Persons Finals Reviewers

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Xavier University College of Law (2016) BLOCK B

Lorenzo Elegio III, Sittie Aina Munder, Joseph Ian Sabado
Reviewer for
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW1
Finals (A.Y. 2016-2017)
TITLE IV
PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES
I. General provisions
Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and
wife shall be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the
marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom.
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage
settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute
community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete
separation of property, or any other regime. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime
agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of
property as established in this Code shall govern.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage
settlements may be valid, it must be made before the
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification
thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and
executed before the celebration of the marriage. They
shall not prejudice third persons unless they are
registered in the local civil registry where the marriage
contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of
properties.
- Marriage settlement/ante nuptial agreement
agreement entered into before marriage, and in
consideration thereof, between an intended husband and
wife, by which the enjoyment or devolution of property is
regulated.
- Theory of freedom of stipulation the law is merely
suppletory to the will of the parties in the
determination of the regime for the marriage
(Pangalanagan).
*Sempio-Dy: Agreement of the parties embodied in the

marriage settlement executed by them before their
marriage prevails over the provisions of law on the
matter of their property relations during their marriage.
- If no MS or if MS is void. Apply system of ACP in FC.
The nullity of a stipulation does not carry with it the nullity
of the entire marriage settlement.
- Void stipulations. Stipulations of contracts should not
be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy (Art. 1306 CC).
- Those contrary to the nature and purpose of
marriage (stipulations to consider the union dissolved
for reasons other than death and annulment or
invalidity of marriage, or which relieve a spouse of
his/her moral obligations to the other or to the
children, or of their obligations to support and
educate the latter), to the liberty and rights of
individuals (agreement prohibiting the surviving
spouse from contracting a subsequent marriage,
imposing the isolation of the wife, or preventing the
exercise of any individual right), or to morals and
good customs (stipulations fixing monetary penalty
for infidelity, depriving either party of the right to ask
for legal separation when the ground exists, or
effecting the purchase of one of the spouses or the
consent of the parent)
- Those which violate legal provisions of a prohibitory
or mandatory character all legal precepts related to
public order
- Those which are derogatory to the authority of the
spouses in the family, or those contrary to public
order or public policy stipulation that the wife shall
not follow the domicile of the family, or that the wife
shall have patria potestas over the children of the
marriage or that she will have the exclusive obligation
to support such children
- Local custom is defined as a rule of conduct formed
by repetition of acts uniformly observed as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. The law requires that a
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules
of evidence.
1 Incorporating the commentaries of Arturo Tolentino (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the

Civil Code of the Philippines Volume 1), Alicia Sempio-Diy (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines), and Melencio Sta. Maria (Persons and Family Relations Law), and the lectures of
Elizabeth Pangalangan (UP) and Silvia Jo Sabio (XU).
Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

Xavier University College of Law (2016) BLOCK B | Lorenzo Elegio III, Sittie Aina Munder, Joseph Ian Sabado
- Property regimes that may be agreed upon in

the marriage settlement. Future spouses may
agree on:
a. Regime of absolute community (ACP)
b. Conjugal partnership of gains (CPG)
c. Complete separation of property (CSP)
d. A combination of the above regimes. Sta.
Maria: Mixed up regime
e. Any other regime, like the dowry system,
whereby the female before the marriage delivers
a dowry or property to the male to help out in the
marriage obligations, but at the end of the
marriage, the property or its value must be
returned
- Valid MS must be in writing. The requirement that
an ante nuptial agreement must be in writing is
mandatory not only for the purpose of enforceability
but, more importantly, for its validity. An oral marriage
settlement, therefore, is void and cannot be ratified
by any claim of partial execution or absence of
objection (Sta. Maria).
- Under FC, ACP is the default regime. Exception:
In the event that a marriage is terminated by the
death of one of the spouses and the surviving
spouse marries again without initiating any judicial or
extrajudicial settlement of the properties of his or her
previous marriage within one year from the death of
the deceased spouse, a mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage.
- If spouses stipulated that ACP shall not exist
between them, but do not state the rules or
regime by which their property shall be
governed.
*Tolentino: The property relations of the spouses
shall be regulated by custom. If not, intention of the
parties should be sought as first criterion.
*Pangalangan: First, determine the intention of the
parties as to what system they really want and for
this purpose, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be considered. Second, if
intention cannot be ascertained, then apply the
local custom in accordance with Art. 74 (3). Lastly,
if there is no local custom, apply the rules on coownership.
*Sta. Maria: Apply the local custom. If MS provides
that neither the ACP nor local custom shall prevail
in the marriage without particularizing any other
valid property, such provision is void. Being void,
the ACP shall prevail.
- Property regime cannot be altered after
marriage, except in few instances. Any
extrajudicial agreement between the spouses
separating their properties is void. Whatever regime

the spouses may adopt is unchangeable and cannot
be altered once the marriage has been celebrated.
Exceptions:
- Art. 66 & 67. Reconciliation and revival of
previous property regime in case of LS.
- Art. 128. If a spouse abandons the other or fails
to comply with his/her obligations, the aggrieved
spouse may ask the court for receivership or
judicial separation of property, or for sole
administration of the CPG.
- Art. 135 & 136. Permits separation of property
either by petition of one spouse for just cause.
- Requisites of MS modifications. The general rule
is that, in order that any modification in the marriage
settlements may be valid: (1) it must be made before
the celebration of the marriage, (2) in writing and (3)
signed by the parties. Exceptions: Arts. 66, 67, 128,
135, & 136.
- MS should not prejudice third party except
when registered in proper civil registries. The MS
does not only affect the parties but also third persons
who may enter into contracts with the spouses or
either of them. Hence, third persons should know
what property regime governs the property relations
of the spouses. To bind third persons, the marriage
settlement and any modification thereof must be
registered in the local civil registrar where the
marriage contract is recorded and in the proper
registries of property.
*Pangalangan: If MS is not registered it will not
prejudice third persons, and the ACP will apply as
to them.
*Sabio: MS is unenforceable with respect to third
party.
.
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract
marriage may also execute his or her marriage
settlements, but they shall be valid only if the
persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to
the marriage are made parties to the agreement,
subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement
executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil
interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject
to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for
the guardian appointed by a competent court to be
made a party thereto.
- Consent by those designated by law. Art. 15 FC:
consent can be obtained from father, mother,

surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal

charge, in order.
*Sta. Maria: The applicability of Article 78 is now in
doubt by virtue of the effectivity on December 18,
1989 of Republic Act No. 6809 which specifically
provides that a person, whether male or female,
attains the age of majority upon reaching 18 years
of age. A marriage contracted by a person below
18 years of age is, according to Article 35(1), void
ab initio. Thus, the phrase a minor who according
to law may contract marriage under Article 78 has
been impliedly repealed considering that no minor
now may contract a valid marriage.
- Civil interdiction. Art. 34 RPC: Civil interdiction
shall deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of
any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage
his property, and of the right to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
- Disabilities include civil interdiction, hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf-mutes who are unable to read
and write, those being of unsound mind, by reason of
age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property
.
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a
marriage settlement, the property relations of the
spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws,
regardless of the place of the celebration of the
marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
affecting property not situated in the Philippines and
executed in the country where the property is
located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
entered into in the Philippines but affecting property
situated in a foreign country whose laws require
different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
- If the contracting parties are Filipinos, their
property relations will be governed by Philippine
laws in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary. This rule applies even if they are married
abroad or even if they reside abroad.
- Art.16 CC: Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
- First paragraph of Art. 80 is not applicable

where both spouses are aliens married in the
Philippines. If one spouse is Filipino and the other is
alien, they will select what law shall govern their
property regime.
.
Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or
contracts referred to in the preceding articles in
consideration of a future marriage, including
donations between the prospective spouses made
therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does
not take place. However, stipulations that do not
depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall
be valid.
- Donations propter nuptias (DPN) are also
rendered void under the above provision if the
marriage does not take place. BUT under the CC,
such donations are not automatically revoked by the
non-celebration of the marriage, but still need to be
revoked by the donor under Art. 132 (2).
- Stipulation that does not depend upon
celebration of marriage: admission of paternity of
an illegitimate child, provision for support, etc.
.
II. Donations by reasons of marriage
Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those
which are made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same, and in favor of one or
both of the future spouses.
Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules
on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book
III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified
by the following articles.
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime
other than the absolute community of property, they
cannot donate to each other in their marriage
settlements more than one-fifth of their present
property. Any excess shall be considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by
the provisions on testamentary succession and the
formalities of wills.
- Donation by reason of marriage is known as
donation propter nuptias. They are without
onerous consideration, the marriage being merely

the occasion or motive for the donation, not its

causa.
*Sta. Maria: Giving a donation propter nuptias to a
would-be spouse prior to the marriage is useless if
the property regime that will govern their marriage
is the absolute community of property.
- Requisites of DPN: (1) made before the
celebration of the marriage, (2) made in
consideration of the marriage, (3) made in favor of
one or both of the future spouses.
- DPN exclude those (1) made in favor of the
spouses after the celebration of the marriage, (2) in
favor of future of spouses made before the
celebration of the marriage, but not in consideration
of the marriage (3) in favor of persons other than the
spouses, even though founded on the marriage
(parents of the female, children of one spouse by
previous marriage).
- Who may donate: the spouses to each other;
parents to one or both of the spouses; third persons
to either or both spouses.
Donations Propter
Nuptias
1. Does not require
express acceptance
2. May be made by
minors
3. May include future
property (same rule as
wills)
4. If present property is
donated and property
regime is not absolute
community, limited to 1/5
5. Grounds for revocation
are found in Art. 86
Ordinary Donations
Express acceptance is
necessary
Cannot be made by minors
Cannot
property
include
future
No limit to donation of
present property provided
legitimes are not impaired
Grounds for revocation are
found in law on donations
- Rules governing ordinary donations under Title

