Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Before
IN THE MATTER OF
[ An appeal preferred U/S 374 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, against the
conviction and sentence U/S 302 & 325 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the
Learned Trial Court ]
IN THE MATTER OF
Varun.......... Appellant
v.
State of Odisha
...............
Respondent
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Abbreviations.......................................................................................... 4
Index of Authorities .............................................................................................. 6
Cases.....................................................................................................................6
Statutes.................................................................................................................6
Lexicons...............................................................................................................8
Commentaries / Digests ..8
Journals & Reports......8
Legal Database....9
Statement of Jurisdiction..................................................................................... 10
Statement of Facts ............................................................................................... 11
Statement of Issues.............................................................................................. 13
Summary of Arguments................................................................................................14
Arguments Advanced.......................................................................................... 15
1.1.
That the prosecution has proved the case beyond all reasonable doubt15
Accused was last seen with the deceased on his bike towards the forest......22
2.2.
-2-
2.3.
3.1.
Deficiency of will due to weak intellect of the accused has not been fully established.
...26
3.3.
Alter personalities will not be an excuse for inability to distinguish right from
wrong....31
-3-
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
Section
Sections
Paragraph
Paragraphs
A.C.
Appellate Cases
AIR
All ER
Anr.
Another
Att. Gen.
Attorney General
All.
Allahabad
Bom.
Bombay
B.L.J.R
CJI
CrPC
Cr. L.J.
CLT
C.W.N.
DW
Defence Witness
Edn.
Edition
GLR
I.C
Indian Cases
-4-
ILR
IPC
IndLaw
Indian Law
J.
Justice
Ker.
Kerala
KB
Kings Bench
M.P.
Madhya Pradesh
Ori
Orissa
p.
Page
P. / para
Paragraph
PW
Prosecution Witness
P.L.W
Raj
Rajasthan
SC
Supreme Court
v.
versus
Vol.
Volume
-5-
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Indian Penal Code, 1860
India Evidence Act, 1872
TABLE OF CASES
1. Abdul Ghami v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1972) 2 S.C.W.R. 838 at p. 843..16
2. Amrit Bhushan Gupta v. Union of India and Ors 1981 SCC(Crl) 516..28
3. Avtar Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1984 (1) Crimes 636 at p. 640...26
4. Ashiruddin Ahmed v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 182 at p. 183.26
5. BaswantraoBajirao v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1949 Nag. 66 : I.L.R. (1948) Nag. 711 : 50
Cr.L.J. 181.26
6. Bater v. Bater, [1950] 2 All E.R. 458.18
7. Bhandari v. State, AIR 1967 Goa 21 at p. 56.20
8. Bhikari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1...27
9. Charan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1973) 75 Punj. 734 at p. 738.26
10. Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1563.27, 28
11. Daniel Mcnaughtens case, (1843) 8 E.R. 718 : (1843) 10 Cl. Fin. 200...26
12. Debyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat AIR 1955 SC 156328
13. Devender Pal Singh v.s. State of NCT of Delhi &anr. [(2002) 5 SCC 234] ...18
14. Digendra v. State, 74 C.W.N. 231 at p. 241..27
15. Govardhan v. Union of India, (1961) 2 Cr. L.J. 475 at p. 476...26
16. Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 44518
17. Hans Raj v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1995 Cri LJ 1004 (Raj), para 18..19
18. Kalicharan v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1948 Nag. 20 (2) at p. 23..28
19. Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430.20
20. Lonimohan Das v. Union Territory of Manipur (1974) 2 Cr.L.J. 1186 at p. 1187..29
21. M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharastra, (1963) 2 S.C.R. 405...16
22. Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947)2 All ER 372 at p. 373.16
23. Mousam Singha Roy and Ors v. State of West Bengal, [2003] 12 SCC 37715
24. Naina Mohd. Re, AIR 1960 Mad 218....22
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-7-
LEXICONS
1. Compact Oxford Reference Dictionary Ninth Edition
2. Blacks Law Dictionary Ninth Edition, 2009
3. J. L. P. Singh & P. K. Majumdars Judicial Dictionary 3rd Edition 2009
-8-
LEGAL DATABASE
1. Manupatra
2. SCC Online
3. West Law
-9-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE RESPONDENT HAVE THE HONOUR TO SUBMIT BEFORE THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF
ORISSA, THE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT IN THE MATTER CRI. APPEAL PETITION
NO. ***/2015 FILED BY THE APPELLANT, UNDER SECTION 374 (2) OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE, 1973.
THE PRESENT MEMORANDUM SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND ARGUMENTS IN
THE PRESENT CASE.
- 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Himtal, is a small underdeveloped town in the north-west Odisha with very thin population,
and is one of the coldest town in the State of Odisha. It is built on highlands, but the outskirts
are mostly marshy and covered with dense forest. Apart from other places, it has a town square,
a few recreational places and one local library.
Pallavi Mishra, (hereinafter, deceased) a woman aged 26 years, was the librarian of the local
library. She was an intelligent and attractive woman, married to one Shrikant Mishra, since,
February 29th, 2008. Her husband, a dealer in pesticides and insecticides, used to go to the
neighbouring town which was 5-6 hours away, very often, for business supplies.
She was a very friendly lady and shared a cordial relationship with people visiting the library
and of the many regular visitors to the library, she had developed friendship with a person
named Varun, (hereinafter, accused / appellant) who was a writer and professional district level
cricketer. The appellant was very strong and well-built man with very jovial, mellow, humorous
and quick witted personality. They bonded over their love for literature and with passage of
time their relationship became more intimate. Although she was married, yet she responded to
his advances.
Everything went well for a few months but eventually their relationship got strained, owing to
the temporary occasional erratic and violent behaviour of the appellant, which was in sharp
contrast to his usual nature but, when things got more complicated, the deceased decided to
back out of the relationship and stopped talking to him without giving any reason. Appellant
tried talking to her and she eventually agreed to meet and settle the matter.
Deceased's husband went out of the town for few days to get supplies and on the morning of
28th December 2012, whereby, she called the appellant to meet on that very evening. At around
5 P.M., after closing the library, the appellant picked her up from the end of the town square.
En route to forest on his bike, they were seen by two local people (P.W. 2 and 3).
At around 8:30 P.M., P.W. 4, who happens to be an acquaintance of the appellant, saw him
walking towards his bike from the forest, parked beside the main road, in a hurried manner.
P.W. 4 called out the appellant, who didn't respond and rode away.
- 11
Shrikant, tried calling the deceased, throughout the next day and when she didn't pick up the
call, he called their neighbours to enquire about her. On not finding her whereabouts, he
returned to the town on the night of 30th December, 2012. On 31st December, 2012 he filed
an F.I.R in the local police station.
On 4th January, 2013, the dead body of the deceased was found in a damp and marshy place in
the heart of the forest. On post mortem which was conducted the next day, various injuries
were found on her body and the cause of death was determined to be intake of monocrotophos.
The date and time of death could not be conclusively determined, yet from the state of
decomposition of the body it was opined by the doctors that the death could have occurred 3-4
days ago.
During investigation, P.W. 1 came forward and stated that on the night of 28th December, 2012,
he met the appellant and being his flatmate, tried to indulge him in a friendly conversation. But
the appellant seemed very distant, cold and unresponsive. He behaved very strangely and tried
to leave the place. On being enquired further by P.W. 1, he turned uncharacteristically angry
and shouted at him, revealing in the process that he had just beaten the deceased very brutally
and left her at a certain spot, which happened to coincide with the place where the dead body
was discovered.
The appellant was arrested and during interrogation he stated that he does not remember
anything about that evening apart from picking up the deceased and having altercation with her
on the road. During his physical examination, the doctor (P.W. 5) found some scratches on the
back of the neck of the appellant. In course of trial, the court ordered for a psychiatric
evaluation of the appellant. On examination, it was found that he is suffering from Dissociative
Identity Disorder. The Psychiatrist (P.W. 6) also examined the father of the appellant (D.W. 1)
and he gave statement regarding the accused's previous occasional unpredictable behaviour.
The trial court held that the fact that the accused is suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder
does not exempt him from criminal liability and relying on the facts, circumstances and the
evidence adduced convicted the appellant under section 302 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code
and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
- 12
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following questions are presented before the Honble Court in the instant matter:
Issue I
Whether the order of conviction passed by the learned trial court is tenable in the eyes of
law?
Issue II
Whether the doctrine of last seen theory holds good in the instant case?
Issue II
Whether the Dissociative Identity Disorder can be considered as a defense to exempt the
criminal liability?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
It is submitted that the Learned Trial Court has rightly passed the order of conviction and
sentenced the appellant with life imprisonment for the charges of Section 302 & 325, I.P.C. the
prosecution has ipso facto discharged its initial burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
all reasonable doubt.
II.
It is furthermore submitted that prosecution in order to discharge its initial burden of proof has
placed reliance upon circumstantial evidence and in doing so, has taken the help of last seen
theory to conclusively prove the guilt of the accused. The instant case is a fit platform to hold
good, the doctrine of last seen together.
III.
It is humbly submitted that the appellant has prima facie failed to rebut the statutory
presumption of absence of circumstances, bringing his case u/s 84 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860. So also, he has failed to establish the fact that, at the time of commission, he was labouring
under the influence of unsoundness of mind, which has impaired his cognitive faculties to such
an extent, that he was unable to know the nature of his act.
- 14
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that, the more serious the offence, the
stricter the degree of proof, since a higher degree of assurance, is required to convict the
accused.1
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble court that the order of conviction U/S 302
and 325 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, passed by the Learned Trial Court in the instant
matter, is tenable in the eye of law, as the Learned Court below has very well appreciated
the facts and evidences of the instant case and has passed a proper order taking into
consideration the fact, that the prosecution has proved the case beyond all reasonable doubt,
thereby ruling out every possible hypothesis, which stands in favour of innocence of the
accused and hence, Conviction of accused cannot be questioned when same is proved by
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.2
1.1.
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble court that in all criminal cases the
prosecution is required to give satisfactory proof of the corpus delicti , i.e., it must prove
that the deceased was murdered. The prosecution has then to prove that the appellant is the
person who murdered the deceased and no one else.3
Mousam Singha Roy and Ors v. State of West Bengal, [2003] 12 SCC 377
Vijay Pal v. State Govt., 2015 Indlaw SC 160
3
Rajnikant Kesha Bhandari v. State, AIR 1967 Goa 21 at p. 56
2
- 15
In Miller v. Minister of Pensions,4 while examining the degree of proof required in criminal
cases, it has been held that:
That degree is well stated. It need not reach certainty but it must reach high
degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof
beyond shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it
admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is
so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour
which can be dismissed with a sentence of course, it is possible but not in the
least probable, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
1.1.1. Conviction
Based
Upon
Complete
Chain
Of
Circumstantial Evidence.
It is submitted that, it is a well-established rule in criminal jurisprudence that circumstantial
evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an accused persons conviction, if it is of such
a character that it is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is consistent
only with his guilt.5
In the light of the facts in record of the instant matter, it is humbly submitted that the chain
of circumstances when knitted together, give rise to merely only conclusion that it is the
accused who has committed the murder of the deceased and the Learned Court below has
not committed any error in convicting the accused.
It is also submitted that, when it is held that a certain fact is proved, the question arises
whether the fact leads to the inference of guilt of the accused or not, and in dealing with this
aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt would apply and an inference of guilt
can be drawn only if the proved fact is wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused
and is consistent only with the hypothesis of his guilt.6
(1947)2 All ER 372 at p. 373, quoted Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P, 1990 Cri. LJ 1519 at p.1528 (SC)
M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharastra, (1963) 2 S.C.R. 405.
6
Abdul Ghami v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1972) 2 S.C.W.R. 838 at p. 843
5
- 16
Wigmore, John Henry, A treatise on the system of evidence in trials at common law [electronic resource] :
including the statutes and judicial decisions of all jurisdictions of the United, Imprint Boston : Little, Brown, and
Co., 1904
7
- 17
accused person is acquitted on the basic of every suspicion or doubt then the judicial system
will lose its credibility before the community.8
Also, Lord Denning observation in Bater v Bater, 9 that the reasonableness of doubt must
be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated. Exaggerated devotion
to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts Letting guilty escape
is not doing justice according to the law10, carries reasonable worthiness with respect to
the matter in hand.
Therefore, with specific reference to the facts in record, it is most humbly submitted that
the prosecution has duly discharged its duty of proving his case beyond all reasonable doubt
and there resides no room of doubt or suspicion on the duty of prosecution, which infer that
the crime has been committed by none else than the accused.
1.1.2. Chain of Circumstances So Established is Consistent
Only with the Guilt of the Accused.
It is humbly submitted that the indirect or circumstantial evidences, are evidences which
without going directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to a logical interference
that such fact does exist.11 Circumstantial evidence, in its every context means, a
combination of facts creating a network from which there is no escape for the accused,
because the facts taken as a whole do not exhibit any inference, but the guilt of the accused.12
In other words, the circumstances as a whole must be thoroughly inconsistent with the
hypothesis of the innocence of the accused.13 It is therefore submitted that, circumstantial
evidence is that species of indirect evidence which the municipal law deems sufficiently
proximate to form the basis of judicial decision.
- 18
It is furthermore submitted that in order for a conviction to be based solely upon the
circumstantial evidence, there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.14
From the evidence considered and scrutinized by the Learned Court below, it can be well
made out that the claim of the evidence is complete and is of such a nature that it would
definitely and unerringly points to the guilt of the accused. At the time of occurrence there
was none else than the deceased and the appellant at the scene. The deceased was last seen
with the accused and thereafter no clue of deceased was found, until her body has been
recovered from the same place by the police. Moreover, the circumstances of last seen in a
murder case must be done in proximity with the recovery of corpse of the deceased.15
It is true that the principle of innocence of an accused must be kept in view while
appreciating the circumstantial evidence, but simultaneously, it must also be kept in view
that guilty person should not be allowed to escape punishment only on a remote possibility
of innocence in his favour. In such cases the judicial conscience of the Court must be tested
on the anvil of rational thinking man, who could reasonable, honestly and conscientiously
arrive on the same conclusion. The Court cannot afford to give a long rope to the subordinate Courts to entertain untenable doubts about innocence of an accused on a fanciful
conjectures in a brutal crime committed in broad light.16 If this is permitted, the law and the
law courts will not be able to protect the society from anti-social elements from whom
society has developed the concept of law and Courts from time immemorial.17
1.1.3. Facts so Established Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt.
It is humbly submitted that it is undisputed that where the prosecution relies on
circumstantial evidence alone to prove the guilt, the facts and circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is sought to be drawn must be fully established beyond any
reasonable doubt.18
14
supra note 15
Slim Babamiya Sutan v. State of Maharashtra 2000 All MR (Cri) 1155
16
Hans Raj v. State of Rajasthan 1995 Cri LJ 1004 (Raj), para 18
17
ibid
18
State of UP v. Satish, AIR 2005 SC 1000: 2005 (1) Crimes 146 (SC): (2005) 3 SCC 114
15
- 19
So also, in a case, based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances alleged against the
accused must be conclusively established and the chain of circumstances must be so closely
knit so as to exclude all the reasonable hypothesis of the innocence of the accused.19
In Prakash v. State of Rajasthan,20Justice P. Sathasivam (former CJI) has laid down the
following five golden principles of standard of proof required in a case sought to be established
on the basis of circumstantial evidence otherwise said to constitute the panchsheel of the proof
of a cased based on circumstantial evidence:
a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established.21
b) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty.22
c) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.23
d) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved24, and
e) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in
all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
In the instant matter, all the circumstances relied on by the prosecution is forming a
complete chain and at the same are closely connected with the principal fact i.e., death of
the deceased. The circumstances as illustrated in the facts in record, conceives a complete
chain which would ultimately lead to the inference that the accused had caused the death of
the deceased.
Those circumstances are,
(a) Strained relation between the accused and the deceased.
(b) Appellant was last seen with the deceased on the evening of 28th December 2012.
(c) Thereafter, the appellant was seen alone returning from the crime scene that too in a
hurried manner.
19
State of M.P. v. Satish, 2005 Cri LJ 1428 : AIR 2005 SC 1000 (SC)
2013 Cr.LJ 2040 (SC): AIR 2013 SC 1474
21
Vikas Ramdas Khairnar Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 Indlaw MUM 23
22
Sharad Birdhichand Sardar v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 1984 Indlaw SC 432
23
Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430; Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P.
AIR 1990 SC 79
24
Vinita Singh v. State Of Chhattisgarh SLP(CRL) NO. 9858/2013
20
- 20
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble Court that in the instant case the doctrine
of last seen theory holds good. With the development of the principle of Last seen
together, the investigation system and the courts have been a little bit relieved of the burden
of proof. When the principle could be invoked, the burden of proof would be shifted to the
accused to explain any intervening facts, after being last seen together with the victim of
any criminal offence.
It is also submitted that that the presence of the accused at the place of the offence or his
being seen last with the deceased are very much relevant as a part of circumstantial
evidence.25 The theory of last seen together is one where two persons are seen together
alive and after an interval of time, one of them is found alive and the other, dead. If the
period between the two transactions is not remote, presumption as to the person alive, being
the author of death of the other may be drawn. Furthermore, time gap should be such, so as
to rule out every possibility, of somebody else committing the crime.
25
Prof. V. Nageswara Rao, opinion expressed on the Last Seen Principle at www.lawyersclubofindia.org
- 21
In the absence of eye-witnesses and tangible evidence, it is the last resort of the prosecution
in a murder case the person last seen with the victim is presumed to be the murderer, thus,
shifting the onus onto the accused to prove otherwise or come up with an alibi.26
2.1.
Pursuant the facts in record of the instant case, it is most humbly submitted before the
Honble Court, that the accused was last seen with the deceased on his bike going towards
the forest on the dusk of 28th December 2012, thereafter there was no information as to the
where about of the deceased and ultimately the corpus of the deceased was found in the
heart of the forest on 04th January, 2013.
Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and
when he parted the company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to
be probable and satisfactory. It is well established that in a case resting on circumstantial
evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in the discharge of burden
placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances, proved
against him.
Section 106 of the evidence Act lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw
any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support
any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence the Court can consider his failure
to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain.27.
2.2.
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble Court that following are the incriminating
circumstances which are clearly established against the appellant:
(a) That his relationship with the deceased got strained.
26
27
- 22
(b) On 28th December 2012, he was seen with the deceased en route to the forest on his
bike.
(c) Accused was seen walking towards his bike alone, from the forest.
(d) On the very same day, the accused has admitted before the PW 1 that he has brutally
beaten the deceased and left her in the forest.
(e) Deceased didnt receive the call from her husband the very next day.
(f) On 4th January 2013, the dead body of the deceased was found in a damp and marshy
place in the heart of the forest.
These incriminating circumstances form a complete chain and are consistent with no other
hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. If the accused was with the deceased on the
evening of 28th December 2012, he should have explained how and when he parted
company. The appellant has not pleaded alibi, nor has he given an explanation which may
support his innocence.28
Thus, the entire incidences disclosed in the fact sheet reveals that the appellant was the only
person who was there with the deceased during her last hours and therefore burden of
proving the fact lies with the accused as being especially within the knowledge of the
accused.
2.3.
It is most humbly submitted that Section 106 of the Evidence Act, would apply to cases
where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference
can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of
his special knowledge regarding such facts failed to offer any explanation which drive the
Court to draw a different inference.29
28
29
- 23
30
31
- 24
offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same
becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete.32
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble Court that where an accused is alleged to
have committed the murder and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that
shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together, it has been consistently
held that if the accused does not offer an explanation as to how the deceased died or offers
an explanation which is found out to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates
that he is responsible for commission of the crime.
Since in the instant case the accused failed to explain, as to how the deceased died, moreover
the accused intimated the P.W 1, that he has beaten deceased brutally and left her in the
forest, which is the conclusive proof of the fact that the accused was the only person who
caused the death of the deceased, left her in the forest and ran hurriedly from there.
3.
Whether
The
Dissociative
Identity
Disorder
Can
Be
It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that crux of the instant matter rest solely
on the determination of one prime issue by this appellate Court, i.e., whether Dissociative
Identity Disorder can be taken as a plea of insanity or unsoundness of mind as defined U/S
84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to neutralize the criminal liability.
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 states as herein below cited-Nothing is an offence which is done by a person, who at the time of doing it by
reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or
that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
It is submitted that, since the accused committed an act which is both wrong as well as
contrary to law, and moreover he has failed to supply reliable evidence to establish the fact
that he was not capable of understanding the nature of the act at the time of its commission,
32
T. N v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 : State of U.P v. Dr Ravindra Prakash Mittal (1992) 3 SCC 300
- 25
therefore it cannot be concluded that the accused would be exempted of criminal liability
availing the defense of Dissociative Identity Disorder in lieu of unsoundness of mind.
3.1.
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble Court that every man is presumed to be
sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the
contrary be proved33, and to establish a defense on ground of unsoundness of mind, it must
be clearly proved34 that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and the
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.35
In the matter in hand, the defence has prima facie failed to rebut the presumption of absence
of circumstances that will bring the act of the accused under the ambit of general exception.
