G.R. No.

174626

October 23, 2013

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
vs.
LUIS MIGUEL O. ABOITIZ, Respondent.

PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines Republic), represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General OSG), seeking to set aside the December 14 2005 Amended
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 75032 and its September 12
2006 Resolution2 affirming the February 21 2002 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial . Court
Cebu City Branch 11 RTC), which granted the application for registration of respondent
Luis Miguel O. Aboitiz Aboitiz) in Land Registration Case LRC) No. 1474-N.
The Facts
On September 11, 1998, respondent Aboitiz filed his Application for Registration of Land
Title of a parcel of land with an area of 1,254 square meters, located in Talamban, Cebu
City, and identified as Lot 11193 of the Cebu Cadastre 12 Extension, before the RTC.
After establishing the jurisdiction of the RTC to act on the application for registration of
land title, hearing thereon ensued.
In support of his application, Aboitiz attached the original Tracing Cloth Plan with a
blueprint copy, the technical description of the land, the certificate of the geodetic
engineer surveying the land, and the documents evidencing possession and ownership
of the land.
To prove his claim, Aboitiz presented his witness, Sarah Benemerito (Sarah), his
secretary, who testified that he entrusted to her the subject property and appointed her
as its caretaker; that he purchased the subject property from Irenea Kapuno (Irenea) on
September 5, 1994; that he had been in actual, open, continuous, and exclusive
possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner; that as per record of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII, the subject
property had been classified as alienable and disposable since 1957; that per
certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Cebu City, the subject property was not covered by any subsisting public land
application; and that the subject property had been covered by tax declarations from
1963 to 1994 in Ireneas name, and from 1994 to present, in his name.
Another witness for Aboitiz, Luz Kapuno (Luz), daughter of Irenea, the original owner of
the subject property, testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the deed
of sale of the subject property and that saw her mother affix her signature on the said

document. She added that her mother was in open, continuous, peaceful, and exclusive
possession of the said property.
Subsequently, the Republic, through Assistant City Prosecutor Edito Y. Enemecio,
manifested that it would not adduce any evidence to oppose the application for
registration of Aboitiz.
On February 21, 2002, the RTC granted Aboitizs application for registration of the
subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the Court hereby renders judgment
in this case granting the application filed by the applicant. The Court hereby accordingly
adjudicates the land described on plan RS-07-000856 located in Talamban, Cebu City,
together with all the improvements thereon, as belonging to the applicant, and confirms
his title thereto. The Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered to issue the
corresponding Decree of Registration to confirm the applicants title to the said land and
to subject the said land under the operation of the Torrens System of Registration.
Upon this decision becoming final, let a decree of confirmation and registration be
entered and, thereafter, upon payment of the fees required by law, let the corresponding
original certificate of title be issued in the name of the applicant.
Furnish copies of this decision to the Administrator of the LRA, the Director of Lands
and the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Cebu City Prosecutor.
SO ORDERED.4
Not in conformity, the Republic appealed the RTC ruling before the CA.
In its June 7, 2005 Decision,5 the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and denied Aboitizs
application for registration of land title, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court dated February 21, 2002 is hereby
REVERSED and the application for registration of title is accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6
The CA ruled that it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable and
disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession since
June 12, 1945 or earlier would commence. Possession prior to the date of declaration of
the lands alienability was not included. The CA observed that the subject property was
declared as alienable and disposable only in 1957, and so the application clearly did not
meet the requirements of possession needed under the first requisite of Section 14 (1) 7 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 which must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereafter, Aboitiz moved for reconsideration of the June 7, 2005 Decision of the CA
which dismissed his application for registration of title. Aboitiz asserted, among others,

that although the subject land was classified as alienable and disposable only in 1957,
the tax declarations, from 1963 to 1994, for a period of thirty one (31) years, converted
the land, by way of acquisitive prescription, to private property. He asserted that the
evidence he presented substantially met the requisite nature and character of possession
under P.D. No. 1529.
In its December 14, 2005 Amended Decision, the CA reversed itself and granted the
application for registration of land title of Aboitiz. The pertinent portion of the said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the June 7, 2005 Decision of this Court is
hereby REVERSED and the Decision dated February 21, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Cebu City with respect to L.R.C. No. 1474-N is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.8
In granting the application for registration of land title, the CA relied on Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529.9 It stated that although the application for registration of Aboitiz could
not be granted pursuant to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 because the possession of his
predecessor-in-interest commenced in 1963 (beyond June 12, 1945), it could prosper by
virtue of acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 upon the lapse of
thirty (30) years. The CA explained that the original owners (Ireneas) possession of the
subject property beginning from 1963 up to 1994, the year Aboitiz purchased the subject
property from Irenea, spanning thirty one (31) years, converted the said property into
private land and, thus, susceptible to registration. The CA also declared that although
tax declarations and real property tax payments were not by themselves conclusive
evidence of ownership of land, they were nevertheless good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner.
The Republic moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA on September 12,
2006. Hence, this petition.
ASSIGMENT OF ERROR
THE CA ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF LOT 11193 UNDER PLAN RS-07-000856 BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE IT RELIED UPON EARLIER DISMISSING THE SAID APPLICATION. 10
In his Memorandum,11 Aboitiz contends that the Republic is raising questions of fact
which is beyond the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, the findings of
fact by the RTC and affirmed by the CA are final, binding and conclusive upon the Court.
Aboitiz claims that sufficient evidence was presented to establish the nature and
character of his possession of the subject property as required by P.D. No. 1529.
In its Memorandum,12 the Republic, citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 13 argues
that Aboitiz failed to validly establish the alienability of the subject property because he
only adduced a CENRO certification to that effect, without presenting a copy of the

original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records. Further, a declaration that the property is
alienable and disposable is not sufficient to make it susceptible to acquisitive
prescription. An express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer intended for public use, for public service or for the
development for the national wealth pursuant to Article 422 14 of the New Civil Code
must also be shown. The Republic asserts that it is only when the property has become
patrimonial that the period of acquisitive prescription can commence to run against the
State.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious. The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether Aboitiz
is entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, or, in the
alternative, pursuant to Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141,15 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,16 provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government

grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[Emphases supplied]
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must
establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
The foregoing requisites are indispensable for an application for registration of land
title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The absence of any one
requisite renders the application for registration substantially defective.
Anent the first requisite, to authoritatively establish the subject lands alienable and
disposable character, it is incumbent upon the applicant to present a CENRO or
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Certification; and a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.17
Strangely, the Court cannot find any evidence to show the subject lands alienable and
disposable character, except for a CENRO certification submitted by Aboitiz. Clearly, his
attempt to comply with the first requisite of Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 fell short due
to his own omission. In Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, 18 the
Court declared that the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public
lands. Thus, the CENRO Certification should be accompanied by an official publication
of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. For this
reason, the application for registration of Aboitiz should be denied.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation
of a parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.19 A mere showing of possession and occupation for
30 years or more, by itself, is not sufficient.20
Unfortunately, Aboitiz likewise failed to satisfy this third requisite. As the records and
pleadings of this case will reveal, the earliest that he and his predecessor-in-interest can
trace back possession and occupation of the subject land was only in the year 1963.
Evidently, his possession of the subject property commenced roughly eighteen (18)
years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly provided under Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529. Here, he neglected to present any convincing and persuasive evidence
to manifest compliance with the requisite period of possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Accordingly, his application for registration of land title was
legally infirm.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529

Notwithstanding his failure to comply with the requirements for registration of land title
under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, Aboitiz advances that he has, nonetheless, satisfied
the requirements of possession for thirty (30) years to acquire title to the subject
property via prescription under Section 14(2) of P. D. No. 1529.
Regrettably, the Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to applicants proposition.
Significantly, Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
In the case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 21 the Court clarified the import of
Section 14(1) as distinguished from Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 22 of the
Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil

Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government.The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.23 [Emphasis supplied]
On September 3, 2013, the Court En Banc came out with its Resolution, 24 in the same
case of Malabanan, denying the motion for reconsideration questioning the decision. In
the said resolution, the Court authoritatively stated that x x x the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land
as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth." 25
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence
and operate against the State, the classification of ' land as alienable and disposable
alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to
the said classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued, by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State,
the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to
acquisition by virtue of prescription.
In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or legal
justification. Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the assailed CA Amended
Decision and Resolution and to deny the application for registration of land title of
Aboitiz.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 14, 2005 Amended Decision
and the September 12, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
75032, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application for
Registration of Title of respondent Luis Miguel O. Aboitiz in Land Registration Case No.
1474-N is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179990

October 23, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
DIOSDADA I. GIELCZYK, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The present petition is one for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The Republic of the
Philippines petitioner) challenges the Decision1 dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 70078, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, which granted the application of Diosdada I. Gielczyk (respondent) for the original
registration of title of Lot Nos. 3135-A and 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-072219004551, both situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu. The petitioner prays that the Court annuls the
CA Decision dated September 21, 2007 in CA-GR. CV No. 70078, and that it should dismiss Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. N-452 for utter lack of merit. 3
Antecedent Facts
On July 17, 1995, the respondent sought the registration under her name of the lands denominated
as Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No. 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-072219-004551. Both
lands were situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu.
In her verified application in LRC Case No. N-452, the respondent claimed that she is the owner of
the two parcels of land, which are situated, bounded and specifically described in Plans Csd072219-004552 and Csd-072219-004551,4 to wit:
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS
Lot 2007, Cad. 545-D, identical to lot
3135-A, Csd-072219-004552
(Luisa Ceniza)
A parcel of land (lot 20047, Cad.545-D, identical to lot 3135-A, Csd-072219-004552), being a portion
of lot 3135, Cad. 545-D (new), situated in the Barrio of Jugan, Municipality of Consolacion, Province
of Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2 by lot 20048 (identical to lot 3135-B,
Csd-072219-004552), on the SE., along line 2-3 by Camino Vicinal Road, on the SW., along line 3-4
by lot 3126, on the NW., along line 4-1 by lot 3136, All [sic] of Cad. 545-D (New). Beginning at a
point marked "1" on plan being S. 83 deg. 17E., 1878.69 m. from BLLM No. 1, Consolacion, Cebu.
thence S. 61 deg. 20E., 40.69 m. to point 2;
thence S. 26 deg. 14W., 57.80 m. to point 3;
thence N. 61 deg. 26W., 38.40 m. to point 4;
thence N. 23 deg. 59E., 58.02 m. to point of the