III of Book III of the Civil Code must be observed:
The donee must accept the donation personally, or
through an authorized person with a special power
for the purpose, or with a general or sufficient power;
otherwise, the donation shall be void (Art. 745 CC).
The acceptance must be made during the lifetime of
the donor and the donee (Art. 746 CC). Likewise,
according to the Civil Code, the donation of a
movable may be made orally or in writing. An oral
donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the
thing or of the document representing the right
donated. If the value of the personal property
donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation
and the acceptance shall be made in writing.
Otherwise, the donation shall be void. In order that

the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must
be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which
the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be
made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it
is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form
and this step shall be noted in both instruments (Sta.
Maria).
- Modifications of the general rules on donations:
(1) DPN do not require express acceptance by the
donee; (2) If made by minors, must be with consent
of those who are required to consent to the marriage;
(3) Cannot exceed 1/5 of the present property of the
donor, when made by future spouses to each other;
(4) Can include future property; (5) Not revoked by
the subsequent birth or reappearance of children; (6)
Revoked by the non-performance of the marriage
and the other causes in Art 86 of FC (Tolentino).
- DPN not more than one-fifth. Article 84
contemplates a situation where the parties are not
yet married. Ratio: to prevent one spouse from
unduly exerting influence on the other. A donation is
an act of pure liberality on the part of the donor. It is
not negotiated. Neither is a donation a settlement in
itself. Though a donation may be contained in a
marriage settlement, it cannot be considered as part
of the property settlement.
- The not more than one-fifth limitation will not
apply if DPN not contained in MS and is made in a
separate deed of donation (Sta. Maria).
.
Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property
subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is
sold for less than the total amount of the obligation
secured, the donee shall not be liable for the
deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the
total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be
entitled to the excess.
- If donees rights are subject to the
encumbrance, the donation is still valid. If the
object of the donation has been foreclosed to answer
for the unpaid debt of the donor, the donee shall not
be liable for any deficiency in the event the amount
obtained as a result of the foreclosure is less than
the amount of the debt of the donor which was
supposed to be satisfied by the foreclosure. The

donee could not be held liable for the deficiency as

he is not a debtor with respect to the principal
obligation incurred by the donor.
.
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be
revoked by the donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially
declared void ab initio except donations made in the
marriage settlements, which shall be governed by
Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the
consent of the parents or guardian, as required by
law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee
acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty
spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the
condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of
ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil
Code on donations in general.
***DPN may be revoked by the donor, grounds:
1. Marriage not celebrated or judicially declared void,
except DPNs made in the marriage settlements;
2. Marriage without the consent of the parents or
guardian;
3. Annulment, and the donee acted in bad faith;
4. Legal separation, the donee being the guilty
spouse;
5. Compliance of resolutory condition;
6. Donee committed an act of ingratitude
- The donor may not exercise the right and allow the
donee to keep the property. The action to revoke the
donation may be waived by the donor (Tolentino).
- DPN also revoked by operations of law: (1) Void
bigamous marriage (Art. 40 in relation to Arts. 52 &
53), donee-spouse acted in bad faith; (2) Voidable
bigamous marriage (Art. 41), donee-spouse acted in
bad faith; (3) DPN made in the marriage settlement,
if the marriage does not take place; (4) if the DPN is
subject to a suspensive condition and the condition
does not take place.
- Prescriptive periods for filing action for
revocation of donations. In case of a legal
III. System of Absolute Community (Arts. 88-104)
IV. Conjugal Partnership Property (Arts. 105-133)
VI. Regime of Separation of Property (Arts. 143-146)
separation, it must be brought w/in 5 yrs. From the

time the decree of legal separation has become final.
Prescriptive periods in other provisions of the CC
should apply depending on the ground for
revocation:
1. If the marriage is not celebrated: Written
donation 10 yrs (Art. 1144, par 1); Oral
donation 6 yrs (Art. 1145, par 1)
2. If marriage is declared void ab initio: same as
in par (1) hereof
3. When marriage takes place w/o consent 4
yrs, being an injury not founded upon contract
(Art. 1146, par 1)
4. If resolutory condition is complied with - same
as in par (1) hereof
5. When marriage is annulled - same as in par
(3) hereof
6. If donee committed an act of ingratitude 1 yr
from donors knowledge of the fact (Art. 769)
.
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall
also apply to persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage.
- Reasons for prohibition of donation: (1) prevent
the weaker spouse from being influenced by the
stronger spouse; (2) protect creditors; (3) prevent an
indirect modification of the marriage settlement
during the marriage.
- Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which
the spouses may give each other on the occasion of
any family rejoicing.
- What is moderate is relative to the financial
capacity of spouses (Sabio).
- The prohibition also applies to persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.

Elements
General provisions
Absolute Community of Property
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Definition of ACP. The husband and the wife are

considered as co-owners of all properties they
bring into the marriage (those that they owned
before the marriage), as well as the properties
acquired during the marriage, except for certain
properties express excluded by law.
Definition of CPG. Under the regime of CPG,

the husband and wife place in a common fund
the proceeds, products, fruits and income from
their separate properties and those acquired
by either or both spouses through their efforts
or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained by either or both spouses
shall be divided equally between them, unless
otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements
(Art. 106).
Time of commencement. The ACP between

spouses shall commence at the precise moment
the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation express
or implied for the commencement of the community
regime at any other time shall be void (Art. 88).
Time of commencement. Same (Art. 107).

Waiver of rights. No waiver of rights, interests,
shares and effects of the ACP during the marriage
can be made except in the case of JSP (Art. 89).
When the waiver takes place upon a JSP, or after
the marriage has been dissolved and annulled, the
same shall appear in a public instrument and shall
be recorded as provided in Art. 77. The creditors of
the spouse who made such waiver to the extent of
the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their
credits.
Default application of co-ownership. The
provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the ACP
between the spouses in all matters not provided for
in this chapter.
Waiver of rights. Same (Art. 107).

Supplementary application of FC. In case
the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that the regime of CPG shall
govern their property relations during
marriage, the provisions in this chapter shall
be of supplementary application (Art. 105).
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply
to CPG already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws
as provided in Art. 256.
Default
application
of
contract
of
partnership. The CP shall be governed by the
rules on the contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in this chapter or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements.
Com
Definitio
dispose
or her o
the cons
belong
professio
natural,
during th
property
Supplem
the futu
settleme
marriage
Separatio
Chapter
143).
Scope o
refer to
may be
property
pertain to
Kinds of
- Conven
in their M
- Judicial

Elements
Inclusions
General rule. Unless otherwise provided in this

Chapter or in MS, the community property shall
consist of (Art. 91):
1. All property owned by the spouses at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
2. Acquired thereafter
General rule. All property acquired during the

marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in
the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved
(Art. 116).
On conversions. When an exclusive property is

converted, i.e. from one form to another, the
resultant property shall belong to the ACP.
Properties involved. The following are CPG

(Art. 117):
1. Those acquired by onerous title
during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership or
for only one of the spouses.
2. Those obtained from the labor,
industry, work or profession of either
or both of the spouses.
3. The fruits, natural, industrial or civil,
due or received during the marriage
from the common property, as well as
the net fruits from the exclusive
property of each spouse.
Com

Elements

4.
5.
6.
7.
The share of either spouse in the

hidden treasure which the law awards
to the finder or owner of the property
where the treasure is found
Those acquired through occupation
such as fishing or hunting.
Livestock
existing
upon
the
dissolution of the partnership in
excess of the number of each kind
brought to the marriage by either
spouse; and
Those which are acquired by chance,
such as winnings from gambling or
betting. However, losses therefrom
shall be borne exclusively by the
loser-spouse.
On properties on installment. Property

bought on installments paid partly from
exclusive funds of either or both spouses and
partly from conjugal funds belongs to the:
- Buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested
before the marriage (e.g. contract of sale).
- Conjugal partnership if such ownership was
vested during the marriage (e.g. contract to
sell).
In either case, any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses shall
be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership (Art. 118).
Credits
collected
during
marriage.
Whenever an amount or credit payable within
a period of time belong to one of the spouses,
the sums which may be collected during the
marriage in partial payments or by installments
on the principal shall belong to the CP (Art.
119).
On improvements. The ownership of
improvements,
whether
for
utility
or
adornment, made on the separate property of
the spouses at the expense of the partnership
or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the
following rules:
1.
When the cost of the improvement

made by the CP and any resulting
increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of
improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to
Com

Elements
2.
the conjugal partnership, subject to

reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner spouse at the
time of the improvement;
Otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner
spouse,
likewise
subject
to
reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement;
In either case, the ownership of the entire

property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at the
time of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
On conversions. The conversion of a
paraphernal property shall not affect its
exclusive character.
Exclusions
General Rule. The following shall be excluded

from the community property (Art. 92):
1. Property acquired during the marriage by
gratuitous title by either spouse, and the
fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the
donor, testator or grantor that they shall
form part of the community property.
2. Property for personal and exclusive use of
either spouse. However jewelry shall form
part of the common property.
3. Property acquired before the marriage by
either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and
the fruits as well as the income, if any of
such property.
Exception. Property acquired during the marriage
is presumed to belong to the community, unless it
is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom
(Art. 93).
Paraphernal properties. The following shall

be the exclusive property of each spouse (Art.
109):
1. That which is brought to the marriage
as his or her own.
2. That which each acquires during the
marriage by gratuitous title
3. That which is acquired by right of
redemption, by barter or by exchange
with property belonging to only one of
the spouses; and
4. That which is purchased with
exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband.
Ownership, possession, administration of
paraphernal properties. The spouses retain
ownership, possession, administration and
enjoyment of their exclusive properties. Either
spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the
administration of his or her exclusive property
to the other by means of a public instrument,
which shall be recorded in the registry of
property of the place where the property is
located (Art. 110).
The alienation of any exclusive property of
a spouse administered by the other
automatically terminates the administration
over such property and the proceeds of the
alienation shall be turned over to the ownerspouse (Art. 112)
Com
10

Elements
Com
Property donated or left by will to the

Spouses, jointly and with designation of
determinate shares, shall pertain to the doneespouses as his or her own exclusive property,
and in the absence of designation, share and
share alike, without prejudice to the right of
accretion when proper (Art. 113).
If the donations are onerous, the amount of
the charges shall be borne by the exclusive
property of the donee spouse, whenever they
have been advanced by the CPG (Art. 114).
***Charges
obligations
and
The ACP shall be liable for (Art. 94):

Support
1. The support of the spouses, their common
children and legitimate children of either
spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by
the provisions of this code on support.
Debts and obligations
2. All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated
administrator spouse for the benefit of the
community, or by both spouses, or by one
spouse with the consent of the other.
3. Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have been
benefitted.
Taxes, liens, etc.
4. All taxes, liens, charges and expenses,
including major and minor repairs, upon
the common property.
5. All taxes and expenses for mere
preservation made during the marriage
upon the separate property of either
spouse used by the family.
Expenses for education/self-improvement
6. Expenses to enable either spouse to
commence or complete a professional or
vocational course, or other activity for selfimprovement.
7. The value of what is donated or promised
Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities,

gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits
shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or
onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each
case (Art. 115).
The CPG shall be liable for (Art. 121):
The same with Art. 94 on Support, Debts and
obligations, Taxes, liens, etc., Expenses for
education/ self-improvement, Ante-nuptial
debts, and Litigation expense.
Solidary liability. If the common property is
insufficient to the cover the foregoing liabilities,
the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties.
Payment of debts. The payment of personal
debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Neither shall the fines and indemnities
imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts
contracted by either spouse before the
marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been recovered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient;
but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership, such spouse shall be charged for
Both s
expense
in case
the curr
propertie
The liab
family e
(Art. 146
The pro
amount
property
Each sp
contracte
- When o
other sp
latter
- When
obligation
former s
unjust en
Neither
from the
advice, o
merely a
11

Elements

by both spouses in favor of their common
legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a
professional or vocational course or other
activity for self-improvement.
Com
what has been paid for the purposes abovementioned (Art. 122).
On gambling/ games of chance. Same, not
to be charged to CP (Art. 123).
Antenuptial debts
8. Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar
as they have redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Other debts and expenses (criminal liabilities,
litigation, etc.)
9. Antenuptial debts of either spouse not
redounded to the benefit of the family, the
support of illegitimate children of either
spouse and liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or a quasidelict, in case of absence or insufficiency
of the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the payment of which shall be
considered as advances to be deducted
from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
liquidation of the community.
Litigation expense
10. Expenses of litigation between spouses
unless the suit is found to be groundless.
Solidary liability. If the common property is
insufficient to the cover the foregoing liabilities,
except those falling under paragraph 9, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties.
Ownership,
administration,
enjoyment
and
disposition
On gambling/ games of chance. Whatever may

be lost during the marriage in any game of chance,
or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law,
shall be borne by the loser and shall not be
charged to the community but any winnings
therefrom shall form part of the conjugal
partnership property (Art. 95).
Who shall administer the common property.
The administration and enjoyment of the common
property shall belong to both spouses jointly (Art.
96).
In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
Who shall administer the common

property. The administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal property shall belong to both
spouses jointly (Art. 124).
The same provisions with that of ACP in
case of disagreement and if one spouse is
incapacitated (Art. 124, Par. 2).
The same provisions with that of ACP on
Who s
property
possess,
separate
the othe
earnings
or indust
civil, due
or her se
12

Elements

If one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the
common properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse.

donations of conjugal partnership property
(Art. 125).
In the absence of such authority or consent, the

disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors (Art.
96, Par. 2).
Will of interest. Either spouse may dispose by will
of his or her interest in the community property.
Dissolution
Donation of community property. Neither spouse

may donate any community property without the
consent of the other. However, either spouse may,
without consent of the other make moderate
donations from the common property for charity or
on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress
(Art. 98).
Effectivity of dissolution. The absolute
community terminates (Art. 99):
1. Upon death of either spouse.
2. When there is a decree of legal
separation.
3. When the marriage is annulled or
declared void.
4. In case of judicial separation of property
during the marriage under Art. 134 to 138.
The separation in fact between husband and wife
shall not affect the regime of absolute community
(Art. 100). Exceptions:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal
home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be
supported.
2. When the consent of one spouse to any
transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be obtained in
a summary proceeding.
3. In the absence of sufficient community
property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
Effectivity of dissolution. Same reasons with

that of ACP (Art. 126).
The separation in fact between husband and
wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal
partnership (Art. 127), for the same
exceptions enumerated in Art. 100.
abandonment without just cause (Art. 128).
Com
- The w
manage
however
because
apply to
- Proof
evidence
spouse
registere
to be th
spouse i
be the ow
13

Elements
support of the family. The spouse present

shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authorization
to administer or encumber any specific
separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to
satisfy the latters share.
Liquidation
If a spouse without just cause abandons 2 the

other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to
the family,3 the aggrieved spouse may petition the
court for, subject to such precautionary conditions
as the court may impose (Art. 101):
1. Receivership,
2. Judicial separation of property or
3. Authority to be the sole administrator of
the absolute community
Dissolution by legal separation, annulment,
declaration of nullity. Upon dissolution of the
absolute community regime, the following
procedure shall apply (Art. 102):
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the
absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each spouse.
2. The debts and obligations of the absolute
community shall be paid out of its assets.
In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate
properties in accordance with the
provisions if the 2nd par. of Art 94.
3. Whatever remains of the exclusive
properties of the spouses shall thereafter
be delivered to each of them.
4. The net remainder of the properties of the
absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife. Exceptions:
Different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the MS
Voluntary waiver of such share as
Dissolution by legal separation, annulment,

declaration of nullity. Upon dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime, the following
procedure shall apply (Art. 129):
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the
absolute
community
and
the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
2. Amounts advanced by the conjugal
partnership in payments of personal
debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the
conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.
3. Each spouse shall be reimbursed for
the use of his or her exclusive funds
in the acquisition of property or for
the value of his or her exclusive
property, the ownership of which has
been vested by law in the conjugal
partnership.
4. The debts and obligations of the
conjugal partnership shall be paid out
of the conjugal assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the
2 The spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. Meaning, the spouse who has left
the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to
give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have
no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling (Art. 101, Par. 3).
3 The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital,
parental or property relations (Art. 101, Par. 2).
Com
14

Elements

5.
6.
Forfeiture of the shares of net profits

of guilty spouse.4
Presumptive legitimes of the common
children shall be delivered upon partition,
in accordance with Art. 51.
The conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall be adjudicated to
the spouse whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain.5
5.
6.
Dissolution by death. Upon the termination of the
marriage by death, the community property shall
be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the diseased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the
surviving spouse shall liquidate the community
property either judicially or extrajudicially within one
year from the death of the deceased spouse. If
upon the lapse of the said period, no liquidation is
made, any disposition or encumbrance involving
the community property of the terminated marriage
shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a
subsequent marriage without compliance with
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Two or more marriages before FC. Whenever the
liquidation of the community properties of two or
more marriages contracted by the same person
before the effectivity of this code is carried out
7.
8.
9.
spouses shall be solidarily liable for

the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (2)
of Art 121.
Whatever remains of the exclusive
properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of
them.
Unless the owner had been
indemnified from whatever source,
the loss or deterioration of movables
used for the benefit of the family,
belonging to either spouse, even due
to fortuitous event, shall be paid to
said spouse from the conjugal funds
if any.
The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute
the profits, which shall be delivered
equally between husband and wife.
Exceptions:
Different proportion or division
was agreed upon in the MS
Voluntary waiver of such share
as provided in this code.
Forfeiture of the shares of net
profits of guilty spouse.6
Presumptive legitimes of the common
children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Art. 51.
The conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse whom the
4 Computation of net profits. For the purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Art. 43 (2) and 63 (2), the said profits shall be the increase
in value between the market value of the common property at the time of celebration of
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
5 Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties in the partition of the properties. Children
below the age of 7 years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of the said children. NB: This provision does not apply to
void marriages referred to in Art. 147 or 148 FC.
6 Supra note 4.
Com
15

Elements

simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and
income of each community shall be determined
upon such proof as may be considered according
to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to
which community the existing properties belong,
the same shall be divided between or among the
different communities in proportion to the capital
and duration of each.

majority of the common children
choose to remain.7
dissolution by death and subsequent
marriage without compliance.
The same provisions with that of ACP on two
or more marriages before FC, with additional
provisions:
The Rules of Court on the administration of
estates of deceased persons shall be
observed in the appraisal and sale of property
of the conjugal partnership, and other matters
which are not expressly determined in this
chapter (Art. 132).
From the common mass of property support
shall be given to the surviving spouse and to
the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to
them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support
which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to
them (Art. 133).
V. Separation of Property of the Spouses and

Administration of Common Property by One
Spouse during the Marriage
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in
the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order. Such judicial
separation of property may either be voluntary or for
sufficient cause.
- The regime of separation of property may be:
- Agreed upon by the spouses in a marriage
settlement
- Judicially ordered in proper cases upon petition of
one spouse
- By voluntary agreement of the spouses during
the marriage, with judicial approval
- Decreed in legal separation
- Compulsory, in the case of a subsequent
marriage of a spouse who failed to liquidate the
7 Supra note 5.
conjugal or ACP of his/her preceding marriage

dissolved by death (Arts. 103&130).
- CSP is the only property regime that may not
commence at the celebration of marriage
- This article is deficient since it fails to take into
account the compulsory separation of property,
imposed by law, in a subsequent marriage of a
spouse who failed to liquidate the ACP or CPG of
his/her preceding marriage dissolved by death of the
former spouse.
*Tolentino: Before the law, every contract of
separation of property executed by the spouses
without judicial approval during the marriage is
non-existent. The fact that the spouses are
separated without judicial sanction does not bring
about a regime of separation of property; the ACP
or CPG will not be affected (Arts. 100&127). An
agreement of separation of property may be
submitted to the court for approval; and if
approved, a decree of separation of property will
be issued. The separation of property, however, is
Com
16

not effected by the contract or agreement of the

parties, but by the decree of the court approving
the same. It becomes effective only upon judicial
approval without which it is void.
- Separation of property shall not take place
except by judicial order. Judicial separation of
property may be [a] voluntary, or by agreement; or [b]
for sufficient cause (improves Art190 CC). In case of
voluntary separation of property, the contract or
agreement for separation of property is void, even if
the parties consent to it, if it is without judicial
approval (Sempio-Diy).
.
Art.135. Any of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
1. That the spouse of the petitioner has been
sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction;
2. That the spouse of the petitioner has been
judicially declared an absentee;
3. That loss of parental authority of the spouse of
petitioner has been decreed by the court;
4. That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned
the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided in Article 101;
5. That the spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage settlements has
abused that power; and
6. That at the time of the petition, the spouses have
been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in nos. 1, 2 and 3, the
presentation of the final judgment against the guilty
or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant
of the decree of judicial separation of property.
- Grounds for JSP both by sufficient cause (1-6)
and voluntary/agreement (7) (Sta. Maria):
1. Civil interdiction. The accessory penalty of
civil interdiction deprives the offender during the
time of his or her sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship, either as to
the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and
of the right to dispose of such property by any
act or any conveyance inter vivos.
2. Declaration of absence. Two years having
elapsed without any news about the absentee or
since the receipt of the last news, and five years
in case the absentee has left a person in charge
of the administration of his property, his absence
may be declared. The judicial declaration of
absence shall not take effect until six months

after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
3. Loss of parental authority. The loss of such
authority over the common child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, of the spouse of the
petitioner and the petitioner, or over the child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the spouse
of the petitioner with another person. The law
does not distinguish.
4. Abandonment and failure to comply with
obligations to the family. A spouse is deemed
to have abandoned the other when he or she
has left the conjugal dwelling without any
intention of returning8 and with an intent to
absolutely forego his or her family duties.
5. Abuse of administration. Connotes willful
and utter disregard of the interests of the
partnership, evidenced by a repetition of
deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to
the latter.
6. Separation in fact. Spouses must have been
separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
7. Voluntary separation. Spouses may agree
on the separation of their ACP or CPG. The
petition to be fi led in court need not state any
reason for the conversion. The agreement of the
parties is enough. But if the reason is stated and
the same is against public policy, the court must
reject the agreement.
- A petition for separation must be filed by the
spouse entitled to ask for it, and the court should
grant the petition. It is the court order granting the
petition that will effect the separation of property
(Tolentino). In cases 1-3, judicial decree is enough
for court to approve JSP (Sta. Maria). In cases 4 to
6, there must be proof of the cause or ground for
separation of property (Sempio-Diy).
.
Art.136. The spouses may jointly file a verified
petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
8 Art. 101 FC: The spouse who has left the

conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same
period to give any information as to his or
her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling
17

of gains, and for the separation of their common

properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as well as the personal
creditors of the spouses, shall be listed in the petition
and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take
measures to protect the creditors and other persons
with pecuniary interests.
- The law does not state the reasons w/c would
justify the court in approving a voluntary agreement
of the parties for separation of property. The intention
of the law is to leave the sufficiency of such reasons
to the sound discretion of the court (Tolentino).
- Procedure in voluntary agreement for
separation of property (Sempio-Diy):
1. Spouses will file a verified joint petition w/ the
court for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute
community (AC) or conjugal partnership (CP)
2. The petition shall list all the creditors of the AC
or CP as well as personal creditors
3. Creditors shall be personally notified
4. Publication may be ordered for the protection of
creditors
5. During the pendency of the proceedings, the AC
or CP shall pay for the support of the spouses and
their children
6. After the hearing, the court shall enter a decree
of separation of property bet the spouses, after w/c
the spouses will already be governed by the
regime of complete separation of property
7. The petition and final judgment shall be
recorded in (a) the proper local civil registries and
(b) registries of property
.
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been
decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity
with this Code.
During the pendency of the proceedings for
separation of property, the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of
the spouses and their children.
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community
or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on
complete separation of property shall apply.
Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and
the final judgment granting the same shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registries and
registries of property.
- Liquidation and dissolution of property. The

