or not Century Iron terminated Banas for just and valid causes
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside. The
Complaint for illegal dismissal is dismissed for lack of merit

LABOR LAW
Since Banas was an ordinary rank-and-file employee, his termination on the ground
of loss of confidence was illegal.
Banas did not occupy a position of trust and confidence nor was he routinely in
charge with the care and custody of Century Irons money or property.
We point out in this respect that loss of confidence applies to: (1) employees
occupying positions of trust and confidence, the managerial employees; and (2)
employees who are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employers
money or property which may include rank-and-file employees. Examples of rankand-file employees who may be dismissed for loss of confidence are cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal routine exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Thus, the
phrasing of the petitioners second assignment of error is inaccurate because a rankand-file employee who is routinely charged with the care and custody of the
employers money or property may be dismissed on the ground of loss of
confidence.
With respect to Century Irons assertion that Bas was grossly and habitually
neglectful of his duties, the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in concluding that the dismissal was illegal. The NLRCs finding
that there was illegal dismissal on the ground of gross and habitual neglect of duties
is not supported by the evidence on record. It believed in Bas bare and
unsubstantiated denial that he was not grossly and habitually neglectful of his
duties when the record is replete with pieces of evidence showing the contrary.
Bas self-serving and unsubstantiated denials cannot defeat the concrete and
overwhelming evidence submitted by the petitioners. The evidence on record shows
that Bas committed numerous infractions in his one year and eleven-month stay in
Century Iron.
They maintained that Bas committed numerous infractions during his tenure
amounting to gross and habitual neglect of duty. These included absences without
leave, unauthorized under time, failure to implement proper standard warehousing
and housekeeping procedure, negligence in making inventories of materials, and
failure to ensure sufficient supplies of oxygen-acetylene gases.
Article 282 of the Labor Code provides that one of the just causes for terminating an
employment is the employees gross and habitual neglect of his duties.
To our mind, such numerous infractions are sufficient to hold him grossly and
habitually negligent. His repeated negligence is not tolerable. The totality of
infractions or the number of violations he committed during his employment merits
his dismissal.

Besides, the determination of who to keep in employment and who to dismiss for
cause is one of Century Iron's prerogatives. Time and again, we have recognized
that the employer has the right to regulate, according to its discretion and best
judgment, ell aspects of employment. It would be the height of injustice if we force
an employer to retain the services of an employee who does not value his work.
Dismissal must be based on willful breach of trust 0
BY THE MANILA TIMES
ON
JUNE 28, 2013 BENCHPRESS
A bank manager was promoted to the position of vice president of Allied Business
Ventures Department of the bank after just five years.
When one of the banks branch managers resigned, the VP was asked to sign the
branch managers standard employment clearance pertaining to the latters
accountabilities with the bank. The VP, however, issued a clearance only for the
branch managers paid cash advances and salary loan, after being shown receipts
by the banks cashier.
Seven months later, the VP was informed that the resigned bank manager was
involved in a questionable transaction involving P11 million for which the bank was
being sued. Because the clearance issued by the VP effectively barred the bank
from going after the bank manager, the bank terminated the services of the VP for
loss of trust and confidence as was demanded by his position.
Aggrieved, the VP filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. He insisted that there was a
plot to oust him from his position, which was why they blamed him for clearing all of
the bank managers financial clearances even though he only cleared the latter for
paid cash advances and salary loan. The reasoning that there was loss of trust and
confidence was a mere afterthought given the gap between the issuance of the
clearance and the bank firing him, he said.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the VP holding that the act of issuing the
clearance was not a valid and justifiable ground for the bank to lose trust and
confidence in him.
The Labor Arbiter was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Court of Appeals however held that the VP was dismissed for just cause as he
failed to exercise prudence in clearing [the bank manager]of his accountabilities
given that the same were yet to be audited.
On appeal, the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, and
found that the VP was illegally dismissed. First, it explained the rules on a dismissal
based on willful breach of loss and confidence
As provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer has the right to dismiss
an employee by reason of willful breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