beginning. Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (2,285)
SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on
the ground as follows; points 1 and 2 by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15x40 cms. and the rest are old P.S.
cyl. conc. mons 15x60 cms. Bearings Grid; date of original survey July 14, 1987-November 11,
1987, and that of the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. Abella on
November 12, 1993 and approved on May 24, 1994.5
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS
Lot 20045, Cad. 545-D, identical to
Lot 3136-A, Csd-072219-004551
(Constancio Ceniza)
A parcel of land (lot 20045, Cad.545-D, identical to lot 3136-A, Csd-072219-004551), being a portion
of lot 3136, Cad. 545-D (New), situated in the Barrio of Jugan, Municipality of Consolacion, Province
of Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by lot 3135, on the SW., along line 2-34 by lot 3126, on the NW., along line 6-1 by lot 20046, All [sic] of Cad. 545-D (New), on the NE.,
along line 6-1 by lot 20046 (identical to lot 3136-B, Csd-072219-004551). Beginning at a point
marked "1" on plan being S. 83 deg. 17E., 1878.69 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Consolacion, Cebu.
thence S. 23 deg. 59W., 58.02 m. to point 2;
thence N. 65 deg. 10W., 41.39 m. to point 3;
thence N. 35 deg. 15W., 2.55 m. to point 4;
thence N. 20 deg. 43E., 44.05 m. to point 5;
thence N. 20 deg. 44E., 12.48 m. to point 6:
thence S. 65 deg. 37E., 46.79 m. to point of the
beginning. Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TEN (2,610) SQUARE
METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground as follows; points 1 and 6 by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15x40 cms. and the rest are old P.S. cyl.
conc. mons 15x60 cms. Bearings Grid; date of original survey July 14, 1987-November 11, 1987,
and that of the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. Abella on November 19,
1993 and approved on May 26, 1994.6
The respondent further alleged the following: (a) that the said parcels of land were last assessed for
taxation at P2,400.00; (b) that to the best of her knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage nor
encumbrance of any kind affecting said land, nor any person having interest therein, legal or
equitable; (c) that she had been in open, complete, continuous, and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner over said parcels of land up to the present time for more than 30 years,
including the possession of her predecessors-in-interest; (d) that she acquired title to said land by
virtue of the deeds of absolute sale; and (e) that said land is not occupied. 7

The respondent, as far as known to her, also alleged that the full names and complete addresses of
the owners of all lands adjoining the subject land are the following:
ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3135-A:
North - Lot 3135-B owned by Mrs. Luisa Ceniza
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
East - Municipal Road
c/o Municipal Mayor
Consolacion, Cebu
South - Lot 3126 owned by Mr. Rene Pepito
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
West - Lot 3136-A owned by the applicant.
ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3136-A:
North - Lot 3136-B, owned by Mr. Constancio Ceniza
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
East - Lot 3135-A, owned by the applicant;
South - Lot 3126, owned by Mr. Rogelio M. Pepito
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
West - Lot 3138, owned by Mr. Miguel Hortiguela Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu 8
To prove her claim, the respondent submitted the following pieces of evidence:
(a) Approved plans of Lot Nos. 3135-A and 3136-A;9
(b) Approved technical descriptions of the same lots;10
(c) Certification from the Chief, Technical Services Section, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Central Visayas Lands Management Services in lieu
of surveyors certificates;11
(d) Latest tax declarations of the lots;12
(e) Latest tax clearance of the same lots;13
(f) Deeds of Sale in favor of the respondent;14
(g) Certifications from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO),
Cebu City, that the lots are alienable and disposable;15 and

(h) Certification from the Chief, Records Section, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City that the same
lots are not subject to public land application.16
Furthermore, when the respondent testified in court, her testimony sought to establish the following:
(i) That the respondent acquired Lot No. 3136-A (which is identical to Lot 20045, and is
situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu, with an area of 2,610 sq m), and Lot No. 3135-A
(which is identical to Lot 20047, and is situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu, with an area of
2,285 sq m) through purchase from Constancio Ceniza and Luisa Ceniza respectively; 17
(ii) That the respondent was never delinquent in paying the taxes for the said lots. In fact the
following tax declarations were issued for Lot No. 3136-A: Tax Dec. No. 01258 for the year
1948; Tax Dec. No. 012459 for the year 1965; Tax Dec. No. 20846 for the year 1980; Tax
Dec. No. 29200 for the year 1981; Tax Dec. No. 04210 for the year 1985; and Tax Dec. No.
13275 for the year 1989; while the following tax declarations were issued for Lot No. 3135-A:
Tax Dec. No. 01670 for the year 1948; Tax Dec. No. 012931 for the year 1965; Tax Dec. No.
021294 for the year 1968; Tax Dec. No. 25146 for the year 1973; Tax Dec. No. 01411 for the
year 1974; Tax Dec. No. 20849 for the year 1980; Tax Dec. No. 04208 for the year 1985; Tax
Dec. No. 13274 for the year 1989;18
(iii) That the said parcels of land are alienable and disposable and are not covered by
subsisting public land application;19
(iv) That the respondent and her respective predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No. 3136-A for more than 40 years in the concept of an owner,
exclusively, completely, continuously, publicly, peacefully, notoriously and adversely, and no
other person has claimed ownership over the same land;20 and
(v) That the respondent is a Filipino Citizen and that despite her marriage to an American
national, she has retained her Filipino citizenship. 21
The petitioner filed an opposition dated September 18, 1995 to the respondents application for
registration of title, alleging among others:
1) That neither the respondent nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;22
(2) That the muniments of title and/or the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of the
respondent attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an
owner since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto; and that said muniments of title do not appear to
be genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended
possession of the respondent to be of recent vintage;23
(3) That the respondent can no longer avail of the claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of Spanish title or grant since she has failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six months from February 16, 1976 as required by

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892. From the records, the petitioner further alleged that the
instant application was filed on July 7, 1995;24
(4) That the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
petitioner and that the said parcel is not subject to private appropriation. 25
On November 3, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision26 in favor of the respondent, the dispositive
portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed facts supported by oral and documentary
evidence, the Court finds and so holds that the applicant has registrable title over subject lots, and
the same title is hereby confirmed. Consequently, the Administrator, Land Registration Authority is
hereby directed to issue Decree of Registration and Original Certificate of Title to Lots 3135-A and
3136-A [sic], both situated at Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu in the name of the applicant DIOSDADA I.
GIELCZYK, 44 years old, Filipino, married to Philip James Gielczyk, American national, resident of
No. 4 Noel St., UHV, Paranaque, Metro Manila, as her exclusive paraphernal property.
Upon finality of this judgment, let a corresponding decree of registration and original certificate of title
be issued to subject lot in accordance with Sec. 39, PD 1529.
SO ORDERED.27
Not convinced of the RTCs decision, the petitioner filed an appeal dated August 5, 2002 before the
CA, which was also denied on September 21, 2007,28 the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in its entirety.29
Thus, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
raising the sole issue:
Issue
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT SHE AND HER
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, COMPLETE, CONTINUOUS,
NOTORIOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND PEACEFUL POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS SUBJECT OF
THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION FOR A PERIOD OF OVER 40 YEARS
THROUGH MERE TAX DECLARATIONS AND IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF WHEN THE
SUBJECT LOTS WERE DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.30
Our Ruling
It must be noted that the respondent did not file any comment on the petition despite efforts to notify
her and her counsel of record. Thus, in the Resolution31 dated March 30, 2011, this Court resolved to
dispense with the respondents comment and shall decide the instant petition based on available
records.

After a thorough study of the records, the Court resolves to grant the petition.
The respondent failed to completely prove that there was an expressed State declaration that the
properties in question are no longer intended for public use, public service, the development of the
national wealth and have been converted into patrimonial property, and to meet the period of
possession and occupation required by law.
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree enumerates the persons who may
apply for the registration of title to land, to wit:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
In the assailed decision granting the respondents application for registration of title, the CA
explained that the RTCs decision was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section
14(1) of the same decree.32 The CA said:
However, a judicious scrutiny of the attendant facts would reveal that the assailed decision of the
RTC was based not on PD No. 1529, Section 14(1), but under Section 14(2) of said issuance. The
pertinent portion of the decision is quoted as follows:
"From the documentary evidence presented and formally offered by the applicant, the Court is
convinced that she and her predecessors-in-interest has (sic) been in open, complete, continuous,
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession over the lands herein applied for registration of title, for
a period of over 40 years, in the concept of an owner and that applicant has registrable title over
same lots in accordance with Sec. 14, PD 1529."
A closer scrutiny will show that the questioned decision was based on PD No. 1529, Section 14(2).
In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Naguit, it was ruled that:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude
the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

"Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been [sic] open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree."
In the instant case, applicant-appellee was able to present tax declarations dating back from 1948.
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at the least
constructive, possession. They constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests, not only ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but it also announces his adverse claim
against the State and all other interested parties, including his intention to contribute to the needed
revenues of the Government. All told, such acts strengthen ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.33 (Citations omitted)
The Court agrees with the CAs finding that the RTCs grant of the respondents application for
registration of title was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the
same decree. As the CA, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, 34 correctly
explained, an applicant may apply for registration of title through prescription under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, stating that patrimonial properties of the State are susceptible of prescription and that
there is a rich jurisprudential precedents which rule that properties classified as alienable public land
may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least 30 years.35
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,36 the Court further clarified the difference between Section
14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the basis of
possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis of
prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P.D. No. 1529 and
the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529
and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No.
1472, the 30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil
Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.37
Indeed, the foregoing jurisprudence clearly shows the basis of the respondents application for
registration of title. However, the petitioner argued that the respondent failed to show proof of an
expressed State declaration that the properties in question are no longer intended for public use,
public service, the development of the national wealth or have been converted into patrimonial
property. It pointed out that the certification which the respondent submitted did not indicate when
the lands applied for were declared alienable and disposable. 38
On this point, the Court cannot completely agree with the petitioner. Indeed, the respondent
attempted to show proof as to when the subject lands were declared alienable and disposable. While

the RTC and the CA failed to cite the evidence which the respondent submitted, the Court cannot, in
the name of substantial justice and equity, close its eyes to the September 23, 2004
Certification issued and signed by Fedencio P. Carreon (Carreon), OIC, CENRO, which the
respondent attached in her Appellees brief in the CA, 39 as a supplement to her earlier submissions,
particularly Annex "G" and Annex "G-1" or the June 28, 1995 Certifications issued by Eduardo M.
Inting, CENRO.40
Carreons Certification is reproduced here:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICE
Cebu City
23 September 2004
CENRO, Cebu City, Lands Verification
CONSTANCIO CENIZA ET AL (Consolacion, Cebu)
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that per projection conducted by Forester Restituto A. Llegunas a tract of land lots
3135 and 3136, Cad 545-D(New) containing an area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
EIGHTY SEVEN (15,687) square meters[,] more or less, situated at Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu as
shown and described in the sketch plan at the back hereof as prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Aurelio Q. Caa for CONSTANCIO CENIZA ET AL was found to be within Alienable and Disposable
Block I of Land Classification Project No. 28 per L. C. Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified
under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063 dated September 1, 1965. (Emphasis Supplied)
This is to certify further that the subject area is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Watershed Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 1074 dated Sept. 2, 1997.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Constancio Ceniza for the purpose of ascertaining
the land classification status only and does not entitle him preferential/priority rights of possession
until determined by competent authorities.
FEDENCIO P. CARREON
OIC, Community Environment
& Natural Resources Officer
However, following our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 41 this CENRO
Certification by itself is insufficient to establish that a public land is alienable and disposable. While
the certification refers to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063 dated September 1, 1965, the
respondent should have submitted a certified true copy thereof to substantiate the alienable

