Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ROLAND V. VELOSO,
-versus-
Promulgated:
After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision dated July 6,
1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged and imposing upon him the
corresponding penalty, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph
2nd, sub-paragraph 2-(e), of the Revised Penal Code, and, in default
of any modifying circumstance in attendance, hereby sentences
him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) Months of
Arresto Mayor as minimum, to One (1) Year and Eight (8) Months
and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional as maximum,
with the accessories provided by law; to indemnify the offended
party, Developers Group of Companies, Inc., owner and operator
of the Shangri-La Finest Chinese Cuisine Restaurant, in the
amounts of P11,391.00, with interests thereon at the legal rate per
annum from August 23, 1995 until fully paid, and P10,000.00, as
and for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On appeal by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City,
in its Decision dated April 7, 2000, affirmed the MeTC judgment, holding that all
the issues being raised by petitioner have been thoroughly considered and passed
upon by the MeTC. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
RTC.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On March 2,
2001, the appellate court rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC,
ratiocinating as follows:
x x x To quote the trial court, having observed the demeanor of the witnesses who
paraded before the Court, we are of the considered view that, between the
affirmations of the witness for the prosecution and the denials of the accused, the
choice is not difficult to make and gave credence to the prosecutions
evidence. The RTC sustained the MTCs assessment, and so must We. The
credibility of witnesses is a matter best assessed by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude.
The inconsistencies and contradictions cited by petitioner in the testimony of Sto.
Domingo are on minor details which do not impair her trustworthiness. If any,
they indicate that she is not a tutored witness. Truthful witnesses are seldom
perfect witnesses.
Petitioners argument that he was not prevented from leaving the Shangrila
Restaurant even after he refused to pay the bill for four tables, does not serve him
any. Compelling him to stay because of his failure to pay for his food would have
exposed the person enforcing it to possible criminal charge of coercion. The
victim would then become the villain.
xxx
In sum, as aptly defined by the MTC and RTC the issue boils down to
credibility. The case law is that the assessment of the trial court on this matter is
entitled great weight and persuasion and at times conclusive to the appellate
courts.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the RTC Decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The issue involves the correctness of the MeTCs findings of fact, which
findings were affirmed by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review and it
becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment
whether or not it is an assigned error.[4]
Appellant insists that he is only civilly liable for an unpaid debt.
We reviewed the records very closely and found that petitioner and his
guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he
refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the
understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for only
one table.
We agree with the Solicitor General in his brief for the People that petitioner
employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered
and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article
315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.[5]
After a careful review of the records of the case, we found no reversible
error in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court thus adopts its
findings of fact and conclusion of law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 59239 finding petitioner
Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr. and Associate Justice Alicia L. Santos (all retired); rollo, pp. 20-29.
[2]
Id., p. 41.
[3]
Id., pp.114-115.
[4]
People v. Buban, G.R. No. 170471, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 118, citing People v. Lab-eo, 373 SCRA 461, 480
(2002).
[5]
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below shall be punished by:
xxx
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not exceed P12,000.00.
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xxx
(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn, restaurant x x x without paying therefor,
with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof x x x.
- versus -
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In the prosecution for the crime of estafa committed under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, there must be evidence of false representation or false
pretense on the part of the accused to prove reasonable doubt. In this case, the employees
act of soliciting a client despite previous knowledge of several complaints against his or
her employer for failure to deliver the motor vehicle that was the subject of the
agreement, is tantamount to misrepresentation.
Factual Antecedents
These petitions for review on certiorari impugn the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27414 which affirmed with modifications the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 99-173688, convicting
petitioners Lyzah Sy Franco (Franco) and Steve Besario (Besario) of the crime of
Estafa. The Information filed against petitioners and their co-accused, Antonio Rule, Jr.