To temper the exercise of such prerogative, the law imposes the burden of proof
upon the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for just cause
failing which would mean that the dismissal is not justified.
The law mandates that before validity can be accorded to a dismissal premised on
loss of trust and confidence, two requisites must concur, viz: (1) the employee
concerned must be holding a position of trust; and (2) the loss of trust must be
based on willful breach of trust founded on clearly established facts.
Although the VP held a position of trust, the SC ruled that the act of issuing the
clearance could not be considered a willful breach of that trust
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the act that breached the trust must be
willful such that it was done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently.
The conditions under which the clearance was issued exclude any finding of
deliberate or conscious effort on the part of the petitioner to prejudice his employer.
Also, the petitioner did not commit an irregular or prohibited act. He did not falsify
or misrepresent any company record as it was officially confirmed by [the cashier]
(Torres v. Rural Bank of San Juan, G.R. No. 184520, 13 March 2013, J. Reyes).
LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; SEPARATION PAY; INTEREST MORAL DAMAGES;
SOLIDARY LIABILITY; 13TH MONTH PAY Torres vs. Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., et. al.
G.R. No. 184520, March 13, 2013 Facts: The petitioner was initially hired by RBSJI as
Personnel and Marketing Manager in 1991. After a six-month probationary period
and finding his performance to be satisfactory, RBSJI renewed his employment for
the same post to a permanent/regular status. In June 1996, the petitioner was
offered the position of Vice-President for RBSJIs newly created department, Allied
Business Ventures. He accepted the offer and concomitantly relinquished his post.
The vacancy created was filled by respondent Jobel who temporarily held the
position concurrently as a Corporate Planning and Human Resources Development
Head. On September 24, 1996, the petitioner was temporarily assigned as the
manager of RBSJIs N. Domingo branch in view of the resignation of Jacinto. On
September 27, 1996, Jacinto requested the petitioner to sign a standard
employment clearance pertaining to his accountabilities with RBSJI. When the
petitioner declined his request, Jacinto threw a fit and shouted foul invectives. To
pacify him, the petitioner bargained to issue a clearance but only for Jacintos paid
cash advances and salary loan. About seven months later or on April 17, 1997,
respondent Jesus issued a memorandum to the petitioner requiring him to explain
why no administrative action should be imposed on him for his unauthorized
issuance of a clearance to Jacinto whose accountabilities were yet to be audited.
Jacinto was later found to have unliquidated cash advances and was responsible for
a questionable transaction involving P11 million for which RBSJI is being sued by a
certain Actives Builders Manufacturing Corporation. The memorandum stressed that
the clearance petitioner issued effectively barred RBSJI from running after Jacinto.

The petitioner submitted his explanation on the same day clarifying that the
clearance was limited only to Jacintos paid cash advances and salary loan based on
the receipts presented by the branch cashier of N. Domingo branch. He emphasized
that he had no foreknowledge nor was he forewarned of Jacintos unliquidated cash
advances and questionable transactions and that the clearance did not extend to
those matters. After conducting an investigation, RBSJIs HRD recommended the
petitioners termination from employment for the following reasons, to wit: (1) the
issuance of clearance to Jacinto have been prejudicial to the Bank considering that
damages found caused by Jacinto during his stay with the bank; (2) the petitioner is
not in any authority to issue said clearance which is a violation of the Company
Code of Conduct and Discipline under Category B Grave Offense No. 1 (falsifying or
misrepresenting persons or other company records, documents or papers)
equivalent to termination; and (3) the nature of his participation in the issuance of
the said clearance could be a reasonable ground for Compiled and Edited by:
PURDEY P. PEREZ Acting Chief the Management to believe that he is unworthy of the
trust and confidence demanded by his position which is also a ground for
termination. On May 19, 1997, RBSJIs Board of Directors adopted the above
recommendation and issued Resolution No. 97-102 terminating the petitioner from
employment, the import of which was communicated to him in a Memorandum
dated May 30, 1997. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive, leave pay and
retirement benefits. The LA ruled in favor of petitioner and awarded separation pay,
backwages, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Issues: (a) Is petitioners dismissal valid? (b) Is petitioner entitled to separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement and back wages with legal interest? (c) Is the award of
moral and exemplary damages proper? (d) Is the individual respondent solidarily
liable with RBSJI? (e) Is the award of 13th month pay proper? (f) Is the award of
attorneys fees proper? Ruling: (a) No. As provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code
and as firmly entrenched in jurisprudence, an employer has the right to dismiss an
employee by reason of willful breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. To
temper the exercise of such prerogative and to reconcile the same with the
employees Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, the law imposes the
burden of proof upon the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for
just cause failing which would mean that the dismissal is not justified. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not necessary but the factual basis for the dismissal must be
clearly and convincingly established (Jerusalem vs. Keppel Monte Bank, G.R. No.
169564, August 6, 2011). Further, the law mandates that before validity can be
accorded to a dismissal premised on loss of trust and confidence, two requisites
must concur, viz: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust;
and (2) the loss of trust must be based on willful breach of trust founded on clearly
established facts (Bristol Myers Squibb, Inc. vs. Baban, G.R. No. 167449, December
17, 2008). There is no arguing that the petitioner was part of the upper echelons of
RBSJIs management from whom greater fidelity to trust is expected. At the time
when he committed the act which allegedly led to the loss of RBSJIs trust and
confidence in him, he was the Acting Manager of N. Domingo branch. It was part of
the petitioners responsibilities to effect a smooth turn-over of pending transactions
and to sign and approve instructions within the limits assigned to the position under