processes laid down in Articles 102 and 129 must be
observed. However, the delivery of the presumptive
legitime provided for in the said provisions need not
be complied with, as such delivery specifically
applies only in case the marriage is either judicially
annulled under Article 45 or declared void for nonobservance of Article 40 (i.e., the subsequent void
marriage).
- Effects of separation of property between
spouses (Sempio-Diy):
1. The absolute community or conjugal partnership
of the spouses is dissolved and liquidated.
2. Each spouse shall thereafter have exclusive
management, ownership, and disposition of all his
or her earnings and the fruits of his or her separate
property.
3. The liability of the spouses to creditors shall,
however, be solidary with their separate properties.
4. The mutual obligation of the spouses to support
each other continues except when there is a
decree of legal separation.
5. Rights previously acquired by creditors are not
prejudiced.
.
Art. 140. The separation of property shall not
prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors.
- Rights of creditors not to be prejudiced. The
recording in the civil registry of the petition of the
separation of property and the final judgment is to aid
present and future creditors in determining whether
an asset of a spouse is conjugal or really separate. If
there has been a waiver on the part of one of the
spouses relative to a property in the regime sought to
be liquidated, any creditor of the spouse who made
such waiver may petition the court to rescind the
waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover
the amount of the credit (Sta. Maria).
- This is true WON the creditors were notified and
WON they attended the hearing. A creditor who
has a mortgage on a piece of community or conjugal
property retains his security even after the decree of
separation of property between the spouses and the
assignment of the property mortgaged to either of
them. Attaching creditors also retain their liens on
properties attached (Sempio-Diy).
.
Art. 141. The spouse may, in the same proceedings
where separation of property was decreed, file a
18

motion in court for a decree reviving the property

regime that existed between them before the
separation of property in any of the following
instances:
1. When the civil interdiction terminates;
2. When the absentee spouse reappears;
3. When the court, being satisfied that the spouse
granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements will not again abuse that power,
authorizes the resumption of said administration;
4. When the spouse who has left the conjugal home
without a decree of legal separation resumes
common life with the other;
5. When parental authority is judicially restored to
the spouse previously deprived thereof;
6. When the spouses who have separated in fact for
at least one year, reconcile and resume common life;
or
7. When after voluntary dissolution of the ACP or
CPG has been judicially decreed upon the joint
petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of
the former property regime. No voluntary separation
of property may thereafter be granted.
The revival of the former property regime shall be
governed by Article 67.
- The motion must be filed by both spouses. In
the first place, the article does not give that right to
only one spouse. In the second place, the revival of
the former property regime shall be governed by
Article 67, under which the revival of their former
property regime must be agreed upon by both
spouses (Tolentino).
- There must be a judicial proceedings for revival.
The agreement to revive the former property regime
shall be executed under oath and shall specify: 1)
the properties to be contributed anew to the restored
regime; 2) those to be retained as separate
properties of each spouse; and 3) the names of all
their known creditors, their addresses and the
amounts owing to each (Sta. Maria). After due
hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measures to
protect the interest of creditors. Such order shall be
recorded in the proper registries of property (See Art.
67 FC).
.
Article 142. The administration of all classes of
exclusive property of either spouse may be
transferred by the court to the other spouse:
1. When one spouse becomes the guardian of the
other;
2. When one spouse is judicially declared an

absentee;
3. When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction; or
4. When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice
or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of
incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just
cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be
the administrator.
- This is self-explanatory (Paras, ahtik wruh!).
- Changes from CC to FC. In CC, the transfer of
administration applies to all classes of property in
the marriage whether exclusive properties of a
spouse or conjugal partnership property. In FC,
applies only to all classes of exclusive property of
either spouse. Yet, the heading of Chap5 refers to
Administration of Common Property by One
Spouse. This could be only an error in phraseology
in the title, and the present article must be
considered as limited only to exclusive property of
either spouse (Tolentino).
- The power of the administrator has the power of
a trustee only. Ownership is not transferred to him
or her, and he or she cannot enjoy and dispose of
the properties to the same extent as the owner. He or
she cannot perform acts of ownership without
authority of the court. The court may impose
conditions or limitations upon the powers of the
administrator. This authority must be implied from the
duty of the court to safeguard the rights of the
spouse who owns the properties (Tolentino).
- If the cause for the transfer of administration of
the exclusive properties of a spouse ceases to
exist, the reason for the administration by
another disappears. The owner-spouse may
petition the court to declare the administration
terminated and recover his or her full rights over the
properties under the administration. He or she may
demand an accounting from the administrator, and
recover compensation for such damages as may
have been caused by the latter (Tolentino).
- Art. 142 distinguished from Arts. 96 & 124 FC.
The above case must be distinguished from sole
administration by one spouse of the absolute
community or conjugal properties, which he or she
can assume w/o need of court authorization
(Sempio-Diy). There is no need for court
authorization in this case because the spouses have
joint administration of the community or conjugal
properties, so that if one of them is incapacitated or,
for any other reason, cannot participate in such
19

administration, the other spouse can assume sole

administration of their common properties. [Arts
96&124]
.
VII. Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
- Living together as spouses. Also contemplates
those living together in a state of concubinage or of
marital cohabitation. Proofs: facts of sexual relations,
common household, manifestations of marital ties
before third parties, personal correspondence,
mutual financial assistance and support, raising of
children together (Tolentino).
- Informal civil relationship. Though there is no
technical marital partnership between persons living
as husband and wife without being lawfully married
or under a void marriage, nevertheless there is
between them an informal civil relationship which

would entitle the parties to some rights (Sta. Maria).
This covers: Art. 147 (special co-ownership) and Art.
148 (limited co-ownership).
***Unions covered by Art. 147.
1. Man and woman capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Requisites:
- Capacitated to marry each other. Not
capacitated: incestuous, against public policy,
under 18, bigamous marriage
- Live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife
- Without benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage.
2. Void marriages. Includes void marriages
because of psychological incapacity (Art. 36),
reappearance of wife (Art. 42), non-LPD (Art. 53),
and absence of formal requisites.
- Structure:
1. Salaries and wages shall be owned by equal
shares
2. Property acquired with exclusive funds is owned
by them exclusively
3. Property acquired through work or industry
governed by co-ownership
4. Property acquired while they live together will be
owned by them in equal shares. (Contribution can
be in the form of care and maintenance of family,
household)
5. Fruits of separate property not part of
coownership
6. Conjugal home will be owned equally.
- Cannot encumber or dispose of his/her share
without consent of the other or after cohabitation.
Can alienate in favor of the other his or her share
BUT cannot waive any interest in co-ownership.
- Special rules applicable to void marriages. Only
one party is in good faith, the other party having
been aware of the ground that renders their marriage
void but did not communicate it to the other party
latters net share shall be forfeited as follows:
a. In favor of common children
b. Predecease or waiver of common child, then
descendants of said child
c. Right of representation of descendants applies
even if in case of repudiation by a common child of
his/her share in forfeited property, since
transmission is inter vivos and not mortis causa
(upon termination of cohabitation and not upon
death of either parties)
20

d. If descendant dies ahead of common child,

there will be no transmission
e. Absence of descendants, innocent spouse.
.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his
or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad

faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith.
***Unions covered by Art. 148: Cohabitation not
under Art. 147.
a. Bigamous marriages
b. Adulterous relationships (woman married to
another and man is single)
c. Relationships in state of concubinage (man is
married to another and woman is single) contrary
to Tolentino!
d. Both man and woman are married to other
persons
e. Multiple alliances of the same married man
***Summary of differences and similarities of unions under Arts. 147 & 148
Rules governing
Capacity to marry
Cohabitation
Wages and salaries
Presumption of
property owned
Property acquired
During union
Art. 147
Parties are capacitated to marry but not married;
married but marriage is void ab initio
Live with each other exclusively
If earned separately, it shall be owned by them
(common) in equal shares
Obtained by joint effort

1. If acquired by both through THEIR WORK OR
INDUSTRY, CO-OWNERSHIP governs
2. If acquired by either through donation,
succession, or exchange for exclusive property,
ART. 147 DOES NOT APPLY
3. Presumption that properties acquired during
cohabitation have been obtained by joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned in EQUAL
SHARES
4. Efforts consisting of care and maintenance of
family and household considered contribution
5. Management of co-owned property shall be
joint
Obligations
incurred
During union
Art. 148
No capacity to marry or suffering under legal
impediment
Parties have an existing valid marriage
If earned separately, remains EXCLUSIVE.
There must be actual joint contribution in the
acquisition of property in order to be owned in
common; share of each party is in proportion to
his/her contribution
No presumption, there must be actual joint
contribution
1. Co-ownership exists PROVIDED that: it is
acquired by them through their joint contribution
of money, property, or industry PRESUMED to
be equal (contribution)
2. ACTUAL contribution Efforts of one party in
the care and maintenance of family and
household not included
3. Properties acquired BEFORE union remains
separate and exclusive
4. There is also a PRESUMPTION of equality in
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit
like bonds or securities
1. There being no conjugal or ordinary

partnership, each must be PERSONALLY
LIABLE for debts and expenses personally
incurred
5. Management of co-owned property shall be

joint
1. There being no conjugal or ordinary
partnership, each must be PERSONALLY
LIABLE for debts and expenses personally
incurred
2. EXCEPT: when expenses are for preservation
2. EXCEPT: when expenses are for preservation
21

Alienation or
encumbrance of
property
Accrual or
Forfeiture of share
of common property
Rules on co-ownership applies but modified;
alienation or encumbrance of individual share
must be made with the consent of the other
of common property
Rules on co-ownership applies but modified;
alienation or encumbrance of individual share
must be made with the consent of the other
1. If only one party to a void marriage is in good

faith, share of the party in bad faith in coownership forfeited in favor of the following, in
order: (a) COMMON children; (b) in default or
waiver, vacant share belong to respective
surviving descendants (c) in absence, to
INNOCENT PARTY
1. If one is validly married to another, share in

coownership will ACCRUE to the ACP or CPG
existing in valid prior marriage
2. Forfeiture shall take place UPON

TERMINATION OF COHABITATION
2. If party in BAD FAITH is not validly married to

another, share forfeited in the following order: (a)
COMMON children; (b) in default or waiver,
vacant share belong to respective surviving
descendants (c) in absence, to INNOCENT
PARTY
3. Even if both parties are in bad faith, (2) still
applies; PARI DELICTO DOES NOT APPLY
Contributions in
acquisition of
common property
by one spouse who
has no salary
Disputable
presumptions
Efforts in care and maintenance of family and

household
Acquisition of property that is presumed to be

joint efforts and thus owned in equal shares
4. Forfeiture shall take place UPON

TERMINATION OF
COHABITATION
Not recognized, actual contribution required
Equality of contributions if actual contribution

by one party is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares
Similarities:
1. Parties must be in a state of cohabitation
2. No ACP or CPP is formed
3. Common property governed by co-ownership
4. Property not co-owned remains exclusive
5. Bad faith results in share forfeiture
- In the absence of proof to the contrary,

contributions and shares of the parties to the
properties acquired during their cohabitation are
presumed to be equal. Same rule applies in joint
deposits and to evidences of credit.
- If one party is validly married to another:
a. His/her share in co-owned properties will
accrue to ACP/CPG of his/her existing valid
marriage
b. If party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his/her share shall be
forfeited in same manner as preceding
article
c. Both parties in bad faith, then the same rules
will apply
- Structure. Parties are co-owners of property
acquired during cohabitation only upon proof that
each of them made an actual contribution.
1. Salaries and wages are separately owned; if
either is married the salaries go to that marriage.
2. Property acquired by the money of one, belongs

to that person exclusively
3. Only properties acquired by both of them
through joint contribution will be owned by the in
common in proportion to what they gave (money,
property, or industry but cannot be mere care
and
maintenance
of
family/household).
Presumption is that shares over property owned is
equal shares but can be rebutted through proof
showing otherwise.
4. If one of the parties is validly married, that
persons share in the co-ownership will accrue to
the marriage.
.
TITLE V
THE FAMILY
I. The family as an institution
22