The deposition of PW 6 and DW 1 though establish the fact that the accused is suffering
from the Dissociative Identity Disorder, but ipso facto has failed to raise even a reasonable
doubt that the accused at the time of offence was labouring under such a disorder.
It is furthermore submitted that, every person, who is mentally diseased is not ipso facto
exempted from the criminal liability36, and to get the benefit of Section 84, I.P.C., the
accused must establish that at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and the
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.37
33
Charan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1973) 75 Punj. 734 at p. 738; Avtar Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1984
(1) Crimes 636 at p. 640; Ranjan v. State of Kerala, 1984 Cr. L.J. 874 at pp. 877 (Ker.)
34
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 998; The State v. Durgacharan Barik Alias Duria, AIR
1963 Ori 33; Sudhakaran v. State of Kerala, (2010) 10 SCC 582
35
Daniel Mcnaughtens case, (1843) 8 E.R. 718 : (1843) 10 Cl. Fin. 200.
36
Govardhan v. Union of India, (1961) 2 Cr. L.J. 475 at p. 476.
37
Ashiruddin Ahmed v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 182 at p. 183 : 5 C.W.N. 237 : 50 Cr. L.J. 255; Baswantrao
Bajirao v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1949 Nag. 66 : I.L.R. (1948) Nag. 711 : 50 Cr.L.J. 181.
- 26
3.1.1
DEFENSE.
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 deals with the acts of a person of unsound mind
and mandates interalia
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it,
by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act,
or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.38
It is humbly submitted that as to insanity, it has been observed in HalsburysLawsof
England,39that where it can be shown that a person at the time of his committing or
omitting an act, the commission or omission of which would otherwise be criminal, was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act or omission or as not to know that what he was doing was wrong then
such a person is not in law responsible for his act.40
It is also submitted that accuseds duty under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 18060
is twofold i.e., initially he must establish that at the time of committing the act, he was non
composo mentis not of sound mind.
In the second place, he must prove that the said unsoundness of mind was of a degree and
nature to fulfil one of the tests as laid down in the aforesaid provision, namely, that by
reason of such unsoundness of mind he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or
that he was doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.41
In the light of the facts in record of the instant matter, it is submitted that the deposition of
PW 6, merely establishes the fact that the alternate personality of the accused is violent and
volatile, and which in no sense have an effect of causing, such mental disorder as will debar
the accused from knowing the consequences of his act.
38
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Furthermore, Section 84, I.P.C., has received strict interpretation and is considered
governing in only those cases where the cognitive faculties of the accused are completely
impaired.42
3.1.2. Accuseds mental faculty at the time of occurrence
was that of a reasonable and prudent man.
It is humbly submitted that, in case where the accused takes the plea of unsoundness of
mind, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong.43
In Sheralli Wali Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra44, it was held that it must be proved
clearly that, at the time of the commission of the acts, the appellant, by reason of
unsoundness of mind, was incapable of either knowing the nature of the act or the acts were
either morally wrong or contrary to law.
With reference to the dictum of Honble Supreme Court in Debyabhai Chhaganbhai
Thakkar v. State of Gujarat,45 it is most humbly submitted that when a plea of legal insanity
is set up, the Court has to consider whether at the time of commission of the offence, the
accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of the act
or that he was doing that was either wrong or contrary to law. The crucial point of time for
ascertaining the state of mind of accused is the time when the offense was committed.
Whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of Section
84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 can only be established from the circumstances which
preceded, attended and followed the crime.46
So also, in, Amrit Bhushan Gupta v. Union of India and Ors47, it has been held that unless
the Court comes to the conclusion that the accused was insane, at the point of time he
42
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committed the offence, he cannot be absolved of the responsibility of the offence, even if it
is found by the Court that he was insane either earlier or in the later point of time of the
commission of offence.
Since in the instant case the accused has prima facie failed to rebut the statutory
presumption that at the time of the commission of the act he was suffering from such a
mental disorder, due to which he was incapable of knowing the nature or consequences of
his act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to the law hence, the benefit
of Section 84 must not accrue to the accused.
It is submitted that, mere abnormality of mind, partial delusion, irresistible impulse or
compulsive psychopathic behaviour, affords not protection U/S 84 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. So also, mere eccentricity or strange behaviour or a mental set-up not
amounting to insanity as known to the law, could not absolve a person of consequences of
his act.