(Rule) and George Torres (Torres), contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the first week of June 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MA. LOURDES G. ANTONIO,
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to said Ma. Lourdes G. Antonio, to the effect
that they are employees of FINAL ACCESS MARKETING, a business entity engaged
in the sale and financing of used or repossessed cars, and as such could process and
facilitate the sale of a Mazda car 323 bearing plate number PVB-999 worth P130,000.00
provided they be given the amount of P80,000.00 as down payment and by means of
other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing the said Ma. Lourdes
G. Antonio to give and deliver as in fact she gave and delivered to herein accused the said
amount of P80,000.00, and accused knowing fully well that their manifestations and
representations were false and untrue and were made only to obtain the said amount
of P80,000.00 which amount once in their possession, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the said amount
of P80,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
MA. LOURDES G. ANTONIO in the aforesaid amount of P80,000.00 in its equivalent
amount to the Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.[3]
During arraignment, petitioners entered separate pleas of not guilty. Rule and
Torres failed to appear and, to date, remain at large. After the termination of the pre-trial
conference, trial ensued.
Meanwhile, Lourdes and her husband returned to the showroom on Houston Street, San
Juan, where they saw the Mazda car already clean. The security guard told them it was
ready for release in the afternoon.
When the car was still undelivered, Lourdes sought the aid of Hoy Gising, a television
show that broadcasts grievances of people against fraudulent schemes. During a visit to
the shows office, Lourdes learned that 12 other persons were victimized by the group of
petitioners.
Lourdes also met with Atty. Renz Jaime, legal counsel of Final Access Marketing, who
assured her that Final Access Marketing would return her money by August. When he
reneged on his promise, formal demand was made on him to settle the obligation of said
business enterprise.
Erlinda Acosta (Erlinda) was one of the alleged victims of petitioners whom Lourdes met
while airing her complaint in the television program Hoy Gising. Erlinda testified that
she was referred to Besario when she was looking for a second-hand vehicle. She went to
the office of Final Access Marketing in Timog Avenue, Quezon City, and was shown by
Besario several pictures of vehicles from which she chose a Mitsubishi Pajero.
On April 7, 1998, Erlinda and her son met Besario, Rule and their other companions in a
restaurant. They brought the vehicle Erlinda wanted to purchase and her son drove it for
a road test. Thereafter, she agreed to buy the vehicle for P600,000.00. She signed a
Vehicle Sales Proposal and handed to Rule a downpayment of US$3,000.00.
On April 20, 1998, Erlinda delivered to Besario and Rule a managers check in the
amount of P245,000.00 as payment for the entire balance. She was then assured that the
vehicle will be delivered a week later. However, Besario and Rule reneged on their
promise. Erlinda went to the office of Final Access Marketing and complained to Franco
but to no avail. Her motor vehicle was never delivered. Thus, she went to Hoy Gising.
Juanito Antonio corroborated the testimony of his wife, Lourdes. He was present when
petitioners Franco and Besario, together with Rule, went to their house in the evening of
July 2, 1998 with a written proposal for the sale of a vehicle. After his wife signed the
document, she gave a downpayment of P80,000.00. When the car was not delivered on
the date agreed upon, he and his wife went to the office of Final Access Marketing. Upon
their inquiries, the security guard on duty said that the car they purchased already had a
gate pass and would be delivered in the afternoon. However, the said vehicle was never
delivered to them.
The Version of the Petitioners
Franco denied involvement in the alleged conspiracy to commit estafa
against Lourdes. She alleged that it was Torres, the owner of Final Access Marketing,
who was the swindler. And like Lourdes, she was a victim in this case.
Franco claimed that petitioner Besario hired her as a clerk-typist. She was
promoted to the position of Assistant Administrative Coordinator and was authorized to
solicit clients for Final Access Marketing.
Franco learned from her sister that Lourdes wanted to purchase a second-hand
car. She went to see Lourdes and presented to the latter a list of repossessed vehicles. She
gave her calling card to Lourdes before they parted. Later on, Lourdes called and visited
the office of Final Access Marketing, where Franco introduced Lourdes to Besario and
Rule.
Franco accompanied Lourdes to showrooms where the latter chose a blue Mazda
car with Plate No. PVB 999. Rule agreed to sell the car
to Lourdes for P130,000.00. Thus, on the evening of July 2, 1998, she, Besario and Rule
went to the house of Lourdes with a Vehicle Sales Proposal. Franco signed the document
without reading and understanding the same upon the insistence of Rule. Rule then
signed an official receipt and instructed Franco and Besario to return the next day to give
the same to Lourdes after collecting her downpayment. Lourdes was also assured that
the car would be delivered within three days from receipt of the downpayment.
On July 3, 1998, at around 10 a.m., Franco and Besario came back to collect the
downpayment. Lourdes gave her cash payment to Besario, who counted it. He gave said
cash to Franco, who counted it again. When the money was handed back to Besario, he
put it inside a black bag. Thereafter, Franco and Besario went to a restaurant to pick-up
Rule. They rode a taxi and proceeded to the house of Torres, but it was only Besario and
Rule who went inside. Franco went home without receiving a single centavo for her
transportation fare.
When the car was not delivered, Lourdes called Franco who in turn reminded her
boss to expedite its release. However, the continued failure to receive the vehicle
compelled Lourdes to report the incident to Hoy Gising. It was only during this period
that
Franco
learned
of
similar
complaints
from
other
Accused Franco and Besario are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
private complainant, Ma. Lourdes Antonio, the sum of P80,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, petitioners filed separate petitions for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision of the CA. Franco contends that the Court of Appeals decided the case on a
mistaken inference and [misappreciation] of facts bordering on speculations, surmises or
conjectures.[6]
On the other hand, Besario ascribes the following error to the CA:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY DISREGARDING THE LAW, JURISPRUDENCE AND EVIDENCE
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER BESARIO IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[7]
In its Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General opposes the petitions by arguing that
petitioners raise[d] questions of fact which are inappropriate in a petition for review
on certiorari. x x x.[8] The Solicitor General also believes the prosecutions evidence was
sufficient to convict petitioners of estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code and that petitioners defenses failed to overturn the evidence showing their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The petitions are not meritorious.
Exception to the Finality and Conclusiveness
of Factual Findings of the Court of Appeals
[A]s a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to
the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as
findings of fact are deemed conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[9] While this rule
is not without exception, there are no exceptional circumstances in these cases that
warrant a departure from the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA. Even after considering the merits, the petitions deserve outright denial.
their complaints with the company itself. Hence, we are at a loss why Franco, as the
companys Assistant Administrative Coordinator would feign ignorance of the same. We
also could not understand why after discovering her employers fraudulent transactions,
and after said employers absconded, Franco continued to report to their office. She did
not even bother to inform Lourdes that her employers had already absconded. Finally,
since she made representations to Lourdes that the car would be delivered in three days
time, the least that Franco could have done was to investigate the matter and explain
to Lourdes the companys failure to deliver the car. After all, Franco was a friend
of Lourdes niece.
Besario, for his part, actively conspired with Franco by inducing Lourdes to part
with her money. He also went to the house of Lourdes and induced the latter to make a
downpayment on the car she wanted to purchase and sign the Sales Proposal
Agreement. He and Franco collected the money from Lourdes and promised her that the
car would be delivered three days later even if he had knowledge from the previous
transaction with Erlinda that the delivery would never happen. Thereafter, he could not
be reached or found when the car was still undelivered and their devious plot was
exposed.
Evidently, petitioners actions were in relation to the attainment of a common
objective. They had vital roles in the nefarious scheme to sell a vehicle that they knew
would never be delivered, but for which they obtained a substantial sum of money
from Lourdes.
Having established the existence of a conspiracy between Franco and Besario, the
prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove that the acts of the petitioners
constituted estafa.
Estafa by Means of Deceit
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes fraud or deceit when
committed as follows:
xxxx
2. by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud:
(a)
by using fictitious name, or actions, falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing provision are: (1) there
must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money
or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[13]
Petitioners presented themselves to Lourdes as persons possessing the authority
and capacity to engage in the financing of used vehicles in behalf of Final Access
Marketing.This was a clear misrepresentation considering their previous knowledge not
only of Erlindas complaint but also of several others as regards the failure of Final Access
Marketing to deliver the motor vehicles bought. Lourdes relied on their
misrepresentations and parted with her money. Almost a week passed by, but petitioners
and Rule did not deliver the said motor vehicle. They also did not fulfill their subsequent
promise to provide a replacement or to refund her payment. When Lourdes visited the
office of Final Access Marketing to demand the return of her money, it was already
closed. She could not locate any of them except for Franco who denied any
wrongdoing. Consequently, she suffered damage.
If indeed they were innocent as they claimed to be, Erlindas complaint to
petitioners and the 12 other similar complaints with Hoy Gising regarding undelivered
vehicles should have dissuaded petitioners from further soliciting customers. The fact
that they continued to offer for sale a second-hand car to Lourdes is indicative of deceit
and their complicity in the conspiracy to commit estafa. The manner in which petitioners
transacted business with Erlinda and Lourdes as well as their awareness of 12 other
similar complaints with HoyGising were sufficient to establish the existence of a modus
operandi.
Francos attempt to escape culpability by feigning ignorance of the previously
failed transactions on the delivery of vehicles by Final Access Marketing cannot be
countenanced.As gleaned from the testimony of Erlinda, Franco was already with Final
Access Marketing at the time these transactions occurred. She was therefore familiar
with the companys procedure and policy on the sales of second-hand vehicles. She even
accompanied Lourdes to showrooms and introduced her to Besario and Rule.
As an employee of Final Access Marketing, Franco was expected to be familiar
with its daily activities. It would be unworthy of belief that she did not know of the
complaints for the unexplained failure of Final Access Marketing to deliver vehicles to its
customers. Human nature and experience would compel her to make queries on her own
to discover the reasons for the non-delivery of the vehicles. Her continued insistence in
soliciting Lourdes as a client by introducing herself as an Assistant Administrative
Coordinator of Final Access Marketing with the ability to provide financing for a vehicle
of her choice is therefore indicative of fraudulent misrepresentation.
The petitioners also contend that they are not criminally liable since the transaction
with Lourdes was a contract of sale. This contention does not deserve serious
consideration.While the fact that they entered into a contract with Lourdes cannot be
denied, the transaction transpired due to their deceit. It was their misrepresentation that
induced Lourdes to sign the Sales Proposal agreement and part with her money.
In denying any criminal wrongdoing, petitioners blame their co-accused, Torres,
whom they claim to be the owner of Final Access Marketing. The shifting of blame is
common among conspirators in their attempt to escape liability. It is a desperate strategy
to compensate for their weak defense. We are not readily influenced by such a
proposition since its obvious motive is to distort the truth and frustrate the ends of justice.
[14]
The Penalty
Having committed the crime of estafa, the petitioners must suffer the proper
penalties provided by law. The law imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount is
over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount swindled
exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed 20 years.[15] To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
reduced by one degree, that is, to prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. The minimum period of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full
range of the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which
is six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. With the amount
of the fraud at P80,000.00, there is P58,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Five years must
therefore be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty ranging from six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years. Thus, the maximum
term of the penalty would range from eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days to thirteen (13) years. This is in accord with our ruling in People v. Temparada,
[16]
viz:
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when
the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e. from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the
five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional since this is within the
range of prision correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty
of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum in its maximum period,
adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided
that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of prision correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum is
not prision mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of
which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the
RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The
incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted
by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year
shall be discarded as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance
with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. x
x x.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
CA rollo, pp. 185-199; penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Danilo B. Pine. .
[2]
Records, pp. 360-373; penned by Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[3]
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 373.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 199.
[6]
Rollo of G.R. No. 171328, p. 10.
[7]
Rollo of G.R. No. 171335, p. 17.
[8]
Id. at 197.
[9]
People v. Petralba, 482 Phil. 362, 374 (2004).
[10]
Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 641, 647 (2001).
[11]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 8.
[12]
Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387,
414-415.
[13]
RCL Feeders PTE., Ltd. v. Hon. Perez, 487 Phil. 211, 220-221 (2004).
[14]
People v. Macaliag, 392 Phil. 284, 299 (2000).
[15]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 315.
[16]
G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 283-284.
[4]
On December 4, 1989, an Information for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, was filed against Roberto Erquiaga, Glenn Orosco, Pastor Lawas and Manuel
Dayandante. Said information reads:
That on or about May 24, 1989, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, confederating, conspiring and helping one
another, under a common design or scheme, did then and there, by means of
misrepresentation and deceit, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud herein complaining
witness HONESTA P. BAL, in the following manner, to wit: accused above-named, well
knowing that the two hundred fifteen (215) sealed tins they are selling contain only starch,
misrepresented to the complaining witness that the same is made in Singapore as marine
product preservative and relying on said deceitful misrepresentation, the latter paid the value
of the two hundred fifteen (215) tins of said item at a unit price of P1,500.00 per can or for a
total price of P322,500.00, which turned out to be only starch with no significant commercial
value after the same were examined at the NBI Forensic Chemistry Examination Division,
Manila, thereby defrauding said complaining witness in the aforesaid sum of THREE
HUNDRED TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P322,500.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Upon arraignment, Erquiaga and Orosco pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Dayandante was
apprehended only during the latter part of 1992 and was tried separately, while Lawas is still atlarge.
On March 31, 1993, the RTC promulgated its decision finding the petitioners guilty of estafa. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Roberto Erquiaga, a.k.a. "Mr.
Guerrero" and Glenn Orosco, a.k.a. "Rey" guilty of the offense of estafa as defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, beyond reasonable
doubt and, in accordance with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period,
as minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum penalty. The said accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and
severally Honesta P. Bal, the herein offended party, the sum of Three Hundred Twenty Two
Thousand and Five Hundred (P322,500.00) Pesos, plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve
(12%) percent per annum computed from May 24, 1989 up to the time the said amount shall
have been paid in full, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision, while affirmed, should be
MODIFIED. The penalty should instead be FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
of prision correccional as the minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, Honesta Bal, the amount of P322,500.00 with
interest at 12% per annum starting May 24, 1989 until full payment; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed their separate motions for reconsideration 9 which the appellate court denied "for lack
of merit".10Petitioners now raise before us the following questions of law:
(1) Can the court validly render judgment of conviction based on mere conjectures, surmises
that there was conspiracy to commit the offense, if the evidence presented by the
prosecution is not strong enough to stand the test of reason?
(2) Can the legal maxim "flight is an evidence of guilt" prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence accorded to all accused in criminal case?
(2.1) Are the petitioners duty bound to prove their innocence?
(3) Can the loss in a consummated sale be converted to damages in a criminal case for
estafa without violating the maxim of "caveat emptor?"11
Petitioners contend that the trial court based its decision on mere conjectures and surmises and that
it was biased against them. They likewise assail the finding of conspiracy.12 Finally, they opine that
private complainant should bear her losses under the doctrine of caveat emptor.13
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, dismisses the issues raised by petitioners as
mere "rehash" of their previous arguments before the Court of Appeals, hence redundant. 14 In our
view, the pertinent issue in this case is whether conspiracy to commit estafa and estafa itself had
been adequately established. That petitioners had conspired with each other must be viewed not in
isolation from but in relation to an alleged plot, a sting, or "con operation" known as "negosyo" of
their group. Further, whether such a well-planned confidence operation resulted in the consummated
crime of estafa, however, must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. It
has to be shown as clearly as the commission of the offense. 15 It need not be by direct evidence, but
may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the
accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full
cooperation and participation.16 It may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during
and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments.17
We find that the following circumstances together, conclusively show petitioner Glenn Oroscos role
in defrauding Honesta: (1) Glenn a.k.a. "Rey" acted as salesman of the marine preservative. (2) He
providentially surfaced after Dayandante and Lawas had already primed up Honesta regarding
profits she would make buying and selling the product. (3) He conveniently had available a can of
the marine preservative after Dayandante and Lawas told her of the business possibility. (4) He led
Honesta to believe that the contents of the cans were indeed marine preservatives. At the very least,
he kept silent on the real contents of the cans. (5) He pretended to refuse the P5,000 down payment
from Honesta while inducing her to borrow the larger sum of P322,500. (6) He assured Honesta he
still had 50 cans and convinced her to shell out another P1,000 for him to deliver them. (7) He
disappeared with the other accused after their nefarious designs had been unearthed.