Art.149. The family, being the foundation of the

nation, is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects. Consequently, family
relations are governed by law and no custom,
practice or agreement destructive of the family shall
be recognized or given effect.
- Paramount Importance. Paramount importance is
given to the family as provided in the 1987
Constitution.
- Regulation by Law. family relations are
governed by law and no custom, practice or
agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect. Hence, an agreement
that, while the marriage is subsisting, the husband
can have a concubine or the wife can enter into an
adulterous relationship is void. Family rights are
governed by law. They are acquired, exercised, and
extinguished in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
1. Between husband and wife;
2. Between parents and children;
3. Among other ascendants and descendants; and
4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half-blood.
- Strict Construction. Any person not included in
the enumeration cannot be considered as within the
term family relations.
- Application. In a case involving suits between a
husband and his sister-in-law, the court ruled that the
requirement of earnest efforts to seek a
compromise between family members before the
commencement of any suit between them as
provided under Article 151 of the Family Code, need
not be observed as the parties are not within the
term family relations or family members under the
law (Gayon v.Gayon, 36 SCRA 104). Also, collateral
relatives who are not brothers and sisters are not
included in the term family relations (Mendez v.
Eugenia, 80 SCRA 82).
.
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the same case must be
dismissed. This rules shall not apply to cases which
may not be the subject of compromise under the

Civil Code.
- Earnest Efforts to Compromise. Before a suit can
be filed by a person against another belonging to the
same family as provided for under Article 150,
earnest efforts must first be made to settle the case
amicably. Otherwise, the suit is dismissible.
Exceptions:
1. If included in the suit between family members is
a stranger not of the same family as the interest of
such stranger may differ from the interest of
members of the same family.
2. Special proceedings like a petition for the
settlement of estate guardianship and custody of
children, and habeas corpus. The term suit
provided by law clearly implies only civil actions.
3. Cases which may not be compromised under
the Civil Code.9
- Exemption from Criminal Liability in Crimes
against Property. Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that no criminal, but only civil liability,
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused
mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or
relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the
property which belonged to the deceased spouse
before the same shall have passed into the
possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law, if living together.
- Note: The exemption established by Article 332,
however, shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.
- No Prescription. Civil Code provides: Article 1109.
Prescription does not run between husband and
wife, even though there be a separation of property
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or by
judicial decree.
Neither does prescription run between parents and
children, during the minority or insanity of the latter,
and between guardian and ward during the
continuance of the guardianship.
.
9
Article 2035 of the Civil Code provides that No

compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
1) the Civil status of persons; 2)the Validity of a marriage
or of a legal separation; 3) any Ground for legal
separation; 4) Future support; 5) the Jurisdiction of courts;
and Future legitime.
23

II. The family home

Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of
a family, is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
(2) they live in the Family home; and

(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the
head of the family.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted

on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from

execution, forced sale or attachment except:
1) For non-payment of taxes;
2)For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution; and
4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialmen and others who
have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
- Constitution of family home. Under the Family

Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a
house and land from the time it is actually occupied
as a family residence. The requirement of house and
land as constitutive of a family home stresses the
element of permanence. Hence, a boat on water
cannot be constituted a family home.
- Exempt from Execution. The exemption from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided by law
is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein. It is a personal
right which can be claimed only by the judgment
debtor, and not by the sheriff, and therefore generally
must be claimed before the public auction.
- The exemption is not, however, absolute as
there are obligations and indebtedness excluded
from the exemption which are enumerated in Article
155.
- Application. In Gomez v. Sta. Ines, G.R. No.

132537, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 25, where the
debt was incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 and the subject property
had not been constituted as a family home under the
provisions of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court
ruled that , because a home which was not a family
home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
became a family home by operation of law upon the
effectivity of the Family Code, the debt therefore can
be considered as having been incurred before the
constitution of the family home and hence can be
subject to execution. The Supreme Court also said
that the 1989 judgment sustaining the liability of the
debtor was not the reckoning date for the existence
of the debt. It is the time when the debt was actually
incurred that is the reckoning point which in this case
was sometime in 1977 such that the action was filed
only in 1986.
.
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and
2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers
and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and
who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support.
- Beneficiaries. To be a beneficiary (other than the
husband and the wife or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family) of the family home, three
requisites must concur:
(1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in this article
.
Art. 156. The family home must be part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either
spouse with the latters consent. It may also be
constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his
or her own property.
- Family Home. The family home must be
constituted at a place where there is a fixed and
permanent connection with the persons constituting
it. The law provides that it must be a part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either
spouse with the latters consent. It may also be
24

constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his

or her own property.
- Not considered:
1. Boat or vessel
2. Apartment or house being rented
3. House on anothers property
- Considered: Property that is the subject of a
conditional sale on instalment where ownership is
reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of
the purchase price may be constituted as a family
home.
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply

regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall

not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount
of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas,
and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or
such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes
after the adoption of this code, the value most
favourable for the constitution of a family home shall
be the basis of the evaluation. For purposes of this
article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered
cities and municipalities whose annual income at
least equals that legally required for chartered cities.
All others are deemed to be rural areas.
Art.160. When a creditor whose claim is not among

those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in
his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the family home is actually worth more than the
maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply
to the court which rendered the judgment for an
order directing the sale of the property under
execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the
maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds
the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from
subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by
the person or persons constituting the family home,
by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of
the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall
apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed
for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds
shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in
Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the
judgment and costs. The excess, if any, shall be
delivered to the judgment debtor.
Value of the Family Home. Those above the

amount stipulated (at the time of its constitution) will
not be exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment. Urban areas = shall not exceed
P300,000. Rural areas = shall not exceed P200,000
.
Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated,
donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or
owners thereof with the written consent of the person
constituting the same, the latters spouse, and a
majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of
conflict, the court shall decide.
- Death of the persons who constituted the family

home. Upon their death, the property will remain as
family home for 10 years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary living in it.
- The heirs cannot partition the family home.
Exception: When the court finds a compelling
reason, (ex. no money to buy food to survive).
- Bidders cannot bid below the amount of

P300,000 (Urban area).
- If the house is sold, 300,000 is given to the owner
of the house and the balance to the creditor to satisfy
his debt. This happens even if the debt is not fully
satisfied. (Idea is to give 300,000 so that the debtor
can buy a house) This however does not apply when
if the creditor is one of those mentioned in Article 155
(the debt must be satisfied even if nothing is left with
the owner).
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the

death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family for a period of ten years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds
Art.161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a

family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person
may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one
family home.
Disposition of the family home. Written consent is

needed for the disposition of the family home:
1. Person constituting the family home
2. Latters spouse
3. Majority of the beneficiaries of legal age
25

Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also

govern family residences insofar as said provisions
are applicable.
.
TITLE VIII
SUPPORT
Art.
194.
Support
comprises
everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include
his schooling or training for some profession, trade
or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to
and from school, or to and from place of work.
- Natural and civil support. Natural support is
absolutely indispensable for the subsistence of
recipient; civil support is necessary for recipient to
live and maintain himself in accordance with his
condition and circumstances.
- Characteristics of support:
1. Personal
2. Reciprocal on the part of those who are by law
bound to support each other
3. Intransmissible
4. Mandatory
5. Provisional character of support judgment
6. Exempt from attachment or execution
7. Not subject to waiver or compensation
- Full extent means indispensable and
financial capacity. This phrase is also seen in the
two succeeding provisions for support of family
members and illegitimate brothers and sisters.
- Even beyond age of majority.
- Support depends on the need and the capacity of
the person obliged to support (Sabio).
- The status of the parties should be established first
before support can be made.
.
Art. 105. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
articles, the following are obliged to support each
other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding
article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the

legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or
half-blood
Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately
related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise
bound to support each other to the full extent set
forth in Article 194, except only when the need for
support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due
to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or
negligence.
Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants;
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and
brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or
illegitimately related, only the separate property of
the person obliged to give support shall be
answerable provided that in case the obligor has no
separate property, the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall
advance the support, which shall be deducted from
the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation
of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership.
Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal
separation or for annulment of marriage, and for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and
their children shall be supported from the properties
of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership. After the final judgment granting the
petition, the obligation of mutual support between the
spouses ceases. However, in case of legal
separation, the court may order that the guilty
spouse shall give support to the innocent one,
specifying the terms of such order.
Summary of support to spouses and children
During marriage
Pendente lite
After litigation
Spouse
From the
ACP: From the
No obligation to
community
community
support.
property
property assets.
Exception: If
Exception: If Art
there is Legal
203 applies, that if Separation. In
the claimant
which case, the
spouse is the
court may
guilty spouse,
require the
he/she is not
guilty spouse to
26

entitled to
support.
CPG: Support is
considered an
advance of such
spouses share.
From the
community
property
NB: The rule does

not apply if the
spouses are
under ACP based
on Art 153.
Children
From the
community
property
give support
From the
separate
properties of
the spouses
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are

obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls
upon two or more persons, the payment of the same
shall be divided between them in proportion to the
resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special
circumstances, the judge may order only one of
them to furnish the support provisionally, without
prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors
the share due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim
support from one and the same person legally
obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient
means to satisfy all claims, the order established in
the preceding article shall be followed, unless the
concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a
child subject to parental authority, in which case the
child shall be preferred.
proportionately, according to the reduction or

increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to furnish
the same.
Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a
right to receive the same needs it for maintenance,
but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extra-judicial demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
Payment shall be made within the first five days of
each corresponding month or when the recipient
dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he
has received in advance.
- Payment of the amount for support starts only
from the time support has been judicially or extrajudicially demanded.
.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who
has a right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle thereto.
Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title
as well as any money or property obtained as such
support shall not be levied upon on attachment or
execution.
Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the
person obliged to give support, it is given by a
stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the
same from the former, unless it appears that he gave
it without intention of being reimbursed.
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases

referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the necessities of the recipient.
Art. 207. When the person obliged to support

another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of
reimbursement from the person obliged to give
support. This Article shall particularly apply when the
father or mother of a child under the age of majority
unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to
the child when urgently needed.
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the

preceding article shall be reduced or increased
Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given

by will, the excess in amount beyond that required
27

for legal support shall be subject to levy on

attachment or execution.
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to
adjustment whenever modification is necessary due
to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties.
father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a

judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence
towards their parents and are obliged to obey them
as long as the children are under parental authority.
- Illegitimate kids are under mothers authority.
.
TITLE IX
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
I. General Provisions
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of
parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and
responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing
them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being.
- Patria potestas. The sum total of the rights of
parents over the persons and property of their
unemancipated child.
- Natural right and duty of parents: (1) caring for
and rearing them for civic consciousness and
efficiency, (2) development of their moral, mental,
physical character & well-being.
- Characteristics of parental authority:
1. Jointly exercised by the father and mother;
2. Natural right and duty of the parents;
3. Cannot be renounced, transferred or waived,
except when authorized by law;
4. Purely personal (It cannot be exercised through
agents);
5. Temporary.
.
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may
not be renounced or transferred except in the cases
authorized by law.
- Support is inalienable, cannot be renounced or
transferred. Exceptions:
1. Adoption
2. Guardianship
3. Surrender to a child-caring institution
.
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either

parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving
parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to
be the guardian of the person or property of the
children.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit.
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability
of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case
several survive, the one designated by the court,
taking into account the same consideration
mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the
authority.
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a
criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony is
indispensable in a crime against the descendant or
by one parent against the other.
- Innocent spouse gets custody of minor children
- In matters of custody and parental authority, it is
always the best interest of the child (indeterminate
standard dependent upon the subjective values and
life experience of the fact finder and psychological
experts).
- Vicarious liability. Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with the
Civil Code (Art. 58. Torts).
.
II. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
28

Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially

appointed guardian, the following person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child
in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art.
214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian
over the property of the child becomes necessary,
the same order of preference shall be observed.
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned
neglected or abused children and other children
similarly situated, parental authority shall be
entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads
of children's homes, orphanages and similar
institutions duly accredited by the proper government
agency.
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child are shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 129. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused
by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said
minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved
that they exercised the proper diligence required
under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the
preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
.
III. Effect of Parental Authority
Persons of the Children
Upon the
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental

authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following

rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in
keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, selfdiscipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate
their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them
from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring
habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their
interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required
under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by
law upon parents and guardians.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law.
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the
child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best
interests of the child so requires.
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or
incapacity, the individual, entity or institution
exercising parental authority, may petition the proper
court of the place where the child resides, for an
order providing for disciplinary measures over the
child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of
counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the
court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted
wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds
the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the
petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the
court may also order the deprivation or suspension
of parental authority or adopt such other measures
as it may deem just and proper.
29

Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding

article may include the commitment of the child for
not more than thirty days in entities or institutions
engaged in child care or in children's homes duly
accredited by the proper government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not
interfere with the care of the child whenever
committed but shall provide for his support. Upon
proper petition or at its own instance, the court may
terminate the commitment of the child whenever just
and proper.
.
IV. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property
of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity
of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the
father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual
income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in
such amount as the court may determine, but not
less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the
property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be
filed in the proper court of the place where the child
resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in
the proper court of the place where the property or
any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special
proceeding in which all incidents and issues
regarding the performance of the obligations referred
to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be
heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely
suppletory except when the child is under substitute
parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a
parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary
rules on guardianship shall apply.
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child
earned or acquired with his work or industry or by
onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in
ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the
latter's support and education, unless the title or
transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of

the child's property shall be limited primarily to the
child's support and secondarily to the collective daily
needs of the family.
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or
administration of any of their properties to an
unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such
property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be
given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount
not less than that which the owner would have paid if
the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner,
grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case,
the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not
be charged to the child's legitime.
.
V. Suspension
Authority
or
Termination
of
Parental
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:

(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child.
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final
judgment, parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the
child in a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court
divesting the party concerned of parental authority;
or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity
of the person exercising parental authority.
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon
conviction of the parent or the person exercising the
same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of
civil interdiction. The authority is automatically
reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon
pardon or amnesty of the offender.
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose
in a related case may also suspend parental
authority if the parent or the person exercising the
same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or
cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or
example;
30

(3) Compels the child to beg; or

(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected
to acts of lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to
include cases which have resulted from culpable
negligence of the parent or the person exercising
parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the
welfare of the child so demands, the court shall
deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt
such other measures as may be proper under the
circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and
the parental authority revived in a case filed for the
purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds
that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be
repeated.
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority
has subjected the child or allowed him to be
subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be
permanently deprived by the court of such authority.
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of

individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon
the child.
Memory aid for cases
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Decision
Property relations between husband and wife; diff. property regimes available
87
Manongsong v.
Estimo
152 sq meter lot in Las Pinas of Guevarra to be divided by 5 kids.

Manongsong wants to get his share. Navarro, the mom of Guevara,
sold it to Jumaquio: contention of Jumaquio sisters who lived there for
more than 30 years (Acquisitive Prescription) with proof of deed of
sale. RTC: void deed of sale. It is a conjugal property. CA: No absolute
presumption of conjugal property. Should prove that property was
acquired during the marriage.
Affirm CA. Adduce evidence that property was acquired during the
marriage for it to be conjugal. Jumaquio sisters own the property.
88
Maquilan v.
Maquilan
Wife committed adultery (prision correctional. No civil interdiction)

Compromise agreement. The husband changed his mind.
Husband cannot nullify the compromise agreement once there is

judicial approval. It is valid and binding.
89
Matthews v. Taylor
British husband allegedly used his money to buy Boracay lot named
under Filipina wife. Separation de facto. SPA executed by wife in favor
of husband giving all rights to husband with regards to property. Later,
wife rented out the property to Matthews. RTC: in favor of Husband.
CA: affirmed RTC.
Property is not a conjugal property. Constitution: foreigners are not

allowed to own property.
90
De Leon v. De
Leon
Husband when single bought by installments a lot under a conditional

contract to sell. 2 years later after the marriage, lot was fully paid then
sold it to his sister, Lita. Lita wanted to transfer the title of the lot to her
name contending it was the registered in the sole name of husband.
Property is conjugal. He only got the final deed of sale during his
marriage. He needed the consent of wife to sell it to his sister. No
consent, void sale.
91
Imani vs.
Metropolitan Bank
Wife, part of company, loaned from Metrobank. Forfeited on loan.

Motion for execution. Property of wife was auctioned, acquired by
Metrobank.
Imani should prove that property is conjugal. Affidavit of previous

spouse that property is sold to spouses is hearsay if witness is not
presented in cross exam.
92
Munoz
Spouses mortgaged from GSIS. Munoz lended 600k to cancel the

mortgage from GSIS. Wife paid 200k to GSIS, cancelled, gave title
without consent of husband. RTC: no need consent of H, property is
gratuitous. CA: during mortgage, it became conjugal, Hs salary was
used to pay.
Exclusive property. Munoz cant transfer the title because its only an
equitable mortgage, not sale. Tax dec, still living in house, not full
payment. Return the 200k so you could get the title back.
93
Pana
Spouses were charged were murder. Husband acquitted. Land used to

pay civil indemnity. RTC: spouses were married before FC, CPG. FC is
retroactive, no vested rights.
FC cannot reach back and convert CPG to ACP. General rule: do not
charge to partnership. CPG cannot answer to civil indemnities. Wife is
solidary liable. Art. 121: since no separate of wife, conjugal property
will pay for civil interdiction.
ACP regimes
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Decision
94
Sunga Chan v.
Chua
H entered into partnership to sell LPG. Only H was registered as sole

proprietorship. Widow continued business without consent of Chua.
Chua requested liquidation to get net profits.
Art 94: writ of execution. Property of lilibeth even though conjugal is

liable because the business redounded to the benefit of her family.
95
Dar
Spouses filed petition. Only husband signed it.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 should not be literally construed. Signature

of husband is enough in behalf of the spouses.
CPG regimes
97
Buado v. CA
Erlinda liable for damages, property was levied and auctioned,

husband filed complaint for annulment of sale. Is Erlindas obligation
from criminal liability chargeable to CPG?
NO. Unlike ACP, CPG not liable for damages arising from crime or
quasi-delict
98
Sarmiento v. IAC
Wife filed case for 50% of husbands retirement benefit. Is wife entitled
to these benefits?
NO. Retirement benefits considered gratuities, which form part of

separate property
120
Dael vs.
Intermediate
Appellate Court
First marriage distinguished by the death of the first wife w/ 5 children

(by the way is the sister of the second wife. Akalain mo nga naman),
after a year husband contracted another marriage(no children
afterwards). The oppositors claimed they are entitled to the the
properties of the second wife (after their death).
The death of the first wife automatically distinguished the conjugal

partnership. Whatever fruits or income may thereafter be derived from
the properties, including the property in question, would no longer be
conjugal. Therefore, the said petitioners do not have any share over
the property the second wife acquired during the marriage.
Property Relations of Unions without Marriage

121
Maxey vs. CA
Maxey and Morales lived together as husband and wife, were blessed
with 6 children, inc.the petitioner. 1911 and 1912 Maxey acquired a
parcel of land. After the death of Morales, Maxey sold the said land to
the private respondents. The petitioners alleged that the said land was
a common property, and it was sold without their knowledge and
consent. The responded claimed that it was an exclusive property of
Maxey for his money were used in acquiring the said land and that
Morales was incapable of contributing any money to acquire the land.
The SC ruled that the said land were owned in common by Maxey and
Morales when it was sold. The real contributions are not just earnings
of the wife for the family but also her contribution to the family's
material and spiritual goods through caring for the children,
administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing
her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the
traditional duties of a housewife. Girl power!!! Charot
122
Valdes vs. RTC
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 1971. Valdes

sought declaration of nullity on the grounds of PI. RTC affirmed and
provided that Art 147 must be followed for liquidation for property. The
petitioner disagrees.
The court is right in applying the law. In a void marriages, regardless of

the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by the provision of the Art 147 or
148, such as the case may be, of the FC. Divide properties between 2
marriages by the number of years.
123
Tumlos v.
Fernandez (2000)
Tumlos lived in apartment owned by Fernandez for 7 years without

paying rent, Sps. Fernandez filed ejectment case. Tumlos claims she
is co-vendee, that she is in relationship with Mario Fernandez, that she
administered the property for a number of years.
Tumlos not co-owner according to Art. 148. Mario and Tumlos not
capacitated to marry each other, Mario is married to Lourdes. Only
property acquired through actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry is owned in common. Tumlos failed to present evidence of
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Decision
her actual contribution.
124
Cario v. Cario
(2001)
Santiago died, conflict between who will receive his death benefits.
Santiago married twice in his life, first to Susan Nicdao and then later
to Susan Yee.
Marriage to Susan Nicdao was without marriage license, Art. 147

applies. Susan Nicdao entitled to half. Even if death benefits earned by
deceased alone, Art. 147 creates a co-ownership. Marriage to Susan
Yee without JDON, thus bigamous. Art. 148 applies. Susan Yee not
entitled to any death benefits, as there is no proof of her actual
contribution.
125
Saguid v. CA
(2003)
Gina married, but separated de facto from her husband. Met Jacinto
and the two decided to cohabit, cohabitation ended after 9 years. Gina
filed to partition and recover personal property, as well as her share in
the expenses of completing their house.
Art. 148 applies, as Gina validly married to another. Gina only able to
prove 11K of contribution in construction of house, only 11K awarded
to her. As to personal properties, no proof as to exact contribution of
both. Thus, share is presumed to be equal.
126
Homeowners vs.
Dailo
Spouses bought a house and lot during their marriage. Deed of

absolute sale executed only in favor of husband. Without wifes
consent, husband executed SPA in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo to
obtain loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured
by said house and lot. Loan became outstanding, Homeowners
instituted extrajudicial sale, property awarded to highest bidder.
Husband died in the process. Wife comes to court claiming she had no
knowledge of mortgage. Homeowners claim property was exclusively
owned by husband. RTC and CA ruled in favor of wife.
Since spouses were married on 1967 without MS, their default

property regime is CPG governed by chapter 4 of Family Code with
rules on partnership under the Civil Code as being suppletory. Absence
of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. RTC
and CA correct in nullifying mortgage. Homeowners was not able to
sufficiently prove that the loan redounded to the benefit of the family,
therefore, conjugal property cannot be held to pay for the principal
obligation.
127
Abing vs. Waeyan
In 1986, Juliet and John lived together as husband and wife without
getting married. During cohabitation, they purchased a 2 storey
residential house. Tax declaration thereof was in the name of Juliet.
Later, they split and partitioned their properties. Executed a
memorandum of agreement but left unsigned by them. Under the
agreement, John will leave property but Juliet will pay him for his share
in the property. Juliet failed to pay half of his share, John executed
ejectment suit claiming he alone spent for annex structure. RTC:
awarded annex to John, CA reversed.
John failed to prove that he alone, using money he borrowed from

relatives, spent for the construction of the annex. Even though tax
declaration of annex was under his name, it does not sufficiently prove
ownership when not supported by other effective proofs. Art. 147:
common law spouses, in the absence of proof to contrary, properties
acquired while living together presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, with equal shares. Property regime shall be rules on coownership. Being co-owner of annex, Juliet cannot be ejected
therefrom. Memo of agreement still binding. John may file action for
recovery of sum of money for balance.
128
Atienza vs. De
Castro
Lupo lived with Yolanda despite being married. Union turned sour after
their second child. Lupo instituted judicial partition partition regarding
parcel of land with improvements in Bel-Air subdivision claiming his
exclusive funds were used in buying the property without knowing it
was transferred by seller to Yolandas name. Yolanda also claims she
used her money in buying. TC: property is co-owned. CA: property is
exclusively Yolandas.
Couple is incapacitated to marry each other during their cohabitation,