existing regulations. Prior thereto and ever since he was employed, he has occupied
positions that entail the power or prerogative to dictate management policies as
Personnel and Marketing Manager and thereafter as Vice-President. The presence of
the first requisite is thus certain. Anent the second requisite, the Court finds that the
respondents failed to meet their burden of proving that the petitioners dismissal
was for a just cause. The act alleged to have caused the loss of trust and confidence
of the respondents in the petitioner was his issuance, without prior authority and
audit, of a clearance to Jacinto who turned out to be still liable for unpaid cash
advances and for an P11-million fraudulent transaction that exposed RBSJI to suit.
The clearance barred RBSJI from running after Jacinto. The records are, however,
barren of any evidence in support of these claims. The onus of submitting a copy of
the clearance allegedly exonerating Jacinto from all his accountabilities fell on the
respondents. It was the single and absolute evidence of the petitioners act that
purportedly kindled the respondents loss of trust. Without it, the respondents
allegation of loss of trust and confidence has no leg to stand on and must thus be
rejected. Moreover, one can reasonably expect that a copy of the clearance, an
essential personnel document, is with the respondents. Their failure to present it
and the lack of explanation for such failure or the documents unavailability props
up the presumption that its contents are unfavorable to the respondents assertions.
At any rate, the absence of the clearance upon which the contradicting claims of the
parties could ideally be resolved, should work against the respondents. With only
sworn pleadings as proof of their opposite claims on the true contents of the
clearance, the Court is bound to apply the principle that the scales of justice should
be tilted in favor of labor in case of doubt in the evidence presented. RBSJI also
failed to substantiate its claim that the petitioners act estopped them from
pursuing Jacinto for his standing obligations. There is no proof that RBSJI attempted
or at least considered to demand from Jacinto the payment of his unpaid cash
advances. Neither was RBSJI able to show that it filed a civil or criminal suit against
Jacinto to make him responsible for the alleged fraud. There is thus no factual basis
for RBSJIs allegation that it incurred damages or was financially prejudiced by the
clearance issued by the petitioner. More importantly, the complained act of the
petitioner did not evince intentional breach of the respondents trust and
confidence. Neither was the petitioner grossly negligent or unjustified in pursuing
the course of action he took. It must be pointed out that the petitioner was caught
in the quandary of signing on the spot a standard employment clearance for the
furious Jacinto sans any information on his outstanding accountabilities, and
refusing to so sign but risk alarming or scandalizing RSBJI, its employees and clients.
Contrary to the respondents allegation, the petitioner did not concede to Jacintos
demands. He was, in fact, able to equalize two equally undesirable options by
bargaining to instead clear Jacinto only of his settled financial obligations after
proper verification with branch cashier. It was only after the branch cashier
confirmed Jacintos recorded payments that the petitioner signed the clearance. The
absence of an audit was precisely what impelled the petitioner to decline signing a
standard employment clearance to Jacinto and instead issue a different one
pertaining only to his paid accountabilities. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
concluded that the petitioner was in any way prompted by malicious motive in
issuing the clearance. He was also able to ensure that RBSJIs interests are

protected and that Jacinto is pacified. He did what any person placed in a similar
situation can prudently do. He was able to competently evaluate and control
Jacintos demands and thus prevent compromising respondents image, employees
and clients to an alarming scene. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the act
that breached the trust must be willful such that it was done intentionally,
knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act
done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently (The Coca-Cola Export
Corporation vs. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433, June 22, 2011). The conditions under
which the clearance was issued exclude any finding of deliberate or conscious effort
on the part of the petitioner to prejudice his employer. Also, the petitioner did not
commit an irregular or prohibited act. He did not falsify or misrepresent any
company record as it was officially confirmed by the branch cashier that the items
covered by the clearance were truly settled by Jacinto. Hence, the respondents had
no factual basis in declaring that the petitioner violated Category B Grave Offense
No. 1 of the Company Code of Conduct and Discipline. The respondents cannot
capitalize on the petitioners lack of authority to issue a clearance to resigned
employees. First, it remains but an unsubstantiated allegation despite the several
opportunities for them in the proceedings below to show, through bank documents,
that the petitioner is not among those officers so authorized. Second, it is the
Courts considered view that by virtue of the petitioners stature in respondent
bank, it was well within his discretion to sign or certify the truthfulness of facts as
they appear in RBSJIs records. Here, the records of RBSJIs cashier clearly showed
that Jacinto paid the cash advances and salary loan covered by the clearance issued
by the petitioner. Lastly, the seven-month gap between the clearance incident and
the April 17, 1997 memorandum asking the petitioner to explain his action is too
lengthy to be ignored. It likewise remains uncontroverted that during such period,
respondent Jesus verbally terminated the petitioner only to recall the same and
instead ask the latter to tender a resignation letter. When the petitioner refused, he
was sent the memorandum questioning his issuance of a clearance to Jacinto seven
months earlier. The confluence of these undisputed circumstances supports the
inference that the clearance incident was a mere afterthought used to gain ground
for the petitioners dismissal. Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal
has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective
nature. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper
and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought intended to justify an
earlier action taken in bad faith (Lima Land, Inc. vs. Cuevas, G.R. No. 169523, June
16, 2010). All told, the unsubstantiated claims of the respondent fall short of the
standard proof required for valid termination of employment. They failed to clearly
and convincingly establish that the petitioners act of issuing a clearance to Jacinto
rendered him unfit to continue working for RBSJI. The petitioner was illegally
dismissed from employment and is entitled to back wages, to be computed from the
date he was illegally dismissed until the finality of this decision.
Tan Brothers Corporation of Basilan City v. Escudero
G.R. No. 188711, July 3, 2013
J. Jose P. Perez
Facts:

