Rule 38

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS

(Sections 1 to 7)

Grounds and nature

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. (2a)
Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. When a judgment or final order is rendered by any
court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been
prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the
appeal be given due course. (1a)
* The phrase any court refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.

Purcon vs. MRM Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 182718, 26 September 2008.
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by respondent MRM Philippines, Inc as a seaman on
January 28, 2002. On June 2002, petitioner felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle.
After being examined, he was diagnosed with hernia. Subsequently, petitioner was
repatriated due to his ailment. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner was again
examined by the company physician and the latter declared that he was fit to resume
work. When petitioner reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for
another contract, he was told that there was no vacancy for him. Petitioner a complaint
filed by petitioner for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and
permanent disability benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees before the Labor Arbiter. However, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for utter lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals(CA). However, the CA
dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
also denied. Subsequently, the CA resolution became final and executory. Petitioner filed
with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure assailing the resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for
certiorari. In Our Resolution dated July 16, 2007, We denied the petition. Thus, petitioner
filed the instant petition for relief from judgment.
Issue:
Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from the resolution denying his petition for review?
Held:

We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available
remedy in the Supreme Court. First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a
judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule
must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases
cognizable by the Supreme Court. A petition for relief from judgment is not included in
the list of Rule56 cases originally cognizable by this Court. Second, while Rule 38 uses
the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial
Courts. Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate
provisions of the Rules of Court. Neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal
Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA. There is no provision
in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The
procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45which pertains to
the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment
of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule
52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38mentioned.If a
petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with
more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. A petition for
relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which
are beyond the concerns of this Court.

Grounds

(1) When judgment or final order is entered or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against petitioner
through FAME
(2) When petitioner has been prevented from taking an appeal by FAME
* Requires final judgment or loss of appeal
* Only available against a final and executory judgment

Valencia v. CA
G.R. No. 119118, 19February 2001.
Facts:
Rufino Valencia entered into a lease agreement with the Roman Catholic Bishop
of Malolos (RCBM) involving a fishpond. The people of Barrio Sta. Cruz, Paombong
filed a complaint against RCBM for declaration of nullity of the title of the fishpond
alleging ownership of the fishpond and that RCBM was a mere trustee.They prayed for
the issuance of an injunction to prevent RCBM from leasing the fishpond or in case it had
already been leased, from implementing the lease.
The RTC rendered judgment upholding the validity of RCBMs title and its lease
contract with petitioner. However, he dismissed petitioners counterclaim for lack of
evidence.

Upon belatedly learning of said judgment, petitioner moved for execution

pending appeal, contending that since the trial court found him entitled to possession of
the fishpond, it is unfair to deprive him thereof. Meanwhile, he filed a petition for relief
from the portion of the judgment dismissing his counterclaim, where he alleged that his
failure to move for reconsideration of or appeal from said judgment was due to a
mistaken belief of his former counsel that he was no longer interested to pursue the
counterclaim.
The RTC deferred action on the petition for relief. The trial court also said that a
grant of the petition for relief during the pendency of the appeal would pre-empt the
appellate courts ruling in case private respondents would appeal.The court added that
they were entitled to have their appeal given due course, otherwise, the grant of the
petition might bring incalculable harm to them.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus
contending that it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to defer action on his
petition for relief.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari and mandamus concludin that there was nothing capricious or whimsical in the
trial courts decision to defer action on the petition for relief on the ground that it would
pre-empt the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Lastly, since the petition for relief remained
to be resolved by the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not deem it appropriate to pass
upon the issue of whether the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim was a violation of his
right to due process.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
WON the trial court should have allowed the petition for relief.
Held:
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to compel the trial
court to act on the petition for relief.According to him, the trial courts duty under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court, except sections 4 & 6 thereof, is ministerial such that upon
finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the judge must order the other party
to answer, conduct a hearing and decide whether to grant or deny the petition.The judge
was therefore remiss in his duty when he deferred action on the petition, since his only
role was either to dismiss or grant it, according to petitioner.
Private respondents argue that the trial court was correct in deferring action on
the petition for relief, in the interest of justice and equity.To grant the petition pending
private respondents appeal, they aver, would pre-empt the Court of Appeals.This, they
say, is not abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We find no merit in petitioners argument.A petition for relief under Rule 38 is
only available against a final and executory judgment. In this case, the trial courts

judgment subject of the petition for relief has not yet attained finality because of the
timely appeal by private respondents.Therefore, petitioner cannot require the judge to
follow the procedure laid down in Rule 38.The judge did not err nor abuse his discretion
when he deferred action on the petition.
Fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence

Gomez v Montalban
G.R. No. 174414, 14 March 2008
Facts:
Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of P40,000
with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month. Montalban failed to
comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of money.
Summons was served but despite her receipt, she still failed to file an Answer. She was
declared in default and upon motion, Gomez was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that
there was no proper service of summons since there was no personal service. She alleged
that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receive summons and that her
failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence
(FAME). The Petition was set for hearing but counsel for respondent failed to appear
before the court hence the dismissal of the Petition.
Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petition
stating that counsels failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTC granted. To
this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.
Issue:
WON the granting of Petition for Relief from Judgment by the RTC is proper.
Held:
NO. The RTC committed an error in doing so. A Petition for Relief under Rule 38
is only available against a final and executory judgment and the grounds include fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion
for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or
taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
Discussion on Grounds:
"Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The
word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never

intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial.
Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist in the case at
bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.
"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court,or
was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This is not
present in the case at hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and
was given the opportunity to present her case.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the "negligence" must be
excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it
is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his
counsel's conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening
by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is
seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the
court's ruling.
In Tuason v CA, the court explained the nature of a Petition for Relief from
Judgment:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another
remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief
can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

In the case, Montalban contended that judgment was entered against her through
mistake or fraud because she was not duly served summons. However, under the
discussion of the following grounds, the SC sees no merit in her petition. Petition for
Relief from Judgment is set aside.
Time for filing (Sec. 3)

Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of
the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. (3)
(1) Within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside;
AND
(2) Not more than 6 months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken

The two periods for the filing of a petition for relief are not extendible and never interrupted. Both periods
must be complied with. [Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v. Ariaga]
Reckoning points:
(1) The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or
proceeding. Not from the date he actually read the same [Perez v. Araneta]
(2) 6-months period is computed from the date of entry of the order or judgment
* Strictly followed

Victory Liner, Inc. v. Michael Malinias

G.R. No. 151170, 29 May 2007.
Facts:
A vehicular collision occurred between a bus owned by petitioner Victory Liner,
Inc. and an Isuzu Truck used by respondent Michael Malinias. Nobody died, but both
vehicles were damaged from the accident. A complaint for sum of money and damages
was instituted by respondent against petitioner and the bus driver.
In the course of trial, respondent finished presenting his evidence and rested his
case. In the meantime, counsel for petitioner filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, but
the same was denied by the MTC as the motion did not bear any signature of conformity
from the petitioner. When the case was called for the reception of petitioners evidence,
no appearance was made for the bus company. Respondent thus immediately moved that
petitioner be declared to have waived its right to adduce evidence in its favor and that the
case be deemed submitted for judgment. The MTC found merit in respondents
contention, and ordered the case be deemed submitted for decision.
Through its new counsel, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a
defective Notice of Hearing. Accordingly, the MTC declared that its earlier judgment had
become final and executory. In the same order and upon the same predicates, the MTC
also granted the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by respondent.
Petitioner responded to the foregoing developments by filing a Notice of Appeal
which was however denied, the MR being defective and not having tolled the
reglementary period for appeal.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the MTC which was denied by
the MTC on the ground that it had been filed out of time. The MTC explained that the
petition for relief from judgment must have been filed either within sixty (60) days from
the date petitioners new counsel learned of the judgment, or sixty (60) days after
learning that the Motion for Reconsideration had been denied for having been filed out of
time. Neither circumstance was met by petitioner. Subsequently, the MTC likewise
denied a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Second, petitioner filed a petition for certiorariwith the RTC. The petition for
certiorari was dismissed by the RTC agreeing with the MTC that the Petition for Relief
from Judgment had been belatedly filed. Petitioner filed an MR, which was again denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari to Annul Judgment"
under the aegis of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Interestingly, based on
the first paragraph and the express relief prayed for in this petition, the "judgment" sought
to be annulled was not the final and executory judgment of the MTC, but rather, the two

orders of the RTC which successively dismissed the special civil action for certiorari, and
directed the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of respondent. However, in
explaining the "nature of the petition," petitioner claimed that it was seeking to annul the
judgment and orders of both the RTC and the MTC,although the issues identified in the
petition pertain only to "serious errors" and "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the
RTC.There is a general allegation that the acts of the RTC in granting the motion for
execution even before petitioners motion for reconsideration was acted upon constituted
an extrinsic fraud, but no particular arguments were offered to explain why that was so.
The Court of Appeals further held that it was clear that the ground of extrinsic
fraud raised by petitioner had already been availed of in its earlier petition for relief from
judgment before the MTC. Such circumstance contradicted Section 2 of Rule 47, which
provides that "extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground (for annulment of judgment) if it
was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief."
Issue:
What should have been the remedy pursued by petitioner?
Held:
A proper remedy for the petitioner is found under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which governs petitions for relief from judgment. Indeed, Section 2,
Rule 38 finds specific application in this case, as it provides that "[w]hen a judgment or
final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file
a petition [for relief from denial of appeal] in such court and in the same case praying that
the appeal be given due course."Such petition should be filed within sixty (60) days after
the petitioner learns of the judgment or final order, and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or final order was entered. The facts of this case indicate that petitioner
could have timely resorted to this remedy.
Notably, it was only after the Notice of Appeal was denied that the petitioner had
pursued the two remedies it could have undertaken from the MTC Order declaring its
motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper. First, petitioner filed a Petition for
Relief from Judgment with the MTC. The problem with this remedy was the utter
belatedness in the resort thereto. Section 3 of Rule 38 requires that said petition must be
filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final
order was entered. Neither benchmark was met by the petitioner, since the petition was
filed only on 25 October 1999, or some sixteen (16) months after the rendition of the
judgment sought to be set aside, and around fourteen (14) months after such judgment
was declared final and executory. Petitioner had opportunely learned of both the rendition
of the judgment and the Order refusing to give cognizance to the motion for
reconsideration. Had it simply consulted the rulebook, it should have realized that a
petition for relief from judgment was a remedy available to it, and certainly one more
appropriate than the Notice of Appeal it ultimately resorted to.
Contents

Affidavit of merit (Sec. 3)

FORM AND CONTENTS OF THE PETITION

(1) The petition for relief must be verified
(2) The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit showing the FAME relied upon; and
(3) The affidavit of merit accompanying the petition must also show the facts constituting the
petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense as the case may be

The absence of an affidavit of merits is a fatal defect and warrant denial of the petition
[Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick].

However, it is not a fatal defect so long as the facts required to be set out also appear in the
verified petition [Fabar Inc. v. Rodelas].
When Affidavit of Merit is not necessary:
(1) When there is lack of jurisdiction over the defendant;
(2) When there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(3) When judgment was taken by default;
(4) When judgment was entered by mistake or was obtained by fraud; or
(5) Other similar cases.