Lupo is legally married to another woman, therefore, art. 148 which
applies to bigamous marriages, regime of limited co-ownership of
property, shall apply. Under this regime, Co-ownership will only be up
to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal. Even though cohabitation was before FC, art.
148 will apply retroactively because it was intended to fill the gaps in
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Decision
the law. CC does not provide for property regime of such spouses.
Yolanda was able to prove her sole ownership by preponderance of
evidence. CA decision affirmed.
129
Dino v. Dino (2011)
RTC granted petition for JDON under Art. 36 and ruled that JDON be
issued only after LPD. Petitioner argued that marriages under Art. 36 is
subject to Art. 147, and not Sec. 19 (1) of Rules of Nullity and
Annulment, hence LPD is not a requisite for issuance of JDON.
SC held that for void marriages under Art. 36, JDON not subject to
LPD. The void marriage is subject to Art. 147, hence there is no ACP,
only co-ownership.
130
Buemer v. Amores
(2012)
P is dutch husband, R is filipina wife. RTC declared their marriage

void, P filed to dissolve CP.
SC affirmed RTC and CA, ruling that properties were paraphernal of R

bec. of constitutional prohibition. Equity cannot be granted to P bec. he
is not innocent
131
Salas v. Aguila
(2013)
Salas is the husband petitioner, Aguila the wife respondent.

R filed petition for JDON under Art. 36. R discovered there were
properties named after P and filed motion and manifestation. RTC
ordered partition. Rubina (paramour) intervened saying these
properties were hers and P did not contribute. CA sustained RTC.
SC sustained RTC and CA. Rubina has no legal interest to CP. P failed
to disprove conjugal partnership in discovered properties. Art. 147
applies, hence there is co-ownership between P and R to the
properties.
Rights granted by adoption

156
Cervantes v.
Fajardo
Child born to common-law husband and wife was given up for adoption
to wifes sister and her husband since she was 2 weeks old. An
affidavit of consent of adoption was signed by parents and filed with
RTC. A few months later, the adoptive parents received from the birth
parents demanding to be paid P150,000 or they will get their child
back. The adopters refused. While they were at work, the birth mom
took the child home, saying the affidavit was not fully explained to her
and that she will only return the baby if paid P150,000.
The adopting parents have the legal right to care and custody of the
child. She will be freed from parental authority of her natural parents as
well as the legal obligation and maintenance to them and for all legal
intents and purposes the child of the adopting parents, capable of
inheriting from them. Even though the child is below seven years of
age, the courts can still decide on the best interest of the child and that
is with her adopting parents rather than his birth parents on grounds
that the child will not have a suitable environment with his adopting
parents.
157
Republic v.
Hernandez
Adopted child wants to change his first name to complement his

changed surname. Judge opposed the inclusion of relief of change of
name in the petition for adoption saying that the two are distinct and
separate proceedings, governed by different laws.
Judge is correct. The law only allows the adoptee to bear the surname
of the adopter upon issuance of decree of judgment. The given name
should remain as it was originally registered in the LCR. If a change in
ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a
special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. Being a proceeding in rem, a strict compliance with all
requirements is indispensable. It is not a mere incident or offshoot of
another special proceeding. It is an independent and discrete
proceeding.
Rules on Succession
No
.
158
Case Name
Sayson v. CA
Pertinent Facts
Decision
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio,

Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro married Isabel and
begot: Doribel (legitimate daughter), Delia and Edmondo (both legally
adopted). Who is entitled to inherit from Elenos estate.
As the legitimate daughter of Teodoro, Doribel has a right to

represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents Eleno and Rafaela. Delia and Edmondo,
being adopted a total strangers to Eleno and Rafaela, cannot inherit
from the latter. Adopted and legitimate have the same rights except
does not include right of representation. Adoption is between adopted
only and the adopter, does not extend to blood relatives of the family.
However, the 3 are the exclusive heirs of Teodora and are under no
obligation to share the estate of their parents with the other children of
Eleno and Rafaela.
A childless couple adopted the wifes nephew and brought him up as

their own. 1972, the decree of adoption was issued, change of name in
LCR from Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. But the child is
stubborn and refused to use his new surname. Wife commenced a
case to rescind the adoption. Before institution of the case, in 1998,
RA 8552 Domestic Adoption Act came into effect where the adopters
cannot rescind a decree of adoption.
Case will not prosper because the court bases its decision on the
current laws. RA 8552 bars the wife from rescinding the decree of
adoption. Even if she commenced the case before the passage of RA
8552, she will still be barred by the 5 year rule in rule 100 of rules of
court: only 5 years given to adopter after decree to rescind. Couple
may forfeit rights of stubborn child in inheriting from estate by will or
testament.
Husband filed complaint of adultery against wife. Wife later filed legal
separation, separation of properties, custody of children and support
pendent lite against husband.
The right to separate support and maintenance presupposes existence

of justifiable cause. Art 104: after filing of leg sep, the spouses are
entitled to live separately. A petition in bad faith by the spouse guilty of
an act for leg sep will not be considered. Art 303: 303 of the same
Code the obligation to give support shall cease when the recipient, be
he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance.
Recission of Adoption
159
Lahom v. Sibulo
Support: Spouses
160
Lerma v. CA
Support: Ascendants and descendants

161
Santero v. CFI
Pablo Santero had 3 children (petitioners) with Felixberta. He also had

4 children (respondents) with Anselma. All are natural children, their
mothers were not married to Pablo. Pablo died. During the pendency
of admin proceedings involving estate of Pablo, petitioners questioned
the courts granting of allowance to respondents saying they were no
longer studying, working, and all at the age of majority.
They are still entitled to allowance. Being of age, gainfully employed,

or married should not be regarded as the determining factor to their
right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code.
162
Lim v. Lim
Edward and Cheryl, married, had 3 children living in the house of

house of Edwards parents. Later, wife left the home with her 3
children, all minors, after finding Edwards relationship with the midwife
of his grandma. She sued for support against Edward and his
The court granted support worth P40,000. P6,000 from Edward (his
income from the family business) and the rest (P36,000) from parents
and grandparents of Edward. It is also undisputed that the amount of
support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
grandparents.
Decision
insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward
and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of
their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree (art. 199).
However, support from grannies only extends to grandchildren being
related to them by blood and not to the wife.
Support: Parents and legit/illegit children/descendants

163
Lam v. Chua
Adriana Chua filed JDON against her husband Jose Lam but failed to
ask support for their child. Court granted JDON and ordered Lam to
provide monthly support of P20,000 to their son. Lam questioned this
saying he and his wife already provided for the provision of support on
their compromise agreement: they shall contribute P250,000 each to a
fund for their child.
Court is correct in ruling that amount of support is not permanent.

Judgment for support does not become final; always subject to
changes. No merit on the claim of Jose that the compromise
agreement bars the court in providing for support. It is not res judicata
since any judgment for support is always subject to modification,
depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the
parents to give support.
Parental Authority (over person)

164
Bondagjy v.
Bondagjy
Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a

Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still
bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her fitness to
be the custodian of her children? We apply civil law in the best interest
of the children.
Decision of Shariah court granting custody to father is reversed, finding

mother unworthy to care for their 2 children. Evidence presented was
not enough to overcome the fitness of the mom in caring for children.
Since mom is not a Muslim anymore, fam code will still apply. Shes
capable of providing and caring for the kids. PD 603: Custody of
minors given to mothers absent compelling reasons against it. Art 211:
parents have joint parental authority. Father is awarded visitation
rights.
165
Tonog v. CA
Dinah gave birth to Gardin, illegitimate child with Edgar. Later, Dinah
left for the US to work. Gardin was left in the care of her father and
grandparents. Edgar filed for guardianship, approved. Later, the CA
granted custody to Edgar.
CA did not err. The general rule of giving custody to mothers is to avoid
instances of where mothers have their babies torn away from them.
Exceptions may be granted by the court for compelling reasons.
Bearing in mind the welfare of the child, it is but right to let him stay
with the father and not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings,
and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and
places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
166
Briones v. Miguel
Parents not married, mother went to Japan to work but goes home
twice a year. Custody of child is given by her to her sister. Whether or
not the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of
his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Child being under 7, custody still belongs to mother. An illegitimate

child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise
of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The
Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause
showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care. However,
that may taken away from her and awarded to another person due to
some compelling reasons such as neglect or abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Decision
disease that would render her unfit to perform her duties as the
custodian of the child. No compelling reasons here.
167
Dacasin v. Dacasin
Herald (American) married to Sharon (Filipino) in Manila. They have a

daughter. Later, Sharon obtained a divorce decree in Illinois with sole
custody awarded to her and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes. Later, they executed a contract for joint
custody over their child. Herald filed a case in RTC alleging that
Sharon sill exercised sole custody over child despite their agreement.
Court can take cognizance of the case. Agreement would be valid had
the couple not separated since couple has joint custody and parental
authority over their kids. But in their separation, sole custody is
awarded to the mother since child was below 7. Any agreement
against it is void. When the child reaches 8, the law gives the
separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations,
to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt.
Over property
168
Badillo v. Ferrer
H died intestate. W sold a parcel of land left by H by a Deed of

Extrajudicial Partition and Sale. Later, sister of H was able to obtain
guardianship over 5 minor children of H&W without personal notice to
W who could not be located.
W has acted beyond her authority in conveying to the appellants the

5/12 undivided share of her minor children. powers given to her by the
laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and
cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured
the permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the
property in question belonging to her minor children.
169
Pineda v. CA
PMSI has insurance policy for its sailors. 6 sailors perished when the
ship sank in Morocco. Insular, relying on SPA, released checks to
president of PMSI who pocketed the amounts. It also did not observe
Sec 180(3), when it released the benefits due to the minor children of
Ayo and Lontok without the required bond.
Art. 225: The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement,
the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the
contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income
of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required
to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not
less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for
general guardians.
170
Mijares v. CA
A left a parcel of land to his 8 children. B, one of the heirs, held the
property in trust for his co-heirs. Several years after, the other co-heirs
discovered that their shares had been purchased by B. The Deed of
Sale was registered in 1971. The co-heirs filed an action for
reconveyance of the property in 1975.
At that time, guardianship of parents over minor children does not

extend to the property of their minor children. Parents then had no
power to dispose of the property of their minor children without court
authorization. Without authority from a court, no person could make a
valid contract for or on behalf of a minor or convey any interest of a
minor in land. The action is not barred by prescription. An action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title of the property. Here the questioned Deed of Sale was registered
only in 1971. The co-heirs filed their complaint in 1975, hence well
within the prescriptive period.
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Decision
Substitute/Termination of parental authority