Respondent was hired as bookkeeper by petitioners. On September 1, 2004,

respondent filed against petitioners a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment
of wages, cost of living allowance and 13th month pay. In support of the complaint,
respondent alleged in her position paper that, starting July 2003, her monthly salary
of P2,500.00 was not paid on time by petitioners. After having the corporations
office remodeled in the early part of 2004, petitioners allegedly rented out the office
space respondent used to occupy and ceased giving her further assignments.
Eventually constrained to stop reporting for work because of her dire financial
condition, respondent claimed that petitioners 'shrewdly maneuvered' her illegal
dismissal from employment. In its position paper, on the other hand, petitioners
averred that respondent was paid a daily wage of P155.00, and she abandoned her
employment when she stopped
reporting for work in July 2003. Aside from taking with her most of the corporations
payrolls, vouchers and other material documents evidencing due payment of wages
and labor standard benefits, petitioners
maintained that, without its knowledge and consent, respondent appropriated for
herself an Olivetti typewriter worth Php 15,000.00. With respondents refusal to
heed its demands for the return of the
typewriter, petitioners asseverated that it was left with no choice but to lodge a
complaint with the barangay authorities. The LA rendered a decision, finding
petitioners guilty of constructively dismissing
respondent from employment. On appeal, the Labor Arbiters decision was affirmed
in toto.
Issues:
(a) Will the defense of abandonment prosper?
(b) Was respondent constructively dismissed?
Ruling:
a) No. As defined under established jurisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate
and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment (DUP Sound Phils.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168317, November 21, 2011). It constitutes neglect of
duty and is a just cause for termination of employment under paragraph (b) of
Article 282 of the Labor Code (CRC Agricultural Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No. 177664,
December 23, 2009).
To constitute abandonment, however, there must be a clear and deliberate intent to
discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In this regard, two
elements must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Otherwise stated, absence must be accompanied
by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want
to work anymore. It has been ruled that the employer has the burden of proof to
show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment without any intention of returning (Henlin Panay Company v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 180718, October 23, 2009).

On the theory that the same is proof enough of the desire to return to work
(Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174141, June 26, 2009),
the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal more so when it includes a
prayer for reinstatement has been held to be totally inconsistent with a charge of
abandonment (Chavez v. NLRC, 489 Phil. 444, 460 [2005]).While it is true that
respondents complaint prayed for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioners loses sight of
the fact, however, that it had the burden of proving its own allegation that
respondent had abandoned her employment in July 2003. As allegation is not
evidence, the rule has always been to the effect that a party
alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence which
has been construed to mean such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will
accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ingusan v. Court of Appeals, 505 Phil.
518, 524 [2005]). It is, on the other hand, doctrinal that abandonment is a matter of
intention (Macahilig v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158095, November 23, 2007) and cannot, for
said reason, be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed from certain equivocal
acts (Garden of Memories Park v. NLRC, G.R. No. 160278, February 8, 2012). Viewed
in the light of respondents persistence in reporting for work despite the irregular
payment of her salaries starting July 2003, the Court found that her subsequent
failure to do so as a consequence of petitioners non-payment of her salaries in May
2004 is hardly evincive of an intention to abandon her employment. Indeed, mere
absence or failure to report for work, even after a notice to return work has been
served, is not enough to amount to an abandonment of employment (New Ever
marketing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 575, 586 [2005]).
b) Yes. Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when
there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee
leaving the latter with no other option but to quit (The University of Immaculate
Conception v. NLRC, G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011). The test is whether a
reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up
his position under the circumstances (Philippine Veterans Bank v. NLRC, G.R. No.
188882, March 30, 2010). Much though petitioners may now be inclined to
disparage the same as mere alibis, the fact that respondent was deprived of office
space, was not given further work assignment and was not paid her salaries until
she was left with no choice but stop reporting for work all combine to make out a
clear case of constructive dismissal.
G.R. No. 72977 December 21, 1988 BIENVENIDO R. BATONGBACAL, petitioner, vs.
ASSOCIATED BANK
Facts: Petitioner Bienvenido R. Batongbacal, a lawyer who was admitted to
the Bar in 1952, began his banking career in 1961 as manager of the Second
Rizal Development Bank and from them on he had worked to several banking
institutions and the last being the Associated Bank as assistant vice-president.