When motion for reconsideration considered as petition for relief

Action of court before answer
Power to deny (Sec. 4)
Section 4. Order to file an answer. If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify
relief, the court in which it is filed, shall issue an order requiring the adverse parties to answer the
same within fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof. The order shall be served in such manner as the
court may direct, together with copies of the petition and the accompanying affidavits. (4a)

Preliminary injunction pending proceedings (Sec. 5)

Section 5. Preliminary injunction pending proceedings. The court in which the petition is filed
may grant such preliminary injunction as may be necessary for the preservation of the rights of the
parties, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond in favor of the adverse party, conditioned that if the
petition is dismissed or the petitioner fails on the trial of the case upon its merits, he will pay the
adverse party all damages and costs that may be awarded to him by reason of the issuance of such
injunction or the other proceedings following the petition, but such injunction shall not operate to
discharge or extinguish any lien which the adverse party may have acquired upon, the property, of the
petitioner. (5a)
Order to file answer (Sec. 4)
Procedure

Availability of preliminary injunction (Sec. 5)

Proceedings after answer is filed (Sec. 6)

Section 6. Proceedings after answer is filed. After the filing of the answer or the expiration of the
period therefor, the court shall hear the petition and if after such hearing, it finds that the allegations
thereof are not true, the petition shall be dismissed; but if it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set
aside the judgment or final order or other proceeding complained of upon such terms as may be just.
Thereafter the case shall stand as if such judgment, final order or other proceeding had never been
rendered, issued or taken. The court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely
motion for a new trial or reconsideration had been granted by it. (6a)
Where denial of appeal is set aside (Sec. 7)
Section 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside. Where the denial of an appeal is
set aside, the lower court shall be required to give due course to the appeal and to elevate the record
of the appealed case as if a timely and proper appeal had been made. (7a)
Action of court after giving due course

Grant of petition for relief (Sec. 7)

Denial of petition for relief (Rule 41, Sec. 1 (b))
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;

* Appeal from an order denying a petition for relief is no longer available under the present rules. The
remedy against a denial of a petition for relief is certiorari under Rule 65, when proper.
Remedies after petition for relief expires

Reopening not allowed

Alvendia v. IAC
G.R. No. L-72138, 22 January 1990
Facts:
A simple collection suit was filed by Bonifacio Bonamy against the spouses
Alvendia. Thereafter, both parties submitted to the trial court a "Compromise
Agreement." Subsequently, Bonamy moved for execution of judgment. The court ordered
the issuance of the writ prayed for. The Alvendias did not move for reconsideration nor
did they elevate the matter to the higher courts.Bonamy sought the issuance of an alias
writ of execution, the first writ having been returned unsatisfied. Pursuant to the alias writ

, the provincial sheriff levied on the Alvendias "leasehold rights" over a fishpond.
Thereafter, a certificate of sale over said leasehold right was executed by the Sheriff in
favor of Bonamy. More than a year later, the spouses moved for the quashal and
annulment of the writ of execution, levy and sale.
A final deed of sale was executed and registered with the Register of Deeds. In an
order, the trial court denied the spouses' motion to quash and ordered instead the issuance
of a writ of possession in Bonamy's favor. The possession of the fishpond was delivered
to Bonamy.
In a petition forcertiorariand prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court, the spouses
Alvendias sought the annulment of the writ of execution, the levy made upon the
leasehold rights and the writ of possession.
The IAC dismissed the aforesaid petition. The Alvendias filed an urgent motion
for reconsideration. Pending action thereon, the spouses manifested to the court, thru
motion, their willingness to immediately pay to Bonamy the remaining balance of the
judgment sought to be enforced. The IAC issued two resolutions, denominated as
Resolutions I and II.
Resolution I denied the Alvendias' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Resolution II granted their motion to satisfy the judgment sought to be enforced in cash
thereby directing the parties to submit to the court an agreement duly signed by both
parties regarding full satisfaction of the judgment but only after the total amount involved
in said judgment had been tendered and delivered to Bonamy. The Alvendias then
tendered payment to Bonamy in the form of a cashier's check. Bonamy refused said
tender of payment, and instead moved for a reconsideration of Resolution II.
Hence, this petition forcertiorariand prohibition, praying for the annulment of
respondent court's Resolution I and II alleging that respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting the Alvendias' motion that they be allowed to pay the
judgment debt in cash. Petitioner claims that the assailed resolutions are in effect an
annulment of the assailed Orders and Writs of the Bulacan Regional Trial Court, the
Certificate of Sale and the Final Deed of Sale of the Leasehold Rights over the Foreshore
Lands;
Issue:
WON the writs and orders may be annulled or at least reopened.
Held:
No. The writs and orders of the lower court sought to be annulled or at least
reopened are already final and executory and in fact already executed. The judgment
which was executed was a compromise judgment, duly approved by the court and
therefore, final and immediately executory.Bonamy was clearly entitled to execution
since the Alvendias failed to pay on time the judgment.

It is axiomatic that there is no justification in law and in fact for the reopening of
a case which has long become final and which has in fact been executed. Time and again
this Court has said that the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental
consideration of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error the
judgments of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law.
The Alvendias cannot invoke equity as a ground for reopening the case and
making the payment of the judgment in cash possible. The records show that they had all
the opportunity to make such payments on four occasions but failed. The Alvendias failed
to pay on time the judgment of which the execution sale was a necessary consequence.
They also failed to redeem the property within the required period despite the fact that the
Final Deed of Sale was issued long past the aforesaid period; undeniably showing a lack
of intention or capability to pay the same.

Rule47
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
(Sections 1 to 10)
I.

When remedy available

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case

where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.

Annulment of judgment is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new

trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner, and is based on only two grounds,
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. (Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 470 SCRA 697)
a. Where applicable
Annulment of judgment does not apply to judgments rendered by quasi-judicial
bodies. It does not also apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases whose decisions or orders may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43. (Macalalag v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 147995, 5 March
2004)

II.

Note: In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction,

petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction (Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manzo, G.R. No.
163602, 7 September 2011).

Grounds (Sec. 2)
1. Extrinsic fraud or collateral fraud
is trickery practiced by the prevailing party upon the unsuccessful party, which
prevents the latter from fully proving his case. It affects not the judgment itself

but the manner in which said judgment is obtained. (People v. Bitanga, G.R. No.
159222, 26 June 2007)
must emanate from an act of the adverse party, and the fraud must be of such
nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not
extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel. (Pinausukan
Seafood House, Roxas Boulevard, Inc. v. Far East Bank & Trust Company, G.R.
No. 159926, 20 January 2014)
must be sought within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, which fact
should be alleged and proven; the particular acts and omissions constituting
extrinsic fraud must be clearly established. (People v. Bitanga, supra)

2. Lack of jurisdiction
petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to
annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion.(Antonino v. The Register
of Deeds of Makati City, G.R. No. 185663, 20 June 2012)
Cosmic Lumber Co v. CA
G.R. No. 114311, 29 November 1996
Facts:
Cosmic Corporation, through its General Manager, executed a Special Power of Attorney
appointing Paz G. Villamil-Estrada (Estrada) as attorney-in-fact to initiate, institute and file
any court action for the ejectment of third persons and/or squatters of the entire lot 9127 and 443
for the said squatters to remove their houses and vacate the premises in order that the corporation
may take material possession of the entire lot, one of which is respondent Isidro Perez (Perez).
Estrada, by virtue of her power of attorney, instituted an action for the ejectment of private
respondent Isidro Perez and recover the possession of a portion of lot 443 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC).
Estrada entered into a Compromise Agreement with Perez. Although the agreement was
approved by the trial court and the decision became final and executory, it was not executed
within the 5 year period from date of its finality allegedly due to the failure of Cosmic Lumber to
produce the owners duplicate copy of title needed to segregate from lot 443 the portion sold by
the attorney-in-fact, Paz Estrada to Perez under the compromise agreement. Respondent filed a
complaint to revive the judgment. Petitioner sought the annulment of the decision of the trial
court based on the compromise agreement, alleging that it had no knowledge of the compromise
agreement.
Issue:
Whether the annulment of the decision of the trial court must be sustained.
Held:
Yes. Nowhere in the authorization was Estrada granted expressly or impliedly any power
to sell the subject property nor a portion thereof.Neither can a conferment of the power to sell be

validly inferred from the specific authorityto enter into a compromise agreementbecause of the
explicit limitation fixed by the grantor that the compromise entered into shall only beso far as it
shall protect the rights and interest of the corporation in the aforementioned lots.
It is therefore clear that by selling to respondent Perez a portion of petitioners land through a
compromise agreement, Villamil-Estrada acted without or in obvious authority.The saleipso
jureis consequently void.So is the compromise agreement.This being the case, the judgment
based thereon is necessarily void. Antipodal to the opinion expressed by respondent court in
resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, the nullity of the settlement between VillamilEstrada and Perez impaired the jurisdiction of the trial court to render its decision based on the
compromise agreement.
Under authority of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, a party may now petition the Court of
Appeals to annul and set aside judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) shall exercise x x x x (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
over action for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Courts x x x x However, certain
requisites must first be established before a final and executory judgment can be the subject of an
action for annulment.It must either be void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of
law, or it has been obtained by fraud.
Conformably with law and the above-cited authorities, the petition to annul the decision of
the trial court in Civil Case No. D-7750 before the Court of Appeals was proper.Emanating as it
did from a void compromise agreement, the trial court had no jurisdiction to render a judgment
based thereon.
It would also appear, and quite contrary to the finding of the appellate court, that the highly
reprehensible conduct of attorney-in-fact Villamil-Estrada in Civil Case No. 7750 constituted an
extrinsic or collateral fraud by reason of which the judgment rendered thereon should have been
struck down.
For sure, the Court of Appeals restricted the concept of fraudulent acts within too narrow
limits. Fraud may assume different shapes and be committed in as many different ways and here
lies the danger of attempting to define fraud. For man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination
will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary.
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is
one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting
all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment
itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party
in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced
on him by his opponent.Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never
had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which

show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for
which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case
for a new and fair hearing.
III.

Where petition filed (Secs. 1, 10)

Judgments, Final Orders of Resolutions of

RTC

Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions of

MTC

Filed with the Court of Appeals

Filed with the RTC

Basis: It has exclusive original Basis: RTC as a court of general

jurisdiction over said action under Sec. 9 jurisdiction under Sec. 19 (6) of B.P. 129
(2) of B.P. 129
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial
Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. (n
Section 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts.
An action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It shall be treated as an
ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable
thereto.

IV.

Annulment of MTC judgment should be filed with RTC

Victory Liner v. Malinias
G.R. No. 151170, 29 May 2007

Facts:
On 17 July 2001 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari to Annul
Judgment" under the aegis of Rule 47. In explaining the "nature of the petition," petitioner
claimed that it was seeking to annul the judgment and orders of both the RTC and the MTC,
although the issues identified in the petition pertain only to "serious errors" and "grave abuse of
discretion" on the part of the RTC.There is a general allegation that the acts of the RTC in
granting the motion for execution even before petitioners motion for reconsideration was acted
upon constituted an extrinsic fraud,but no particular arguments were offered to explain why that
was so. The CA dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was the proper venue for the petition.
Held:

Section 2 of Rule 47 does disqualify extrinsic fraud as a valid ground "if it was availed
of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief,"and such
provision would have found incontestable relevance had the clear object of the petition for
annulment been the MTC judgment.But petitioners action for annulment of judgment did not
provide clarity in that regard, and in fact does devote considerable effort in imputing errors on
the part of the RTC with the objective of annulling, in particular, the RTC decision. If that were
so, reliance on Section 2 of Rule 47 would have been misplaced, since the judgment subject of
the petition for relief was different from the decision subject of the action for annulment of
judgment. Still, given the confused nature of the petition for annulment of judgment, blame
could hardly be attributed to the RTC.
All told, even if we were to hold that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
on the perceived defect in the verification and certification requirements, the appellate court
would have been left with an action stigmatized by error upon error interminably. Most
frustratingly, for every procedural misstep committed by petitioner, there existed a corresponding
viable alternative which would have necessitated a ruling on the merits, and which petitioner
could have chosen with ease. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, it could have instead filed a
special civil action for certiorari or a petition for relief from judgment. Instead of filing the no
longer timely petition for relief from judgment, it could have instead by then filed a petition for
annulment of judgment. When it did file a petition for annulment with the Court of Appeals, it
could have instead filed a more feasible petition for annulment with the RTC.

V.

Period for filing (Sec. 3)

Extrinsic Fraud
Period for filing

Four (4)
discovery

years

Lack of Jurisdiction
from Before it is barred by laches
or estoppel.

Laches
A party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction for the first
on time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything doen in the case, with
the active participation of said party invoking the plea. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
G.R. No. L-21450, 15 April 1968)
Marcelino v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 94422, 26 June 1992

Facts:

Petitioners are the registered owners of the land in Tarlac but even before WWII
respondents have been and still are in possession of these lands and the titles. Petitioners
demanded the restitution to them of the physical possession and titles of the property but was
refused by the respondents. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of laches. CA upheld the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are guilty of laches.
Held:
Yes. Laches in a general sense, means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it.
In the case at bar, the petitioners admitted in their complaint, that the private respondents
had been occupying the parcels of land in question even before World War II, and that they
(private respondents) have in their possession the titles thereof. For almost 50 years, or until June
20, 1988 no action had been taken by the petitioners, or their predecessors-in-interest, to recover
possession of the land and the titles thereof.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the petitioner's long inaction in asserting their right to the
contested lots bars them from recovering the same. The law serves those who are vigilant and
diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.
Although the parcels of land in question are registered under the Torrens System, it is
nevertheless settled in this jurisdiction that the ownership of registered land may be lost through
laches. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based on grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims. Unlike the statute of
limitations, laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a stale right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
The individual elements of laches were sufficiently and thoroughly discussed by the
appellate court in its decision. We find no need to make any further disquisition on the matter.
VI.

Parties and contents (Sec. 4)

The action for annulment of judgment shall be commenced by filing:
1. Verified petition alleging therein:
a. With particularity the facts and the law relied upon; and
b. Petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense.
2. Filed in seven (7) legible copies together with sufficient copies corresponding
to the number of respondents.
3. Certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be
attached to the original copy of the petition.

4. Affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or

defense; and
5. Certificate of non-forum shopping.

May be filed by a non-party to the judgment

The petitioner need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled.
What is essential is that the petitioner is one who can prove his allegation that
the judgment was obtained and that he was affected thereby. (Alaban v, Court
of Appeals, supra)

Available even if judgment has been executed (Sec. 9)

The judgment of annulment may include the award of damages, attorney's
fees and other relief.
If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution had already been
executed the court may issue such orders of restitution or other relief as justice
and equity may warrant under the circumstances. (n)
Islamic DaWah Council of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 80892, 29 September 1989

Facts:
Da Sila, mortgagor and petitioner, mortgagee, executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a
land in Cubao as security for a 1 million promissory note. Upon default, petitioner filed for
foreclosure with the RTC. Parties entered into a Compromise Agreement that the land will be
transferred to petitioners. The title was then transferred in the name of the petitioner. Araneta
filed with the RD a notice of lis pendens in connection with the ejectment case filed by petitioner
against Araneta but was later on withdrawn by the petitioner. Araneta filed a notice of adverse
claim in connection with the case filed by da Silva against Araneta. Both lis pendens and adverse
claim were annotated on the title. Petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery
of possession against Araneta and for the cancellation of the 2 annotations. Pending said case,
heirs of Araneta filed in the CA a petition to annul the judgment in the foreclosure case.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case before the CA on the ground that the decision in the
foreclosure proceeding had already been executed and that the heirs were not a party to the
proceedings before the lower court.
Issue:
Whether the petition for annulment of judgment is proper.
Held:
There can be no question as to the right of any persons adversely affected by a judgment
to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared a nullity on the ground of
fraud and collusion practiced in the very matter of obtaining the judgment when such fraud is

extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised at the trial which resulted in
such judgment.
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a person need not be a party to the judgment
sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment
was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the foreclosure
case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by the judgment rendered therein.
However, their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and connivance
perpetuated by and between the Da Silvas and the Council as would adversely affect them. This
allegation, if fully substantiated by preponderance of evidence, could be the basis for the
annulment of the civil case.
Finally, the Council asserts that the remedy of annulment of judgment applies only to
final and executory judgment and not to that which had already been fully executed or
implemented. The Councils contention is devoid of merit. In Garchitorena v. Sotelo, the Court
affirmed the trial courts annulment of the judgment on foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that
ownership of the house and lot subject of the mortgage had passed from the mortgagee who
foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property at public auction to a person who bought the
same and finally to another individual in whose name the Torrens certificate of title stood by the
time the case reached this Tribunal. (An action for annulment of judgment may be availed of
even if the judgment sought to be annulled had been fully executed and implemented.)
VII.

Action by the court.

Two Stages:

Should the court find no substantial merit in the petition, the same may be dismissed
outright with specific reasons for such dismissal.

Shouldprima faciemerit be found in the petition, the same shall be given due
course and summons shall be served on the respondent. (Sec. 5, Rule 47)

VIII.

Procedure.

The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should trial be necessary,
the reception of the evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of
a Regional Trial Court. (Sec. 6, Rule 47)

IX.

Effect of judgment. (Sec. 7)

Extrinsic Fraud

Lack of Jurisdiction

Effect of judgment

X.

Court may on motion,

order the trial court to try
the case as if a timely
motion for new trial had
been granted.

Set aside the questioned

judgment and render the
same null and void, without
prejudice to the original
action being re-filed in the
proper court.

Suspension of prescriptive period.

The prescriptive period for the refiling of the aforesaid original action shall be
deemed suspended from the filing of such original action until the finality of the
judgment of annulment. However, the prescriptive period shall not be suspended
where the extrinsic-fraud is attributable to the plaintiff in the original action. (Sec.
8)

Rule 65
CERTIORARI
Constitutional provisions on judicial power
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2, Constitution
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Petition for certiorari, in general (Sec. 1)
Rule 65, Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
Distinction between without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and grave of abuse of
discretion
a. Without jurisdiction the court has no jurisdiction from the beginning; there is an
absolute want of jurisdiction.
b. In excess of jurisdiction if the court has acted beyond the limits of its authority.
c. Grave abuse of discretion too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or an act in contemplation of law, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and personal hostility; does not encompass an error of law nor does it include a mistake
in the appreciation of the contending parties respective evidence or the evaluation of
their relative weight.
Remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction
Jamer v. NLRC
G.R. No. 112630
5 September 1997

Facts:
Petitioners worked as store cashiers at respondents Isetann Department Store. Their
work as store cashiers is to accumulate, at the end of daily operations, the cash sales receipts of
the selling floor cash register clerks. Thereafter, petitioners will reconcile the cash sales with the
tally sheets to determine shortages and deposit the same with the bank depositor of Isetann.
Petitioners discovered a shortage ofP15,353.78. It was complainant Corazon Jamer who
first discovered the shortage. She informed her co-store cashier, complainant Cristina
Amortizado, about the shortage. Amortizado also reconciled and re-counted the sale and she also
confirmed that there was a discrepancy or a shortage ofP15,353.78. They did not immediately
report the shortage to management hoping to find the cause of the shortage but to no avail.
Hence, they had no other alternative but to report the same to the management.
Respondents placed both petitioners under preventive suspension for the alleged
shortages. Thereafter, respondents conducted an administrative investigation. Finding the
explanation of the complainants to be unsatisfactory, respondent dismissed the complainants on
the alleged ground of dishonesty. Aggrieved, complainant instituted an action for illegal
dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of herein petitioners, finding that
petitioners had been illegally dismissed. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the latter rendered the
challenged decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal.
Hence the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that petitioners were
validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Held:
At the outset, the Court notes petitioners inexcusable failure to move for the
reconsideration of respondent NLRCs decision. Thus, the present petition suffers from a
procedural defect that warrants its outright dismissal. While in some exceptional cases we
allowed the immediate recourse to this Court, we find nothing herein that could warrant an
exceptional treatment to this petition. Moreover, The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is
thatcertiorariwill lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law against the acts of respondent.In the case atbench, the plain and
adequate remedy referred to in Rule 65, Section 1, is a motion for reconsideration of the
challenged decision and the resolution thereof.
Petitioners asseverate that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when
it reversed the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter.
In asserting that there was grave abuse of discretion, petitioners advert to alleged
variances in the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the respondent NLRC. This is inept and

erroneous. Firstly, errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within
the province of a special civil action forcertiorari.Secondly, a careful reading of the records of
this case would readily show that if there is any error by public respondent in its analysis of the
facts and its evaluation of the evidence, it is not of such a degree as may be stigmatized as a
grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered
in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does not
necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of
the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The
NLRC's decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from
the Court.
The special civil action forcertiorariis a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The rationale for this rule is simple. When a court
exercises its jurisdiction an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not countenance such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original special civil action ofcertiorari.
On the merits, there is substantial evidence exists to warrant the finding that petitioners
were validly dismissed for just cause and after observance of due process. The Supreme Court
agreed with the findings of the public respondent that the herein petitioners were guilty of acts of
dishonesty by incurring several occurrences of shortages in the amounts
ofP15,353.78,P1,000.00,P450.00 andP70.00 which they failed to turnover and account for/and
in behalf of respondent Isetann. The failure of petitioners to report the aforequoted shortages and
overages to management as soon as they arose resulted in the breach of the fiduciary trust
reposed in them by respondent company, thereby causing the latter to lose confidence in them.
This warrants their dismissal.
The NLRC, therefore, did not act with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that
petitioners were legally dismissed from employment. The failure of petitioners to report to
management the aforementioned irregularities constitute fraud or willful breach of the trust
reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative one of the just causes in
terminating employment as provided for by paragraph (c), Article 282 of the Labor Code, as
amended.
Distinction between error of jurisdiction and error of judgment
a. When court without jurisdiction and it rendered decision, committed error of
jurisdiction - decision null and void even if correct, and remedy is certiorari.
b. When court with jurisdiction and rendered decision, but decision not correct,
committed error of judgment decision valid even if wrong, and remedy is
appeal

Questions of fact cannot be raised

Day v. RTC of Zamboanga City
G.R. No. 79119
22 November 1990
Facts:
Petitioner Victorino Day is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Zamboanga City.
Respondent Go Chu is the owner of a building constructed on said lot. Petitioner asked
respondent to peacefully vacate and remove the latters building on the formers lot. Due to
private respondents refusal to vacate the premises, on April 17, 1982, petitioner instituted a
formal complaint against respondent with the Office of the Barangay Chairman. As no amicable
settlement could be reached, the Barangay Chairman issued a certification that conciliation of the
dispute at the barangay level had failed.
On January 15, 1985, petitioner again made another demand on respondent to remove the
building. Because of respondents adamant and continued refusal to vacate the disputed lot,
petitioner filed with the MTC on March 25, 1985 an action for unlawful detainer with application
for a writ of preliminary mandatory. Petitioner did not use the former Barangay Certification in
commencing the said suit against respondent. The MTC rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner, ordering defendant to vacate the premises and remove the portion of his building over
petitioners property. The MTC considered the April 1982 certification to file action as sufficient
compliance with the provision of P.D. No. 1508 requiring prior conciliation proceedings.
Respondent filed an original action for certiorari with the RTC. The RTC granted the
petition for certiorari, setting aside the decision of the MTC. Hence the present petition for
review assailing the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not procedural questions or questions of facts or substance may be
entertained in a petition forcertiorari.
Held:
No. The RTC has no jurisdiction in acertioraricase to entertain procedural questions or
questions of facts or substance already passed upon by the lower court. The barangay certificate
of 1982 was admitted and found to be sufficient by the MTC after considering the circumstances
surrounding its issuance. This is a procedural question or a question of fact which cannot be
raised or corrected in acertioraricase, but should be assigned as error and reviewed in the
appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.
Admissibility of evidence is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court
(the MTC in this case). Such being the case, no potent reason existed to justify respondent RTCs
substitution of the lower courts judgment with its own judgment. "Questions of fact cannot be

raised in an original action for certiorari. Only established or admitted facts can be
considered." (Rubio v. Reyes, Et Al., L-24581, May 27, 1968)
It is therefore clear that respondent court erred in reversing the lower courts findings
regarding the sufficiency of the Barangay Certificate of 1982. It was an error for the respondent
court to rule upon a question of fact or procedural question already decided by the lower court.
Furthermore, only errors of jurisdiction are correctible by certiorari. Clearly, the only
grounds which may serve as the basis for the respondent court to raise the writ of certiorariare
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by the lower court or that the said lower court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in its appreciation of the barangay certification as
constituting sufficient compliance with P.D. No. 1508. In the ejectment suit filed by petitioner
against respondent, the lower court undoubtedly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the person of the respondent. Thus, it cannot be said that the lower court had no jurisdiction
to render the decision set aside by respondent court. Assuming that the lower court committed a
mistake on the merits of the case, it was in the exercise of such jurisdiction. The error, if at all, is
at most one of judgment and not of jurisdiction, which cannot be the object of a petition for
certiorari. The proper remedy in such case was appeal. Errors in the application of the law and
the appreciation of evidence committed by a court after it has acquired jurisdiction over a case,
are correctible only by appeal.
Neither can it be said that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion or
exceeded its jurisdiction when it appreciated the barangay certification as sufficient compliance
with P.D. 1508. In the petition forcertiorarifiled by respondent before the respondent court, he
did not allege that the lower courts decision was outside or in excess of its jurisdiction, or was
issued in grave abuse of discretion. Respondent merely alleged that the lower court
"erroneously" appreciated facts and evidence, issued interlocutory orders, and appreciated the
issues. He also challenged the soundness of the decision. These do not constitute excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
Neither questions of fact nor of law entertained
Romys Freight Service v. Castro
G.R. No. 141637
8 June 2006
Facts:
In 1975, respondent Castro was hired by respondent as a mechanic, and later as
supervisor. In 1994, he suffered a stroke and had to take a leave of absence from work. While
on leave, petitioner sent him several demand letters urging him to work. Later he was asked to
show cause why he should not be disciplined for prolonged absence. Cruz also filed complaints
forestafaand qualified theft against him. Because of these, Castro was constrained to file a case
for illegal dismissal against petitioner on the ground that Cruzs acts constituted constructive
dismissal. Respondent Veloria was hired in 1977 as a carpenter, and later as a senior mechanic.
Sometime in 1995, he figured in an accident. He was forced to absent himself from work to

undergo recuperation. During his absence, he received several letters from Cruz. One letter
required him to explain the loss of several tools, another ordered him to pay his loan and still
another required him to explain his absences. He was later charged for qualified theft of the
missing tools. Because of petitioners acts against him,Veloriajoined Castro in filing a case for
illegal constructive dismissal against petitioner.
The labor arbiter ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal dismissal. Upon appeal to the
NLRC, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiters ruling. Finding respondents guilty of
abandonment of work, the NLRC dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal. Aggrieved,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the
petition and reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter. Hence the present petition for certiorari,
faulting the CA for reversing the decision of the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the issues of illegal dismissal, abandonment and entitlement to backwages
and benefits are proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
Held:
No. The issues raised by petitioner,i.e., whether respondents were illegally dismissed (as
the CA and the labor arbiter ruled) or abandoned their work (as the NLRC held) and whether
they were entitled tobackwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorneys fees, are not
proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. They involve an inquiry into factual matters.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but
only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.The sole object of
the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The phrase grave abuse of
discretion has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion too patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility. It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it
include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties respective evidence or the
evaluation of their relative weight.

The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze,
assess and weigh them all over again to ascertain if the trial court or quasi-judicial agency and
the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of
one party or the other. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public respondents evaluation of the evidence
and the factual findings based thereon. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari fails insofar
as it questions the affirmation by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that private
respondents were illegally dismissed, entitling them to an award ofbackwages, unpaid benefits,
separation pay and attorneys fees.


Only issue involved is jurisdiction, either want of or excess thereof
Gerardo vs. De la Pena
G.R. No. 61527
26 December 1990
Facts:
Angel Gerardo owned three parcels of lots. Filomina, Berta, and Santiago were his
children. Filomina and Berta were both survived by their respective children, herein
respondents. Santiago was also survived by his children, herein petitioners.
Before the cadastral hearing involving the subject parcels of lots could commence, Angel
Gerardo died. Subsequently, Santiago filed the corresponding answers for the three lots in
question. It was alleged in said answers that he (Santiago) was the heir of Angel Gerardo and
that said three lots were being claimed by him as his inheritance from his late father, Angel
Gerardo. Consequently, after hearing, the lots were registered in Santiagos name.
About sixteen (16) years later, or on April 28, 1960, respondents instituted an action for
ownership, partition and accounting against the petitioners. The case, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 3191-11, prayed for the cancellation of title in the name of Santiago. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, declaring all the petitioners and respondents as
legal heirs of Angel Gerardo and co-owners of the subject lots. Petitioners elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the same. Thus, the judgment became final and
executory on October 11, 1965.
Several years later, or on March 18, 1982, petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance
of properties, annulment of judgment and damages in the lower court against respondents. The
lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. According to the lower court,
all the elements or res judicata are present: (1) the judgment in Civil Case No. 3191-II became
final on October 11, 1965; (2) the court in taking cognizance of the case had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment was rendered on the merits of the case; and (4) in
both cases, the same parties and properties and the same causes of action are involved.
Hence, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Held:

No. The Supreme Court possesses no authority to rule upon non-jurisdictional issues in a
certiorariproceeding. The only question involved inCertiorariis jurisdiction; either want of or
in excess thereof. In the case at bar, respondent Judge correctly dismissed the complaint in based
on res judicata considering the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 3191-11. There is no question
that petitioners have no right at all to claim exclusive ownership of the properties in question.
Ownership thereof having been settled in favor of both herein petitioners and private respondents
as co-owners of the subject properties in Civil Case No. 3191-11 which constitutes res judicata to
Civil Case No. 7590.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Respondent judge who dismisses a complaint on the ground of res
judicata does not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Distinction between certiorari under Rule 45 as a mode of appeal
Rule 65 as a special civil action

and certiorari under

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. CA

G.R. No. 132703
23 June 2000
Facts:
The instant case originated from the sale by Banco Filipino to Tala Realty of four (4) lots
in Iloilo City, covered and described in the aforementioned TCT Nos. 62273 and 62274, for two
million one hundred ten thousand pesos (P2,110,000.00). Tala Realty then leased them back to
Banco Filipino for a monthly rental of twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00) /for a period of
twenty (20) years and renewable for another twenty (20) years. The lease contracts of the other
branch sites sold to Tala Realty have substantially similar terms and conditions, except for the
amount of the rent.
Banco Filipino alleges that a trust was created by virtue of the above transactions. Tala
Realty was allegedly established to serve as a corporate medium to warehouse the legal title of
the said properties for the beneficial interest of Banco Filipino and to purchase properties to be
held in trust for the latter.
However, sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty demanded payment of increased rentals,
deposits and goodwill from Banco Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to
comply thereto. On April 20, 1994, some stockholders of Banco Filipino filed a derivative suit
against Tala Realty before the SEC for the reconveyance of the properties sold by the former to

the latter. However, on March 6, 1995, the SEC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Due to Banco Filipinos failure to comply with Tala Realtys terms, the latter carried out its
threat by filing numerous ejectment suits against Banco Filipino. This prompted Banco Filipino
to file, on August 16, 1995, an action for recovery of real properties before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch 28, on the ground of breach of trust. Incidentally, during the period from
August to September 1995, Banco Filipino also filed sixteen (16) other complaints for recovery
of real properties which it had previously sold to Tala Realty.
These complaints, including the one filed in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 28, were uniformly worded in their material allegations.
As regards Banco Filipinos complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Tala
Realty filed on October 9, 1995 a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) forumshopping; (2) litis pendentia; (3) pari delicto; (4) failure to implead indispensable parties; and (5)
failure to state a cause of action. On the same date, private repondents Pilar D. Ongking,
Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly W. Lim and Rubencito del Mundo filed a separate motion to dismiss
in the same case on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)
litis pendentia; and (3) failure to state a cause of action. Likewise, on November 10, 1995,
private respondent Nancy L. Ty filed a separate motion to dismiss, alleging the same grounds as
those invoked by private respondents Ongking, et. al.
These motions to dismiss alleged, among others, that aside from the said suit before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 28, other suits involving certain Quezon City, Lucena
City, Malolos and Manila branches of Banco Filipino are also pending in other Regional Trial
Courts.
Banco Filipino filed separate oppositions, dated October 14, 1995, October 31, 1995 and
November 21, 1995 respectively, to the motions to dismiss. After a protracted exchange of
pleadings, the trial court dismissed the complaint on April 22, 1996.
On June 27, 1996, the trial court denied Banco Filipinos motion for reconsideration.
Banco Filipino received a copy of said order of denial on July 5, 1996 but instead of filing an
appeal, it filed, on July 24, 1996, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals. Banco Filipino alleged in its petition that the trial courts decision was issued with grave
abuse of discretion because it did not comply with the constitutional mandate on the form of
decisions.
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed Banco Filipinos petition on the ground, among
others, that the "[p]etitioners recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is patently
malapropos." It reiterated the rule that a special civil action for certiorari may be resorted to only
when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Banco Filipinos failure to appeal by writ of error within the reglementary period and its
belated recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was interpreted by the Court of Appeals
as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino to resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals debunked Banco Filipinos theory that the assailed order of the
RTC did not comply with the substantive requirements of the Constitution, and was thus,
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
On December 28, 1996, Banco Filipino received a copy of the Court of Appeals decision
dismissing its petition thereby prompting the latter to file a motion for reconsideration on January
10, 1997. The Court of Appeals denied the said motion for reconsideration on December 19,
1997 in a resolution, a copy of which was received by Banco Filipino on January 7, 1998. Banco
Filipino then filed with this Court its subject petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court on March 9, 1998.
Held:
Without need of delving into the merits of the case, this Court hereby dismisses the
instant petition. For in filing a special civil action for certiorari instead of an ordinary appeal
before this Court, Banco Filipino violated basic tenets of remedial law that merited the dismissal
of its petition.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
We have said time and again that for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by
reason of grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion, must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility.
The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the
decision of the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for
certiorari. This Court has often enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case
fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
The antithetic character of the remedies of appeal and certiorari has been generally
observed by this Court save only in those rare instances where appeal is satisfactorily shown to
be an inadequate remedy. In the case at bar, Banco Filipino has failed to show any valid reason
why the issues raised in its petition for certiorari could not have been raised on appeal. To justify
its resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, it erroneously claims that an appeal
is not a speedy and adequate remedy because further delay in the disposition of this case would
effectively deprive Banco Filipino of the full use and enjoyment of its properties. However, the
further delay that would inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is one
purely of Banco Filipinos own doing. We cannot countenance an intentional departure from

established rules of procedure simply to accommodate a case that has long been pending in the
courts of law because of the partys own fault or negligence.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. Banco
Filipinos recourse to a special civil action for certiorari was borne not out of the conviction that
grave abuse of discretion attended the resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but
simply because of its failure to file a timely appeal to this Court. This observation is shared by
the Court of Appeals, which was quick to point out that when Banco Filipino filed its petition for
certiorari assailing the RTC order, the reglementary period for filing a petition for review before
the Court of Appeals had already lapsed.
It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule
45 to serve the higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed well beyond the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without offering any reason therefor.
No appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
General rule, if appeal available, no certiorari
Fajardo vs. Bautista
G.R. Nos. 102193-97
10 May 1994
Facts:
Private respondents Isabelo Jareo and Purita Jareo (hereinafter JAREOS) are the
owners and developers of a subdivision known as the Calamba Central Compound. On various
dates, they as SELLERS, and the petitioners as BUYERS signed separate contracts, each
designated as a CONTRACT TO SELL, under which, for the considerations therein stated, they
bound themselves to sell to the petitioners the lots subject thereof, and after the latter shall have
paid the purchase price and interest, to execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding
deeds of transfer of title, free from any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided for
in the Contract to Sell.
On the other hand, private respondent Fernando Realty and Development Corporation
(hereinafter FERNANDO) as SELLER, and petitioner Emily Yu Fajardo as BUYER signed on
22 February 1985 a CONTRACT TO SELL under which for the considerations therein stated,
FERNANDO agreed to sell to Fajardo Lot No. 10, Block No. 3, also located at the Calamba
Central Compound Subdivision, and upon full payment of the agreed price and interest thereon,
to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Fajardo.
It appears, however, that on 18 October 1986, the JAREOS sold the aforesaid lots
subject of the different contracts to sell to private respondent Ruben Habacon (hereinafter
HABACON) under separate documents denominated as "Kasulatan ng Bilihan." On 18
February 1991, HABACON caused the cancellation of the certificates of title covering the said
lots and the issuance of new ones in his name.

When the petitioners learned of these, they filed on 21 June 1991 separate complaints
with the court a quo for annulment of the sales in favor of HABACON and of the new
certificates of title issued to him, for reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by those
issued to HABACON, and for accounting and damages. The complaints were docketed as Civil
Cases Nos. 1683-91-C, 11 1684-91-C, 12 1685-91-C, 13 1686-91-C, 14 and 1688-91-C, 15 and
were assigned to Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba.
On 9 August 1991, HABACON filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the ground
that the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) have no legal capacity to sue because they were not parties
to the "BILIHAN."
In its Order of 4 September 1991, 20 the trial court dismissed the aforesaid civil cases for
lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, but the trial court
denied this in its Order of 20 September 1991. 22 It ruled that while HABACON may not be the
developer, the JAREOS are, and by selling the same lots to HABACON after they were
previously sold to different parties, the JAREOS may have committed an "unsound business
practice." Moreover, it ruled that Section 19(2) of B.P. Blg. 129, being a general law, should
yield to P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344, which is a special law.
On 24 December 1991, the petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari to
annul the 4 September 1991 and 20 September 1991 Orders of the trial court on the ground that
the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
their complaints and that they have no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The petitioners maintain that the trial court has jurisdiction over their complaints.
In the Resolution of 18 November 1991, 23 we required the respondents to comment on
the petition. Private respondent HABACON filed his comment and opposition on 27 August
1992 24 while public respondent Cesar S. Reyes filed his comment on 24 August 1993. 25 Both
respondents rely on our pronouncement in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal and echo the ruling of
the trial court in the questioned orders. The copy of the resolution sent to the JAREOS was
returned unserved and in the Resolution of 21 July 1993, we considered it as served on them. As
required, the petitioners filed a reply to the comment. On 8 November 1993, we resolved to give
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their memoranda, which the
petitioners complied with on 29 December 1993 and the private respondents, on 28 March 1994.
Held:
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an
ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of
the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari
cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by
the petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.

The petitioners admit that they received a copy of the trial court's order dismissing their
complaints on 4 October 1991. The instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond the
15-day period to appeal from the order. The petitioners have not even attempted to explain why
they were unable to appeal from the challenged order within the reglementary period. This civil
action then was resorted to as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none
of the exceptions to the rigid rule barring substitution of remedies was alleged to exist in this
petition, or even indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be dismissed.
Exceptions
(1) May be availed of even when appeal is available or period to appeal has
expired
Lansang v. CA
G.R. No. 76028
6 April 1990
Facts:
Private respondent Salangsang filed a complaint for damages arising from a vehicular
accident against Spouses Lansang (the petitioners) before the RTC of South Cotabato. During
trial, Salangsang was able to present his evidence. Thereafter, the court issued an order resetting
the hearing. On the date of hearing, neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared. As such, on
the same day, the Court submitted the case for resolution. Subsequently, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Salangsang. From said judgment, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or to set aside order or decision and to allow them to present their evidence.
Petitioners motion was, however, denied.
Thereafter, petitioners filed their notice of appeal with the RTC. The RTC approved the
appeal and ordered the records of the case to be forwarded with the appellate court. Later on,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, wherein they alleged that they already perfected their
appeal and that they are not abandoning it, but the same is not an adequate, speedy and plain
remedy due to the P250.00 daily penalty in the RTCs award. Subsequently, the appellate court
dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari.
According to the CA, petitioners, by filing a petition for certiorari, in effect abandoned
their appeal and that the perfected appeal is inconsistent with the remedy of certiorari.
Furthermore, the CA held that petitioners cannot be permitted to first resort to appeal and then
shift the remedy to certiorari.
Issue:
Is a perfected appeal inconsistent with the remedy of certiorari?
Held:

No. The purpose of an appeal is to bring up for review a final judgment or order of the
lower court. The remedy of certiorari is to correct certain acts of any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions performed without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. A certiorari proceeding may be instituted during the pendency of a
case or even after judgment.
If after judgment, the petition for certiorari is availed of when appeal is plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, then the petition must fail as certiorari may not be resorted to as a substitute for
appeal much less for a lost one. In such a case, the right to appeal is abandoned. However, after a
judgment had been rendered and an appeal therefrom had been perfected, a petition for certiorari
relating to certain incidents therein may prosper where the appeal does not appear to be plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, appeal and certiorari are not remedies that exclude each
other.
Indeed, there are instances when this Court relaxed the application of Rule 65 on
certiorari and allowed the writ to issue even while appeal was available in the interest of justice,
or due to the dictates of public welfare and for the advancement of public policy.
In this case, after judgment was rendered, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which is in effect a motion for the trial. The failure of counsel and petitioners to appear on
November 8, 1985 in order to present its evidence was duly explained and which may be
considered excusable. The courts are called upon to be liberal in the assessment of the nonappearance of counsel or the party if only to promote the greater interest of justice.
While it appears that the vehicle of petitioners hit the car of private respondent while
parked it is contended by petitioners that it was parked in a prohibited zone. Assuming the
petitioners to be at fault, they contend the additional damage of P250.00 per day is
unconscionable in addition to the actual damage to the car of P19,500.00 and P10,000.00
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. They estimate the damage awarded can run up to the
amount of P600,000.00.
These circumstances justify the grant to petitioners of another day in court. It is a pity
that this case has been pending in court for so long. But this is what happens when an overly
strict and narrow interpretation of the rules is undertaken. The liberal application of the rules
must always be in the mind of the courts.
(2) When appeal not adequate, or equally beneficial, speedy or adequate
Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co.
G.R. No. L-25771
29 March 1982

Facts:
Urbano and Bonifacio Jaca (the petitioners) filed a complaint for Accounting, Return of
Price Differentials and Damages against Davao Lumber (the respondent). The trial court, in
resolving the case, rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Thereafter, petitioners filed an
appeal. Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal, which was granted
by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
granting respondents motion, but the same was denied. As such, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari, contending that the Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order granting execution pending appeal, and denying their motion for
reconsideration. In its answer to petitioners petition for certiorari, respondent contends that
petitioners, having availed of the remedy of appeal are barred from filing a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Are petitioners barred from filing a petition for certiorari since they already availed of the
remedy of appeal?
Held:
No. Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil
action of certiorari may only be invoked when there is no appeal, nor plain speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law, the rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary
course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making used of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacynot the mere absenceof all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari.
In the case at bar, the remedy of appeal is inadequate. It will not immediately relieve petitioners
from the injurious effect of the order granting execution. The slow and inexpensive remedy of
appeal will not prevent respondent judge from executing his decision requiring petitioners to pay
the huge amount of P867,887.52. Moreover, to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner
has already availed of the remedy of appeal will only aggravate the patent injustice already
inflicted on petitioners.
Motion for reconsideration required; exceptions
Settled is the rule the rule that, except in some recognized situations, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari to allow the
court an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. The filing of a motion for reconsideration
before a resort to certiorari is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct
any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual
aspects of the case.

Some of the recognized exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari will lie even
without first availing of a motion for reconsideration include:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

The order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
The questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;
There is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner;
The subject matter of the action is perishable;
Under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
Petitioner was deprived of due process and there is an extreme urgency for
relief;
In a criminal case, relief from order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
The proceedings were done ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object;
Where the issue raised is one purely of law; or
Where public interest is involved.
Tan v. CA & DPG Development
G.R. No. 108634
17 July 1997

Facts:
Tan was the lessee of a piece of property in Sampaloc, Manila when DPG Development
(the respondent) acquired ownership over said property from one Manuel Gonzales.
Subsequently, respondent filed an ejectment suit for non-payment of rentals against Vermont
Packaging, which was managed by Tan.
During the pendency of the ejectment suit, Tan filed a complaint for the cancellation/
annulment of title. For respondents failure to file an answer, Tan moved that respondent be
declared in default. Tans said motion was granted and thereafter, the trial court rendered
judgment in Tans favor. From the trial courts judgment, respondents filed a motion for new
trial, which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for certiorari,
which was granted by the CA.
Issue:
Did the CA err in not dismissing respondents petition for certiorari considering that no
motion for reconsideration was filed before said petition was resorted to?
Held:

No. The special civil action of certiorari will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration
is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors. However,
this rule admits of certain recognized exceptions such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the Court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from
an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial Court is improbable; (g)
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. It is exceptive
circumstance (b) that justified DPGs non-filing of a motion for reconsideration, inasmuch as
DPGs petition for certiorari before the CA involved a similar issue or question passed upon by
the trial court in its November 23, 1990 Order, i.e., the propriety of the motion for new trial filed
by DPGs new counsel (Atty. Formoso).
It must also be stressed that what is determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies.
Thus, even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, a writ of certiorari has been
allowed when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without
jurisdiction. Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and
insufficient and that to strictly observe the general rule would result in a miscarriage of justice.
This is especially true when the petition, such as DPGs certiorari petition before the CA, appears
to be meritorious and the trial judge indeed seems to have committed grave abuse of discretion.
Period for filing (Sec. 4)
Rule 65, Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no
case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (4a) (Bar Matter No. 803, 21 July 1998; A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC).

DEPOSITIONS
I.

RULE 23 - Depositions Pending Action

Deposition definition and purpose.

People vs. Webb
G.R. No. 132577, 17 August 1999
312 SCRA 573 (1999)
Facts:
Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb (Webb) is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404
for Rape with Homicide. During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed
on May 2, 1997, a Motion To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition1praying that Webb be allowed
to take the testimonies of five (5) citizens and residents of the United States before the proper
consular officer of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be. Webb
alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose
testimonies are allegedly "material and indispensable" to establish his innocence of the crime
charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule
24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-accused, has no
application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional examination of witnesses
for the accused before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule 19, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/
defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction.
In an Order dated 11 June 1997, the trial court denied the motion of respondent on the
ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Webbs Motion for Reoncisderation having been denied, he elevated
his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition forcertiorari.
The Court of Appeals granted Webbs Petition for Certiorari, and set aside and annulled
the trial courts Order dated 11 June 1997. Thus, the People challenged the Court of Appeals
Decision before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the trial courts Order dated 11 June
1997, denying Webbs motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which
would be used in the criminal case before her Court.
Held:

No. As defined, a deposition is

The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in
open court, but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by court, or under a
general law or court rule on the subject, and reduce to writing and duly authenticated, and
intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or a criminal prosecution. A
pretrial discovery device by which one party (through his or her attorney) ask oral questions of
the other party or of a witness for the other party.
The person who is deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is conducted under
oath outside of the court room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices. A transcript word for
word account is made of the deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken in writing, under oath
or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to questions or interrogatories . . . and the
purposes of taking depositions are to: (a) give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the
truth and in checking and preventing perjury; (b) provide an effective means of detecting and
exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; (c) make available in a simple, convenient and
inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; (d)
educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby
encouraging settlements; (e) expedite litigation; (f) safeguard against surprise; (g) prevent delay;
(h) Simplify and narrow the issues; and (i) expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode
of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice
particularly on the defense of alibi, which is respondent's main defense in the criminal
proceedings against him in the court below states that when a person intends to rely on such a
defense, that person must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time
provided for filing a pre-trial motion.
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign
witnesses is "to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility
of Defense Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue has, however, long been rendered moot and
academic by the admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the trial court in its
order dated 10 July 1998.
The Supreme Court ruled that the factual circumstances of this case only serves to
underscore the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based
witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying respondent's
motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a
superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the
persuasiveness of the evidence already on record.
Depositions pending action,when may be taken.
1.

By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property
which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served,
the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any
party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories.

2.

The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in

Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules.

3.

The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such
terms as the court prescribes.
Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. vs. Reyes
225 SCRA 622 (1993)

Facts:
The American President Lines, Ltd. (APL) sued Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover
the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof
as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In one of the hearings for the presentation of its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying
that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and
prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul,
vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . "Five (5) days later
APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate
office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by
the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center,
Inc.," it was necessary and it therefore prayed "that commission or letters rogatory be
issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange
Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear
and take the oral deposition of the aforenamed persons
The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally
defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a person within its
jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be
examined before the Philippine Court;" and(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the
testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition."
The trial court granted APLs Motion. Motion for Reconsideration having been denied,
Dasmarinas instituted a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which
likewise denied said petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion in granting APLs motion to take
testimonies of the Taiwanese witnesses.
Held:
No. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some
suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to

parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or

things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the
material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the
adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible
for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have
knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of
factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court,
without omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing
themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for
the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented
for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of
evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented
in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness
is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing,
in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded
on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to crossexamine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity
for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the
opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial
evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These
exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.
The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of
the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of
evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the
Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken
before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign
state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under
letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of
the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After
answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside,

the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is
required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . .
(stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to
be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify
him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court
intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the
notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or
impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking
be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc.
(Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being
conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no
"secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then
obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory.
A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or other
competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of
such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic Law
Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent
in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be
examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is
within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed" (Feria,J.,op.
cit., citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 653). Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states that a
commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title,"
while letters rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state."
Noteworthy in this connection is the indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied
for and issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is apparent from Form
21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which requires the inclusion
in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the following paragraph,viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. A commission issued by this Court on the ______ day of ______, 19__, to take
the testimony of (here name the witness or witnesses) in (here name the foreign country
in which the testimony is to be taken), before _________________ (name of officer),
wasreturned unexecutedby __________________ on the ground that ____________, all
of which more fully appears from the certificate of said __________ to said commission
and made a part hereof by attaching it hereto (or state other facts to show commission is
inadequate or cannot be executed) (emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to the "Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H.
Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that said
Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of Authentications" attesting to the identity and
authority of Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan (eg., the

Section Chief, Department of Consular Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex
B of Annex N of the petition for review oncertiorari) aprima facieshowing not rebutted by
petitioner.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 90478. 21 November 1991.
204 SCRA 212 (1991)
Facts:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago together
with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco,
and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan.
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule
25 of the Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25."
Basically, they sought an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG
(aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or
authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R.Tantoco, Jr.and Dominador R. Santiago as
defendants in the..case?"The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to
strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or
"procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and
irrelevant under anyguise."
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to
strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without
legal and factual basis. It opined, among others, that service of interrogatories before joinder of
issue and without leave of court is premature absent any special or extraordinary circumstances,
which would justify the same.
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff,"and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories
to Plaintiff"'as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.
By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted
the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents
(production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively. PCGGs Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied, it filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted
the motion for production and inspection of documents.
Held:

Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the
Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties, and production and inspection of documents and
things.Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges),
there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes
and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable
disinclination to resort to them which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the
deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of
other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and
speed up adjudication.Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, theraison d'etreof courts. This
essential function is accomplished byfirst, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts
from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that
determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end
that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is
occupied with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the
extent that adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there is faultiness
in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of
judges to see that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration,
misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a
relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during
the trial.
Seventy-one years ago, inAlonso v. Villamor,this Court described the nature and object
of litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests are to be
conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled
and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is, rather a contest in whicheach contending party fully and fairly lays before the court
the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested right in
technicalities. . . .

The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the
facts in issue-fully and fairly;i.e., to present to the courtallthe material and relevant facts
known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and
adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the
facts within his knowledge.

Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the
pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set
forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of a party's claims or
defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of theultimate factson which
the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts."
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed,i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too
generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an adverse
party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars
seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office
of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more particular or definite theultimate
factsin a pleading It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is
that said evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only during the trial,
when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties
before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial
if not indeed even before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves of all the facts
relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to
adversaries; in other words, thedesideratumis that civil trials should not be carried on in the
dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery
mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample
discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of
modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them
considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the
possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. . ."
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the
conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issueformulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along
with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the
parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose
is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in
the dark.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as
broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry
extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only
those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest
possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon
said trial. The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) which
generally allows the examination of a deponent

1) "regardingany matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending action,
whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents,
or other tangible things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be
useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the
stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it,
thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . .
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery
mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written
interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for
admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court
intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of
said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an
answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or
property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of
discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts
are not clear.
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or
inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental
examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a
showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and
efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such
as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against
the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of
the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery;
taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or
defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken
without leave and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations
inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in
such a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. And . . .

further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege."
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and
within the bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation
of course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be
resolved.
The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25
of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained.
It should initially be pointed out as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave
to File Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 that it was correct for them to seek leave to
serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed ofbeforean answer had been served.
In such a situation,i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property
subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in
relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave
of court." But there was no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their
"Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 19) after they had filed their answer to
the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
The petitioner's first contention that the interrogatories in question are defective
because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being
addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the same matters . . (private
respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion . . for Bill of Particulars" are
untenable and quickly disposed of.
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25
which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or
private corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer
thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely no reason why this proposition
should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the
interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner o
officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to
answer. As the rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent
to testify in its behalf."
Scope of examination.
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by section 16 or 18 of this Rule, the
deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,

documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts.
Use of depositions.
At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof,
in accordance with any one of the following provisions;
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an
officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds:
(1) the witness is dead;
(2) the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition;
(3) the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment;
(4) the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoena;
(5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition
to be used.
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party
may introduce any other parts.
Effect of substitution of parties.
1.

Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositions previously taken.

2.

When an action has been dismissed and another action involving the same subject is
afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or successors in
interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in
the latter as if originally taken therefor.

Objections to admissibility.
Subject to the provisions of section 29 of this Rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing,
to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would require the
exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and testifying.

Effect of taking depositions.

A party shall not be deemed to make a person his own witness for any purpose by taking his
deposition.
Effect of using depositions.
The introduction in evidence of the deposition or any part thereof for any purpose other than that
of contradicting or impeaching the deponent makes the deponent the witness of the party
introducing the deposition, but this shall not apply to the use by an adverse party of a deposition
as described in paragraph (b) of section 4 of this Rule.
Rebutting deposition.
At the trial or hearing any party may rebut any relevant evidence contained in a deposition
whether introduced by him or by any other party.

Persons before whom depositions may be taken within the Philippines.

Within the Philippines depositions may be taken before any judge, notary public, or the person
referred to in section 14 hereof.
Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries.
In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken:
(a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory;
or
(c) the person referred to in section 14 hereof.
Commission or letters rogatory.
(a)

A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient, on

application and notice, and on such terms, and with such direction as are just and
appropriate.

(b)

Officers may be designated in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title

and letters rogatory may be addressed to the appropriate judicial authority in the foreign
country.

Disqualification by interest.
No deposition shall be taken before a person who is:

(a)
(b)
(c)

a relative within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or employee or counsel of

any of the parties;
a relative within the same degree, or employee of such counsel;
financially interested in the action.

Stipulations regarding taking of depositions.

If the parties so stipulate in writing, depositions may be taken before any person authorized to
administer oaths, at any time or place, in accordance with these Rules and when so taken may be
used like other depositions.

Deposition upon oral examination;notice;time and place.

(a)

A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give
reasonable notice in writing, to every other party to the action.

(b)

The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address
of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs.

(c)

On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown
enlarge or shorten the time.

Orders for the protection of parties and deponents.

(a)

After notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably
made by any party or by the person to be examined and for good cause shown, the court in
which the action is pending may make an order that:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

the deposition shall not be taken;

it may be taken only at some designated place other than that stated in the notice;
it may be taken only on written interrogatories;
certain matters shall not be inquired into;
the scope of the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the
action and their officers or counsel;
after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court;
secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed;
the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court;
the court may make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or
witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.

Record of examination,oath;objections.

(a)

The officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witness on oath and
shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in his presence, record the
testimony of the witness.

(b)

The testimony shall be taken stenographically unless the parties agree otherwise.

(c)

All objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of the officer
taking the deposition, or to the manner of talking it, or to the evidence presented, or to the
conduct of any party, and any other objection to the proceedings, shall be noted by the
officer upon the deposition.
Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the
oral examination, parties served with notice of taking a deposition may transmit written
interrogatories to the officers, who shall propound them to the witness and record the
answersverbatim.

(d)

Motion to terminate or limit examination.

(a)

At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion or petition of any party or of the
deponent, and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in
such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the
court in which the action is pending or the Regional Trial Court of the place where the
deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the examination to cease
forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking of
the deposition, as provided in section 16 of this Rule.

(b)

If the order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only upon the
order of the court in which the action is pending.

(c)

Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be
suspended for the time necessary to make a notice for an order.

(d)

In granting or refusing such order, the court may impose upon either party or upon the
witness the requirement to pay such costs or expenses as the court may deem reasonable.

Submission to witness;changes;signing.
(a) When the testimony is fully transcribed, the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for
examination and shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and reading are
waived by the witness and by the parties.
(b)

Any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon
the deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for
making them.

(c)

The deposition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive
the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign.

(d)

If the deposition is not signed by the witness, the officer shall sign it and state on the record
the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal to
sign together with the reason be given therefor, if any, and the deposition may then be used
as fully as though signed, unless on a motion to suppress under section 29 (f) of this Rule,
the court holds that the reasons given for the refusal to sign require rejection of the
deposition in whole or in part.

Certification,and filing by officer.

(a)

The officer shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly sworn to by him and
that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness.

(b)

He shall then securely seal the deposition in an envelope indorsed with the title of the
action and marked "Deposition of (here insert the name of witness)" and shall promptly file
it with the court in which the action is pending or send it by registered mail to the clerk
thereof for filing.

Notice of filing.
The officer taking the deposition shall give prompt notice of its filing to all the parties.
Furnishing copies.
Upon payment of reasonable charges therefor, the officer shall furnish a copy of the deposition to
any party or to the deponent.
Failure to attend of party giving notice.
If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition fails to attend and proceed therewith
and another attends in person or by counsel pursuant to the notice, the court may order the party
giving the notice to pay such other party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred by him
and his counsel in so attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.

Failure of party giving notice to serve subpoena.

If the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition of a witness fails to serve a subpoena
upon him and the witness because of such failure does not attend, and if another party attends in
person or by counsel because he expects the deposition of that witness to be taken, the court may
order the party giving the notice to pay to such other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred by him and his counsel in so attending, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Deposition upon written interrogatories;service of notice and of interrogatories.

(a)

A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall
serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the person
who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before
whom the deposition is to be taken.

(b)

Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories upon the
party proposing to take the deposition.

(c)

Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party
who has served cross-interrogatories.

(d)

Within three (3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve
recross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.

Officers to take responses and prepare record.

A copy of the notice and copies of all interrogatories served shall be delivered by the party taking
the deposition to the officer designated in the notice, who shall proceed promptly, in the manner
provided by sections 17, 19 and 20 of this Rule, to take the testimony of the witness in response
to the interrogatories and to prepare, certify, and file or mail the deposition, attaching thereto the
copy of the notice and the interrogatories received by him.
Notice of filing and furnishing copies.
When a deposition upon interrogatories is filed, the officer taking it shall promptly give notice
thereof to all the parties, and may furnish copies to them or to the deponent upon payment of
reasonable charges therefor.
Order for the protection of parties and deponents.
After the service of the interrogatories and prior to the taking of the testimony of the deponent,
the court in which the action is pending, on motion promptly made by a party or a deponent, and
for good cause shown, may make any order specified in sections 15, 16 and 18 of this Rule
which is appropriate and just or an order that the deposition shall not be taken before the officer
designated in the notice or that it shall not be taken except upon oral examination.
Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions.
(a) As to notice. All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a deposition are waived
unless written objection is promptly served upon the party giving the notice.
(b) As to disqualification of officer. Objection to taking a deposition because of
disqualification of the officer before whom it is to be taken is waived unless made before the
taking of the deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the disqualification becomes known or
could be discovered with reasonable diligence.

(c) As to competency or relevancy of evidence. Objections to the competency of witness or the

competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them
before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground, of the objection is one which
might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.
(d) As to oral examination and other particulars. Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral
examination in the manner of taking the deposition in the form of the questions or answers, in the
oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of the parties and errors of any kind which might be
obviated, removed, or cured if promptly prosecuted, are waived unless reasonable objection
thereto is made at the taking of the deposition.
(e) As to form of written interrogatories. Objections to the form of written interrogatories
submitted under sections 25 and 26 of this Rule are waived unless served in writing upon the
party propounding them within the time allowed for serving succeeding cross or other
interrogatories and within three (3) days after service of the last interrogatories authorized.
(f) As to manner of preparation. Errors and irregularities in the manner in which the
testimony is transcribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, indorsed,
transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with by the officer under sections 17, 19, 20 and 26 of this
Rule are waived unless a motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made with
reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due diligence might have been, ascertained.
II.

RULE 24 - Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal

Depositions before action;petition.

A person who desires to perpetuate his own testimony or that of another person regarding any
matter that may be cognizable in any court of the Philippines may file a verified petition in the
court of the place of the residence of any expected adverse party.
Contents of petition.
The petition shall be entitled in the name of the petitioner and shall show:
(a) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action in a court of the Philippines but is
presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought;
(b) the subject matter of the expected action and his interest therein;
(c) the facts which he desires to establish by the proposed testimony and his reasons for
desiring to perpetuate it;
(d) the names or a description of the persons he expects will be adverse parties and their
addresses so far as known; and
(e) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony
which he expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to
take the depositions of the persons to be examined named in the petition for the purpose of
perpetuating their testimony.

Notice and service.

(a)

The petitioner shall serve a notice upon each person named in the petition as an expected
adverse party, together with a copy of the petition, stating that the petitioner will apply to
the court, at a time and place named therein, for the order described in the petition.

(b)

At least twenty (20) days before the date of the hearing, the court shall cause notice thereof
to be served on the parties and prospective deponents in the manner provided for service of
summons.

Order and examination.

(a)

If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay
of justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the persons whose deposition
may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the examination and whether the
depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories.

(b)

The depositions may be taken in accordance with Rule 23 before the hearing.

Reference to court.
For the purpose of applying Rule 23 to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each reference
therein to the court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in which
the petition for such deposition was filed.
Use of deposition.
If a deposition to perpetuate testimony is taken under this Rule, or if, although not so taken, it
would be admissible in evidence, it may be used in any action involving the same subject matter
subsequently brought in accordance with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 23.
Depositions pending appeal.
(a)

If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a court, including the Court of Appeals in
proper cases, or before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired, the court
in which the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of depositions of witnesses to
perpetuate their testimony for in the event of further proceedings in the said court.

(b)

In such case the party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion in the
said court for leave to take the depositions, upon the same notice and service thereof as if
the action was pending therein.

(c)

The motion shall state (a) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the
substance of the testimony which he expects to elicit from each, and (b) the reason for
perpetuating their testimony.

(d)

If the court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure or delay
of justice, it may make an order allowing the deposition to be taken, and thereupon the
depositions may be taken and used in the same manner and under the same conditions as
are prescribed in these Rules for depositions taken in pending actions.

III.

RULE 25 INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES

Interrogation to parties; service thereof

A party may serve written interrogatories:
1. Without leave of court after answer has been served, for the first set of interrogatories.
2. With leave of court in the following circumstances: (a) before answer has been served;
and (b) for the second set of interrogatories for the same adverse party (Section 4, Rule
25).
Answer to interrogatories
The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the
person making them.
N.B. A judgment by default may be rendered against a party who fails to answer written
interrogatories (Section 3(c), Rule 29).
Objections to interrogatories
Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court within 10 days after service
thereof, with notice as in the case of motion. Answers shall be deferred until objections are
resolved, which shall be at the earliest possible time.
Number of interrogatories
No party may, without leave of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to be answered
by the same party.
Scope and use of interrogatories
The scope of interrogatories shall be the matters mentioned in Sec. 2, Rule 23. The answers may
be used for the same purpose provided in Sec. 4 of the same Rule.
Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories
Unless a party had been served with written interrogatories, he may not be compelled by the
adverse party (a) to give testimony in open court; or (b) to give a deposition pending appeal.

The only exception is when the court allows it for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice.
IV.

RULE 26 - ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

Request for admission

When request may be made:
At any time after the issues have been joined (after the responsive pleading has been served).
What request may include:
1.
Admission of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request; and
2.
Admission of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
Implied admission
Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a
period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service
thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the
request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement
either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested
within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in his
compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are resolved, which resolution shall
be made as early as practicable.

Effect of admission
An admission under this Section is for the purpose of the pending action only and cannot be used
in other proceedings.
Withdrawal
The party making an admission under this Rule, may be allowed by the court to withdraw or
amend it upon such terms as may be just.

Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission

The party who fails or refuses to request the admission of facts in question is prevented from
thereafter presenting evidence thereon unless otherwise allowed by the court.

Case:
Po v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-34341, 22 August 1988
Facts:
The petitioner filed a complaint for damages against the private respondent Jose P. Mananzan as
operator of a banca service for shooting the rapids at Pagsanjan Falls, arising from an accidental
spill into the water, which she and her friend suffered when the banca in which they were riding
capsized during their trip back to town. After Mananzan had answered the complaint, petitioner
served upon him a request for admission. Mananzan failed to file and serve an answer to the
request for admission. Petitioner thus filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that
there exists no genuine or substantial controversy on any issue of fact since Mananzan has
deemed admitted the matters stated in the request for admission for his failure to answer the
same. Respondent Judge Lustre denied the motion for summary judgment, observing that "the
interrogatories ... are nothing but a reiteration of a portion of the plaintiffs allegations in the
complaint, which have already been answered and denied by the defendant in his answer" hence,
they "need not be answered again if asked in the form of interrogatories."

Issue:
Whether or not the material facts in a complaint, which were made subject to a request
for admission, are deemed admitted upon failure to answer the request
Held:
No. A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his
pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second
denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not
intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but
should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited
with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it
serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and
"a mere redundancy."
V.

RULE 27 - PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENT OR THINGS

Motion for production or inspection; order

Requisites of the motion for production or inspection:
1. A motion must be filed by a party showing good cause therefor;

2. The motion must sufficiently describe the document or thing sought to be produced or
inspected;
3. The motion must be given to all the other parties;
4. The document or thing sought to be produced or inspected must constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action;
5. The document or thing sought to be produced or inspected must not be privileged; and
6. The document or thing sought to be produced or inspected must be in the possession of
the adverse party or, at least under his control.
VI.

RULE 28 PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION

This mode of discovery is available in an action in which the mental or physical condition of a
party is in controversy.
Examples of these actions are:
a. An action for annulment of a contract where the ground relied upon is insanity or
dementia;
b. A petition for guardianship of a person alleged to be insane; and
c. An action to recover damages for personal injury where the issue is the extent of the
injuries of the plaintiff.
Order for examination
The following are the requisites to obtain an order for examination:
1. A motion must be filed for the physical and mental examination;
2. The motion must show good cause for the examination;
3. The mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy;
4. Notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties; and
5. The motion shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the
examination and the person or persons by whom it is made.
Report of findings
1.
2.
3.
4.

The person examined shall, upon request, be entitled to a copy of a detailed written report
of the examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions.
After such request and delivery, the party causing the examination to be made shall be
entitled upon request to receive from the party examined, a like report of any examination
previously or thereafter made, of the same physical or mental condition.
If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the court on motion and notice may
make an order requiring delivery.
If a physician fails or refuses to make such report, the court may exclude his testimony if
offered at the trial.

Waiver of privilege
Where the party examined requests and obtains a report on the results of the examination, the
consequences are:

1.

He has to furnish the other party a copy of the report of any previous or subsequent
examination of the same physical and mental condition; and
He waives any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same
controversy regarding the testimony of any other person who has so examined him or may
thereafter examine him.

2.

VII.

RULE 29 REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY

If a party refuses to answer any question, the following may be the consequences:
1. The court, may, upon proper application, compel a refusing deponent to answer (Sec.1).
a. If granted and refusal to answer is without substantial justification, court may
require the refusing party to pay the proponent the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees.
b. If denied and filed without substantial justification, court may require the
proponent to pay the refusing party the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees.
2. A refusal to answer after being directed by the court to do so may be considered as
contempt of court (Sec. 2)
If a person refuses to be sworn in as a witness, he may be cited in contempt of court.
If a person refuses to answer designated questions or refusal to produce documents or to
submit to physical or mental examination (Sec. 3), the court may make the following
orders:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Prohibit the disobedient party to introduce evidence of physical or mental condition;

Refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose claims or defenses;
Strike out pleadings or parts thereof;
Stay further proceedings;
Dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof;
Render a judgment by default against disobedient party; and
Direct the arrest of any party or agent of a party disobeying any of such orders except an
order to submit to a physical or mental examination.

If a person denies the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter of fact in a request
for admission under Rule 26, and the party requesting for admission proves said document to be
genuine or said fact to be true, the court may, upon motion, order the party requested to admit, to
pay the expenses incurred in making such proof unless the court finds that there were sufficient
grounds for the denial.
If a person fails despite due notice to attend a schedule for deposition-taking, or fails to file his
answer to written interrogatories, the court may:
1. Strike out all or any part of any pleading of disobedient party;
2. Dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof;
3. Enter a judgment by default against disobedient party; or
4. Order payment of reasonable expenses incurred by the other including attorney's fees.

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC

13 July 2004
GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF
COURT IN THE CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITIONDISCOVERY MEASURES
The use of pre-trial and the deposition-discovery measures are undeniably important and vital
components of case management in trial courts. To abbreviate court proceedings, ensure
prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets, and to further implement the pre-trial
guidelines laid down in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 and except as
otherwise specifically provided for in other special rules, the following guidelines are issued
for the observance and guidance of trial judges and clerks of court:
I. PRE-TRIAL
A. Civil Cases
1. Within one day from receipt of the complaint:
1.1 Summons shall be prepared and shall contain a reminder to defendant to observe restraint
in filing a motion to dismiss and instead allege the grounds thereof as defenses in the Answer,
in conformity with IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated March 12, 2002. A
copy of the summons is hereto attached as Annex "A;" and
1.2 The court shall issue an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories to parties
under Rule 25 and request for admission by adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion
make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules 27 and 28 within five
days from the filing of the answer. A copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant
together with the summons and upon the plaintiff.
Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply,the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte
that the case be set for pre-trial conference.If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the
given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs
containing the following:
a. A statement of their willingness to enter into an amicable settlement indicating the desired
terms thereof or to submit the case to any of the alternative modes of dispute resolution;
b. A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
c. The issues to be tried or resolved;
d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof.(No evidence shall
be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party's evidencein-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pretrial, except if allowed by the court for good cause shown);
e. A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery
procedures or referral to commissioners; and

Case:
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Ley Construction
G.R. No. 147143, 10 March 2006
Facts:
Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati against petitioner Hyatt
Industrial
Manufacturing
Corporation
(Hyatt).
LCDC
filed
an
amended
complaintimpleadingPrinceton Development Corporation (Princeton) as additional defendant.
Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu;PacitaTan
Go, Account Officer ofRizalCommercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); and ElenaSy, Finance
Officer of Hyatt.Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of ManuelLey, President of LCDC,
whilePrincetonfiled notice to take the depositions of Manuel and JanetLey. The RTC ordered
the deposition-taking to proceed. At the scheduled deposition of ElenaSyonSeptember 17,
1996, Hyatt and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set
instead, contending that the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case.The RTC
agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place
onNovember 14, 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not deposition as a mode of discovery should be dispensed with, and the parties to
proceed with pre-trial, to expedite the proceedings of a case
Held:
No. Adeposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party.
It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is wellnigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the
inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.It is allowed as a departure from the
accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding;and provided it is taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court,i.e., with leave of court if summons have
been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a
circumstance for its admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The rules on
discovery should not be unduly restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery
procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.

Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court.It approved
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC onJuly 13, 2004which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial
court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery
measures.Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties
to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party
under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures

under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer.The parties are likewise
required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a
manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of
discovery procedures or referral to commissioners.

Since the pertinent incidents of the case took place prior to theeffectivityof said issuance,
however, the depositions sought by LCDC shall be evaluated based on the jurisprudence and
rules then prevailing, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides as
follows:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.--- By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of
the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition
upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.Depositions shall be taken only in
accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by
leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its
notice to take depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served.LCDC having
complied with the rules then prevailing, the trial court erred in canceling the previously
scheduled depositions.

While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is conducted
in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject
of the inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized
domains of privilege, such circumstances, however are absent in the case at bar.

The RTC cites the delay in the case as reason for canceling the scheduled depositions.While
speedy disposition of cases is important, such consideration however should not outweigh a
thorough and comprehensive evaluation of cases, for the ends of justice are reached not only
through the speedy disposal of cases but more importantly, through a meticulous and
comprehensive evaluation of the merits of the case.Records also show that the delay of the case
is not attributable to the depositions sought by LCDC but was caused by the many pleadings filed
by all the parties including petitioners herein.

The argument that the taking of depositions would cause unnecessary duplicity as the intended
deponents shall also be called as witnesses during trial, is also without merit.

The case ofFortune Corp. v. Court of Appealswhich already settled the matter, explained that:

The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute good cause to
justify the courts order that his deposition shall not be taken.That the witness is unable to attend
or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the
trial.But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.


The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely
distinct.The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their
use.As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties
of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a
substitute for viva voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of the
testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the facts to the parties before trial, drops out of
the judicial picture.

xxx[U]nderthe concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of
a method of discovery - with use on trial not necessarily contemplated - and a method of
presenting testimony.Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been
placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions
looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever practicable.

Petitioner also argues that LCDC has no evidence to support its claims and that it was only after
the filing of its Complaint that it started looking for evidence through the modes of discovery.

On this point, it is well to reiterate the Courts pronouncement inRepublic v. Sandiganbayan:

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in
the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things.Hence, the depositiondiscovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.No longer can the time-honored
cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his
opponents case.Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential
to proper litigation.To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession.The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which
the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing
the possibility, of surprise.

It also does not escape this Courts attention that the trial court, before
dismissingLCDCscomplaint, gave LCDC two options: (a) enter into a pre-trial conference,
advising LCDC that what it would like to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial
conference, thus expediting early termination of the case; and (b) terminate the pre-trial
conference and apply for deposition later on.The trial court erred in forcing LCDC to choose
only from these options and in dismissing its complaint uponLCDCsrefusal to choose either of
the two.

The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions of ElenaSy, the Finance Officer
of Hyatt andPacitaTan Go, an Account Officer of RCBC, may not be obtained at the pre-trial
conference, as the said deponents are not parties to the pre-trial conference.

As also pointed out by the CA:

xxxTo unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial, would defeat the very purpose for
which it is intended, as a pre-trial device.By then, the issues would have been confined only on
matters defined during pre-trial.The importance of the modes of discovery cannot be gainsaid in
this case in view of the nature of the controversy involved and the conflicting interest claimed by
the parties.

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the
pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute between the parties and
affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

Further, inRepublic v. Sandiganbayan the Court explained that:

The truth is that evidentiary matters may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the
trial.Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties - before the trial if not
indeed even before the pre-trial - should discover or inform themselves of all the facts
relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to
their adversaries; in other words, thedesideratumis that civil trials should not be carried
on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the depositiondiscovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.The experience in other jurisdictions has been
the ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most
necessary ends of modern procedure; it not only eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby
shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the
table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased.

As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded
inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation
and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the
pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and
(2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.The evident purpose is, to repeat,
to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on
in the dark.

In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena
andPacitaare necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be defined at the
pre-trial.Without such information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced to prosecute its case in
the dark --- the very situation which the rules of discovery seek to prevent.Indeed, the rules on
discovery seek to make trial less a game of blind mans bluff and more a fair contest with the
basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.