171
St. Marys
Academy v.
Carpitanos
SMA conducted enrollment drive and visited schools from where

prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the
campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15
year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the
jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle.
Sherwin died due to this accident.
Art 218 FC: the following shall have special parental authority over a
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care Art 219: if the person under custody is
a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody. For SMA to be liable, the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. Owner of
the vehicle is liable. Accident is not because of reckless driving but
fault on the vehicle undisclosed by owner.
172
St. Josephs
College v. Miranda
Student had to undergo eye operation after getting into an accident in

science lab. His parents sued the school for damages.
SC found that SJC is liable applying art 218 and 219. Art. 2180: The
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Liability of Parents for Acts of Children

173
Libi v. IAC
Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he
turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the parents of Julie Ann filed
against Wendell's parents to recover damages.
Parents of Wendell Libi are liable for vicarious liability. The subsidiary
liability of parents for damages cause by their minor children is
imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. This liability shall
cease if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father to prevent damage. Wendells parents was not able to prove
this. They only discovered that their child is a drug informant after his
death and that the gun he used was missing from the safety deposit
box.
174
Tamargo v. CA
Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer

Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted in her death. Bundoc was put
up for adoption before the incident and the decree of adoption was
issued after the incident. Natural parents insist that it is the adopting
parents who are now responsible for damages since the parental
authority is already vested retroactively on the latter.
Still the natural parents who are responsible. Art. 221. Parents and
other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting
parents, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
Retroactivity of Family Code: Exception: Vested Rights

175
Aruego v. CA
Antonia and Evelyn (sisters) Aruego filed a petition compulsory
The meaning of vested and acquired rights under Art. 256 was not
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Decision
Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights seeking Jose

Aruego, Jr. And his five minor children to recognize them as illegitimate
children and compulsory heirs of Jose who died on March 30, 1982
claiming there is open and continuous possession of illegitimate status
as children of Jose who had amorous reln with their mother Luz
Fabian. Court declared Antonia as illegitimate while Evelyn is not. They
contested the decision citing provisions of the Family Code: Art. 127
(Filiation), Art. 172 (illegitimate childrens filiation), Art. 256 (retroactivity
of the code).
defined by the Family Code, hence the court will determine it according
to issues submitted to them. The action must be governed by Art. 285
of the Civil Code and not by Art. 175 (2) of the Family Code. The
present law cannot be given any retroactive effect since its application
is prejudicial under Art. 285.
176
Republic v. Miller
July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the
RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child under the
provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to
adopt. Natural parents executed irrevocable consent to adoption,
DSWD recommended approval. August 3, 1998, the Family Code
became effective prohibiting aliens to adopt.
Spouses Miller are still allowed to adopt. Child and Youth Welfare
Code vested a right upon spouses which could not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Vested right
include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand,
but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has
vested.
177
Castillo v. Castillo
Lea married Benjamin in 1972. 1979, she married Renato. 2001:

Renato now filed JDON of marriage with Lea due to P.I. and being
bigamous because Lea contracted it without JDON of her first
marriage.
SC held the validity of marriage between Renato and Lea. Validity of

marriage should be determined in accordance with the law in effect at
the time of its celebration. First marriage was celebrated and their
children born during effectivity of the Civil Code which states: "in a void
marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary,"
while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree. First
marriage was void due to lack of consent. Aragon, Mendoza, and
Arayat doctrines are applicable: no JDON necessary in void marriages
to contract subsequent marriage. No retroactive effect on FC because
it will affect the vested rights of the children of the first marriage.
Upon Vitalianas death (1988), her brothers and sisters filed a petition
for habeas corpus before RTC alleging she was forcibly taken in 1987
from her home and confined by Eugenio in his residence. Writ of
habeas corpus was issued by court but was returned unstatisfied.
Eugenio refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana saying corpse
cannot be subject of habeas corpus and that he was already obtained
a burial permit; being the common law husband, he has custody of
Vitalianas body.
Custody is awarded to the brothers and sisters of Vitaliana. Sec. 1103

(Rev. Admin. Code): Persons charged with duty of burial - if the
deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin;
the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased. Common law marriages are not recognized in the Ph. Law
only recognizes co-ownership of properties in such relationships where
there is no legal impediment between parties to marry each other.
Eugenio has a valid and subsisting marriage with another woman, a
legal impediment which disqualifies him from marrying Vitaliana.
Consuelo David married Tolentino in 1931. Marriage was dissolved

and terminated under the Japanese regime. Tolentino later married
Constancias cause of action has already prescribed. Art 1150 CC: The
time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special
Funerals
178
Eugenio v. Velez
Surname
179
Tolentino v. CA
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Decision
Pilar but she died. Tolentino then married Constancia with whom he
had 3 children. Consuelo continued using the Tolentino surname until
a case was filed by Constancia. Her use of the surname was
authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (his brothers and sisters).
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they
may be brought. Art 1149 CC: Period of prescription is 5 years from the
right of action accrues. Constancia obtained knowledge that Consuelo
David was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951. Case was filed in
1971, 20 years after she obtained knowledge. Philippine law is silent
whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of
her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under
Philippine law. On the Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of
the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands
surname. She cannot be prevented from using it, but neither can she
restrain others from using it.
180
Republic v. CA and
Wong
Siblings Maximo Alcala, Jr. (2 years old) and Margaret Alcala (9

years old) were adopted by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong
(naturalized Filipino citizens). Maximo Wong now wants to revert back
to his name prior to adoption. Adoptive father is deceased but adoptive
mother gave consent and testified to change his name. Being Muslim
Fil residing in a Muslim community, his Wong surname causes him
undue ridicule and embarrassment and affects his business and social
life.
SC allowed change of name. It is a privilege which may be granted

only upon a showing f a proper or reasonable cause or compelling
reason therefor. He did as the law asked when he was now adopted.
Now that he is emancipated, he can legally file for change of name on
certain grounds: (a)When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results
as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will
avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously. Maximo was able to prove
and substantiate his reasons for the change.
181
Republic v. Capote
Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso is the illegitimate child of Corazon

Nadores and Diosdado Gallamoso. Born July 9, 1982, before the
effecitivity of FC. He now wants to remove the surname of his father
since he never recognized him as his child anyway. His mother also
wants to petition to join him in the US and using her surname will make
the process less complicated. RTC found his petition sufficient and
ordered him to publish petition and notify the OSG and LCR. He
complied. CA affirmed RTC. OSG later contested, saying change of
name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding.
SC affirmed change of name. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a

petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
complied with all the procedural requirements. Unlike remedy under
rule 108 of ROC (applies only to clerical errors, can be summary
proceeding), rule 103 should be in adversarial proceeding: proceeding
is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. He
was able to comply with requirements.
182
Remo v. Secretary
W is using her Hs surname. Marriage is valid and subsisting. In her

renewal of passport in DFA, Ilinois, Chicago, she used her maiden
name in her application. DFA denied, wrote to the DFA sec, still denied,
Office of the President, affirmed DFA decision. The Secretary
explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239
or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert
to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce,
and death of the husband. CA affirmed the ruling.
SC: Remo cannot revert to her maiden name in her passport renewal.
Change of name upon marriage is optional, not mandatory. Only the
status is changed. But if the W opts to use her Hs surname, she
cannot revert to maiden name later, except in the following cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2)
divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
183
In Re: Garcia
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child

Stephanie Astorga Garcia. Stephanies mother is now deceased.
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname.
An illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. Being
legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
RTC granted the adoption and her name is now Stephanie Nathy
Catindog. Honorato filed an MR asking that Steph be allowed to use
her mothers surname as her middlename. Lower court denied saying
there is no law that allows an adopted child to use surname of her
biological mother as her middle name.
Decision
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother.
Absence: Declaration of Absence

184
Reyes v. Alejandro
Erlinda prayed for the judicial declaration of absence of her husband

who has been absent in their conjugal dwelling for 7 years now due to
a misunderstanding over personal matters. Since then, she doesnt
know of his whereabouts.
H cannot be judicially declared absent for no reason other than to

judicially declare him absent. The purpose of the declaration is to
provide an administrator of the property. The reason and purpose of
the provisions of the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to 396).
When to declare absence: 1. When there are properties to be taken
care of. 2. The spouse of absentee is asking for separation of property.
3. his wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of
property in the marriage be transferred to her
Civil Register at CC art 407-413

Republic v. Capote
(See #181)
Silverio v. Republic
Errors that involve the change of nationality, age, status, surname, sex
of petitioner are not included in the coverage of RA 9048. Under such
act, only clerical or typographical errors can be changed.
Republic v.
Cagandahan
185
Braza v. City Civil

Registrar
When Ws H died, a women appeared in the funeral with a son of her

H. When W went to LCR to check the birth cert of the child, it was
shown that the child was acknowledged by her H as his and was
legitimated when her H married the mother of the child. She filed a
petition to correct the entries in the birth cert of the child. Her
contention is the child could not have been legitimated bec the
marriage of 2nd W and H is void for being bigamous. Petitioners seek to
nullify the marriage of respondent and Pablo and impugn their childs
filiation and to subject him to DNA testing. They contend that these are
merely incidental to the main petition which is correction of entry under
Rule 108.
In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation. Under these rules, only correction of clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be
allowed. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake
in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of
name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation
of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.
186
Republic v.
Mercadera
Petitioner sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in

her Certificate of Live Birth from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L.
Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048. She has been using the name
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given

name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code.
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the
correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to
No
.
Case Name
Pertinent Facts
Merlyn ever since and only found out about Marilyn later in her life.
Decision
Article 412 of the Civil Code. Considering that the enumeration in
Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of
a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Change of name
is granted under Rule 108.
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Xavier University College of Law (2016) BLOCK B

*Sempio-Dy: Agreement of the parties embodied in the

1 Incorporating the commentaries of Arturo Tolentino (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

- Property regimes that may be agreed upon in

separating their properties is void. Whatever regime

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal

- First paragraph of Art. 80 is not applicable

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

the occasion or motive for the donation, not its

- Rules governing ordinary donations under Title

Otherwise, the donation shall be void. In order that

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

donee could not be held liable for the deficiency as

separation, it must be brought w/in 5 yrs. From the

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

Absolute Community of Property

Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Definition of ACP. The husband and the wife are

Definition of CPG. Under the regime of CPG,

Time of commencement. The ACP between

Time of commencement. Same (Art. 107).

Waiver of rights. Same (Art. 107).

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

Absolute Community of Property

Conjugal Partnership of Gains

General rule. Unless otherwise provided in this

General rule. All property acquired during the

On conversions. When an exclusive property is

Properties involved. The following are CPG

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

Absolute Community of Property

Conjugal Partnership of Gains

The share of either spouse in the

On properties on installment. Property

When the cost of the improvement

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

Absolute Community of Property

Conjugal Partnership of Gains

the conjugal partnership, subject to

In either case, the ownership of the entire

General Rule. The following shall be excluded

Paraphernal properties. The following shall

Reviewer for Persons and Family Relations

Absolute Community of Property

Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Property donated or left by will to the

The ACP shall be liable for (Art. 94):

Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities,

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Absolute Community of Property

Conjugal Partnership of Gains

On gambling/ games of chance. Whatever may

Who shall administer the common

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Absolute Community of Property

Conjugal Partnership of Gains

In the absence of such authority or consent, the

Donation of community property. Neither spouse

Effectivity of dissolution. Same reasons with

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Absolute Community of Property