character of the land. In any case, the Court does not need to further discuss whether the
respondent was able to overcome the burden of proving that the land no longer forms part of the
public domain to support her application for original land registration because of other deficiencies in
her application.
Indeed, the respondent failed to meet the required period of possession and occupation for purposes
of prescription. From the time of the declaration on September 1, 1965 that the properties in
question are purportedly alienable and disposable up to the filing of the application of the respondent
on July 17, 1995, the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the
said properties for only 29 years and 10 months, short of two months to complete the whole 30-year
possession period.
Granting por arguendo that the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and
occupied the subject lots since 1948, the Court cannot still tack those years to complete the 30-year
possession period since the said lots were only declared alienable and disposable on September 1,
1965. In Naguit, we ruled that for as long as the land was declared alienable and disposable, the
same is susceptible of prescription for purposes of registration of imperfect title. 42 In Lim v.
Republic,43 we further clarified that "while a property classified as alienable and disposable public
land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of at least 30 years, public dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable but also with an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use, public
service or the development of national wealth. And only when the property has become patrimonial
can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run." 44
While the subject lots were supposedly declared alienable or disposable on September 1, 1965
based on the Certifications of the CENRO, the respondent still failed to complete the 30-year period
required to grant her application by virtue of prescription.
The respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership to substantiate her claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession in the concept of an owner.
The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the latters claim of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner. Here, the Court agrees with the petitioners argument.
In Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan, 45 the Court ruled that
for an applicant to ipso jure or by operation of law acquire government grant or vested title to a lot,
he must be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot. 46 In
the said case, the Court clarified what it actually meant when it said "open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation," to wit:
The petitioner submits that even granting arguendo that the entire Lot 138 was not assigned to it
during the Spanish regime or it is not the owner thereof pursuant to the Laws of the Indies, its open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138 since 1894 and for many
decades thereafter vests ipso jure or by operation of law upon the petitioner a government grant, a
vested title, to the subject property. It cites Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926 and Subsection
b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874.

This contention is likewise not persuasive.

One of the important requisites for the application of the pertinent provisions of Act No. 926 and Act
No. 2874 is the "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" of the land
by the applicant. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. The phrase "possession
and occupation" was explained as follows:
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with
the order [sic]. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the
aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through
then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam v. The Director of Lands:
x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos v. Director of Lands .
But it should be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case
is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these
qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession," possession under paragraph 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of Section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The
mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over
an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be
constructive, is not a mere fiction. x x x.
xxxx
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own
use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by
the public or the people in the neighborhood.
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.
Indisputably, the petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure built thereon. However, the
record is bereft of any evidence that would tend to show that such possession and occupation
extended to Lots 138-A and 138-C beginning the same period. No single instance of the exercise by
the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over these lots was established. Its
unsubstantiated claim that the construction of the municipal building as well as the subsequent
improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital [sic],
basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, was [sic] by its tolerance does not constitute
proof of possession and occupation on its (the petitioners) part. Absent the important requisite of
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereon since 1894, no

government grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso jure or by
operation of law. Possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. 47 (Citations omitted
and emphasis supplied)
In sum, a simple claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation"
does not suffice. An applicant for a grant or title over a lot must be able to show that he has
exercised acts of dominion over the property in question. The applicants possession must not be
simply a nominal claim where he only plants a sign or symbol of possession. In other words, his
possession of the property must be patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine; it should
be uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; it should demonstrate exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and it should be
conspicuous, which means generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.48
The Court held in Cruz v. Court of Appeals, et al.,49 that therein petitioners were able to show clear,
competent and substantial evidence establishing that they have exercised acts of dominion over the
property in question. These acts of dominion were the following:
(a) they constructed permanent buildings on the questioned lot;
(b) they collected rentals;
(c) they granted permission to those who sought their consent for the construction of a
drugstore and a bakery;
(d) they collected fruits from the fruit-bearing trees planted on the said land;
(e) they were consulted regarding questions of boundaries between adjoining properties; and
(f) they religiously paid taxes on the property.50
However, in the present petition, the respondent failed to specifically show that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had exercised acts of dominion over the subject lots. Admittedly, the
respondents best evidence to prove possession and ownership were tax declarations and receipts
issued in her name or the names of her predecessors-in-interest, but these tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land. "Well
settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of
the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence.
The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of
the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in- interest does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership."51
In the instant case, the respondent failed to show that she or her predecessors-in-interest have
exercised acts of dominion over the said parcels of land. In fact, it was only the respondent who
testified to substantiate her allegations in the application. She did not present anyone else to support

her claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation." Unfortunately,
her testimony simply made general declarations without further proof, to wit:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, are you the same Diosdada Gielzcyk, the applicant in this case?
A - Yes.
Q - Are you familiar with Lots No. 3135 and 20045, both of Consolacion, Cebu?
A - Yes.
Court:
Excuse me, You can answer in English? You dont need an interpreter?
A - Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Germino:
Who is the owner of these lots?
A - I am the one.
Q - How large is 20047?
A - It has an area of 2,286 square meters.
Q - How much is the assessed value of Lot 20047?
A - I do not think, P430.00 per square meters is the assessed value reflected in the document. Court:
Is that reflected in the tax declaration?
Atty. Germino:
Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Then the tax declaration would be the best evidence.
Atty. Germino:
Q - Do you know if there are other persons who are interested whatsoever over the lots you have
mentioned?

A - No sir.
Atty. Germino:
Q - Are there liens and encumbrances affecting the lots?
A - No, sir.
Q - Who is in possession of these lots?
A - I am in possession.
Court:
Physically? I thought you are residing in Manila?
A - Because my family is living there in Consolacion and I always come home every month. I have
my parents and brothers there.
Court:
The same property?
A - Near my parents house,Your Honor.
Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Germino:
Q - How long have you been in possession of the lots?
A - Including my predecessors-in-interest, for over a period of 40 years.
Q - What is the nature of your possession?
A - Adverse against the whole world, continous [sic], peaceful, open and uninterrupted.
Q - How did you acquire Lot 20047?
A - I purchased it from Luisa Ceniza.
Q - Do you know how did Luisa Ceniza acquire the same?
A - She inherited it from her father Remigio Ceniza.
Q - Do you have a deed of sale in your favor?

A - Yes, I have.52
xxxx
Atty. Germino:
Q - You said that includ[i]ng your predecessors-in-interest, your possession including your
predecessors-in-interest has been for over forty (40) years. Do you have the tax declaration of Lot
20047 since 1948 until the present?
A - Yes.
Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 01670 in the name of the heirs of Remigio Ceniza covering
land in Consolacion for the year 1948, please examine and tell the court whether that is the tax
declaration of Lot 20047 for the year 1948?
A - Yes, this is the one.
xxxx
Atty. Germino:
Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 012931 in the name of heirs of Remigio Ceniza for the year
1965, please examine the same and tell the Honorable court what relation has that to the tax
declaration of lot 20047 for the year 1965?
A - This is the same.
xxxx
Atty. Germino:
Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 021294 in the name of Luisa and Constancio Ceniza for the
year 1968, please examine and tell the court whether that is the tax declaration of Lot 20047 for the
year 1968?
A - Yes, this is the same.
xxxx
Atty. Germino:
Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. [no number was indicated in the TSN] in the name of Luisa
Ceniza for the year 1963 tell the court whether that is the tax declaration for the year 1973? A - Yes,
this is the one.53

In the continuance of her testimony, the respondent added no further information for this Court to
conclude that she indeed exercised specific acts of dominion aside from paying taxes. She testified
thus:
xxxx
Atty. Germino:
Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, one of the last lot subject to [sic] your petition is Lot 20045, how large is this lot?
A - 2,610 square meters.
Q - How much is the assess value of this lot?
A - P970.00
Q - Who is in possession of this lot?
A - I am the one.
Q - How long have you been in possession?
A - Including my predecessors-in-interest is [sic] over a period of 40 years.
COURT: (to witness)
Q - Personally, how long have you been in possession of this property?
A - If I remember right, 1985.
ATTY. GERMINO:
Q - How did you acquire lot 20045?
A - I purchased it from Constancio Ceniza.
Q - Do you have a deed of sale in your favor?
A - Yes.
COURT:
We are talking about 3136-A?
ATTY. GERMINO:
Yes, we are through with Lot 3135?

COURT:
This is 3136-A equivalent to Lot 20045. Proceed.
ATTY. GERMINO:
I am showing to you a deed of absolute sale by Constancio Ceniza over lot 3136-A acknowledged
before Notary Public Marino Martillano, as Doc. No. 2637 book 4, series of 1988, please examine
this document and tell the Court if that is the deed of sale?
A - Yes.
xxxx
Q - Are you not delinquent in the payment of taxes for lot 3136-A?
A - No, sir.
Q - Do you have a tax clearances [sic]?
A - Yes, I have.
Q - I am showing to you tax clearance issued by the municipal treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu, is
that the tax clearance you referred to?
A - Yes, sir.
ATTY. GERMINO:
We ask your Honor the tax clearance be marked as double "C".
COURT: Mark it.
xxxx
COURT: (to witness)
Q - You said that including your predecessor-in-interest, your possession of the land applied for is
more than 40 years, do you have a Tax Declaration of lot 3136-A from 1948 until the present? A Yes.
Q - I am showing to you a bunch of Tax Declaration, 6 in all, from the (sic) year 1948, 1965, 1980,
1981, 1985 and 1989, please examine this Tax Declaration and tell us whether these are the Tax
Declarations of Lot 3136-A from 1948 until the present in your name?
A - These are the ones.
ATTY. GERMINO:

We ask that the Tax Declaration in bunch be marked as Exhibit double "F" and the succeeding Tax
Declaration to be marked as double "FF-1" up to double "F-5".
COURT:
Mark it.54
The respondents cross-examination further revealed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have
not exercised specific acts of dominion over the properties, to wit:
COURT:
Cross-examination?
FISCAL ALBURO:
May it please the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Proceed.
FISCAL ALBURO:
Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, how many lots are involved in this petition?
A - 2 portions.
Q - How did you acquire this lot [sic]?
A - I purchased it [sic] from Constancio Ceniza.
Q - When was that?
A - If I remember right in 1985 or 1986.
Q- In other words, you srarted [sic] possessing the property since 1985, until the present?
A- Yes.
Q- But you are not in actual occupant [sic] of the property because you are residing in Paranaque?
A- But I have a cousin in Consolacion.
Q- But you are not residing in Consolacion?
A- I used to go back and forth Cebu and Manila.