on March 15,1983, because of the banks financial loses and reverses, the bank's
board of directors met and approved a resolution stating that, the new management
be given the necessary flexibility in streamlining the operations of the Bank and
for the purpose it is hereby resolved that the Bank officers at the Head
Office and the Branches with corporate rank of Manager and higher be
required, as they hereby are required to submit immediately to the
President their courtesy resignations. But petitioner did not submit his
courtesy resignation. But nevertheless, he received a letter accepting his
resignation. He asked for reconsideration of his termination/resignation but it
was denied so he filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in his favor ordering the respondent bank to reinstate petitioner and to
pay salary differentials. But NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed for courtesy resignation not
really of his own?
Held: The Court held, while it may be said that the private respondent's call
for courtesy resignations wasprompted by its determination to survive, we cannot
lend legality to the manner by which it pursued its goal. By directing its
employees to submit letters of courtesy resignation, the bank in effect forced
upon its employees an act which they themselves should voluntarily do. It should
be emphasized that resignationper se means voluntary relinquishment of a
position or office. Adding the word "courtesy" did not change the essence of
resignation. That courtesy resignations were utilized in government
reorganization did not give private respondent the right to use it as well in its own
reorganization and rehabilitation plan. There is no guarantee that all employers will
not use it to rid themselves arbitrarily of employees they do not like, in the guise of
"streamlining" its organization. On the other hand, employees would be unduly
exposed to outright termination of employment which is anathema to the
constitutional mandate of security of tenure.
Petitioner's dismissal was effected through a letter "accepting" his resignation.
Private respondent rationalizes that this was done, even if petitioner did not
actually submit such letter, so as not to jeopardize his chances of future
employment. But it is also clear from its pleadings that private respondent
terminated petitioner's employment for insubordination in view of his failure to
comply with the order to submit his letter of courtesy resignation. We hold,
however, that insubordination may not be imputed to one who refused to follow
an unlawful order.
Private respondent asserts that petitioner's refusal to submit his letter of
courtesy resignation was "sufficient reason to distrust him." Loss of confidence
as a ground for dismissal must be supported bysatisfactory evidence. Even
with respect to managerial employees who, under Policy Instructions No. 8,
may be dismissed for lack of confidence, loss of trust must be substantiated and
clearly proven.
The record fails to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of
petitioner. There are no proofs of malfeasance or misfeasance committed by

petitioner which jeopardized private respondent's interest. The latter's

allegations that petitioner was "purged" because he sabotaged the bank 15
and that he "contributed, directly or indirectly" to its downfall 16 are mere
subjective conclusions unsubstantiated by hard facts. To clothe with legality
petitioner's dismissal for his failure to submit his letter of courtesy resignation is to
add a ground for termination of employment to the provisions of the Labor Code.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114129. October 24, 1996]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSIONS and JEREMIAS G. CORTEZ, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for temporary restraining order to set
aside the Resolution of the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) dated September 30, 1993 (which reversed the Decision dated August 13,
1991 of the Labor Arbiter Cresencio R. Iniego), and its Order dated December 29,
1993(which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration).
Private respondent Jeremias C. Cortez, Jr. was employed on probationary status by
petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) on September 15, 1975 as a lineman
driver. Six months later, he was regularized as a 3rd class lineman-driver assigned
at petitioners North Distribution Division. In 1977, and until the time of his
dismissal, he worked as 1st class lineman-driver whose duties and responsibilities
among others, includes the maintenance of Meralcos distribution facilities (electric
lines) by responding to customers complaints of power failure, interruptions, line
trippings and other line troubles.
Characteristics, however, of private respondents service with petitioner is his
perennial suspension from work, viz:
Date of Memorandum
Penalty Meted/Description
a. May 25, 1977
- Suspension of five (5) working days
without pay for violation of Company
Code on Employee Discipline, i.e.,
drinking of alcoholic beverages
during working time xxx.
b. March 28, 1984
- Suspension of three (3) working
days without pay for failure or refusal
to report to J.F. cotton Hospital [where
petitioner maintains a medical clinic]
as instructed by a company
physician, while on sick leave.
C. June 13, 1984
- Suspension of ten (10) working days
without pay for unauthorized
extension of sick leave.
d. June 5, 1987
- Suspension of three (3) working
days without pay for failure or refusal

to report
to J.F. Cotton Hospital [where
petitioner maintains a medical clinic]
as instructed by a company
physician, while on sick leave.

e. December 16, 1988

[Private respondents failed to report

for work from Sept. 18, 1986 to Nov.
10, 1986].
- Preventive suspension for failure to
submit the required Medical
Certificate within 48 hours from the
first date of the sick leave.

[Private respondent failed to report

for work from Nov. 28, 1988 to the
time such Memorandum was issued
on December 16, 1988].
f. February 22, 1989
- After formal administrative
investigation, suspension of five (5)
working days without pay for
unauthorized absences on November
28, 1988 to December 2,
1988. Absences from December 2,
1988. Absences from December 9-19,
1988 were charged to private
respondents vacation leave credits
for the calendar year 1989.
g. May 30, 1989
- Suspension of ten (10) working days
without pay for unauthorized
absences from May 17-19 1989, with
warning that penalty of dismissal will
be imposed upon commission of
similar offense in the future. 1
Due to his numerous infractions, private respondent was administratively
investigated for violation of Meralcos Code on Employee Discipline, particularly his
repeated and unabated absence from work without prior notice his superior
specifically from August 2 to September 19, 1989.
After such administrative investigation was conducted by petitioner, it concluded
that private respondent was found to have grossly neglected his duties by not
attending to his work as lineman from Aug. 2, 1989 to September 19, 1989 without
notice to his superiors.
In a letter dated January 19, 1990, private respondent was notified of the
investigation result and consequent termination of his services effective January 19,
1990, viz:
Mr. Jeremias C. Cortez, Jr.

16 E Jacinto Street
Malabon, Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Cortez:
Official findings of formal administrative investigation duly conducted by the
Companys Legal Services Department established the following:
1. You incurred unauthorized and unexcused absences from work starting August 2,
1989 up to September 9, 1989. On September 20, 1989, you were allowed to return
to work but without prejudice to the outcome of an administrative investigation. By
your unauthorized and unexcused absences from work, you have grossly violated
Section 4, par. (e) of the Company Code on Employee Discipline which prescribes
(u)nauthorized and unexcused absences from work which exceed five (5)
consecutive working days penalized therein with dismissal of the erring employees
from the service and employ of the Company.
xxxxxxxxx
The foregoing instances plus your series of violations of the sick leave policy clearly
show your gross and habitual neglect of duties and responsibilities in the Company,
a condition which is patently inimical to the interest of the Company as a public
utility vested vital public interest.
xxxxxxxxx
Based on the foregoing, and considering your series of violations of the Company
Code on Employees Discipline, Management is constrained to dismiss you for
causes from the service and employ of the Company, as you are hereby so
dismissed effective January 19, 1990, with forfeiture of all rights and privileges.
Truly yours,
For E.L. Sapang, Jr.
Assistant Vice President
Personnel Management
Department2
On March 7, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner. After both parties submitted their position papers and the documentary
evidence attached thereto, the case was submitted for resolution.
On August 13, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the case for
lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter ratiocinated thus:
When complainant therefore, in patent violation of respondents clear and express
rules intended to insure discipline and integrity among its employees, deliberately,
habitually, and without prior authorization, and despite warning, did not report for
work from August 1, 1989 to September 19, 1989, complainant committed serious
misconduct and gross neglect of duty. In doing so, complainant can [be] validly
dismissed. For as held by the Supreme Court, dismissal for violation of the
Companys Rules and Regulations is a dismissal for cause. (Peter Paul v. C.I.R., G.R.
No. L- 10130, September 1957; NMI v. NLU, 102 Phil 958).
xxxxxxxxx
Considering the above, we find the complainants dismissal from the service as
lawful exercise by respondent of its prerogative to discipline errant employee.
WHEREFORE, the instant case should be as it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. 3
Aggrieved with the decision of the Labor Arbiter, private respondent elevated his
case on appeal to public respondent.

On September 30, 1993, the NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
ordered petitioner to reinstate respondent with backwages. 4
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
Hence, this petition.
The crux of the present controversy is whether or not private respondents dismissal
from the service was illegal.
A perusal of the records shows that there is a divergence of views between the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC regarding the validity of the dismissal of respondent by
petitioner. Although, it is a legal tenet that factual findings of administrative bodies
are entitled to great weight and respect, we are constrained to take a second look
at the facts before us because of the diversity in the opinions of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC.
Petitioner alleges that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC
when it reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the following grounds: (a) that
petitioner admitted in its Position Paper (Annex 12) that private respondent went
into hiding as he was engaged in a trouble with a neighbor and (b) that in the said
decision, the Labor Arbiter relied not so much on complainants absences from
August 1 to September 19, 1989 which was the subject of the investigation, but on
complainants previous infractions.
Article 283 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination. Among
such causes are the following:
a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employers or representatives in connection with his work.
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties.
xxx xxx xxx.
This cause includes gross inefficiency, negligence and carelessness. Such just
causes is derived from the right of the employer to select and engage his
employees. For indeed, regulation of manpower by the company clearly falls within
the ambit of management prerogative. This court had defined a valid exercise of
management prerogative as one which covers: hiring work assignment, working
methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers. Except as provided for, or limited by, special laws, an employer is free to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. 5
Moreover, this Court has upheld a companys management prerogatives so long as
they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and
not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements.6
In the case at bar, the service record of private respondent with petitioner is
perpetually characterized by unexplained absences and unauthorized sick leave
extensions.The nature of his job i.e. as a lineman-driver requires his physical
presence to minister to incessant complaints often faulted with electricity. As aptly
stated by the Solicitor General:
Habitual absenteeism of an errant employee is not concordant with the public
service that petitioner has to assiduously provide. To have delayed power failure in
a certain district simply because a MERALCO employee assigned to such area was