Petitioner Roberto Erquiaga, for his part, actively connived with Orosco. He did the following: (1) He
posed as "Mr. Guerrero", a "verifier" of the contents of the cans allegedly containing marine
preservative. (2) He also induced complainant to borrow more money and to hold on to the 215
cans. (3) He offered the P5,000 as down payment for the 215 cans. (4) He made the deal more
enticing for Honesta by promising to pay the 10% interest rate on the loan himself.
Patently, each petitioner played a key role in their devious scheme to sell a useless product, alleged
to be a marine preservative, for which they got a substantial amount from Honesta Bal.
But did the acts of petitioners constitute estafa?
The elements of estafa or swindling under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code18 are the following:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 19
As earlier discussed, Erquiaga misrepresented himself as a "verifier" of the contents of the cans. He
encouraged Honesta to borrow money. Petitioner Orosco misrepresented himself as a seller of
marine preservative. They used aliases, Erquiaga as "Mr. Guerrero"; and Orosco as "Rey". Honesta
fell for these misrepresentations and the lure of profits offered by petitioners made her borrow
money upon their inducement, and then petitioners disappeared from the scene after taking the
money from her.
Petitioners contend that the starch is a kind of marine preservative and that the failure of the
prosecution to prove otherwise should be enough reason to acquit them. 20 This argument deserves
no serious consideration by the Court. Note that what was being offered to Honesta was a
preservative from "Taiwanese Marine Products." What was delivered was ordinary starch in sealed
cans. The scam is quite obvious, though suckers still fall for it.
Petitioners suggest that damages should not be awarded because Honesta was forewarned to buy
at her own risk and because the doctrine of caveat emptor placed her on guard. Petitioners
apparently misapply the doctrine. A basic premise of the doctrine of "Let the buyer beware" is that
there be no false representation by the seller. As discussed earlier, petitioners scheme involves a
well-planned scenario to entice the buyer to pay for the bogus marine preservative. Even the initial
buy-and-sell transactions involving one and then five cans were intended for confidence building
before the big transaction when they clinched the deal involving P322,500. Thereafter, they vanished
from the scene. These circumstances clearly show that petitioners Orosco and Erquiaga were in on
the plot to defraud Honesta. Honesta could hardly be blamed for not examining the goods. She was
made to depend on petitioners supposed expertise. She said she did not open the cans as there
was a label in each with a warning that the seal should not be broken. 21 That Honesta Bal thought
the buy-and-sell business would result in a profit for her is no indictment of her good faith in dealing
with petitioners. The ancient defense of caveat emptor belongs to a by-gone age, and has no place
in contemporary business ethics.
It is not true that Honesta did not suffer any damage because she merely borrowed the money, and
that she showed no proof that she issued a check to pay said debt.22 The prosecution clearly showed
that Bichara had sent a demand letter to Honesta asking for payment. 23 Honesta had borrowed
P322,500 from Bichara for which she assuredly must repay. This constitutes business loses to her
and, in our view, actual damages as contemplated under Article 315, par. 2 (a). 24
Given the facts established in this case, we are convinced that estafa had been consummated by
petitioners who had conspired with each other, and the guilt of petitioners had been adequately
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court as
modified by the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Petitioners Roberto Erquiaga and Glenn Orosco are
found guilty of estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. They are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional as minimum, and TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further,
they are also ordered to pay jointly and severally as indemnity to Honesta Bal the sum of P322,500
with interest of 12% per annum until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
It was May 21, 1989, as per Josephines testimony, TSN, February 5, 1991, p. 11, but she
denied this during her cross-examination, TSN, February 5, 1991, pp. 40-41.
3
Records, p. 1.
Id. at 40-41.
10
Id. at 212.
11
Rollo, p. 10.
12
Id. at 13-17.
13
Id. at 20-21.
14
Id. at 74.
15
People vs. Legaspi, G.R. No. 117802, 331 SCRA 95, 125 (2000).
16
Ibid.
People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 128890, 332 SCRA 485, 496 (2000), citing People vs.
Parungao, G.R. No. 125812, 265 SCRA 140, 149 (1996).
17
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
18
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
xxx
19
20
21
22
23
24
Supra, note 18