Q- Who is in charge of your property in Consolacion?

A- My brothers.
Q - In other words, your property is being taken cared of by your brothers?
A - Yes.
FISCAL ALBURO:
That is all, your Honor.
ATTY. GERMINO:
No redirect, your Honor.
COURT: (to witness) By the way, where do you stay often?
A - Usually in Manila.
Q - Who takes care of the property in Mandaue City?
A - My brothers because there are coconut trees and some fruits and he watched it [sic].
Q - Who is using the coconut trees and the fruits? A - Just for consumption, there are few
coconuts.55 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing testimony of the lone witness (the applicant-respondent herself), the Court can
deduce that, besides intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot No. 3135-A, the respondent did not
exercise acts of dominion over it. Neither can the Court give credence to the respondents claim that
her predecessors-in-interest had exercised dominion over the property since the respondent failed to
present any witness who would substantiate her allegation. The pieces of documentary evidence,
specifically the tax declarations and the deeds of absolute sale, can neither be relied upon because
the same revealed no indication of any improvement that would have the Court conclude that the
respondent exercised specific acts of dominion. For instance, the deed of absolute sale simply said
that the improvements on Lot No. 3135-A consisted of two (2) coconut trees, one (1) mango tree,
one (1) caimito tree and one (1) jackfruit tree.56 The tax declarations have not shown any indication
supporting the respondents claim that she exercised specific acts of dominion. 57
As to Lot No. 3136-A, the deed of absolute sale showed that there were 14 coconut trees, eight (8)
jackfruit trees, and a residential building, which was actually possessed by the vendor Constancio
Ceniza. Moreover, it was only in Tax Declaration Nos. 29200, 04210 and 13275 where it was
declared that a residential building has been built in Lot No. 3136-A. 58 And based on the records, Tax
Declaration No. 29200, where the residential building was first indicated, is dated 1981. It may be
said then that it was only in 1981 when the respondents predecessors-in-interest exercised specific
acts of dominion over Lot No. 3136-A, the period of which consists barely of 14 years. Thus, the
respondent has not completed the required 30 years of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation."

Clearly, from the pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence, and considering that the
respondent did not present any other witness to support her claim, the Court has no other recourse
but to declare that she has not presented the premium of evidence needed to award her title over
the two parcels of land.
Finally, the Court cannot end this decision without reiterating the final words of former Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga in the case of Malabanan59. Justice Tinga correctly pointed out the need to
review our present law on the distribution of lands to those who have held them for a number of
years but have failed to satisfy the requisites in acquiring title to such land. Justice Tinga eloquently
put the matter before us, thus:
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For,
every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to
the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.
1wphi1

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to
long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World"
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality
on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of
these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due
to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties. Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to
regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even
that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential
lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive
idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and
their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according
them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law
itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion.
It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and
formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the
problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the
standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the person s family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood
are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering
problem.60 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the Court can only do as much to bring relief to those who, like herein respondent, wish to
acquire title to a land that they have bought. It is for our lawmakers to write the law amending the
present ones and addressing the reality on the ground, and which this Court will interpret and apply
as justice requires.

WHEREFORE in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED and the
Decision dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70078 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DANTE AND LOLITA BENIGNO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the January 22, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97995, which denied the herein petitioners Omnibus Motion 3 seeking
reconsideration of the CAs October 9, 2012 Resolution4 denying petitioners Motion for Extension5 of time to
file its Appellants Brief.
Factual Antecedents
On November 2, 1995, spouses Dante and Lolita Benigno (respondents, collectively) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (Calamba RTC) an Application for Registration 6 of title under Presidential
Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) to a 293-square meter lot in Barangay
Batong Malake, Los Baos, Laguna. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 105-95-C and assigned to
Branch 35 of the Calamba RTC.
After trial, the Calamba RTC issued a December 9, 2005 Decision 7 granting respondents application for
registration, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court affirms the Order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in
this case, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the title of the applicants spouses Dante Benigno and
Lolita Z. Benigno covered by Tax Declaration No. 0284 and designated as Lot 6489, Cad. Lot No. 450
situated in Brgy. Batong Malake, of the Municipality of Los Baos, Laguna and ordering the registration of
said title in the name of the said applicants spouses Dante Benigno and Lolita Z. Benigno.
Once this decision has become final, let an order issued [sic] directing the Land Registration Authority to
issue the corresponding decree of registration.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed its notice of appeal9 on January 10, 2006. In an April 10, 2006 Order,10 the trial court
approved the notice of appeal and directed that the entire records of the case be forwarded to the CA.
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 97995.
On March 9, 2010, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal and Issue a Final Decree of
Registration,11 claiming among others that petitioner has abandoned its appeal. It also filed a Motion to
Resolve12 seeking among others the denial of petitioners appeal on the ground of abandonment. But in a
July 2, 2010 Order,13 the Calamba RTC denied both motions, stating that it was respondents failure to
submit certain required documents the Affidavit of Publication 14 and Certificate of Posting15 as earlier
directed by the court in a March 26, 2010 Order16 which caused the non-transmittal of the records of the
case to the CA, thus delaying the appeal proceedings. On July 26, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration17 of the said Order.
Without awaiting the resolution of its July 26, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration of the July 2, 2010 Order,
respondents filed on September 21, 2011 its Compliance 18 and submitted the documents required by the
trial court. In a September 26, 2011 Order19 of the trial court, the branch clerk of court was directed to

immediately mark the documents and thereafter forward the records of the case to the CA. Thus, on
December 21, 2011, the acting branch clerk of court of the Calamba RTC forwarded the entire records of
LRC Case No. 105-95-C to the Calamba Office of the Clerk of Court for transmittal to the CA.
On December 21, 2011, the entire records of LRC Case No. 105-95-C was received by the CA. 20
On February 21, 2012, respondents filed a Motion for Early Resolution 21 of the appeal, seeking dismissal
thereof on the ground of alleged inaction and failure to prosecute on the part of the petitioner.
Respondents then filed with the CA a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings 22 dated May 8,
2012. Respondents contended that since its Motion for Reconsideration of the Calamba RTCs July 2, 2010
Order and Motion for Early Resolution of the appeal remained unresolved, the filing of an appellants brief by
the petitioner would be premature; thus, the appeal proceedings should be suspended until the said motions
are resolved.
In an April 26, 2012 Notice,23 the CA directed petitioner to file its appellants brief within 45 days from
receipt of the notice.
On June 22, 2012, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension 24 of time to file its brief. It sought an extension of
60 days from June 21, 2012, or until August 20, 2012, within which to file the same.
In a Resolution25 dated June 26, 2012, the CA required petitioner to comment on respondents Manifestation
and Motion to Suspend Proceedings. It likewise granted petitioners Motion for Extension.
On July 16, 2012, petitioner filed an Opposition 26 to respondents Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, with a prayer that the said manifestation and motion be denied for lack of merit.
On August 13, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution27 stating that with the filing of petitioners Opposition,
respondents Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings are deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 17, 2012, petitioner filed a second Motion for Extension 28 of time to file its appellants brief,
praying for an extension of 30 days from August 20, 2012, or until September 19, 2012, within which to file
its brief.
However, petitioner did not file its brief within the period stated in its second motion for extension. Thus, on
October 9, 2012, the CA issued another Resolution29 denying petitioners second motion for extension and
dismissing its appeal pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules). It held:
For resolution is oppositor-appellants motion for extension of time to file the appellants brief, which prays
that it be granted an additional period of thirty (30) days or until September 19, 2012 to file the aforesaid
brief.
The records, however, will show the We have already granted oppositor-appellants previous motion for
extension of time to file its brief. In our Resolution dated June 26, 2012, We granted oppositor-appellant an
additional period of sixty (60) days or until August 20, 2012 within which to file its brief. However,
oppositor-appellant failed to file its appellants brief on or before August 20, 2012. Hence, the instant
motion.
Oppositor-appellant should be reminded that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, and should be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. The statutory nature of the right to appeal requires the one
who avails of it to strictly comply with the statutes or rules that are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Since oppositor-appellant has not
been able to file its brief within the proper period, We deem it appropriate to dismiss its appeal, pursuant to
Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, viz:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its
own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum
within the time provided by these Rules;

x x x x
It should also be noted that the appealed Decision was rendered on December 9, 2005 and the court a quos
Order letting the entire records of the instant case be forwarded to this Court was issued on April 10, 2006.
Thus, We believe that it is high time for the applicants-appellees, as the prevailing party in the court a quos
Decision, to enjoy the fruits of their victory.
WHEREFORE, appellants motion for extension of time to file its brief, dated August 16, 2012, is hereby
DENIED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Considering the foregoing, applicants-appellees Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings, due to
Our alleged inaction on its Motion for Early Resolution, is hereby declared MOOT.
SO ORDERED.30
On October 18, 2012, petitioner filed a third Motion for Extension, 31 praying for another 20 days from
October 19, 2012, or until November 8, 2012, within which to file its appellants brief.
On November 5, 2012, petitioner filed its Appellants Brief.32 It likewise filed an Omnibus Motion33seeking a
reconsideration of the CAs October 9, 2012 Resolution and, consequently, the admission of its appellants
brief. Apologizing profusely for the fiasco, it begged for the appellate courts leniency, claiming that it
cannot be faulted for the delay in the proceedings on appeal; that in fact, the delay was caused by the
failure to transmit the records of LRC Case No. 105-95-C to the CA, for which the respondents and Calamba
City Office of the Clerk of Court should be faulted; that in the interest of substantial justice, the CA should
instead adopt a relaxed interpretation of Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules in order to afford the State an
opportunity to present its case fully.
Respondents filed their Comment34 arguing that only petitioner should be faulted for its failure to prosecute
the appeal; that from its repeated motions for extension, it can be seen that petitioner lacked diligence in
pursuing its appeal; and that consequently, the CA committed no error in issuing its October 9, 2012
Resolution.
Assailed Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 22, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Resolution, pronouncing thus:
A careful reading of oppositor-appellants motion, however, reveals that it does not raise any matter of
substance that would justify the reconsideration being sought. We, therefore, find no compelling reason to
disturb Our findings and conclusion in Our aforementioned Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion is DENIED. Our Resolution dated October 9, 2012 stands.
SO ORDERED.35
Thus, the instant Petition was filed.
Issue
In an April 23, 2014 Resolution,36 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which raises the
following sole issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT ORDERED THE
DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL ALTHOUGH THE DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF
WAS CAUSED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE RESPONDENTS. 37
Petitioners Arguments
In its Petition and Reply38 seeking the reversal of the assailed CA Resolution as well as the dismissal of LRC
Case No. 105-95-C, petitioner reiterates that it should not be faulted for the delay in the proceedings on