absent and cannot immediately be replaced is a breach of public service of the

highest order. A deep sense of duty would, therefore, command that private
respondent should, at the very least, limit his absence for justifiable reasons. 7
The penchant of private respondent to continually incur unauthorized absences
and/or a violation of petitioners sick leave policy finally rendered his dismissal as
imminently proper. Private respondent cannot expect compassion from this Court by
totally disregarding his numerous previous infractions and take into considerations
only the period covering August 2, 1989 to September 19, 1989. As ruled by this
Court in the cases of Mendoza v. National Labor Relation Commissions, 8 and
National Service Corporation v. Leogardo, Jr., 9 it is the totality, not the
compartmentalization, of such company infractions that private respondents had
consistently committed which justified his penalty of dismissal.
As correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter:
In the case at bar, it was established that complainant violated respondents Code
on Employee Discipline, not only once, but ten (10) times. On the first occasion,
complainant was simply warned. On the second time, he was suspended for 5
days. With the hope of reforming the complainant, respondent generously imposed
penalties of suspension for his repeated unauthorized absences and violations of
sick leave policy which constitute violations of the Code. On the ninth time,
complainant was already warned that the penalty of dismissal will be imposed for
similar or equally serious violation (Annex 10).
In total disregard of respondents warning, complainant, for the tenth time did not
report for work without prior authority from respondent; hence,
unauthorized. Worse, in total disregard of his duties as lineman, he did not report for
work from August 1, 1989 to September 19, 1989; thus, seriously affected (sic)
respondents operations as a public utility.This constitute[s] a violation of
respondents Code and gross neglect of duty and serious misconduct under Article
283 of the labor Code.10
Habitual absenteeism should not and cannot be tolerated by petitioner herein which
is a public utility company engaged in the business of distributing and selling
electric energy within its franchise areas and that the maintenance of Meralcos
distribution facilities (electric lines) by responding to customers complaints of power
failure, interruptions, line trippings and other line troubles is of paramount
importance to the consuming public.
Hence, an employees habitual absenteeism without leave, which violated company
rules and regulation is sufficient to justify termination from the service. 11
In reversing the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC made the
following findings, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
We perused the records of exact what transpired in the fateful August 1 to
September 19, 1989 where complainant failed to report for work, and found out that
no less than Annex 12 (to respondents position paper which is labeled
Administrative Investigation dated 14 October 1989) shows that during that period,
the complainant went into hiding as he was engaged in a trouble with a neighbor.
With such admission by respondent, that is, therefore, no way with which the
complainant may be validly penalized for his absence during the period August 1 to
September 19, 1989.12

However, a meticulous perusal of Annex 12 readily shows that the statement he

went into hiding as he was engaged in trouble with a neighbor was merely a
defense adduced by respondent employee and is tantamount to an alibi. The said
defense only proved to be self-serving as the same had not been fully substantiated
by private respondent by means of a document or an affidavit executed to attest to
the alleged incidents.
Furthermore, contrary to the findings of public respondent, petitioner never
admitted private respondents went into hiding as he was engaged in a trouble with
a neighbor.As found out by petitioner in the course of its investigation:
Out of curiosity, we verified from the Barangay where [private respondent resides to
find out the nature of [the] cases he was allegedly got (sic) involved. Records of
Barangay Captain of Bgy. Concepcion, Malabon, Metro Manila showed that Cortezs
wife has a pending complaint against a neighbor for physical injury the complaint
was filed on July 6, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
We are also not convinced that he went into hiding as we met him at his known
address at that time he said he was still beset with problems. 13
This report only bolstered the falsehood of private respondents alibi hence,
petitioner had no other recourse but to mete the penalty of dismissal as an exercise
of its management prerogative.
Private respondent herein cannot just rely on the social justice provisions of the
Constitution and appeal for compassion because he is not entitled to it due to his
serious and repeated company infractions which eventually led to his dismissal.
Private respondents prolonged absence from August 2, 1989 to September 19, 1989
was the crucial period in this particular case. Subsequent investigation conducted
by petitioner, however, showed that private respondent was given the full
opportunity of defending himself, otherwise, petitioner could not have possibly
known of private respondents side of the story, viz:
Statement of Respondent
In his sworn statement, Cortez maintained his allegations contained in his letters to
his office explaining that his absence were inevitable due to the family problems. He
insisted that his wife and his children suffered from LBM probably due to the floods
at their place brought about by a typhoon. Since they were not treated by a
physician, he could not present a medical certificate to the effect.
Cortez also intimated that he was engaged in trouble and averred that, for security
reasons, he went into hiding in a town in Cavite Province. He claimed that in several
occasions, he had informed his office about his problems and requested the same
that his absences be considered excused.14
Notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial
proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decide by this court. 15 The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side. 16 As held in the case of
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. NLRC: 17
xxx Actual adversarial proceedings becomes necessary only for clarification or when
there is a need to propound searching questions to unclear witnesses. This is a
procedural right which the employee must, however, ask for it is not an inherent
right, and summary proceedings may be conducted. This is to correct the common

but mistaken perception that procedural due process entails lengthy oral
arguments. Hearings in administrative proceedings and before quasi-judicial
agencies are neither oratorical contest nor debating skirmishes where cross
examination skills are displayed. Non-verbal devices such as written explanations,
affidavits, positions papers or other pleadings can establish just as clearly and
concisely aggrieved parties predicament or defense.What is essential, is ample
opportunity to be heard, meaning, every kind of assistance that management must
accord the employee to prepare adequately for his defense.
In this case, private respondent was given the opportunity of a hearing as he was
able to present his defense to the charge against him. Unfortunately, petitioner
found such defense inexcusable. In other words, the fact that private respondent
was given the chance to air his side of the story already suffices.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision rendered by the National labor
Relations Commissions is annulled and the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), J., Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Manila Electric Company vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 78763
July 12, 1989
Labors Liberal Approach
Facts:
Private respondent Signo was employed in petitioner company as supervisorleadman since January 1963 up to the time when his services were terminated on
May 18, 1983.
In 1981, a certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the petitioner company
for electrical services at his residence at Peafrancia Subdivision, Marcos Highway,
Antipolo, Rizal. Private respondent Signo facilitated the processing of the said
application as well as the required documentation for said application at the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. In consideration thereof, private respondent received
from Fernando de Lara the amount of P7,000.00. Signo thereafter filed the
application for electric services with the Power Sales Division of the company.
It was established that the area where the residence of de Lara was located is not
yet within the serviceable point of Meralco, because the place was beyond the 30meter distance from the nearest existing Meralco facilities. In order to expedite the
electrical connections at de Lara's residence, certain employees of the company,
including respondent Signo, made it appear in the application that the sari-sari store
at the corner of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the subdivision, is applicant de
Lara's establishment, which, in reality is not owned by the latter.
As a result of this scheme, the electrical connections to de Lara's residence were
installed and made possible. However, due to the fault of the Power Sales Division

of petitioner company, Fernando de Lara was not billed for more than a year. As a
result, services of the respondent were terminated and this prompted respondent to
file a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages and separation pay. The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision directing the petitioner to reinstate respondent without
back wages. Both parties appealed to the Commission and were dismissed by the
Commission for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Signo should be dismissed from petitioner company on
grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
Held:
No. This Court has held time and again, in a number of decisions, that
notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust
by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a
penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in the
service of his employer. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. L- 54280,
September 30,1982,117 SCRA 523; Meracap v. International Ceramics
Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al., G.R. Nos. L-48235-36, July 30,1979, 92 SCRA 412;
Sampang v. Inciong, G.R. No. 50992, June 19,1985,137 SCRA 56; De Leon v. NLRC,
G.R. No. L-52056, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 691; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PALEA,
G.R. No. L-24626, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489).
In a similar case, this Court ruled:
As repeatedly been held by this Court, an employer cannot legally be compelled to
continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of breach of
trust towards his employer and whose continuance in the service of the latter is
patently inimical to its interest. The law in protecting the rights of the laborers,
authorized neither oppression nor self- destruction of the employer.
However, taking into account private respondent's 'twenty-three (23) years of
service which undisputedly is unblemished by any previous derogatory record' as
found by the respondent Commission itself, and since he has been under preventive
suspension during the pendency of this case, in the absence of a showing that the
continued employment of private respondent would result in petitioner's oppression
or self-destruction, We are of the considered view that his dismissal is a drastic
punishment. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
The ends of social and compassionate justice would therefore be served if private
respondent is reinstated but without backwages in view of petitioner's obvious good
faith. (Itogon- Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 11 7 SCRA 528)

Further, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance
to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the
New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. 71812,
July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140).