Evidently, the Honble Supreme Court in the case, State of M.P. v. Ahmadulla,48 held that,
to earn exemption U/S 84, I.P.C., the defence has to prove insanity of the accused at the
time of the offending act.
Pursuant to the facts in record, it is submitted that, in the instant case there is not a single
positive evidence, as to the deferred mental condition of the accused at the time of
commission of the offence.
The fact that, on former occasions he had been subject to insane delusions or had suffered
from derangement of mind and subsequently he had behaved like a mentally deficient
person, is not per se sufficient to bring his case within the exemption. So far as section 84,
I.P.C. is concerned, the court is only concerned with the state of mind of the accused at the
time of the commission of the offence.
In a very similar case of, Lonimohan Das v. Union Territory of Manipur,49 wherein the
evidence established by reference only showed that the appellant at times was of unsound
48
49
supra note 26
(1974) 2 Cr.L.J. 1186 at p. 1187.
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mind, but he had lucid intervals. There was nothing to show that at the time of the
commission of the homicide in question, the appellant was of unsound mind, and that by
reason of that unsoundness of mind, he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act, it
was held that
..the appellant was capable of knowing the nature of his act. That being so
he failed to discharge the burden of bringing his case within the exception as
enumerated under Section 84 of the Indian Penal; Code, 1860.
In the instant case even though, the nature of the alternate personality of the accused, was
violent and erratic, the defence of legal insanity cannot be relied on his previous character
or behaviour.
3.2.
Statutory
presumption
as
to
nonexistence
of
50
T. Chettiar v. Ponnammal, 1966 Cri. L.J. 1149 : AIR 1966 Mad 363.
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contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence,
is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.
With reference to the facts of the instant case, it is submitted that the prosecution has proved
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the plea of the accused taken in his
defense does not even stands probabilised from the materials on record.
Neither, the deposition of PW 1 or that of PW 4 conceives a rebuttal of the aforesaid
presumption, nor that of PW 6 establishes the fact, that at the time of commission of the
offence, the accused was labouring under the influence of unsoundness of mind.
Hence, it shall be construed from the facts in record that the accused has ipso facto failed
to rebut the statutory presumption of absence of circumstances bringing his case U/S 84 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and hence, the criminal liability charged upon him must not be
under any circumstances, whatsoever, be exempted.
3.3.
State v. Jones, 743 P.2d 276 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) affd, 759P.2d 1183, 1185 (Wash. 1998)
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSN, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(American Psychiatric Press, 4th ed., 1994).
51
52
- 31
53
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responsible. The host personalityrather than the alter in controlis the touchstone for
criminal accountability.
3.4.
It is humbly submitted that it is only the unsoundness of mind which naturally impairs the
cognitive faculties of the mind that can form a ground for exemption from criminal
responsibility.
Furthermore, the law recognizes nothing but incapacity to realize the nature of the act and
presumes that where a mans mind or his faculties or ratiocination are sufficiently clear to
apprehend what he is doing, he must always be presume to intend the consequences of the
action he takes.
So also, mere absences of motive for crime, howsoever, atrocious it may be, cannot, in the
absence of plea and proof of legal insanity, bring the case within Section 84 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860.
It is furthermore submitted that, there can be no legal insanity unless the cognitive faculty
of mind is destroyed as a result of unsoundness of mind to such an extent as to render the
accused incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he is doing is wrong or
contrary to law.56
Moreover in the instant case, the medical examination of the accused, might have
established that, he is suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder, but the same cannot be
construed to be a legal insanity. According to the medical science, inanity is another name
for mental abnormality due to various causes and existing in various degrees. Even an
uncontrollable impulse driving a man to kill or wound comes within its scope. But a man,
whom the medical science would pronounce as an insane, might not be legally insane,
unless and until it must be clearly proved that, by reason of that unsoundness, he was
incapable of knowing the nature of his act.
56
Sarka Gundusa v. State, 35 Cut. L.T 79 at p. 81 : A.I.R. 1969 Orissa 102; Surya Prasad v. State of Orissa, 1982
C.L.T. 232.
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It is therefore submitted that, the conviction and sentence to the accused has been unerringly
passed by the Learned Court below and that the same shall not be set aside.
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PRAYER
Wherefore, in the lights of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Honble Court, that it may graciously be
pleased:
Place: Cuttack
s/d -
Date: __ / 03 / 2015
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