appeal, as it resulted from the Calamba City Office of the Clerk of Courts failure to transmit the records of
LRC Case No. 105-95-C to the CA; that it was the ministerial duty of the clerk of court to transmit the
records of the case to the CA, and he has no authority to withhold the records on the pretext that certain
exhibits were lacking; and that the CA should liberally apply Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules in order to
afford the State an opportunity to present its case fully.
Petitioner further argues, at this stage of the proceedings, that the Calamba RTCs December 9, 2005
Decision granting respondents application for registration is null and void for lack of the required
certification from the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. It claims that the mere testimony of a
special investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) cannot form the
basis for the Calamba RTCs finding that the land applied for is alienable and disposable, pursuant to the
ruling in Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation;39 respondents should have submitted a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. Petitioner justifies the raising of the issue at this late stage, arguing that the State
may not be estopped by the mistakes of its officers and agents; and that when the inference made by the
CA is based on a misapprehension of facts, or when its findings of fact are manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, as in this case, its erroneous decision may be reviewed by this Court. 40
In its Reply, petitioner further points out that the Calamba RTCs December 9, 2005 Decision is void for lack
of publication;41 in other words, petitioner suggests that respondents in fact failed to cause the publication
and posting of the notice of initial hearing on its application, and that the subsequent submission through its
September 21, 2011 Compliance of an Affidavit of Publication and Certificate of Posting of Notice of Initial
Hearing was a mere fabrication and fraudulent submission.
Respondents Arguments
In their Comment,42 respondents insist that the assailed CA disposition is correct in all respects; that
petitioners failure to file its brief is not attributable to respondents; that petitioner filed no less than four
motions for extension to file its brief, which is indicative of its failure to prosecute its appeal with reasonable
diligence and despite having been given by the CA the opportunity to do so; that the CAs authority to
dismiss an appeal for failure of the appellant to file a brief is a matter of judicial discretion; 43 that the CA
exercised its discretion soundly; that Section 1244 of Rule 44 of the Rules states that extensions of time for
the filing of briefs will not be allowed except for good and sufficient cause; that petitioner should not expect
that every motion for extension it files will be granted; and that the rules on appeal are not trivial
technicalities that petitioner can simply disregard at will.
Respondents add that petitioners allegations of fraud and fabrication are not substantiated by the evidence;
that the affidavit of publication and certificate of posting were already presented during the initial hearing
and later submitted as part of their formal offer of evidence; that the Calamba RTC admitted the said
exhibits and in fact mentioned the same in its Decision granting the application; and that with the ruling
in Republic v. Vega,45 it can be said that despite the absence of a certified true copy of the DENR original
land classification, an application for registration could nonetheless be approved when there has been
substantial compliance with the legal requirements relative to proof that the land applied for is alienable and
disposable.
Our Ruling
The Court finds for petitioner.
It is true, as we have held in numerous cases particularly Beatingo v. Gasis46 that the power conferred
upon the CA to dismiss an appeal for failure to file an appellants brief is discretionary. We likewise agree
with the CAs application of Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules. Indeed, petitioner took its liberties in the
prosecution of its appeal, filing at least three motions for extension of time before finally turning in its
appellants brief, and taking the demeanor consistent with expecting that each motion for extension of time
would be granted.
However, while petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, was admittedly ornery in the
prosecution of its case, it is nonetheless true that [a]s a matter of doctrine, illegal acts of government
agents do not bind the State, and the Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its
officials, more so if they are erroneous, let alone irregular.47 This principle applies in land registration
cases.48 Certainly, the State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public domain just

because its agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their duties. Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.49
Applicants for registration of title under PD 152950 must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945 or earlier. Section 14(1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.51
And, in order to prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the
general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must
include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO52 certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification
made by the DENR Secretary.53
A perfunctory appraisal of the records indicates that respondents did not present any documentary evidence
in LRC Case No. 105-95-C to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable public land. Their
Exhibits A to N54 are bereft of the required documentary proof particularly, a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records, and a CENRO or PENRO certification to show that the 293-square meter land applied for
registration is alienable and disposable public land. Respondents do not dispute this; in fact, they sought
the application of the exceptional ruling in Republic v. Vega55 precisely to obtain exemption from the
requirement on the submission of documentary proof showing that the property applied for constitutes
alienable and disposable public land.
Consequently, the December 9, 2005 Decision of the Calamba RTC is rendered null and void. The trial court
had no basis in fact and law to grant respondents application for registration as there was no proof of
alienability adduced. As such, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding
whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or
final order; it may simply be ignored. x x x Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be
the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from
it have no legal effect.56
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong
to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.57 [P]ublic lands remain
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.58 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.59
Therefore, even if the Office of the Solicitor General was remiss in the handling of the States appeal, we
nevertheless cannot allow respondents application for registration since they failed to prove that the land
applied for is alienable and disposable public land. Respondents cannot invoke Republic v. Vega60to
claim substantial compliance with the requirement of proof of alienability; there is complete absence of
documentary evidence showing that the land applied for forms part of the alienable and disposable portion
of the public domain. Complete absence of proof is certainly not equivalent to substantial compliance with
the required amount of proof.
Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, We find no need to resolve the other issues raised by
the parties, as they have become irrelevant in view of the finding that respondents failed to prove that the
land applied for forms part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The only available
course of action is to dismiss respondents application for registration.
We are aware that respondents have come to court at great cost and effort. The application for registration
was filed way back in 1995. However, the difficult lesson that must be realized here is that applicants for
registration of public land should come to court prepared and complete with the necessary evidence to prove
their registrable title; otherwise, their efforts will be for naught, and they would only have wasted precious
time, resources and energy in advancing a lost cause.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The October 9, 2012 and January 22, 2013 Resolutions of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97995 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The December 9, 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 35 in LRC Case No. 105-95-C is
likewise SET ASIDE, and LRC Case No. 105-95-C is thus ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179155

April 2, 2014

NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, Petitioner,

vs.
EULALIA BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA BRACEWELL, JAMES
BRACEWELL, JOHN BRACEWELL, EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF
GEORGE BRACEWELL,Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated May 23, 2007 and the
Resolution dated August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, which
affirmed the Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pifias City,
Branch 275 in Civil Case No. LP 98-0025, directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to set
aside Decree of Registration No. N-217036 (Decree No. N-217036) and Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-78 in the name of petitioner Nicomedes J. Lozada (petitioner), and ordering the latter to
cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 as well as segregate therefrom Lot 5 of Plan PSU180598.
1

The Facts
On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted on February 23, 1989 by the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 134, acting as a land registration court. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the
LRA issued Decree No. N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained OCT No. 0-78
covering the said parcel of land.
5

On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the aforementioned decree, James
Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree," before
the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 275 (Las Pias City-RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. LP 980025, claiming that a portion of Plan PSU-129514, consisting of 3,097 square meters identified as
Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598 (subject lot) of which he is the absolute owner and possessor is
fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036. He allegedly filed on September 19, 1963 an
application for registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well as of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan
PSU-180598, situated in Las Pias City, which was granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58,
on May 3, 1989. He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed the fact that he
(Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners, and left him totally ignorant of the registration
proceedings involving the lots covered by Plan PSU-129514. Instead of impleading him, petitioner
listed Bracewells grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an adjoining owner, although she had already died
by that time.
7

10

11

12

In his answer to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called Bracewell a mere interloper with respect
to the subject lot, which the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of Plan PSU129514. He argued that his Plan PSU-129514 was approved way back in 1951 whereas
Bracewells Plan PSU-180598 was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan, in fact,
contained a footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a portion of the parcel of
land covered by Plan PSU-129514.
13

14

15

The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M. Cortez in his 2nd Supplementary Report
dated August 5, 1996, which was submitted to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134. The report,
which contains a recommendation that petitioner be ordered to cause the amendment of Plan PSU129514 in view of Bracewells claims, reads as follows:
16

COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the Honorable Court respectfully
submits this report:
1. LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the Honorable Court on February 23,
1989, confirming the title of the herein applicant [petitioner] over the parcel of land covered
by plan PSU-129514;
2. Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet, thru its tie line, it was found to
overlap with plan PSU-180598, Lot 5, applied in LRC Record No. N-24916, which was
referred to the Lands Management Services, El Bldg., Quezon City, for verification and/or
correction in our letter dated January 12, 1996 x x x;
3. In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief, Surveys Division, in his letter
dated 20 June 1996, x x x, informed this Authority that after [re-verification] and research of
the plan, they found out that Lot 5, PSU-180598 applied in LRC Record No. N-24916 is a
portion of plan PSU-129514, applied in the instant case;
4. Our records further show that the petition for registration of title to real property pertaining
to Lot 5, PSU-180598 filed by the petitioner James Bracewell, Jr. under Land Reg. Case No.
N-4329, LRC Record No. N-24916 has been granted by the Honorable Court per his
decision dated May 3, 1989.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information with
the recommendation that the applicant [herein petitioner] in the instant case be ordered to cause for
the amendment of plan PSU-129514, subject of registration, by segregating therefrom the portion of
Lot 5, PSU-180598 also decided in Land Reg. Case No. N-4328. The approved amended plan and
the corresponding certified technical descriptions shall forthwith be submitted to the Honorable Court
for its approval to enable us to comply with the decision of the Court dated May 3, 1989 in the instant
case. (Emphases supplied)
17

The Las Pias City-RTC Ruling

Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78 in bad faith, the Las Pias
City-RTC rendered a Decision on July 31, 2003 in favor of Bracewell, who had died during the
pendency of the case and was substituted by Eulalia Bracewell and his heirs (respondents).
Accordingly, it directed the LRA to set aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and ordered
petitioner (a) to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 and to segregate therefrom the subject
18

lot, and (b) to pay respondents the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the cost of
suit.
19

The Las Pias City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately preventing respondents from participating
and objecting to his application for registration when the documentary evidence showed that, as
early as 1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes for the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was
recognized as the owner thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as well as
in the City Assessor's Office.
20

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
81075, arguing mainly that the Las Pias City-RTC had no jurisdiction over a petition for review of a
decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should be filed in the same branch of the
court that rendered the decision and ordered the issuance of the decree. He likewise raised (a) the
failure of Bracewell to submit to conciliation proceedings, as well as (b) the commission of forum
shopping, considering that the decision granting Bracewells application for registration over Lots 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598 was still pending resolution before the Court at the time he filed
Civil Case No. LP 98-0025.
21

22

23

24

The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the assailed judgment of the RTC,
finding that respondents were able to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement of
Decree No. N-217036, which is the only ground that may be invoked in a petition for review of a
decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529. It held that, since the petition for review was
filed within one (1) year from the issuance of the questioned decree, and considering that the subject
lot is located in Las Pias City, the RTC of said city had jurisdiction over the case. It further declared
that: (a) there was no need to submit the case a quo for conciliation proceedings because the LRA,
which is an instrumentality of the government, had been impleaded; (b) no forum shopping was
committed because the petition for review of the decree of registration before the Las Pias CityRTC and the application for land registration then pending before the Court involved different parties
and issues; and (c) the award of attorneys fees was well within the sound discretion of the RTC.
25

26

27

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he now comes before the Court via the
instant petition for review, challenging primarily the jurisdiction of the Las Pias City-RTC which set
aside and nullified the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 that had not yet
become final and was still within its exclusive control and discretion because the one (1) year period
within which the decree of registration issued by the LRA could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.
28

29

30

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue raised for the Courts resolution is whether or not the Las Pias City-RTC has
jurisdiction over the petition for review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the
judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.
The Courts Ruling
The petition must fail.

Under Act No. 496 (Act 496), or the "Land Registration Act," as amended, which was the law in
force at the time of the commencement by both parties of their respective registration proceedings
jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title was conferred upon the Courts of First
Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is
situated.
31

32

33

The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on January
23, 1979, and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration is still
vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated.
34

35

36

Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their comment to the instant petition that
when petitioner filed his land registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over applications for
registration of property situated in Las Pias City was vested in the RTC of Makati City in view of the
fact that there were no RTC branches yet in the Las Pias City at that time. Bracewells own
application over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all situated in Las Pias City, was thus
granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58.
37

38

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," was enacted and took effect on August 14, 1981, authorizing the
creation of RTCs in different judicial regions, including the RTC of Las Pias City as part of the
National Capital Judicial Region. As pointed out by the court a quo in its Decision dated July 31,
2003, the RTC of Las Pias City was established "in or about 1994." Understandably, in February
1998, Bracewell sought the review of Decree No. N-217036 before the Las Pias City-RTC,
considering that the lot subject of this case is situated in Las Pias City.
39

40

41

42

Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been filed with the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134, which rendered the assailed decision and ordered the issuance of Decree No. N217036, citing the 1964 case of Amando Joson, et al. v. Busuego (Joson) among others. In said
case, Spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo (Sps. Joson) filed a petition to set aside the
decree of registration issued in favor of Teodora Busuego (Busuego) on the ground that the latter
misrepresented herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth, the Sps. Joson were owners of
one-half thereof, having purchased the same from Busuegos mother. The court a quo therein
dismissed the petition for the reason that since its jurisdiction as a cadastral court was special and
limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues raised. Disagreeing, the Court held that, as long
as the final decree has not been issued and the period of one (1) year within which it may be
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another.
43

44

45

To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take cognizance of the nullification of the
decree, i.e., the cadastral court that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction. It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the
distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred
upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all
questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising from applications for original registration of
titles to lands and petitions filed after such registration. Accordingly, and considering further that the
matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction, petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson pronouncement to advance its theory.
46

47

48

Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of registration falls within the jurisdiction
of and, hence, should be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance," viz.:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any
person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments,
subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of
such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in
this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.
1wphi1

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since the LRAs issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds from the land registration courts
directive, a petition taken under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the land registration
courts ruling. As such, case law instructs that for "as long as a final decree has not been entered by
the [LRA] and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under
the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."
49

While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 which rendered the
decision directing the LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and should, applying the general rule as
above-stated, be the same court before which a petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 is
filed, the Court must consider the circumstantial milieu in this case that, in the interest of orderly
procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition before the Las Pias City-RTC.
Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for original registration in this case was
only filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e., December 1976,
Las Pias City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the aforesaid application should not have been
filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing at that
time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1,
1964, the proper venue for real actions, such as an application for original registration, lies with the
CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. (a) Real actions. Actions affecting title to, or for
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.
As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Pias City, the application for its original
registration should have been filed before the Las Pias City-RTC were it not for the fact that the
said court had yet to be created at the time the application was filed. Be that as it may, and

considering further that the complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of jurisdiction
(given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over review of registration decree cases pursuant to Section
32 of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation, holds that the Las Pias CityRTC has the authority over the petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 filed in this case.
Indeed, the filing of the petition for review before the Las Pias City-RTC was only but a rectificatory
implementation of the rules of procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set back only because
of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevailing, the Court perceives no compelling
reason to deviate from applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of
procedure and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the orderly administration of
justice.
50

51

Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum shopping, submission to conciliation
proceedings, and award of attorney's fees, suffice it to say that the same have been adequately
discussed by the appellate court and, hence, need no further elucidation.
Finally, on the matter of petitioner's objections against the trial judge's "unusual interest" in the case,
the Court concurs with the CA in saying that such tirades are not helpful to his cause. Besides, as
pointed out in the Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 275, petitioner
already had his chance to disqualify the trial judge from further hearing the case, but the appellate
court dismissed his petition in CA G.R. SP No. 74187 for lack of merit.
52

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and the Resolution dated
August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES
(ANCF) AND DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, IN HER CAPACITY AS ANCF
SUPERINTENDENT, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, NAMELY: SALVACION L. SIN,
ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME
CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, AND CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 65244 dated
February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land
being claimed by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in
her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima
Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan,
and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, containing
an approximate area of FIFTY[]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or
less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on the
East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by Amado Cayetano and

declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701
(1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00.2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Lucio
Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a
41,231square meterportion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of
doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF
reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of
Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the
area, which included said portion of private respondents alleged property, as civil reservation for educational
purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is
timberland and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio Arquisola, who
retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the
designated OfficerinCharge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of firstlevel courts. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1181 (4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from their
mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired
said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit B), and then developed the same by planting
coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her
death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by ANCF and
converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were
previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy
land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession, respondents presented several
tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and possessor of
the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the same from the Civil
Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March
31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for the unearned
yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when the same has
been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year
1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00 for
attorneys fees and costs of this suit.3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh. LL) shows that the
disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the land covered
by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960
(Exh. 4D). The MCTC observed that the phrase Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415 was printed on the Map
of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. 6), indicating that the
disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of Appeals4 where it
was pronounced that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.
The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later
included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the

President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all persons to
depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who has settled
thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously
granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart from the
reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their
predecessors open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title, which
should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant Ricardo Andres
from the payment of damages and attorneys fees. All other details of the appealed decision are affirmed in
toto.5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private individuals prior
to its issuance on March 31, 1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal unless the court below
has overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results of its findings. The RTC, however,
absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on record that he acted with
malice or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074. 6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as the new
Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review. The
petition was docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. In
addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise declared a
timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that of the
private respondents, which are also within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates of
title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and therefore
disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the subject property from
its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years before the
said landholding was declared a timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession of the
previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it does not tax ones imagination
to conclude that the subject property had been privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was
declared a timberland. This being the case, the said possession has ripened into an ownership against the
State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this should come under the
meaning of private rights under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the mass of
civil reservation granted to petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS CLAIM
TO SUPPOSED PRIVATE RIGHTS OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS
CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND
BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO
THEM.8

The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of Natural Resources
and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do
hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to private rights, if any
there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares, situated in the Municipality of
New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines, designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR
203, x x x [.]9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to the
disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon. The private
right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the
subject property, through their predecessorsininterest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland
on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a
quo apparently treated respondents complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration of
ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if respondents complied with the requirements
therefor.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessorsininterest under a bona fideclaim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and
disposable before 1960, citing petitioners failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects,
alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that lands
not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in the fairly recent case
of Valiao v. Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as

alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same province of
Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under
the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 382 was
issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondentsclaimants in said case filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 382
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes. The respondents claim that through their predecessorsininterest, they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945
or earlier since time immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with this Court, President
Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twentyeight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitionerclaimants and other landowners in
Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their prior vested right over portions of Boracay which they allege to
have possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the petition for review
concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 382.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine visvis the right of the claimants to lands they claim to have
possessed since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive
act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is
on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land
is alienable and disposable. Absent such wellnigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.14(Emphases in the original;
citations omitted.)

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the subject
land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the
presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption
is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the
Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held:
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are
public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of
the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was furthermore
painstakingly debated upon by the members of this Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared
alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There
was, however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by
their predecessorsininterest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly,
respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to
prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the
rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390)
for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington
and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries
reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199310

February 19, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 90503. The CA affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-11465.
1

The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application with the RTC for
judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of
29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
4

On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order finding the respondents application for
registration sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002.
The scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was
published in the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-1633 and in
the March 21, 2002 issue of Peoples Balita, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077,
as well as in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.
5

On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general
default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondents
application for registration.
10

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondents application for registration,
asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002,
likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
11

12

Trial on the merits of the respondents application ensued thereafter.

The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondents corporate secretary;
Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application
for registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties
since 1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the
respondent to conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga)
and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by
the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondents witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077
from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject
properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and
planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943.
Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to
cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed
of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the
respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject
properties; (4) Geodetic Engineers Certificate; (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for
13

15

14

16

2002; and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno),
Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
17

18

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondents application for registration should be
denied since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850 (R.A. No.
4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of
12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga,
testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties,
based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by
the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found out that the
elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the
subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the
subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
19

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual
topographic survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the
elevations of the subject properties, contrary to LLDAs claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr.
Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the
elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, which granted the respondents application for
registration of title to the subject properties, viz:
20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant
Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters
(Lot 3068) and 20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00001769 respectively and ordering their registration under the Property Registration Decree in the
name of Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.

21

The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the
subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not
part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC pointed out that LLDAs claim that the elevation of the
subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic
map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to
prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data
for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that
the elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed
aerial survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC

likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject
properties, pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositors witness
merely compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he
used as his [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the
elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was
allegedly 12.79 meters and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said
[benchmark] or reference point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was
below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDAs witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted that it was
DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as
the [benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots and that he has no
personal knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said
[benchmark] or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the
information he got from FF Cruz.
22

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC
opined that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that,
under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be
covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence,
the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna
Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by
the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from
the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake
is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, affirmed the RTC Decision dated
May 16, 2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties
are part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; that the same are not part of the
bed of Laguna Lake, as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
23

The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its
name. Appellees witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the
subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and
the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the
elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest
portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as
provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the Topographic Map
dated March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject

parcels of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was
gathered through aerial photography over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However,
nobody testified on the due execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the
testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are
below the 12.5 meter elevation, the same can be considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay
considering his admission that his findings were based merely on the evaluation conducted by
DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x. (Citations omitted)
24

The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the
DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent
was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to
June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
dated May 16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondents application for
registration since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject properties are below the
reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part
of the bed of Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding
of fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-standing policy
of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are
generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the
factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so.
25

That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily
mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still
incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject
properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While
deference is due to the lower courts finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above
the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to
Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to
substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not

appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden
of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented
to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."
26

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 , which provides that:
27

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land
Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration
of title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same;
and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
28

29

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two
certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per
LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."
30

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the
Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a
parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable
and disposable. They must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus:
31

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the

legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis ours)
32

In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties,
viz:
33

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In
this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts
must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable
or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical
description of the land which bears no information regarding the lands classification. She did not
bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government
agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
34

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for
registration are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the
DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the
legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application
for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence
that the subject properties are alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was
promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court
form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no
retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title to the subject
properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Courts promulgation of its ruling in
T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of the original classification covering
the subject properties approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof
as a true copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant the denial of its application for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondents application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior
to the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the
present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the
Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law
from the date it was originally passed, since this Courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. "Such judicial
35

doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or
interpretation of a pre-existing one."
36

Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding
that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida, the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on
October 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v.
Jaralve, the application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996
and was granted by the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding
that the applications for registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and
denied the applications for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the
legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
37

38

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena
testified that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and
cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to
Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation
of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute
the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties
required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the
respondent failed to present any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and
occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of
ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration
cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence
of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.
39

Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest cultivated the
subject properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to
the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession
and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to
the number of crops that are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce
harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have
indeed planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject
properties have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The
supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual
cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of
years."
40

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the
respondent were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it
acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same
for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they
constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the subject properties were declared for taxation
purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or
possession of the subject properties starting that year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were
declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony, have been in possession and occupation
of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
41

Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the
respondent's application for registration should be denied.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which
affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in
Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for
Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183511, March 25, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EMETERIA G. LUALHATI, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 31, 2008 and June 18, 2008, respectively, of the
Court Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision3 dated October 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
LRC Case No. 04-3340.
The antecedents are:
On August 12, 2004, respondent Emeteria G. Lualhati filed with the RTC of Antipolo City an application for
original registration covering Lots 1 and 2 described under Plan Psu-162384, situated in C-5 C-6 Pasong
Palanas, Sitio Sapinit, San Juan (formerly San Isidro), Antipolo, Rizal, consisting of an area of 169,297 and
79,488 square meters, respectively. Respondent essentially maintains that she, together with her deceased
husband, Andres Lualhati, and their four children, namely: Virginia, Ernesto, Felicidad, and Ligaya, have
been in possession of the subject lands in the concept of an owner since 1944. 4
cralawred

In support of her application, respondent submitted the blueprint of the survey plan and the tracing cloth
plan surveyed at the instance of Andres Lualhati and approved by the Director of Lands in October 1957, the
certified true copy of the surveyors certificate, the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 2, Tax Declaration
No. 26437 issued in the name of Andres Lualhati, which states that the tax on the properties commenced in
1944, the real property tax register evidencing payment of realty taxes on the subject properties from 1949
to 1958, certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IV, City
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Antipolo City, that no public land application/land
patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title, and a letter
from the Provincial Engineer that the province has no projects which will be affected by the registration. 5
cralawre d

Moreover, respondent presented several witnesses to prove her claim, the first of which was respondent
herself. She testified that she and her late husband have been occupying the subject lots since 1944. Since
then, she stated that she and her husband, together with their four children, have tilled the soil, planted
fruit-bearing trees, and constructed their conjugal house on the subject properties, where all four of her
children grew up until they got married. She identified the owners of the adjoining lands and attested that
the subject lots are alienable and disposable.6
cralawre d

Respondent next presented her 65-year old son-in-law, Juanito B. Allas, who testified that he first visited the
subject properties during the time when he was courting respondents daughter whose family was already in
possession thereof; that his subsequent visits were when he would accompany his father-in-law to the said
lots for the entire afternoon to plant fruit-bearing trees such as mango, coconut, jackfruit; that his parentsin-law cleared the lots and uprooted its grasses; that he knows the adjoining owners of the subject lots; that
he does not know of any other person with any interest adverse to that of his in-laws; and that respondent
has been in actual possession of the properties publicly, openly, and in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years.7
cralawre d

Thereafter, respondent presented her husbands compadre, Aurelio Garcia, who attested that he had been
friends with Andres Lualhati since 1964; that respondent and Andres planted various fruit-bearing trees such
as mango, cashew, coconut, and jackfruit, and erected their conjugal house thereon; that he and Andres
would usually have drinking sprees on the properties; that he regularly visited the subject lots from the time
he became friends with Andres until his death in 1982; that the last time he visited was in 2000; and, that
the real property taxes were paid from 1949-1958.8
cralawred

Finally, respondent presented another close friend, Remigio Leyble, who similarly declared that he had been
friends with respondent and her spouse since 1950 and that ever since then, he had known them to be the
owners of the lots in question; that the spouses told him that they had been sojourning thereon since 1944;
that they were the ones who planted the fruit-bearing trees as well as constructed the conjugal house
thereon; that he would usually join them in planting said trees; that he was actually present at the time
when the lots were surveyed in 1957; that the lots were declared for taxation purposes even before the
same was surveyed; and, that he does not know of any other person claiming or owning the subject
properties other than respondent and her family who are constantly managing and improving the same. 9
cralawre d

On October 4, 2005, the RTC granted respondents application finding that she had been in open, public,
continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession and occupation of the lands for more than 50
years under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to June 12, 1945, as required under Section 14 (1) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.10
cralawred

In its Decision dated March 31, 2008, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, rejecting petitioners contention

that respondent failed to overcome the burden of proving her possession of the subject lots in its entirety,
the area being too big for respondents family to cultivate themselves, and that even if they did, such can
hardly suffice as possession, being a mere casual cultivation. The CA also rejected petitioners averment that
the tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership for they constitute at
least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property. According to the appellate court, the fact
that respondent and her family cultivated the subject lands, erected their conjugal home, and paid real
property taxes thereon, cannot be construed as a mere casual cultivation but an intention of permanently
settling down therein.
On August 11, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:

chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

I.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE CHARACTER OF THE LAND APPLIED FOR
REGISTRATION.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

II.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION IN THE
CONCEPT AND WITHIN THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW.11
cralawlawlibrary

Petitioner contends that the appellate court failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly taken
into account, will justify a different conclusion. First, petitioner posits that respondent did not present any
evidence to show that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of public domain. In
its Reply,12 petitioner, citing our ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,13 criticizes the probative value of the
certifications submitted by respondent from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, that no public land
application/land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative
title as well as the letter from the Provincial Engineer that the province has no projects which will be affected
by the registration. In said case, this Court held that a certification from the CENRO is insufficient to prove
the alienability and disposability of lands.
Second, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence proving her claim of
possession and occupation over the entire portion of the subject properties. Contrary to the findings of the
courts below, respondents planting of fruit-bearing trees, at best, constituted a mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land which can hardly become sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. Other than planting
trees and constructing their home, respondent failed to provide any other proof of acts of dominion over the
subject land such as enclosing the property or constructing other improvements thereon considering the
vastness of the same. In addition, petitioner points out that apart from a single tax declaration, there is
nothing in the records which evince respondents religious payment of real property taxes.
The petition is meritorious.
While it is true that this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, and not of fact, in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, when the findings of fact are devoid of support by the evidence on
record, or when the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, this Court may revisit the
evidence in order to arrive at a decision in conformity with the law and evidence at hand. 14 In the instant
case, the evidence on record do not support the findings made by the courts below on the alienable and
disposable character of the lands in question.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
cralawla wlibrary

Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision, applicants for registration of title must prove that: (1) the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) they, by

themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.15
cralawre d

Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the
State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable
or disposable.16
cralawre d

To support her contention that the lands subject of her application is alienable and disposable, respondent
submitted certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land
application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any
administrative title.
Respondents reliance on the CENRO certifications is misplaced.
In the oft-cited Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,17 it has been held that it is not enough for the CENRO or the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to certify that a certain parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,18 dated 30 May 1988,
delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988,
the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands
covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No.
38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification
status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B.
The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate
covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of
1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
chanrobleslaw

xxxx
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
xxxx
x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an
official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.18
cralawlawlibrary

Accordingly, in a number of subsequent rulings,19 this Court consistently deemed it appropriate to reiterate
the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties in denying applications for registration on the ground of failure to
prove the alienable and disposable nature of the land subject therein. In said cases, it has been repeatedly
ruled that certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the DENR, as well as Survey Plans prepared

by the DENR containing annotations that the subject lots are alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that the property sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable
public domain. Rather, this Court stressed the importance of proving alienability by presenting a copy of the
original classification of the land approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.20
cralawre d

Thus, as it now stands, an application for original registration must be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or
PENRO certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records, in order to establish that the land is
indeed alienable and disposable.21
cralawred

Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence, that the land sought to be registered has
been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The records of this case merely bear
certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land application or land
patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title. Said
CENRO certifications, however, do not even make any pronouncement as to the alienable character of the
lands in question for they merely recognize the absence of any pending land patent application,
administrative title, or government project being conducted thereon. But even granting that they expressly
declare that the subject lands form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, these
certifications remain insufficient for purposes of granting respondents application for registration. As
constantly held by this Court, it is not enough for the CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. Unfortunately for respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls short of the
requirements for original registration in order to show the alienable character of the lands subject herein.
In similar regard, the evidence on record likewise fail to establish that respondent, by herself or through her
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the properties under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The testimonies of respondent and her close friend, Remigio Leyble, insofar as they allege possession of the
subject properties since 1944, fail to convince. The tax declaration submitted by respondent dates back
only to the year 1947.22 In fact, as the records reveal, said tax declaration is the oldest piece of
documentary evidence submitted in support of the application. Hence, at best, the same can only prove
possession since 1947. Other than the bare allegations of respondent and her witness, as well as the 1947
tax declaration, respondent did not present any other proof to substantiate her claim of possession
beginning in 1944. Neither did she provide any explanation as to why, if she has truly been occupying the
properties as early as 1994, it was only in 1947 that she sought to declare the same for purposes of
taxation.
In addition to this, the real property tax register presented by respondent evidenced payment of realty taxes
only from 1949 up to 1958. Consequently, this Court cannot concede to respondents assertion that she had
been adversely possessing the properties beginning in 1944 up until the filing of her complaint in 2004, or
for a duration of sixty full years, when the evidence presented depicts payment of taxes for only nine years.
Payment of realty taxes for a brief and fleeting period simply cannot be considered sufficient proof of
ownership. It is clear, therefore, that respondents assertion of possession before 1945 will not suffice for
applicants for registration must present proof of specific acts of possession and ownership and cannot just
offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. 23
cralawre d

Furthermore, it bears stressing that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership
or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The disputed property may have
been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or of their predecessorsin-interest, but it does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indiciaof a claim of ownership.24
cralawre d

Moreover, as petitioner aptly points out, respondent failed to provide any other proof of acts of dominion
over the subject land other than the fact that she, together with her husband and children, planted fruitbearing trees and constructed their home thereon considering the vastness of the same. As enunciated
in Republic v. Bacas, et al.:25
cralawre d

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as

to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be
considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock
upon it, without substantial enclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a
claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.x x x. 26
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To repeat, the law requires open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Thus, it is
imperative for applicants for registration of property to prove, by sufficient evidence, each requisite
character and period of possession and occupation for the failure to do so will necessarily prevent the land
from being considered ipso jure converted into private property even upon the subsequent declaration of the
same as alienable and disposable.27
cralawred

Hence, in view of respondents failure in proving that: (1) the subject property was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) she and her predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fideclaim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, this Court is constrained to reverse the assailed decisions and deny
the application for registration in fulfilment of its duty to ensure that ownership of the State is duly protected
by the proper observance by parties of the rules and requirements on land registration. 28
cralawre d

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
March 31, 2008 and June 18, 2008, respectively, of the Court Appeals which affirmed the Decision dated
October 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. 04-3340 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for registration of title filed by respondent Emeteria G. Lualhati over Lots 1 and 2 consisting of
an area of 169,297 and 79,488 square meters, respectively, situated in C-5 C-6 Pasong Palanas, Sitio
Sapinit, San Juan, Antipolo, Rizal, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

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HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
BRION,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:
April 29, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it
has many consequences.
xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from

Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these
people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that
none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of
informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the
Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own
forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which
are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal
business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,
and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to
bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only
one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists
a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal
legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of

persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide
definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings
under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so,
the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the
Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of
untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has
unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in
by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our
part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the
legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social
obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,
[2]
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) CaviteTagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to
appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence,
Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing.
Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons

Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather.

Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator
of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to
his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco
to Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I
affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco. [6] The Republic of
the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR),
which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing
the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification
had
verified
that
the
property
was
declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to
that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;
[10]
hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.
Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which
was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the
discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since
the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the
property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing
was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue,

remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is

agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior
to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and
the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008,
the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues
for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may
be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?[13]

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners
further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the
Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred
interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the
OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the
OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman
Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,
[17]
as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for
more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it
under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter
whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property
had already been converted into private property through prescription. To bolster
their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties.[19]

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section
14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that

the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil
Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period
can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the
public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since
its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. [20] Alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land
Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial
legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.

1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the
law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced
by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment
restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. [23] This is not actually the
case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset
of lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural
lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period
was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of
ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the
same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified
the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the
public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands
of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the

inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both
laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression
that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of
the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather
than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the
proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of

the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and

given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act
that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been
in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of
the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to
seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times,
most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of
the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the
area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of
this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons
from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.[24]

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership

since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must
have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all
lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered
either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was
discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12,
1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide
claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs
view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as
it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed
out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual
inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable
prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona
fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is
void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice
of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court,
citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when
the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous.
Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered
as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The
evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession
on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is
not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being

that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has
any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation
wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein
was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1)
is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been
filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession
that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable
and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it,
and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration
in Cenizashould have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November
25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show

the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further,
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the
Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of
public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a
confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able
to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that
this is one of them.[29]

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain
lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12
June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration
was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the
land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the
dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2).
The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section

14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but
we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did
not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[ [31]] With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable
public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession
being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right
to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where
the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as
1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.

The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible
basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is
Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the
other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may
be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary
prescription of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith,[34]as well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides
that persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid
basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs
affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration
proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has
acquired through prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence

holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period,
additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates
would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year
rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original
registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner
for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,

applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule
introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by
implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of
prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed
through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No.
1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under
Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did
not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the
application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the
property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,
throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential
basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement, [38] similar to
our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now
sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period
as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by

prescription under the provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration.
Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription
under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into
operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does
not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil
law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of
Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated
in the preceding article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property

belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of
the commerce of man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable

and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable
and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable
and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113
provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription;
and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may
be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how
public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible
to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,

pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.

It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress
or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet
this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is
to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent.
The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch.
Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual
example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of
Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known
as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military
reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila,
including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale
of the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military

lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) [40] which in turn is
authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is authorized to
sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part. [42] Accordingly, the BCDA
law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing
sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands
have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to either public
service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that
time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2),
notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as
authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared
as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion
into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for
the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion

property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription

according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2)
falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no
way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription
and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on
the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis
of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the
thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472
is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code,
while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not
apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil
Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to
other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is

not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts
subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent
exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how
our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which,
under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article
1113, which states that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired
under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under
Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in
the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State
through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to
impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith
and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles
526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, [45] provisions that
more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse

claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the
owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.[46]

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major
premise for the argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not
transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the
person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership
or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of
public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the
period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite
period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property
is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the
periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of

property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of

confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not
fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the
Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect
title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the
Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June
1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code,
though it arguably did not preclude such registration. [50] Still, the gap was
lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over
the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing
original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code
as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable

lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The
person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the
Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property

may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is
no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property
that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its
social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance

or alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has
emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the
informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even
that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively
held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many
more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They
have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as
common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them

legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive
law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It
could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are
lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of wellbeing not only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of
security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political
branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
BRION,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 29, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it
has many consequences.
xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from

Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these
people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that
none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of
informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the
Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own
forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which
are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal
business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,
and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to
bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only

one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists
a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal
legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of

persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide
definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings
under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so,
the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the
Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of
untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has
unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in
by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our
part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the
legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social
obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,
[2]
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) CaviteTagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly

designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to

appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence,
Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing.
Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather.
Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator
of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to
his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco
to Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I
affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco. [6] The Republic of
the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR),
which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration
and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,

otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree
of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that

Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he
had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing
the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification
had
verified
that
the
property
was
declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to
that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;
[10]
hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.
Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which

was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the
discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since
the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the
property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing
was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue,
remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is
agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior
to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and
the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008,
the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues
for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may
be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their

names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?[13]

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners
further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the
Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred
interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the
OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the
OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman
Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,
[17]
as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for
more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it
under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter
whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property
had already been converted into private property through prescription. To bolster
their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties.[19]

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section
14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that
the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil
Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period
can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the
public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since
its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands. [20] Alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land
Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial
legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the
law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced
by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment
restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. [23] This is not actually the
case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset
of lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural
lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period
was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of
ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the
same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified
the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the
public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands
of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the

inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both
laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership

since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression
that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of
the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather
than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the
proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of

the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and
given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act
that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been
in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of
the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to
seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times,
most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of
the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the
area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the
several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of
this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons
from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.[24]

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the

position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must
have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all
lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered
either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was
discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12,
1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide
claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only
the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs
view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as

it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed
out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual
inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable
prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona
fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is
void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice
of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court,
citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when
the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous.
Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered
as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The
evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession

on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is
not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being
that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has
any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation
wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein
was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1)
is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been
filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession
that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable
and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it,
and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration
in Cenizashould have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November
25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural

Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show
the real character of the land subject of private respondents application. Further,
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the
Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that
the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of
public land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a
confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private
respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able
to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that
this is one of them.[29]

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain
lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12
June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration
was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the
land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also
stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the
dissent seeks to belittle.
III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2).
The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section

14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but
we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did
not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[ ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[ [31]] With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable
public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession
being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right
to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
[30]

Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where

the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as
1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible
basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is
Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the
other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may
be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary
prescription of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith,[34]as well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides
that persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid
basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including

patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs
affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration
proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has
acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period,
additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates
would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year
rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original
registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner
for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule
introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by
implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of
prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed
through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No.
1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under
Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did
not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the
application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the
property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,
throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential
basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement, [38] similar to
our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now
sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period
as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration.
Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription
under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into
operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does
not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil
law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of
Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:
[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated
in the preceding article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property

belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of
the commerce of man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable
and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable
and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable
and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113
provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription;
and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may
be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how
public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible
to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the

development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress
or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet
this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant
assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is
to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent.
The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch.
Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual
example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of
Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known
as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military

reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila,

including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale
of the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military
lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) [40] which in turn is
authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is authorized to
sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part. [42] Accordingly, the BCDA
law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing
sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands
have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to either public
service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that
time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2),
notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as
authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared
as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion
into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for
the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion
property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription
according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2)
falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no
way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription
and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on
the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis
of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while
registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the
thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former
speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472
is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code,
while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not
apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil
Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to
other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is
not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts
subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent
exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how
our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which,
under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article
1113, which states that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired
under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under
Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in
the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State
through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to
impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith
and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles

526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, [45] provisions that
more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the
owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.[46]

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major
premise for the argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not
transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the
person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership
or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of
public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the
period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite
period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property
is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the
periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the
property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of
property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not
fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the
Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect
title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the
Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June
1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code,
though it arguably did not preclude such registration. [50] Still, the gap was
lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over
the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing
original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code
as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such
lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The

person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the
Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property
may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is
no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the

development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property
that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its
social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance

or alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has
emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the
informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even
that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively
held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many
more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They
have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as
common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them
legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive
law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It
could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are
lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of wellbeing not only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of
security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political
branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence
their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for
land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that
the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the
part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable
by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.15This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 18 lands of the
public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. 19 Section 10, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department. 22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of
the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however, public land
will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land
is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands

of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent
be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should
best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law
as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed
no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of
the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in
order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) 33in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. 35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the
land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from
the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED