Core China Relations CNDI

2016

***Uniqueness***

Relations High

Relations UQ rising ***

U.S. China relations are increasing now
Risen, 15
Tom Risen is a technology and business reporter for U.S. News & World Report.
December 3, 2015. Hotline Bling: China, U.S. Work to Further Cybersecurity Pact US
News http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/03/hotline-bling-china-us-workto-further-cybersecurity-pact

U.S. and Chinese officials are continuing to coordinate against the threat of
online crime and are working to ensure that hacking allegations do not lead
to hostilities between the world powers. On the heels of a meeting in the District of
Columbia between high-level officials from both countries, the Department of Justice on Wednesday further

Obama and Chinese President Xi

already have committed to the creation of a hotline between the two
countries to avoid escalation of issues that may arise in the course of
responding to cybercrime and other malicious cyber activities , and the two nations
delineated plans to address such hacking concerns. President Barack
Jinping

aim to nail down the scope and procedures for the hotline before their next cybersecurity meeting in
Beijing in June. The idea of establishing emergency lines of communication that resemble the type of Cold
War-era hotline set up between the U.S. and Russia to avoid escalation and paranoia centered around

countries are seeking to deal with an

evolving cybersecurity landscape and hacking as a potential act of war . In fact,
China and the U.S. have recently set up a space hotline to avoid incidents in
orbit, according to The Financial Times. The two technological powers also have agreed
their agencies will work together to tackle terrorism, child exploitation and
online crime like fraud and the theft of trade secrets. Officials from both
countries additionally will conduct a tabletop exercise next spring to test
proposals regarding the partnership.
nuclear activity has gained traction in recent years, as

US China relations are always moving forward.

Liu Zhen, 3/13/2016, CHINAS RELATIONS WITH US MOVING FORWARD,
SAYS PREMIER, AMID STRAINS OVER TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN SOUTH CHINA
SEA, South China Morning Post, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacydefence/article/1925794/chinas-relations-us-moving-forward-says-premieramid
Li said that as co-operation between China and the United States grows the
number of differences may naturally rise, but the percentage of problems in
their overall relationship will fall. He said there were over 100 mechanisms for
dialogue to manage any differences between the two sides. As long as the
two sides act in good faith and properly manage their differences, I believe
our common interests will further expand, he said. Li discussed the
negotiations for an investment treaty between the two countries, promising
to gradually give US investors wider access to Chinas markets. He said
Chinese investors should also enjoy similar openings in the US. The China-US

relationship had gone through many ups and downs since diplomatic ties
were established, he said. It has always been moving forward, which I
believe is the underlying trend, he added.

US/china relations resilient and improving

Cui 5/26 (Tankui, Chinese ambassador to the US, Making the Right
Choices: China-U.S. Relations at a Critical Point, China Focus, 5/26/2016,
http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/making-the-right-choices-china-us-relations-at-a-critical-point/) KC
It is a real pleasure to come to Sunnylands again. There is no better place in America to host this forum.
Three years ago next month, our leaders, President Xi and President Obama, had their first presidential
meeting here. It was the beginning of a new model of presidential dialogue, one with less formality and
fewer aides but greater candor and a clearer focus on issues of strategic importance. Such top-level
communication has now become a prominent feature of our relationship, from Sunnylands to Yingtai, from
the Blair House to the recent Nuclear Security Summit. It has enabled our leaders to build up a good

only of priorities and policies, but also of each other as

people. Thanks to the strong guidance of our two presidents and the joint
efforts of both sides, the China-U.S. relationship in the last three years has
withstood one test after another and has by and large moved forward on a
positive and stable track. Today, our bilateral cooperation is more extensive
and comprehensive than what is usually reported in the media . The
relationship is stronger and more resilient than many people have
realized. At the same time, this relationship now seems to be more difficult to manage than ever
mutual understanding not

before. While our cooperation is expanding and deepening, our differences stand out more and more.

While there is growing evidence that our two countries are increasingly
connected to each other, there are also mounting worries that we might
eventually clash. This is, I believe, partly because of the inherent complexities of the relationship,
and partly because fundamental changes in the global political and economic
structure have made these complexities even more complicated and have
magnified their impact. Therefore, the China-U.S. relationship today is probably at
another defining moment. How we define and direct it now will have far-reaching consequences.
Both countries have a big stake in the choices we are going to make. Whether or not we will be able to
make the right choices depends on a few key factors. First, it will depend on our vision of the world today.
Do we see a world in which great powers can and should coexist and cooperate with one another, or do we
see it as a place of inherent conflict among those powers? Do we embrace the opportunities for win-win
cooperation, or do we believe in the inevitability of a zero-sum game? Do we base our policies on full
recognition of 21st century global challenges with a view to partnership and community building, or do we
still see everything through the lens of allies versus rivals? Actually, the case for great-power partnership
and global community building is now stronger than ever. We are all faced with tremendous global
challenges: climate change, disease, natural disasters, terrorism, poverty, energy security, food security,
financial instability, and so on. On the positive side, all major powers are now members of key international
institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World
Trade Organization. We are also working together in new global governance mechanisms such as the G20.
All of this means that the major powers are committed to the maintenance and better functioning of the
existing international order. As long as there is sufficient political will, it will be possible for us to seize this
historic opportunity and build a new partnership for long-term stability and prosperity in the world. Here let
me say a few words about U.S. alliances in the world. We all know the origins of these alliances and how
they operated during the Cold War era. People may believe that they served American interests well in
those years. But here is the question today. Without necessary reforms, are these alliances really up to the
task of addressing the global challenges of the 21st century? Are they winning more partners for the
United States or are they turning away and even antagonizing other important players? Second, our ability
to make the right choices will depend on our perceptions of each other. There are people in the United

States who believe that everything China does is aimed at challenging the U.S. position in the world. And
there are people in China who think that everything the United States does is intended to contain China. I
believe that both groups are wrong because neither has come to recognize that, when it comes to
policymaking in countries like China and the United States, there are always many variables in the
equation. For China, the top priority is to accomplish economic, social, and political transformation for the
modernization of the country. Its most important tasks are domestic and its foreign policy is first and
foremost aimed at preserving a peaceful external environment. Naturally, as China develops and
integrates more deeply with the rest of the world, it will have more interests to attend to beyond its
borders and greater international responsibilities to fulfill. In doing so, China has to deal with the United
States and develop a positive and stable relationship with it. Of course, when U.S. policies hurt Chinas
interests, we will do what we can to safeguard and protect ourselves and ask the United States to change
its position. But this is entirely different from challenging the American global position and trying to
establish Chinas own dominance in the world. We are also aware that nowadays what China says and does
is closely followed by many. But some prevailing perceptions are simply wrong. A telling example is the
issue of the South China Sea. The real issue there is disputes over territorial and maritime jurisdiction.
China is doing nothing more than maintaining and defending its long-standing and legitimate position. But
this has been grossly misperceived as a strategic move by China to challenge U.S. dominance in the Pacific
and the world. American responses to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road
Initiative are similar examples of misperceived intentions. Some people seem to be concerned about a socalled Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine. They see Chinas call for Asians to take up more responsibility
for Asian affairs as an attempt to drive the United States out of Asia, whereas China is simply saying that
no one else can solve Asian problems if we Asians fail to shoulder our own responsibilities. The fact is that
China consistently stands for open and inclusive regional cooperation. But there is an alarming
development toward exclusion here. Today, whatever China does, even within its own territory, some
people in the United States always question Chinas intentions and challenge Chinas position. So the
reality is not that China is trying to drive anyone out of the Asia-Pacific, but that there are attempts to deny
Chinas legitimate interests in its own region. I would call this a Monroe Doctrine in reverse. Third, whether
or not we can manage differences while enhancing cooperation will depend on our will and our skill .

It is
encouraging to note that China-U.S. cooperation is expanding and deepening.
Our success stories include agreements on climate change and the Iran nuclear issue. However, there are
always differences between us. Many of them will not disappear overnight. It is imperative to manage
them in a constructive and pragmatic way, so that they will not dominate our bilateral agenda and derail
the overall relationship. We are doing relatively well on some issues, such as cyber-security. But we have
reason to be concerned about others, such as the situation in the South China Sea. Statements made by
U.S. officials and actions taken by the American military risk escalating tensions there. There have been
assertions that the United States is against actions to militarize the South China Sea. But it is the United
States that is sending more and more military vessels and airplanes there. Such deployments, if not
curbed, can only have the effect of militarizing the region. There have been demands on China to abide by
international rules, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But these same people
are denying Chinas rights under the Convention. Besides that, they often forget to mention that the scope
of the Convention does not cover sovereignty and territorial issues, as made clear in the Convention itself.
The concept of freedom of navigation is frequently used to justify actions by the U.S. military in the South
China Sea. The fact is that the U.S. freedom of navigation operations were originally designed as a countermeasure against the freedom of navigation defined by the Convention, as the United States believed that
the Convention provisions would restrict freedom of movement of its navy around the world. What is more
disturbing is that such statements and actions are likely to embolden some players to be even more
aggressive and provocative. And we are told that the U.S. alliance obligations would be invoked if China
responds to such provocations. It could be that all of this is intended to intimidate China, not to start a real
conflict. But what if China is not intimidated? This approach is clearly a path to conflict. It is indeed a
dangerous path and an irresponsible policy. In conclusion, the world has changed. We need a new vision for
our relationship based on a recognition of the new realities in the world. China and the United States
should form a new partnership to work together on todays global challenges. This will help both countries
to better accomplish domestic goals and fulfill international roles. It will thus serve the interests of the

This is exactly what President Xi proposed to President Obama

here at Sunnylands three years agoa new model of major-country relations
characterized by no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win
cooperation. Despite doubts and even suspicions in some quarters, this new
model is gradually taking shape. There will be a new administration here in the United States
world community as a whole.

next year, and we should keep moving forward on this positive track. I hope and believe that this
Leadership Forum will take the lead in helping shape government policies and public opinion in support of
our joint efforts.

Relations high- recent progress proves

-

Iran
ebola
military collaboration
export growth
paris deal
north korea

Blinken 4/27 (Anthony J, Deputy Secretary of State, US-China relations:

strategic challenges and opportunities, US department of state, 4/27/2016,
http://www.state.gov/s/d/2016d/256657.htm) KC
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Members of the Committee, thank you. It is very good to be back
before this Committee and have the opportunity to discuss our relationship with China, which as you have
outlined very well, Mr. Chairman, is complicated indeed. I just got back this past weekend from what was
my sixth visit to the Asia-Pacific in a little over a year. I have seen with each tri p that the rebalance efforts
we have been making to Asia have in fact advanced our interests and helped shape Asias upward
trajectory by bolstering our alliances, building new partnerships with emerging countries, strengthening
regional institutions and rule of law, advancing our economic ties, and engaging with China. I am pleased
to discuss this last pillar of our rebalance with you today. Secretary Kerry has called our relationship with
China our most consequential relationship. And it is indeed crucial that we try to get it right. The
approach that weve taken to China seeks to do three things: broaden and deepen practical cooperation on
issues of shared concern; it directly confronts and then tries to resolve or narrow our differences wherever

we
have seen real progress on important issues that do advance our interest s.
The relationship that we have been working on with China paved the way for a landmark
joint announcement on climate change that galvanized the international community to reach a global
climate agreement in Paris last December and sign it in New York just last week. We
engaged China in the global response to Ebola with positive effec t. We grounded
our work together to craft a deal that prevents Iran from developing a nuclear
weapon far into the future. We produced new confidence-building measures
between our militaries, and we sparked growing collaboration to meet
development challenges from Afghanistan to Sierra Leon e. From top to bottom, this
we can; and where we cant to manage those differences peaceably. Over the past year, we believe

Administration has worked to expand and deepen our diplomatic, military, economic, and people-to-people

our exports to China have nearly doubled,

and China is now the largest market for American-made goods outside of
North America. It is also one of the top markets for U.S. agricultural exports
and a large and growing market for U.S. services . These efforts to deepen
bilateral ties have been designed to turn a challenging rivalry into healthy
competition and to try break out of a zero-sum thinking on both side s. We
have seen results of this approach in our collaboration on some of the most difficult issues,
including most recently North Korea and the provocative, destabilizing, and internationally unlawful
actions it continues to take to advance its proscribed missile and nuclear program s. While
links with China. Since the President took office,

we have taken significant steps to make it more difficult for North Korea to acquire technology and
equipment for those programs or the resources to pay for them, the fact remains that their development
continues. As a result, they get closer to the day when they have the capacity to strike at our allies, at our
partners, and at the United States with a ballistic missile armed with a miniaturized nuclear warhead. That
is simply unacceptable. This threatcombined with an inexperienced leader who acts rashlymakes it an
urgent priority not only for us but increasingly for China. While the United States and China share an
interest in ensuring that North Korea does not retain a nuclear weapons capability, we have not always
agreed on the best way to reach that objective.

But in the last few months we have worked

together to draft and pass the toughest UN Security Council Resolution in a

generation to try to compel the leadership of the DPRK to rethink its pursuit
of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. If fully and effectively implemented, UNSCR 2270
will significantly reduce the North Korean regimes ability to procure, pay for, or produce weapons of mass
destruction and will challenge the calculus of the leadership in North Korea.

Relations UQ rising nuclear coop

Nuclear regulation coop strengthening US/China relations
now
Kai 4/4 (Chen Kai, Secretary General China Arms Control and Disarmament
Association, Chinas Vital Role at the Nuclear Security Summit, Huffington
Post, 4/4/2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chen-kai/china-nuclearsummit_b_9583412.html) KC
As the curtain of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit finally dropped on April 1 in Washington, Xi
Jinping, the president of China, alongside leaders from 51 other countries and four
international organizations including the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United
Nations were there. Together, they focused on strengthening the global nuclear
security architecture in order to seek a more coordinated and effective approach to the worlds
lingering nuclear security challenges. The summit bore fruit with a joint China-U.S.
communique, plus five separate action plans from different participants. At
present, terrorism is the most severe security challenge to the international community. Worse, it will be a
nightmare for all mankind if nuclear materials are used by terrorists or if nuclear terrorists abuse
cyberspace and other high-tech areas. Six years ago, the first Nuclear Security Summit was initiated in
Washington. Now,

the NSS process has contributed to strengthening the

international nuclear security architecture and upholding international peace
and security. There are three central aspects of the NSS that are worth looking at: 1.The NSS served
as a platform for sharing experience. Taking this opportunity, leaders from various countries shared their
opinions and best practices on nuclear security issues, discussed simulated crises and debated different
solutions with a view to learning from each other and mutually making up deficiencies. 1.The NSS
enhanced global capacity for emergency responses. Under the guidance of the NSS process, participating
countries have taken concrete steps toward that goal closely monitoring and evaluating the global
nuclear security situation, formulating policies and laws and streamlining administration and procedure, all
of which are beneficial to avoiding nuclear security accidents, preventing nuclear terrorist attacks and
continuously consolidating our defense to nuclear terrorism. 2.The

NSS promoted international

nuclear security cooperation. Established international institutions and new
initiatives are complementary to one another. Multilateral and bilateral
cooperation are mutually reinforced. The nuclear security cooperation framework with the
IAEA as its core gained universal recognition around the globe and plays a significant role in integrating
and coordinating global resources and actions. nuclear north korea A new multiple launch rocket system
is test fired in this undated photo released by North Korea on March 4. (REUTERS/KCNA)

China plays

an active role in establishing, constructing and upholding this international nuclear security
architecture. China supported the NSS process by participating in and carrying out the
outcomes of the previous summits. In The Hague in 2014, President Xi put forward a Chinese approach to
nuclear security for the first time, which provided an important and useful perspective to promote

President Xi delivered a speech that

fully demonstrated Chinas policies and initiatives . I believe that speech will be
international nuclear security. At the 2016 summit,

welcomed by the international community, becoming another significant contribution to promoting

international nuclear security architecture and global nuclear order. As a responsible member of the

China fulfills its commitments and takes the foremost

responsibility for improving its domestic nuclear securit y. In recent years, China
international community,

placed more emphasis on the overall planning of nuclear security and made great efforts in various fields
from the improvement of administration to the formulation and amendments of laws and regulations,
the development of advanced technology and the fostering of nuclear security culture. By doing so, China
achieved movement forward in developing nuclear security, which constitutes an important contribution to
the international nuclear security architecture. We will

build an international nuclear

security architecture featuring fairness and win-win cooperation .

At the same
time, China fully participates in global nuclear security governance. Alongside other countries, China is
committed to promoting a healthy and sustainable development of the international nuclear security
process. China firmly supports the work of the IAEA and the U.N., and continuously benefits from the
deepening exchange and cooperation with other countries on nuclear security. China takes an active role in
rule-making in the field of nuclear security and plays a constructive role in influencing the nuclear security
governance and establishment of nuclear order. In the end, China adds its share to the cause of global
nuclear security by utilizing its experience and capacity. Though this is the conclusion of the NSS process,
the endeavor to promote global nuclear security will never stop. The small steps we made will lead to
great advances in the field of nuclear security. We will build an international nuclear security architecture
featuring fairness and win-win cooperation and will embrace a world with shared nuclear security.

Relations UQ rising interdependence

Economic interdependence means relations never get low
enough for conflict
Forbes 6/6 (Ralph Jennings, reporter for Kyodo, Reuters, and Forbes, Why
odds of war in the contested south china sea are near zero, Forbes,
6/6/2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/06/why-odds-ofwar-in-the-contested-south-china-sea-are-near-zero/#21c1dc0035e0) KC
If you live in Taiwan, you know how this works: Show up in a caf or a library and find the tables occupied
not by people but their stuff. Books and a water bottle, even a laptop computer, tell you dont sit here, its
occupied. Owners of the stuff arent in the toilet. Theyre in a class or out shopping. Seat seekers usually
oblige the hint even though its a slap in the face, or maybe just a forgettable nip. This metaphor happens
to apply to the South China Sea, a tropical Asian body of water contested by seven governments, including
an expansionist China and others backed by Beijings rival world superpower the United States. Taiwan is a

Despite speculation about armed conflict as China bores deep

into other countries maritime territory, the parties have learned during their
dispute of more than 40 years to avoid one anothers stuff yet keep saying in public
claimant as well.

that its all theirs and please everyone else stay away. US Secretary of State John Kerry (L) speaks during a
session on across from Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi (R) during a Strategic Track small session as
part of the US China Strategic and Economic Dialogues at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on June
6, 2016.President

Xi Jinping said China and the US needed to trust each other

more as both sides sought to minimise tensions over the South China Sea at
the opening Monday of key annual talks in Beijing. (SAUL LOEB/AFP/Getty Images) China, for example,
disagrees that Malaysia has a territorial right to explore for undersea natural gas around the Spratly
Islands, but it doesnt sabotage the equipment. Vietnam and Taiwan claim islets elsewhere in the Spratlys,
one archipelago in the 3.5 million-square-meter ocean, that are so close you can see from one to the next.
But they dont attack and Taiwan says it has even helped Vietnamese vessels erstwhile maritime
intruders per Taiwanese law recover from storm damage. The two governments still occasionally point
fingers for infringing on each others maritime claims to parts of the ocean thats packed with fish and
undersea fuels. Armed conflict would follow only if a claimant took the books and laptop off someones
metaphorical library table and theres little precedent. I only think there would be a war if Vietnam or the
Philippines tried retaking territory already seized by Beijing, says Sean King, senior vice president with
consulting firm Park Strategies in New York. I think a de facto code of conduct is evolving, most easily
shaped by Beijing. Fear of conflict has obvious merit. Vietnam fired on two Chinese ships in 1974 and in
1988 China killed 74 Vietnamese sailors as it sank or demolished three ships. Two years ago Chinese and
Vietnamese boats sparred after Beijing allowed a Chinese state oil company to park a rig off Vietnams
coast. Chinas militarization of some of the seas approximately 500 islets among the various archipelagos
raises more concern, prompting weaker claimants such as the Philippines to seek help from the United

upsets are oddball incidents, nothing near

routine. No one wants a war despite the maddening erosion of their claims
and the economic opportunity they represent. First, the countries claiming the
South China Sea have been leaving their stuff there a long time and coast
guards from other places know where it is, reducing odds of a mishap. China and
States or start buying more weapons. But those

the United States both move in predictable ways and military commanders from each side have probably
ordered no shooting except in extreme cases, says Denny Roy, senior fellow with the East-West Center
think tank in Honolulu. The idea is the United States could strike on behalf of its old colony the Philippines

the United States, China

and other Asian countries with maritime claims depend on one another too
much economically to get into an armed struggle, says Lin Chong-pin, a retired
strategic studies professor in Taiwan. Interdependence has surged since the
Global Financial Crisis seven years ago, he says. China, he adds, since 1982 has
advocated struggle without a reaching a breaking point. The unprecedented
as the two sides have increased defense cooperation since 2014. But

magnitude of interdependence of powers in the world and especially after the

great recession 2009 is such that they wouldnt want a war, Lin says.

A2 Steel tanks relations

Increased econ coop shows progress on rmb issue and
steel overcapacity and betters trade relations
Xinhua 6/10 (Xinhua News, China-US dialogue makes progress in BIT
talks, overcapacity, RMB trading, china.org.cn, 6/10/2016,
http://www.china.org.cn/world/2016-06/10/content_38638380.htm) KC
Senior Chinese and U.S. officials have agreed to speed up
negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) during the eighth ChinaU.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) that concluded Tuesday in
Beijing. "The two countries will exchange new 'negative list' offers in mid-June," Chinese Vice Premier
BIT TALKS

Wang Yang told a news briefing on Tuesday. "We will try to reach a mutually beneficial and high-level
agreement at an early date," he said. A negative list outlines sectors closed to foreign investment. The last
time the two sides exchanged such lists was in early September last year, days ahead of Chinese President

Xi on Monday urged both countries to strengthen

coordination on their macroeconomic policies and reach a reciprocal bilateral
investment treaty as early as possible. "I think this is as good as you could hope
for, given how the U.S. has already expressed its view that the Chinese list is too long and needs to be cut
Xi Jinping's state visit to the United States.

for a BIT to become realistic," Jacob Kirkegaard, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, told Xinhua. That will "bode well" for the negotiations if China's new negative list offer is
"significantly reduced" in length from the previous offer, said John Frisbie, president of the U.S.-China
Business Council (USCBC). China and the United States started to negotiate a BIT in 2008 and 24 rounds of
talks were held ahead of the eighth S&ED as both countries sought to increase mutual investment. STEEL

The two sides held candid discussions on excess capacity in steel

and other industries during the two-day dialogue, and both recognized that this is a
global issue which requires collective responses. "The United States and
China support ongoing international efforts aimed at identifying effective
government policies for addressing global excess capacity and structural
adjustment, and achieving greater transparency on industry developments to promote market-driven
responses," a joint statement released after the dialogue said, noting that the two countries will
attend an OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Steel Committee
meeting in September to address global excess capacity. The statement also said the
United States acknowledges China's recently announced plans to close 100 to
150 million metric tons of steel capacity, and to strictly prohibit the
expansion of crude steelmaking capacity over the next five years . Thomas J.
Gibson, president and CEO of the American Iron and Steel Institute, said on Tuesday in a
statement that his institute welcomed "the new commitments by Chinese
leaders to adopt measures to strictly contain steel capacity expansion,
reduce net steel capacity, eliminate outdated steel capacity, and dispose of
'zombie enterprises' through restructuring, bankruptcy and liquidation , as
appropriate." "China's participation in further efforts to address global excess capacity at the
OECD Steel Committee is also positive," Gibson said. Frisbie, the USCBC president, called on
OVERCAPACITY

the United States to use "internationally-accepted, legally-sound" trade tools to address distortions in the
U.S. market caused by overcapacity problems. The China-U.S. annual strategic dialogue comes at a time
when steel overcapacity has become an acute global challenge and U.S. steel producers are increasingly
resorting to trade remedies and tariff protection to ride out a sluggish steel market, a practice strongly
opposed by Chinese steel producers and exporters. Kirkegaard said he was convinced that this round of
strategic dialogue "will help prevent a much more damaging confrontation later this year over steel and

help channel the issue into a multilateral OECD-led process." RMB TRADING & CLEARING IN U.S. China has
set up offshore RMB trading hubs in Hong Kong, London and Toronto, but the U.S. market remains
untapped. China will grant the United States a quota of 250 billion yuan (38 billion U.S. dollars) under the
country's Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor program and appointed one Chinese and one
U.S. bank to conduct RMB clearing business in the United States, according to the statement. "It's very

both sides have endorsed a framework for facilitating RMB

trading and clearing in the U.S. for the first time," said Michael R. Bloomberg, chair of
the Working Group on U.S. RMB Trading and Clearing and founder of Bloomberg L.P. " This will help
bring new momentum to the working group's efforts to expand trade
between the United States and China by allowing the RMB to be cleared
in the U.S.," he added. S&ED MECHANISM U.S. experts said the S&ED has become an important venue
encouraging that

for promoting cooperation and managing differences between the world's two largest economies, but this
mechanism needs improvement to become more effective in the future. "As we approach the close of the

the S&ED was established in

recognition of the need to expand engagement to address the array of issues
in the U.S.-China relationship," Frisbie said. "In the next administration, the mechanisms for
Obama administration, it is important to remember that

dialogue can be tweaked to make further improvements and become more effective, but high-level
engagement is now mandatory in the U.S.-China relationship," he added. Kirkegaard said the S&ED is very

"The S&ED is part of the

process to 'avoid doing stupid things' and keep small problems from growing into
something bigger -- as such, its real value is largely preemptive as well as latent in the sense that if an
much part of the overall process to manage the U.S.-China relations.

important issue suddenly needs to be dealt with in U.S.-China relations, in the S&ED the two governments
have a channel available," he said. "This S&ED will surely have been instrumental in paving the
ground for any big announcements made when President Xi and President Obama meet later in the year
and also for

steel,"

helping avoid large confrontation over 'manageable issues' like

he said

Relations UQ no war
Public support to avoid military conflict with China is high
and is less likely to cause conflict between the US and
China.
A. Trevor Thrall, senior fellow for the Cato Institutes Defense and Foreign
Policy Department, Eric Gomez, research associate for defense and foreign
policy studies at the Cato Institute, 6/9/2016, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS NOT
VERY HAWKISH ON CHINA, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/blog/americanpublic-not-very-hawkish-china
Most importantly, though, Americans overwhelming support a cooperative
approach to dealing with China rather than a confrontational one. Sixty-seven
percent responded to the 2014 CCGA poll that the best way to handle the rise
of Chinese power is to undertake friendly cooperation and engagement ,
compared to 29% who said the United States should actively work to limit
the growth of Chinas power. And when it comes to the prospect of military
conflict with China the public is truly not interested. Just 26% believe the
United States should send troops to help if China invades Taiwan. These
figures provide fair warning to the next president to think twice about how to
deal with China. An aggressive military posture like the one in place today
(and promoted by both candidates) not only runs contrary to public
preferences, it also increases the prospects for direct conflict between the
United States and China.

Low risk of war U.S. and China err toward coop

Hu Shuli, editor-in-chief of Caixin Media, 6/8/2016, CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS:
HOSTAGE TO NONE, Caixin Online, http://english.caixin.com/2016-0608/100952795.html
In addition to tensions over disputed islands and reefs in the South China
Sea, friction has been generated in recent months by China's attempt to be
recognized as a "market economy" and America's plan to deploy an antimissile system in South Korea. Anti-China rhetoric spilling over from the U.S.
presidential campaign has also fueled tension. But relations between the
world's two largest economies must not be held hostage by these problems .
This point was recently made clear by the Chinese ambassador to the United
States, Cui Tiankai. We fully believe in the merits of his argument. The ChinaU.S. bilateral relationship has matured to a point where neither country can
hurt the other without inflicting damage on itself. The line between
cooperation and conflict, however, is constantly adjusting to reflect the
dynamics of a fast-changing external environment and domestic politics.
Regardless of how the line changes, though, each government has agreed

and should maintain this key position that strengthening cooperation yields
more benefits for all than does dwelling on diversions and friction points.

A2 SCS war now

US/China mil-mil relations prone to fluctuationscannot
be assessed based on singular instances, and longitudinal
trend indicates strengthening relationships
Kamphausen and Drun 4/22 (Roy Kamphausen, Senior Vice president
for research and director of National Bureau of Asian Research, teaches East
Asian security, Jessica Drun, Bridge Award fellow at the national bureau of
Asian Research in the political and security affairs group, What are mil-mil
ties between the US and China good for? War on the Rocks, 4/22/2016,
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/what-are-mil-mil-ties-between-the-u-s-andchina-good-for/) KC
The full report, entitled U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains, is available online. Senior Defense
Department leadership clarified this week that Chinas invitation to the 2016 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
exercises still stands, despite calls from Capitol Hill for its withdrawal. Opponents to Chinese participation
argue that the United States should impose costs for Chinas increasingly aggressive actions in the South
China Sea. However, military-to-military (mil-mil)

which include multilateral and

bilateral exercises but encompass a wide range of activities that serve as
confidence-building and deconfliction measures play an important role in
the broader U.S.China relationship, serving as a channel for sustained
dialogue and conflict management. Former head of U.S. Pacific Command Adm. Samuel
Locklear, during a keynote address at an event this Tuesday co-hosted by the National Bureau of Asian

Chinas participation in RIMPAC 2014 was a

very big success and that Washington should do all that [it] can to keep the PLA engaged in
Research, advanced this view, noting that

international military forums. His comments come at a time where mil-mil relations between the United
States and China are growing ever more consequential, in light of recent developments in the Asia-Pacific.

militarization in the region and Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea
heighten the need for mil-mil contacts as a way to manage tensions, ensure
stability, and communicate each sides respective interests to avoid
miscalculations. Both Washington and Beijing have acknowledged the importance
of the U.S.China relationship for maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific .
Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping jointly advocated for a more mature and
robust mil-mil relationship during respective state visits in November 2014 and September 2015.
Clearly both sides want to avoid military tensions and armed conflict because
they recognize that conflict would be disastrous for both countries and
catastrophic for the region. However, the United States and China share a long
history of highs and, more frequently, lows in the mil-mil domain, given its correlation to
overall political ties. The mil-mil relationship took root during the SinoSoviet split. But mil-mil
relations fluctuated in the following years, subject to the ripple effects of the
Increasing

Tiananmen Square incident, the cross-strait crisis in 1995 and 1996, NATOs accidental bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the EP-3 incident, and arms sales to Taiwan .

Mil-mil ties were

always reestablished after these crises subsided. All the more, the type and
sophistication of mil-mil ties have markedly increased , to include a first-ever naval
exercise involving cross-deck helicopter landings in 2013, the completion of an air annex, and an increase

The adaptability to change and

fluctuations in the strategic environment reflects an overall maturation of the
in the number of high-level exchanges, among others.

bilateral relationship and should signal confidence going forward,

not cynicism. In
particular, there is now a heightened awareness about the need for more restraint in suspending ties. For
example, Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, was welcomed in November 2015
by Chinese counterparts, despite the USS Lassens freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea
a few days earlier. A new round of arms sales to Taiwan late last year also did not result in suspension of
mil-mil activities, serving as another solid indicator. Yet the mil-mil program between the United States and
China could be further optimized in the near term through collaboration in areas of shared interests. This
includes enhancing communication mechanisms to reduce miscalculations and assuage differences. For
example, they could mutually determine the correct mix of mil-mil activities or clarify interests to the other
party.
Longer term, the development of a collaborative agenda could both increase security and
strengthen the relationship in important ways. There seems to be scope based off the success of extraregional initiatives such as the Gulf of Aden exercises for the United States and China to develop a
framework of mil-mil engagement through activities that manage each others important constraints and
deal with existing challenges.

Theres actually a net improvement in relations- SCS

conflict distorted and is exaggerated
Chen 6/10 (Dingding, Prof of government and public admin at U of Macau,
Fellow at Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, Founding director of Intellisia
institute, Reality Check: The South China Sea does not define the US-China
relationship, The Diplomat, 6/10/2016,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/reality-check-the-south-china-sea-does-notdefine-the-us-china-relationship/) KC
Over the last two years or so, the South China Sea issue has been dominating
Sino-U.S. relations, as evidenced by endless newspaper headlines, regional summits, and think tank
events. At the most recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, for example, again the South China Sea issue
dominated the agenda. So we cannot entirely blame general readers and casual followers of international
news for misunderstanding Sino-U.S. ties .

The reality is very different from what you

read in the headlines. For example, at the recently concluded Strategic and
Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing, a number of important agreements
were moved along by both countries . Among them, the Bilateral Investment
Treaty is a major one. Both sides agreed to speed up the process and exchange so-called negative
lists soon. Renminbi trading will also soon head to the U.S. market, further
deepening the economic interdependence between China and the U nited States.
And, of course, there are major global and regional issues that have seen positive
cooperation between China and the U nited States during the last few years, including
climate change, the Iranian nuclear issue, and, most recently, UN sanctions
on North Korea. All this just shows how global the Sino-U.S. relationship really is, reminding us of
the relative lack of importance of the South China Sea issue . Enjoying this
article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Given this, why is it the case the South
China Sea issue tends to dominate newspaper headlines, not to mention private and public conversations

the media has a tendency

to report more conflict-based and negative stories in global affairs . It is also partly
between the United States and its Asian allies? This is partly because

because both the United States and China have failed to effectively communicate their respective

It should be crystal clear to top leaders that China has

no intention or capability to push the U nited States out of Asia and the U.S. has
no intention or capability or block Chinas rise in Asia and beyond . Despite all the
debates that are ongoing within both countries, this fundamental point should be
emphasized and reemphasized again and again by officials on both sides. Unfortunately, so far, we
intentions toward each other.

have not seen adequate efforts to this and. And so the mistrust and suspicions continue. As Peking

Universitys Wang Jisi, dean of the Institute for International and Strategic Studies, pointed out last year in
an influential essay on Sino-U.S. relations, the problem of two orders lies at the heart of the Sino-U.S.

the United States should respect Chinas

domestic order and the Chinese Communist Partys rule. Meanwhile, China
should respect Americas global leadership. In other words, the United States
should not try to impose its values and political will on Chinas domestic
order, and China should likewise not seek to change the rules and norms of a
liberal international order that has been largely underwritten by the United
States since 1945. So, in a sense, maintaining stability is a common interest
between the two powers, though Chinas focus is focused on domestic stability
and the United States on the stability of the international order . To avoid what
relationship today. Essentially, this means that

seems like an inevitable conflict between a dominant power and a rising power, both China and the United
States should take a step back and reevaluate their fundamental interests with regard to the South China
Sea. Once this is done, China will realize its first priority is to realize the China dream or modernization
for the Chinese people, not its claims in the South China Sea. Also, the United States will realize that its
own first priority is maintaining a liberal international order, which can only be done by bringing China into

There will always be some

sort of competition between China and the United States, but this can be
good for the world. We should not, however, let the South China Sea define U.S.China relations. To allow that to happen would indeed be foolish and lead to a tragedy in great power
it and accommodating Chinas legitimate interests and demands.

politics

Relations Low

Relations UQ falling ***

No relations currency manipulation

Needham 16 ( Vicki, finance reporter for The Hill, Trade lawmakers urge
US to take tough stance with China, 06/05/16 12:22 PM EDT, The Hill)
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/282269-trade-lawmakers-urge-us-to-taketough-stance-with-china
Four top trade lawmakers are urging U.S. officials to address a broad range of
concerns with China during the three-day U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) beginning Sunday. Senate Finance Committee Chairman
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin
Brady (R-Texas), Finance Committee ranking member Ron Wyden (D-Ore.),
and Ways and Means Committee ranking member Sander Levin (D-Mich.)
sent a letter on Friday saying that the upcoming talks occur at a time of
increasingly troubling developments in Chinas economic policies. They
called on top U.S. officials, including Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and
Secretary of State John Kerry, to urge China to pursue market-oriented
economic policies instead of maintaining their practice of excessive
government intervention. The lawmakers called the meeting a critical
opportunity to address the barriers and distortions that endanger the wellbeing of the U.S.-China economic relationship and the international
economy. They ticked off a handful of major concerns including currency
manipulation, the protection of intellectual property, cybersecurity issues, the
overcapacity of commodities such as steel, aluminum and solar, and the
persistence of state-owned enterprises. Instead of following through on its
asserted desire to move towards a market-determined exchange rate, China
has continued to let the government play a decisive role in determining the
value of the renminbi, they wrote in the letter also addressed to Commerce Secretary Penny
Pritzker, and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman. This practice cannot continue . Lew
and Kerry arrive in Beijing on Sunday for the start of the summit. On Sunday, Lew will participate in a
discussion on U.S.-China economic relations at Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management.

The
lawmakers said China continues to follow old models of investment-led
growth and that path is creating severe shocks in the global marketplace.
At the same time, the new policies that China is unveiling appear to
undermine fair and open competition in the Chinese market, they wrote. The
lawmakers also noted that trade secrets theft in China is a major problem for
U.S. companies. Additionally, Beijing is implementing policies that will
hamper the development of the digital economy and U.S. agricultural exports
to China continue to face significant regulatory barriers. "Despite positive
commitments made by China during President Xis visit to Washington last
year, approval of innovative U.S. biotechnology products remains slow,
irregular, and unpredictable," they wrote. "This situation has caused serious price
In the evening, he will attend a dinner with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the Summer Palace.

disruptions in the international market for U.S. agricultural products and harm
to U.S. farmers." "There are important, difficult reforms and course
corrections that China must undertake in order to make it possible for the
U.S.-China economic relationship and the global economy to achieve
their full potentials," they wrote. "We urge you to impress upon China the
enormous stakes at issue in our bilateral relationship and partnership."

US-China economic relations strained s teel overcapacity,

currency manipulation, regulatory barriers, and IP theft
Talley 6/6 (Ian, studies global economy and geopolitics, writes for WSJ in
DC, Why the US Steel industry is molten hot over Chinas Trade practices,
Wall Street Journal, 6/6/2016,
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/06/06/why-the-u-s-steel-industry-ismolten-hot-over-chinas-trade-practices/) KC
John Ferriola, chief executive of U.S. steel giant Nucor Corp., is skeptical China will soon fix what he calls
the biggest problem facing his industry: excess production capacity. The Chinese government isengaged
in economic warfare against the U.S. and sadly, they are winning, Mr. Ferriola said in an interview ahead

Chinas illegal,
subsidizing of an industry the U.S. government recently accused of
dumping, or selling products below production cost to improperly gain market
share. From outright government ownership to an array of illegal subsidies, Chinese steel
companies are being propped up at the expense of U.S. and other producers,
American officials and firms complain. When U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew presses
of high-level U.S.-China talks kicking off in Beijing Monday. The trouble, he says, is
unfair

Beijing on the matter, Chinese officials will likely reiterate recent promises to gradually cut annual
production by 100 million to 150 million tons over the next five years. But Nucor is taking a seeing is

China two months ago set a new production record after

spending two years promising to cut production, the Charlotte, N.C., company contends.
believing approach.

We dont need any more promises, said Mr. Ferriola. What we need is for China to provide a capacity
reduction plan that provides timelines and a mechanism to verify that cuts have occurred. And even if the
country delivers on its existing promises, that is only a slice of the estimated 425 million tons many
consider needs to be shuttered in China to balance out supply with demand. To put that in perspective, the
entire U.S. steel market is only around 100 million tons. China has conflicting motivations. Beijing knows it
needs to cut production across a range of industrial sectors so as not to exacerbate growing debt problems
that risk creating a financial crisis. At the same time, it risks a dangerous surge in unemployment and a
sharp deceleration in growth if it moves too quickly and allows its unproductive capacity to fall offline.
Thats a particular problem for President Xi Jinping as he seeks to consolidate power ahead of a key

The excess capacity dispute is one of several issues

aggravating trade tensions between China and the U.S . The yuan has fallen to
five-year lows against the dollar, cyber attacks on corporations are straining
relations and U.S. firms complain that a host of regulatory barriers are
restricting their access to the Chinese market. Those trade irritants, compounded by weak
growth, are fueling voter anger in the U.S. presidential elections . Chinas trade practices have
been a prime factor in the loss of 15,000 steel workers who have lost their
jobs over the last year and a half, the steel boss said. Our government must vigorously
leadership change next year.

enforce our trade laws, Mr. Ferriola said. If we allow Chinas steel producers to break our trade laws
without any consequences, that will embolden other Chinese manufacturers to do the same thing, he
said. Anyone who thinks theyre not going to take the next step down stream is dreaming. Such concerns
are driving opposition to the administration potentially declaring China a market economy in December,
a move that will change how the government calculates tariffs against allegedly unfair Chinese imports.
Under the deal the U.S. signed with China when it backed its entry into the World Trade Organization,

Washington agreed to no longer recognize the country as a non-market economy after 15 years. We
should vigorously oppose Chinas ascension to market economy status, the Nucor chief said. The
Communist country has failed to meet the criteria needed, he said. They broke those rules, they violated

As that debate gathers steam in Washington ahead of the

November presidential elections, look out for further strains in U.S.-China
relations.
the criteria.

US/China relations declining, pushing China to coop w/

Russia
Babich 6/24 (Dmitry, political analyst at Sputnik international, Unwise
Obama policy pushes China and Russia closer together, RT, 6/24/2016,
https://www.rt.com/op-edge/348210-china-putin-visit-russia-xi/) KC
President Vladimir Putins visit to China on June 25 will continue the tradition of frequent high level SinoRussian meetings that have been going on since 2014. In 2015 Putin and Chinas President Xi Jinping met
four times. During their meeting in Beijing, Putin and Xi are expected to discuss economic cooperation and
the geopolitical issues such as the situation in Syria, the deployment of the American THAAD missile
defense system in South Korea, and the growing tension between China and local US allies in the South
China Sea. According to the Russian ambassador to China, Andrey Denisov, Chinese trade with Russia is
still no match to its trade with America, but the gap has been narrowing during the last 25 years. If it had
not been for the dramatic fall in oil prices, the volume of trade between Russia and China in 2014 would
have exceeded $100 billion, Denisov told the Interfax news agency. Read more Russian President Vladimir
Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Sergey GuneevOur views are either similar or coincide: Putin on
comprehensive strategic China-Russia alliance Moscow and Beijing had to restart trading in the early
1990s almost from scratch: as the frosty relations between Maoist China and the Soviet Union in 1960s1970s had brought trade almost to a standstill. The Soviet Union and China had ideological differences,
which the pre-neocon US used with great skill, reorienting the Chinese economy to cooperation with
American companies in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, the opposite is happening. In Denisovs words,

Russia and China are now seeing eye to eye on Syria, US-inspired regime
changes in many countries and other important international political
problems. Meanwhile, Sino-US cooperation has been put under political pressure
by Washingtons concern about Chinas peaceful rise (the favorite expression of the
Chinese foreign ministry, describing Chinas growth as devoid of imperial ambitions). The new
configuration of forces on the world stage reflects in the dynamic of Putin-Xi summits. At least two of the
last years meetings between the leaders had an important symbolic meaning. The BRICS summit in Ufa the capital of an autonomous region with a mostly Muslim population in central Russia - took place in July
2015. The Ufa summit is seen now as the most productive in terms of BRICS development projects, with

Putins attendance of the

celebrations commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of the World
War II in China in September 2015 also had an important symbolic meaning. The
Chinese celebrations then were boycotted by US President Barak Obama and other
Western leaders, despite China being an ally of the US in that war, which by far
lost the largest number of people among the countries that fought Imperial Japan. The Sino-Russian
relations are given a special boost by the fact that they are currently based
on mutual respect, said Professor Yang Xiyu, senior fellow at the China Institute of International
Studies. You dont always see that in Chinas relations with Western countries. Signs of respect for
China from Washington have been especially slow in coming. The absence of
President Obama at the parade in Beijing in 2015, which commemorated the victory of the
Sino-Russian-American coalition in the war with Japan, was unofficially explained by
Obamas unwillingness to support a show of Chinas military might . US
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, during her campaign in 2015-2016, was not
the creation of joint development banks and currency pools.

describing President Xi as a "shameless".

Descriptions of China as an aggressive power, posing a threat to both its neighbors and
the US, have been made this year by senior US defense officials with connections to Clinton.
The recent naval exercises in the South China Sea, conducted by American
warships with the navies of United States allies, had a specific goal of checking Chinese
ambitions in the area, i.e. showing Beijing its place. The US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter
particularly sympathetic to China,

labeled China's behavior in the South China Sea "self-isolating" and visited American aircraft carriers in the
area. Read more Russian President Vladimir Putin. Sergey GuneevShanghai Cooperation Organization
expands, commands respect worldwide Putin to Xinhua I dont think Russia needs to get involved in

the Sino-American rivalry in the South China Sea directly, said Aleksandr Lukin, the director of
the Center for East Asian Studies at MGIMO University in Moscow. But this rivalry creates an important

making the Chinese side to be more

forthcoming to Russias needs and worries. Experts agree that in May 2014 it was
Obamas hostile policy towards both China and Russia that pushed the
Chinese to agree to higher prices for Russian natural gas. The natural gas will be
part of context for Sino-Russian relations,

supplied to China via the 2,500-mile Power of Siberia pipeline now under construction. The deal, worth
$400 billion over 30 years, was helped by the fact that days earlier Obama promised American support to
just about all of Chinas rivals in South-East Asia. The EU is also helping Russian-Chinese cooperation by
threatening to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. The recent threat by the European Commission
President Jean-Claude Juncker to apply the same EU legislation to the newly planned Nord Stream-2
pipeline - which foiled Russias South Stream project to supply gas to Greece and Italy - will no doubt make
Russias turn to the East timelier than ever. Russias turn to China is natural, and wise people would not
need the EU and the US to tell them that Russia had to look east at last, said Sergey Karaganov, Dean of
the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the Moscow-based Higher School of Economics.
But we had a lot of illusions about the West, for many years after the fall of communism in 1991. We
should thank the disastrous leadership of Mr. Obama and the Eurocrats for setting us on the right path.

Relations UQ failing IPR

IPR issues discourage trade with China-local corruptions
make cooperation fails
Morrison 9
(Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, June 23, 2009,
China-U.S. Trade Issues pg. 11, HY)
Under the terms of its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China agreed to
immediately bring its IPR laws in compliance with the WTOs Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which include a commitment to establish an effective IPR enforcement
regime. The U.S. Trade Representatives (USTR) office has stated on a number of occasions that China has made great
strides in improving its IPR protection regime, noting that it has passed several new IPR-related laws, closed or fined
several assembly operations for illegal production lines, seized millions of illegal audio-visual products, curtailed exports of
pirated products, expanded training of judges and law enforcement officials on IPR protection, and expanded legitimate

However, the USTR has indicated that much work needs

to be done to improve Chinas IPR protection regime, especially in terms of
deterrence. Many business groups contend that poor IPR protection is one of the
most significant obstacles for doing business in China. To illustrate: According to IPR
industry groups, China has some of the highest piracy rates in the world : 95% for
licensing of film and music production in China.

entertainment software, 90% for records and music, and 82% for business software. Piracy in China for business and
entertainment software alone is estimated to cost U.S. firms $3.5 billion in lost trade annually, which were was than losses
from any other foreign country.50 The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported that China accounted for 81%
($221 million domestic value) of pirated goods seized by the agency in FY2008.51 Piracy also has a number of negative
effects on Chinas economy. For example: The Chinese government estimates that counterfeits constitute between 15%
and 20% of all products made in China and are equivalent to about 8% of Chinas annual gross domestic product. A
study by the Motion Picture Association of America estimated that Chinas domestic film industry lost about $1.5 billion in
revenue to piracy in 2005 (and that the combined losses of both foreign and Chinese film makers totaled $2.7 billion).52 It
also found that about half of pirated films in China are Chinese movies. A Business Software Alliance study estimates
that a 10 percentage point reduction in Chinas PC software piracy rates would raise its GDP by $20.5 billion and create an
additional 355,179 jobs. Opinions differ as to why the Chinese government has been unable (or unwilling) to make a
significant reduction in the level of piracy in China. Some explanations put forward by various analysts include the
following: Chinas transformation from a Soviet-style command economy (in which the government owned and
controlled nearly every aspect of the economic life) to one that is becoming more market-based is a very recent
occurrence. IPR is a relatively alien or unfamiliar concept for most people in China to grasp (as is the concept of private

Chinese
leaders want to make China a major producer of capital-intensive and hightechnology products, and thus, they are tolerant of IPR piracy if its helps
Chinese firms become more technologically advanced .54 Although the central
government may be fully committed to protect IPR, local government officials
are often less enthusiastic to do so because production of pirated products generates
jobs and tax revenue, and some officials may be obtaining bribes or other benefits which
property rights) and thus it is difficult for the government to convince the public that piracy is wrong.53

prompts them to tolerate piracy. The USTRs April 2009 report on IPR stated it was concerned by reports that government
officials in China were urging more lenient enforcement of IPR laws because of the impact of the global financial crisis.

As a developing country, China lacks the resources and a sophisticated legal system
to go after and punish IPR violators, and establishing an effective enforcement
regime will take time.5 As a practical matter, IPR enforcement in China will be
problematic until Chinese-owned companies begin to put pressure on the
government to protect their own brands and other IPR-related products. U.S. trade officials
note that the Chinese government took aggressive action during the 2008 summer
Olympics in Beijing to stop infringement activities. Chinese trade barriers and
regulatory restrictions on IPR-related products and their distribution are so onerous
that they prevent legitimate products from entering the market, or raise costs

high that they are unaffordable to the average individual, thus creating a huge demand for lowcost pirated products.
so

Relations UQ falling cyber

relations decline cybersecurity
Hart 15 [Melanie, Director of China Policy @ The Center for American
Progress, 11-29-2015, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and
Counterterrorism: Hearing on the Changing Landscape of U.S.-China
Relations, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf]-DD
cyberspace intrusions at health insurer Anthem and
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management are reported to be Chinese
intelligence-gathering operations.12 Those two incidents affected an
estimated 100 million Americans, and they follow a string of commercial
cyberthefts targeting American businesses. It is difficult to quantify with precision the costs
Cybersecurity: Recent

to the United States from a steady drain of U.S. commercial secrets and other private information

those costs are likely to be significant,

both in terms of U.S. economic competitiveness and U.S. national
security. In the absence of an international cybergovernance mechanism or common cyberspace
including federal government informationbut

norms, it is difficult for U.S. leaders to craft an effective response. That problem is particularly acute with
commercial cyberespionage because many American businesses prefer to keep cyberthefts private to
avoid undermining investor confidence.

Relations UQ falling trade war

Alt cause to relations decline- trade complications
Hart 15 [Melanie, Director of China Policy @ The Center for American
Progress, 11-29-2015, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and
Counterterrorism: Hearing on the Changing Landscape of U.S.-China
Relations, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf]-DD
Trade complaints have plagued the U.S.-China
economic relationship for decades. U.S. companies have confronted
intellectual property theft, export subsidies that appear to violate
World Trade Organization regulations, and overt market access
barriers in China. More recently, Chinese regulators are applying anti-monopoly
legislation in a biased manner against American firms to force those firms to
surrender market share to Chinese competitors and license or sell their
intellectual property at sub-market rates.13 The underlying legitimacy of the anti-monopoly
Commercial concerns:

rules that Beijing is manipulating for protectionist purposes makes it very difficult to counter these actions.

Relations UQ falling steel

Lack of transparency, complex regulations, and trade
complaints straining US/China relationship
Wei and Schwartz 6/6 (Lingling Wei and Felicia Schwartz, Wei is part of
WSJs Beiking Bureau and studies Chinese finance, Schwartz is a Dartmouth
graduate and reporter at WSJs DC bureau, U.S., China Find Common Ground
Elusive at High-Level Talks, The Wall Street Journal, 6/6/2016,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/beijings-south-china-sea-claims-cloud-u-s-chinatalks-1465180495) KC
trade and investment have emerged as
a new source of friction. The Obama administration, given the sharp rhetoric
in the presidential election, has issued trade complaints and levied duties on
some Chinese goods, including the cold-rolled steel used in appliances and
auto parts. U.S. business groups are more vocal about what they see as an
uneven playing field, with regulations restricting access to major sectors and
pressuring them to share technology and other proprietary information with
Chinese partners. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong tour the
For many years the bedrock of U.S.-China relations,

Forbidden Citys Qianlong Garden in Beijing, June 5, 2016. ENLARGE U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and
Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong tour the Forbidden Citys Qianlong Garden in Beijing, June 5, 2016.
Photo: Reuters . Candidly,

foreign businesses wonder if they are welcome, and find Chinas

regulatory environment harder and harder to navigate, Mr. Lew said during
Mondays talks. He called on Beijing to increase transparency and remove barriers
to market access. Chinese officials, who want to keep factories humming in the midst of an
economic slowdown, have criticized the U.S. and other foreign governments for
resorting to protectionist measures to protect home markets from Chinas
competitive exports. Some of Beijings prickliness was evident after Mr. Lew took
issue with the overcapacity that is sending a glut of steel, aluminum and other
Chinese industrial goods onto global markets. Mr. Lou, Chinas finance minister, said that he
didnt feel any discomfort with Mr. Lews criticisms and said that Beijing would rely on markets to deal
with the capacity problems. He reminded reporters that the problem is rooted in the massive
infrastructure-building program China launched following the global financial crisis in 2008. In the three
years that followed, he said, China accounted for more than half of the worlds economic growth. At the
time, the world thanked China for boosting economic growth, he said. Now, the world is pointing fingers
at China.

*Note: Lew = U.S. Treasury Secretary

Relations UQ yes war

Current US and China actions could potentially be
destabilizing.
Eric Gomez, research associate for defense and foreign policy studies at the
Cato Institute, 6/16/2016, U.S. POLICYMAKERS SHOULDNT LEAVE CHINA
WITH NOTHING TO LOSE, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/blog/uspolicymakers-shouldnt-leave-china-nothing-lose
The United States is attempting to use its military to check Chinese military
and political assertiveness in East Asia. Yet Beijing has not responded to
American freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea (SCS),
increased troop deployments to the region, and deepening political/military
relations with former adversaries by changing course. Instead, China has
reacted with its own form of military escalation. In response to Beijings
intransigence, prominent U.S. policymakers, think tanks, and scholars
advocate policies that impose higher costs on Chinese actions. This singular
focus on cost imposition is dangerous because it ignores the benefit aspect
of coercive strategies and places China in a corner. Cost imposition has utility,
but it should not be the only leg for U.S. policy to stand on. Coercive
strategies work by manipulating a target states cost/benefit calculation to
prevent it from taking certain actions (deterrence) or force it to take certain
actions (compellence) to the benefit of the coercing state. Advocates of
greater cost imposition in the SCS want to deter aggressive Chinese actions
by making the costs of such actions greater than the benefit that would
accrue to Beijing. However, the high value that China places on the SCS
implies a very high level of cost necessary for deterrence to be successful.
Complicating the task of deterrence further is the fact that China has shown a
willingness to escalate its military presence and bellicose rhetoric when
confronted. This suggests that any increase in costs inflicted by the United
States will be replied to in kind by China. Such a dynamic is ripe for
dangerous escalation, which undermines a stated U.S. goal of peace and
stability in East Asia.

Relations UQ yes SCS war

US/China military relations sinkingmultiple warrants
-

spy plane collision incident and following diplomatic row

US naval and air maneuvers in SCS
presidential campaign politics
Pentagons dismissal of Chinese claims
Pentagon announcement of sending naval and air forces wherever it
pleases
support of Philippines and japan
military ties with India and Vietnam

Gurtov 6/16 (Mel, Professor of Polisci at Oregon Univ and Editor-in-chief of

Asian Perspective, Doctorate on Chinese relations, human security, and US
policy, US-China Maritime Disputes: Too Close for Comfort, Foreign Policy in
Focus, 6/16/2016, http://fpif.org/us-china-maritime-disputes-close-comfort/)
KC
Two recent close encounters between US spy planes and Chinese jets spell
trouble for relations between Washington and Beijing . The first, between a US
EP-3 spy plane and two Chinese jets over the South China Sea (SCS) near Chinas Hainan
Island, was strikingly similar to the 2001 incident in the same area in which a
Chinese jet and an EP-3 collided, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot, the forced
landing and detention of the US crew, and a tense diplomatic row . The second involved a US RC135 plane that was closely tracked by a Chinese jet over the East China Sea (ECS). Such incidents,
which also bring US and Chinese ships in close proximity, are happening with greater
frequency these days. There are two reasons for this. China is backing its claims of indisputable
sovereignty over the islandsthe Spratlys (Nansha) and Paracels (Xisha) in the SCS, Diaoyudao (Senkaku)

US naval and air maneuvers are

deliberately challenging Chinese activity. Leaders of both countries are now
issuing thinly veiled warnings, demanding acceptance of their respective positions,
and disputing details of the encounters. scs The dispute cannot be separated from other
developments, domestic and international, involving the US and China. In the American
case, those developments include presidential campaign politics, in which tough
posturing on China is expected of the candidates; the Pentagons dismissal of
Chinese claims by announcing it will send naval and air forces anywhere it
chooses; and alliance politics, particularly in support of the Philippines and Japan
(which has its own close encounters with Chinese vessels in the ECS) but also in strengthening
military ties with Vietnam and India. The Chinese position is influenced by rising nationalism;
in the ECSwith military construction and personnel. And

Taiwans election of a new leader from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, leading to pressure by
Beijing to insure against a declaration of independence; pro-democracy activism in Hong Kong, most
recently fueled by Chinas illegal seizure of five journal editors; and the Beijing leaderships assault on civil
society, which has created a backlash against President Xi that surely troubles his inner circle. These are
all sources of actual or potential pressure on political leaders not to stray from their tough stances on
international issues. Containment of China? Like the Philippines, Vietnam is a big fan of a larger US military
presence in Southeast Asia. How ironic that the one-time US base at Cam Ranh Bay may soon be regularly
visited again by the US Navy for resupply, while US multinational corporations eagerly pursue investment
opportunitiesdespite Vietnams serious human rights problems and growing rich-poor divide. In return for
US access, Obama announced an end to the US embargo on arms sales to Vietnam at the time of his visit
to Vietnam in late May. Though he explicitly stated that the decision was part of the normalization of

relations with Vietnam and unrelated to China, of course it had everything to do with reining in China
(while, unfortunately, setting aside US human-rights concerns). The official Chinese response to the USVietnam agreement was subdued. A foreign ministry spokeswoman said China welcomes normal relations
between Vietnam and the United States. Likewise, the China Daily found nothing amiss in Obamas

the three-day
visit has been described by some as a pivotal move in the US strategic
rebalancing to curb the rise of China. The US, they say, is using Vietnam as
an offset to Chinas growing strength in the region , especially after tensions increased in
the South China Sea because of regional countries competing sovereignty claims. This, if true,
bodes ill for regional peace and stability, as it would further complicate the situation in the
South China Sea, and risk turning the region into a tinderbox of conflicts . India is a
agreement but only so long as Chinas interests are not harmed: It is worrying to note

newcomer to US maritime strategy, though the Pentagon doesnt officially classify India as a partner in
containing China. But how else to interpret Indias signing of a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific
and Indian Ocean region with the United States, a Special Strategic and Global Partnership with Japan and
a Framework for Security Cooperation with Australia, frequent visits to India since 2008 by US defense
secretaries, a pending logistics support agreement that would enable repair and resupply of US air and
naval forces on Indian territory, and official Indian statements with the US and Southeast Asian countries
about the destabilizing effects of (read Chinas role in) the South China Sea dispute? As US relations with
Pakistan deterioratethe drone strike that killed the Taliban leader on May 21 was conducted without
Pakistans approvalties with India become more crucial to Washington. Though no one is talking about a
formal alliance, cooperative ties with India, highlighted by Prime Minister Nahendra Modis visit to
Washington in June, stretches US military arrangements around Chinas rim, notably with a longtime
adversary of Chinas. During his visit, Modi was quite effusive about mutual security concerns, among
them freedom of navigation on seas.

Vietnam increases military tensions between US and

China
Peniston 5/23 (Bradley, deputy editor of Defense One, launched
Military.com, editor of Armed Forced Journal, national-security journalist,
Carter: Wider US-Vietnam Military Relations not directed at China, Defense
One, 5/23/2016, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2016/05/carter-expectmil-mil-cooperation-between-us-vietnam/128515/) KC
ABOARD A U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT Lifting the U.S. arms embargo for Vietnam will lead to warmer ties
between the two countries militaries, including maritime cooperation in the contested South China Sea ,

U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter said Monday. But Carter and President Barack Obama, who is
visiting Vietnam, insisted the move was not directed at China, which is locked in a dispute with Hanoi and
other neighbors over ownership of islands throughout the sea. The decision to lift the ban was not based
on China or any other considerations, Obama said at a press conference in Hanoi on Monday. It was
based on our desire to complete what has been a lengthy process of moving towards normalization with

Carter echoed Obama, saying the move to sell arms to Vietnam was
not aimed at Beijing, he said theres no question that Chinas actions there,
particularly those over the past year, have heightened concern in the region,
and thats another factor that causes everyone to want to work with us. In
Vietnam. While

terms of its wider regional meaning, what it is is a reflection of the fact that more and more countries in
the region are coming to the United States to do more and more with us because of their general concern
with the security environment, Carter told reporters en route to New Haven, Conn., where he will watch
the commissioning of Yales first graduating ROTC class since the 1970s. Deepening U.S.-Vietnamese
military cooperation is part of a larger trend under Obama of improving bilateral relations with Pacific Rim

Washington has increasingly been leaning on Hanoi to

counter Beijings military buildup.Earlier this morning, Obama announced that the U.S. will end
countries, Carter said.

a decades-long embargo on the sales of lethal arms to Vietnam. Were going to continue to engage in the
case-by-case evaluations of these sales, Obama said. But what we do not have is a ban thats based on
an ideological division between our two countries, because we think, at this stage, both sides have
established a level of trust and cooperation, including between our militaries, that is reflective of common
interests and mutual respect.

US/China relations low now over territorial dispute,

despite Paris deal
Wharton Business 6/9 (Wharton School of Business at U Penn, info
collab by NYU and Wharton, US China Dialogue: Can the Two Countries Find
Common Ground?, Knowledge at Wharton, 6/9/2016,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/u-s-china-dialogue-can-twocountries-find-common-ground/) KC
The recent U.S. calls for China to stop flooding the global markets with excess
steel and tensions over the South China Sea have strained relations between
the two countries. Excess capacity has a distorting and damaging effect on global markets, U.S.
treasury secretary Jack Lew said on June 6 in Beijing, as part of a delegation that secretary of state John

A common ground seemed immediately out of reach for the two

countries, as they engaged in the eighth round of the U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue. That position is distinctly different from the
cooperative spirit they demonstrated with their joint agreement on combating
climate change in November 2014. No respite is immediately visible in terms of
Kerry led to China.

resolving the disputes on how China tackles its overcapacity or over the South China Sea, according to
experts at Wharton and New York University. The disputes actually seem to make sense for select interest
groups in both countries, the experts said.

In the U.S., China is a useful scapegoat in the

presidential election seasons rhetoric. Similarly, for China, increased military
spending to boost its presence in the South China Sea is a useful diversion
from its economic downturn, overcapacity and unemployment . According to
Wharton management professor Minyuan Zhao, the U.S.-China agreement on combating
climate change could have created a new phase in the relationship between the
two countries. However, soon after that agreement, Chinas economy began to go
downhill, and it had lot of burning concerns that needed to be urgently
addressed, she said. [That called for] fire-fighting first and economy-building later. At the same time,
both the U.S. and China have accused each other of maintaining a
provocative military presence in the South China Sea, said Ann Lee, adjunct professor of
economics and finance at New York University. The ostensible reason is to guard economic interests in the
area, in addition to an assertion of territorial rights. About $5 trillion worth of trade passes through that
maritime route annually, as a recent Knowledge@Wharton article noted. Trade relations between China
and other regions in the country have also been thriving.

Perceived US hypocrisy on scs stance tanks US/China

relations
Washington Post 6/19 (Simon, US hypocrisy and Chinese cash
strengthen Beijings hand in South China Sea, The Washington Post,
6/19/2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-hypocrisyand-chinese-cash-strengthen-beijings-hand-in-south-chinasea/2016/06/18/6907943a-330a-11e6-ab9d-1da2b0f24f93_story.html) KC
BEIJING The latest was Kenya. Before that: Lesotho, Vanuatu and Afghanistan. The list of countries
backing Beijings stance in the South China Sea just keeps growing Chinas Foreign Ministry boasted last
week that nearly 60 had swung behind the countrys rejection of international arbitration in a case brought
by the Philippines. The numbers are questionable, and the idea of gaining the support of distant,
landlocked Niger in a dispute about the South China Sea could seem faintly ludicrous. Yet Chinas frantic
efforts to rally support ahead of a ruling from an international tribunal in The Hague may not be as
meaningless as they might seem. Cold, hard Chinese cash and what many see as American double
standards are undermining efforts to build a unified global response to Beijings land reclamation activities

in the disputed waters and employ international law to help resolve the issue. The lure of Chinese money is
having an impact in the Philippines, where President-elect Rodrigo Duterte has made wildly contradictory
comments on the issue but has suggested some openness to bilateral negotiations if China builds
railways there. Carter: China risks erecting 'Great Wall of self-isolation' Play Video1:36 U.S. Defence
Secretary Ash Carter urges China to join a "principled security network" for Asia during a regional security
summit. (Reuters) A farcical display of disunity from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was
another case in point. On Tuesday, China sensed a mild rebuke when ASEAN appeared to issue a statement
expressing serious concerns over rising tensions in the South China Sea, urging restraint in land
reclamation and full respect for international law. Within hours, the statement had been retracted for
urgent amendments. No revised statement ever emerged. Beijing, experts said, was riled because the
statement was issued at a meeting held in China and at a sensitive time in the run-up to the arbitration
ruling, expected anytime in the next three months. It was withdrawn after China lobbied close ally Laos, an
official at the talks told Bloomberg News. Ian Storey, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in
Singapore, called it another embarrassing episode of ASEAN disunity. China didnt create the disunity in
ASEAN, but it does exploit the divisions and uses its economic clout to try to get its way, Storey said.

The Philippines took

China to court in 2013 after the Chinese navy seized control of Scarborough Shoal, set amid rich
fishing grounds off the main Philippine island of Luzon. Among other things, it wants the court to
rule on whether Chinas nine-dash line under which it claims most of the South China Sea
is consistent with international law. China vehemently rejects arbitration and says it
will ignore the courts rulings. It argues that the Philippines had previously agreed to settle the
dispute bilaterally and that the court has no jurisdiction over issues of territorial
sovereignty. Julian Ku, a professor of constitutional law at Hofstra University, says Beijing has a
very weak case. The court, he points out, has already spent a year considering the question of
China didnt want ASEAN to in any way support the arbitration process.

jurisdiction and ruled that it does have the authority to consider many of the issues raised by the
Philippines. While I have expressed strong criticism of

the Philippines use of arbitration (and

the U.S. role in supporting it) from a strategic perspective, I dont have any such criticism of
their legal arguments, Ku wrote in a blog post. Chinas claim that it can legally ignore the pending
arbitral award is not only wrong, it is legally insupportable. The weakness of Chinas legal case may

China as the victim of a vicious

and deceptive legal case. They accuse the United States of militarizing the region
through President Obamas strategic rebalance to Asia and encouraging Asian
nations to seek confrontation with China. The U.S. cannot tolerate others
challenging its global hegemony, Chinas ambassador to ASEAN, Xu Bu,
wrote in the Straits Times, calling Washington dictatorial and overbearing .
explain the vehemence of some of its propaganda. Officials portray

But legality is only part of the argument, since the court is not in a position to enforce any rulings. In the
end, the matter will be settled militarily, in the chess game of global power relations or in some notional

And this is where American double standards come in.

the Senate has never ratified the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). So when the United States, the
European Union and Japan urge China to respect a rules-based international
system, the admonishments often come across here as insincere. Japan, experts
court of global public opinion.

Despite efforts by the Bush and Obama administrations,

point out, has ignored a 2014 ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against its whaling

the United States ignored a 1986 ICJ ruling against the Reagan administrations
the United States has never
ratified UNCLOS, countries that have maritime disputes with it are unable to
take it to legal arbitration, said Storey, arguing that the issue has become even more glaringly
operations, and

support for contra rebels in Nicaragua. More importantly, because

apparent in the run-up to the ruling. Although the U.S. government says it follows UNCLOS as customary
international law, its failure to submit itself formally to its provisions rankles many nations especially
China. China

is trying to emulate components of American exceptionalism that

place the U.S. above other nations and international law , said Yanmei Xie, a
senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. The U.S. not ratifying
UNCLOS just proves Chinas point. Wang Dong, an associate professor in the School of

International Studies at Peking University,

underlined Chinas frustration with American

hypocrisy. Big powers rarely subject themselves to international law, he said. Thats the reality we
have to face. Aside from Russia, experts note that none of Chinas supporters are major maritime powers,
and some question Beijings tally. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says that only
eight countries have explicitly supported Chinas position, while Cambodia, Slovenia and Fiji have
disavowed Chinas description of their views. The 60-country claim is complete nonsense, said Gregory
Poling, head of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. The vast majority have made very vague
comments in support of peaceful resolution or that negotiations are the best way to deal with conflict
and China takes that and says, See, they side with us in the arbitration. WorldViews newsletter
Important stories from around the world. Sign up Nevertheless, Chinas ability to get poorer countries on
its side could be important if the issue ever comes up at the United Nations. China can also portray this as
the West against the Third World, of the developed world bullying the developing world, Xie said. The
narrative matters. But however the arbitration panel rules and however Manila reacts China wont be
giving an inch on its territorial claims in the South China Sea. A move to declare an Air Defense
Identification Zone under which foreign planes would be asked to inform Chinese authorities before
entering airspace above the South China Sea would be seen as provocative and seems unlikely for now,

Beijing wont be letting up in its drive to expand its military presence in the South China
Sea, experts say. That spells more tension with the United States. Emily Rauhala and Xu
but

Jing contributed to this report. Read more: Storm clouds gather over South China Sea ahead of key U.N.
ruling U.S. ramps up military presence in Philippines, starts joint patrols in South China Sea China
scrambles fighter jets as U.S. destroyer steams past disputed island Todays coverage from Post
correspondents around the world.

infrastructure construction in the South China Sea causes

threat perception US withdrawal proves
Hart 15 [Melanie, Director of China Policy @ The Center for American
Progress, 11-29-2015, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and
Counterterrorism: Hearing on the Changing Landscape of U.S.-China
Relations, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf]-DD
China is building new outposts on
disputed reefs and rocks in the South China Sea to strengthen its
hand in ongoing maritime territorial disputes.14 This activity raises
new questions about Chinas intentions toward its neighbors and
willingness to abide by both the letter and spirit of international law. Of particular
concern for the United States, the Chinese military has ordered U.S. and Philippine
aircraft to stay away from some of these new outposts. Those actions indicate
that China may be aiming to block foreign military navigation in the seas
surrounding these new infrastructure projects, a move that would violate the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Infrastructure construction in the South China Sea:

A2 Nuclear cooperation solves SCS tensions

US/China relations on brink of collapse, Philippine court

challenge and recent US developments uniquely redefines
scs conflict and rolls back nuclear progress
Broder 6/22 (Jonathan, award winning foreign correspondent in the Middle
East, South Asia, China, and East Asia for the Chicago Tribune and the
Associated Press, The Inevitable War between the US and China,
Newsweek, 6/22/2016, http://www.newsweek.com/south-china-sea-warnuclear-submarines-china-united-states-barack-obama-xi-473428) KC
Roughly 15 years ago, a Chinese fighter jet pilot was killed when he collided with an American spy plane
over the South China Sea. The episode marked the start of tensions between Beijing and Washington over

in May, when two Chinese warplanes nearly

crashed into an American spy plane over the same area, many in China felt a
familiar sense of nationalist outrage. Most Chinese people hope Chinas fighter jets will
Chinas claim to the strategic waterway. So

shoot down the next spy plane, wrote the Global Times, Chinas official nationalist mouthpiece. Though
little talked about in the West,

many Chinese officials have long felt that war between

Washington and Beijing is inevitable. A rising power, the thinking goes, will
always challenge a dominant one. Of course, some analysts dismiss this idea; the costs of
such a conflict would be too high, and the U.S., which is far stronger militarily, would almost certainly win.

maritime dispute
between the U.S. and China has become the most contentious issue in their
complex relationship, and conditions seem ripe for a military clash between
the two countries: This summer, an international court will rule on a Philippine challenge to China's
claim to the disputed waterway, and for the first time, Beijing appears poised to send
nuclear-armed submarines into the South China Sea . Try Newsweek for only $1.25 per
Yet history is riddled with wars that appeared to make no sense. Today, the

week Philippines says China blocking access South China Sea atoll. Chinese soldiers of the People's
Liberation Army Navy stand guard in the Spratly Islands, known in China as the Nansha Islands, on
February 10. The Spratlys are the most contested archipelago in the South China Sea. Stringer/Reuters On
one level, the dispute is about territory. Beijing insists that nearly the entire seafrom its islands, reefs and
submerged rocks to its fish and underwater energy reserveshistorically belongs to China. The U.S.,
however, regards the South China Sea as international watersat least until rival claims by several
neighboring countries can be resolved. Until then, Washington contends, only the U.S Navy can be trusted
to ensure freedom of navigation in those waters, which include some of the worlds most important

The larger conflict, however, revolves around Chinas emergence as

a major regional power and Americas insistence on policing the Pacific. It also
involves the system of international rules and institutions that Washington
and its allies crafted after World War II. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly
complained this system favors America and prevents Beijing from taking its
rightful place as the dominant power in Asia. And at a time when Chinas economy is
slowing, Xi is under increased pressure at home to find other ways to
demonstrate Chinas advances under his leadership. A clear reassertion of Beijings
shipping lanes.

control over the South China Sea after more than a century of foreign domination would do just that.
Failure to do so, however, analysts say, could threaten Xis grip on power. China says its claim to the South
China Sea dates back thousands of years. But historians date the modern dispute back to about 130 years
ago, when various European countries took over the waterway. Over the next century, the sea formed part
of French Indochina, then Japans Pacific empire, and after World War II, the U.S. Navy acted as its

caretaker. But in the 1970s, oil and gas deposits were discovered under the sea bed, prompting the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan to stake their own claims to the region. Those countries
have since seized 45 islands. Since 2012, China has occupied seven shoals and, through land reclamation
operations, turned them into man-made islands with landing strips and missile defenses. History
matters, says Fu Ying, a former ambassador to Britain and now spokeswoman for the National Peoples
Congress, Chinas parliament. In recounting Chinas litany of foreign invasions, beginning in the 1840s with
Britains seizure of Hong Kong and ending with Japans brutal occupation of China before and during World

the Chinese remain acutely aware of the countrys past

humiliation. The people wont tolerate it if we lose territory yet again , says Fu.
War II, she notes that

Weve lost enough. Wary of an armed conflict, U.S. President Barack Obama has responded by quietly
permitting Beijing to operate in the South China Sea while building up military and economic relations with
Chinas neighbors in hopes of weakening its influence. And despite the administrations repeated vows to
sail continuously through the disputed waters, it has mostly avoided them. Weve done a lot sailing in the
South China Sea but in areas that arent claimed by anybody, says Bryan Clark, a retired Navy veteran
who last served as a special assistant to the chief of naval operations. Critics of Obama, including
Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, say such nonintrusive voyages easily could be construed as
acknowledgement that China has a valid claim. McCain and others have called on Obama to get tougher
with Beijing and conduct more aggressive operations in the disputed waters. Chinas neighbors, such as
Vietnam and the Philippines, have also urged Obama to be more aggressive, and theyve offered U.S.
forces the use of their bases. But theres a limit to how far they want Washington to go. While they may
resent Beijings bullying, China is their largest trading partner and a major source of funding for
infrastructure projects such as roads, railways and ports. Bilahari Kausikan, a senior Singaporean diplomat,
notes that small Southeast Asian countries must navigate a path between China and the United States by
constantly playing one against the other, hedging their bets and sometimes deferring to Washington or
Beijing. We see nothing contradictory in pursuing all...[of these] courses of action simultaneously, he

The Obama administration is bracing for trouble this summer when an

international court in the Hague rules on the Philippine challenge to Chinas claim
says.

to the South China Sea. The ruling is expected to go against Beijing, which has declared it wont accept
any decision from the court. China says its willing to talk one-on-one with the Philippines, as well as with
the other countries with rival claimsa position that would give Beijing a clear advantage over its smaller
neighbors. The U.S. wants China to negotiate with these claimants collectively, and Beijing has told
Washington to butt out. Our

view is the U.S. is stoking the dispute and using it to

bring its forces back the Pacific, said Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu
Zhenmin during a meeting with a small group of visiting American and British reporters in May. For U.S.
officials, the big question is how China will react to an unfavorable ruling. Some
fear Beijing will step up its land reclamation operations. Others worry it will
restrict the air space over the South China Sea and begin intercepting
unidentified aircrafta policy that would force it to confront the U.S.s spy flights. Or they could do
something even more provocative. The [Chinese] military is urging the leadership to
put it in fifth gear, step on the gas and give the finger to the world, says a U.S.
official, asking for anonymity under diplomatic protocol. Obama has warned Xi that such measures would
prompt a substantial American response, including military action. Some regional experts say Beijing may
counter an unfavorable ruling with tough rhetoric to mollify people at home, but take no actions before
September, when China hosts the G-20 summit. But once that gathering is over, the dispute could become

U.S. officials are particularly worried about a Chinese plan to

send submarines armed with nuclear missiles into the South China
Sea for the first time. Chinese military officials argue the submarine patrols are
needed to respond to two major U.S. military moves: plans to station a
defense system in South Korea that can intercept missiles fired from both North Korea and
China, and the Pentagons development of ballistic missiles with new hypersonic
warheads that can strike targets anywhere in the world in less than an hour. Taken together, Chinese
much more volatile.

military officials say, these American weapons threaten to neutralize Chinas land-based nuclear arsenal,

leaving Beijing no choice but to turn to its submarines to retaliate for

any nuclear attack. The implications would be enormous. Until now, Chinas nuclear
deterrent has centered on its land-based missile s, which are kept without fuel and

That means the countrys political

leadership must give several orders before the missiles are fueled, armed and ready
to launch, giving everyone time to reconsider. Nuclear missiles on a submarine are
always armed and ready. U.S. and Chinese warships operate in uncomfortably close proximity in
remain separate from their nuclear warheads.

the South China Sea. Add submarine operations to the mix, and the chances of an accident multiply

Submarines are stealthy vessels,

and China is unlikely to provide their locations to the Americans. That means
the U.S. Navy will send more spy ships into the South China Sea in an effort to track the
subs. With the U.S. Navy sailing more and more in the area, theres a high
possibility there will be an accident, says a high-ranking Chinese officer, who spoke
anonymously to address sensitive security issues. War between a rising China and a ruling
U.S. isnt inevitableprovided each side is prepared to make painful
adjustments. Xi said as much during his visit to the United States last fall. But in a warning to
despite protocols meant to minimize the risk of collisions.

Americans (which could apply to Chinas fighter pilots as well), he added: Should major countries time
and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they could create such traps for themselves."

A2 Economy maintains relations

US/China relations low and current economic policy paves
way for continued downward spiral
Xie 6/24 (Andy, an independent economist based in Shanghai, and the
former Morgan Stanley star chief Asia-Pacific economist, with sino-US
relations fraying, the world is losing its anchor for stability, South China
Morning Post, 6/24/2016, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/1980592/sino-us-relations-fraying-world-losing-its-anchorstability) KC
China and the United States were never really pals. The relationship started as both needed each other to counterbalance

economic complementarity that is,

profits for American corporations, cheap goods for American consumers, and
jobs for Chinese labour became the foundation for the relationship. It
worked well for nearly two decades, but has become frail in recent years. The 2008 financial crisis
the Soviet Union four decades ago. After the USSR collapsed in 1991,

was a turning point. It blew up the fiction that globalisation was good for everyone. American workers defended their
living standards with debt, partly backed by inflated property values, as their income came under pressure from global
competition. The crisis blew that away. Living standards fell amid declining wages. Globalisation has since become a dirty
word in American politics. Decades after the US embraced free trade, its clear who the losers are( Corporate America had
a great ride in China. The big consumer companies saw their sales rivalling those at home and achieving bigger profit
margins. American companies came to dominate the markets for fast food, personal hygiene, soft drinks, smartphones

Lately, Chinas economic slowdown

and overcapacity are making the market less and less profitable . Chinese copycats
and the like. China became a magic word in the US stock market.

are having an impact on profitability in the market and could make it completely unprofitable in a few years. The long-

demands by corporate America for accessing Chinas media and

financial markets are falling on unsympathetic ears . In the past, corporate
America stepped up to stabilise the relationship whenever a crisis happened.
It is less and less inclined to do so. Is China defending its interests in the South China Sea or its
standing

pride?( On top of a weakening economic foundation comes the new element of strategic rivalry. China has been taking
steps to flesh out its claims in the South China Sea. Despite its broad claims, the competing claimants have been
extracting up to half a million barrels of oil in the contested waters with nothing for China. China feels aggrieved. SSIf the
Sino-US relationship breaks down, global chaos becomes inevitable China and the US have fundamentally different views
of the South China Sea dispute. China sees it as a regional issue. China is by far the
biggest country in the region and should have a big voice there. The US could still be the sole global superpower, but
China should have a bigger voice in East Asia.

The US sees itself as an anchor because of its

global domination. East Asia accounts for one-third of the worlds population and gross domestic product. And
most of the worlds savings and manufacturing are located there. If the US is not the dominant force
in East Asia, its superpower status is untenable . Hence, the US will commit more
and more resources to limit Chinas ambitions in the region. The downward
spiral in the bilateral relationship could get much worse in the coming years .
The next US president will be protectionist in trade. Increasing anti-dumping measures and
possible penalties for outsourcing will further slow or even decrease bilateral
trade. That would decrease Chinas incentives to open its domestic market further to
corporate America, which in turn weakens the domestic voice for taming the
strategic rivalry with China. What really happens when Chinese investment goes bad, and is there any
way out of the hole?( The only way out is for China to reform its economy and become an engine for regional and global
growth. Its economy is stuck with overcapacity and excessive leverage. Other countries increasingly view China as a
negative force, destroying capital value and suppressing labour wages.

The current path is simply not

sustainable from any perspective. China must shrink the state sector and empower the household sector to break
away from the vicious spiral of capital destruction and stagnation. It will earn the trust of the international community by

demonstrating that economic development is for enriching the people, not merely empowering the government and
affiliated elite. SSChina will earn the trust of the international community by demonstrating that economic development is
for enriching the people China has been driving global trade through rearranging the global supply chain rather than being
the final source of demand. When it becomes a balanced economy by increasing the workforces disposable income to 60
per cent of GDP from 40 per cent, China will be a real driver for global trade and economic growth. Countries from far and
near will sing its praises. China will eventually be, and should become, the dominant voice in East Asia. That position can
only be achieved by becoming a place that people look up to and try to join if possible. Pax Sinica during the Tang dynasty
was achieved through a superior way of life that others, like Japan, earnestly emulated. Projection of force may be
necessary and effective at some point in time. But, without a superior system at home, its impact would be fleeting.
Global stability depends on a solid relationship between the US and China. The European Union is failing. The fact that so
many in the core of the system want out means that its influence in the world will continue to decline. Russia, on the other
side, is severely weakened by low oil prices and has had to pull back strategically and focus on economic development. If
the Sino-US relationship breaks down, global chaos becomes inevitable. Is a new cold war brewing over the South China

The US has never developed a long-term view towards China. It has

anchored the relationship on temporary strategic gains or money for
influential companies or even individuals. This is the fundamental reason for the constant flareSea?(

ups in bilateral relations. Now, with the US having second thoughts about China, the relationship is increasingly anchored

Without a positive force as a solid anchor, any

accident, like a flare-up in the South China Sea, could send the relationship into a
downward spiral and fast. Unfortunately, the US is bogged down in domestic
conflict. Its presidential politics has exposed the frictions from globalisation. Regardless of who becomes the next
president, the disaffected working class will continue to rebel against the ruling
elite that have reaped all the upside from globalisation. The US will become less and less able to develop a coherent
global strategy. As domestic issues bog down both China and the US, their foreign
involvement will be increasingly left to fear and knee-jerk responses to
accidents. The unpalatable truth is that the world is losing its anchor for stability and
could be sleepwalking into another era of conflict.
by the consequences of a break-up.

***Links***

Harms Relations

Harms relations Rebalancing

US rebalancing in Asia hurts relations
Mingjiang and Kemburi 15 (Li, Associate Prof at S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Kalyan, Associate Research Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School
of International Studies, 2015, New Dynamics in US-China Relations: Contending for
the Asia Pacific, Routledge, New York, NY, p. 2-3) NV

Tensions between the US and China in the region have been on the rise
essentially because of the increasing friction between the US strategic
rebalance to Asia and Chinas pursuit of new strategic and security interests
in the region. Washington's new regional strategy has multidimensional
characteristics involving economic, diplomatic and military components.
Economically, recognizing Asia as a new source of demand and investments
for global economic growth, Washington is keen to push for the conclusion of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative. Diplomatically, the US has
emphasized multilateral engagements with institutions led by ASEAN (the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and increased high-level visits to
many regional states by senior American leaders. Militarily, the US has
undergone a qualitative and quantitative upgrading of force capabilities and a
rebalancing of key military assets to the Asia-Pacific including expansion of its
military exercises in the region. US leaders have repeatedly explained that
their strategic rebalance to Asia is aimed at benefiting from the thriving
regional economies and that it emanates from a desire to play the leading
role in maintaining peace and stability in the region, but China seems to be
not entirely convinced. The majority of the Chinese elite believe that
Washington is intent on containing China or at least undermining China's
growing regional influence. Even the small group of Chinese officials and
analysts who do not believe in any 'US conspiracy' theory conclude that the
American strategic rebalance will inevitably lead to the weakening of China's
strategic position and influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Various statements
emanating from China indicate that Beijing is particularly concerned about US
efforts in further consolidating its alliances and in deepening security
partnerships with a number of regional states. Beijing is extremely critical of
US intervention in the territorial and maritime disputes involving China and
some regional states in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In fact, it is
widely believed in China that Washington has tacitly encouraged or
emboldened regional states to challenge and provoke China on those
disputes in the past few years purely for the purpose of retaining
Washingtons preponderant strategic position and the pursuit of US security
interests. The United States, however, argues from an altruistic stance that
all the initiatives related to the rebalancing are undertaken to maintain peace
and stability in Asia, while simultaneously benefiting from the expanding
economic opportunities offered by the regional economies.

Harms relations SCS

Making South China Sea a central issue in US-China
relations fosters conflict
Fravel 14 (M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Prof of Political Science at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 2014, Policy Report: U.S. Policy
Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995, S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Pg. 9,
http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2014.RSIS.us.policy.scs.pdf
) NV
Over the past four years, U.S. policy towards the South China Sea has
evolved in response to the increase of tensions in these disputes and in
particular to Chinas actions. Although the U.S. does not take a position on
the underlying claims to sovereignty, it has increased its involvement in the
dispute with an emphasis on the peaceful management of claims and
ultimately the peaceful resolution of disputes. Because China has the
greatest maritime capabilities of all the claimants, claims all of the land
features in the South China Sea (along with Vietnam and Taiwan), and
maintains ambiguity regarding the meaning and legal status of the of the
nine-dashed line, U.S. policy has responded to Chinese actions more than
those of any other claimant. As a result, maritime security in the South China
Sea has become an issue in U.S.-China relations. By balancing greater
attention to dispute management with neutrality over sovereignty, the U.S.
has sought to prevent the South China Sea from becoming a dominant or
central element of U.S.-China relations. So far, U.S. policy has succeeded.
Maritime security and the South China Sea have been discussed frequently at
annual meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asian
Summit while China and ASEAN have begun to take steps towards reaching a
binding code of conduct. However, if the South China Sea were to
become a more central issue in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship,
it would most likely signal greater competition between the two
states in regional security.

US action in the South China Sea hurts relations- distrust

spills over
Mingjiang and Kemburi 15 (Li, Associate Prof at S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Kalyan, Associate Research Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School
of International Studies, 2015, New Dynamics in US-China Relations: Contending for
the Asia Pacific, Routledge, New York, NY, p. 4) NV

Second, sources of instability and conflict in US-China relations are many and
profound. The most dangerous source of conflict in their bilateral relations
has been identified as maritime security in East Asia. Territorial disputes over
various islands and other land features in the East and South China Seas,
maritime zone demarcations and maritime resources could easily sour US-

China relations and could even lead to open conflicts between the two
countries. It is also pointed out in this volume that the deterioration of
strategic trust between Washington and Beijing has generated significant
negative impact on bilateral relations in some of the less sensitive areas,
such as regional economic integration, energy, and various non-traditional
security issues. Contending for influence and the shaping of the regional
strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific is likely to continue to be a major
element in US-China relations.

Empirics proveUS policy clarification in the SCS leads to

increased tensions
Fravel 14 (M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Prof of Political Science at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 2014, Policy Report: U.S. Policy
Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995, S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Pg. 4,
http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2014.RSIS.us.policy.scs.pdf
) NV
In 2010, the United States decided to expand and clarify its policy
towards the South China Sea in response to the escalation of tensions
among the claimants after 2007. During this period from 2007 to mid-2010,
all claimants, especially China, more actively asserted their claims and,
at times, took actions to uphold or defend those claims that only further
increased tensions. Such actions included Chinas threats to foreign oil
companies investing in Vietnamese offshore exploration blocks (including
several American companies) between 2006 and 2008, the 2009 submission
of claims and counter-claims for extended continental shelf rights to a UN
body, Chinas detention of hundreds of Vietnamese fishermen operating in
the waters near the Paracel Islands in 2008 and 2009, Chinas efforts to
obstruct the operations of the USNS Impeccable roughly 75 nautical miles
from Hainan Island in March 2009, Chinas inclusion of a map with the ninedashed line in a note verbale to the UN in May 2009, Chinas imposition of
seasonal fishing bans in the northern portion of the South China Sea, an
increase in the number of patrols by Chinese maritime law enforcement
agencies in contested waters, an increase in the frequency and scope
Chinese naval exercises in the South China Sea, symbolic visits by Malaysian
and Vietnamese leaders to the Spratly Islands in 2009 and 2010, the passage
in the Philippines of an archipelagic baseline law with claims to many of the
Spratlys in February 2009, and a stand-off between Vietnamese and Chinese
law enforcement vessels in April 2010.8

US involvement in the region seen as containmenthurts

relations
Johnson 15 (William Johnson, consultant for the Naval Post-graduate
School on China policy issues. 6-23-2015, "The five most important issues in
U.S.-China relations," Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2015/06/23/the-five-most-important-issues-in-u-s-china-relations/) NV

the United States will host the seventh annual U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the capstone piece of more than 90 high-level meetings
This week,

between American and Chinese officials. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and his Chinese counterpart will lead
the economic track, while Secretary of State John Kerry and his counterpart will co-chair the strategic

This years
dialogue has special significance because it will set the stage for President Xis state
visit in September. U.S.-China relations have been rocky recently, owing
primarily to tensions in the South China Sea, Chinas new law governing foreign nontrack. All four will be acting as the direct representatives of their respective presidents.

governmental organizations, and friction over membership in Chinas Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
and the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In addition to these issues, Chinese and American leaders
will devote substantial attention to cybersecurity and the recently disclosed hack of the Office of Personnel
Managements database, as well as the ongoing negotiations toward a U.S.-China Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT). The diplomatic community has expected previous dialogues to produce substantial
agreements, but they have lower expectations for this round due partly to recent difficulties in the
relationship, as well as an inclination on both sides to save major announcements until President Xis state

The South
China Sea issue has been front and center for the last 18 months, as China
carried out major land reclamation efforts. While the issue stems from territorial disputes
visit. Ill briefly explain the significance of these five major issues. 1. The South China Sea

between China and various Southeast Asian nations, which dont intrinsically involve the United States,

the United States sees Chinas island building activities as a

potential threat to freedom of navigation along a critical trade route.
China, on the other hand, sees U.S. involvement in the region as
meddling in bilateral disputes with Chinas neighbors. It sees
enhanced U.S. military cooperation with Vietnam and the
Philippines, and increased Japanese military activity in the region, as
part of a U.S. strategy to contain China. The 2015 dialogue provides an opportunity
to ratchet down the recent level of confrontation in order to smooth the way to a successful state visit by
President Xi.

A2 Cooperation helps relations

Limited cooperation on climate change, terrorism, and
non-prolif does not solve disputes or indicate good
relations
Hao 15 (Qi, an assistant research fellow at the Institute of American
Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He also served as deputy
director of Asia-Pacific security center at the Institute of Modern International
Relations, Tsinghua University. The significance of Xi Jipings US visit, The
Diplomat, 9/24/2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-significance-of-xijinpings-u-s-visit/) KC
Nevertheless, it is not important that the U.S. accept this new concept; what really matters is that both

It is true that the two powers have

many interests in common, especially in areas of global governance, such as
climate change, terrorism and non-proliferation. This is taken by more optimistic
observers as strong justification for U.S.-China cooperation. However, close cooperation on
these issues will not guarantee the peaceful resolution of the
disputes between them, such as the wrestling over maritime and cyber
issues and the inevitable scramble for financial and economic influence, all of
which can be reduced to the redistribution of power and reset of international
orders or norms. In considering all these fundamental changes to the bilateral relationship, some
strategists in China argue that U.S.-China relations should focus more on the
pluses than on the minuses, which sounds convincing but underestimates
the potential risk of setting aside the disputes, especially during a period of
power redistribution or power transition in which both the emerging and
status quo powers are constantly haunted by mutual distrust and fear.
countries can achieve new relations in the true sense.

Addressing the distrust and fear should be a key mission for both leaders. Doing so would have historic
meaning, both for U.S.-China relations and for a chaotic world. The question, though, is how. First, its quite
understandable that China as a rising power would attempt to defend some of its vital interests at a
minimum level, even if in the past it used to sacrifice them out of weakness or other considerations, such
as domestic stability or a positive international environment.

Clash and cycle of conflict inevitable and superficial

cooperation doesnt solve root cause of US/China tension
Xia 8 (Ming, PhD in international politics, prof at College of Staten Island,
China threat or a peaceful rise of China? The New York Times, 7/22/2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html) KC
"China's rise" can be seen as a quintessentially political processthrough which the ruling Communist
Party has sought to shore up its legitimacy after the Cultural Revolution irreversibly changed the nation
and caused three crises of ideological belief, faith in the CPC, and confidence in the future. As the Party
realized that the performance-based legitimacy was the only hope for prolonging its rule, economic
development became the highest politics. Consequentially, the success of economic development would
have to cause political implicationsthe external ones are carefully monitored and evaluated by China's
neighbors and the only superpower of the worldthe United States. Will China become a threat to the

The reason for American concern mainly

arises from its hegemonic status in the world politics and the ideological
incompatibility of China with the Western value system . China's stunning economic
United States, Japan, and surrounding countries?

growth has convinced the West that it is just a matter of time until China becomes a
world superpower. But its ideological orientation makes China a revolutionary
power that is threatening both to the United States' status and global
structure. Three different logics have been constructed to substantiate the "China threat" thesis. First,
ideological and cultural factors make China a threat. For neo-conservatives in the
Bush Administration, the mere factor that China still sticks to communism makes
view it adversely. Samuel Huntington has added a cultural factor: in the clash of civilizations, the
"unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian civilizations" is the most
fundamental threat to the West. For people using this logic, the sensible response from the U.S.
is, in the short run, a containment policy, and confrontation is possible if needed; in the long run, the
promotion of a peaceful transformation within China. Second, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors. For

as a great power in size

(territory, population, and economy), China has to pursue its own interest and respect.
Nationalism may still drive China into a course of clash with the United States ,
if the latter refuses to accommodate or share the leadership with China as a rising power. Some
scholars fear that democracy can unleash strong nationalism and popular
nationalism can make China even more aggressive toward the United States.
many realists, even China has shed off its ideological straitjacket,

Third, the collapse of China. Opposed to the previous two perspectives, some people are concerned that if
China suffers a Soviet-style sudden-death syndrome and spins out of control, it can create an even worse
scenario. The sheer size of the population makes refuge problem, the failed state and the followed crises
(warlordism, civil war, crime, proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc) impossible for the world to deal with.

the United States often oscillates from

demonization to romanticization of China, from containment to engagement .
The U.S.-China relationship has shifted from conflict, to confrontation, to
competition and back to conflict, but so rarely features with cooperation. One
Due to these three different considerations,

American China specialist characterizes the bilateral relationship as "the sweet-and-sour Sino-American
relationship." The Japanese have a different set of reasons to feel upset by China's rise. Although Japan has
been culturally indebted to China since the Tang dynasty, somehow Japan has developed a strong Oedipus
complex toward Chinanamely to commit patricide against its cultural patron. In the past century, China
suffered several severe acts of aggression at the hands of the Japanese. The mutual animosity between
these two countries has been strong. The Japanese deep involvement in Taiwan, its stubborn refusal to
offer unequivocal apologies to the Asian neighboring countries over its aggressions, and American military
alliance with Japan all have been irksome to the Chinese. The construction of Chinese nationalism by
mainly relying on anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese turned Japan into an easy target. To some
degree, the Chinese leadership has tried to release the popular anger against the regime by directing it
either to the local tyrants or to the international bullies (U.S. and Japan are two natural candidates). Now
Japan and China still have not developed any framework to resolve their territorial disputes and their
relationship has reached a low point. The Chinese often suspect that U.S. and Japan are the originators of a
variety of "China threat" arguments. In addition to the ideological threat, many other neighboring countries
have more stakes in China's new move. For Southeast Asian nations, the presence of a sizeable and
extremely rich Chinese ethnic group and their increasing dependency upon China's economy for growth
forced them to be very careful in handling their relationship with China. With a continental size (China has
almost two times the territorial and population sizes of all other Asian Pacific countries combined), China
consumes a tremendous amount of foreign direct investment and pops out huge volume of exports; other
countries feel the competition from China. At this moment, no government in the Asian Pacific region has
adopted a clear anti-China policy; but sporadic anti-Chinese riots have occurred in Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines; and strong resentment against the Northern economic and cultural invasion has surfaced in
Myanmar (former Burma), Thailand, Vietnam, and other countries. Even Singaporethe self-proclaimed
third Chinese territory in addition to China and Taiwanwas upset by China's strong hand in 2004 after Lee
Hsien Loong, the soon-to-be-inaugurated Prime Minister of Singapore, visited Taiwan. The combination of
stunning economic growth and unpredictable political governance causes deep concerns about China
among the nations in the world. The Chinese leadership has realized the urgency to calm down these
concerns and to build a supportive international environment for its ascendancy. To make its rise less a
threat, the Chinese government has sponsored many PR events, such as exhibitions in foreign countries,
promoting Chinese language programs, and so on. But most importantly, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao
put forward the thesis of "China's peaceful rise" in his speech to a Harvard University audience in
December 2003. Under this thesis, there are several points: First, China's development depends upon and

in return will contribute to the world peace; second, China will resort to peaceful means for development;
third, China's development will rely more on its own resources and market; fourth, China is prepared for a
long-term process of hard work, even several generations, for economic prosperity. Finally, even as China
has achieved its economic development, it will not seek hegemony in the world or come out as a threat to
any country. Under the guiding principle of "China's peaceful rise," the Chinese government has conducted
actively diplomacy at four (at least) different levels: (1) Creating strategic partnerships with the second-tier
powers. China has signed strategic partnership treaties with the EU, Russia and India to strengthen their
relationships as well as to balance the American power. (2) Promoting "good neighbor policy" in the Asian
Pacific region. By increasing trade with the Asian-Pacific region and also let these countries enjoy trade
surplus with China, China has positioned as an important trading partner with these countries. Besides,
China has entered into various mechanisms of regional cooperation with these countries. During the 1997
Asian financial crises, that China refrained from devaluing its currency and helped stabilize the regional
economy by mobilizing its foreign currency reserve won positive reactions from this region and the U.S. (3)
Seeking cooperation and avoiding confrontation with the U.S. The Chinese side basically has sent to
Washington a clear message that China is a conservative power and has no intention to upset the status
quonamely the U.S. as the sole superpower in the world. (4) Neglecting Japan. As China has successfully
managed relationships with the sole superpower, the second-tier strategic partners, and neighboring
countries, China is able to afford to ignore Japan and occasionally show some toughness. For the past five
years, the Chinese leadership has been cautious and successful in managing the internal nationalism and
American unilateralism, to some degree, thanks to the anti-terror war. Now some signs have indicated that
the honeymoon between the U.S. and China in the aftermath of Sept.11 attack and anti-terrorism coalition

If the United States shifts its policy to a hard-line toward

China, the cyclical turbulence in the Sino-American relationship may soon
resurface. This might jeopardize China's plan of a peaceful rise. At the micro-level, the U.S. seems to
has arrived at its end.

have been more provocative toward China, the latter has been more on defensive; but if we look at the
Sino-U.S. relationship from the macro-level, it seems that China can take back initiative if it can remove
the thorn of communist ideology and authoritarianism, because the Americans tend to believe that under
the doctrine of democratic peace, democratic countries do not fight war against each other. Therefore, to
create long-term internal and external stability, the CPC has to learn how to play the card of democracy.
Does this amount to ask a leopard to change its spots?

Helps Relations

Helps relations Cooperation

Initiating cooperation helps alliancenew model of
relations
Lai 15 (David Lai, Research Professor of Asian Security Affairs at the
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, The Diplomat, 10-162015, "The Impasse of US-China Relations," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/the-continuing-impasse-of-us-chinarelations/) NV
The biggest difference was on Xis model for major-country relations. The
Chinese foreign minister claimed that Xi and Obama had an extensive
discussion of the new model. The No. 1 item on the Chinese list states that
the two sides commended the important outcomes of the meeting at
Sunnylands in 2013, the meeting in Beijing in 2014, and the meeting in
Washington in 2015 between the two presidents, and agreed to continue their
efforts to build a new model of major-country relationship between China and
the United States based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation.
However, the White House documentation has no record of Obama discussing
the model with Xi and there is no mention of the Chinese initiative in any of
the statements and releases either. We dont know which side is telling the
true story. Yet one can see that the different accounts are clearly bumps in
the U.S.-China power transition. As this journey continues, the Chinese side
will continue to press for mutual trust and respect; and insist that practical
issues will go away if they have the strategic commitment from the United
States. The U.S., however, always goes after specific problems in the two
nations relations; and believes that trust and respect can only come from
measurable cooperation. This journey will continue to be bumpy if the two
nations continue to talk past each other with neither side willing to break the
impasse.

Cooperation and trust bolster relations

Greitens 13 (Sheena Chestnut, senior fellow with the Center for East Asia
Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute6-11-2013, "U.S.-China Relations and
Americas Alliances in Asia," Brookings Institution,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/06/11-us-china-relationsasia-alliances-greitens)
the United States should coordinate closely with each of its allies
to anticipate possible developments and ensure that the alliance responds
with measures that appropriately balance reassurance and restraint. (Here, the
To offset this risk,

firm but non-escalatory response of the United States and the Republic of Korea to North Koreas recent belligerent
rhetoric provides a positive example.)

It should also stress that disputes among American

allies must not be allowed to derail cooperation on shared interests, and
should support mechanisms that facilitate intra-allied cooperation. Conversely,
Chinese leaders should understand that bilateral efforts to build strategic

trust with China are a complement to Americas regional alliance

commitments, and not a substitute for them. Less fear and more trust are indeed likely to
contribute to a constructive U.S.-China relationship . But the principal foreign policy challenge
facing the United States in Asia today is not the creation of strategic trust between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, or
between the United States and China. It is the challenge of alliance management: to reassure Americas allies without
emboldening them toward unnecessary adventurism, and to use those alliances to deter potential adversaries without

Wise and steady management of U.S. alliances in

Asia will make Americas interests and commitments clear, and help shape
the level of conflict or cooperation in the U.S.-China relationship for years to
come.
provoking them into spirals of conflict.

Helps Relations BIT

Accepting BIT helps China-US relations- economic and
investment cooperation
Jianmin 16 (Wu Jianmin, Former President of China Foreign Affairs
University, 3-31-2016, "Here's What's on the Table for the China-U.S.
Relationship This Year," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wujianmin/china-us-relationship-2016_b_9568060.html)
The year 2016 is a very sensitive year for the China-U.S. relationship, because this is the election year in
the U.S.. The presidential candidates may have a big mouth and say whatever they deem helpful to their
campaign. Other sensitive issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the Democratic Progressive Partys

How to best manage the China-U.S. relationship is a

major challenge to both China and the U.S.. There are two competing agendas in the
relationship: cooperation and friction. If the cooperation agenda fails to move forward,
the friction agenda may take over. That would be a very bad scenario. Given the
importance of China-U.S. relations to world peace and development, this
scenario would be bad not only for our two countries, but also for the whole
world. Therefore, to advance the cooperation agenda is the best way to
manage the China-U.S. relationship. To advance the cooperation agenda, we have first to
identify the convergent interests between China and the U.S.. In 2016, what is the most
important convergent interest between the two countries? Economy . If you read
victory in the election in Taiwan.

Premier Li Keqiangs government work report and watch the U.S. economic performance in the 4th quarter
of 2015, you can see that economic growth tops the agenda of both the Chinese and American
governments. On Jan 27, when President Xi Jinping met with Secretary of State John Kerry in Beijing, Xi
pointed out: Ive emphasized several times, when China and U.S. strengthen cooperation, we can do big
things for the benefit of the world. President Xi is right. Look at the Paris Climate Change Agreement, the
Iranian nuclear deal and the U.N. Security Councils resolution on North Korea China-U.S. cooperation
played a pivotal role in each. Sluggish economic growth is a major issue facing both China and the U.S., as

If we want to give a strong boost to economic growth,

we must, first of all, further grow China-U.S. cooperation. What can China and
the U.S. do in this area? Two things come to my mind: 1. To speed up and conclude BIT
negotiation. China and the U.S. are negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. If concluded, this
treaty will be another milestone in China-U.S. economic cooperation, taking
our economic cooperation to a higher stage. Chinese companies, both public
and private, are going global. The U.S. is one of their most coveted
investment markets. The Chinese economy is going through a restructuring
process. To fix the problem of pollution and upgrade the Chinese industry,
American companies can do a lot in China. BIT will open up a new phase of
China-U.S. economic and investment cooperation and give a push to Chinas
badly needed economic reform.
well as the rest of the world.

BIT key to stabilize US-China relationsecon reform and

investment security
Freeman 15 (Charles Freeman, a Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institution
and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
March 2015, "U.S.-China Relations: Challenges for the 114th Congress," The

National Bureau of Asian Research, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?

id=538) NV
Trade and Bilateral Investment The U.S. business community has long been a
primary champion of strong commercial and diplomatic relations with China.
That support is fraying as a result of perceived bullying by Beijing and the cyberespionage
scandals. Companies are no longer as willing as they once were to speak out on behalf of China on Capitol
Hill or in discussions with the administration. The assumption in Beijing seems to be that U.S. companies
need China more than China needs them, or that the United States needs access to China more than the
other way around. This is a miscalculation by Beijing, and Congress has a role to play in reminding China

The
primary means of government-to-government discussions about problems in the
commercial relationship have been the Joint Commission on Commerce and
Trade and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. These forums have in the past been
successful in resolving disputes between the two countries, but in recent
years their deliverables to U.S. commercial interests have come fewer and
farther between. This may be due in part to the Chinese perception that accommodating U.S.
requests is less important to China: China wants less from the United States, so it is
willing to give up less. Negotiations leading up to the signing of a potential bilateral
investment treaty (BIT) present an important opportunity to stabilize U.S.-China
commercial relations. China is genuinely interested in successfully concluding a BIT
for two reasons: First, the standards in a BIT would provide useful external pressure
within the Chinese economic reform process . Second, Chinese firms are
increasingly investing in the United States, and a BIT would provide greater
security for their investments. China is also carefully watching negotiations of the Trans-Pacific
that support for open markets between China and the United States is not to be taken for granted.

Partnership (TPP), with a view to possible accession if the TPP is not directed at building a trading bloc that
excludes China.

Helps Relations Cyber

Cyber talks key to improving relations now failure to do
so tanks relations
Segal 15(Duncan Innes-Ker, Regional editor, Asia. Elizabeth C. Economy,
C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations. Shen Dingli, Prof and Associate Dean, Institute of International
Studies. Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies
and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program. Orville H. Schell,
Director, Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society, 9-22-2015, "How to
Improve U.S.-China Relations," Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044) NV
Washington and Beijing have a common interest in preventing escalation
in cyberspace. Some attacks may be viewed as legitimate surveillance by one side but as prepping
the battlefield by the other. In this climate, there are a few steps each side should take : The United
States and China should broaden and deepen discussions on possible
thresholds for use of force in cyberspace and provide greater transparency
on their respective offensive cyber doctrines; If the White House has decided to levy sanctions
Still,

after the summit, Obama should clearly explain to Xi how they will be implemented and what evidence the

In
June at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington,
Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi called for China to work with the United
States to develop an international code of conduct for cyber information
sharing. While there have been no further details from the Chinese side, Obama should pick up on the
United States has of the hacking. Beijing continues to question Washington's ability to attribute attacks.

offer to discuss the types of information that are adequate to identify an attacker, thereby setting a

Neither side wants cybersecurity to

derail the bilateral relationship. The summit is unlikely to produce any concrete
agreements, but hopefully the two sides will agree to further expand discussion on
standard that could be shared by the two sides.

shared interests.

Helps Relations Human Rights

Adressing Human Rights is necessary to improve relations
Schell 15(Duncan Innes-Ker, Regional editor, Asia. Elizabeth C. Economy,
C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations. Shen Dingli, Prof and Associate Dean, Institute of International
Studies. Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies
and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program. Orville H. Schell,
Director, Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society, 9-22-2015, "How to
Improve U.S.-China Relations," Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044) NV
the vexing question of human rights
looms larger than ever. The issue plagues the overall health of the bilateral
relationship like a low-grade infection. U.S. displeasure with Chinas rights record is
only matched by Beijings displeasure with Washingtons judgmental attitude .
This standoff has created an increasing sourness in relations that have made it difficult
As U.S. and Chinese heads of state gather for another summit,

leaders from both countries to feel at ease with one another. The result is that the two countries have
struggled to establish the lan and comfort level required for solving problems where real common interest
is shared. Disagreement over human rights grows out of a more divisive problem that sits unacknowledged
like the proverbial elephant in the room. Because nobody quite knows what to do, we are hardly inclined to

the United States and China have fundamentally

irreconcilable political systems and antagonistic value systems. If we
want to get anything done, we must pretend that the elephant isnt
there. President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear that his China is not heading in any teleological
recognize, much less discuss it:

direction congruent with Western hopes. Xi seems to suggest that China has its own model of
development, one that might be described as Leninist capitalism, with rather limited protection of
individual rights. This is a model with so-called Chinese characteristics, which, in the world of human
rights, means that China will emphasize collective welfare rights, such as the right to a better standard

rather than emphasizing individual rights like

freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion . But if this is the model, then the
United States and China are heading in divergent historical directions. A host of new friction
points now center around the abridgement of individual rights in China:
arrests of human rights lawyers, growing restrictions on civil society
activities, new controls on academic freedom, a more heavily censored
media, more limited public dialogue, visas denied to foreign press, and
domestic journalists and foreign correspondents suffering more burdensome
forms of harassment. These trends grow out of differences in our systems of governance and
of living, a job, and a freer lifestyle,

values. Whether we should confront these differences head on or seek some artful way to set them aside
so the two countries can get on with other serious issues of common interest is a question we have hardly
dared even think about. The elephant is still in the room, and the fact that no one knows quite how to
address it lays at the root of our human rights disagreements. These differences often gain such an
antagonistic dimension that they not only inhibit our ability to make progress on the rights front, but also

undermine the rest of the U.S.-China relationship .

Helps Relations South China Sea

Increased communication on South China Sean improves
relations
Dingli 15 (Duncan Innes-Ker, Regional editor, Asia. Elizabeth C. Economy,
C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations. Shen Dingli, Prof and Associate Dean, Institute of International
Studies. Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies
and Director of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program. Orville H. Schell,
Director, Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society, 9-22-2015, "How to
Improve U.S.-China Relations," Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044) NV
Historical narratives in Beijing, Washington, and other capitals in the region reflect diverging views over
what Asia's security order should be. Will the Asia-Pacific region's security be contingent on ongoing
American dominion or will a Chinese-led security architecture emerge? This very question tests
Washingtons willingness and ability to accept Beijing's proposal for a new type of major power relations.

To overcome mutual suspicion, both parties should follow some guiding principles:
abide by international law, establish common standards of action in the AsiaPacific, and improve communication lines and increase transparency;
preserve as much as possible the status quo. The use or threat of force undermines the existing security

maximize efforts to manage and resolve differences through peaceful

means; notify one another ahead of any major security move to bolster mutual confidence and
collaborative security. China and the United States should seize opportunities to
work together and to benefit mutually from a stable security environment.
order;

Understanding Chinas intentions in the SCS prevent

miscalc and help relations
Xinhua 16 (Xinhua, staff at Global Times, 2/6/16, "China-US relations
shouldn't be hijacked by South China Sea issue: Chinese ambassador," Global
TImes, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/986505.shtml) NV
China-US relations are too important that they should not be allowed to be hijacked by
the South China Sea issue, Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai
said Wednesday. In an opinion piece published on bloomberg.com, Cui pointed out that China and
the US share important interests, and they "have significant potential for cooperation."
"We may have major differences, but we also share important interests, including
maintaining regional peace and stability, supporting freedom of navigation and overflight
in accordance with international law, and resolving disputes through peaceful negotiations
and diplomatic dialogue," Cui wrote. "The region should not become a competing
ground for China and the US," he added. Cui mentioned that some of the perceptions in the United
States and elsewhere about China's policy and intentions in the area "are misplaced." " A pressing
task is to understand the facts and China's intentions correctly so as
to avoid real danger and consequences as a result of
misinterpretation and miscalculation," Cui emphasized.
The

Helps Relations TPP

Excluding China from TPP kills relationsanti-China
rhetoric decks cooperation and the economy
Zhou 15 (Steven regular contributor to The American Conservative, Muftah
and Ricochet media, among others, 11-6-2015, "OPINION: The TPP risks
making US-China relations worse," Aljazeera America,
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/11/the-tpp-risks-making-us-chinarelations-worse.html) NV
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), finalized last month by 12 Pacific Rim nations, including the United
States, will be the largest trade pact in modern history. It will rewrite the rules that
affect how about 40 percent of the global economy does business , with the intent of
increasing trade and investment. The White House released the agreements text to the public yesterday.

discussion regarding the TPP has focused on the absence from the pact
of China, the largest economy in the Asia-Pacific region . President Barack Obama
has portrayed the exclusion as an attempt by the U.S. and its allies to write the
rules in the region before China does. But this kind of antagonism does nothing to
push U.S.-China relations perhaps the most important bilateral relationship in the world
toward anything productive. The increasing anti-China rhetoric that has accompanied
the Obama administrations Asian pivot will result in fewer opportunities to partner on
major global initiatives and hurt both nations economically.
Much

Link flux

Relations = Cyclical
US/China relations prone to fluctuations but mutual
dependence checks significant deteriorationno chance
of triggering impact
Alexandroff 11 (Alan, research director of the Program on Conflict
Management and Negotiation (PCMN) at the University of Toronto, Grasping
fully the realities and challenges in US-China relations, China US Focus,,
2/25/2011, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/grasping-fully-therealities-and-challenges-in-us%E2%80%93china-relations-the-key-bilateralrelationship-in-international-relationsthe-key-bilateral-relationship-ininternational-relationsthe-key-bila/) KC
In contemporary geo-politics/economics many experts have observed that the key power relationship
today and seemingly for the next decades is the United States-China relationship. The United States
has exercised a near-hegemonic role in global affairs for the past several decades. US leadership was only
accentuated with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This unitary moment saw
the US dominant militarily accompanied by assertions that it would maintain dominance militarily against
other powers. The appearance of China as a large emerging market country was powered by the
extraordinary economic growth unleashed in the late 1970s with Deng Xiaopings Reform and Opening.
After several decades of such high growth China today challenges Japan for the second largest economy.
Chinas peaceful rise was analyzed and commented on by most international relations experts. The
growing redistribution of economic power, most notably China, but also other emerging powers Indian
and Brazil raised concerns among many. International relations experts had traced the difficult transition
of powers and pointed to the many historical instances where these power transitions had led to
competition and even conflict among the great powers of the time. With the rise of the China threat
perspective in Washington a view of the rising challenge of China to the United States regionally but even
globally observers and experts focused closely on the course of relations between the two powers. And

China-US relationship has not disappointed observers. This great power relationship
exhibits a highly cyclical even unstable pattern of behavior. The
relationship has been able to shift from a near friendship hugto an
almost Cold War stance. The hug came most evidently the 1970s with the
reestablishment of relations between the two countries and the Nixon trip to China to
meet with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. On the cold war-like behavior instances are
numerous. There is the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the
impact on relations; then there was the emergency landing of the EP-3 surveillance
plane on Hainan Island in April 2001 after collision with a Chinese navy
fighter jet and the relations thereafter. These changes can come quickly and
unexpectedly. How then are we to describe US-China relations? Fei Di Fei You () Neither Friend
nor Foe. In the early 1990s, American scholar and long time China expert Harry Harding now
the dean of the University of Virginia's Frank Batten Sr. School of Leadership and Public Policy, described
the US-China relations as being:fei di fei you ( ) neither friend nor foe. As he
the course of

said at the time: The most likely future is for a difficult relationship, featuring a China that is neither friend
nor foe in the international arena. More recently the well-known Chinese scholar and international
relations expert Yan Xuetong, the director of The Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University,
described the US-China relationship in much the same way and captured the relationship in exactly the

there are four kinds of

interests in this critical bilateral relationship: common interests,
complementary ones, confrontational interests and conflicting ones . For Yan
same terms.. But Yan Xuetong extended the analysis by concluding that

Xuetong the difficulty in the current relationship between these two critical powers arises because

policy makers insist on characterizing the US-China relationship as

being more cooperative that in fact is the case.China and the US fail
in their efforts to build a more collaborative and stable relationship
because they fail to see that in fact they have more mutually
unfavorable interests than mutually favorable ones. Officials in both
countries find it difficult to create stable relations because of the unrealistic
expectations of mutual support each presumes of the other. In fact, according to this
scholar, this instability is of sort greater than one might find in a conflictual relationship. For Yan Xuetong
superficial enmity is more stable and it also provides more chances for improvements in bilateral
because the nations have more mutually favorable interests than they realize.. So in this analysis,
enmity is better than friendship at least for now a rather strange conclusion but perhaps a logical
outcome of a difficult relationship and differing national interests. Yan Xuetong urges both to lower
expectations and to reduce unexpected conflict by accepting that the two great powers regard the other as
a political competitor. Further he suggests that that the two should enlarge their mutually favorable
interests before they even consider developing durable cooperation. There is no doubt that there are many
experts who are willing even eager to accept the competitive perhaps rivalrous nature of the
relationship. In a variety of views and opinions, the China Threat school in the United States, as noted
above, urges strong defense against a rising China power and the threat it poses to American dominance.
On the Chinese side, the China Can Say No school urges greater national assertiveness and firmness
against both regional neighbors and the United States particularly as it regards China core interests, most
particularly Taiwan. Yi Di, Yi You ( )Both Friend and Foe But is ceding the field to these realist and
realist-like schools of thought the appropriate characterization of the relationship and the difficulties that
periodically engage the United States and China? I start from a slightly altered perspective from either of

the US-China relationship as fei di, fei you, let me

alter the expression slightly characterizing the US-China relationship as yi di, yi you ( ) both
friend and foe. This slightly altered characterization I believe better captures the relationship in a
number of ways. First the expression recognizes that are aspects where the US-China
are, and need to, collaborate. The US and China are embedded in a global economy where
these two scholars. Rather than framing

globalization and mutual interdependence even dependence- hold sway and are far more developed than
was the case between the US and the former Soviet Union, and also far greater than earlier periods of

China has welcomed foreign direct investment unlike some other

Asian tigers including notably Japan. Further its prosperity is a product, in part, of the enormous
export platform that Chinese and foreign multinational corporations have
built generating enormous trade surpluses for China in the last few years. The mutual interdependence
great power relations.

was made quite visible with the global financial crisis that emerged in 2008. While analysts had been
suggesting that the large emerging market countries were likely decoupled from the structure and
behavior of the traditional powers, the crisis made it clear that all the major countries, traditional, large
emerging market and developing countries were staring into the same economic and financial abyss.
Collective action was called for and the G20 countries including the United States and China met
repeatedly to ensure that the global economy would not slip into a new great depression. The mutual
grasp of the two was only underscored when analysts, and even some officials talked of possible Chinese
efforts to liquidate the heavy US Treasury position China had accumulated in its foreign exchange
account. But it became clear that such a strategic change would of course hurt the United States and the
US dollar reserve position. But right next to the US would come China and the sale of a depreciating asset

the degree of mutual

dependence generated by the high and growing degree of globalization well
beyond other power relationships historically sets a parameter for the
relationship. There is an aspect of friend that is structurally built into their
relationship like it or not. Furthermore, national interests are, I would argue, more similar that officials
would be a blow to Chinas public finances. It would be painful for both. So,

and publics are prepared to recognize at times. So China experts will suggest, for instance, that Iran and
the question of nuclear proliferation represents a core or major interest for the United States but represent
a much less central concern for China. Indeed China sees Iran as an important source of oil for China. Yet it
is evident that a conflict between the US and Iran would explode the situation in the Middle East, threaten
oil supplies and at raise the cost of oil to close to unimaginable price levels. Such an outcome is no less a
crisis for China than for the United States. That kind of conflict and international instability is equally a
dilemma for China as it is for the United States. There is no decoupling here just as there wasnt in the face

of the global financial crisis. If it is the case that both are friends if only because of structural realities and
national objectives, there are aspects where the two are positioned as foes as well. Both countries are the
most sovereign-oriented and most domestically politically driven of any of the great powers. As my
colleague Chen Dongxiao of SIIS has pointed out China favors the creation of the G20 and sees it as
legitimate and has the potential to be the primary institution for global economic issues [but] it is also
concerned about protecting its own independence over domestic economic policies.. Thus Chinese
leadership has accepted that a framework must be constructed for the G20 to deal with global imbalances
but at the same time has sought retain control over its domestic economic policy by urging that the
framework be only consultative and instructive. National political assertions, even populist politics, color
the positions of both countries and lead leaders to raise objections and even objectionable policies for the
other. A pure strategic policy calculation driven only by geopolitical policy concerns is unlikely to

There is then small likelihood that the foe

aspect of the US-China relationship is likely to disappear any time soon . Thus it
seems to me we are destined for now to live through the foe circumstances and
behaviors as well as those where the two act as friends . What analysts need to
do is to refrain from concluding that the foe aspects have somehow
redefined the relationship that US-China relations have simply
become one dimensionally rivals. There is and will continue to be nothing simple
about this critical relationship United States and China. They are destined for now to be
both friend and foe.
dominate the relationship any time soon.

Fluctuations in relations inevitableempirics prove

relations never deteriorate to a critical level
Shambaugh 11 (David, US chinese relations take a new direction? Part
I, Yale Global, 1/24/2011, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-chineserelations-new-direction-part-i) KC
WASHINGTON: The world is safer this week than last week. The Sino-American summit between presidents

more
than a year of fluctuating and deteriorating ties, causing unsettling ripple
effects throughout the Asia-Pacific region and globally , US-China relations were in dire
Barack Obama and Hu Jintao succeeded in stabilizing the worlds most important relationship. After

need of stabilization. Now the key question is how long can the new stability achieved at the summit last?

Any observer of Sino-American relations should be both cautiously optimistic

but skeptical. Establishing equilibrium in ties between the US and China has been hard enough over
the years sustaining it has been even harder. If theres been one overriding
characteristic in the relationship over the past 30 years, it has been
fluctuation and disequilibrium. As a result, this summit could not have come at a more
propitious time. The period since President Obamas state visit to China in November 2009 until this past
week has been perhaps the worst period in two decades of relations since the Tiananmen incident of 1989.
Both sides took advantage of the opportunity to reset the tone of the relationship. Now the hope is that a
new tone can result in tangible cooperation. China and the US have reset the relationships tone. The
hope is that a new tone can result in tangible cooperation. There was, in this observers view, an implicit
wager by the Obama administration going into the summit: The American side would accord President Hu
full respect and dignity befitting the leader of the worlds second largest economy which would, in turn,
hopefully produce a less truculent and more compliant Chinese position on a wide range of issues in which
Washington sought Beijings cooperation. This was the simple, but smart, strategy. Tactically, the
administration sought to shape the summit atmosphere by rolling out four cabinet secretaries Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geithner and
Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke in the week leading up to Hus arrival to each give tough high-profile
speeches outlining American expectations from China across virtually every area of the relationship . These
high-profile speeches by leading cabinet secretaries set the tone going into the summit and allowed the US
side to articulate its China policy and concerns about Beijings behavior. This was good both for Beijing to
hear as well as for building domestic political support behind the administrations China policy. The Obama

administration coupled the toughness in its pre-summit speeches with the warm, respectful welcome for
Hu at the summit. The administration coupled the toughness in its pre-summit speeches with the warm,
respectful welcome for Hu at the summit. The administration understood well that what Hu and his
entourage wanted most from the summit, by significant measure, was largely the symbolism of protocol.
This is true for one important reason: The Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) political legitimacy rests in
part on restoring Chinas international dignity as a major global power. Ever since 1949, when the
Communists came to power, this has been the consistent narrative that the CCP has told its people. Thus,
with all the protocol trappings of a high-level state visit a welcome at Andrews Air Force base by VicePresident Joseph Biden with a phalanx of armored Cadillac limousines, staying at Blair House, a White
House South Lawn honor guard reception and 21-gun salute, black-tie state dinner and champagne toasts,
Oval Office fireside chats, high-profile public speeches Hu was accorded the symbolic respect from the
worlds leading power, which Chinese believe is due their country, and all-important mianzi, literally face
but translated more as respect. As a result, Xinhua News Agency and other Chinese media beamed an
unrelenting series of photo images of Hu playing the role of international statesman back to domestic
constituencies in China. The Peoples Daily, the flagship newspaper of the CCP, delayed publication of its
January 19 edition by an unprecedented six hours to carry images of the summit. With all the protocol
trappings of a high-level state visit, Hu was accorded the symbolic respect from the worlds leading power.
The Obama administrations wager is, first, that providing President Hu and his party with full symbolic
respect will play into the CCPs domestic legitimacy and sense of security, hopefully undercutting those
constituencies in China that perceive the United States is trying to subvert the CCPs political power,
restrain the nations rise, and contain Chinas growing presence in East Asia and globally. Second, by
according Hu respect and a civil tone on display in Obamas own welcoming speech, banquet toasts, and
comments at the joint press conference the administration hopes that it might produce a more trustful
and cooperative China in addressing the long list of American concerns inside China, throughout East Asia,
and globally. The detailed 41-point joint statement released by the two sides at the conclusion of the
summit was a good step in the right direction, setting out common positions and perspectives on a range
of issues. But so too did the joint statement issued at Obamas November 2009 summit in Beijing only for
it to become a stillborn document that immediately foundered on a series of irritants and actions by both
sides. Time will tell whether the 2011 statement has more staying power than the last one, as both
countries have powerful bureaucratic constituencies that remain distrustful of each other with huge

Differing political values and systems will

continue to be a barrier; volatile nationalism in China remains a wildcard;
economic protectionism embodied in low renminbi and competition is not
going to disappear; mutual strategic interests in Asia only partially converge
and Chinas military modernization will continue to alter the regional balance
of power; respective worldviews differ and global interests are increasingly
competitive. These realities are not changed by the successful Obama-Hu summit. The summits
budgets aimed at countering the other.

detailed joint statement is a step in the right direction, setting out common positions and perspectives on
a range of issues. While some skepticism about the future of US-China relations is thus warranted for these
reasons, nonetheless the summit did produce new and much-needed stability and improved levels of trust.
What it did not produce, though, are new mechanisms of institutionalized interaction to follow-through on

The relationship remains driven by episodic delegation

exchanges and short visits, while whats needed is a new model of institutionalized working
the lengthy joint statement.

groups that forge tangible cooperation across bilateral, functional, regional and global issues 365 days per
year. Looking to the future, cooperative moves by both sides will likely take place in a parallel rather
than joint fashion. Whether the issue is North Korea or Iran, commercial or currency differences, release of
imprisoned dissidents or increasing press freedoms, Beijings ability to appear to be overtly cooperating
with a US agenda will be severely constrained by domestic nationalistic pressures and bureaucratic
constituencies. The Chinese military, internal security and intelligence services, protected domestic
industries, and the Communist Party propaganda apparatus all have vested institutional interests in
countering American influence and, to some extent, benefit from an antagonistic relationship with the
United States. For its part, the US military, intelligence services, protectionist and xenophobic elements in
Congress, the human rights community, and other domestic actors similarly have a stake in an adversarial
relationship with China. While these domestic actors will no doubt play their constraining roles, for the
moment both sides seem pleased with the outcome of the summit. Whether they can now convert the
improved atmosphere into practical gains remains to be seen.

US/china relations stuck at stalematesmall fluctuations,

but wont trigger significant deterioration or progress
empirics prove
Watson Institute 12 (Watson Institute of international and public affairs
at Brown University, The cyclical us-china military relationship, Watson
Institute at Brown, 2/21/2012, http://watson.brown.edu/news/2012/cyclicalus-china-military-relationship) KC
According to US Army Colonel Randy Lawrence, the US-China military
relationship has been "stuck in a cyclical nature of starting and stopping, with
no real improvement over the past 25 years." Lawrence is currently a student
at the US Naval War College. From 2008 to 2011, he served as the Executive
Officer to the US Defense Attach in China. On February 16, Lawrence gave a
talk at the Watson Institute's Joukowsy Forum titled "The Future of U.S.-China
Relations: Cooperation or Competition?" US-Chinese relations began as a cold
war alliance opposed to the Soviet Union. This culminated in Washington
agreeing to sell Black Hawk helicopters to Beijing in 1985, in what is now
considered a high point of the bilateral military relationship. The Tiananmen
Incident in 1989, however, brought the relationship to a screeching halt. In
the 1990s, the White House again sought to engage China. The Clinton
administration believed that the best way to ensure that China act
responsibly was to make sure it had a stake in the international community.
Relations between the two countries warmed somewhat, only to cool rapidly
after it emerged that the US had mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in
Yugoslavia. Relations went further downhill in 2001. In April of that year, a US
intelligence aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter jet off Hainan Island in
Southern China, causing outrage in China. Later that year, following 9/11, the
Pentagon began a decade-long shift in attention towards the Middle East at
the expense of East Asia. As the War on Terror winds down, the Obama
administration has promised a "pivot" back towards East Asia. Despite this,
Lawrence is not optimistic that military relations will improve significantly.

No risk of deteriorating relations enough to trigger impact

cyclical pattern and multiple checks
Gojree 15 (Mehraj Uddin, analyst for Eurasia Review, US-China Strategic
Cooperation Or Strategic Competition: An Overview, Eurasia Review,
12/10/2015, http://www.eurasiareview.com/10122015-us-china-strategiccooperation-or-strategic-competition-an-overview/) KC
US military strategists are of the view that even though Beijings
China has the ability to
pose unacceptable risks in a conflict with Washington . Moreover, China is increasingly
More particularly, the

absolute military power is not formally equal to those of the United States,

developing sophisticated means to negate traditional US advantages and this could eventually lead to the
creation of China-centric Asian bloc which would ultimately dominate Western-Pacific.6 Thus, according to
them, the US and Chinese interests are destined to clash as China continues its rise and, in coming
decades, reaches economic and military parity with the US.7 These apprehensions are also implicitly

the US policy
toward China has swung back and forth and finally converged around the
reflected in various US defense strategy reports. Amidst of these views from both sides,

middle. The current approach therefore, seeks to combine engagement with containment or in other
words the US is engaging China but even as it does so, it is preparing itself for the eventuality of the future

In
Chinas threat perception, the United States is regarded as one of the most
important and serious security threat to its interests . They are also convinced that the
conflict. On the other side, the provoking/challenging interpretations in China fallow an opposite logic.

US as a declining power is determined to thwart the rise of any challenger, of which China is the most
credible.8 Thus it is widely held in China that the primary goal of the US is to westernize, split, and
weaken China. Some Chinese argue that in spite of intense cooperation which Beijing seeks with
Washington, its fixed objective is contain the rising China by increasing its military forces around Chinas
periphery and thus preventing China from playing its historic role as the Middle Kingdom.9 Many Chinese
strategists also believe that even the engagers within the US would like to see China evolve towards a
politically pluralistic democratic system. The difference between those who advocate engagement and
containment in the US policy is therefore, only of strategy and not of goals and the main goal of the US
strategy is to perpetuate its own global dominance and to thwart any attempt by any state particularly

Despite all these threats perceived or actual China has

deliberately sought to maintain good relations with the United States . It due to
the fact that Chinas leadership are aware of the fact that maintaining good
relationship with the United States and downplaying the negative trends will
be more beneficial for the Chinas interests in the long run. Thus for the time being,
China to alter that status quo.10

Chinas leadership has adopted Deng Xiaopings advice be calm, keep low profile, hide your capacities

For the United

States too, the relationship with China is extremely important irrespective of
whether China is seen as strategic partner or a competitor. Chinas growing
economic and military power, a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, a nuclear weapons state, and a regional power with significant
influence in Asia is something which the US cannot ignore . Moreover, the
economic links forged between the two states in the last two decades provides
strong foundation to the relationship. In spite of some trade and economic frictions between
and bide your time as the guiding principle of their approach towards the US.11

the two, both sides benefit from these economic links and neither would like to see deterioration in the
relationship which would undermine these benefits. As Brookings Institute scholars Richard Bush and
Michael O Hanlon noted, Most

hypothetical causes of war between the United

States and China turn out, upon inspection, to have little or no basis . The two
countries will not duke it out simply to settle the question of who will run the world in the twenty-first

especially the economic cooperation create a

potent incentive for cooperative and sensible behavior between the two
countries.13 From the above discussion, it can be asserted that the US-China relationship
reflect the dual characteristics wherein it leads to the observation that the relationship is increasingly
one of coopetation and competitive co-existence . It implies that while the two
powers coexist, they do so in an increasingly competitive manner. However, so metimes the
cooperative dimension is more apparent, at others the competitive dimension
is more visible. David Shambug beautifully illustrates such a complex and dual type of US-China
century.12 They further argue that

relationship in these words, if one simply conceptualizes the extremes of conflict and accord at the two

The US-China
relationship today operates in the spectrum between the competitioncooperation bands, never achieving real accord and (hopefully)
avoiding conflict.14 Figure 1 illustrates a Simple Spectrum of U.S-China Relations adopted by
ends, then the middle is composed of the band between competition and cooperation.

David Shambag Figure 1 illustrates a Simple Spectrum of U.S-China Relations adopted by David Shambag
Thus, both the powers are likely to find it increasingly difficult to coexist yet they do not have any other
option. This uneven relationship, marked by twists and turns, can be further interpreted as an unhappy
marriage where the two dare not to divorce each other or as one expert remarked, the two huge powers
have divergent interests but also deep interdependence. Working together is hard and frustrating, but not
working together is worse.15 As long as there is no fundamental conflict of national interests, the US and
China will continue to manage this sort of relationship as depicted above.

A2 Relations are Cyclical

Current political climate means fluctuations are uniquely
more dangerous than in the past
Hao 15 (Qi, an assistant research fellow at the Institute of American
Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He also served as deputy
director of Asia-Pacific security center at the Institute of Modern International
Relations, Tsinghua University. The significance of Xi Jipings US visit, The
Diplomat, 9/24/2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-significance-of-xijinpings-u-s-visit/) KC
Chinas President Xi Jinping is in the U.S. on his first state visit, which within China is being widely seen as
a historical event comparable to that undertaken by then vice premier Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Xis visit is
being given an unusually high profile, which seems to signify a new chapter in the bilateral relationship. It
is worth exploring the possible justification for this. It is widely acknowledged that Dengs visit to the U.S.
in 1979 showed that China was ready to be embedded into the institutional network initiated and
dominated by the U.S. In other words, China was following Americas lead with the aims of both achieving
domestic economic prosperity and balancing against the external threat from the former Soviet Union,
which turned China into a de facto ally of the U.S. In this way, Dengs visit to the U.S. can be interpreted as
a dramatic change in Chinese foreign policy, which ultimately brought a seismic shift in the global balance

the factors shaping the U.S.-China dynamic have

changed beyond all recognition, and both countries face considerable
uncertainty over how to reorient their relationship . Although both Chinese
President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama have emphasized the
significance of keeping bilateral ties on track, critical infrastructure to support
that objective has eroded. Given their common security disagreements with Washington, Russia
of power. More than 35 years later,

and China are being pushed together again and they seemingly share more security interests than do the

The role of trade and economic ties, meanwhile, long regarded as

the ballast for U.S.-China relations, is becoming increasingly negative due to
the widening discord over exchange rates and Chinas ambition in expanding its
influence within regional economic and financial systems , a move perceived by the
U.S. and China.

U.S. as a challenge to its dominance. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a
month. U.S. scholars and strategists often prefer to attribute Chinas changing pattern of behavior to its
growing power, rather than to any occasional burst of nationalism or efforts to defend its legitimacy. Either
way, given all these changes,

its natural that fluctuations in U.S.-China

relations are being viewed with far greater seriousness today . In the
recent debate within the U.S. over whether Washingtons grand strategy toward China should change, it is
noteworthy that some rational scholars have sought to draw attention to the dangerous shift in mutual
perceptions. In David Lamptons words, The

tipping point is near. Our respective fears

are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization.
This anxiety about the relationship is well justified, both by the louder voices
in America advising a tougher policy to counteract Chinas assertive behavior
and its threat to U.S. primacy in Asia-Pacific, and by Chinas burgeoning
tendency to see the U.S. as the main impediment to its stability and
rejuvenation. In this atmosphere, Xis visit to the U.S. is destined to be more mission oriented than
those of his predecessors. Handling U.S.-China relations in the era of Chinas rise is itself a tough task and
it would be historic to show the world how an emerging and existing power achieve peaceful coexistence,
or co-evolution in the words of certain Chinese scholars. For this purpose, Xi Jinping has put forward a
proposal to construct a new type of great power relations with the U.S. Unfortunately, feedback on the
idea has been chilly. Nevertheless, it is not important that the U.S. accept this new concept; what really
matters is that both countries can achieve new relations in the true sense. It is true that the two powers

have many interests in common, especially in areas of global governance, such as climate change,
terrorism and non-proliferation. This is taken by more optimistic observers as strong justification for U.S.China cooperation. However, close cooperation on these issues will not guarantee the peaceful resolution
of the disputes between them, such as the wrestling over maritime and cyber issues and the inevitable
scramble for financial and economic influence, all of which can be reduced to the redistribution of power

In considering all these fundamental

changes to the bilateral relationship, some strategists in China argue that U.S.-China
and reset of international orders or norms.

relations should focus more on the pluses than on the minuses, which sounds convincing but

the potential risk of setting aside the disputes, especially during a

period of power redistribution or power transition in which both the emerging
and status quo powers are constantly haunted by mutual distrust and fear .
underestimates

Addressing the distrust and fear should be a key mission for both leaders. Doing so would have historic
meaning, both for U.S.-China relations and for a chaotic world. The question, though, is how. First, its quite
understandable that China as a rising power would attempt to defend some of its vital interests at a
minimum level, even if in the past it used to sacrifice them out of weakness or other considerations, such
as domestic stability or a positive international environment. Nor should the U.S. be criticized for seeking
to maintain its dominant position in the region; that inclination is based on a realpolitik principle that holds
for now. China and the U.S. have no choice but to strike a new deal on how to protect Chinas vital interests
without undermining the dominance of the U.S. or its credibility within the alliance system. That will in turn
require crisis control and compromises by both parties for a peaceful redistribution of power and rights.

the traditional pattern of China conceding its interests to the so-called

larger picture of U.S.-China relations is increasingly infeasible. When the U.S. is no
Second,

longer capable of handling regional or global issues on its own, it creates a long-term disconnect between

Perhaps if China did make the

concessions the U.S. expected it would alleviate tensions in U.S.-China
relations for the short term, but it would be unrealistic to expect a rising
power to be taken advantage of or to maintain a status quo that rarely works
in its favor, while simultaneously being asked to take on more responsibilities. This is not
power and international order, which is unsustainable.

simply arguing for the interests of China; it also draws on lessons from past conflicts. Both leaders should
bear in mind that the new model needs to be built on a new balance of power and psychological
expectations, rather than on unilateral concessions by one party. Finally, we should temper our
expectations of Xis visit. In contrast to Dengs visit to the U.S. in 1979, the lack of a common enemy
deprives the bilateral relationship of an obvious direction. Until a new consensus or equilibrium is reached,
the two powers must manage their disputes while seeking cooperation where it is possible. If the leaders of
the U.S. and China are not clearly aware of the arduousness of this long process, any visit or top-level
communication will only add to their illusion, putting the two countries on an undesirable path. In that
sense, the significance of Xis visit to the U.S. and his handling of U.S.-China relations lies in

these

challenges and in the lack of precedent.

Yes fluctuations but SCS conflict operates outside of that

patternThucydides trap, rebalancing and containment
guarantee
Zhang 14 (Zhixin, Chief of American Political Studies of Institute of
American Studies, CICIR. His researches focus on the U.S. politics and USChina relations, Why China has good reason to worry about the US rebalance
strategy, China US Focus, 7/8/2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/why-china-has-good-reason-to-worry-about-the-us-rebalance-strategy/)
KC
With the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) underway, the concern about
the rapid deterioration in relations between China and the U.S. has relaxed to
some degree. Ever since the beginning of the Obama administration , the

fluctuation of Sino-U.S. relations has become the new normality of bilateral

relations. This recent development is simply new evidence for that trend .
However, China still has good reason to worry about the United States rebalancing strategy towards Asia.

This round of ups-and-downs highlighted the structural contradictions

between China and the U.S. Although both countries would like to avoid the
so-called Thucydides Trapdestructive tensions between an emerging power
and established powersfrictions and disputes are still difficult to avert . The
Obama administration is right to pivot to Asia, seeing that future U.S. prosperity and security challenges lie
in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the region is full of potential of economic growth as well as the risk of
proliferation of nuclear weapons from the Northeast Asia. Whats more, the Cold War has not ended yet in
the Korean Peninsula, and the DPRK and ROK are literally still at war with each other. What President

the use of the rebalancing strategy to contain Chinas

rise and squeeze the strategic space of China. This not only risks an irreversible deterioration
of bilateral relations, but also of an early military showdown between the
worlds No. 1 and No. 2 economies, which neither would like to see. For the U.S., the worstcase scenario is forcing the regional countries to choose between China and the U.S. That said, the
recent U.S. aggression towards China are producing such effects anyway. As the
Obama miscalculated, then, is

U.S. constructs a missile defense system in East Asia with the excuse of defending regional alliances,
South Korea is remaining cautious not to irk China, despite strong pressure from the Pentagon. In earlier
June, when the commander of the United States Forces Korea (USFK), Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, said the U.S.
was considering to deploy THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense) in Korea, the South Korean
Defense Ministry spokesperson was very quick to deny this by saying that Seoul had received no such
request from Washington. Some military experts pointed out that such a system would threaten Chinas
highly valued portfolio of ballistic missiles. As such, South Korea is extremely sensitive about the issue.
With U.S. military presence and deployment approaching China, regional countries have good reason to
ask if the U.S. is preparing for war against China. Even more,

U.S. aggression towards China

has alerted some Asian countries. For example, during a recent visit to Washington, the
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott urged President Obama to remain focused on the U.S. strategic pivot
to the region and to not view Chinas rise as a threat. The Australian opposition party leader Tanya
Plibersek made it even clearer, Our alliance with the U.S. is really important to Australia right now, but we
also have a very close relationship with China. The best outcome is to have strengthened, closer
relationships with both. Ms Pliberseks remark showed the reluctance of regional countries that were

The criticism by U.S. officials of Chinas

recent assertiveness in foreign policy and challenging China on its nine-dash line in the
South China Sea inevitably added fuel to the fire of regional territorial disputes. It also
forced to choose sides between two major powers.

emboldened Vietnam and the Philippines to act more provocatively. Top officials from Singapore correctly
pointed out that the regional countries should not ignore the reasonable part of Chinese claims, as the

While the U.S.

repeatedly says that it is not excluding China from regional multilateral
economic and trade negotiations, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it is
actually seen that the opposite is true. This is thus another example of American
aggression against China. A recent example is the United States dissuasion of South Korea from
nine-dash line existed long before the U.N. Convention of the Law of Sea was ratified.

joining the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) proposed by China last November. It is reported
that the U.S. was deeply concerned over the South Koreas participation in the mechanism, as it believes
this would inevitably pose challenges towards the U.S.-dominated international economic order. Such a
move is not unusual for the U.S. When Japan proposed the Asian Monetary Fund in 1990s, the U.S. did not

the U.S. agreed to

development a new type of major power relationship with China , both sides were
hopeful, but they were also doubtful. Such an arrangement is unprecedented and would
therefore be innovative and challenging for both countries. Both sides would like to
avoid confrontations and mange differences. However, if the U.S. frequently
plays tricks in areas like the military, the economy, and trade, as well as
foreign policy, the bilateral relationship will certainly suffer, and mutual
hesitate to strongly oppose it; whats more is that the U.S. succeeded. When

confidence would be more difficult to build. For example, the indictment of five PLA
officials was more of a farce, as humiliation can never achieve one countrys foreign policy objectives.
Recently, more and more strategists from the U.S. began to question the Obama Administrations policy

the
U.S. military deployment in Asia, stating that it was sending a vague message of
containment, and it characterized the interaction between the two countries
as increasingly antagonistic.
towards China. In early June, the former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski criticized

***Laundry List***

Relations Good

Relations good laundry list

US-China relations key to energy security, climate change,
economy, counter terror and disease
Asia Society Center 9
(Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, January 2009 A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on
Energy and Climate Change pg. 6-7 HY)
China and the United States are closely linked through a vast web of
economic, political, and security interests and social networks that have
deepened and broadened through government-to-government collaboration
and through the process of globalization. The result is an interdependent,
bilateral relationship in a world in which the fates of all nations are tied ever
closer together, as evidenced by the rapid internationalization of the 2008 financial crisis. China and the United States
face similar strategic challenges in seeking to strengthen energy security,
combat climate change, and ensure economic growth and prosperity. However,
neither can fully meet these challengesnor can the worldwithout the full
engagement of the other. Nearly four decades ago, a historic rapprochement between the United States and China set in motion the most
far-reaching transformation of the international economic, political, and security order since the aftermath of World War II. In opening the door to a new strategic
relationship in 1972, China and the United States overcame more than 20 years of mutual isolation, ideological rivalry, and intense hostility, inflamed by a hot war in
Korea, a nearconflict over Taiwan, and a proxy war in Vietnam. The initial objective of this rapprochement was the containment and strategic isolation of the Soviet Union,
and one effect was, indeed, to hasten the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European empire, thereby ending the Cold War and creating the conditions
for a more integrated world economy. The subsequent normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979 created the international conditions for Chinas successful opening to
the outside world and its market-based economic reforms, leading not only to the extraordinary reemergence of China on the global stage, but to the acceleration of

. Despite periodic bilateral tensions and differences, the U.S.-China

relationship has contributed significantly to global economic growth and
strategic stability, as well as to solving many pressing political and security
problems. As China has grown immensely more powerful over the last thirty years, the United States and China have not engaged in a destabilizing strategic
competition for regional and global dominance. Rather, leaders in both nations have recognized their increasing
strategic interdependence and have effectively collaborated to solve or
manage regional and global threats and challenges. For example, since 9/11, the two countries have
cooperated quietly and extensively on a wide range of counter-terrorism measures. They have also engaged in sustained and
effective collaboration on proliferation, including the Six Party Talks, to
eliminate North Koreas nuclear weapons program ; establishing collaborative
bilateral and international measures, stimulated by the 2003 SARS epidemic
and the later emerging danger of avian flu, to prevent and contain
pandemics; and consulting at a high level on a daily basis in response to the
fall 2008 global financial crisis. In addition, they have effectively handled the volatile Taiwan issue, leading to more hopeful prospects
globalization

for long-term peace and stability in cross-Strait relations.

US-China cooperation key to global issues including

climate change, trade, cyber and prolif
Patrick and Thaler 10
(Stewart M. Patrick and Farah Faisal Thaler, March 15-17 2010, Council on
Foreign Relations,China, the United States, and Global Governance: Shifting
Foundations of World Order pg1-2 HY)

for effective multilateral cooperation on global and transnational

problems in the twenty first century will inevitably reflect the distinct national interests and
Prospects

international visions of the great powers. But the identity and number of the worlds leading states is changing, creating new challenges and
opportunities for global governance. The world order that ultimately results from this transition period will reflect difficult negotiations between

No
relationship will be more important in shaping prospects for a cooperative
world order than that between the United States and China . Yet the past year has witnessed
established powersincluding the United States, European Union, and Japanand emerging onesincluding China, India, and Brazil.

Sino-American tensions and mutual disillusionment, including acrimony over climate change, currency manipulation, Internet censorship, and
arms sales to Taiwan. It was against this backdrop that the Council on Foreign Relations convened a workshop in Beijing on March 15 17, 2010,
with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. The two-day event brought together more than thirty experts from both
countries to discuss Chinas rise and the evolving world order. The purpose of the meeting was to identify points of Sino-American divergence
and potential areas of bilateral cooperation in addressing a daunting global agenda and in updating the existing institutional architecture of
multilateral collaboration. The workshop underscored the deep and growing interdependence between the United States and China. Indeed,

Sino-American bilateral relations have in a sense become

global relations. Whether the issue is climate change, global trade,
international finance, nuclear proliferation, or cybersecurity, no global
challenge can be successfully addressed without some degree of Sino-U.S.
cooperation. At the same time, the workshop revealed differences in the world order visions, national interests, and foreign policy
given their systemic impact,

priorities of the two countries that unless carefully managed could hamstring effective collaboration on this global agenda, as well as domestic
constraints on the constructive exercise of U.S. and Chinese global leadership.

US-China cooperation is key to solving multiple global

challenges
Fingar and Garrett 13
(Thomas Fingar, Stanford University and Banning Garrett, Atlantic Council
China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, September 2013 pg 9-11
HY)
The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and interdependence, but past achievementsand further progressare
threatened by a host of looming challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their
own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. Governments
everywhere face rising expectations and increasing demands but find themselves less able to manage the challenges they face. The next

most difficult
and most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without
sustained cooperation between the largest developing country, China, and
the largest developed country, the United States . Stated another way, the ability of
China and the United States to work together on critical global challenges will
determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually
beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to the global
future and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China. This
shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just hope that our countries will
find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for
sustained, proactive collaboration to address challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It
builds on the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and
potential game-changers with the goal of developing a framework for the US
China relationship that will better enable us to meet the challenges facing the
global community and the strategic needs of both countries. The Joint Working Group
round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, the

recognizes that China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is
constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and responsibility as major powers are
more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of
bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity

ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our

increasingly intertwined future s. We must cooperate on global challenges not as a favor to one another or because
other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the international system. We must do it because failure to
cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative
consequences for the citizens of our own countries . The Joint Working Group has no illusions about
as is our

how difficult the task ahead will be. Leaders in both countries face relentless domestic pressures to focus on near-term issues, often to the

detriment of long-term interests, as well as on looming US-China bilateral differences and mutual suspicions. This report seeks to illustrate why
it is imperative and how it is possible to pursue long- and short-term interests at the same time.

US-China coop checks multiple hotspots like new military

capabilities, Taiwan, Korea, maritime security, nuclear
modernization and militarization of outer space
Lieberthal and Wang 12
(Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Kenneth Lieberthal is Senior Fellow in Foreign

Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L.
Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Wang Jisi is Director of the
Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of
International Studies at Peking University, March 2012 Addressing U.S.-China
Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series Number4, pg 13, HY)

When it comes to mutual strategic distrust, the military/security sphere is

both important and pernicious. We therefore focus especially on ideas to reduce distrust in this realm.
Strategic postures The United States and China are now making significant
decisions regarding both doctrine and investments in military capability . Broadly,
the U.S. is reducing anticipated military expenditures and at the same time reconfiguring forces to assure that American
goals in the Asia-Pacific can be met. China is in the midst of a significant buildup of its military capabilities to be
commensurate with its increasing regional and global activities and interests. Their respective efforts are likely to
contribute to increased strategic mistrust unless the two sides address a central question: what array of military
deployments and normal operations will permit China to defend its core security interests and at the same time allow
America to continue to meet fully its obligations to its allies and friends in the region? The answer will not be completely
comfortable for either sideChinas military is already developing capabilities to force changes in American platforms and
plans, and Beijing cannot realistically hope to achieve the capacity to dominate the surrounding seas out to the first island
chain against determined American efforts to prevent that domination. As of now, each side is developing doctrines that
are ill-understood by the otherChina talks about securing the near seas and the U.S. talks in terms of an Air-Sea Battle
doctrine that is now evolving into a Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). These doctrines both reflect and shape threat
perceptions. Almost unique to the military sphere, moreover, is that decisions are made in anticipation of requirements
10-20 years from now, as it generally takes that long to move from initial agreement to develop a major new weapons
system to integration of the actual system into combat capability and doctrine. Each side, in addition, as best it can
monitors the decisions the other side is making about this long-term future and reacts accordingly. While the specific
concerns and operational assumptions behind each doctrine are opaque, each is increasingly being couched in terms that
can easily justify escalating military expenditures as both militaries attempt to achieve basically unattainable levels of
certainty. U.S. analysis regards China as having adopted an anti-access and area denial strategy, but many details about
Chinese aspirations are very unclear. The Chinese side is anxious over its lack of understanding of either the Air Sea Battle
Concept or the new JOAC. There is, therefore, now a pressing need for a serious discussion of the respective doctrines and

This cries
out for top political leaders to step in and, along with their
militaries, discuss principles and accommodations that give each
side reasonable certainty about its core security interests through a
set of understandings and agreements that include steps embodying
mutual restraint on development and deployment of particularly
destabilizing weapons systems and platforms. Such discussions also need to probe
their relationship to various decisions about deployment of military capabilities as pertains to Asia.

each sides goals and expectations on such sensitive issues as the Korean peninsula and Taiwan in order to improve

Mutual
restraint on new capabilities: This is a particularly important topic
because many capabilities are being developed in direct response to
what the other side is doing. Demonstration of the viability of
commitments to mutual restraint may in turn increase mutual trust . The history of
mutual understanding and build greater trust. Specifically, such discussions might fruitfully address:

international arms control agreements highlights that this is an area worth pursuing. Anticipating future possibilities in

Mutual discussion of potential long-term futures for the Korean

peninsula can elucidate each others goals and possibly engender
Korea:

new ideas about how to achieve mutually agreed upon outcomes .

Even the process of holding such discussions may create better mutual
understanding and reduce the bases for strategic distrust. This is not a suggestion to try
to develop a U.S.-China agreement that can be used to dictate to the governments in North and South Korea or to impinge

Both
sides want to work toward a peaceful resolution of existing
differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. U.S. weapons
sales to Taiwan are viewed in Washington and Taipei as a necessary
ingredient for sustaining the confidence of U.S. support in Taipei necessary for
Taipei to continue to develop wide ranging cross-Strait relations. Those same
sales in Beijing are viewed as confirming American arrogance and
determination to interfere in Chinas domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful
unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese
interest. Washington and Beijing should engage in serious discussion
of the overall security situation surrounding the Taiwan Strait . Lack
of such discussion has contributed to having each side make worst
case assumptions in their acquisition and deployment of military
resources, enhancing mutual distrust and ultimately potentially reducing the
chances of maintaining the peace in the Taiwan Strait that both sides desire .
Maritime security: Maritime security discussions already take place and have
produced a U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement,
but there remains significant room for expansion and enhancement
of those discussions.8 It is worth considering whether there are steps that
might address U.S. security concerns in a way that reduces Washingtons
perceived need to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence activities just
beyond Chinas territorial waters and air space . Nuclear modernization and
militarization of outer space: Each of these spheres exhibits all of the
characteristics of a classic security dilemma, where measures taken
to enhance defensive capabilities by one side are seen as
threatening and requiring commensurate measures by the other.
These are spheres in which greater mutual transparency, potential
agreements on specific areas of mutual restraint, and deeper
understanding of respective concerns and doctrines can potentially
reduce the chances of destabilizing changes occurring in these
technologically dynamic realms.
upon their sovereign rights, which is not a feasible or desirable objective. Reducing distrust over Taiwan:

Defense

A2 Relations solve disease

US-China cooperation on disease cant solve- different
ideological goals and China looks like a hypocrite
Miller 14. The U.S.-China Perception Monitor website aims to mitigate
tensions between the U.S. and China by creating innovative channels for
building trust, facilitating collaboration between the two countries in critical
areas around the world, and raising mutual awareness of common interests.
[Is There Room for U.S.-China Cooperation on the Ebola Crisis? (Part I) USChina Perception Monitor US-China Young Scholars Forum Travis M. Miller
October 13th, 2014 URL: http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2014/10/13/is-thereroom-for-u-s-china-cooperation-on-the-ebola-crisis-part-one/]
While both China and the U.S. share an interest in containing the spread of
infectious disease in Africa, their intentions for doing so may perhaps remain
ideologically at odds. Such circumstances are hardly unique within this complex relationship, and
with U.S.-China relations come decades of misperceptions and distrust of
intentions. However, the scope of potential reasons on behalf of both states for desiring a cessation to
the outbreak of Ebola and other deadly disease in Africa still each arrive at a conclusion that involves

The presence of Chinese investment on the

continent of Africa is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Last year
marked a fifth consecutive year that China remained Africas largest trade
partner, and foreign direct investment from China to Africa was measured at
US$15 billion in 2012. As trade and investment by the Chinese in Africa continues to increase
immensely on an annual basis, such interdependency has established a need in
fostering a stable environment for economic growth to persist . Funding and
humanitarian action in some capacity.

construction of infrastructure (China pledged US$20 billion for such activities alone in 2013) has created a
two-fold benefit for the Chinese by both creating opportunities to earn government contracts from African
states while also strengthening the means by which Chinese resource industries based out of the African

Some in the West, such as the European Parliament,

have rushed to declare these practices as neo-colonialist , but the opposite end of the
continent can transport materials.

spectrum would cite an interest by the Chinese in forging stronger relations with unique and untapped
foreign markets for the exportation of goods. As Deborah Brautagam notes in The Dragons Gift: The Real

Chinas approach is not solely focused on resource

extraction but on developing business in the region. This process of the
spread of capitalism is remarkably reminiscent of the Western economic
ideologies advocated for hundreds of years; it is simply being conducted in
exclusion of non-Western nations. While infrastructure is crucial for industry to prosper, just as
Story of China in Africa,

necessary are safe living conditions in which companies and workers are willing to brave thousands of
miles to relocate to. With estimates of over one million Chinese currently living across the African
continent, the push to attract greater business initiatives will require migrants to believe that they will
prosper relatively uninhibited overseas. The Ebola crisis in West Africa has affected the ability of Chinese
companies to conduct business in the region. A Chinese diplomat was quoted as claiming that while the
nearly 1,500 Chinese workers in Liberia face little risk of exposure to Ebola, the disease has negatively
impacted the operations of many Chinese businesses. Xue Xiaoming, vice-chairman of the Chinese
Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Nigeria, stated that many potential Chinese companies looking to
invest in what has become Africas largest economy have put existing plans on hold in response to
international airlines suspending flights to Ebola-affected countries. This economic interest may have
stirred up humanitarian aid by China in combating Ebola in West Africa. The relief efforts mark a rare action
on their behalf when referring to overall global Chinese humanitarian aid.

While China has quickly

developed into the worlds second largest economy, the state ranked 29th in
2012 in international monetary humanitarian aid, remaining in stark contrast
from its Western economic equivalents in terms of assistance. The continent
of Africa represents a historical anomaly in traditional Chinese humanitarian
efforts. For China, the state has dispatched over 20,000 medical practitioners to Africa dating back to
Mao Zedongs regime. Chinese workers worldwide administered over 240 million medical treatments in 71
countries, 45 of which located in Africa. These efforts were curbed under Deng Xiaoping when the state
turned its efforts towards intensive economic development, perhaps a signal that the previous decades of

From the
American perspective, the amount China has donated still reflects only a
fraction of U.S. humanitarian monetary assistance . Even in West Africa, the U.S. (ranked
work was not simply mercantilist policy but the result of humanitarian inspiration.

1st in 2012 in humanitarian assistance donations) allocated US$100 million to aid in the Ebola crisis
through U.S.A.I.D. (United States Agency for International Development) as of September 2014, with
congress assessing whether to send an additional amount in the form of C.D.C. personnel and equipment
that would bring the overall total of U.S. aid to US$250 million. This is despite not possessing the same
breadth of business interests as China in the region (only trading at a rate of nearly half that of China
within the continent). However, the organizational purposes of U.S.A.I.D., to end extreme poverty and to
promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity, reflect the myriad of

criticism has
been levied against the American government from multiple angles, accusing
the U.S. of overseeing the distribution of aid only to favorable regime-types
or attaching political structural adjustment requirements in order to become
a recipient. Still, regardless of motivations, both states have seemingly formed a stake in aiding the
intentions behind humanitarian aid donations backed by the U.S. government. Indeed,

West African nations.

A2 Relations solve terrorism

China uses counter-terrorism cooperation with the US to
exacerbate oppressive policiesETIM
Drennan 15 (Justine Drennan, fellow at Foreign Policy, 2-10-2015, "Is
China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/is-china-making-its-own-terrorismproblem-worse-uighurs-islamic-state/) NV
Meanwhile, its unclear if the group Beijing singles out as the greatest threat, the East Turkestan Islamic

The
Chinese government first mentioned ETIM in a vaguely sourced document in 2001,
shortly after then-U.S. President George W. Bush announced his global war on
terror. In it, China called the group a major component of the terrorist
network headed by Osama bin Laden. United States seemed to agree that
ETIM posed a real threat, listing the group as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist group in 2002 and detaining 22 Uighurs captured in Afghanistan and
Pakistan at Guantnamo Bay. Some were held for more than a decade, though the United
States later acknowledged that it didnt have adequate evidence against
them. Just over a year ago it sent the last three to Slovakia one of a handful of small countries that
agreed to host them. But George Washington Universitys Roberts concluded in a 2012
paper titled Imaginary Terrorism? that Washington also may have inflated the Uighur
threat. The Uighur detainees at Guantnamo who said theyd received jihadi training described a
Movement, comprises a distinct, self-identified terrorist entity or a looser grouping of individuals.

training camp in Afghanistan that amounted to a small, run-down shack. The highlight, in Robertss words:
A one-time opportunity to fire a few bullets with the only Kalashnikov rifle that was available at the camp.

detainees expressed anger about Chinese rule, they all denied belonging to ETIM,
and many said theyd never heard of the group. Roberts has argued that the United
States may have backed Chinas claims about ETIM in order to cement Chinas
support for the occupation of Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. Nevertheless, various
Although

international terrorism analysts continued to perpetuate the allegations about ETIM in work that cited

China uses
this echo chamber of supposed evidence about ETIM to keep alive the idea of an
international Uighur threat, conflating ETIM with the newer, propagandaproducing Turkistan Islamic Party. A U.S. State Department official told Foreign
Policy that the United States designated ETIM a terrorist group after careful
study, having concluded that its members were responsible for terrorism in
China and were planning attacks on U.S. interests abroad, but declined to
specify the sources of this information. The official added that the government still
government statements as their primary sources. According to Georgetowns Millward,

maintains this listing. Officials at Washingtons Chinese Embassy and Chinas State Council didnt return

What worries Human Rights Watchs Bequelin, as

several countries including the United States move to scale up counterterrorism
cooperation with China, isnt so much that other countries believe Chinas
inflated claims. Its more that the need to cooperate on security and other
goals may mean de facto acceptance of, or even practical assistance for,
Chinas repressive policies.
repeated calls and emails seeking comment.

Chinese internal conflict undermines counter-terrorism

efforts
Poh 15 (Angela Poh, PhD Candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, The Diplomat, 7-28-2015, "Uyghur Terrorism: A
Misnomer?," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/uyghur-terrorism-amisnomer/) NV
However, it is critical for both Beijing and the international community to
recognize that the uneasy coexistence between the Uyghurs and Chinas Han
majority is a deep-rooted socio-economic problem. Chinas Uyghur problem
was not created by the September 11 attacks or the rise of the Islamic State.
Ethnic tensions and violence in Xinjiang stem from decades worth of
discrimination, perceived religious and cultural suppression, and economic
disparities. Conflating domestic protest with international terrorism which
both Beijing and the international media are guilty of in the case of the
Uyghurs is unhelpful for two reasons. First, it is a distraction. It reduces the
pressure for governments to resolve domestic problems and tensions. This
could result in further resentment and alienation among groups marginalized
by state policies, and increase the allure of a violent but radically different
world such as that promised by the Islamic State. Second, as Brian Jenkins
from the RAND Corporation suggested: Some governments are prone to
label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents .
what is called terrorism thus seems to depend on ones point of view. Overly
broad definitions of terrorism can allow governments to label and punish
dissenters as terrorists. Governments may therefore be tempted by a readymade narrative to back up the claim that domestic unrest derives from
outside influences rather than from authentic local concerns. This carries the
risk of undermining the legitimacy of genuine international counter-terrorism
efforts.

Chinas false claims of ETIM terrorism are a self-fulfilling

prophecyfear and marginalization
Drennan 15 (Justine Drennan, fellow at Foreign Policy, 2-10-2015, "Is
China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/is-china-making-its-own-terrorismproblem-worse-uighurs-islamic-state/) NV
an SUV crashed through a crowd at Beijings Tiananmen Square in late 2013, killing
The attackers, they
said, had been members of Chinas Uighur Muslim minority, with links to
many international extremist terrorist groups. Police said they found a flag bearing jihadi
emblems in the crashed vehicle and blamed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, or ETIM, a
group named after the independent state China says some Uighurs want to
establish in the far-western region of Xinjiang. After the attack, Foreign Ministry
spokeswoman Hua Chunying called ETIM Chinas most direct and realistic
When

two bystanders and injuring 40, it didnt take Chinese officials long to name culprits.

security threat. Beijing has long characterized cases of Uighur violence as

organized acts of terrorism and accused individual attackers of having ties to
international jihadi groups. Back in 2001, China released a document claiming that
Eastern Turkistan terrorists had received training from Osama bin Laden
and the Taliban and then fought in combats in Afghanistan, Chechnya and
Uzbekistan, or returned to Xinjiang for terrorist and violent activities. Since
then, China has frequently blamed ETIM for violence in Xinjiang and
elsewhere. But scholars, human rights groups, and Uighur advocates argue
that China is systematically exaggerating the threat Uighurs pose to justify its
repressive policies in Xinjiang. The regions onetime-majority Uighur population of roughly 10 million,
which is ethnically Turkic, has been marginalized for decades by ethnic Han Chinese migrants that Beijing has encouraged

The repression has been

getting worse. Since the regions bloody ethnic clashes in 2009, the government has increased
regulations on Muslim practices, restricting veils and beards and strictly
enforcing rules that prohibit many from fasting during Ramadan or visiting
mosques. Heightened security operations have led in some cases to
imprisonment, executions, and suspected torture . Government materials about how to spot
extremists (hint: they tend to look like Uighurs) elide religiosity with terrorism. Now, with the rise of the
Islamic State, China has again ramped up its claims about Uighurs waging
international jihad. Chinese government-run Global Times asserted in December that
to move there in the hope that theyd help integrate the restive region into China.

about 300 Chinese extremists were fighting alongside ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and in January that another 300 had

suggested that many were terrorists

from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. On Thursday, Global Times said ISIS had executed
traveled to Malaysia en route to joining the group. The reports

one of these Uighur recruits in September and two in December when they tried to flee its control, attributing the
information to an anonymous Kurdish official. Many experts dismiss Global Timess numbers. I assume there are
Uighurs joining ISIS, but I also assume the numbers are quite small in comparison to other groups throughout the world,
said Sean Roberts, a George Washington University professor who studies the minority group. Were probably talking
about 20 to 30 people max. Nicholas Bequelin, a Hong-Kong-based senior researcher with Human Rights Watch,

called Chinese medias figure of 300 implausibly high.

Its likely that the rise of the

experts
say any increase in Uighur extremism is largely due to the fact that the very
policies China says are meant to combat terrorism have actually made the
threat worse. Chinese reports about hundreds of Uighurs fighting with the Islamic State are likely
intended to make the Uighurs look as if theyre a threat, an Islamist terrorist
organization, said Dru Gladney, an anthropologist who studies ethnic identities in China. Several international
media outlets havere peated the numbers from Chinese media. But Chinas inflated claims are
ultimately counterproductive, Gladney said. They create more fear
and marginalization, which exacerbates the problem. China isnt wholly
Islamic State has given a few disenfranchised young Uighurs a cause to fight and potentially die for. Still,

inventing the threat. Propaganda material from a group China links to ETIM that calls itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)
suggests there are at least 30 to 40 Uighur jihadis in Syria and Iraq, according to Washington Institute for Near East Policy
fellow Aaron Zelin, who runs the website Jihadology.net. TIP has an increasingly active online presence thatincludes
footage of young children firing guns in mountain valleys. In recent years, it has also claimed responsibility for attacks like
the Tiananmen Square SUV incident via videos in which its purported leader, Abdullah Mansour, has called for more
attacks. But many researchers doubt TIPs claims, as its accounts of attacks often contradict facts on the ground that
dont seem to indicate the sophistication of internationally organized terrorist operations. The general consensus,
according to Georgetown professor James Millward, is that radicalized Uighur expats, who mostly seem to be based in
Pakistan rather than Iraq and Syria, havent provided any operational support for recent violence in China, but rather just
propaganda. And any who are fighting with Middle Eastern jihadi groups dont seem to be rising very high in their ranks,

China, however, has been quick

to label moderate Uighurs who speak out as radicals . Last year a Xinjiang
court sentenced Uighur professor Ilham Tohti to life in prison on charges of
separatism, for running a website that discussed Uighur experiences in the
said Raffaello Pantucci, an analyst at Londons Royal United Services Institute.

region. The United States condemned Tohtis sentence, with Secretary of State John Kerry warning that silencing
moderate voices can only make tensions worse. Indeed, acts of apparent Uighur terrorism within China have risen
sharply over the past couple years. An attack last March by eight knife-wielding men and women at a train station in
Yunnan provinces city of Kunming left 29 dead and at least 130 wounded. In April, people armed with knives and
explosives killed three and injured 79 at the railway station in Xinjiangs capital, Urumqi. The next month, attackers
crashed two cars into shoppers at an Urumqi market and set off explosives, killing 31 and injuring more than 90. The
Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, the leading advocacy organization for the minority (which uses an alternate
spelling of the groups name), condemns violence but says China uses the threat of terrorism to stifle peaceful dissent as
well. Alim Seytoff, the Washington spokesman for the group, told Foreign Policy by email that he didnt know whether any
Uighurs had joined ISIS, but if they had, they by no means represent the vast majority of peace-loving Uyghur people,
just as those who joined ISIS from the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Europe by no means represent the freedom-loving

China is
conflating the Uyghur peoples legitimate demands for human rights,
religious freedom, and democracy with international Islamic terrorism , he said.
peoples of America, Great Britain, Australia and Europe. In order to deflect criticism of its Xinjiang policies,

Gladney, the anthropologist, said any Uighurs with ties to ISIS were more likely driven by resentment of China than by
aims of global jihad. They may want militant training to fight China and even to establish a Uighur state, he said, but
theyre less interested in creating a global caliphate. Analysts also note that those who do desire a global caliphate seem
to have little more than a passing interest in Uighurs relatively parochial aspirations, despite some tokengestures, such as
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadis reference to Chinese violations of Muslim rights last July, and exaggerated claims about such
abuses made last fall by an al Qaeda-run magazine.

***North Korea***

Relations Good

Relations good North Korea mod***

Nuclear conflict caused by North Korea can be avoided
through collaboration of the United States and China.
Sam Nunn, member of the U.S. Senate (D-Ga.) from 1972 to 1997, is cochairman and chief executive of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 5/26/16, ON
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NATIONS MUST COOPERATE TO AVOID CATASTROPHE,
The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/on-nuclearweapons-nations-must-cooperate-to-avoid-catastrophe/2016/05/26/f5af4c4c21e0-11e6-9e7f-57890b612299_story.html
Around the world, leaders must take practical steps to reduce nuclear risks
now: First, the agreement to curb Irans nuclear program has significant
regional and global implications for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.
All parties must live up to their commitments, assuring full implementation.
Second, North Koreas nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threaten
regional stability in Northeast Asia. We must work closely with our allies in
South Korea and Japan to stop these programs and eliminate nuclear
weapons from the Korean Peninsula. China must play a vital role in this joint
venture if we are to avoid this nuclear nightmare without military conflict.
Third, we should build on the progress to secure nuclear materials that
Obama and other leaders have made at the four Nuclear Security Summits.
Leaders must sustain the momentum of the summits and develop a global
nuclear security system that covers all weapons-usable nuclear materials,
including those held for military purposes. We must also make an all-out
global effort to secure dangerous radiological materials and prevent a
terrorist dirty bomb. Fourth, the United States and Russia cannot afford to
treat dialogue as a bargaining chip when our two countries hold more than 90
percent of the worlds nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
materials. Most urgently, Washington and Moscow must rebuild a bridge of
cooperation to ensure that neither the Islamic State nor any other violent
extremist group acquires nuclear, radiological or other weapons of mass
destruction. A joint working group should be formed to develop priorities and
an action plan to prevent catastrophic terrorism a threat to both of our
nations and the world. Fifth, nuclear weapon states should avoid reckless
rhetoric that can lead to disastrous mistakes. Split-second decisions made by
those directly responsible for nuclear weapons and warning systems can be
affected by the surrounding atmosphere. A poisoned political climate can lead
to miscalculation, turning a false warning caused by a software glitch or a
cyber attack into a nuclear exchange. Sixth, in Washington, the question of
How much nuclear is enough? must be asked and weighed against other
urgent defense needs, with a focus on the need for stability among nuclear
weapon states. Perry has called for a review of whether we should phase out
our land-based missile force and for canceling plans to build a new airlaunched nuclear cruise missile. Considering the growing terrorist threat, both

the United States and Russia should reexamine the current practice of storing
hundreds of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. We must also bring the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty a powerful nonproliferation tool
into force globally, including by securing U.S. Senate approval. Finally, it
defies human nature to build trust when weapons remain postured for mutual
assured destruction. Washington and Moscow together must carefully
dismount the nuclear tiger by reducing first-strike capabilities and fears,
increasing warning and decision time for leaders and improving the
survivability of their nuclear forces. We must escape the trap of continuing
this high-risk and costly policy, with the likelihood of other nations following
in our footsteps.

Relations good NoKo solvency

Strong US China relations are key to check North Korean
escalation and manage the Korean Peninsula- that checks
nuclear escalation, chemical warfare, drone deployment,
and cyberwarfare
Gady 16 [Franz-Stefan, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, 3-19-2016, SinoUS Cooperation Over North Korea Is Now More Important Than Ever, The
Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/sino-us-cooperation-over-northkorea-is-now-more-important-than-ever/]-DD
China and the United States share the same short-term interests on
the Korean Peninsula, perhaps best summarized in Beijings longstanding policy vis--vis North Korea of no war, no instability, no
nukes. () Neither side is interested in a military solution to ongoing tensions between
North and South Korea. Neither party, despite US rhetoric to the contrary, wants to topple the Kim Jong-un
regime and see the North descend into chaos amid a succession or unification crisis. And neither Beijing
nor Washington desire a nuclear-armed North Korea further fueling tensions in an already volatile region of
Asia. China and the United States continue to disagree on the right tactical approach to achieving these
three objectivesthe former preferring quiet diplomacy and continuous engagement with Pyongyang, the
latter favoring publicly pressuring the regime with sanctions to change its behavior and both countries
also pursue markedly different long-term strategic goals on the Korean Peninsula. However, the Obama
administrations policy of strategic patience (putting pressure on the regime while calling for North Korea
to return to the Six-Party Talks) is a de facto acceptance of the unlikelihood of the reunification of North
and South Korea in the near future. As a consequence, there will be no way around Kim Jong-un in the
years ahead, and Beijing and Washington will have to find a way to deal with the regime, no matter how
distasteful. Apart from this apparent confluence of Chinese and US interests, there are three reasons why
both countries need to cooperate more tightly than ever on managing the ongoing crisis on the Korean
Peninsula. First, given the Republic of Korea (ROK) governments uncompromising stance with respect to
North Korean provocations, there will be an increased chance of more severe inter-Korean crises occurring
over the next two years. (There will be little chance of a Korean-led dtente initiative until the end of the
presidency of Park Geun-hye in 2018, given the governments current policies.) Second, notwithstanding
repeated calls for putting a military option back on the table, a large-scale joint US-ROK military

ongoing tensions on
the Korean Peninsula have the potential to undermine trust and increase
military competition between China and the United States, a development
that is set to detrimentally affect overall Sino-US relations and cannot be in
the interest of either party. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a
operation against North Korea is increasingly becoming less realistic. Third,

month. Seoul, under the government of Park Geun-hye and after repeated provocations from the North,
has abandoned engagement and stepped up its bellicose rhetoric and uncompromising stance against
North Korea. Over the last decades, both sides have mastered the game of bringing tensions to the
precipice and then pulling back. However, as tensions rise, there is less and less flexibility in this perennial
brinkmanship with both sides in danger of losing control during a future confrontation as martial
propaganda and provocations will reach unprecedented heights. In addition, there is little understanding
how much control Kim Jong-un genuinely exercises over the military and the party and whether they would
stand down in the face of South Korean provocations when given the order by the supreme leader. Certain
South Korean policies have also helped to further fuel tensions. For example, ever since 2010, South Korea
has implemented a disproportional response theory of deterrence. As John Delury, a professor at Yonsei
University, explained in an interview with The Diplomat: Seoul has proclaimed that for every one shot
fired by the North, the South will hit back with 3 to 5 times greater force. That principle for deterring the
North along the contested maritime border seems to apply to the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] as well. This
concept of deterrence increases the chance of an escalating spiral of attacks and counter-attacks that
could eventually lead to full-scale war. A military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has the potential to
once more draw in both the United States and China. Beijing is committed to the defense of the North

under the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, whereas the
United States and South Korea have kept a mutual defense treaty since 1953. However, China has
repeatedly said that in a conflict provoked by the North, it would not uphold its treaty obligations. (Indeed,
according to a US scholar, China has tried to have the clause requiring it to defend North Korea revoked.)
Any type of large-scale military operation on the Korean Peninsula will almost certainly involve large-scale
destruction of human life and property. As the commander of US forces in South Korea, General Curtis
Scaparrotti recently testified: Given the size of the forces and the weaponry involved, this would be more
akin to the Korean War and World War IIvery complex, probably high casualty. North Korean artillery
could shell Seoul with thousands of rounds within the first hour of a full-scale war. Yet, certain weapon

Next to an arsenal of
approximately 700 (potentially nuclear-armed) Soviet-designed
short-range ballistic missiles (and an unknown number of
intermediate-range and long-range missiles), North Korea also has
one of the worlds largest chemical weapons stockpiles including
mustard, phosgene, and sarin gas. According to a RAND study cited
by the Congressional Research Service, One ton of the chemical
weapon sarin could cause tens of thousands of fatalities.
Pyongyang has also made substantial investments in special
operations forces, cyber weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles to
offset the Souths conventional military advantage. Even short of full-scale
systems could make a confrontation even worse than the Korean War.

war, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula have the potential to derail the Sino-US relationship. For
example, China vehemently is opposing the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to
South Korea. Yet, Pyongyangs nuclear and missile tests over the last couple of weeks, finally convinced
Seoul to move forward with plans to station the US missile defense system in the South. China sees the
deployment of THAAD as an outright provocation not only designed to thwart North Koreas missiles but
also its own military power. We are firmly opposed to the deployment of the THAAD system on the Korean
Peninsula and urge relevant parties to act cautiously. No harm shall be done to Chinas strategic security
interests, Chinas Foreign Ministry spokesperson said in March 2016. While Washington and Seoul could
have used the potential deployment of THAAD merely as a threat to obtain Chinas cooperation on
imposing tougher UN sanctions on North Korea (something US diplomats have denied), the diplomatic
consequences of stationing THAAD in South Korea could hobble the Sino-US strategic relationship and
cause China to retaliate in other areas, for example in the South China Sea or in cyberspace, where it feels

This could further fuel the ongoing US-China arms

race in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, given ongoing inter-Korean
political dynamics, the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on the
Korean Peninsula, and the potential of ongoing inter-Korean crises to disrupt
and damage the China-US relationship, it is of vital interest to both Beijing
and Washington to craft a more constructive approach towards North Korea,
centered around dialogue and persistent diplomatic initiatives and despite a
new set of UN sanctions. As John Delury noted in an email exchange with The Diplomat:
threatened by US military power.

Sanctions work best when implemented and more important lifted in the context of negotiation, and a
robust diplomatic process backed by political will on both [all] sides. This does not necessarily mean the
resumption of Six-Party Talks, but rather quiet backdoor channel diplomacy laying the groundwork for
future negotiations. A diplomatic deal with the United States and South Korea might be useful for Kim Jongun at this juncture given that it would cement his legitimacy in the upcoming Seventh Korean Workers
Party Congress in May 2016. We

should stop fighting the idea of his [Kim Jong-uns]

existence, and instead use our leverage inherent in helping him deepen his
legitimacy to get things we want, according to Delury. One sign that the
United States would be open to such a dialogue, presumably spearheaded by
China, is that US Secretary of State John Kerry on February 23rd did not
outright dismiss the suggestion of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to
pursue in parallel tracks the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the
replacement of the Korean armistice with a peace agreement. For the time
being and no matter how unpleasant, Beijing and Washington have a vested

interest in stable relations with Pyongyang and the timing might just be right
for a concerted Sino-US diplomatic effort. Indeed, it is a political necessity.

Only US-China coop can solve North Korea threatalienating China risks increasing Chinese aid to North
Korea
Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin 16 [Emma Chanlett (specialist in Asian
affairs), Ian E. (analyst in Asian Affairs), Mary Beth D. (specialist in
nonproliferation), Congresstional Research Service, North Korea: U.S.
Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, 1-15-2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf]-DD
U.S. policy to pressure North Korea depends heavily on Chinas influence. In
addition to being North Koreas largest trading partner by faraccounting for
about 70% of North Koreas total tradeChina also provides food and energy
aid that is an essential lifeline for the regime in Pyongyang. Chinas
overriding priority appears to be to prevent the collapse of North Korea.
Analysts assess that Beijing fears the destabilizing effects of a humanitarian
crisis, significant refugee flows over its borders, and the uncertainty of how
other nations, particularly the United States, would assert themselves on the
peninsula in the event of a power vacuum. Beijing is supporting joint industrial projects
between Chinas northeastern provinces and North Koreas 14 See, for example, Jonathan D. Pollack, No
Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2011); North Korea:
Beyond the Six-Party Talks, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 269, June 16, 2015. 15 Choe Sanghun, North Korea Vows to Keep Nuclear Arms and Fix Economy, New York Times, March 31, 2013. 16
DPRK NDC Issues Statement Refuting UNSC Resolution, Korean Central News Agency (North Korea),
January 24, 2013. Congressional Research Service 9 northern border region. Some Chinese leaders also
may see strategic value in having North Korea as a buffer between China and democratic, U.S.-allied

since 2010 an increasing number of Chinese

academics have called for a reappraisal of Chinas friendly ties with
North Korea, citing the material and reputational costs to China of
maintaining such ties. The rhetorical emphasis Chinese leaders now place on denuclearization
South Korea. However,

of the Korean Peninsulareportedly even in meetings with North Korean officialsmay suggest that

Beijings patience could be waning. In what is viewed by many observers

as a diplomatic snub, Chinese President Xi Jinping has had several summits
with South Korean President Park Geun-hye but has yet to meet with the
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Despite this apparent cooling in relations,
Beijing remains an obstacle to many U.S. policy goals. Imposing harsher
punishments on North Korea in international fora, such as the United Nations,
is hindered by Chinas seat on the UNSC . However, Chinese trade with and aid to North
Korea is presumed to be a fraction of what it might be if Beijing decided to fully support Kim Jong-un. This

assumption is a key factor driving the U.S. and South Korean approach, which
seeks to avoid pushing China to a place where it feels compelled to provide
more diplomatic and economic assistance to North Korea.

North Korea has chemical weapons that can be used

against Japan and South Korea
Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin 16 [Emma Chanlett (specialist in Asian
affairs), Ian E. (analyst in Asian Affairs), Mary Beth D. (specialist in
nonproliferation), Congresstional Research Service, North Korea: U.S.
Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, 1-15-2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf]-DD
According to congressional testimony by Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, North Korea

North Korea is widely

reported to possess a large arsenal of chemical weapons, including
mustard, phosgene, and sarin gas. Open source reporting estimates
that North Korea has approximately 12 facilities where raw
chemicals, precursors, and weapon agents are produced and/or
stored, as well as six major storage depots for chemical weapons.31
North Korea is estimated to have a chemical weapon production
capability up to 4,500 metric tons during a typical year and 12,000
tons during a period of crisis, with a current inventory of 2,500 to 5,000 tons, according to
has one of the worlds largest chemical weapons stockpiles.30

the South Korean Ministry of National Defense.32 A RAND analysis says that 1 ton of the chemical weapon

if North Korea at some point

decides to attack one or more of its neighbors, South Korea and Japan would
be the most likely targets.33 North Korea is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons
sarin could cause tens of thousands of fatalities and that

Convention (CWC) which bans the use and stockpiling of chemical weapons. North Korea is suspected of

The United States intelligence

community continues to judge that North Korea has a biotechnology
infrastructure to support such a capability, and has a munitions production
capacity that could be used to weaponize biological agents .34 South Koreas
maintaining an ongoing biological weapons production capability.

Ministry of National Defense estimated in 2012 that the DPRK possesses anthrax and smallpox, among
other weapons agents.35

A2 China-NoKo relations foil coop

China and North Korea relations strained now
Avery, Rinehart, and Nikitin 16 [Emma Chanlett (specialist in Asian
affairs), Ian E. (analyst in Asian Affairs), Mary Beth D. (specialist in
nonproliferation), Congresstional Research Service, North Korea: U.S.
Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, 1-15-2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf]-DD
Chinas reaction to the testa strongly-worded criticism that stressed the
need for North Korea to denuclearizeseemed to confirm Beijings strained
relations with Pyongyang. Under Kim Jongun, now entering his fifth year in power, Chinas
role as North Koreas benefactor and protector appears to have
diminished. Yet China still provides critical assistance and trade to the isolated nation and does not
appear to have adjusted its fundamental strategic calculus that opposes a collapse of the regime, fearing a
flood of refugees and instability on its border. Following the test, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said
that China could not continue business as usual and that its approach to North Korea had not been
successful.3 Chinese officials retorted that U.S. policy bore much of the blame for North Koreas moves

that this testy exchange exposed a

stark gap between Beijing and Washingtons approach to North Korea , a
toward a nuclear capability. Some analysts pointed out
development that may have pleased Pyongyang.

Defense

Relations bad A2 relations solve NoKo

China wont help US in denuclearizing NoKo
Bandow 6/23 (Doug Bandow, Senior fellow at the Cato Institute, How to
win chinas aid on North Korea: stop forcing Beijing to choose between the US
and the North, Cato Institute, 6/23/2016,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-win-chinas-aid-northkorea-stop-forcing-beijing-choose-between-us-north) KC
China is not happy with its long-time ally next door. North Koreas Kim Jong-un has yet to be invited to visit. Beijing
implemented the latest round of United Nations sanctions against Pyongyang. Unofficial criticism of the North is

Washington continues to make it difficult for

the PRC to abandon the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea . The Obama
administration appears to expect Beijing to simply choose America over the
DPRK. That is not likely to happen. The U.S. and China both oppose North
Koreas acquisition of nuclear weapons . Thats about it, however. They look at
most other aspects of the issue differently, including how much emphasis to place
on denuclearization. If the administration hopes to enlist Beijings aid, it needs to make possible a compromise
outcome which respects the PRCs interests. For Beijing, the North is a geopolitical buffer . Barely
ubiquitous in the Peoples Republic of China. Yet,

a year after proclaiming the PRCs formation, Mao Zedong took his country into war against America to prevent the latter

the Peoples Liberation

Army retains a special interest in the North, and the Communist Party, not
Foreign Ministry, handles Chinese relations with the North . Although propinquity should
from occupying the DPRK and deploying forces along the Yalu River. Decades later

matter less for security in a world filled with nuclear-tipped intercontinental missiles, the PRC appears to be no more
receptive today to the idea of a united Korea hosting U.S. forces. The possibility may have become even more sensitive

Pyongyang is the
PRCs only formal ally. Despite evident tensions, the two remain close. At the end
of May, North Korea sent a newly empowered former foreign minister to Beijing for talks.
Ri Su-yong, a Kim Jong-un favorite recently promoted to the Politburo, reportedly told his hosts that the
nuclear program was permanent. Beyond the DPRK, China sees potential
adversaries everywhere. The U.S. maintains close military relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore, and is building ties with Burma and Vietnam. The PRC understandably
feels vulnerable. Moreover, the cost of a North Korean implosion would be
great. The DMZ seals the inter-Korea border while the Yalu offers the PRC no
similar protection. If intensified sanctions produced regime collapse, violent
conflict, loose nukes, humanitarian catastrophe, mass refugee flows and
more, the PRC would suffer more than any other country. The U.S. would be
far away, with the Pacific Ocean acting like a huge moat. American officials might espouse goodwill, offer sympathy,
because of Washingtons ill-disguised effort to set up a containment system around China.

and reiterate the greater global good being served by Beijings sacrifice, but thats not likely to win over the residents of

China has been slowly toughening its position toward the DPRK but has continued to
emphasize the importance of maintaining stability and discouraging conflict
on the peninsula. If forced to choose between two frenemiesPyongyang,
which poses no threat, and Washington, which is the greatest obstacle to
Chinas advanceone shouldnt bet on the PRC picking the latter . In which
case, North Korea will continue to develop nuclear weapons and ICBMs . David Albright
Zhongnanhai.

of the Institute for Science and International Security figures the North has enough fissile material for about 20 nuclear
weapons and is capable of producing the equivalent of about seven more weapons a year. Northeast Asias future is
looking uglier. Unfortunately, the U.S. is out of options. Military strikes risk full-scale war and the destruction of Seoul,
South Koreas capital. Unilateral sanctions arent likely to bring the DPRK to its knees. Insisting on a commitment to

denuclearization before bilateral or multilateral negotiations with the North ensures that serious negotiations will not
occur.

US-China relations cant affect North Korea- lack of

flashpoints means China always leans North Korea
Chunshan 16. Mu Chunshan is a Beijing-based journalist. Previously, Mu
was part of an Education Ministry-backed research project investigating the
influence of foreign media in shaping Chinas image. He has previously
reported from the Middle East, Africa, Russia and from around Asia. [Why
China-North Korea Relations Cant Be Broken The Diplomat: China Power
March 10th 2016 URL: http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-china-north-korearelations-cant-be-broken/]
North Koreas nuclear development has been all over the headlines lately. Accordingly, some Western
media and Chinese observers seem to believe that it would be within Chinas strategic interests to cool

In view of their real national

interests, however, China and North Korea will not turn away from each other,
despite their cooling relations. From a long-term, historical viewpoint, ties
between the two countries will eventually stabilize and strengthen, but under
one condition North Koreas nuclear impasse must not drag on forever.
Among all of Chinas diplomatic ties with its various neighbors in Northeast
Asia, relations between China and North Korea have been relatively stable,
with plenty of flexibility. Geographic proximity, a condition neither party is
able to change, makes it unrealistic for the two sides to break off relations. As
part of his foreign policy, President Xi Jinping has been vigorously looking for
allies among Chinas neighbors, and has even approached Japan and the
Philippines in order to bridge differences. Why should he abandon North
Korea and create a large flashpoint right along Chinas northeast border ? The
down, or even break off, its relationship with North Korea.

significance of China-North Korean relations can be better appreciated when one looks at Chinas relations

China and the United States disagree in many areas

Internet security, human rights, trade, and the South China Sea , just to name a
with the Asia-Pacific powers.

few. China is in dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the interpretation of history
(symbolized by Yasukuni Shrine). China and South Korea have thorny issues between them as well, such as
competing claims over Ieodo/Suyan Rock, the U.S. military presence in South Korea, and defectors from

No major bilateral flashpoint exists between China and North Korea.

The exception is North Koreas nuclear and missile development, which is
actually a multilateral dispute that goes beyond bilateral ties between China
and North Korea and involves South Korea and the United States as well . China
North Korea.

is aware that North Koreas possession of nuclear weapons would severely threaten the security
environment of China and all of Northeast Asia. Thus, as North Koreas closest friend, Beijing proposed the
six-party talks to allow the parties involved to negotiate and resolve the dispute. The six-party talks are in
fact Chinas attempt at testing the water as a responsible player in regional and international affairs. The
West is aware of this. This is why every time the Korean nuclear issue rears its head, the United States

Historically, however, China-North Korean relations have

never been significantly affected by North Koreas nuclear programs. When
North Korea launched the Taepodong-1 missile in 1998, an international
outcry for sanctions ensued. Less than two years later, Kim Jong-il visited
China in secret. Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a reciprocal visit to
Pyongyang in 2001, and was received by Kim with great ceremony . When North
points fingers at China.

Korea dropped out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* in 2003 and was determined to develop nuclear
weapons, China promptly hosted a six-party talk. In October of that same year, National Peoples Congress

Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo visited North Korea and was welcomed with unchanging
hospitality. This was followed by another visit by Kim Jong-il to China in April 2004 .

President Hu
Jintaos state visit to Pyongyang in 2006, one year prior to a North Korean
nuclear test, was not only an endorsement of the friendly and positive
relations between the two countries, but also intended to show concern over
the escalation of North Koreas nuclear program. Confidential diplomatic talks
between China and North Korea continued after the nuclear test, with Beijing
becoming the de-facto key to engaging North Korea . Kim Jong-il visited Beijing again in
secret in January 2006, three months after Hus state visit. In October 2006, North Korea detonated a

Ties between China and North Korea continued to develop in the

aftermath of the nuclear test. One indicator was Xis first visit to North Korea
in 2008, after he was elected the vice president of China at the plenary
sessions of the National Peoples Congress and the National Peoples
Consultative Conference. Xi was also the first high-ranking Chinese official to
visit North Korea after the National Congress of the Communist Party of China
in 2007. After North Koreas second nuclear test in April 2009, and the announcement shortly afterwards
nuclear device.

that it would quit the six-party talks, Premier Wen Jiabao still managed to visit the country in October 2009.
Interestingly, 2009 was also the year of China-North Korean Friendship. In the same year, North Korean
Premier Kim Yong-il was ceremoniously received in China. Kim Jong-il visited China another three times in a
row over the period of one year, in May and August of 2010 and later in May 2011. Then-Vice Premier Li

From these visits it is

obvious that high-level contact between the two countries was not affected
by North Koreas nuclear programs. Relations between the two countries only started to show
Keqiang (now Chinas premier) also visited North Korea in October 2011.

signs of deterioration after the sudden death of Kim Jong-il. Since Kim Jong-un took power, North Korea has
carried out two nuclear tests, in February 2013 and February 2016. In between these two dates, North
Koreas military second-in-command Choe Ryong-hae showed up in China twice; and on the Chinese side,
Vice Chairman of the National Peoples Congress Li Jianguo, Vice President Li Yuanchao, and Politburo

Although less intense

and frequent, top-level contact between China and North Korea has continued
despite the two countries cooling relations. Xis policy toward North Korea
does show a subtle departure from policy under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
But in essence, the bilateral ties between China and North Korea are not
challenged by any major, hard-to-bridge differences, especially ideological
differences, such as those China has with the United States, South
Korea, and Japan. Relations between the two countries are only beset by North Koreas nuclear
development a multilateral dispute. China and North Korea will not turn away from
each other over North Koreas nuclear programs. In fact, the political and
pragmatic logic behind China-North Korean relations remain unchanged. Xis
intention to develop normal relations with North Korea, something beneficial
to both countries, is perfectly understandable . Some Chinese observers believe China
Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan have all paid visits to North Korea.

should not develop relations with North Korea, a country that is not democratic, is closed to the outside
world, and has no human rights. In fact, American pundits would sometimes use the same rhetoric about

National
interests are rational, something very different from value judgments. China
cannot afford to turn away from North Korea. Keeping a distance is part of
diplomacy between two countries with normal relations. Turning completely
away from North Korea, however, is not in line with Xis policy of developing
normal relations with Chinas neighbors . Normal relations involve a willingness to negotiate
and resolve differences. The two parties might be displeased with each other, but
they should not damage their basic diplomatic contact or their mutual
China, but the official ties between United States and China continue to strengthen.

interests. Whether during the era of Jiang and Hu or under the leadership of
Xi, Chinas basic policy toward North Korea should be to navigate the balance
between intimacy and antipathy. The apparent difference of Xis approach to North Korea from
his predecessors goes no further than strategic adjustments toward one of the two poles, without actually
breaking the balance. A move toward outright enmity is an unlikely scenario within the foreseeable future.
Another analogy is the love-and-hate relations between the United States and its major ally in the Middle
East Saudi Arabia. Many Americans are furious over the Saudi elements involved in the 9/11 attack, but
the U.S. government kept on friendly terms with its ally. The United States did not turn away from or
criticize Saudi Arabia because of its monarchial regime, nor did it compromise the common strategic
interests it shares with the Saudis in the region, despite domestic outrage. The Sunni rulers, meanwhile,
are apprehensive about American animosity, but they continued to regard the United States as the most
reliable friend in the Middle East. If one day, China and North Korea can develop a partnership like that
between the United States and Saudi Arabia, their relationship will have reached a true balance.
*Corrected. The original stated that North Korea dropped out of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty.
In fact, North Korea was never a signatory.

THAAD missiles take out US-China cooperation on North

Korea
Dingli 16. Dr. Shen Dingli is a professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of
International Studies, Fudan University. He is also the founder and director of
Chinas first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional
Security at Fudan University. [Dialogue Represents the Way Forward China
US Focus March 14th 2016 URL: http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/dialogue-represents-the-way-forward/]
China is deeply unsettled by the attempt to deploy the THAAD system in the
ROK under the pretext of installing a defense safeguard against the DPRK,
and it strains relations between China and both the US and the ROK.
Understandably, the ROK may want to develop or introduce some degree of
anti-missile capabilities to defend itself as a sovereign nation, but to what
degree? That is to be gauged and pondered anew. The THAAD is equipped with an X-band
radar that could penetrate 2,000 miles, considering the breadth and length of
the DPRK, the possible deployment of the THAAD would jeopardize Chinas
strategic security, which is beyond argument. Hence, Chinas stern opposition
to its deployment is based on solid ground . The fact that the defiance of the DPRK
drives a wedge between China & US and China & ROK lays bare the
vulnerabilities of these bilateral relations . To overcome this challenge, the three countries
must rise above a flurry of diplomatic rhetoric and engage in high-level dialogue for pragmatic outcomes.
During his visit to the US, Minister Wang Yi put forth a strategy whereas it hardens the stick and
sweetens the carrot of the deal to up the ante for continued defiance, and entice the DPRK back to the
negotiating table. For the stick, the newly adopted UN Security Council resolution demands aviation fuel
embargo against the DPRK, which may well serve to ground the entire fleet in the DPRK. For the carrot,
the goal is to promote denuclearization in tandem with transition from armistice to peace on the Korean
Peninsula and realize enduring peace and security on the Peninsula.

US-China relations cant solve- differing ideologies in

containing North Korea
Wenjing 16. Yang Wenjing is Chief of American Foreign Policy at the
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. [Chinese Way vs. U.S.
Way: North Korea Issue and Its Prospect China US Focus February 2 nd, 2016
URL: http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-way-vs-u-s-waynorth-korea-issue-and-its-prospect/]

After Obama took office, strategic patience, a strategy of only granting talks
under the precondition of a comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible
denuclearization process agreed upon by North Korea has become the main
guidelines of US policy; otherwise, the US and its allies would resort to
military deterrence, sanctions and isolation as the main tools to deal with the country, so as to
make it yield under pressure. China, as the countrys closest friend, has been relied
upon to make all the tough measures effective, and if not, it would be
criticized for irresponsibility. Yet the US should think more squarely and
objectively if it would not intentionally use North Korea as a lever to set its
China policy on other fronts. Its unrealistic for China to follow the US every
step in dealing with North Korea, since China would not like to resolve the
nuclear issue by forcing the country into a corner by even harder sanctions,
especially by using leverage that may shake the fundamental existence of
the country, which might result in domestic turmoil that will harm the
denuclearization process per se. In Chinas eye, the US should talk with North
Korea directly without preconditions, and end hostile rhetoric and coercive
activities that will do no good for reassuring an already fiercely insecure North Korea. All sorts of
negotiations, no matter six parties or two parties, should be tried as long as it can be useful for the
denuclearization process. A systematic approach should be adopted and the normalization of US-North
Korea relations and the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace agreement should also be
incorporated as before. Based on these, China would not oppose and even welcome a peaceful, gradual
unification of the Korean Peninsula according to the will of its own people.

US-China relations cant solve- fear of increased US power

in cooperating together means China leans to North Korea
Lankov 16. Andrei Lankov is professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin
University, Seoul. He is the author of "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics
in the Failed Stalinist Utopia". [Don't expect China to ice North Korea AlJazeera-Asia January 28th 2016 URL:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/don-expect-china-icenorth-korea-160128061357218.html]
Equally, China has no enthusiasm for the most likely final outcome of such a
crisis: German-style unification under the control and tutelage of a powerful,
wealthy and US-allied South Korea. Such a unified Korean state might create
trouble for China - more so now as Seoul's alliance with Washington is
increasingly seen in Beijing as an alliance with its major adversary. Thus, it
appears that at some point last August or September the Chinese leadership
decided to abandon the tough approach that they had sought back in 2013.
As a sign that they were in a mood to mend relations, they dispatched Liu
Yunshan, a top Beijing decision-maker, to Pyongyang. It seems that none of
the subsequent events has made them decide to reverse course. Beijing
appears to consider North Korea as a buffer zone against greater US influence
in the region. Recently, the Chinese resolve has been tested twice: in midDecember when the North Koreans suddenly cancelled a high-profile
performance of a North Korean musical group (because Chinese officials
strongly objected to paeans to nuclear weapons that were to be sung), and
the beginning of January when the nuclear test was conducted. In both cases

reason prevailed, and the Chinese leadership decided, after indicating their
displeasure, to continue with the policy in place. It is saying that the Chinese
Internet censors began to delete messages critical of North Korea which
flooded the Chinese net immediately after both events. Some in Washington
clearly hope that Americans will influence the Chinese position if they react to
North Korean nuclear tests and missile launches with a military build-up.
Indeed, the Chinese are not pleased by the increase in the US presence in
Northeast Asia, and often complain that "North Korea's actions actually help
the Americans".

US-China relations dont solve for North Koreaempirically proven and fear of US hegemony in the area
Kleine-Ahlbrandt 14. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt joined the U.S.
Institute of Peace as Director of the Asia-Pacific Program in August 2013.
Previously, she set up and ran the Beijing office of the International Crisis
Group for five years, engaging in research, analysis and promotion of policy
prescriptions on the role of China in conflict areas around the world and its
relations with neighboring countries. [U.S.-China Cooperation on North
Korea: What are the Options? United States Institute of Peace June 9 th, 2014
URL: http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/us-china-cooperation-north-korea-whatare-the-options]
United States policy towards North Korea aims at achieving verifiable steps toward denuclearization -which China says it wants, too. The U.S. believes that the best way to accomplish this is through targeted

Beijing disagrees. It argues that

Pyongyang needs security assurances and encouragement for economic
reform, and that this might produce a willingness in the long term on
Pyongyangs part to revisit its nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile,
Pyongyangs nuclear stockpile continues to expand, missile delivery systems
are being improved, the danger grows of spreading nuclear weapons
technology, and the threat to U.S. allies increases . Clearly the U.S. tactic of
trying to persuade China to come over to its approach isnt having the
desired effect. The idea that China can and will compel Pyongyang to give up
its nuclear weapons cannot be the basis of sound U.S. policy . Following North
financial measures and conditional engagement.

Koreas 3rd nuclear test [in February 2013], Western officials and analysts interpreted President Xi

Jinpings stronger emphasis on denuclearization as a sign of a policy shift and

greater convergence between U.S. and Chinese national interests. But this
shift in rhetoric did not translate into any measures to press North Korea to
denuclearize or in any sense change Chinese priorities on the [Korean]
Peninsula. While China does not want a nuclear North Korea, what it wants
even less are scenarios such as war, the collapse of the regime, or a reunited
Peninsula [that] allows a U.S. presence on [Chinas] border . Even when
Chinese analysts believe North Koreas weapons buildup damages Chinas
strategic interests, they think that North Korea is simply trying to guarantee
its security in the face of existential threats from the United States. In this regard,
they cite examples such as Iraq, the NATO operation in Libya and now Ukraine as evidence that
renunciation of weapons of mass destruction would only result in regime change. Beijing arguably
maintains an interest in the survival of the North Korean regime for its own domestic legitimacy.

At a

time when President Xi is working to bolster his [Chinese Communist] Partys

standing through ambitious anti-corruption measures and a bold economic
reform program, the last thing he needs is the failure or collapse of a
communist regime next door. And these fears are [exacerbated] by the fact that the Chinese
see the fall of Myanmar to western values as a country on Chinas border that is now falling into the
western camp. China sees the nuclear issue as just one component of its broader bilateral relationship
with North Korea, which is based on a policy of sustaining the country to integrate it more fully into the

Chinese officials see economic engagement as part of a

long-term process that will ultimately change North Koreas strategic
calculations with regard to nuclear weapons. To be sure, there is not much
affection left between China and North Korea. But Chinese mistrust of the
U.S. remains the primary obstacle to meaningful U.S. cooperation on the
Peninsula. When China looks at North Korea, it does so through a geopolitical
strategic lens featuring U.S.-China competition at its core . Consensus amongst
international economy.

analysts in Beijing is that the U.S.-led bloc is using North Korea as a pretext to deepen its Asia rebalance,
to strengthen regional alliances, move missile defense and military assets to the region and expand
military exercises.

US-China relations cant solve- North Korea never listens

to any country, even if its China
Knodell 14. [China Kinda Hates North Korea Why Beijing considers
Pyongyang a liability War Is Boring April 5th 2014 URL:
https://warisboring.com/china-kinda-hates-north-korea6c0f0f3eb3fc#.26eah6y5x]
North Korea is an isolated, impoverished, impulsive rogue nuclear state ruled
by a family that has built one of the most terrifying personality cults the
world has ever seen. As result, Pyongyang doesnt have a lot of friends. The one
country that North Korea can depend on is China. Beijing provides Pyongyang with much of its food and

China and
North Korea have a reputation for being closely aligned, both militarily and
ideologically. Except that Sino-North Korean relations are not what they once
were. More and more, Beijing views Pyongyang as a liability. And thats
leading to some seismic shifts in Asias power dynamics . After 20 years of sustained
weaponsand is bound by treaty to support the North in the event of war with South Korea.

growth, China is an economic powerhouse and a regional military power with expanding ties to the rest of

North Korea, by contrast, has clung to political and economic systems

that have bankrupted and starved its people. Pyongyang has pursued nuclear
weapons over other countries nearly unanimous opposition. North Korea
doesnt seem interested in changing. Nor in listening to other
governments. Indeed, as former president Kim Jong Ils health deteriorated near the end of his 17
the world.

year rule, Beijing met with American delegations to talk about cooperating in the event of North Koreas
collapse. As it turned out, Kim Jong Ils son Kim Jong Un took over leadership in 2011, forestalling a
statewide implosion. Kim Jong Un continued his fathers aggressive rhetoric. This, along with strengthening
trade ties between China and South Korea, is fundamentally changing Chinas relationship with its
troublesome ally.

***South China Seas***

Relations Good

Relations good SCS***

U.S. relations with China solve war in the South China Sea
Aranvi Mehta, October 24, 2015, SOUTH CHINA SEA CRISIS AND
INTENSIFYING US-CHINESE RELATIONS, McGill International Review,
http://mironline.ca/?p=5612
The most recent talks at the 14th annual Shangri-La Dialogue, a security
forum attended by governments from Asian Pacific countries, have again
brought forward the question of territorial disputes in the South China Sea .
Islands, most notably the Spratly Islands, within the Sea promise regional
countries economic benefits due to their extensive oil and natural gas
reserves, and their abundant fishing opportunities. The South China Sea also
facilitates $5.3 trillion worth of international trade annually making it a
commercial asset for several nations (Counting the Cost, Aljazeera, 2015).
However, Chinas seemingly unlawful annexation and its increasing
militarisation of about 80 per cent of the Spratly Islands have given regional
actors such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia and the international
community a cause for worry. Although affected nations have expressed their
discontent towards China for its aggressive behaviour, it is the straining of
relations due to conflict of interests between the United States and China that
could potentially be destabilising.

The South China Sea stays on the brink risk of quick

nuclear war is ever-present
Jonathan Broder, defense and foreign policy writer for Newsweek,
6/22/2016, THE INEVITABLE WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA,
Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/south-china-sea-war-nuclearsubmarines-china-united-states-barack-obama-xi-473428
But once that gathering is over, U.S. officials are particularly worried about a
Chinese plan to send submarines armed with nuclear missiles into the South
China Sea for the first time. Chinese military officials argue the submarine
patrols are needed to respond to two major U.S. military moves: plans to
station a defense system in South Korea that can intercept missiles fired from
both North Korea and China, and the Pentagons development of ballistic
missiles with new hypersonic warheads that can strike targets anywhere in
the world in less than an hour. Taken together, Chinese military officials say,
these American weapons threaten to neutralize Chinas land-based nuclear
arsenal, leaving Beijing no choice but to turn to its submarines to retaliate for
any nuclear attack. The implications would be enormous. Until now, Chinas
nuclear deterrent has centered on its land-based missiles, which are kept
without fuel and remain separate from their nuclear warheads. That means
the countrys political leadership must give several orders before the missiles

are fueled, armed and ready to launch, giving everyone time to reconsider.
Nuclear missiles on a submarine are always armed and ready. U.S. and
Chinese warships operate in uncomfortably close proximity in the South
China Sea. Add submarine operations to the mix, and the chances of an
accident multiply despite protocols meant to minimize the risk of collisions.
Submarines are stealthy vessels, and China is unlikely to provide their
locations to the Americans. That means the U.S. Navy will send more spy
ships into the South China Sea in an effort to track the subs. With the U.S.
Navy sailing more and more in the area, theres a high possibility there will be
an accident, says a high-ranking Chinese officer, who spoke anonymously to
address sensitive security issues.

Relations good SCS solvency

US China relations solve conflict between the two

countries.
Dingding Chen, assistant professor of Government and Public Administration
at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy
Institute, 6/10/2016, REALITY CHECK: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DOES NOT
DEFINE THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/reality-check-the-south-china-sea-does-notdefine-the-us-china-relationship/
To avoid what seems like an inevitable conflict between a dominant power
and a rising power, both China and the United States should take a step back
and reevaluate their fundamental interests with regard to the South China
Sea. Once this is done, China will realize its first priority is to realize the
China dream or modernization for the Chinese people, not its claims in the
South China Sea. Also, the United States will realize that its own first priority
is maintaining a liberal international order, which can only be done by
bringing China into it and accommodating Chinas legitimate interests and
demands. There will always be some sort of competition between China and
the United States, but this can be good for the world. We should not,
however, let the South China Sea define U.S.-China relations. To allow that to
happen would indeed be foolish and lead to a tragedy in great power politics.

Defense

A2 SCS impact no war

South China Sea conflict does not lead to war.
Aranvi Mehta, October 24, 2015, SOUTH CHINA SEA CRISIS AND
INTENSIFYING US-CHINESE RELATIONS, McGill International Review,
http://mironline.ca/?p=5612
With all said, neither the US nor China would go to war upon the first chance .
Threats would be exchanged, but negotiations and mediation would ensue in
the background. In this way, the South China Sea Crisis can be compared to
the the Cuban Missile Crisis, when it was in both countries best interests to
not attack each other. Although the notion of nuclear annihilation in the
Cuban Missile Crisis was the primary deterrent, the South China Sea Crisis
has deterrents of its own. US and China putting economic sanctions on each
other would be catastrophic for both countries due to their interdependence.
Other powers in the world would also prioritise US-Chinese mediation as
sanctions would affect their economies too. As long as American diplomacy is
geared towards preventing Chinas zero sum game in the region without
overstepping its own legal and military boundaries, the South China Sea will
be a relatively stable region.

***Space***

Relations Good

Relations good space war mod***

Relations solve space conflicts between China and the

U.S.
Weeden, 15
Brian Weeden is the Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and a former U.S.
Air Force Officer with sixteen years of professional experience in space operations
and policy. September 9, 2015. An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to
Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship The National Bureau of Asian Research
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602

U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation

for a stronger overall relationship between the two countries. Space was arguably a
The

stabilizing element in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War by
providing national capabilities to reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration. Although the future of the

taking concrete
steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of the solution to avoiding the
Thucydides trap, where an established powers fear of a rising power leads
to conflict. Space is a critical domain to the security of the United States. Space capabilities enable
U.S.-China relationship will be characterized by both competition and cooperation,

secure, hardened communications with nuclear forces, enable the verification and monitoring of arms
control treaties, and provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the foundation of the United
States ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat
adversaries. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could affect the United States ability to maintain all these benefits in the
future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are involved in space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned in the near
future. Active satellites coexist in space along with hundreds of thousands of dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six
decades of space activities. As a result, the most useful and densely populated orbits are experiencing significant increases in physical and electromagnetic congestion
and interference. Amid this change, China is rapidly developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has a robust and successful human
spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASAs successes in the 1960s and 1970s and is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a
long way to go, China is developing a range of space capabilities focused on national security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. Some of
Chinas new capabilities have created significant concern within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or threatening the space
capabilities of the United States and other countries. The massive changes in the space domain and Chinas growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship
in space. There is growing mistrust between the two countries, fueled in part by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as rendezvous and proximity
operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems. This mistrust is compounded by a misalignment in political and strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and
increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United States is focused on maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities. Despite these challenges
and concerns, there are concrete steps that the United States and China can take to manage tensions and possibly even work toward positive engagement. In 2011,
President Barack Obama and then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations during a visit by President Hu to the White
House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space and discuss

visit presents an opportunity to build on the 2011

agreement and take steps toward these goals. The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on
space security. President Obama should clearly communicate the importance that the United States places
on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the potential
opportunities for practical future cooperation. President Xi Jinpings upcoming

Both countries should exchange

views on space policies, including their interpretations of how self-defense
applies to satellites and hostile actions in space. Doing so can help avoid
misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either country to
unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis. Second, Presidents Obama and Xi should
negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space.

discuss specific ideas for cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for
peaceful applications on earth. Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it
from developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure that China cooperates with other

Space weather,
scientific research, exploration, capacity building for disaster response, and
global environmental monitoring are all areas where the United States and
China share joint interests and could collaborate with each other and other
interested countries to help establish broader relationships outside the
military realm. In addition, the United States should take steps on its own to stabilize the relationship.
countries in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals.

First and foremost, it should get serious about making U.S. space capabilities more resilient. Increasing
resilience would support deterrence by decreasing the benefits an adversary might hope to achieve and
also help ensure that critical capabilities can survive should deterrence fail. While resilience has been a
talking point for the last few years, the United States has made little progress toward achieving the goal.
Radical change is thus needed in how Washington develops and organizes national security space
capabilities. Moreover, the United States should embrace commercial services to diversify and augment
governmental capabilities, while encouraging allies to develop their own space capabilities. Second, the
United States should continue to bolster the transparency of space activities by increasing the amount of
space situational awareness (SSA) data available to satellite operators and the public. Greater
transparency reinforces ongoing U.S. and international initiatives to promote responsible behavior in space
and also helps mitigate the possibility for accidents or naturally caused events to spark or escalate
tensions. Shifting responsibility for space safety to a civil agency that can share and cooperate more easily
with the international community and working with the international community to develop more publicly
available sources of SSA data outside the U.S. government are two steps that would enhance trust,
improve data reliability, and reinforce norms of behavior. The consequences of not addressing the current

A future conflict in space between the United

States and China would have devastating impacts on everyone who uses and
relies on space. Both the United States and China have acknowledged the
dangers of outright conflict and have pledged their interest in avoiding such
an outcome. Taken together, the initial steps outlined here could help
stabilize the U.S.-China strategic relationship in space, mitigate the threat of
the worst-case scenario, and work toward a more positive outcome that
benefits all.
strategic instability in space are real.

U.S. China space war causes extinction

Broder, 16
Jonathan Broder writes about defense and foreign policy for Newsweek from
Washington. He's been covering national security issues for more than two decades,
including 12 years as a writer and senior editor at Congressional Quarterly. Before
moving to Washington, Broder spent 20 years as an award-winning foreign
correspondent in the Middle East, South Asia, China and East Asia for the Chicago
Tribune and the Associated Press. Broders writing also has appeared in The New York
Times Magazine, The Washington Post and Smithsonian magazine. He's a frequent
commentator on foreign affairs for NPR and Al Arabiya TV. May 4, 2016. WHY THE
NEXT PEARL HARBOR COULD HAPPEN IN SPACE Newsweek
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/05/13/china-us-space-wars-455284.html

A war in space would have staggering implications. If conflict were to erupt ,

say, over Chinas territorial claims to the South China Sea or Russias aggression in
Eastern Europe, Americas military satellites wouldnt be the only space assets at
risk. Fighting would also likely cripple the civilian satellites that control so much
of modern life, from cellphone networks to ATMs and personal GPS units. And
although such a conflict might start in space, experts say it could easily turn into fullscale war on Earth. If war does extend into space somedayand I hope it never
doesthe first [nuclear] response is not going to be in space , warns General John
Hyten, head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. This year, the Pentagon will spend $2 billion on
measures to counter threats to its national security satellites. That amount is expected to soar as part of
the $22 billion set aside to maintain U.S. superiority in space in 2017. Senior U.S. officials explain such
large investments reflect the Pentagons recognition of a major shift in U.S., Chinese and Russian
capabilities. For the first 25 years after the Cold Wars end, they note, Americas conventional forces were
unmatched, thanks largely to the advantages their satellites gave them on the battlefield. Making their

satellites have guided American precision

munitions, provided U.S. commanders with worldwide communications and
helped American forces navigate the globe ever since. But over the past 15 years,
a period in which U.S. defense dollars were diverted to pay for the wars in the Middle East, China and
Russia have developed advanced weapons that challenge our
advantages...especially in cyber, electronic warfare and space , says Deputy
Defense Secretary Robert Work. As a result, our margin of technological superiority is
slowly eroding. Today, Beijing and Moscow can no longer be ignored. With their
ability to deny, disrupt and degrade Americas hard-to-defend satellites , warns
Lieutenant General David Buck, commander of the 14th Air Force, there isnt a single aspect of
our space architecture that isnt at risk .
debut in the 1991 Persian Gulf war,

Relations good space war solvency

China wants to partner with the US in space
Harrington, 16
Rebecca Harrington is a reporter on Tech Insider's science section and just received
her Master's degree from New York University's Science, Health and Environmental
Reporting Program. She also received a B.S. in Biology and a B.A. in Journalism from
the University of Minnesota. Rebecca has previously written for Popular Science,
Scientific American, the Minneapolis Star Tribune and the Minnesota Daily. April 21,
2016. China plans to reach Mars by 2020 and eventually build a moon base Tech
Insider http://www.techinsider.io/china-plans-mars-moon-landings-2016-4

China wants to partner with the US on space missions , too.

"We would like to cooperate with the US, especially for space and moon
exploration," he said. "We have urged the US many times to get rid of
restrictions so scientists from both countries can work together on future
exploration." A clause in the 2011 bill funding NASA prohibits the space agency from collaborating
with China, citing the possibility for espionage. But Aldrin predicts countries will have to
work together soon. "I think we will be organizing the other three - Russia,
Europe, Japan - so that they will be cooperating and coming along soon after
China, because we're helping all of them," he said. "So it's going to be
cooperation at the moon and cooperation at Mars. "
Weiren told the BBC that

China and the US have the same space goals

Dalby, 15
Chris Dalby is a Mexico-based analyst of Chinese politics and economics. December
20, 2015. China and US should work together on space travel Global Times
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/959567.shtml
A famous, if slightly warped, statistic states that for every dollar the US spends in outer space, it gains
eight dollars in economic growth. The long-term American dominance of space may have made that true

China's space goals are beginning to look similar to

NASA's. No longer is it satisfied with sending up satellites or manned Shenzhou missions. The
country is now planning a permanent space station by 2020 accompanied by
manned missions to the Moon and Mars. But what will China get from it? Prestige? Acclaim?
but it now has severe competition.

Those things might have been enough in the past but, especially with a slowing economy, the conquest of
space needs to turn a profit. At 10 percent growth a year, China's space program is getting pricey.
However, there are numerous avenues to make it affordable. China already lets foreign satellites piggy
back off its rockets, space tourism is now being discussed, and in the long-term, China may even take the
lead in asteroid mining. Seeking to analyze or understand China's space program on the basis of its price
tag alone is an exercise in futility. Unlike NASA, which has seen its shuttles grounded and its budgets
restricted for years, China may not value each space venture on its own cost but as part of a larger order.
Furthermore, as China's own GDP has grown steadily, so has its space budget. In
pure dollar terms, China is still only spending about $2 billion a year on its space program as opposed to
NASA's $18 billion. However, that $2 billion is going toward supporting numerous pillars. The Jade Rabbit

Construction of the
Tiangong 2 space lab was delayed but it is now set to launch in 2016, giving
rover, which landed on the Moon in 2013, showed China's focus on our satellite.

China a permanent foothold in space.

It should be completed around 2022, near when the

International Space Station will be retired. But how quickly will tangible benefits warrant China's
investments? After all, while space travel generated unparalleled public enthusiasm in the US, NASA's
budget was slashed after the collapse of the USSR. Without the rivalry of the Cold War, the US' interest in
being the leader of space exploration waned. The geo-political climate of today means that China is

but
seeing people, whether Chinese or American, walk on the Moon once more
will work toward a tangible purpose: the joint exploration of space. While
Russia and the US have worked together consistently on the International
Space Station (ISS), China has not been invited to take part , at the insistence of
Congress. While concerns about intellectual property and national security may have some basis, this is
nothing more than a colossal wasted opportunity . Treaties exist to prevent the
unlikely to run into similar problems. Tangible benefits cannot be easily quantified economically,

militarization or colonization of outer space and surely the best way to enforce them is to ensure all space
players work toward the same goals. China is focused on lunar exploration while the US seems bent on

The private space sector is blooming in the US with Space X and

Blue Origin making great strides and now refueling the ISS. Private launch
pads being built will hopefully lighten the load born by the Baikonur
Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Competition drives success and innovation but
another space race between China and the US is not what the world needs. Arranging such longterm collaboration would require the setting aside of old grievances but doing
so could lead to a currently unthinkable objective: a Space X rocket, carrying
a crew of Russians and American astronauts to the Tiangong 2 Space Lab. This
getting to Mars.

also makes solid business sense. The desire to fund space exploration waxes and wanes as governments

A true international cooperation, bringing together the US and Europe

with emerging players such as China and India, would see the expense of
space travel shared by all, as well as the costs of manpower, equipment and
payloads.
change.

Actions taken now will determine future of US China space

relations
Moltz, 15
James Clay Moltz is the author, most recently, of Crowded Orbits: Conflict and
Cooperation in Space (Columbia University Press, 2014). His writing on space
developments has also appeared in such journals as Current History and Nature, as
well as in the Boston Globe, the New York Times, and the San Francisco Chronicle.
January 17, 2015. Its On: Asias New Space Race The Daily Beast
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/17/why-china-will-win-the-next-spacerace.html

The surge of Asian countries joining the ranks of major space powers mirrors the
rise of Asian economies and their militaries more generally since the end of the
Cold War. But following the political drivers of these trends leads most often to
regional rivalries, not a desire to compete with the United States or Russia. Being first in Asia
to do anything in space brings prestige , lends credibility to governments in power, and helps
stimulate Asias young population to study science and technology, which has other benefits for their
national economies. The responses to Chinas rise have included the sudden development of military
space programs by two countries that previously shunned such activitiesJapan and Indiaand dynamic
new activities in countries ranging from Australia to Singapore to Vietnam. On the Korean Peninsula, both
North and South have orbited satellites in the past three years and both have pledged to develop much

Many of these countries realize that they cant win Asias space
race, but they also know that they cannot afford to lose. Chinas rapid
expansion in space activity has also raised serious concerns within U.S. military
circles and in NASA. But these developments pose an existential threat to Chinas neighbors, some
larger rockets.

of whom see Beijings space program as yet another threatening dimension to their deep-seated historical,
economic, and geo-political rivalries for status and influence within the Asian pecking order. Even more,
space achievements affect the self-perceptions of their national populations, challenging their

How this competition will play out and whether it can be managed,
or channeled into more positive directions, will have a major impact on the future of
international relations in space. The U.S. government has thus far responded
with a two-track strategy, seeking a bilateral space security dialogue with Beijing, while quietly
expanding space partnerships with U.S. friends and allies in the region, adding a space
dimension to the U.S. pivot to Asia.
governments to do more.

Space war high risk now

Risk of space war with China is high almost happened
before
Walters, 16
Greg Walters is a journalist specializing in business, politics, energy markets and
Russia. Formerly based in Moscow, he has written for Bloomberg News, Dow Jones
Newswires, the Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Moscow Times, VICE
News, Energy Risk magazine and more. Hes appeared on BBC World Service, NPR's
All Things Considered and All Songs Considered, Deutsche Welle and other television
and radio programs. February 12, 2016. The Pentagon Is Betting Big on Space
Warfare Against China and Russia Vice News https://news.vice.com/article/thepentagon-is-betting-big-on-space-warfare-against-china-and-russia
"The

US military is the most reliant on satellite capabilities of any military in

the world," noted Theresa Hitchens, an expert on space and cyber security at the Center for
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. "Russia and China look at US
space capabilities and say, 'You know what? That's a vulnerability.' " A potentially
devastating vulnerability. Taking out those satellites would throw American
forces back into the "pre-digital age," Singer said. "After that, the battles may look
more like the battles of WWI or WWII, where you're struggling to find the
enemy first, and they're struggling to find you. " The US military is looking to forestall that
scenario and envision the battleground of the future. In December, US military and civilian specialists
gathered at the Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado for a large-scale war game set in outer space in the
year 2025. The event brought together 200 experts from 27 US agencies as well as representatives from
the UK, Canada, and Australia. While details are classified, a statement by the US Air Force Space
Command said the game "included full spectrum threats across diverse operating environments that

The goal of a war

in space would be for each side to take out its competitor's satellites as
quickly as possible using any means available . A blinding assault on enemy
satellites could well be the very first step of a military conflict between great
powers, said professor Bhupendra Jasani, an expert in the militarization of outer space at the
department of war studies at King's College London. Some satellites would be jammed by
radio waves. Others might be blown to smithereens by rockets fired from
earth. This kind of kinetic attack has enormous implications for space debris. It
could be a relatively trivial matter to create enough debris to set off a chain reaction
of collisions that could eventually clear out an entire orbit. Attack drones might also
challenged civilian and military leaders, planners, and space system operators."

spray paint onto surveillance satellites, blinding their lenses. Kamikaze space-bots might collide into
satellites, ramming them off course. Lasers and directed-energy beams would likely be used in space

Actually mounting laser

weapons on spacecraft is probably no more than a decade away , according to
Jasani, but until then they would probably be fired from the earth's surface.
Russia, China, and the US are all thought to already have this capability .
combat to blind surveillance equipment or fry satellite components.

Another element of assault would be to hack or reprogram an opposing military's satellites and use them
to send false signals to its forces, sowing chaos. An attacking army could slip past enemy lines on the

Compromised
satellites could even allow an enemy to redirect deployed missiles against the
side that launched them, said Singer. A prime target for any would-be adversary
ground as early warning systems give false all-clear readouts to defenders.

taking on the US would be the Global Positioning System, or GPS, which lets users
pinpoint exact locations on the earth's surface. GPS is a network of satellites developed
and maintained by the US Air Force. The same system that helps college undergrads road trip during
spring break is also used to drop bombs on the heads of Islamic State militants in Syria. That's one reason
China set alarm bells ringing in the halls of Washington, DC in 2013 when it launched a rocket 30,000
kilometers into space far enough to hit one of the GPS satellites, which hang in orbit about 20,000

China had
previously knocked one of its own satellites out of the sky from a height of
865 kilometers using a missile launched from earth in 2007. "China needs to be
kilometers from earth, or other key communications satellites even farther out.

more forthcoming about missile tests that appear to be more focused on the development of destructive
space weapons," US Admiral Cecil D. Haney told the US Senate Committee on Armed Services last March.

Relations good satellites

China developing counterspace capabilities
Turner 15 [Ronald E., PhD affiliated with Analytic Services, Inc.,Should the
United States Cooperate with China in Space?, May 6, 2015,
http://www.anser.org/babrief-us-china-space-coop]-DD
The Chinese are also developing counterspace capability: the
ability to destroy or render inoperative the space assets of opposing
forces. The most prominent example of this was the destruction of one of
their own retired weather satellites (Fengyun-1C) to test an antisatellite
weapon in January 2007. That test by a kill-vehicle launched from the Earth to destroy the target
spacecraft on orbit resulted in the largest single production of long-lived space debris.[6] That was
the only instance of a full kinetic kill test, but the Chinese continue
to develop counterspace options, including co-orbital spacecraft that
can rendezvous with target spacecraft and ways to blind or
incapacitate satellites using lasers or other covert means.

Only open cooperation rather than secrecy can stop

further space militarism and helps the global economy
Turner 15 [Ronald E., PhD affiliated with Analytic Services, Inc.,Should the
United States Cooperate with China in Space?, May 6, 2015,
http://www.anser.org/babrief-us-china-space-coop]-DD
The Chinese military is indeed investing heavily in space-based systems. It certainly makes sense to
carefully restrict access to technologies that would uniquely and substantially increase the capabilities of

excessive efforts to restrict all U.S.

cooperation is not in the interests of the United States . Denying the
Chinese access to U.S. know-how will not reduce the threat of
Chinese military space ventures: the Chinese will continue to acquire
the necessary capabilities either from the international space
community or by developing the capabilities themselves. (Note that most
systems that pose a significant military threat, but

space technology applications are neutral to whether the application is overtly military or civilian.) This
path has resulted in the expansive capability they have fielded over the past decade and the advances we

the
Chinese can become increasingly competitive in the world market. China is
increasingly cooperating with other nations, particularly Russia and European
nations. This supports the technological advancements and
economies of those countries, to the detriment of U.S. industry,
which is hurt in two ways: it cannot compete for bilateral U.S.Chinese opportunities, and its contributions to international
missions are restricted if there is the possibility of Chinese
participation in or access to those missions. As the Chinese increase
their reliance on space systems, they will be less inclined to employ
counterspace attacks, thus reducing the Chinese threat to U.S. military space
anticipate in the decades ahead. Indeed, by developing their own space manufacturing infrastructure,

systems. Attacks that destroy all space systems (via orbital debris or other
means) will also take out their own systems . The Chinese may be less inclined to develop
more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital intercept, since this could lead to a
counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese recognize, the United States is in a better technological
position to win.

Defense

No space war

No space war China wants peaceful space use

McKenzie, 15
David McKenzie is an award-winning international correspondent for CNN based in
Johannesburg, South Africa. May 29, 2015. Chinese astronaut calls for cooperation,
access to International Space Station CNN
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/28/asia/china-space-mckenzie/

China wants greater cooperation with other nations in space, particularly the United
States, the country's most experienced astronaut has told CNN in an exclusive interview. Fifteen nations
including the United States, Russia and Japan cooperate on International Space Station missions, but

China's involvement has always been a non-starter because of longstanding

resistance from U.S. legislators. "As an astronaut, I have a strong desire to fly with astronauts
from other countries. I also look forward to going to the International Space Station," Commander Nie
Haisheng told CNN. "...Space

is a family affair, many countries are developing their

space programs and China, as a big country, should make our own
contributions in this field." The comments came during a wide-ranging and exclusive interview
with the three-person crew of the Shenzhou-10 mission inside Space City, the center of China's space
program, near Beijing last month. In 2011, Congress passed an act to bar NASA from having any bilateral
contact with individuals of the Chinese space program because of national security fears. "Every time it
gets mentioned at all anywhere near Congress, it gets shut down immediately," space analyst Miles
O'Brien told CNN. "There is tremendous skepticism there about China. It is viewed as a foe, it is viewed as
a government that seeks to take our intellectual property -- our national secrets and treasure." In a white

China said that outer space had become an area of

"strategic competition." "The Chinese government has always advocated the
peaceful use of outer space, it opposes space weaponization and an arms
race in outer space. This position will not be changed ," Wang Jin, a spokesman for the
Ministry of Defense, said. A recent report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission said China's improving space capabilities had "negative
sum consequences for U.S. military security." But Nie discounted those fears. "The United
paper released Tuesday,

States and Russia started their space programs early. They are the pioneers," he said. He says foreign

Chinese expect
to finish their space station by 2022 -- around the time International Space
Station runs out of funding, potentially leaving China as the only country with
a permanent presence in space. China launched its manned space program in 1992. It initially
astronauts are welcome to visit China's own space station once it is launched. The

borrowed and bought a great deal of Russian technology, primarily by replicating their Soyuz space craft -which they dubbed the Shenzhou. But it has been steadily checking off the boxes in manned space flight.
In 2003, it put its first man in space. In 2008, it completed its first space walk. And in 2013 Nie and his
crew completed the country's longest space mission to date and twice docked with the Tiangong-1 space

With support from the highest echelons of the ruling Chinese Communist
Party and exceptionally deep pockets, most analysts believe China's space
program could become a world leader.
lab.

A2 Relations solve space mil

US wants space milalt causes other than China threat
RCW 14 (Reaching Critical Will, thinktank for Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Outer Space,
reachingcriticalwill.org, October 2014,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448outer-space) KC
While as far as anyone knows there are currently no weapons deployed in
space, the US policy on outer space is concerning. Under the Bush
administration, the 2006 US National Space Policy explained that the US will
preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or
deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities
intending to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space
capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the
use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests. At that point, the
United States rejected treaties limiting its actions in outer space and its
space policy firmly opposed the development of new legal regimes or other
restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space, and
insisted that proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not
impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development,
testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national interests.
In July 2010, the Obama administration released the new US National Space
Policy. It states that the US shall pursue bilateral and multilateral
transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible
action in, and the peaceful uses of, space. The new policy also notes that the
US will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are
equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the US
and its allies. The language in this new policy suggests that this is a
significant departure from its predecessor. However, the actual implications
of this change are still unknown. While claiming that it is open to considering
space-related arms control concepts and proposals, the US argues that such
proposals must meet the rigorous criteria of equitability, effective
verifiability, and enhance the national security interests of the US and its
allies. The Russian-Chinese joint draft treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) would not meet these criteria
according to the US, as it is fundamentally flawed and would not provide
any grounds for commencing negotiations. The United States Department of
Defense continues to invest in programs that could provide anti-satellite and
space-based weapons capabilities. While the technology itself is highly
controversial, it presents major business opportunities to companies that
know how to overcome moral, logistical, and financial roadblocks. War has
always been highly profitable, and dominance of outer space leads to further
profits in conventional warfare. As the Air Force Space Command stated in its

2003 Strategic Master Plan, the ability to gain space superiority (the ability
to exploit space while selectively disallowing it to adversaries) is critically
important and maintaining space superiority is an essential prerequisite in
modern warfare. Superiority in conventional warfare relies on military assets
in space, especially satellites, which are used for intelligence, remote
sensing, navigation, and monitoring, among other things. Since the US
currently asserts its political will through force, protection of its own space
assets and disturbance of others is key to guaranteeing US dominance.

Squo solvesand US wont cooperate to decrease space

mil even if us/china relats good
Bodner 15 (Matthew, journalist for The Moscow Times, UN approves
Russia-led proposal to limit militarization of space, The Moscow Times,
12/8/2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/un-approves-russialed-proposal-to-limit-militarization-of-space/552230.html) KC
United Nations General Assembly has approved a Russian-led resolution calling for
nations to refrain from being the first to deploy weapons into outer space, in
spite of U.S. resistance and European silence on the proposed measure, the Foreign Ministry said
in a statement. The resolution was first drafted by Russia in 2014, but was
rejected by the United States and other nations last year, and then again this year ,
when the draft resolution was considered by a GA committee focusing on issues of arms control. On
Tuesday, 129 nations represented in the General Assembly voted to adopt the measure,
which was co-sponsored by 40 nations including China and Syria and is
known as the no first placement initiative. It is noteworthy that the only
government objecting to the substance of our initiative is the U nited States, which
The

for many years has stood in almost complete isolation trying to block successive efforts of the international

The initiative calls

on nations to refrain from being the first to place military weapons in outer
space, thereby preventing a new and potentially devastating arms race between the
world's leading space-faring nations Russia, China and the United States, who are all working
on space weapons. Europe, which has an effective multi-national space program of
its own, has consistently abstained from ruling on the Russian proposal.
community to prevent an arms race in outer space, the Foreign Ministry said.

US wants space milUS/China coop wont yield results

Shah 7 (Anup, editor of Global Issues, Militarization and weaponization of
outer space, Global Issues, 1/21/2007,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/69/militarization-and-weaponization-ofouter-space) KC
Some delegations expressed the view that a greater risk of the introduction of weapons into outer space
and the adoption of a concept of a use of force in outer space would undermine the basis for and the very
logic of developing nonproliferation mechanisms and of the whole system of international security. The
view was expressed that an international agreement should be concluded to prohibit the deployment of
weapons in outer space. Report of the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, United Nations
General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/58/20), 11 to 20 June 2003, pp. 78 Similar

October 2006 saw a near-unanimous

vote at the General Assembly when 166 nations voted for a resolution to
prevent an arms race in outer space. Only one country abstrained, Israel,
positions have been reiterated since, too. For example,

while only one voted against such a resolution, the U nited States of America. Whether
the Committee can be effective, as the General Assembly desire, depends largely some some of the most
powerful nations in the world. Back to top US Seeks Militarization Of Space While various militaries around

the
Bush Administration in the United States has long made it clear that the US wishes
to expand its military capabilities and have weapons in space and therfore also be
the world have used Space for years, it has largely been for surveillance satellites etc. However,

dominant in this fourth military arena (the other three being sea, land and air). This new ultimate high
ground would provide further superior military capabilities. While

it would provide additional

important defense mechanisms, many worry about the other benefit it would bring
capabilities for offensive purposes to push Americas national interests

even
if they are not in the interests of the international community. Furthermore, together with its pursuit of
missile defense, (which goes against the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty, an important part of global arms

Since the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the resulting War on Terror
military-based policies and spending has increased . So too have the policies
looking into space-based weapons. The Washington D.C.-based Center for Defence
control mechanisms), the USA risks starting a wasteful expenditure of an arms race in space.

Information (CDI) provides a detailed report suggesting that this should not be a rushed decision: Unlike in
Star Trek, the final frontier has yet to become a battlefield. But if the current trends continue, that will
changenot in the distance future of science fiction, but within the next several decades. Emerging Bush
administration plans and policies are clearly aimed at making the United States the first nation to deploy

There are several drivers behind this goal, including the very
real concern about the vulnerability of space assets that are increasingly
important to how the US military operates, and the administrations decision
to pursue missile defense. Unfortunately, the administration has done little thinkingat least
space-based weapons.

publiclyabout the potential for far-reaching military, political and economic ramifications of a US move to
break the taboo against weaponizing space. There is reason for concern that doing so could actually
undermine, rather than enhance, the national security of the United States, as well as global stability. Thus
it behooves the administration, as well as Congress, to undertake an in-depth and public policy review of
the pros and cons of weaponizing space. Such a review would look seriously at the threat, both short-term
and long-term, as well as measures to prevent, deter or counter any future threat using all the tools in the
US policy toolbox: diplomatic, including arms control treaties; economic; and military, including defensive
measures short of offensive weapons. There is nothing to be gained, and potentially much to be lost, by
rushing such a momentous change in US space policy. Theresa Hitchens, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet
or Russian Roulette?, The Policy Implications of US Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons, Center for Defence
Information, April 18, 2002 But because space-based weapons have been on the agenda long before
September 11, and the War on Terror, the fight against terrorism is not the sole justification, though it may
now add to the reasons. However, long before September 11, the concerns of the US motives for pursuing
such policies have been questioned. The fear is that by seeking to create a dominant position in space, the
US will become more powerful and others may be compelled to join an arms race in space. The abovementioned CDI report also points out that The Bush administrations views were directly reflected in the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released Oct. 1, 2001. A key objective is not only to ensure
US ability to exploit space for military purposes, but also as required to deny an adversarys ability to do
so, states the QDR. In this context then, space is no longer seen as the resource available for all of

New York
Times reported (May 18, 2005) that there is a further push by the US Air Force
for weapons in space. Any deployment of space weapons would face financial, technological,
humanity, but another ground from which to fight geopolitical and economic battles. The

political and diplomatic hurdles, although no treaty or law bans Washington from putting weapons in
space, barring weapons of mass destruction, claims the Times. Yet, this news article appears to ignore the
Outer Space Treaty mentioned above, or the Prevention of Outer Space Arms Race resolution, adopted by a
recorded vote of 163 in favor to none against, with 3 abstentions (the US being one of those three). If
technically there are no bans on weapons, then certainly such weaponization would go against the spirit of
those treaties. What the Times does mention, though, is that There has been little public debate while the
Pentagon has already spent billions of dollars developing space weapons preparing plans to deploy
them; Air Force doctrine defines space superiority as freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack
in space; In April 2005, Gen. James E. Cartwright, who leads the United States Strategic Command, told
the Senate Armed Services nuclear forces subcommittee that the goal of developing space weaponry was
to allow the nation to deliver an attack very quickly, with very short time lines on the planning and

delivery, any place on the face of the earth. Space superiority is not our birthright, but it is our destiny.

Space superiority is our day-to-day mission. Space supremacy is our vision for
the future. General Lance Lord, head of US Air Force Space Command, quoted from Air Force Seeks
Bushs Approval for Space Weapons Programs, New York Times, May 18, 2005 On August 31, 2006,
President Bush authorized a new national space policy, supersedeing the National Space Policy of
September 14, 1996. The policy was based on 8 principles. One was about supporting the peaceful use of
space by all nations. However, Consistent with this principle, claimed the policy, peaceful purposes
would allow U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests. Two other key

The United States considers

space capabilitiesincluding the ground and space segments and supporting linksvital to its
national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities,
principles noted the use of force, if needed to defend US interests:

and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing
capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to
interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national
interests;

***Climate Change***

Relations Good

Relations good Warming mod ***

Increased relations resolves warming and economic
growth- warming independently causes extinction
Lieberthal and Sandalow 9
(Kenneth Lieberthal Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution Professor,
University of Michigan, David Sandalow Senior Fellow, The Brookings
Institution January 2009 Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation
on Climate Change HY)
Climate change is an epic threat. Concentrations of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere are higher than at any time in human history and rising sharply.
Predicted consequences include sea-level rise, more severe storms , more
intense droughts and floods, forest loss and the spread of tropical disease.
Each of these phenomena is already occurring. Every year of delay in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions puts the planet at greater risk. The United
States and China play central roles in global warming . During the past century, the United States emitted
more greenhouse gases than any other countrya fact often noted, since carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas, remains in the atmosphere for roughly 100 years.

Together, the two

countries are responsible for over 40% of the greenhouse gases released into
the atmosphere each year. For the world to meet the challenge of global
warming, the United States and China must each make the transition to a lowcarbon economy. Far-reaching changes will be needed. To date, however, each nation has used the other as one reason not do to more.
Enormous benefits would be possible if this dynamic were replaced with
mutual understanding and joint efforts on a large scale . Yet cooperation will not be easy. The U.S. and
However, in 2007, China may have surpassed the United States as the worlds top annual emitter of carbon dioxide.

China are separated by different histories, different cultures, and different perspectives. Opportunities for collaboration in fighting climate change and promoting clean
energy are plentiful, but moving forward at the scale needed will require high-level political support in two very different societies and systems that have considerable
suspicion of the other. This report identifies major barriers to cooperation and recommends ways to overcome them. G The time for large-scale U.S.-China cooperation on
climate change and clean energy is now. Unless both countries change course soon, ongoing investments in 20th century technologies will commit the world as a whole to
dangerous levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere in the decades ahead. Recent political and technological developments make the benefits of such cooperation
especially compelling. Furthermore, thirty years after normalization and with the start of a new administration in the United States, the U.S. China relationship is ready to
move to a new stage. This new stage will initiate full bilateral consultation and cooperation where possible on the most critical global issues of the era. Climate change and
clean energy are at the top of the list. This new stage does not envision a U.S.-China condominium or alliance. Any U.S.-China agreements must be supplements tonot
substitutes forother relationships and obligations. If handled properly, such agreements will increase bilateral and global capacities to manage critical world challenges.

major failing in U.S.-China relations to date is that, despite much progress over the past 30 years,
mutual distrust over each others long-term intentions remains deep and
perhaps has even grown in recent years. By making active cooperation on
critical global issues a centerpiece of the relationship , both countries
governments can increase trust over long-term intentions and thereby reduce
the chances of slipping into mutual antagonism over the coming 10-20 years.
In particular, U.S.-China cooperation can make each side less inclined to point
to the other as a reason to do less at home to fight global warming. It can
also contribute to the success of multilateral climate change negotiations.
Having the U.S. and China successfully manage issues that have divided
industrialized and developing countries in the global climate change
negotiations can help shape acceptable multilateral climate change
agreements for the post-Kyoto period. Finally, U.S.-China cooperation on
climate change and clean energy can also help each country enhance its
energy security and pursue a sustainable economic path that will create jobs
and promote economic recovery.
The

Relations good warming

US-China cooperation also spills over to working together

to combat climate change- only this can spur reducing
pollution and catalyze global movement towards clean
energy
The Conversation 15 [Contributor to US News, US News, Why China
and the U.S. Have Found Common Purpose on Climate Change, 12-10-2015,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/10/why-china-and-the-ushave-found-common-purpose-on-climate-change]-DD
the United States and China forged a climate change
partnership that would have been almost unthinkable not long ago. Not only
have both countries committed to emissions reduction and sustainable
energy goals of substantial ambition, they are pursuing those goals in
concert. This bilateral climate cooperation has been crucial to the UN climate
summit in Paris and will continue to be so after any agreements are signed.
Following years at loggerheads, the converging positions of the worlds
two largest emitters are becoming invaluable components of future
climate response actions. So why is this happening? A combination of domestic, bilateral and
Over the past year,

international forces help explain the transformation, and reveal its potential and continuing challenges.

In China, conventional pollution has moved environmental

issues up the list of development priorities and made them part of the
countrys core national strategic calculations. The scale and scope of protests
against air pollution and environmental decline which by some
measurements lead to 1.6 million deaths per year are on the rise, and
Chinese leadership is responding through rhetoric and practice . President Xi called
China's Pollution Crisis

poor air quality Beijings most prominent challenge in 2014, while a top climate adviser deemed an
acute pollution episode in the capital unbearable. [READ: Primer: The UN Climate Summit in Paris] In
response, the metrics for measuring local bureaucratic success and promotions through party ranks
emphasize environmental performance more than ever before. Punitive measures against polluters are
gaining strength, and efforts to transform energy systems are accelerating through rapid expansions in
solar, wind and nuclear sectors. Such measures have the corollary effect of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, which has changed the ways that Chinese leadership views international pressure to act on
climate change. Outside pressures to reduce Chinas carbon emissions used to be viewed as anathema to
the countrys development needs, and a distraction from its core business of wealth generation and
societal development. They are now seen as opportunities for gaining partnerships, technical support and
finance to help China transition toward a cleaner energy future. This includes expanding Chinas
manufacturing and export of clean-energy technologies, which have strong economic growth potential. Xis
China thus looks to the international climate arena for help addressing its domestic energy transition and
pollution reduction goals. That the measures taken will also reduce climate risks is an added bonus. U.S.
Executive Action RELATED CONTENT FILE - In this Aug. 10, 2010, file photo, Rep. Lamar Smith, R-Texas
speaks during a news conference on Capitol Hill in Washington. With a re-election campaign looming,
President Barack Obama is pushing Congress to overhaul the immigration system, but lawmakers seems to
have little appetite to take on the issue. GOP Digs in Heels on Climate Action In the US, executive branch
boldness has the Obama administration toeing the line of what is politically and legally tenable to advance
some form of the environmentally progressive agenda the president campaigned on in 2008. Frustrated
with congressional intransigence and international inertia, the administration has opted for executive
regulation at home and bilateral partnerships abroad. Obamas Clean Power Plan places new emissions
standards on power plants and vehicles, mandates and supports clean energy expansion, and seeks to cut

energy waste and improve infrastructure. On the first day of the Paris summit, the U.S. announced Mission
Innovation and officials touted the potential for technologies to lower emissions and further encourage
private-sector investment in clean energy innovation. And in defending its Clean Power Plan, the White
House emphasizes public health dividends, job creation, economic growth and long-term energy security.
Like China, U.S. leadership sees these measures as being in the countrys long-term economic and
strategic interests, and not merely as a ticket out of climate pariah status. Federal actions suggest this is
not bluster, but a key part of the Obama administrations vision for the countrys future. Some Welcome
Common Ground Bilaterally, American and Chinese diplomats have come to see climate change
cooperation as low-hanging fruit in an agenda otherwise brimming with strategic tension. From currency
markets and competitive free trade groupings to maritime navigation and the rise of Chinas military, the
relationship does not lack for wicked problems. Climate change used to be just another avenue for
strategic posturing, with China clinging to its status as a developing country with little culpability for the
problem, and the U.S. justifying its inflexibility through Chinas inaction. Those days have passed, at least
for now. Beijing and Washington now see opportunity in the climate problem, and view it as a refreshingly
non-zero sum game. They recently formed and now cofund the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center,
with a mandate extending through 2020, and are pursuing technical cooperation on issues from carbon
capture and sequestration to sustainable urban infrastructure. These connections feed into growing
business ties, manifested most publicly through the annual U.S.-China Clean Energy Forum. Such ties
create incentives that are likely to keep climate cooperation from being a flash in the pan. Global Enablers

This growing US-China alignment has accelerated because of

changes in the direction of international climate change diplomacy. UNcentric approaches have largely abandoned the holy grail of an
encompassing and binding global agreement that covers an exhaustive
range of climate issues. Disaggregated and largely voluntary approaches now rule the day, which
and Implications

allows the U.S. and China to chart their own paths without feeling overly constrained or dictated to by
international accords. This shift also presents challenges. The US, China and their partners in Paris are
searching for acceptable ways to transparently report and verify what emissions reductions are taking
place where. This issue is taking on renewed urgency in the wake of Chinas revelations that it
underreported past coal consumption, and that it may resist including strong verification protocols in the
Paris agreement.

The U.S. insists upon enhanced international norms and

practices around verification, which it sees as essential to prevent the
approach of voluntary commitments from becoming a house of cards. The
two countries' ability to extend their cooperation to this issue will
help determine the Paris outcome. [ALSO: Obama Pressures China's Xi Jinping on
Cybersecurity] The U.S. and China can likewise drive efforts to lubricate the gears
of global commerce and reduce barriers to cooperation in clean energy
sectors. Complex intellectual property and trade regulation challenges
currently keep clean energy trade from reaching its full potential. These
hurdles will not disappear overnight, but Paris is an appropriate forum for
developing strategies to address them. More fundamentally, the U.S. and
China are in a position to ensure that moves toward the flexible and voluntary
do not devolve into reduced ambition and the shirking of loose commitments.
If these two economic and polluting behemoths show earnestness and
ambition in Paris and beyond, the world is likely to follow.

US-China cooperation key to climate change, energy

security and economy
Asia Society Center 9
(Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, January 2009 A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on
Energy and Climate Change pg. 6-7 HY)

Of the many issues crowding the international agenda, there is perhaps none
so pressing, nor so quintessentially global, as the rising threat of climate
change. In its causes and potential consequences, climate change has
implications for every inhabitant of every nation on earth. Yet the power to mobilize an
effective response rests largely with a handful of nations. There are two in particular without which it will not be possible to find a meaningful

The United States and Chinathe worlds largest developed and

developing nations, the two largest energy consumers, and the two largest
producers of greenhouse gasesmust be partners in any effort to avert
catastrophic climate change and usher in a new and prosperous low-carbon
global economy. The advent of a new U.S. administration presents an unparalleled opportunity for a new strategic partnership
remedy.

between the United States and China that promises a more sustainable future for both nations and for the world.1 The United States and China
should develop a sustained cooperative agenda as well as national policies to catalyze a new global strategic transformation to sustainable,

two countries can together advance key

technologies and practices that will help to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions, while also addressing their critical energy security needs. The
current global economic crisis, far from being a deterrent, should provide
even stronger impetus for efforts to develop a low-carbon economy
generating green jobs and sustainable growth. At the same time, stronger
bilateral collaboration on energy and climate can provide the leadership and
momentum needed to achieve a true global climate accord, and build a
stronger foundation for future Sino-American cooperation on other strategic
challenges facing both nations in the 21st century . This Report presents both a vision and a concrete
low-carbon economic development. Through direct collaboration, the

Roadmap for this new collaboration. With input from scores of experts, stakeholders, and policymakers from the worlds of science, business,
civil society, policy, and politics in China and the United States, the Report explores the climate and energy challenges facing both nations and
recommends a program for sustained high-level engagement and on-the-ground action. The Report and its recommendations are based on the

Action is Urgent. The United States and China should start now.
There is overwhelming scientific consensus that human-induced climate
change poses grave economic and environmental risks. Minimizing these
risks requires that global greenhouse gas emissions, now rising at an
unprecedented rate, peak as soon as possible and decline dramatically over
the coming decades. Accomplishing this goal will be feasible only through
concerted and sustained action, beginning immediately. The United States
and China should not await new domestic legislation or multilateral
agreements before launching stronger collaborative efforts . A Path to Energy Security.
Climate change is largely a consequence of soaring global energy use, and
addressing it requires a fundamental transformation of energy systems worldwide.
This transformation presents an unparalleled opportunity to simultaneously
address the urgent energy security challenges confronting the United States,
China, and other nations by introducing new sources and technologies capable of enhancing the diversity, reliability, and independence of
national energy supplies. New Economic Opportunity . At a time of global economic upheaval, strong
efforts to address the twin challenges of climate change and energy security
can contribute to economic recovery, while laying the foundation for a
prosperous new low-carbon economy. The near-term investments that are needed will produce substantial longterm dividends through sustainable growth and employment. Conversely, delaying these investments will
risk severe economic harm and drive up the cost of minimizing the impact of
climate change.
following understandings:

US-China cooperation key to climate change- failure

causes economic crisis and environmental disaster
Asia Society Center 9
(Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and Pew Center on Global
Climate Change, January 2009 A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on
Energy and Climate Change pg. 6-7 HY)
cooperation between the United States and China that
focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and thus mitigating the
potentially catastrophic effects of climate change, is both necessary and
possible. Indeed, as this Report suggests, if human beings hope to avoid the worst
consequences of global climate change, the United States and China
respectively the worlds largest developed and developing nations, the two
largest energy consumers, and the two largest producers of greenhouse
gaseshave no alternative but to become far more active partners in
developing low-carbon economies. To prevail in such a common effort, both countries will
need not only bold leadership and a new set of national policies, but also a
path-breaking cooperative agenda that can be sustained over the long run . The
A new comprehensive program for

advent of a new U.S. presidential administration in Washington, D.C., coupled with a central leadership in Beijing that is increasingly aware of
the destructive impact and long-term dangers of climate change, presents an unparalleled opportunity for this new strategic partnership.
While the current global economic crisis could make joint action between the United States and China more difficult, it could also provide an
unexpected impetus. If wisely allocated, funds invested by both governments in economic recovery can help address climate change while

Stronger bilateral
collaboration on energy and climate change has at the same time the real
prospect of helping to build a new, more stable, and constructive foundation
under SinoAmerican relations, the most important bilateral relationship in the
21st century world. This Reportwhich was produced in partnership between Asia Societys Center on U.S.-China Relations
also advancing the green technologies and industries that will lead to a new wave of economic growth.

and Pew Center on Global Climate Change, in collaboration with The Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, National Committee on
U.S.- China Relations, and Environmental Defense Fundpresents both a vision and a concrete Roadmap for such Sino-U.S. collaboration. With
input from scores of experts and other stakeholders from the worlds of science, business, civil society, policy, and politics in both China and

climate and energy challenges facing both

nations and recommends a concrete program for sustained, high-level,
bilateral engagement and on-the-ground action . The Report and its recommendations are based
on the following understandings: That because there is overwhelming scientific
consensus that human-induced climate change is well underway and poses
grave economic and environmental risks to the world, the United States and
China need to immediately begin acting in concer t, without awaiting new domestic legislation or
multilateral agreements, to jointly seek remedies for their emissions of greenhouse gases. That because climate change is
largely a consequence of soaring global use of fossil fuels, addressing the
problem will require a fundamental transformation of energy systems in both
countries, as well as worldwide, through the development and deployment of new technologies and the widespread introduction of
new energy sources capable of enhancing the diversity, reliability, independence, and
greenness of national energy supplies.
the United States, the Report, or Roadmap, explores the

US-China cooperation on climate change is key- sets

international norm and eases commercial barrier
US News 15

(US News, 12.10.2015, Why China and the U.S. Have Found Common Purpose on Climate Change,
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/10/why-china-and-the-us-have-found-common-purpose-onclimate-change, HY)

Bilaterally, American and Chinese diplomats have come to see climate change
cooperation as low-hanging fruit in an agenda otherwise brimming with strategic
tension. From currency markets and competitive free trade groupings to maritime navigation and the rise of Chinas military, the

relationship does not lack for wicked problems. Climate change used to be just another avenue for strategic posturing, with China clinging to
its status as a developing country with little culpability for the problem, and the U.S. justifying its inflexibility through Chinas inaction. Those

. Beijing and Washington now see opportunity in the climate

problem, and view it as a refreshingly non-zero sum game . They recently formed and now cofund the
days have passed, at least for now

U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, with a mandate extending through 2020, and are pursuing technical cooperation on issues from
carbon capture and sequestration to sustainable urban infrastructure. These connections feed into growing business ties, manifested most

Such ties create incentives that are likely to keep

climate cooperation from being a flash in the pan. This growing US-China alignment has accelerated because
publicly through the annual U.S.-China Clean Energy Forum.

of changes in the direction of international climate change diplomacy. UN-centric approaches have largely abandoned the holy grail of an
encompassing and binding global agreement that covers an exhaustive range of climate issues. Disaggregated and largely voluntary
approaches now rule the day, which allows the U.S. and China to chart their own paths without feeling overly constrained or dictated to by
international accords. The U.S. insists upon enhanced international norms and practices around verification, which it sees as essential to
prevent the approach of voluntary commitments from becoming a house of cards. The two countries' ability to extend their cooperation to this

U.S. and China can likewise drive efforts to

lubricate the gears of global commerce and reduce barriers to cooperation
in clean energy sectors. Complex intellectual property and trade regulation challenges currently keep clean energy trade
issue will help determine the Paris outcome. The

from reaching its full potential. These hurdles will not disappear overnight, but Paris is an appropriate forum for developing strategies to

More fundamentally, the U.S. and China are in a position to ensure

that moves toward the flexible and voluntary do not devolve into reduced
ambition and the shirking of loose commitments. If these two economic and
polluting behemoths show earnestness and ambition in Paris and beyond,
the world is likely to follow.
address them.

US-China climate coop key to solve emission and

implement structural reform for business interest
Hongzhou 15
(Zhang Hongzhou, an Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme
at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore, Oct. 13 2015, China-US Climate Change
Cooperation: Beyond Energy , http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-usclimate-change-cooperation-beyond-energy/ HY)
Climate change presents the world with massive and potentially devastating
challenges. As the worlds two leading economic powerhouses, China and the
United States are jointly responsible for nearly 40% of global carbon
emissions
both countries are central to any successful global effort to
mitigate climate change.
cooperation between China and the United States
works to build
effective global climate change governance
its time to
improve China-US climate cooperation to a situation of co-progress.
. Consequently,

The international community attributes the incremental progress successes at the Copenhagen and Cancun climate conferences to enhanced
. As the international society

during the forthcoming 2011 Durban Climate Change Conference,

Ecologically speaking,

China and the United States are among the countries that will suffer the worst effects of climate change, and both view climate change and energy security as two of the greatest challenges of our time as stated
in their leaders joint statement in January 2011. Just before the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, President Hu Jintao addressed the 2009 UN Climate Summit and said, Climate change is one of the serious
challenges to the survival and development of mankind. Chinas 2008 White Paper on Climate Change stated that, China is vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, like droughts, disruptive storms,
and inundation of coastal zones and decreased agricultural production. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) concluded in 2008 that, Climate change will have wide-ranging implications for national security
interests over the next 20 years, including destructive storm activity, increased water scarcity, reduced agricultural yields, disease and pandemics, mass migration, increased conflict and destabilized states. During
his remarks on the Cancun Climate Conference, President Obama asserted that, No nation, however large or small, wealthy or poor, can escape the impact of climate change. Economically speaking, China and
the United States both face unprecedented opportunities to shift the traditional economic mode to low carbon development associated with mitigating climate change. President Hu Jintao recently encouraged low
carbon growth to the 2010 APEC Summit; Chinas National Peoples Congress passed the Renewable Energy Law; before the Copenhagen Convention China set the goal that, by 2020, carbon emission intensity
per unit of GDP will be reduced by 40% 45% compared to that in 2005; and Shanghai Expo 2010 took low carbon as its core theme. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama announced a target of
generating 80% of electricity from clean energy sources by 2035 (presently it is less than 40%) and become the first country to have a million electric vehicles on the road by 2015. Politically speaking, global
climate change governance needs the full engagement of China and the United States. The United States, the worlds largest carbon emitter, is not a member of the Kyoto Protocol and even opposes the Kyoto
regime with Japan and Russia. As the main global energy organization, the International Energy Agency (IEA) doesnt include China as a full member. Global governance on climate change is notably becoming more
and more fragmented: the divergences among developing countries, particularly on emissions targets and timetables, are becoming larger, while the inherent conflicts on the Kyoto Protocol between the umbrella
group (Japan, Russsia, and the US) and the EU continue to reduce the Kyoto regimes effectiveness. Concurrently, the climate change governance landscape is evolving and there are new mechanisms such as the

United States and China

are both prioritizing the issue of climate change and low carbon growth, As
U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu has pointed out, both countries have a
G20 and WTO that will replace to some extent the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As discussed above, the

chance to lead the world in solutions on climate change

China and the United States should
demonstrate their global accountability and take all-round diplomatic efforts

. Thus we should improve China-US cooperation to a position

of co-progress in three ways: Global Accountability, Win-Win Cooperation, and Co-progressive Collaboration:

to

make a breakthrough at the Durban Climate Conference. At the Cancun Climate Conference, it was resolved that any decisions on the future of the Kyoto Protocol will be deferred until Durban, particularly the global

, China
and the United States can help to work out the unequivocal commitments on
global emission vision associated with common but differentiated principle(s),
and they also should shift global attention from mitigation to adaptation
measures to cope with climate change by technology and market measures
which are the preferred ways to address climate-induced social economic
impacts. China and the United States both face unprecedented extensive
business opportunities for win-win cooperation. The burgeoning new energy
and low carbon business will create a carbon economy worth thousands of
billions of dollars
goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050, and the implementing the regime for financial, technological and capacity-building support to developing countries. To begin with

. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama maintained clean energy issues as a high priority for his administration which has been associated with jobs,

competitiveness and the future. China will spend $293 billion in clean and alternative energy investment before 2020, and the clean energy market will likely amount to $555 billion in 2020. In cooperation with
China the largest global market the US can certainly achieve economic growth and enhanced competitiveness. Coal made up about 70% of Chinas electricity generation over the past year. In the clean coal area,
GE and the Chinese company Shenhua have signed a joint venture agreement on coal-gasification technology. Since 2006, Chinas installed capacity of wind power has doubled over the past four consecutive years
and brings extensive market business. In January 2011, American UPC Renewables and China Guodian signed an agreement on wind-power projects in China involving about $1 billion in investment. In 2010, China
planned to start construction of more than 20 nuclear power generators, accounting for 40% of the worlds installations. During President Hu Jintaos visit in 2011, Westinghouse Electric and China State Nuclear

low carbon society is both the US and

Chinas common and progressive vision, and requires both mutual support
and concerted action
Power Technology Corp. worked together on AP1000 and AP1400 nuclear power plants. A

. Clearly, the U.S. economy is built on a consumption-intensive fossil fuel energy infrastructure. Chinas economy, however, is also dependent on exported

services and goods with extensive energy consumption. U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu stressed that China and the United States consume 15% and 25%, respectively, of global energy supplies, but that the

As the leading country in clean energy, the US can share

its expertise and experience with China, and help in the transformation and
relocation of Chinas energy structure in the following areas: energy cuttingedge know-how, fossil fuel efficiency, developing renewable energy, and
building carbon markets, technology innovation and green education. It also
seems very likely that bilateral regime projects can institutionalize China-US
Co- progress, such as a Clean Energy Research Centre, Renewable Energy
Partnership, Energy Cooperation Program, and the China-US Ten Year
Framework on Energy and Environment Cooperation. By developing a coprogressive cooperation, both countries will enjoy complementary business
advantages, push domestic economic structure reform, and achieve
breakthroughs in climate negotiations. Most important of all, both countries
can evolve jointly into a low carbon society.
.
Achieving these outcomes should be built on the cooperation and co-progress
developed between China and the US. In the long run, clean energy,
associated only with technological know-how, will help make the world
independent of fossil fuel resources which have contributed to many geopolitical wars and conflicts in human history. Global permanent peace can
start from China-US co-progress on climate change and low carbon.
U.S. consumes about 8 times as much energy as China.

Urgent tasks at the Durban Climate Change Conference, such as agreeing to the 2050 global

mitigation reduction target and solidifying developed countries second commitment period in the Kyoto Protocol offer solutions to a more harmonious relationship between man and nature

China is advancing in renewable energy

Haworth, 16
Jessica Haworth is NCTJ trained and is an experienced reporter with a background in
newspapers and is now working online. She is experienced in working across a
number of national newspapers and websites in news writing, showbiz, and features.
She also has the experience of reporting overseas in countries such as Afghanistan
and Europe. February 8, 2016. China creates 'artificial star' three times hotter than

the sun, paving the way for the end of burning fossil fuels Mirror
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/china-creates-artificial-star-three-7330127

Scientists in China have created an 'artificial star' that is three times hotter
than the sun, paving the way for the end of fossil fuels. Physicists have
engineered a way to make hydrogen gas that heats up to a whopping 50
million C. And crucially, they've been able to maintain that temperature for a record 102 seconds.
While it might not sound hugely impressive, the only other attempt to reach this high a temperature was

Physicists
believe this new discovery could mean the end of relying on fossil fuels . This
is because scientists can harbour nuclear energy from the gas, providing
unlimited clean energy. The tests were carried out using a machine called the Experimental
done by German scientists, who managed 80 million C - but only for a fraction of a second.

Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST) - the reactor that produces the high temperature substance at the Institute of Physical Science in Hefei, China. It reached highs of 50 million Kelvins - this is compared
to the surface of the sun, which comes in at around 15 million Kelvins. The gas was kept in the nuclear
chamber for well over a minute, helped along by creating a magnetic field to keep it suspended in the
doughnut-shaped contraption. This magnetism appears when scientists superconducted the coils
surrounding the structure at the same time as driving an electrical current through the plasma. Their goal

But even
though they didn't achieve their target, this latest feat is hugely significant in
ridding the world of fossil fuels. Earlier this month, researchers found that
burning fossils such as petrol and coal has meant the Atlantic Ocean has
soaked up 50 percent more carbon dioxide than normal in the past decade.
was to reach highs of 100 million Kelvins for 1,000 seconds, which is around 17 minutes.

Defense

A2 Relations solve warming

Chinese suspicion of US intentions decks possibility of climate
cooperation
Lieberthal and Sandalow 9
(Kenneth Lieberthal Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution Professor,
University of Michigan, David Sandalow Senior Fellow, The Brookings
Institution January 2009 Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation
on Climate Change HY)
The United States plays into the politics of addressing climate change in
China in several palpable ways. First, many Chinese, including many among
the leadership, are deeply suspicious of American motives. They believe that
the United States is determined to find some set of measures that will knock
China off its current trajectory of rapid economic growth and increasing
international influence because they regard America as simply too zero-sum
in its outlook to comfortably contemplate the ongoing rise of China. These
Chinese suspect that American statements about the need for China to
address global warming are simply the latest in a series of efforts to derail
Chinas growth machine,41 especially since they believe that nobody with a
deep understanding of Chinas stage of development could reasonably
demand that China commit to firm targets for greenhouse gases during the
coming decade. China sees the United States as the country most responsible
for the greenhouse gases currently in the atmosphere. Yet, it is well aware
that the United States has rejected the Kyoto Protocol and that the Bush
Administration came very reluctantly to an acknowledgement that climate
change is occurring and that human actions are contributing to it. It
recognizes that the Bush White House never moved significantly away from
its deep antipathy to taking measures against climate change beyond hoping
for technological solutions developed primarily in the private sector. The
United States is enormously richer overall and per capita than China, has a
far more developed scientific community, and enjoys far greater institutional
capacity. It has already constructed most of its infrastructure and completed
its urbanization and is now primarily a service economy. All these facts make
it particularly galling to the Chinese when the United States refuses to take
on serious national obligations to confront global climate change and
explicitly bases that reluctance in part on the fact that China has not agreed
to accept comparable obligations. In China, the U.S. record thus provides
strong cover for officials who prefer to maximize growth and minimize
international obligations to expend more effort to get onto a lower carbon
path of development. It weakens those who advocate more forward-leaning
Chinese postures on these issues. In sum, Beijing harbors very serious
concerns about the United States on the climate change issue and distrusts
American motives when Washington stresses the importance of greater
Chinese efforts.

US-China relations create disillusionment of cooperation despite

Chinese discontent
Patrick and Thaler 10
(Stewart M. Patrick and Farah Faisal Thaler, March 15-17 2010, Council on
Foreign Relations,China, the United States, and Global Governance: Shifting
Foundations of World Order pg.6 HY)
The past thirty years have witnessed a profound transformation of Sino-U.S.
relations, with both sides making overarching strategic commitments to
global peace and security and the creation of an open global economy.
Despite periodic frictions over differences in values, interests, and priorities,
the bilateral relationship has always recovered, and interdependence has
increased. This past year, however, has been a period of mutual
disillusionment, with heated rows that have reopened old wounds and
highlighted new points of tension. The overall sense is that the Sino-American
relationship has gotten off track. Workshop participants attributed this state
of affairs to several factors. First, both the U.S. and Chinese governments had
unrealistic expectations for the relationship. The Obama administration
arrived in office flirting with the idea of a Group of Two (G2), and it created a
bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED) to address a panoply of
global and bilateral issues. But the Obama administration quickly become
disillusioned with the direction in which China appeared to be traveling.
Politically, the notion that economic integration would transform Chinas
political system and bolster the rule of law seemed increasingly illusory, with
few signs that the Chinese Communist Party would liberalize its tight grip on
power. Economically, the currency issue seemed to portend a more
protectionist China, while many U.S. corporations came to question their
future in China, thanks to the governments indigenous innovation
requirements. Diplomatically, Chinas riseaccelerated by the global financial
crisisstoked increased U.S. anxiety about whether this ascending behemoth
would pursue responsible policies, including addressing major proliferators
like Iran. Obamas unsuccessful visit to Beijing, Chinas perceived
obstructionism in Copenhagen, and the Google/China brouhaha merely added
to the sense of disillusion. In China, meanwhile, there was a growing sense
of unfairness about how China was being treated, as if the United States was
bent on humiliating it and preventing it from taking its rightful place as one of
the worlds leading powers. Chinas riseand the nationalism that the
Chinese government has at times encouragedhas made the country even
more sensitive to perceived incursions on sovereignty, such as arms sales to
Taiwan and presidential audiences with the Dalai Lama. Chinese officials and
commentators complain that Washington is asking China to do more while
giving little in return and showing insufficient respect for Chinas core
interests. The overall Chinese impression was that there was less change
than met the eye in Obamas actual policies.

No effective US-China climate cooperation-economic

incentives, structural difficulties and corruption
Lieberthal and Sandalow 9
(Kenneth Lieberthal Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution Professor,
University of Michigan, David Sandalow Senior Fellow, The Brookings
Institution January 2009 Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation
on Climate Change HY)
China is in some ways the mirror image of the United States. Whereas in the United States the most serious efforts to date

in China the
major initiatives have come from the national-level party and government and have
often been blunted by conflicting interests among local officials and enterprises.
Chinas political system is highly centralized and disciplined only in certain unusual
circumstances: i.e., when all the top leaders not only agree on an issue but also agree
to give the issue overriding priority and are able to determine reasonably well
in real time whether their directives are being carried out. Very few issues in
recent years have met all these criteria. Chinas political system interacts massively
with its economic system at every political levelfrom the national to provincial, municipal, county, and
to address climate change have been made at the state and local levels and in the private sector,

township. In addition, the fundamental structure of the political system allows leading officials at each of these five levels
large latitude to act entrepreneurially to assure GDP growth in their own bailiwicks each and every year, and it rewards

Despite increasing efforts to build environmental and energy

efficiency concerns into the incentive structure all the way down the line,
most local officials still regard meeting GDP growth expectations as their primary objective.
Not only do the internal complexity and operational rules of the system allow for
considerable flexibility at each of the five levels, but authority is divided among agencies in a
way that typically requires extensive consensus building to implement major
initiatives. One recalcitrant player can often slow things to a crawl for long periods of
time. And distortions in reporting of accomplishments as information travels
from local to national levels also plague the system. The above characteristics have
them for doing so.

contributed on the whole mightily to Chinas record of extraordinary growth over the past thirty years. They have enabled
a one-party political system to nevertheless enjoy enormous dynamism and entrepreneurial creativity, with different

these same
characteristics inhibit effective action on most types of environmental issues.
localities often competing with each other to attract foreign investment and other resources. But

US-China cooperation fails-China shifts responsibility

Lieberthal and Sandalow 9
(Kenneth Lieberthal Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution Professor,
University of Michigan, David Sandalow Senior Fellow, The Brookings
Institution January 2009 Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation
on Climate Change HY)
Chinas rise has been so rapid since the turn of the century that there is great attention both in Beijing and abroad to the way China is

Chinas leaders seek to be seen as constructive

international players, protecting Chinas own interests while also reducing
international instability, enhancing prosperity, and contributing to the
positioning itself on major international issues.

capacity of the international system to manage the global issues of the 21st
century. This mix of goals makes the Chinese leadership both desirous of contributing to
progress on the climate change issue and wary about obligations that might
negatively impact Chinas own growth prospects . China positions itself as a
developing country in international relation s. As noted above, while retaining some merit, this positioning
does not nearly capture the full reality of the PRC, which both confronts the problems of developing countries and has many of the attributes
of an industrialized nation. China is now in a somewhat uncomfortable transition period, where the balance is shifting toward more explicit
acceptance of its rights and obligations as a major power but where the most comfortable and internationally acceptable posture is not yet
clear. This situation complicates Chinas role during 2009 in addressing the global economic crisis, and it also has a complicating effect on

China is a leader in articulating the three

issues that developing countries in general raise with the advanced industrial countries on climate
change obligations. These are Countries should be held responsible not only for
their current emissions but also for their cumulative historical emissions, given
that greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere over many decades. Metrics should not focus on total
national emissions and neglect to account for per capita emissions in densely
populated countries. Developed countries have already gone through high
emissions stages of development (such as building out their infrastructure), while developing countries
still have much of this work to do. International agreements should recognize
this fundamental reality. The above three issues have the intended effect of
placing the major burden for global warming and its mitigation on the
industrialized countries and of laying down a conceptual framework to permit
ongoing increases in greenhouse gas emissions by developing countries even
as industrialized countries assume cap and reduction obligations. China specifically
Chinas posture in climate change negotiations leading to Copenhagen and beyond.
major framework

points to provisions in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, reaffirmed in the 2007 Bali Roadmap, which obligate advanced
industrial countries to aid the transfer of pertinent technologies and to provide financial support to developing countries to meet their climate

international economic malaise makes the demand for financial

support likely to be politically more difficult to achieve.
obligations. The current

***Cyber security***

Relations Good

Relations good cyber attacks mod***

U.S. China relations solve cyber terrorism
McAfee, 16
John McAfee is the founder of world's first public cyber security company. Has
founded four other cybersecurity companies and now is CEO of Future Tense Central the world's leading mobile device, corporate network and secure communications
company. March 23, 2016. JOHN McAFEE: The US should subcontract its
cybersecurity to China Business Insider http://www.businessinsider.com/johnmcafee-us-should-subcontract-cybersecurity-to-china-2016-3

in America, and within each of our allies, we seem to know nothing whatsoever
about impending extremist attacks until they occur . What in Gods name is happening?
But

The answer is certainly NOT crippling encryption. In China, encryption is controlled by the Office of State
Commercial Cryptography Administration (OSCCA). However, items such as wireless telephones, standard
computer operating systems and internet browsers are not included under their regulations. Think of how
odd this is compared to the extreme paranoia of our own government regarding encrypted

China, by
any cybersecurity measures is 20 years ahead of the US . So advanced, that
the White House voiced open frustration at our inability to stop or even slow
down Chinas increasing invasion of our cyberspace. China is not concerned about
communications between people. Yet, for the top cybersecurity experts, it's not odd at all.

encryption because it's capable of gathering all inputs prior to encryption and capturing screen shots after
data has been decrypted. They don't care what encryption techniques are used. Why should they waste

If the American government could grasp this

powerful departure from our archaic cybersecurity paradigm, then we might
have a chance of survival in this technological world for which we have entirely missed
time on the interim communication step?

the boat. How does China achieve such dramatic results compared to the US? The answer is through a
brilliant application of the foundation upon which digital science rests - mathematics. One of the most
powerful tools of intelligence gathering in this new age of digital communications is a nearly forgotten field
of mathematics called Point Set Topology. I chose this field as my specialty in grad school because it was
trivially easy and I was lazy. At the time it had absolutely no practical use, about which I cared little. I was
simply enjoying college life for as long as possible, and it's simplicity gave me lots of free time. Topology
deals with the relations between and among sets, or collections of things. The things can be anything, fish,
buttons, shoelaces, orPeople. Let me give you an oversimplified example of how it can be used in
intelligence gathering: Imagine that I am a terrorist (not difficult for my detractors within the FBI), and I
have a set (collection) of people that I frequently or infrequent call in my phone. If China suspects me it will
first plant spyware on my phone that merely transmits the phone numbers of my contacts and the
frequency and duration of my calls. Nothing else. The spyware planting is trivial for the Chinese and they
can do it from halfway around the world. They then plant the same spyware on the phones of everyone I
contact, and then everyone that they contact, and so on down the line until upwards of 100,000 phones or
more are infected. Since the software is merely transmitting interactions, each individual phone is
minimally impacted and few, ever detect the spyware. Next? They process these hundreds of millions of
interconnections using another seldom used branch of mathematics called Boolean Algebra. It, like Point
Set Topology, is so simple that you could get PhD in the field by sleeping through every class and shooting
up heroin every night. However, the combination of the two fields is one of the most powerful tools ever
constructed for ferreting out terrorists and other secret societies, criminal organizations, etc. It does this by
identifying and isolating communication anomalies. For example: a terrorist leader may make exclusively
outgoing calls and demand no incoming calls quite common for some groups. Now who does this,
really, except possibly your drug dealer who calls you whenever he receives a shipment but threatens to

if a terrorist leader makes a decision or gives

an order, only a few people will be called - those closest to him. Within a matter of minutes
whack you if you ever call him. Likewise,

those that he called will call a subset of others and likewise on down the chain of command. The software

the
Chinese would immediately download more sophisticated software onto only
doing the Boolean analysis would identify this as anomaly and report it. If this,we're to happen,

those phones in the chain of command that would collect keystrokes and
screen shots and send them home to China. Chinese foreign agents would then collect all
involved before they could even buy the duct tape to strap on their bombs. What is fascinating about this
technique is that if any one person, or more, throws away their phone and gets a new one, the new phone
will be identified with minutes of the first few calls sent or received. Powerful stuff. But back to the stone

Our government is trying to find out what is

happening after the impetus for what is happening has been activated. We
are lost if we remain in this state of ignorance. It would be better to
subcontract our security to the Chinese, eat crow and swallow our pride, until we can
stand on our own as a nation in this sea of cyber security chaos which we are
clearly incapable of navigating.
age system under which we live.

Cyber war escalates total system shutdown, including

accidental nuclear war
Nolan 15 {Andy, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research
Service, former Trial Attorney at the United States Department of Justice,
holds a J.D. from George Washington University, Graduate of Marquette
University High School!!! (Go Hilltoppers), Cybersecurity and Information
Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions CRS Report to Congress, March
16th, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf}
Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks 1 have been
perpetrated on a number of high profile American companies. In January 2014, Target
announced that hackers, using malware,2 had digitally impersonated one of the retail
giants contractors,3 stealing vast amounts of data including the names, mailing
Introduction

addresses, phone numbers or email addresses for up to 70 million individuals and the credit card
information of 40 million shoppers.4

Cyberattacks in February and March of 2014

potentially exposed contact and log-in information of eBays customers, prompting the online
retailer to ask its more than 200 million users to change their passwords.5 In September, it was revealed

cyber-criminals tried to steal the credit card

information of more than fifty million shoppers of the worlds largest home improvement
retailer, Home Depot.6 One month later, J.P. Morgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank by assets,
disclosed that contact information for about 76 million households was captured in a
that over the course of five months

cyberattackearlier in the year.7 In perhaps the most infamous cyberattack of 2014, in late November, Sony
Pictures Entertainment suffered a significant system disruption as a result of a brazen cyber attack8
that resulted in the leaking of the personal details of thousands of Sony employees.9 And in February of
2015, the health care provider Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield [end page 1] disclosed that a very
sophisticated attack obtained personal information relating to the companys customers and

high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be

indicative of a broader trend: the frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks
are increasing,11 posing grave threats to the national interests of the United
States. Indeed, the attacks on Target, eBay, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan-Chase, Sony
Pictures, and Anthem were only a few of the many publicly disclosed
cyberattacks perpetrated in 2014 and 2105.12 Experts suggest that hundreds of
thousands of other entities may have suffered similar incidents during the same
period,13 with one survey indicating that 43% of firms in the United States had
employees.10 The

experienced a data breach in the past year.14 Moreover, just as the cyberattacks
of 2013which included incidents involving companies like the New York Times, Facebook, Twitter,
Apple, and Microsoft15were eclipsed by those that occurred in 2014,16 the consensus
view is that 2015 and beyond will witness more frequent and more
sophisticated cyber incidents.17 To the extent that its expected rise outpaces
any corresponding rise in the ability to defend against such attacks, the result could
be troubling news for countless businesses that rely more and more on
computers in all aspects of their operations, as the economic losses resulting from a
single cyberattack can be extremely costly.18 And the resulting effects of a
cyberattack can have effects beyond a single companys bottom line . As nations
are becoming ever more dependent on information and information
technology,19 the threat posed by any one cyberattack [end page 2] can have devastating
collateral and cascading effects across a wide range of physical,
economic and social systems.20 With reports that foreign nationssuch as
Russia, China, Iran, and North Koreamay be using cyberspace as a new front
to wage war,21 fears abound that a cyberattack could be used to shut down
the nations electrical grid,22 hijack a commercial airliner,23 or even

launch a nuclear weapon with a single keystroke.24 In short, the

potential exists that the United States could suffer a cyber Pearl Harbor, an
attack that would cause physical destruction and loss of life25 and expose
in the words of one prominent cybersecurity expert vulnerabilities of staggering
proportions.26

Cyber Russia hacking trade off

Chinese Hacking Against US Declines, Grows Against
Russia
Sputnik, 16
Sputnik, a major new media brand with modern multimedia centers in dozens of
countries, was launched on November 10, 2014. It has multimedia press centers, and
it produces exclusive content for own web-sites and has radio service for the local
audience. FireEye is a publicly listed US network security company that provides
automated threat forensics and dynamic malware protection against advanced cyber
threats, such as advanced persistent threats and spear phishing. June 21, 2016.
Chinese Hacking Against US Declines, Grows Against Russia Study Sputnik
http://sputniknews.com/military/20160621/1041660827/chinese-hackers-russiaus.html

The intensity of cyberattacks conducted by hackers from

China against the US targets has decreased , however the Chinese hackers
continue attacks against Russia and the Asia Pacific region , US cybersecurity
company FireEye said in a report. "Between September 2015 and June 2016,
we observed 13 active China-based groups conduct multiple instances of
network compromise against corporations in the U.S ., Europe, and Japan. During this
same timeframe, other China-based groups targeted organizations in Russia and the
Asia Pacific region," FireEye said in the report published Monday. The report added that the shift in
the activities could be described by the political and military reforms in China, as
well as activities of the US government to cope with China's cyberattacks.
MOSCOW (Sputnik)

According to the FireEye, the company has reviewed the activity of China's 72 groups suspected of
conducting hacking activities against targets in the United States and 25 other countries.

Relations good cyber solvency

US and China can work through cyber tensions.
Murdock, 16
Jason Murdock is a journalist for IBTimes UK reporting on technology and
cybersecurity. Beat covers data breaches, encryption, surveillance legislation and
hacking. May 12, 2016. From hacking to cyber espionage: US and China discuss
security in the digital age International Business Times
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hacking-cyber-espionage-us-china-discuss-security-digitalage-1559787

Cybersecurity and espionage have long been a problem between the two
rival nations at least one that simmers under the surface of diplomacy. Both countries boast
sophisticated intelligence agencies and hacking techniques. The US is renowned for
its surveillance operations under the aegis of the NSA while, on Chinese shores, PLA-affiliated hackers have
long been sanctioned by the government to single out foreign targets from whom to steal intellectual
property for economic gain. The fresh rounds of discussions was led on the US side by Christopher Painter,
coordinator for cyber issues at the State Department. Officials from the Department of Justice (DoJ),
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defence (DoD) were also present.
Meanwhile, the Chinese delegation was led by Wang Qun, director-general of arms control at the nation's
foreign ministry alongside officials from the public security ministries as well as the Cyberspace

Chinese official Qun

said it was in the 'shared interests' of both superpowers to cooperate on
cybersecurity issues. He wrote: "While it is true that the US and China may
sometimes be at odds with each other on some of the cyber issues, it
shouldn't affect the cooperation between them. To fling accusations at each other
is not a solution. Only through cooperation, can the US and China forge a unified
and prosperous cyberspace. Otherwise, the cyberspace will divide and
wither." He continued: "The digital economy is taking up an increasingly large
share of GDP in both the US and China, two of the world's key players in
cyberspace. In the meantime, the two countries have evolved towards a
community of shared interests with each having a stake in the other. "
Administration of China. Writing on The Huffington Post following the meeting,

US China cooperation key to cyber deterrence- directly

affects economic stability
SIPA 14
(School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, June 2014,
U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Capstone Report, pg16-20, HY)
Cybersecurity is a global challenge within the international political economy .
In August 2012, the business and administrative systems of the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) and Qatars RasGas, were hit by
the Shamoon computer virus. Saudi Aramco is the worlds largest energy company in the world, holding nearly 10% of the worlds oil supply,
meanwhile, RasGas is the worlds second largest producer of liquefied natural gas.35 Shamoon demonstrates that the targeted attack of one
entity has the potential to shake the underpinnings of the world economy. Fortunately, Shammon did not penetrate systems governing
operations. Had that been the case, any disruption of production would have immediately impact on oil supply and prices, leading to far
reaching effects on multiple levels and sectors of the global economy. China and the U.S. are the top oil consumers in the world. Since
Shamoon, Saudi Arabian telecommunications companies and Western technology companies have increased efforts to secure Saudi data and

. China is now recognizing the importance of international cybersecurity

cooperation. Rapid international response enabled the Estonian government to combat the attacks. The governments CERT relied
systems

on assistance from its Finnish, German, Israeli and Slovenian CERT counterparts to restore normal network operations. NATO CERTs and the

EUs European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) also supported Estonia in providing technical assessments and other

cooperation, along with cooperation with private sector banks and Internet
was essential to strengthening Estonias cyber infrastructure,

assistance during the attacks.36 International

providers,
for example to
incrementally increase its throughput capacity.37 Notably, the international responses to aid Estonia happened within established security
communities and strong transnational relationships. China refrained from involvement, viewing the incidents as an internal matter of Estonia

Chinas stance is
changing as evidenced by a recent high-level discourse and policy
approaches calling for renewed cooperation with the entities such as the U.S. and European Union.39
Analysts stated that this new direction is intended to boost Chinese capabilities and
hamper notions of a China threat.40 International cooperation and preparedness
are now on the Chinese cyber agenda to move its strategic interests in
technology development, global reputation, and economic growth. Proposed
and also did not take part in the international cybersecurity discussions that followed.38 However,

Infrastructure Sectors for Cooperation. The previous sections provided background information, tools, and themes for negotiating with Chinas
cybersecurity counterparts. The second area of focus drills down into tangible areas for information sharing and coordination. The following
section details three infrastructure areas where cybersecurity cooperation is most promising and beneficial to U.S.-China shared interests:
Financial Services, Commercial Port Security, and Civilian Nuclear Energy. Each sector examines five categories of research: Sector Priorities,

Cooperation
in Financial Systems Sector Priorities The soundness, efficiency and stability
of securities markets rely on the quality of information provided and the
robustness of the supporting technological infrastructure . In recent years,
cybersecurity in relation to financial markets, both domestically and
internationally, has become a top priority. The cornerstone of financial
services is the maintenance of trust. The industry is built upon trust with clients, trust between firms, and trust
Past and Potential Attack Examples, Shared Vulnerabilities, Chinese Partners and Key Actors, and Recommendations.

to ensure the proper function of markets, executions of transactions and protection of information. Any loss or integrity failure in financial
infrastructure could impact a national economy in significant ways, including the loss of credit and liquidity to the marketplace, and the loss of
confidence in the operational effectiveness of the marketplace, which would impact other critical infrastructures. Examples of Past or Potential
Attacks In recent years, cyber attacks on the financial services sector have been increasingly prevalent. In 2012, some of the largest banks in
the United States came under cyber attack.41 In 2012 alone, 53% of securities exchanges around the world experienced a cyber attack.42 In
2013, cyber attacks brought down systems and some of South Koreas major banks, paralyzing bank machines across the country.43
Operation High Roller, discovered in 2012, siphoned up to $2.5 billion from bank accounts in Europe, the U.S. and Latin America.44 Numerous
stock exchanges around the world have faced DDoS cyber attacks, which in some cases have forced trading to halt for brief periods. It is
estimated that 60% of cyber crime occurring in China is financerelated. Some Chinese banks are subject to extortion by cyber criminals,
including third party actors from Eastern Europe.45 The economic and financial interdependence between China and the U.S. is remarkable.
China owns nearly 1.3 trillion dollars of U.S. treasury bonds. The U.S. is also one of Chinas largest trading partners, with trading between the

financial market operations centered

in the United States are increasingly electronically connected around the
world. The SWIFT interbank system and the U.S. CHIPS system process trillions of dollars of payments daily. With Chinas
increasingly globalized economy, China has strong incentives to ensure the
stability of these systems. Equally importantly, impacts of financial events sometimes cannot be contained regionally
(for example, the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and the Southeast Asian Crisis in 1998). Cyber attacks on the
complex and interdependent global financial system could damage
the orderly functioning of the global economy and undermine
investor confidence. Given this interdependence, both countries
have a significant stake in ensuring the stability and safety of the
others financial cybersecurity and have important incentives to
share information regarding threats from third-party malicious
actors such as rogue states, terrorist groups, and the like. The
majority of interviewees agreed that the financial sector serves as the
platform with one of the greatest opportunities for cybersecurity cooperation
between the U.S. and China. However, these interviewees also believed that the most effective and sustainable
two nations reaching over half a trillion dollars each year. Furthermore,

mechanism for encouraging such cooperation has yet to be identified. The remainder of this section identifies several approaches designed to
spur cooperation.

US-China cooperation checks cyberattacks against critical

infrastructure and financial sectors
SIPA 14

(School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, June 2014,

U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation Capstone Report, pg16-20, HY)
China and the U.S. should begin cooperating on several areas
related to financial cybersecurityidentifying threats, establishing
processes for disseminating information, coordinating crisis
responses, and improving abilities in detecting and forecasting
threats. The timely sharing of threat information is critical in developing and
deploying protective measures against malicious cyber activity. Gaps or lags
in information sharing and analysis necessitates that the industry deploys
faster and more effective electronic tools for detection and intelligence
collection in relation to security attacks and incidents. In particular, there is
an increased need for capabilities to assimilate multiple sources of threat
data to better identify threat activity and produce threat profile identification,
which might be difficult to obtain. The U.S. and Chinese governments should
create a formal system to cooperate against cyberattacks, but as this might
take time (as there would be initial sensitivity to establishing this system), it
would be best to encourage the big banks and financial exchanges in each
country to start sharing information first. Interviewees expressed concern
surrounding information sharing and U.S. privacy laws. They recommended
that the focus of information sharing be directed toward information involving
globalized financial utilities such as financial exchanges and clearinghouses.
Defending against third parties. China undoubtedly has an independent
incentive in U.S. financial cybersecurity, as it has so much invested a great
deal of capital in the U.S. and the global financial system. It would therefore
be in Chinas best interest to cooperate with the U.S. in preventing other
countries, such as Iran, from damaging the U.S. financial system. Agree that
certain areas are sacred. The governments of the U.S., China, and other
nations should find ways to cooperate and agree to maintain the sanctity of
certain critical infrastructure in the financial sector, therefore implicitly
discouraging these areas of infrastructure from becoming targets of attack. In
the financial services sector, the important prohibitions would be no probing,
surveillance, or malicious activity by governments or government entities
against this infrastructure. Again, the two most relevant areas of
infrastructure are exchanges and clearinghouses. Not only are these
infrastructures extremely important, but there is nothing to be gained by
governments from attacking them. Cooperation between states will make it
easier for them to target non-state actors wishing to cause damage or steal
money in these areas.

Cyber = most probable war

Cybersecurity is more important than the South China Sea
Killalea, 16
Debra Killalea is a senior journalist with 17 years experience in the national
and international press and digital media. June 24, 2016. South China Sea
conflict: China cyber war that is the real story New Zealand Herald
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?
c_id=2&objectid=11662456
China's
cyber war capabilities will in the future be more dangerous than anything else
currently taking place across the region. By the next decade, Beijing's cyber war capabilities
It's a scary but potentially very real threat facing the world by 2030. In fact one expert warns

could change the strategic balance in Asia, eclipsing the potential danger of rising tensions in the South
China Sea. That is the view of cyber security expert Greg Austin who predicts

new technologies will

"redefine both war and politics across East Asia". The professor of cyber security,
strategy and diplomacy in the Australian Centre for Cyber Security at the University of NSW told
news.com.au that while tensions were simmering in the South China Sea, the biggest threat to peace in
the region was yet to come. "Today, China is struggling to integrate cyber weapons and information
dominance into its military strategies," he said. "By 2030, China will have acquired a total war capability in
cyber space against Taiwan. "This

will alter the strategic balance in the Western

Pacific more than anything that is happening around the coral reefs in the
South China Sea today." Prof Austin, who addressed a two-day conference with a presentation on
Shaping the Cyber Arms Race of the Future, yesterday also warned Australia was lagging behind. Prof
Austin said warfare in East Asia today could be described as cyber-enabled but this would change very
quickly. "After 2030, it will become 'cyber-dominant' and Australia will have to build systems that can
survive in that environment of electronic torpedos and logic bombs," he warned. He said it was vital
Australia's military and naval technology could withstand any potential cyber threats in future. "Australia's
12 new submarines, the first to be launched in 2030, at a total cost in excess of $30 billion, would have to
operate in cyber space even better than they can navigate under the sea," he warned. "Any major power
that Australia confronts in conflict at sea after 2030 will use cyber attacks to try to prevent these boats
from putting to sea, or failing that, to disable them or their weapons systems at sea. " All

of the
critical systems will be cyber-controlled and therefore cyber vulnerable, even
if it meant simply manipulating and falsifying data inputs into various
systems." Prof Austin, who touched on the arguments in a January 2016 paper Australia Re-armed:
Future Needs for Cyber-Enabled Warfare, said China and the US had a confrontational relationship in
regards to the South China Sea, especially in regards to Taiwan. China was determined to maintain control
over the island territory but not at the risk of a massive ground or air war with huge casualties. However if
China was to attack Taiwan now in a war it would ultimately fail as it would have backing from its powerful
US ally. Prof Austin said people were looking at the wrong place in terms of the next major US China
flashpoint. "The

real issue here is cyber security," he said predicting how the future
relationship would pan out. "We're looking in the wrong place. It won't be in the South
China Sea where the strategic interests of China and the US collide. "Instead
the place were these interests will collide is in cyber space . While the US was already
heavily investing in its cyber military capabilities, Beijing appeared to be lagging, but not for long. "By
2030 China's military capabilities in cyber space will look significantly different to what they do today," Prof
Austin said. "By

2030 China will be more than capable of launching a militarily

disabling cyber attack on Taiwan." Such capability, without even needing an actual attack,
would shift the balance of power enabling China to keep a firm grip on the Taiwan Strait. The US on the
other hand would not be keen to see Taiwan fall under greater Chinese sway, since a unified Chinese
nation would have even more influence across the region. " For

China the biggest problem in

terms of global and security affairs isn't the South China Sea, it's the
reunification with Taiwan."

Relations Bad

Relations bad Cyber attacks mod***

Relations with China is a trap cyber attacks
Gertz, 16
Bill Gertz is senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon
he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the
Washington Times. March 18, 2016. China Continuing Cyber Attacks on U.S.
Networks The Washington Free Beacon http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/china-continuing-cyber-attacks-on-u-s-networks/

Six months after China pledged to halt cyber espionage against the United
States, Beijings hackers continue to conduct cyber attacks on government
and private networks, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command told Congress. Despite a formal
pledge made by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in September, cyber operations from China are
still targeting and exploiting U.S. government, defense industry, academic,
and private computer networks, Adm. Mike Rogers, the Cybercom chief, said in prepared
testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee on Wednesday. Rogers echoed comments on
continued Chinese cyber attacks made by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in February.
Clapper said in Senate testimony that it

remains to be seen if China will abide by the

informal pledge made during a summit meeting in Washington with President
Obama. Rogers said he agreed with Clapper that Chinas commitment to halt cyber espionage attacks
remains an open question. China has been linked by U.S. intelligence agencies to
wide-ranging cyber attacks aimed at stealing information and mapping
critical computer networks for future attacks in a crisis or conflict. Despite the
Chinese hacking activity, the Obama administration has taken no action against
China for years of large-scale cyber attacks that officials say have cost the
nation billions of dollars in stolen intellectual property and compromised
networks. Rogers also warned that nation states with advanced cyber warfare capabilities are taking
steps to mask their cyber attacks by cooperating with non-government hackers. Unspecified nation states
are expanding cooperation with a much broader range of hackers in a bid to hide the source of
sophisticated cyber attacks. I think this is in no small part an attempt to obscure what the real originator of the activity is, he said. The use of surrogate
hackers makes it more difficult for the U.S. government to confront foreign states about cyber attacks. And they say, Its not us. Its some criminal group; we dont control
all that, Rogers said. Rogers also disclosed new details about cyber attacks against the email system used by the militarys Joint Chiefs of Staff, an attack that officials
have blamed on Russia. The July attack shut down an unclassified email server for 10 days and disrupted an email system used by 4,000 users on the network. Pentagon
officials believe the attack came from Russian government hackers. Ultimately we were able to defeat the [intrusion] attempt in almost 60 other networks simultaneously
except in this one particular network, Rogers said, noting that the final defense against cyber attacks is the user of a computer. In this case we had a user who clicked on
a link that I said What would lead you to do this? Read this. It doesnt make any sense. Because computer users in the Joint Staff clicked on an email link that
downloaded a virus, the Pentagon was forced to spend time and money and limit use of the system. We cant afford to have this sort of thing, Rogers said. Under
questioning from Rep. Elise Stefanik (R., N.Y.), Rogers said he is comfortable that Cyber Command has enough military capabilities to counter cyber threats from Russia,
China, and other states and entities. Ive yet to run into a threat scenario that we couldnt deal with, he said. But Rogers voiced worries about his command having
enough forces to deal with the threats. What concerns me is capacityhow much of it do you have and as the threats proliferate, our ability to deal with high-end,
simultaneous complicated threats, thats probably the biggest limiting factor right now, he said. The four-star admiral testified before the House Armed Services
subcommittee on emerging threats and capabilities, which oversees the command. The command spends around $500 million annually and is in the process of creating
cyber mission teams that are deployed with warfighting commands and other military units. The teams conduct both defensive and offensive cyber operations. The
command is based at Fort Meade, Md., and works closely with the National Security Agency, the electronic spy agency that Rogers also leads. Separately, Defense
Secretary Ash Carter testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday and revealed the Pentagon is adding $900 million for cyber defenses and
operations in fiscal 2017. Much of that sum is focused on countering advanced threats from states like China and Russia. Reflecting our renewed commitment to deterring
even the most advanced adversaries, the budget also invests in cyber deterrence capabilities, including building potential military response options, Carter said. Rogers
said he is concerned that evolving cyber attacks are being used to acquire large databases that can be used for future cyber attacks or for foreign intelligence operations.
Two recent examples were the cyber attacks against the Office of Personnel Management, which obtained records on more than 22 million federal workers, and the Anthem
Healthcare cyber attacks that obtained some 80 million health records. OPM, Anthem, those are good examples to use of data now [being] a commodity that have value

counterintelligence, whether it be social engineering and helping to refine cyber

activity. Youll see increased attacks against Big Data concentrations in the future, Rogers said.
Ransomware attacksmalicious cyber attacks that encrypt data on a targeted computer and then extort
for a variety of purposes, whether that be

Security researchers this

week traced ransomware attacks to China, Reuters reported on Tuesday,
noting that cyber tools used in the attacks were associated with earlier
Chinese-linked cyber attacks. If you watch over the next year, youll see a lot
the owners of the data to have it decryptedalso pose a growing threat.

more ransomware activity, Rogers said. In his prepared testimony to the subcommittee, Rogers
said cyber attacks by a range of nations and non-state actors are intensifying.
While North Korea has not conducted a repeat of its November 2014 cyber attack against Sony Pictures
Entertainment, we have seen a wide range of malicious cyber activities aimed against American targets
and victims elsewhere around the world, and thus we are by no means sanguine about the overall trends
in cyberspace, he said. Cyber attacks are ubiquitous. Literally every American who has connected to a
network has been affected, directly or indirectly, by cyber crime, Rogers said. By this point millions of us
have had personal information stolen, or seen our accounts or credit compromised. Some 300 American
companies involved in critical infrastructure, such as electrical power, finance, communications and
transportation, are working with Cybercom to study ways to protect against major cyber attacks, Rogers
noted. We

remain vigilant in preparing for future threats, as cyber attacks

could cause catastrophic damage to portions of our power grid,
communications networks, and vital services, he said. Coordinated cyber attacks in
Ukraine last December disrupted the power grid and damaged electricity control systems. If directed at
the critical infrastructure that supports our nations military, cyber attacks could hamper our forces,
interfering with deployments, command and control, and supply functions, in addition to the broader impact such events could have across our society, Rogers
said, adding that the major cyber threats remain Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Rogers said cyber attackers from several nations have explored computer networks
used to control critical infrastructure and can potentially return at a time of their choosing to disrupt or damage the infrastructure. Russia has very capable cyber
operators who can and do work with speed, precision, and stealth, Rogers said. Iran and North Korea represent lesser but still serious challenges to U.S. interests, he
said. Although both states have been more restrained in this last year in terms of cyber activity directed against us, they remain quite active and are steadily improving
their capabilities, which often hide in the overall worldwide noise of cybercrime. Both Iran and North Korea work against the United States in cyberspace but direct most of
their malicious hacking against regional states. On ISIS, Rogers said he is concerned about the terror groups cyber capabilities. Most ISIS cyber activity involves
propaganda, recruiting, radicalization, and fundraising. ISIS-affiliated cyber operators a year ago publicized online personal data of more than 100 American service
members, including many in the United States. Not only did the hackers for ISIL publicize the personal details on these Americans, but ISIL also called for jihad against
them, urging followers in the United States to assassinate them and their family members, Rogers said. While there was no direct link between the activity and the recent
terrorist shootings in the United States and France, ISIL wants its followers on the Internet to take inspiration from such attacks, Rogers said. Cyber Command attacks
against ISIS make it more difficult for ISIL to plan or conduct attacks against the U.S. or our allies from their bases in Iraq and Syria, he said. Rogers said Cybercom also
has begun to think more about strategic deterrence in cyber space by creating capabilities that would dissuade foreign hackers from considering attacks. Cybercom
currently has set up 123 cyber mission teams staffed by 4,990 people. Twenty-seven of the teams are fully operational and 68 are in early stages of deployment. The
teams include combat mission teams that work with warfighters, like those in U.S. Central Command waging cyber war against ISIS. The command also has a national
mission team that defends U.S. critical infrastructure. Cyber protection teams are devoted to defending defense networks from attack. The cyber protection teams were
called in last year to help with the cyber attack on the Pentagons Joint Staff computer system.

China cyber attack takes down U.S. hegemony and causes

major power war
Karlin 10independent writer, author, analyst, educated at UC Berkeley
(Anatoly, 28 March 2010, How a Second Korean War will be Fought,
http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2010/03/28/korean-war-2/
If this were to happen, all bets are off. China will probably be able to roll back
the invasion forces to the DMZ. After all, it managed to do this in the 1950s,
when it was much more militarily backwards relative to the US. Now, it will
have a big preponderance over land, while its new carrier-killing ballistic
missiles, submarines, cruise missiles, and Flanker fighters are now, at some
level, able to deny the seas off China to the US Navy, while its anti-satellite
tests and cyberwar prowess means that the American dominance in space
and information ought not be taken for granted either. Now I am not saying
that the Chinese Army (it ceased by the Peoples Liberation Army recently)
comes anywhere close to matching the American military; however, it might
well already have the ability to defeat it in a local war on Chinas borders. If
China is successful, it will re-establish North Korea as its own protectorate,
although under someone more rational and reliable than Kim Jong-il (though
needless to say this will also completely sever its economic relationship with
the US and cause a severe, but temporary, economic contraction due to the
collapse of its export sector).

There will be a cascade of consequences elsewhere. Taiwan may use the

opportunity to declare independence, provoking a second war in the region.
Though the US says that it will not come to Taiwans aid if it does this
unilaterally, America will probably change its mind if it is simultaneously
embroiled in an intense local war with China on the Korean peninsula! Other
actors opposed to American hegemony may view this as a chance to
undermine the overstretched superpower. For instance, Russia could
orchestrate a new war against Georgia and China may even persuade Iran to
mine the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for security guarantees and
technology transfer. All these dominoes going down may even precipitate the
collapse of the increasingly fragile Pax Americana.

Defense

No cyber war
No Impact Our Cyber Tech is better the Chinese
threat is all hype.

Ross, 2009

Robert S.
, is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the
John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security
Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. September 2009 - October 2009, (The
National Interest, HEADLINE: Here Be Dragons, Robert S. Ross and Aaron L. Friedberg Debate: Is China a
Military Threat?, p. Lexis)

Beijing is also developing cyber-warfare techniques, but exaggerated assessments

of this capability fail to evaluate Chinas own emerging vulnerability to such attacks .
Cyber-warfare technologies and skills are readily accessible and U.S. advanced munitions are increasingly
dependent on high-technology communication and surveillance technologies. The United States is thus
vulnerable to cyber attacks, and a Chinese cyber offensive against the United States could influence U.S.

the reciprocal effect of Washingtons cyberwarfare capability on Beijings ability to wage high- technology warfare is equally
significant. The same advanced Chinese technologies and weaponry that pessimists
argue present a major threat to U.S. security , including ASBMs, are highly dependent
on advanced communication and surveillance technologies that are particularly
vulnerable to U.S. cyber attacks. And once the United States degrades the PLAs
advanced communication technologies, China would lose its high-technology
asymmetric capability that so alarms Americas pessimists, and it would be very
susceptible to a wide range of superior U.S. sea-based forces, even if the United
States suffered from an effective Chinese cyber attack.
operations in the western Pacific. Nonetheless,

No impact their evidence is just rhetoric and empirically denied

cyber weapons burn out and countermeasures are superior
Rid, 12 (Thomas, Reader in War Studies at Kings College London, nonresident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, DC,
Mar/Apr 2012, Cyberwar: Think Again, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full, JD)

"Cyberweapons Can Create Massive Collateral Damage." Very unlikely.

When news of Stuxnet broke, the New York Times reported that the most
striking aspect of the new weapon was the "collateral damage" it created. The malicious
program was "splattered on thousands of computer systems around the world, and much
of its impact has been on those systems, rather than on what appears to have been its
intended target, Iranian equipment," the Times reported. Such descriptions encouraged
the view that computer viruses are akin to highly contagious biological

viruses that, once unleashed from the lab, will turn against all vulnerable
systems, not just their intended targets. But this metaphor is deeply flawed. As
the destructive potential of a cyberweapon grows, the likelihood that it
could do far-reaching damage across many systems shrinks. Stuxnet did

infect more than 100,000 computers -- mainly in Iran, Indonesia, and India,
though also in Europe and the United States. But it was so specifically
programmed that it didn't actually damage those machines, afflicting only
Iran's centrifuges at Natanz. The worm's aggressive infection strategy was
designed to maximize the likelihood that it would reach its intended target. Because that
final target was not networked, "all the functionality required to sabotage a system was
embedded directly in the Stuxnet executable," the security software company Symantec
observed in its analysis of the worm's code. So yes, Stuxnet was "splattered" far

and wide, but it only executed its damaging payload where it was
supposed to. Collateral infection, in short, is not necessarily collateral
damage. A sophisticated piece of malware may aggressively infect many
systems, but if there is an intended target, the infection will likely have a
distinct payload that will be harmless to most computers. Especially in the
context of more sophisticated cyberweapons, the image of inadvertent collateral
damage doesn't hold up. They're more like a flu virus that only makes one family sick.
RAIGO PAJULA/AFP/Getty Images "In Cyberspace, Offense Dominates Defense."
Wrong again. The information age has "offense-dominant attributes," Arquilla and
Ronfeldt wrote in their influential 1996 book, The Advent of Netwar. This view has spread
through the American defense establishment like, well, a virus. A 2011 Pentagon report
on cyberspace stressed "the advantage currently enjoyed by the offense in
cyberwarfare." The intelligence community stressed the same point in its annual threat
report to Congress last year, arguing that offensive tactics -- known as vulnerability
discovery and exploitation -- are evolving more rapidly than the federal government and
industry can adapt their defensive best practices. The conclusion seemed obvious:
Cyberattackers have the advantage over cyberdefenders, "with the trend likely getting
worse over the next five years." A closer examination of the record, however,

reveals three factors that put the offense at a disadvantage. First is the
high cost of developing a cyberweapon, in terms of time, talent, and target
intelligence needed. Stuxnet, experts speculate, took a superb team and a
lot of time. Second, the potential for generic offensive weapons may be far
smaller than assumed for the same reasons, and significant investments in
highly specific attack programs may be deployable only against a very
limited target set. Third, once developed, an offensive tool is likely to have
a far shorter half-life than the defensive measures put in place against it.
Even worse, a weapon may only be able to strike a single time; once the
exploits of a specialized piece of malware are discovered, the most critical systems
will likely be patched and fixed quickly. And a weapon, even a potent one,
is not much of a weapon if an attack cannot be repeated. Any political threat
relies on the credible threat to attack or to replicate a successful attack. If that were in
doubt, the coercive power of a cyberattack would be drastically reduced.

No impact cyber attack is hype

Rid, 12 (Thomas, Reader in War Studies at Kings College London, nonresident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for

Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, DC,

Mar/Apr 2012, Cyberwar: Think Again, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full, JD)
The Cyber War Is Already Upon Us No way. "Cyberwar is coming!" John Arquilla
and David Ronfeldt predicted in a celebrated Rand paper back in 1993. Since

then, it seems to have arrived -- at least by the account of the U.S. military
establishment, which is busy competing over who should get what share of the fight.
Cyberspace is "a domain in which the Air Force flies and fights," Air Force Secretary
Michael Wynne claimed in 2006. By 2012, William J. Lynn III, the deputy defense
secretary at the time, was writing that cyberwar is "just as critical to military operations
as land, sea, air, and space." In January, the Defense Department vowed to equip the
U.S. armed forces for "conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains -land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace." Meanwhile, growing piles of books and
articles explore the threats of cyberwarfare, cyberterrorism, and how to survive them.

Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider
the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be
purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far,
from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. Take the
dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by
cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes
like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a
so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space.
The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear
device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the
operation sabotaged the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm
that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed,
a U.S. National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004
book, At the Abyss; the only harm came to the Soviet economy. But did it really
happen? After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of
the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place,

denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm
such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet
Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. Something likely did happen,
but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a
single document. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of
Reed's source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort to
provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not confirm that

such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the Siberian

pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a
successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are even less
remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came in response
to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the Bronze Soldier. The wellwired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive distributed denial-of-service
attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked computers and lasted three weeks. The
attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58 Estonian websites were attacked at once

and the online services of Estonia's largest bank were taken down. "What's the
difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the
blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?" asked Estonian Prime
Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was

certainly a nuisance and an emotional strike on the country, but the bank's
actual network was not even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one
day and two hours the next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't
purposefully aimed at changing Estonia's behavior, and no political entity
took credit for it. The same is true for the vast majority of cyberattacks on
record. Indeed, there is no known cyberattack that has caused the loss of
human life. No cyberoffense has ever injured a person or damaged a
building. And if an act is not at least potentially violent, it's not an act of
war. Separating war from physical violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would
mean that there is no way to distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on
obesity and cancer. Yet those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do
kill people.

Cyberterrorism impact is alarmist defense is crushing the race

Rid, 12 (Thomas, Reader in War Studies at Kings College London, nonresident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, DC,
Mar/Apr 2012, Cyberwar: Think Again, Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full, JD)

"A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We
could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor."
Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway
for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the
ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War,
former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of
nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing,
refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and
satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in
comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the
standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head
of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than
$3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode
Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said,

"those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at

Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage
a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton
turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in
water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high

vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor
failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices
in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the
Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-

fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's
management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that
ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk
power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk
dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant.
The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the
end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the SayanoShushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount.
The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of
events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult
even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a
daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber

Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep
breath.
"Cyberattacks Are Becoming Easier." Just the opposite. U.S. Director of
National Intelligence James R. Clapper warned last year that the volume of
malicious software on American networks had more than tripled since 2009
and that more than 60,000 pieces of malware are now discovered every day. The United
States, he said, is undergoing "a phenomenon known as 'convergence,' which amplifies
the opportunity for disruptive cyberattacks, including against physical infrastructures."
("Digital convergence" is a snazzy term for a simple thing: more and more devices able
to talk to each other, and formerly separate industries and activities able to work
together.) Just because there's more malware, however, doesn't mean that

attacks are becoming easier. In fact, potentially damaging or lifethreatening cyberattacks should be more difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive
systems generally have built-in redundancy and safety systems, meaning
an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely
forcing the shutdown of one control system, say a power plant, could trigger a
backup and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an
effective weapon, malware would have to influence an active process -- but not bring it
to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to
remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take
Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely
shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly
manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped
onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded
these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input
signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm. Its objective was not just
to fool operators in a control room, but also to circumvent digital safety and monitoring
systems so it could secretly manipulate the actual processes. Building and deploying

Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was

supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous

cyberweapons. Yes, "convergence," standardization, and sloppy defense of controlsystems software could increase the risk of generic attacks, but the same trend has
also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily
and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy
systems more complex, not less.

A2 relations solve cyber

Distrust of US cyber projects decks possibility of cyber
cooperation
Patrick and Thaler 10
(Stewart M. Patrick and Farah Faisal Thaler, March 15-17 2010, Council on
Foreign Relations,China, the United States, and Global Governance: Shifting
Foundations of World Order pg.6 HY)
An emerging issue of U.S.-China friction is the future of cyberspace, where
existing global governance mechanisms are underdeveloped. The workshop
took place at a delicate moment, in the wake of Googles accusations of a
Chinese government orchestrated campaign of cyberattacks (and the
companys impending departure from China), as well as a major speech by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Internet freedom that some Chinese
officials viewed as a broadside against China. The resulting mutual suspicion
and distrust has complicated hopes of advancing Sino-U.S. cooperation on
cybersecurity, including the common vulnerability both countries face with
respect to espionage (whether industrial, political, or military), criminality
(including credit card fraud and identity theft), terrorism (such as attacks on
critical Internet infrastructure), and wartime operations against computer
networks. The policy divergences in this area are clear. The United States has
promoted a vision of cyberspace that is open, secure, and global, and that
affords some degree of anonymity from governmentgoals that are
increasingly difficult to achieve, given the growing sophistication of Internet
attacks. The Chinese vision of cybersecurity, in contrast, is essentially
predicated on state control, including an absence of anonymity for users. This
approach has raised hackles in the United States, which objects to Beijings
Internet censorship, monitoring and perceived persecution of dissidents and
human rights organizations, and alleged attacks on Internet companies.
China, for its part, views U.S. complaints of a politicized Internet as
hypocritical, given the creation of a Pentagon Cyber Command, Googles
cooperation with the National Security Agency, U.S. funding for organizations
seeking to evade Chinas Great Firewall, and alleged U.S. government
control of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
China also notes that many cyberattacks on official and private Chinese
computer networks emanate from the United States.

***Science diplomacy***

Relations Good

Relations good science diplomacy mod***

US-China cooperation promotes science diplomacy, spills

over into multiple issues
XUE, SIMON, ZHANCHEN, MAK (Lan XUE, Professor and Dean of School of
Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University Denis SIMON, Vice
Provost, International Strategic Initiatives and Foundation Professor of
Contemporary Chinese A airs at Arizona State University, XU Zhanchen
(Associate Research Fellow, Department of Strategic Research at CCIEE),
Ronald MAK, U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation,
CHINAUSFOCUS, http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part02-Chapter-122.pdf)
Starting with the establishment of diplomat- ic relations between the U.S. and
China in 1979, the two nations have witnessed many important achievements
in such key fields as energy, agricul- tural S&T, and wireless communications
technol- ogy. Looking into the future, based on the evolving patterns of S&T development in both
countries, it seems clear that the two nations have many poten- tial opportunities for deepening as well as
expand-ing their bilateral cooperation and collaboration. Moreover, with ample consultation and coordina-

the two nations could form a truly unique strategic win-win partnership:
American compa- nies operating in China could further enhance the rate of
return on their investments, while China could continue to energize its S&T
development and accelerate its industrial upgrading. More im- portantly,
enhanced S&T cooperation between the two nations could help both
countries reach a use- ful consensus on a series of critical global issues
including renewable energy, food security, climate change and healthcare
thus fostering a more pos- itive sum, collaborative approach to international
agenda setting. Clearly, there continue to be many problems and hurdles that
plague U.S.-China S&T cooperation, including disputes over intellectual property rights,
export control restrictions, trade barriers and most recently, information security. Amelioration of
these problems will require noth- ing less than continuous bilateral
engagement, ne- gotiation and dialogue at the highest levels of both
governments.
tion,

Science diplomacy good solves every gd impact***

STATEMENT OF DR. NINA V. FEDOROFF, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE;
ADMINISTRATOR OF USAID APRIL 2, 2008. HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND SCIENCE EDUCATION COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED
TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110hhrg41470/html/CHRG-110hhrg41470.htm

Science by its nature facilitates diplomacy because it strengthens political

relationships, embodies powerful ideals, and creates opportunities for all. The
global scientific community embraces principles Americans cherish:
transparency, meritocracy, accountability, the objective evaluation of
evidence, and broad and frequently democratic participation. Science is
inherently democratic, respecting evidence and truth above all. Science is
also a common global language, able to bridge deep political and religious
divides. Scientists share a common language. Scientific interactions serve to
keep open lines of communication and cultural understanding. As scientists
everywhere have a common evidentiary external reference system, members
of ideologically divergent societies can use the common language of science
to cooperatively address both domestic and the increasingly trans-national
and global problems confronting humanity in the 21st century. There is a
growing recognition that science and technology will increasingly drive the
successful economies of the 21st century. Science and technology provide an
immeasurable benefit to the U.S. by bringing scientists and students here,
especially from developing countries, where they see democracy in action,
make friends in the international scientific community, become familiar with
American technology, and contribute to the U.S. and global economy. For
example, in 2005, over 50 percent of physical science and engineering
graduate students and postdoctoral researchers trained in the U.S. have been
foreign nationals. Moreover, many foreign-born scientists who were educated
and have worked in the U.S. eventually progress in their careers to hold
influential positions in ministries and institutions both in this country and in
their home countries. They also contribute to U.S. scientific and technologic
development: According to the National Science Board's 2008 Science and
Engineering Indicators, 47 percent of full-time doctoral science and
engineering faculty in U.S. research institutions were foreign-born. Finally,
some types of science--particularly those that address the grand challenges
in science and technology--are inherently international in scope and
collaborative by necessity. The ITER Project, an international fusion research
and development collaboration, is a product of the thaw in superpower
relations between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President
Ronald Reagan. This reactor will harness the power of nuclear fusion as a
possible new and viable energy source by bringing a star to Earth. ITER
serves as a symbol of international scientific cooperation among key scientific
leaders in the developed and developing world--Japan, Korea, China, E.U.,
India, Russia, and United States--representing 70 percent of the world's
current population. The recent elimination of funding for FY08 U.S.
contributions to the ITER project comes at an inopportune time as the
Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy
Organization for the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project had entered into
force only on October 2007. The elimination of the promised U.S. contribution
drew our allies to question our commitment and credibility in international
cooperative ventures. More problematically, it jeopardizes a platform for
reaffirming U.S. relations with key states. It should be noted that even at the
height of the cold war, the United States used science diplomacy as a means

to maintain communications and avoid misunderstanding between the

world's two nuclear powers--the Soviet Union and the United States. In a
complex multi-polar world, relations are more challenging, the threats
perhaps greater, and the need for engagement more paramount. Using
Science Diplomacy to Achieve National Security Objectives The welfare and
stability of countries and regions in many parts of the globe require a
concerted effort by the developed world to address the causal factors that
render countries fragile and cause states to fail. Countries that are unable to
defend their people against starvation, or fail to provide economic
opportunity, are susceptible to extremist ideologies, autocratic rule, and
abuses of human rights. As well, the world faces common threats, among
them climate change, energy and water shortages, public health
emergencies, environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity,
and religious extremism. These threats can undermine the national security
of the United States, both directly and indirectly. Many are blind to political
boundaries, becoming regional or global threats. The United States has no
monopoly on knowledge in a globalizing world and the scientific challenges
facing humankind are enormous. Addressing these common challenges
demands common solutions and necessitates scientific cooperation,
common standards, and common goals. We must increasingly harness the
power of American ingenuity in science and technology through strong
partnerships with the science community in both academia and the private
sector, in the U.S. and abroad among our allies, to advance U.S. interests in
foreign policy. There are also important challenges to the ability of states to
supply their populations with sufficient food. The still-growing human
population, rising affluence in emerging economies, and other factors have
combined to create unprecedented pressures on global prices of staples such
as edible oils and grains. Encouraging and promoting the use of
contemporary molecular techniques in crop improvement is an essential goal
for U.S. science diplomacy. An essential part of the war on terrorism is a war
of ideas. The creation of economic opportunity can do much more to combat
the rise of fanaticism than can any weapon. The war of ideas is a war about
rationalism as opposed to irrationalism. Science and technology put us firmly
on the side of rationalism by providing ideas and opportunities that improve
people's lives. We may use the recognition and the goodwill that science still
generates for the United States to achieve our diplomatic and developmental
goals. Additionally, the Department continues to use science as a means to
reduce the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and prevent what
has been dubbed `brain drain.' Through cooperative threat reduction
activities, former weapons scientists redirect their skills to participate in
peaceful, collaborative international research in a large variety of scientific
fields. In addition, new global efforts focus on improving biological,
chemical, and nuclear security by promoting and implementing best
scientific practices as a means to enhance security, increase global
partnerships, and create sustainability.

Relations good science diplomacy solves SCS

Science diplomacy key to reducing regional conflicts
around the South China Sea
Vu and Borton 15 (Truong-Minh Vu, Director for the Center for
International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and
Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam and James Borton, panelist at the
recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) symposium on
the South China Sea. July 19, 2015. Science Diplomacy a Crucible for South
China Sea Disputes, GEOPOLITICAL MONITOR,
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/science-diplomacy-a-crucible-for-southchina-sea-disputes/)
The increasingly loud accusations and declarations from Beijing and
Washington over Chinas ambitions to reclaim a string of small islands, coral
reefs and lagoons show no signs of ending. However, given the number of international stakeholders in the region,
the real promise of science for diplomacy may now be at hand in this
complex geopolitical climate. The arena for this convergence of two words- science and diplomacy- was displayed at a Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington symposium, where marine science, and the emergence of Chinas blue
economy framed a new narrative in understanding the environmental stakes
in the regions escalating conflict. Panelists Dr. John McManus, Rosentiel School of the University of Miami,
and Professor Kathleen Walsh, U.S. Naval War College, demonstrated to policymakers how
this contested region is not simply about sovereignty claims, but is likely to
be recognized as one of the most significant environmental issues of the 21st
century. Policymakers may do well to take a lesson or two from nature as they
examine how best to address the complex and myriad of sovereignty claims.
Just as scientists place their subjects under close microscopic inspection, the policymaker, now more than ever, needs to visit science laboratories, where many contested
nations researchers are sharing data about the future of South China Sea coral life. At the 16th Meeting of the ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment

Dr. Leong Chee Chiew, Deputy CEO, National Parks in Singapore highlighted that the
ASEAN region, with its combined coastline of about 173,000 kilometers and rich coastal and marine biodiversity, faces enormous
challenges to sustainability in coastal and shared ocean regions. Unless a
scientific ecosystem approach is adopted, trans-boundary marine areas
conflicts will only become worse. The problems are disturbing. Nearly 80 percent of the SCSs
coral reefs have been degraded and are under serious threat in places from sediment, overfishing, destructive fishing practices,
pollution and climate change. Challenges around food security and renewable fish resources
are fast becoming a hardscrabble reality for more than just fishermen. With dwindling fisheries
in the regions coastal areas, fishing state subsidies, overlapping EEZ claims,
and mega-commercial fishing trawlers competing in a multi-billion dollar
industry, fish are now the backbone in this sea of troubles. An ecological catastrophe is unfolding in
held last month in Singapore,

the regions once fertile fishing grounds, as repeated reclamations destroy reefs, agricultural and industrial run-off poison coastal waters, and overfishing depletes fish

The littoral states ought to be

working together to manage the sea, but the dispute over sovereignty fosters
the fear that any collaboration will be taken as a concession. The United Nations Environmental
Program (UNEP) confirms that the South China Sea accounts for as much as one tenth of global fish catches and by 2030, China will
account for 38 percent of global fish consumption. Overfishing and
widespread destruction of coral reefs now necessitates the intervention of
science policy to safeguard the stewardship of this vital sea. The immense biodiversity that exists in the South China Sea cannot be ignored. The impact of
stocks. A recent issue of The Economist underscores the importance for science diplomacy:

continuous coastal development, escalating reclamation and increased maritime traffic is now regularly placed in front of an increasing number of marine scientists and
policy strategists. Marine biologists, who share a common language that cuts across political, economic and social differences, recognize that the structure of a coral reef is
strewn with the detritus of perpetual conflict and represents one of natures cruelest battlefields, pitting species against species. At the same time, the coral reef, often
referred to as a jewel of the sea, offers a sanctuary to many of the seas life forms like the mollusk, which in turn provides lodging to a mantis shrimp and a miniature eel in
exchange for food and cleaning services. While traditional diplomatic and military tactics are not completely exhausted in the latest round of diplomatic salvos between

the timing is excellent for the emergence of science as an

optimal tool to bring together various claimants, including Brunei, China,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan in the highly nationalistic
contested sea disputes. For the analysts and ministry policy shapers, this means a shift of focus, away
from military capacities and maneuvering of naval vessels and surveillance
planes to a deepening of registers and practices found in science diplomacy.
If the U.S. and China are to find substantive common ground in this
complicated and intractable history, it requires a creative and flexible
diplomatic policy. That bridge for communication may be tapped among marine scientists currently engaged in cooperative research in the region. For
China and the U.S., perhaps

example, the build-up of maritime biology, maritime mapping and geology, deep-sea explorations, and systematic knowledge production was absent only 20 years ago.
However, these scientific advancements fail to support a Chinese position with the UN Seabed Commission, and in other legal battles in the context of international law of
the seas. On the contrary, the Commission fosters and provides the framework for the expansion of cooperative research in scientific marine study on deep-sea
ecosystems. In an amplification of sciences vaulted role, the International Seabed Authority is involved in the vast effort of collecting, analyzing, rationalizing, and
disseminating results of marine scientific research and data. Their one hundred and sixty seven members, including China, recently met at the United Nations to develop
and to discuss the exploitation code. The scientific community does not refute the overwhelming evidence that Chinas continued reclamation of atolls and rocks through
the dredging of sand in the Spratlys disrupts the fragile marine ecosystem. The area has been recognized as a treasure trove of biological resources and is host to parts of
Southeast Asias most productive coral reef ecosystems. With coral reefs threatened around the world, reef specialist, Dr. McManus in his CSIS presentation, expressed
concern for the plight of the regions hard and soft corals, parrotfish, spinner dolphins, sea turtles, groupers, and black-tipped reef sharks. Recent biological surveys in the
region and even off Mainland China reveal that the losses of living coral reefs present a grim picture of decline, degradation, and destruction. More specifically, reef fish
species in the contested region have declined precipitously to around 261 from 460 species. While science provides as many answers as questions, the evidence is

This crisis should weigh heavily on all claimant

nations who need the fish protein to feed a burgeoning 1.9 billion people. As early
alarming that the world may be witnessing a reef apocalypse.

as 1992, McManus was one of several marine scientists who wrote scientific articles advocating for an international peace park or marine protected area. While the
geopolitical intractable SCS impediments remain, the Spratlys might be seen as a resource savings bank, where fish, as trans-boundary residents, spawn in the coral
reefs and encircle almost all of the South China Sea waters, before returning home. In an e-mail, McManus acknowledged that others have added international gravitas in
the call for a marine protected area in the Spratlys. They include, Dr. Liana Talaue-McManus, his wife and an expert on resource management, Dr. Porfirio Alio, a coral reef
ecologist, and Dr. Mike Fortes, a seagrass ecologist, and Dr. Alan White, a senior scientist at the Nature Conservancy, now responsible for the Coral Triangle Program,
representing a coordinated conservation policy driven effort on the part of six countries including, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, the Philippines, Timor
Leste and Malaysia. Additional marine protected area endorsements have come from conservationist Tony Claparols, former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, Vietnams Dr.
Vo Si Tuan and Taiwans, Dr. Kwan-Tsao-Y Shao. The Nature Conservancy report Natures Investment Bank points to improved fish catches outside MPA boundaries,
increased protein intake and even poverty alleviation through ecotourism. Because of earlier scientific work and published articles, the Taiwanese government recognized
Dongsha atolls prominence as a model for the sustainability of fishery resources in the SCS and the Taiwan Strait and was designated as the first marine protected area in

in its simplest
explanation, trans boundary conservation (TBC) implies working across
boundaries to achieve conservation objectives, writes Maja Vasilijevic, chair of the IUCN World Commission on
Protected Areas. Scholars or scientists should provide the interpretations and guidelines for the establishment of trans-boundary-protected areas. The classic
example of science diplomacy was the original Antarctic Treaty, which most
consider to have been a direct and natural extension of the multinational
research in Antarctica associated with the International Geophysical Year
studies in 1957-1958. Marine scientists have disclosed that a similar wellfunded project in the South China Sea would be the natural lead-in to a
Spratly Island agreement. There have been several international projects in the region. However, the ones that had a serious emphasis on
March 2004. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) provides a generous definition of trans-boundary conservation:

the Spratly Islands have been minor because of the regional tensions. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) is a committee of the International Council
for Science (ICSU) charged with the initiation, promotion, and co-ordination of scientific research in Antarctica. SCAR is an international, interdisciplinary, non-governmental
organization that can draw on the experience and expertise of international scientists. Another function of SCAR is to provide expert scientific advice to the Antarctic Treaty
System. Science Councils and Treaties Offer Diplomatic Solutions Antarctica is the one place that arguably is the archetype for what can be accomplished by science
diplomacy. Under the Antarctic Treaty, no country actually owns all or part of Antarctica, and no country can exploit the resources of the continent while the Treaty is in
effect. Over time, the Antarctic Treaty has developed into the Antarctic Treaty System, which includes the protection of seals and marine organisms and offers guidelines
for the gathering of minerals and other resources. Additionally, the Arctic Council has been able to effectively steer the passage of domestic legislation, international
regulations, and, most importantly, international cooperation among the Arctic States. Eight nationsCanada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia,
Sweden, and the United Stateshave territories (claims) in the Artic, and the domestic laws of these nations govern actions taken within their territorial waters. Many of
the adopted Arctic Council key recommendations could be adopted for the South China Sea: create a South China Sea Maritime Council or SCS Oceanographic Council; the
United States should ratify UNCLOS to enhance U.S. authority on SCS issues; develop improved communications, standardized procedures and multilateral training for
search and rescue, military movements, natural disasters, maritime awareness, oil spill management, shipping infrastructure, and oil, gas and mineral development;
identify priorities for scientific study; develop more small-scale and renewable energy projects to improve the economic future of small communities; improve individual
and community health and food security; and improve early-warning systems for environmental change. Unfortunately, none of these recommendations are operative in
the political currents of the South China Sea. Dr. Michael P. Crosby, President and CEO of Mote Marine Laboratory in Sarasota, Florida weighs in on benefits of using this
paradigm for interactions between scientists and resource managers through international marine science partnerships. He has even extolled the merits of the Red Sea
Marine Peace Cooperative Research, Monitoring, and Resource Management Program (RSMPP). Crosby states that RSMPP may serve as a model for improving
international relations and building capacity through marine science cooperation. Asia has the worlds largest fishing fleets, representing nearly three million of the
worlds four million fishing vessels. And most estimates show that the numbers are increasing. Chinas fleet of 70,000 fishing boats, the largest in the world, is increasingly
flaunting the few international rules that exist around fishing. With other coastal claimants like the Philippines and Vietnam increasing their fishing fleets, its not surprising
that China is rolling out a blue economy plan. Professor Kathleen Walshs scholarship on Chinas rising blue economy reveals that some Middle Kingdom marine scientists
are concerned about conservation and sustainability issues. After all, coral reefs once found off Chinas own shores have shrunk by an astonishing 80 percent over the last
20 years. Pollution, overfishing and coastal development are blamed for this environmental collapse. In her examination of Chinas blue economy, which includes marine,
maritime, and naval sector ambitions, Walsh argues that Chinas new maritime development programs could have a big impact on the United States and other nations.
According to her (disclaimer: these are her personal views and not the U.S. Department of Defense, US Navy or US Naval War College), Chinese leaders are looking at
water resourcesincluding coastal areas, rivers, lakes, and oceansas the nations next economic development frontier. Perhaps at the first sight, these observations and
practices seem unconnected. But they operate together, and this notion of a Blue Economy reflects all of the elements of a broader strategic planning in Beijing. But the
crucial point here is that the assemblage of the South China Sea is increasingly shaped in scientific terms. Nevertheless, its painfully clear that todays ecological policy
issues face formidable challenges to inform policy deliberations. In other words, as the disposition of regional maritime space becomes greater, adding seabed research,
geology and mapping, deep-sea biology, underwater archeology, cultural registers, environmental symposia, marine protected areas and art history, there are more

avenues for the creation of common ground for all claimants. In this unfolding maritime drama, science offers all claimants the ability to monitor and to intervene. Science
diplomacy reveals at its core an ontological redefinition of this region. Knowledge sharing rather than naval vessels, commercial trawlers, advanced weaponry, and

Diplomats need to take

a page from scientific collaboration to better understand the myriad of South
China Sea environmental challenges, since Chinas success or failure in
developing a blue economy will have implications for the rest of the globe.
infrastructure, may prove to be the most powerful and essential tool to realizing peace and resolving territorial claims.

Relations good health care

US-China economic coop advances the worldwide
healthcare industry
Jun 15 (Zhou Jun, executive director of the U.S.-China Healthcare
Cooperation Program (HCP). September 26, 2015. Xi's visit will push Sino-US
medical co-op, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/201509/26/content_36686731.htm)
Chinese President Xi Jinping began his state visit to the U.S. on Tuesday, and has currently elevated SinoU.S. relations to the international spotlight. During the trip, Xi is expected to share his views on different
issues, including regional and international issues, as well as domestic and diplomatic policies. Economic
and trade cooperation is always the foundation of bilateral relations. Just as State Councilor Yang Jiechi said

Sino-U.S. relations. In 2014, the trade volume of

With
the growing bilateral economic and trade coop eration, cooperation in the
field of medical treatment and public health is an important part. It not only
brings a win-win result in economic areas, but also promotes technological
innovation in the two countries, while improving people's health. With China's
that economic and trade cooperation is a "propeller" of

the two countries set a record of US$555.1 billion, and investment stocks surpassed US$120 billion.

urbanization, aging process, and development of the middle class, market demands on the medical service
industry are increasing rapidly. In the past decade, China's compound average growth rate of total health
consumption has stayed at 17 percent. The U.S. public health industry and institutions have become the
backbone which meets the needs of the Chinese market. Meanwhile, exchange and cooperation between

Health and
medicine are the priority for technological development in all countries,
including China. The U.S. has the world's most advanced technology and
innovation in medical information, precision medicine, chronic disease
prevention and control, and in many other fields. Bilateral cooperation
between the U.S. and China, such as exchange of visits, talent
communication and project co-construction, has become an effective way to
promote Chinese medical professional training. In January 2011, during the Summit
the two sides has also promoted technological development in China's healthcare industry.

between then Chinese President Hu Jintao and the U.S. President Barack Obama, China's National Health
and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), the Ministry of Commerce, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), and the U.S. Department of
Commerce (DOC) issued a joint communiqu on the China-U.S. Public and Private Partnership on
Healthcare (PPPH), in order to promote healthcare cooperation between the two countries. Under the
framework of the joint statement, both countries supported the establishment of the U.S.-China Healthcare
Cooperation Program (HCP). The program is aimed at building closer working relations between Chinese
and the U.S. governments while leveraging healthcare industry strengths in order to foster long-term
cooperation in the areas of public health, policy research, training, R&D and technology. During the past
four and half years since the HCP was established, exchange and communication between the two sides
has become more frequent and thorough. Each year, medical and healthcare seminars are held in both
countries, hundreds of doctors pay exchange visits, and training programs are held for health care

bilateral communication and cooperation also encourage the

two countries to make more contributions to infectious disease prevention
and control, medical information, medical services, and technological
innovations across the world. After this state visit to the U.S., Chinese President Xi Jinping will
managers. Meanwhile,

attend summits marking the 70th anniversary of the United Nations. Healthcare is one of the main

in future, China
and the U.S. will strengthen and widen their communication and cooperation
in medical treatment and the healthcare industry to support the world's
elements of the UN's sustainable development goals after 2015. We believe that

healthcare governance, and other countries' economic and social

development.

Defense

Science diplomacy bad

Science diplomacy is more likely to increase conflict
innovation rate & political interests
David Dickson, June 4, 2009. http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/thelimits-of-science-diplomacy.html
But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For
example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant
to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal
Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific

innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a
driver for peace may be wishful thinking. Conflicting ethos Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting
was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world. There is
little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership
whether between individuals, institutions or countries is the new buzzword in the "science for development"

community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet
as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries'
interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting
that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. Worlds apart yet co-dependent
The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve
their goals, whether social, economic or unfortunately military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But
they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is or
should be about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that
respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for
science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But a commitment to science
diplomacy that ignores the differences acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly,
vice versa), is dangerous.

Prior political agreements better explain peaceful

cooperation no unique benefit to scientific ties.
David Dickson, SciDev.net, June 2, 2009.
http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2009/06/02/science-diplomacy-the-case-forcaution/
where scientific projects have successfully involved substantial international
collaboration, such success is often heavily dependent on a prior political commitment to cooperation,
rather than a mechanism for securing cooperation where the political will is lacking. Three messages appeared
to emerge from the two days of discussion. Firstly, where the political will to collaborate does exist, a joint scientific project
can be a useful expression of that will. Furthermore, it can be an enlightening experience for all those directly involved. But it is
seldom a magic wand that can secure broader cooperation where none existed before.
Indeed, a case can be made that

A2 Science diplomacy solves war

Politics overwhelms science no internal link to
cooperation larger risk of a turn
David Dickson, June 28, 2010.
http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/science-diplomacy-conference2010/
But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last December to come up with a
meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking. It was
argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be
sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact
that scientific ideas would have. Another example that received considerable attention was the current
construction of a synchrotron facility SESAME in Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together
researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel,
Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that as with
the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example,
physicists from both Russia and the United States SESAME will become a symbol of what regional
collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a beacon of
hope for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in
purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated.
Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists
may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts. Indeed, there was even a warning
that in the developing world, high profile scientific projects, particular those with explicit political
backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another. Scientists
should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as
patronising, appearing unaware of political realities.

More ev
David Dickson, SciDev.net, June 2, 2009.
http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2009/06/02/science-diplomacy-the-case-forcaution/
One of the frustrations of meetings at which scientists gather to discuss policy-related issues is the speed
with which the requirements for evidence-based discussion they would expect in a professional context
can go out of the window. Such has been the issue over the past two days in the meeting jointly organised in London by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Royal Society on the topic New Frontiers in Science
Diplomacy. There has been much lively discussion on the value of international collaboration in achieving scientific goals, on the
need for researchers to work together on the scientific aspects of global challenges such as climate change and food security, and on
the importance of science capacity building in developing countries in order to make this possible. But there remained little
evidence at the end of the meeting on how useful it was to lump all these activities together under the umbrella term of science
diplomacy. More significantly, although numerous claims were made during the conference about the broader

social and political value of scientific collaboration for example, in establishing a framework for
collaboration in other areas, and in particular reducing tensions between rival countries little was
produced to demonstrate whether this hypothesis is true. If it is not, then some of the arguments made on
behalf of science diplomacy, and in particular its value as a mechanism for exercising soft power in
foreign policy, do not stand up to close scrutiny.

A2 Science diplomacy solves war

Science just offers a new means of interstate domination.
David Dickson, February 25, 2011. http://www.scidev.net/en/science-andinnovation-policy/editorials/now-is-the-time-for-science-diplomacy-in-thearab-world.html
science diplomacy the use of scientific cooperation as a tool of international diplomacy
has a key weakness: despite what its supporters sometimes claim, it can never substitute for political
initiatives. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than the lack of any significant follow-through to, or indeed impact of, a speech
I have argued previously that

given by Obama in Cairo in the summer of 2009, in which he publicly advocated the use of closer scientific contacts between the
United States and Muslim countries as a form of "soft diplomacy". But science diplomacy can be invaluable when it provides the
basis for a genuine scientific partnership between two (or more) countries and especially when such partnerships allow the
sharing of skills and experience, for example through joint teaching or research projects . The danger of this approach, of

course, is that the stronger partner may come to dominate, for example in planning or implementing a
research project.

A2 Sci Dip solved in the Antarctic

Their evidence is hype the Antarctic Treaty proves

science does not prevent interstate friction.
Roger Launius, September 17, 2010.
http://launiusr.wordpress.com/2010/09/17/governing-antarctica-a-continentdedicated-to-science-or-a-place-of-geopolitical-rivalry/
Of course, the IGY did indeed play an important role in the resolution of the Antarctic sovereignty
dispute, but not in quite the idealistic way that the traditional narrative has suggested. The actual science
of the IGY, and the improved understanding of the Antarctic environment that it facilitated, played an
important role in the partial resolution of the question of sovereignty. As officials in the treaty nations,
especially in Great Britain and the United States, learned more about the reality of the Antarctica
environment through the work of IGYin particular the realization that it contained little or nothing of
immediate economic valuethey acceded to arguments in favor of internationalizing the continent. There
was, in any eventuality, not much of a downside in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the U.S. led an
effort to diffuse geopolitical tensions in Antarctica by internationalizing the continent. As the various
nations accepted this position they found themselves members of the Antarctic Treaty systems exclusive
club, which continues to govern the continent to this day. Initially the Antarctic Treaty signatory
countries disagreed on the question of the Soviet Unions role on the continent. U.S. officials, perhaps
somewhat naively, believed that they could create a treaty regime for Antarctica that would exclude the
Soviet Union. British officialswho were especially keen to resolve the disputeargued, more
realistically, that the communist superpower would have to be included for any internationalization of
Antarctica to work. After some discussion, the British position prevailed. Since the ratification of the
Antartic Treaty in 1960 the international partners have jockeyed and cajoled each other seeking to gain
advantage, competitive or otherwise, in Antarctic activities.

A2 Federoff author indict

Federoff is a biotech shill

Pamela Drew August 25, 2008.
http://pameladrew.newsvine.com/_news/2008/08/25/1778758-will-nytimesscience-stoop-to-propaganda
It's almost like the problem you have when a lie compounds, at some point there's an awful lot to explain. It appears
NY Times finally decided to tip toe into the subject of gmo foods and use the tobacco industry strategy of

the

employing a paid scientist to do it. The article titled An Advocate for Science Diplomacy is a feeble
attempt by the New York Times to slide in the back door using an interview with Nina Fedoroff as an
introduction to what we've been swallowing. As the press stayed silent, pretending it's nothing different from any other
food, the problem with the cover up grew. Now, it seems the time has come to open discussion and what better way
to begin than with a deceptive bit of propaganda from the industry that has been hidden from view?
Federoff has all the superficial credentials one would look to for a legitimate scientific view but as with most people
who support biotech there's more than meets the eye. By some measure tracing the decade of Nina's career and
associations is like a microcosm of the covert industry growth itself. Since this deception took a decade to grow it
takes a little patience and back story to unravel. It is after all a web of deception so hang in there through the tangles. We'll take it
piece by piece and get to the ties that keep the hands of Monsanto and the other Biotech Brigade
profiteers, hidden with a few degrees of separation from their supporters. August 19, 2008 A CONVERSATION
WITH NINA V. FEDOROFF An Advocate for Science Diplomacy By CLAUDIA DREIFUS When she was a single mother in the
early 1960s, Nina V. Fedoroff, 66, defied odds and conventionality by working her way through college, graduate school and
postdoctoral studies. Dr. Fedoroff, a member of the National Academy of Sciences, did fundamental research on plant transposons,
or jumping genes, and was among the first to clone plant DNA. She is science adviser to the secretary of state and administrator of
the Agency for International Development. We spoke last month in Washington and later on the telephone. An edited version of the
conversations follows. Unless being a hand picked Ambassador, by the most industry friendly Administration in
US history, raises a red flag, one would need to look to Federofff's biotech pedigree to explain the untenable science she
offers in the interview. Let's start with the CV details provided and move on to the missing ones. Like so many programs with
benevolent aims, USAID has been influenced by an agenda of promoting the profit objectives of industry. Few have benefitted
biotech more than USAID which donates food in the name of addressing global hunger, but forces Nations who don't accept gmo
technology to allow gmo as aid. Nations who refuse to accept the gmo grains, either based on concerns for health or fears that the
patented seeds will be planted and grow their indebtedness have been targeted for reprisals. Examples of USAID shipments as a
mechanism to dump biotech on the poor are plentiful. Here is one that reflects the essence of the benevolent policy feeding the poor
of India. The USDA has instructed US Aid Agencies to act as international policemen on behalf of US biotech corporations. In the
minutes of its meeting with aid agencies it is made clear that US Aid Agencies are expected to immediately report any opposition to
GM food imports by recipient nations to USAID, that they are to make investigations to enable USAID to classify objections as
either 'political' or 'trade' related and that USAID will then take the necessary 'diplomatic action' (sanctions?, WTO prosecutions?,
aid cancellations/, IMF action?) to ensure that the shipments are accepted. http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2003/USAID-ReportAntiGM14jan03.htm Now for the details of Nina's career history that missed the interview introduction, taken

from the biography posted at Penn State's Huck Institute where she was a founding member of the biotech
Consortium that became a biotech education program. Much of the picture comes from associations and
there'd be a book if we detailed them all.

***Economy***

Relations Good

Relations good Global economy***

Global growth trends downward without healthy relations

between China and the U.S.
Bwambale (Taddeo,Uganda journalist, China, US set for talks on
economy, maritime differences, June 5th 2016, Sunday
Vision)http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1426167/china-us-settalks-economy-maritime-differences
BEIJING - Top officials from China and the US are this week scheduled to meet in Beijing to discuss
economic and bilateral ties that have in recent months been fraught with tension. Officials from the two
countries will meet under the Eighth Round of China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue, to be held on

The dialogue is a high-level platform for the two states to

discuss regional, global strategic and economic issues between both
countries. It was established in 2009 by U.S. President Barack Obama and former Chinese President, Hu
Jintao to improve cooperation in economic and bilateral ties . Top on agenda will be
economic and foreign policy discussions among the two biggest economic powers, Zheng
Zeguang, Chinas vice foreign minister told journalists at a briefing in Beijing. Also on the agenda is
a review of commitments on climate change, economic cooperation as well
as important and sensitive issues including maritime and cyber security ,
Monday and Tuesday.

Zeguang stated. In 2015, trade volumes between China and the US exceeded $550b and bilateral
investment was above over $440b, highlighting potential for stronger ties, Zeguang added. In recent
weeks, the US has announced plans to sanctions on 'cheap' steel exports from China while China describes
the move as an act of 'protectionism'. Around the same time, China and the US have had close encounters
in the South China Sea, an area claimed by China, subject to overlapping claims by her neighbours. The US
accuses China of militarizing the sea by reclaiming and erecting outposts on it, while China blames the

Guangyao,
Chinas vice finance minister said the dialogue targets to cultivate good
relations between China and the US, push for more open markets and enable
entrepreneurs make business. Last year, the global economy grew at slower 1.2% while
international trade grew at 2.1%. The minister predicts global trade grow 3.2% , although
the World Trade Organization predicts 2.8%. The global market faces downward pressure.
China and Us biggest economies and their relations can produce positive
impact on economy, Guangyao said. The minister said the meeting was expected
to help ease anxiety in financial markets, share experience on structural
reform and policy measures needed to stabilize global growth . The economic
dialogue mechanism is important and constructive way to contribute to
mutual trust and understanding, and preventing misjudgmen t, he explained.
According to Hao Ping, Chinas vice education minister, US-China relations are improving in
education and culture, with a growing number of people-to-people exchanges .
China will support 50,000 Chinese and American students to study in both
countries while Obama has pledged to have one million American students to
study mandarin by 2020 - See more at:
US for interfering in a regional dispute and deploying military vessels to there. Zhu

http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1426167/china-us-set-talks-economy-maritimedifferences#sthash.jRpp8SBv.dpuf

Global economic decline results in war.

Walter Russel Mead (Policy Analyst, World Policy Institute) 1992
Hundreds of millions--billions--of people have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They
and their leaders have embraced market principles--and drawn closer to the west--because they believe that our system can
work for them.
But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates--or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new
period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India--these countries with their
billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany

and Japan did in the 30s.

Relations good global econ solvency

U.S. and China are the center of global growth wealth

center and modeling
Lew 16 ( Jacob J.,American government administrator and attorney who is
the 76th and current United States Secretary of the Treasury and graduate of
Harvard University, Prepared Remarks: Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew
remarks on U.S.-China economic relations at the American Enterprise
Institute, June 16, 2016, America Enterprise Institute)
https://www.aei.org/press/prepared-remarks-treasury-secretary-jacob-j-lewremarks-on-u-s-china-economic-relations-at-the-american-enterpriseinstitute/
The United States and China are the two largest economies in the world,
accounting for roughly one-third of total global output, and in recent years
our countries have been the primary engines of global economic growth. Just
as China benefits when our economy does well, America benefits as a
growing China becomes a larger market for our goods and services . U.S. exports to
China have roughly doubled since early 2009substantially faster than in any other region of the world. As the worlds
second-largest economy, disruptions in China can have negative consequences for the rest of the world, including here in
the United States. Over the past year, China rattled global markets as exchange rate policy changes raised questions
about how it would manage the transition to a more sustainable growth rate. And as China continues to grow, it is more
important than ever that U.S. companies have the ability to compete on a level playing fieldboth within China and
globally. We need to challenge Chinas policies that disadvantage our firms and workers, whether they are currency
practices, trade barriers, or excess capacity in industrial sectors. But our relationship is important beyond sheer market

U.S. and Chinese leadership can be a catalyst to drive higher global

standards and promote growth, fair trade, global development, and efforts to
protect the environment. When our nations reach agreement, it becomes a
magnet for others to join. Finally, a strong U.S.-China relationship has been
integral to increasing the effectiveness of tools like financial sanctions. Close
cooperation was critical in implementing sanctions on Iran and continues to
be essential in responding to North Koreas nuclear provocations.
size and GDP.

US-China relations and presence maintains economic

stability
Pollman 16 ( Mina, Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from
Georgetown Universitys Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
majoring in International Politics with a concentration in Foreign Policy,
Experts Imagine an Asia Without the US, June 23, 2016, The Diplomat)
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/experts-imagine-an-asia-without-the-us/
A panel of Asia experts recently conveyed to American audiences the alarm
that Asian observers feel about U.S. withdrawal from the region. Gathering in New York
on Monday for a panel hosted by NTT and Kinokuniya a Japanese publishing company and book store, respectively the experts
discussed a wide range of divisive issues in Asias security landscape from

the Korean peninsula to the East and South China Seas. Despite covering
Asian power politics from different geographical lenses, all the speakers
agreed on the importance of U.S. commitment to maintaining a stable
balance of power in Asia, especially in light of Chinas reemergence as a
major player. Chisako Masuo, an associate professor at the Graduate School
of Social and Cultural Studies at Kyushu University, warned that the Asian
power balance is more vulnerable than Americans believe. Because of
concerns about U.S. withdrawal, Asian countries are preparing fo r the worse
case scenario: An Asian regional order without U.S. leadership would not be a
rules-based order, but a China-based order . Other Asian countries wouldnt
be happy with that development, but they would have no choice but to go
along if the United States will not help provide balance , Masuo explained. In this sense, the U.S.Japan alliance is an important pillar to maintain an open, liberal, rules-based order in Asia. This is not containment of China, Masuo was
quick to point out. If the game board is transparent and fair, China can play a mutually beneficial game with other Asian countries. One
example Masuo highlights is how the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) spurred the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to
do better. But, she adds, such friendly competition requires a quiet U.S. military presence in the background. And despite a much-touted
rebalance to Asia, experts on the panel remain unconvinced of U.S. commitment to the region. In dealing with China not only Japan, but
Vietnam and the Philippines, in a way, were all disappointed about Obamas actions towards [China] reclaiming islands [in the South China
Sea]. He sent naval vessels only three times so far, and its just too weak, Masuo lamented. And if Trump was going to succeed him, maybe

This sentiment is echoed by Kan

Kimura, a professor at Kobe Universitys Graduate School of International
Cooperation Studies, who explains, American people have to understand
how [strongly Asian peoples fear the] withdrawal of U.S. troops. For
reassuring nervous Asian partners, U.S. commitment isnt enough U.S.
messaging is also important. This is easier said than done, of course. Putting
aside the isolationist sentiment that the bombastic presumptive Republican
nominee Donald Trump has resurrected during this campaign season, even
official Obama administration messaging can be received, or interpreted,
differently based on any given audience states own preoccupations. In geopolitics, a
[Trump wouldnt] do anything, but then, this Asian power balance is gone.

countrys placement in a particular geographic circumstance will shape their assessment of potential threats and other countries intentions.
Kimura expanded on this concept to explain why Japan and South Korea have such different perceptions of the tenor of U.S.-China relations.

As a maritime power, the United States has expected more from Japan,
demanding that Japan play a larger role in recent disputes in the East and
South China Seas. Because of this, Japan has seen the more hard-line
elements of U.S. China policy, leading to expectations that the United States
will be around to stand up to China for decades. Meanwhile, as a land power, South Korea has not had
to deal with the same sort of U.S. expectations and has mostly sat out the disputes in the East and South China Seas. Not having seen the
hard-line elements that Japan interacts with, South Korea expects the United States to take a softer policy tack, and believes Washington will
give them a hall pass when it comes to leaning on China. The challenge for the United States, Kimura concluded, is to send a clearer
message to Asian countries. Its a typical Goldilocks dilemma: while Japan overestimates how hard-line U.S. China policy will be, South Korea
underestimates it. There is some strength to the argument that ambiguity serves U.S. interests, however. As Kimura noted, from the U.S.
perspective, a clear commitment could raise concerns about moral hazard; countries such as the Philippines might be willing to take
unnecessary risks if they believe Washington will have their back. Amid all this concern about the strength of U.S. commitment, there is a
bright spot, as Tuong Vu, a political science professor at University of Oregon, points out: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a good example

While in popular discourse

the military dimension of the American rebalance might have gotten the most
attention, it is really this economic dimension that underpins why the U nited
States for its own interest should stay committed to Asia. Responding to
questions about why the U.S. ought to care about Asia and its thorny
maritime issues, Masuo rebutted: But think about it, Asia is the center of
economic development. And if the U.S. chooses not to establish stronger
relations with Asia, how is it going to maintain prosperity for its own people ?
of the U.S.s biggest efforts to involve Vietnam, to help Vietnam deal with the Chinese threat.

Asian observers are much more comfortable when the United States understands that it should be engaged with Asia for its own narrow
economic interests. The only interest a country can reliably be expected to defend is its own. In the long-term, [including Vietnam in the TPP]
will pay off for the U.S., Vu predicts. The Obama administration knows of these concerns and has been trying to assiduously address them.
And his preferred successor, the presumptive Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, is also known for her lucid understanding of the important

role that American leadership plays in the Asia-Pacific region. But with Trumps candidacy, all bets are off, and Asian leaders are scrambling to
plan for a future where the United States is no longer interested in being the preeminent balancer in Asia.

US China cooperation boosts economic growth.

Wu Jianmin, Former President of China Foreign Affairs University; Member,
Berggruen Institutes 21st Century Council, 3/31/2016, HERES WHATS ON
THE TABLE FOR THE CHINA-U.S. RELATIONSHIP THIS YEAR, Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wu-jianmin/china-us-relationship2016_b_9568060.html
On Jan 27, when President Xi Jinping met with Secretary of State John Kerry in
Beijing, Xi pointed out: Ive emphasized several times, when China and U.S.
strengthen cooperation, we can do big things for the benefit of the world.
President Xi is right. Look at the Paris Climate Change Agreement, the Iranian
nuclear deal and the U.N. Security Councils resolution on North Korea
China-U.S. cooperation played a pivotal role in each. Sluggish economic
growth is a major issue facing both China and the U.S., as well as the rest of
the world. If we want to give a strong boost to economic growth, we must ,
first of all, further grow China-U.S. cooperation.

US China relations key to economic stability and conflict

resolution
Whyte 15
(Leon Whyte, second year masters candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University as well as the Senior Editor for the Current Affairs section of the Fletcher
Security Review, May 26, 2015, US-China: Mutually Assured Economic Destruction? The
Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/u-s-china-mutually-assured-economic-destruction/
HY)

conflict between the United States and

China. According to a 2011 RAND study, conflict between the United States and China would likely lead to a
global contraction greater than the one that occurred in 2008. For the United States, the
economic losses would likely be even higher given the interdependent nature
of the U.S.-Chinese economies. In 2014, total U.S.-China trade was worth &592
billion, China was the United States second largest trading partner, third largest export market, biggest source of
Angells work can provide insight into the possibility of

imports, and the largest foreign holder of American debt, with $1.24 trillion worth of U.S. Treasury bonds in December

if the United States cares about prosperity, it should

avoid a war with China, from which it can only suffer economic losses. This potential for economic loss can
2014. According to Angells theory,

act as a deterrent for both the United States and China, so the United States should not consider reducing economic

Beyond economic
ties between the United States and China, the United States should
encourage Chinas further integration into the world economic system . The
United States should not oppose Chinese efforts to join, or create, multilateral
economic institutions, such as the new Chinese led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. In addition, the
dependence on China as a way to increase its own security, as some pundits have suggested.

United States should not attempt to persuade allies from increasing economic ties with China, as it will reduce the chance
of an ally dragging the United States into a war with China .

It would be hard to find anyone in

either China or America who would argue that a conflict would increase
prosperity. Both economies are too big to fail without having severe effects on

the entire international economic system. Because of this, there exists a state
of mutually assured economic destruction between the two countries . Despite this,
as John Mearsheimer point out, states value security over economic prosperity, because without security they cannot
ensure their survival. This is not to say that the United States should break its economic ties with China, or try to slow
Chinas economic growth. That would hurt the United States economically and would have little utility for increasing

more economically integrated China and the United States

are, the higher the cost is for China to challenge the current system, reducing
the chance of war. However, if China perceives that it can benefit from conflict with the United States, Chinas
security. In addition, the

action will be the same whether its perception is correct or not.

Relations good LDC econs

Developing countries get boosted growth via US China

relations.
Brinda Banerjee, 9/27/2015, CHINA-US TIES: PREDICTING THE GLOBAL
IMPACT, ValueWalk, http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/09/china-us-ties/
It is also suggested that technology expansion along with the advancement
of developing societies such as those of various African nations will
reinvigorate growth. If China and the United States cooperate more on
technological, trade and economic matters, it is likely that the same will
induce growth in relatively less-developed parts of the world, bringing
members the global community up to par with one another. This, in turn, may
reinvigorate growth prospects for the international community as a whole.

Relations good China econ

China Economic Collapse will occur without relations with

America.
Iyer 16 (Gaurav S., research analyst and editor at Lombardi Financia,
China Economic Collapse: Jim Chanos Issues Chilling Report on China, May
24, 2016, Profit
Confidential)http://www.profitconfidential.com/economy/china-economiccollapse-jim-chanos-issues-chilling-report-on-china/
Jim Chanos is at it again. The billionaire short seller has often worried that
Chinas economic collapse is right around the corner. Last years stock market crash
proved he may have a point, but how would we know when the economic collapse is here? Chanos may
have an answer. He says Chinas problems are eerily similar to what went wrong in the United States a few

So, if the Chinese

financial system looks like the U.S. system did between 2005 and 2007, then
that would give us a sign that the Chinese economy may be on the brink of
collapse. Unfortunately, thats exactly whats been happeninga series of
stock market crashes, followed by currency devaluation, followed bywell,
misery. Chanos laid out this devastating argument while speaking with Business Insiders Linette Lopez
years ago: reckless banking activity helped create the conditions for a crash.

and Josh Barro. (Source: This is what Jim Chanos says hes telling his clients about China right now,

If we learned anythingduring our crisis, it was you

shouldnt finance hard-to-value long-term esoteric real estate-related
derivatives or securities with overnight money, which is what a lot of the
investment banks ended up doing by 07/08, he said. They couldnt move a
bunch of the gunk on their balance sheet and increasingly they were
financing themselves in the repo market. (Source: Ibid.) Let me translate
that into plain English: you cant place risky bets on a credit card. By their
very nature, credit cards are short-term debt. You are supposed to pay them
off quickly after using them and the same goes for banks. Youre not
supposed to gamble with it because you could dig yourself a pretty big hole
at the blackjack table. Thats what American investment banks did in 2008
and its what Chinese banks are doing right now. The overnight money
Chanos mentioned represents their credit card. Chanos claims Chinese banks
are using it to prop up a massive housing bubble . Banks propping up a
housing bubblethat, too, sounds familiar. Jim Chanos is calling China out.
Just look at the facts, he says. Chinese banks are ringing in debt-to-capital
numbers of 300%, meaning they have $300.00 of debt for every $1.00 of
equity. They are primed for a crash . There were some specific warnings signs
that flashed red before the Great Recession, but we ignored them at our own
peril. We let it happen. Now those same alarm bells are going off in China but
nobody is paying attention. Everyone is content to sit back and pretend like
excessive debt cant possibly be a problem. Chanos is one of the few willing
to speak out
Business Insider, May 23, 2016.)

Chinese economic slowdown causes global economic crisis

Investment Management Division 16
(January 2016, This material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group in the Investment
Management Division of Goldman Sachs. It is not a product of Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
The views and opinions expressed herein may differ from those expressed by other groups of Goldman
Sachs, Walled In: Chinas Great Dilemma, Investment Management Division,
http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investment-management/private-wealthmanagement/intellectual-capital/isg-china-insight-2016.pdf HY)
In mid-2013, our colleagues in Goldman Sachs Equity Research wrote, China has provided several shocks to the world:
cheap labor and hence cheap goods, cheap capital via export of excess savings, and lastly, a massive demand shock for
commodities, particularly basic commodities.28 How the tide has turned. Today, policymakers, economists and investors

that China is on the verge of providing a major deflationary shock to the

rest of the world. At her September 2015 press conference, Federal Reserve Chair Janet
Yellen referenced heightened concerns about growth in China as one of the
reasons for not raising interest rates.29 She expressed concern about the
spillover effects of slower growth in China to emerging markets, to Canada as
an important US trading partner, and to the US itself . Let us examine the salient facts about
Chinas economy to see how its slowdown can affect other economies and financial
markets. We note that this impact cannot be measured precisely because data is not available across all countries
worry

and sectors. Most importantly, we cannot, ex ante, know the impact of a slowdown in China on risk aversion and market
sentiment. There is no question that China matters to the rest of the world. The question is how much it matters and
whether the volatility in global financial markets has been commensurate with the direct and indirect economic impact of

China is the second-largest economy in the world, as measured

by its GDP of $11.4 trillion. It is the most populous country in the world, with
1.375 billion people. Most importantly, China accounts for 13% of global
exports and 10% of global imports. Its demand accounts for 5060% of the global production of iron
a slowdown in China.

ore, nickel, thermal coal and aluminum, and a significant share of copper, tin, zinc, steel, cotton and soybeans (see

While its imports of commodities make up a smaller percentage of

global production, we believe total demand is more relevant since excess
production relative to local Chinese demand will have a dampening effect on
relevant commodity prices globally, especially when the excess production is
exported. Witness the preliminary decision by the US Commerce Department to impose 236% duties on imports of
Exhibit 4).

corrosion-resistant steel from China, due to what the US steel industry has called illegal and unfair practices.30

low international steel prices driven by

unsustainably cheap Chinese exports.31 China has also been an export market for many developed
ArcelorMittals third-quarter 2015 earnings report also cited

and emerging market countries. As shown in Exhibit 5, exports to China account for 2.3% of developed markets GDP; in
Australia, exports to China are much higher, at 5.1% of GDP. Of Australias total merchandise exports, over onethird are
exported to China. In the US, exports to China account for just 0.7% of GDP. Merchandise exports to China also account for
2.3% of emerging markets GDP, reaching as high as 10.3% in South Korea. Of South Koreas total exports, one-quarter
are exported to China. We note that exports to China as a share of GDP are even higher in countries such as Oman and
Angola, but their combined GDP is less than 0.3% of world GDP. Hence, the share of GDP affected by a China slowdown is
not large in either developed or emerging market economies, at 2.3% in each case. Furthermore, these trade linkages
overstate the true economic exposure because many exports to China are reprocessed and exported outside China. In
their report Chinas Changing Growth: Trade Spillovers to the Rest of Asia, our colleagues in GIR use value-added
exports to China as a more effective measure of true economic exposure.32 For example, while exports to China account
for 5.1% of Australias GDP, about one-third of this exposure is to final demand outside China, i.e., China is reprocessing
those Australian goods and re-exporting them to other countries. As shown in Exhibit 6, value-added exposure to China is
often less than the gross trade exposure. In addition to direct exposure through exports and commodity prices, global
economies are exposed to a slowdown in China through their banking sectors loans to China. This exposure is limited, as
shown in Exhibit 7. Exposure in the developed economies ranges from a low of 0.1% of bank assets in Italy to a high of
3.0% in the UK (primarily driven by HSBC Holdings PLC and Standard Chartered PLC), with a modest 0.8% in the US. To put
these numbers in context, US and German banks exposure to mortgages and to European sovereign debt, respectively,

Countries are also exposed to a slowdown in China

through their corporate sectors. Large multinational companies derive sales
and profits from goods manufactured and sold in China and from services
provided in China; this corporate profit is not captured by exports. Lower
profits stemming from a slowdown in China have a secondorder effect on
global economies as equity markets may weaken, resulting in tighter financial
was substantially higher (see Exhibit 8).

conditions. Our colleagues in GIR have estimated the sales exposure of companies represented by major equity
market indexes. As shown in Exhibit 9, this exposure ranges from 2% in the US to as much as 10% in Germany and
Australia. We must note, however, that it is very difficult to quantify the exposure of major markets corporate sectors to
China with much precision. Many major

multinational companies aggregate their AsiaPacific sales and do not break out China separately. Therefore, estimates of
sales to China, in all likelihood, understate actual sales. Moreover, earnings, which are most relevant,
are not attributed to specific regions, so we have to turn to the national income accounts for a gauge of profit exposure to

direct
and indirect economic and banking sector exposures to China are not of a
scale to have significant impact on major economies and financial markets.
The substantially greater risk from a slowdown in China emanates from its
impact on financial markets and investor risk aversion . In their report The Drag from
China. Such exposure is much smaller, measuring 0.7% in the US and about 3% in Japan. We conclude that the

China: Many Channels, Limited Impact, our colleagues in GIR break down the impact of a slowdown in China on the US

Some of the impact is direct, as in the

case of exports to China, and some of the impact is indirect, such as exports
to other developed and emerging market countries that do business with
China. As shown in Exhibit 10, the direct impact is nearly eight times as great as the indirect impact. But most
economy by trade, exchange rate and financial conditions.33

importantly, the impact of financial conditions may be as big asif not bigger thanthe direct impact. The confidence
interval around the impact of financial conditions is wide: if the impact is negligible, a 1% reduction in Chinese GDP lowers
US GDP by 0.11% by the end of this year; if the impact is significant, US GDP declines by 0.47%. In such a scenario, the
impact of financial conditions will dwarf the direct and indirect impact of economic and banking sector factors. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developments (OECDs)

latest semiannual Outlook also

concludes that the drag from changes in financial conditions could be greater
than the economic impact.34 It estimates that a two percentage point decline in
domestic demand growth in China would slow global growth by 0.33% per year
for two years. However, if such a decline negatively impacts the financial
markets, global growth would slow by 0.751% per year for two years . The IMF
also highlighted Chinas financial market impact in its October 2015 Global Financial Stability Report: The main
spillover channels from China to the rest of the world remain economic
growth and trade, but confidence channels and the direct financial linkages
have also become stronger since 2010.35 We believe that developed financial markets
will, in all likelihood, overreact to deteriorating conditions in China . Part of the
overreaction will be driven by expectations of further deterioration in
emerging markets, especially if a continued slowdown in China corresponds
to further depreciation of the renminbi. However, some of the overreaction will be driven by the
inevitably greater focus of market participants on the latest headlines. As Nobel Laureate in Economics Daniel Kahneman

availability of information that readily comes to mind affects

how individuals formulate their investment views. 36 In the second quarter of 2015, the key
has pointed out, the

theme highlighted by the Goldman Sachs S&P 500 Beige Book report was earnings at risk from Chinese slowdown.37
The report highlighted companies such as General Motors Co., Ford Motor Co., Caterpillar, Inc., United Technologies Corp.,
Johnson & Johnson Inc. and others in the industrial and commodity-linked sectors. The third-quarter S&P 500 Beige Book
report highlighted examples of companies with exposure to China in the information technology and consumer
discretionary sectors, such as Apple Inc., McDonalds Corp. and Starbucks Corp., with very favorable commentary on their
sales to China. Since these names readily come to mind when we think of China, it is likely that the US equity market
would overreact to news of an economic slowdown in China relative to the countrys 2% (or slightly higher) share of S&P

The increase in the correlation

between US and Chinese equities in recent years reinforces this notion . As shown
in Exhibit 11, the correlation has now reached levels last seen during the global
financial crisis, and its increase is greater than what would be suggested by
the direct and indirect economic impacts.
500 sales and the meager 0.7% share of profits in the US economy.

China is interconnected with the global economy

downturn collapses the world economy
Friedman 12 [Edward, specialist in Chinese politics, faculty of the Political
Science Department at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. If China
Sneezes, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/if-china-sneezes/#more3556]-DD
Commodity exporters from Brazil to Sudan to Australia can seem on
the verge of nervous breakdowns at hints that the Chinese economy
will slow and its commodity imports will shrink. After all, no country
adds more new wealth to the world each year than does China. If
Chinas property bubble were to burst and the Chinese economy
crashed in a hard landing, even economies as strong as Germanys
would be impacted. That countrys exports to China last year were worth about $110 billion.
When China sneezes, the world could really catch a cold.

Chinas global standing stems from regional authority

which is contingent upon economic improvement- absent
that, China is destabilized which harms the global
economy and independently causes lashout failed
nuclear states are a threat multiplier
Buzan and Foot 04 [Barry and Rosemary, professor of International
Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor
of International Relations at St. Anthony College, Does China Matter? A
Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal, Questia, p. 145-147]-DD
China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link
between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its
home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that
the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but
that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wver, 2003). The
U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the
EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it
(and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is
a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point
still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as
a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India,

China's global standing thus depends crucially on

what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert
some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of
its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely
enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to
balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into
its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly
present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is
at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia
and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than
themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose
it cannot escape regional politics.

antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's
global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's
development provides it with the strength and the identity to
become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the
U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its
neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear,
prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy
becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is
acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states.
Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is
able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American

If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't

balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global
role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China
succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy,
then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU
in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its
neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia,
Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably
with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional
base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the
global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest
power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be
seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play
States.

and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will
acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing
against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the
trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with
the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development
Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by
two variables: Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or
weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? Does China
become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes
hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic

If China's development
falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region
nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or
development brings internal democratization and liberalization)?

malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-

What could happen in this scenario is that a

breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by
economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale
migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that
would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political
collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the
scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the
military security domain.

malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths,
or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany
and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was
what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

China econ declining less industrial demand, real-estate,

and high debt levels
Seth 15 [Shobhit, freelance financial writer, Can the Tech Sector Save the
Ailing Chinese Economy? (CCCQ, QQQC), 12-15-2015, Investopedia,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/121515/can-tech-sector-saveailing-chinese-economy.asp]-DD
The Chinese economy has had a rough ride lately. Recent developments in the markets
and the nation's macroeconomic figures dont indicate a healthy picture. Amid continued news of a slump
in the Chinese economy, this article explores why the technology sector can act as a savior for the Chinese
economy. (For more, see Is Now the Time for Chinese Stocks?) Signs Of An Ailing Economy Chinese

markets suffered the worst stock market crash since 2007 when the Shanghai
Composite index tanked by more than 8% in late August 2015 . The declining
demand for Chinese goods from international markets has resulted
in falling exports in recent months. The imports have also declined
due to lower consumer demand in domestic markets. The Chinese
growth rate is suspected to hit its lowest levels in last 25 years,
amid the falling industrial production and a sharp decline in the realestate market. High debt levels, multiple yet ineffective rounds of monetary
easing, and rumors about a further rate cut, are some more indications that
the worlds most populous economy may not be in the right shape. (For more, see
The Origins of the Chinese Stock Market Collapse.)

Relations good China econ, tech sector

Collapse of US-China relations devastates tech sector
China produces a vast majority of motherboards and is
key to strategic global industry
Lampton 01 [David, Director of China Studies @ Johns Hopkins Univ, The
U.S. China Relationship, Frontline PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/experts/relations.html]DD
China, unknown to many Americans, is our
fourth-largest trade partner. There are certainly probably 300,000,
400,000, 500,000 American jobs that are directly dependent to
exports to China, and there are some of our most competitive high
tech sector. Obviously, given the state of our own economy, we don't need
more unemployment. ... But China's economic importance -- particularly to the United States, but
It's potentially very important. First of all,

the global economy -- hasn't been recognized in another way, and that is inter-dependence. Let me just
give you a fact that I think is just demonstrative of a larger reality. Eighty-seven percent of the

87 percent of the brains

of a computer, the motherboards made in Taiwan, 50 percent are now made
in the PRC, and that industry is even moving more rapidly towards
the PRC. So in certain key areas, China's component manufacturing is
absolutely key to a strategic global industry. So whether you look at it narrowly, or
in terms of jobs, China is essential. Also, China is the most rapidly growing
major economy in the world today. And heaven knows, with Japan lagging and Europe's
economy stagnating and the Americans hovering near a recession, the world needs all the
center of growth that it can get. So I think we are going to recognize that we have a very great
motherboards of computers in the world are made in Taiwan. And of that

interest in China's prosperity.

Tech sector integral saving Chinese economy

Seth 15 [Shobhit, freelance financial writer, Can the Tech Sector Save the
Ailing Chinese Economy? (CCCQ, QQQC), 12-15-2015, Investopedia,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/121515/can-tech-sector-saveailing-chinese-economy.asp]-DD
The Chinese technology sector primarily comprises of hardware, the Internet,
mobile apps, and e-commerce companies. Encapsulating the technology
sector are the supportive services, like online and mobile payment, courier
delivery, internet service providers, and other online services like social
networking and search engines. Together, these form the technology ecosystem in China.
Hardware manufacturers like Huawei and Xiaomi are established leaders in their space . Some of the
biggest suppliers for global electronic giants like Apple and
Samsung are based out of China. Though successful globally, search
engine giant Google (GOOGL) has not been able to eclipse the
market share of local players like Baidu (BIDU) . Social networking sites like

Facebook (FB) and Twitter (TWTR) have an insignificant share in China, where the Chinese versions of these
social networks like Renren and Weibo are the most popular. The instant messenger services like WeChat
remain dominant in China compared to those like WhatsApp and Viber, which are more popular globally.
Mobile cash payment services like Alipay (a division of Alibaba) dominate in China, where other global

E-commerce giants like Alibaba

and JD.com continue to post high growth numbers with significant revenue
increase year-on-year basis. In essence, the Chinese technology sphere
remains dominated by domestic players. The hardware suppliers do have a
significant dependency on global demand and international business
partners, but the Internet, mobile apps, and e-commerce players have a local
market with local user base without any significant global competition .
players like Venmo and Apple Pay may not have any presence.

A2 Hostile China tanks econ

China assertiveness and aggression doesnt mean that
there arent new opportunities- on the contrary, it opens
up room for co-op over a multiplicity of issues including
saving jobs and improving the global economy, but now is
key
Hart 15 [Melanie, Director of China Policy @ The Center for American
Progress, 11-29-2015, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and
Counterterrorism: Hearing on the Changing Landscape of U.S.-China
Relations, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf]-DD
Chinas new assertiveness creates new opportunities and new
challenges for the United States. On the positive side, China is showing an
increasing willingness to play a leadership role among nations outside the
highly industrialized democratic block. China played a key role in the Iran
nuclear negotiations, helping the process through shaky moments, and
Chinese nuclear experts helped Iranian officials redesign the Arak plutonium
reactor so that it will never produce nuclear fuel.4 On climate change, Chinas
willingness to issue bold climate targets with the United States last November
challenged other developing nations to follow suit and knocked down a
firewall that has hindered global climate negotiations for decades.5 China
also appears to be leaning harder on North Korea.6 China supported the U.N.
Security Council effort to sanction North Korea in response to that nations
February 2013 nuclear test. Earlier this month, after North Korean officials
announced plans to launch another long-range rocket, Chinas foreign
minister warned against taking new actions that could lead to tensions on
the Korean peninsula and called for all nations to take a responsible
attitude.7 On all of these issues, Beijings ability to speak to a different audience and from a different
angle than the United States has made China a valuable diplomatic partner. On the commercial front,

which creates new partnership

opportunities, most notably in China-to-U.S. direct investment.8 For many Americans, China-to-U.S.
Chinese companies are venturing outward,

foreign direct investment, or FDI, projects provide their first opportunity to directly engage in and benefit
from the U.S.-China economic partnership. A recent survey conducted by the Rhodium Group reveals that
340 of the 435 American congressional districts have at least one China FDI project.9 Many of those
projects are providing jobs for American workers: More than 80,000 Americans are now directly employed

Economic competitiveness
has always been an issue in the relationship, including U.S. concern
that American jobs will migrate to China. Now the reverse is
happening: Chinese companies are finally creating jobs in this nation
a trend that leaders in both countries should support . On the other side of
the Pacific, if Chinese leaders successfully rebalance their economy, it
should, in theory, create new overseas commercial opportunities for
American businesses. China is already the United States fastest
through a Chinese investment project in the United States.10

growing export market: U.S. exports to China have grown nearly 300 percent over the past
decade.11 Beijings new reform program aims to boost consumer buying power
and expand the nations dependence on high-tech products, two trends that
should boost Chinese consumption of U.S. goods and services.

Defense

Relations bad economy

No econ solvency Yuan devaluation in China hurts US economy
(Jessica Menton. 08/11/15. 4 Ways China's Devalued Yuan Could Hurt The US
Economy, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, http://www.ibtimes.com/4-wayschinas-devalued-yuan-could-hurt-us-economy-2049204)
China's surprise move to depreciate the yuan this week is expected to help
revive growth in the world's second-largest economy, but it may not be such
a good move for the still-recovering U.S. While a stronger dollar helps American companies and
consumers buy Chinese imports at lower prices, a weaker Chinese currency makes U.S. goods
and services more expensive overseas. Here are four ways a devalued yuan could affect America:
1. The move could weigh on earnings growth from U.S. multinationals . A prolonged
period of dollar strength isnt exactly good news for American corporate bottom lines. The sudden devaluation of the yuan
has negative effects for companies with significant operations in China, such as iPhone maker Apple Inc., which is already
coping with the dollar's recent potency. The devaluation further increases the cost of the iPhones and iPads in the local
market," Gerry Granovsky, senior vice president at Moody's, said in a note Tuesday. Although many of Apples products are
assembled in China, the company would not immediately see cost benefits from its Chinese sourcing because most of the
manufacturing and assembly arrangements are denominated in U.S. dollars, Granovsky explained. 2.

A weaker

yuan could reduce U.S. exports to China.

By devaluing its currency, China intends to boost its

exports to regain competitiveness, but economists say the move will hurt U.S. exports to China. The devaluation will make
Chinese-made goods less expensive, and imports to China more expensive. Economists say this should support growth in
China, which has slowed in 2015, in large part because of a cooling real estate market. For the U.S., however, trade
already is expected to be a hindrance on growth in the second half of this year, and that drag will now be somewhat
larger, Gus Faucher, senior macroeconomist at PNC Financial Services Group, said in a note. 3. Muted U.S. inflation could
dampen the Feds September liftoff. The yuans devaluation may ease concerns about deflation in China, but the stronger
dollar could restrain U.S. inflation during a time when the Federal Reserve would like inflation to accelerate. A strong U.S.
dollar has been a headwind for exports this year, keeping U.S. inflation below the Feds 2 percent target for nearly 40
consecutive months. Devaluing the yuan puts more upward pressure on the greenback, which could be accelerate further
when the Fed raises interest rates. Muted inflation could dampen the prospects for the Fed to hike rates this year. "This
creates uncertainty around the Fed, an uncertainty that many felt was past us," Stephen Guilfoyle, managing director of
NYSE Floor Operations at Deep Value Inc., said in a note. 4. A stronger dollar hurts U.S. manufacturing. A more powerful
dollar also has steep downsides for the U.S. economy. Chief among them, it makes American goods sold abroad more
expensive. As the dollar strengthens, U.S. exports will be less competitive, which could weigh on the manufacturing
sector, accounting for around 12 percent of U.S. gross domestic prod

Increases in US-China economic cooperation will hurt local

industries
Autor, Dorn, & Hanson (David H. Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson.
January 2016. The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to
Large Changes in Trade, The National Bureau of Economic Research,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21906)
Chinas emergence as a great economic power has induced an epochal shift
in patterns of world trade. Simultaneously, it has challenged much of the received empirical
wisdom about how labor markets adjust to trade shocks. Alongside the heralded consumer
benefits of expanded trade are substantial adjustment costs and
distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in the local labor
markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are
concentrated. Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with
wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and
unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the

China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job

churning and reduced lifetime income. At the national level, employment has
fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but
offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize.
Better understanding when and where trade is costly, and how and why it may be beneficial, are key
items on the research agenda for trade and labor economists.

Relations bad Economy IPR

Counterfeiting hurts businesses and causes enormous
damage to the US economy
Lewis 9 (Kevin, The Fake and the Fatal: The Consequences of
Counterfeits, 2009,
https://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE17/lewis.pdf)
By counterfeiting a companys
product, that counterfeiter becomes a competitor of that legitimate company.
As a result, that company loses sales and market share. Making matters
worse, the counterfeiter has an unfair advantage, since it has not had to pay
for R&D costs or brand development. Therefore, counterfeiters leech profits
from American businesses in ways that no legitimate competitor can. As
mentioned previously, counterfeiting costs the U.S. economy as much as $250
billion a year (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, www.thetruecosts.org; Federal Bureau of Investigation).
Counterfeiting poses threats to legitimate businesses as well.

Trade relations with China hurts American economic

growth counterfeiting and IPR violations
Lewis 9 (Kevin, The Fake and the Fatal: The Consequences of
Counterfeits, 2009,
https://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE17/lewis.pdf)
Increased globalization is another culprit that has led to a greater number of
counterfeit goods in the marketplace. Although globalization has been advantageous
to the global economy and has greatly expedited legitimate international trade, it has also
increased the ease of distribution of counterfeit products, as well as the
incentive to counterfeit (Hopkins, 2003). When there is more trade flowing
across borders, it is also easier for counterfeit products to flow between
countries, and new opportunities are created for counterfeiters to maximize
their return on investment and minimize their costs (Hopkins, 2003). A
counterfeit product that infringes on the trademarks of an American company
can be manufactured in Asia, packaged in the Middle East, and sold in the
United Kingdom in no more than a few weeks. All of this can occur outside
the American companys awareness, due to the surreptitious and global
nature of the illicit trade, and the freedom with which such trade can be
conducted in the global marketplace. Globalization has also strained the
resources of U.S. Customs (Hopkins, 2003). The more goods cross U.S. borders, the
harder customs officials have to work to prevent counterfeits from entering
the legitimate supply chain. Due to booming international trade, customs

officials must inspect an overwhelming quantity of goods in a relatively short

time period. This further increases the chances of counterfeits infiltrating the
U.S. economy from abroad.

Counterfeiting undermines American growth***

Lewis 9 (Kevin, The Fake and the Fatal: The Consequences of
Counterfeits, 2009,
https://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE17/lewis.pdf)
The existence of counterfeiting also serves as a disincentive to innovation.
Because counterfeiters dont have to recoup research and development
costs incurred in inventing new products or processes, counterfeiters can
enter the market with a similar product in less than 2 percent of the time and
less than 1/1000 of the cost (Hopkins, 2003). In the presence of widespread
counterfeiting, innovators have a minimal incentive to expend the effort and
resources necessary to produce beneficial new technologies, because
counterfeiters can profitably misappropriate these new ideas and make it
increasingly difficult for innovators to recover their expenses. Moreover, the
prevalence of counterfeiting has forced businesses to divert R&D resources
away from creating new technologies and into methods to deter
counterfeiters. Respondents to a study conducted by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development spent over half their R&D
investment on anti-piracy technologies and product differentiation as a
response to the increasing incidence of counterfeiting in the global economy
(Teresko, 2008). In this way, counterfeiting impedes technological progress,
discourages economic growth, and hinders improvement of the standard of
living in the United States.

U.S. goods are susceptible to counterfeiting

Lewis 9 (Kevin, The Fake and the Fatal: The Consequences of
Counterfeits, 2009,
https://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE17/lewis.pdf)
Counterfeiting harms not only individual consumers and businesses, but also the United
States as a whole. The trade of counterfeit goods is clandestine in nature, and
transactions frequently occur off the books. Therefore, the United States
government cannot collect taxes off of counterfeiters sales and profits. Were
it not for the presence of counterfeit goods in the marketplace, consumers
would buy goods from taxable, legitimate businesses. Counterfeiters thus
deprive the government of tax revenues, leaving less money to fund schools,
hospitals, roads, parks, fire and police forces, and other desirable public
amenities (White Paper, 2005).

Counterfeiting impacts
Piracy is tanking innovation and growth in China.
Rapoza 12 (Kenneth, In China, Why Piracy Is Here To Stay, Forbes, 22
July 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/07/22/in-china-whypiracy-is-here-to-stay/#82e0e696b9b9)
In China, said Tom Doctoroff, author of the book What Chinese Want and a China marketing guru at J.
Walter Thompson, managing a fake Apple store, or any kind of fake this or that, is heralded as
good ole fashion entrepreneurship. When it comes to innovation, the Chinese
wont deliver, he told me in a phone interview back in mid-May. China is the total flip-side
of the U.S. Piracy goes back to the China world view that individual rights
dont matter. The courts have never evolved to protect innovative individuals.
There is still very much the ethos that economic growth has to be managed,
so individual and intellectual property, where the spoils go to one entity or
one person, is not a cultural value, he said. IP protection will always be an uphill
struggle in China and for companies doing business there. And thats mainly
because of the fact that individual rights remain a theoretical notion at best.
Chinese civilization exists courtesy of a top down structure. Even the
education system mitigates against broad-based embrace of IP protection.
Until IP infringement is seen as an immediate threat to economic success, or
advanced as a vital state interest, few will really care whether Windows 8 is a knockoff, or if the X Box 360 sold in Shanghai is being hacked to allow for a pirated version of 2K Sports NBA
Basketball. Microsoft ran its anti-piracy ad in China when it launched Windows 7 to counter the bad habit.
In the ad, two young Chinese techies are seated at a desk. The guy who paid full price is being heralded by
his thumbs-up boss as a good worker. His bamboo plant is growing tall and green in a pot on his desk. His
trash can is clean, save for maybe one piece of paper. Behind him is the guy using the pirated version of
the software. And man does he look down. A big X on his screen, head in his hands. Boss pointing a finger
at him, trash can full of paper, power cords tangled up all over the place, and wilted flowers on his desk to

many Chinese think illegal software is the smart

choice because its cheaper. Computer sales people have incentive to
reinforce this perception because they can increase sales margins by
replacing genuine with copies instead. Wei Quing, head of Microsofts Windows business
add to his miserable work life. Yet,

group in China, told Doctoroff in his book that the company was trying to create a new religion, a new

preliminary efforts
not enough to make a serious dent in
the pirated versions of the same goods. The government of China knows that
current copyright infringements cannot be legally justified under the World
Trade Organization, but it is unable or maybe even unwilling to confront the
problem. Thats software. It gets even more flagrant with filmed
entertainment. Pirated Hollywood (and Chinese) films are sold on the cheap
on street corners across the country, not to mention inside smaller, private
shopping centers. Government censorship polices further complicate matters
because they increase the demand for contraband content. Even if the
Communist Party liberalizes distribution restrictions, per WTO regulations,
censors will sanction only a narrow range of content in legal channels, both
online and in actual stores. This begs the question of Chinese censorship and
what is and is not allowed, Doctoroff said. In his book, he writes: As in dynastic times,
standard of civility in China. It will take a long time. Research suggests that
have helped increase preference for the genuine, but

anything inconsistent with the governments role of promoting a harmonious

society will be prohibited. Notably, groups must never seek to become
alternative centers of authority and challenge the party, and explicit or
extramarital sexuality is always banned. The latter is driven by both the
sensitivities of a generally conservative population and the governments
patriarchal responsibility to protect the moral standing of the masses.
Chinas official view on piracy is more dont ask, dont tell than anything
else. Illegal video games are pervasive in internet bars. Illegal DVDs are
simply sold right out in the open. The Chinese internet is loaded with porn of
all stripes; so much for concern over the moral standing of the masses. While
this may seem profoundly hypocritical, the Chinese consider it pragmatic .
Understatement knowing when to turn a blind eye to transgression is both a
skill and contributor to social order. The government realizes that the people
in China are torn between Confucian regimentation and upwardly mobile
ambition, and therefore are emotionally repressed and crave release , Doctoroff
said. So long as the channels through which this is delivered remain narrow
and pose no threat to centralized authority, they will be accommodated. To
steal a book is an elegant offense, Doctoroff told me. Its recovering wisdom.
Especially if you were not supposed to read the book in the first place. In
China, people do get the link between IP and innovation , for example, but it
doesnt go very deep. Companies like Universal and Warner Brothers will just have to
lower their margins to next to nothing to compete. A sale is a sale; some money is
better than no money at all. This is a society where, if you open a fake Apple store, people start writing
articles about how innovative and creative you are, he said.

Counterfeiting endangers consumers

Lewis 9 (Kevin, The Fake and the Fatal: The Consequences of
Counterfeits, 2009,
https://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE17/lewis.pdf)
counterfeits pose a significant risk to consumers. Unsafe fake
goods can lead to injuries, deaths, and illnesses , as the cases of Maxine Blount illustrates.
In cases where fake goods cause no physical harm, consumers are harmed
financially when they are hoodwinked into spending their hardearned cash on
a poor-functioning, low-quality counterfeit. Moreover, since businesses must
raise their prices to recoup losses from counterfeiting, the public is forced to
pay higher prices for brand-name products because of counterfeiters
(Congressional Hearing, 5/25/05). However, the threat that counterfeits pose to
Americans extends far beyond the shoddy quality of the products themselves
and higher prices for genuine goods. Criminal counterfeiting operations often
fund the activities of groups who seek to kill innocent citizens. According to
the Secretary General of Interpol, intellectual property crime is becoming
the preferred method of funding for a number of terrorist groups, including,
but not limited to, Hezbollah and al Qaeda (Congressional Hearing, 5/25/05). Likewise,
Russian, Eurasian, Asian, and Lebanese organized crime groups profit from
As evidenced above,

intellectual property crimes, and there may be a trend developing for local gang involvement
in counterfeiting (Congressional Hearing, 5/25/05).

A2 Coop solves econ

Cooperation doesnt solve economy-failure to reform
Reinsch and Shea 15
(Hon. William A. Reinsch, Chairman Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Vice Chairman,
November 18, 2015 2015 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, pg.viii, HY)
These developments would be of lesser concern if China were demonstrating itself to be a force for
democracy, rule of law, and responsible governance on the world stage. China has taken some action to
contribute to global peace and security through antipiracy patrols, peacekeeping operations, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. At the same time, though, Chinas willingness to
empower corrupt elites in other countries often undermines good governance and human rights.
Meanwhile, Beijing continues to undermine the autonomy of Hong Kong, and use incentives and

expectation in the United States of

economic reforms when Xi Jinping came into power has not yet been borne
out by his governments performance. Instead, President Xi has not been able to resist the
temptation of resorting to old economic toolsincluding government subsidies for
favored industries, currency manipulation, overinvestment in fixed assets,
and excessive intervention in the financial system in order to avoid short term
dislocation and retain popular support. At the same time, the governments military buildup,
intimidation to draw Taiwan closer to the Mainland. The

expansion in the South China Sea, and crackdown on dissidents and journalists have created significant
concern elsewhere in Asia and increased doubts about Chinas intentions as it asserts itself on the world
stage.

Cooperation doesnt solve reform-market restrictions

(Wayne M. Morrison Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance Chinas Economic Rise: History,
Trends,Challenges, and Implications for the United States October 21, 2015Pg. 29, HY)

Chinas financial system are

inefficient due largely to restrictions on market forces . Chinas stock market system is a
Despite extensive reforms over the past three decades, many parts of

good example of this. Chinas two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, are
the worlds third- and fifth-largest stock exchanges, respectively, based on domestic capitalization as of mid-June. Only
domestic Chinese firms are these exchanges, many of which are SOEs. Both stock exchanges have experienced significant
volatility. According to a study by the Brookings Institution, this

is largely because the markets are

dominated by speculators to a far greater extent than in Western nations .
Chinese shareholders generally have very little influence over the companies they are
investing in and thus they lace less reliance on underlying firm value and
focus more on likely stock price movements in the short run . 67 From January 5 to June
12, 2015, the Shanghai and Shenzhen indexes surged by 54% and 119% respectively, and on a year-on-year (YoY) basis,
they were up by 141% and 132%, respectively a situation the International Monetary Fund stated was obviously a stock
market bubble.

Many Chinese investors

were

buying stocks on margin (i.e., borrowing money to

buy stocks). The bubble began to burst in early June. From June 12, 2015, to July 7, 2015, Chinas two stock indexes
fell by 32% and 40%, respectively, resulting in capitalization losses of $3.6 trillion ($1.9 billion and $1.7 trillion), nearly the

This caused the Chinese government to

intervene to halt the slide, such as by suspending initial public offerings,
relaxing rules for insurance companies buying stocks, prohibiting state-owned
companies from selling their shareholdings, and making funds available to
size of Germanys economy and equivalent to 35% of GDP.

brokerages in order to purchase equities. 68 According to one estimate, the Chinese government
may have spent $235 billion to stabilize the markets. Chinese authorities also reportedly have launched investigations,
arrested a number of individuals for market manipulation, blamed foreign speculators for the crisis, and pressured one
Chinese journalist to confess to causing panic and chaos in Chinas stock markets.69 Both the SSE and the SZSE
regained some stability in the wake of the government intervention, but begun to experience sharp losses again
beginning around mid-August. From August 14 to August 25, 2015, the SEE and SZSE declined by 25.2% and 24.2%,
respectively (see Figure 19). From June 12 to August 25, 2015, combined market capitalization losses by the SEE and SZSE
totaled approximately $5 trillion, essentially wiping out most of the gains made in the first half of 2015. According to a
Brookings Institution report, Chinas stock markets are more heavily affected by speculative investment than markets in
Western countries. This situation exists in part because shareholders in Chinese markets generally have less influence
over companies than their Western counterparts and so focus more on short-term movements in stock prices.70 Chinese
stock exchanges are also dominated by individuals (retail investors), who total 200 million and account for an estimated
85% of market trades. Reportedly, more than 30 million new trading accounts were added during the first five months of
2015. Many of these investors reportedly bought stocks on margin (i.e., using borrowed money), betting that stock prices
would continue to rise. While many economists saw the decline in Chinas stock markets to be a normal correction,

many raised concerns over how the Chinese government handled the crisis
and over its commitment to enhancing free market reform.

US consumer distrust discourages economic cooperation

Morrison 9
(Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, June 23, 2009,
China-U.S. Trade Issues pg. 11, HY)
Although Chinas economic reforms and rapid economic growth have expanded

U.S.-China commercial relations in recent years, tensions have arisen over a wide
variety of issues, including the growth and size of the U.S. trade deficit with
China (which many Members contend is an indicator that the trade relationship is unfair), concerns over
unsafe Chinese food and consumer products , Chinas currency policy (which many
Members blame for the size of the U.S. trade deficit with China and the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs), Chinas
mixed record on implementing its obligations in the WTO , including its, failure to
provide adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), and Chinese industrial policies
used to promote and protect domestic industries. Legislation has been introduced to respond
to several of these issues (see U.S.-China Trade Legislation in the 111th Congress). Reports throughout 2007 of tainted
or unsafe food and consumer products (including seafood, pet food, toys, and tires) from China raised concerns in the

China
maintains a poor regulatory framework for enforcing its health and safety
regulations and standards, and that this is proving to be a growing problem
for U.S. consumers. Many U.S. policymakers have raised concern over how to
press China to improve enforcement of its health and safety standards of its
exports as well as the ability of U.S. regulatory agencies to ensure the health
and safety of imports from China (and other countries). In 2007 and 2008, there were numerous recalls,
United States over the health, safety, and quality of imports from China. Some analysts contend that

warnings, and safety concerns involving Chinese products, as the following instances illustrate.

A2 Coop creates IP agreements

Chinas IPR protections backfire and hurt American
growth and trade relations
Harris 14 (Dan, China IP Protection Is Possible, China Law Blog,
11 July 2014, http://www.chinalawblog.com/2014/07/china-ipprotection-is-possible.html)
Many American businesses think China has no IP laws and that Chinese
companies do not file lawsuits. This is a mistake. Chinese companies actually
tend to be quite adept at using the Chinese IP system to their own benefit,
including employing the following tactics: If the American side fails to register
its intellectual property in China, a Chinese entity will register the IP in its
own name. In this way, the Chinese company cuts the American company out
of the American companys own market. This happens regularly with
trademarks, patents, and commercial copyrights. Many American companies
mistakenly believe that China does not have a developed IP protection
system. They therefore do not adequately investigate to ensure that they are
not infringing the rights of others in their operations in China. This is
especially of concern when the American company hires a Chinese contractor
to perform services or engages in cooperative design or manufacturing operations with a Chinese
company. The American company only learns later that it has infringed on the IP of another. The resulting
damages can be significant. For how this can play out on the trademark front, check out When To Register

to be doing
business in or with China, it behooves you to figure out how best to protect
your intangible assets.
Your China Trademark? Ask Tesla. There is IP protection in China and if you are going

***Trade***

Relations Good

Relations good trade

Failure to engage china prevents effective cooperation on trade

PEACEBRIEF 15
(PEACEBRIEF, United States Institute of Peace, August 15, Overcoming
Barriers to U.S.-China Cooperation, pg. 3, HY)
Lack of strategic trust between the United States and China prevents
productive cooperation. Both sides have largely continued to act as if their
relationship is a zero-sum game. These tensions have only intensified over
recent security concerns in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
Moreover, Washington has cited concerns about Beijings steady increase in
military spending, from $10 billion in 1997 to $145 billion in 2015, and sees China as a direct threat
to its allies and interests in the Asia-Pacific.2 Beijing sees the U.S. military
presence in the region and across Asia as its greatest security threat. It is
also keenly aware that Washington maintains the worlds highest military
spending, up from $560 billion in 2015 to a requested $585 billion in 2016.3 Washington also routinely
accuses Beijing of cyber attacks on government agencies most recently in June 2015 when
both the Office of Personnel Managements systems and corporate computer systems were breached. Both sides lack
strategic trust in trade, despite China being Washingtons second largest trade partner ($592 billion in 2014).4 A
sense of competition is constant. As Washington pushes forward with the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Beijing pursues the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership. Each framework tacitly excludes the other country,
underscoring the mistrust. Further, the two nations continue to compete for
influence in Myanmar, a nascent democracy still threatened by conflict.
Points of tension should not prevent the United States and China from
overcoming their challenges, enhancing cooperation, and fostering deeper
mutual understanding and strategic trust. The private sectors and nongovernmental organizations on both
sides could launch this process by enhancing their own cooperation. Ultimately, Washington and Beijing need to compartmentalize early on
and hope that positivity on some endssuch as cooperation in Myanmarwill spill over to otherssuch as cyber security and the South China
Sea. Both sides will need to commit to greater transparency so that in a moment of crisis, chances are minimal for misunderstanding to lead to
a major conflict.

***Military Modernization***

Relations Bad

Relations bad modernization***

China hijacks relations as political cover for nuclear

modernization
Hoar 10 [William P. Hoar, New American, China Embraces U.S. Debt and
Technology, September 28, 2010,
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/reviews/903-correctionplease/4704-china-embraces-us-debt-and-technology]-DD
Author Bill Gertz pointed out in The China Threat a full decade ago how Lockheed scientists had earlier
traveled to China to help out the communists with problems they were having with rocket motor failures.

Solid rocket technology like other technical assistance

Lockheed supplied the Chinese is critical in helping the Chinese develop
multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, or MIRVs. The rockets can
be adapted to guide clusters of nuclear warheads launched on a single
missile. As the Cox Committee stated, China has threatened to MIRV its warheads in
response to U.S. national missile defenses. So far, China has not deployed
MIRVs on its current nuclear arsenal but has shown the capability of adding
up to three warheads on its new DF-31 truck mobile intercontinental ballistic
missile. The DF-31 was flight tested for the first time in 1999 with
penetration aids dummy warheads designed to fool missile defenses .
As Gertz wrote:

These used kick motors, another technology on which Lockheed provided assistance. Meanwhile, a RAND
Corporation report found that U.S. air power in the Pacific would be inadequate to stop a hypothetical
Chinese attack on Taiwan in 2020, with U.S. stealth fighters being unable to evade Chinas CETC Y-27

Yet, while some in the Pentagon and a few others point to the
growing threat of China, the liberal establishment seems to be
gearing up for another thaw with Beijing, which inevitably makes
China even stronger. During President Obamas state visit to Beijing
in November 2009, he promised comprehensive relations with China.
radars.

Wouldnt you know that the one promise the President keeps would be approved by Beijing.

Modernization leads to miscalc and war

Lewis 9 [Jeffrey. Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation
Initiative at the New America Foundation. Chinese Nuclear Posture and Force
Modernization. Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009]-DD
The ongoing modernization has profound implications for strategic
stability. Over the past few decades, scholars have broadened conceptions of
strategic stability from simple rational actor models that emphasize the
offense-defense balance to encompass concerns about how leaders and
organizations act under times of great stress. The large alert forces deployed
by the United States and the Soviet Union precluded any rational decision to initiate
a nuclear war but raised the prospect of accidents, miscalculation, or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. On one hand, the failure of Chinese and
U.S. political leaders to think through the interaction of new strategic
capabilities*for example, mobile ballistic missiles and antisatellite capabilities

in China; missile defenses and conventional strike options in the United

States*raises the prospect of unintended consequences and perverse
interactions in the event of a serious crisis over the status of Taiwan.

Mil mod artificial intelligence

China uses relations as cover for military modernization
through dual use tech
Hoar 10 [William P. Hoar, New American, China Embraces U.S. Debt and
Technology, September 28, 2010,
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/reviews/903-correctionplease/4704-china-embraces-us-debt-and-technology]-DD
China does not want to develop military ties with Washington and reset a
positive course because Beijing loves peace and has warm fuzzy feelings
for Americans and hopes to enhance the influence of the United States.
Anyone who really thinks that is nave beyond help; many of the
policymakers who pretend this to be the case are dangerously duplicitous .
Communist China is on a long march for more power. For decades, as a few
stalwarts in the U.S. Congress used to point out, the Communist Chinese have been
increasingly focused on acquiring U.S. and foreign technology and
equipment in particular dual-use technologies that can be
integrated into the Peoples Republic of Chinas military and
industrial bases. What isnt bought or otherwise transferred is often
stolen. Moreover, as the Cox Committee in the U.S. House noted as long ago as 1999, The PRC has
also purchased weapons systems or their components from Israel, France, Britain, and the United States,
including air-to-air missiles, air-refueling technology, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology,
helicopter parts, and assorted avionics.

Dual use tech results in militarized AI

Kaspersen 16 [Anja, Head of International Security @ World Economic
Form, We're on the brink of an artificial intelligence arms race. But we can
curb it, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/should-we-embrace-therise-of-killer-robots/, June 2016]-DD
militaries do not reveal all their work on weaponizing artificial
intelligence. However, Russia recently unveiled their Iron Man humanoid military robot, aiming to
minimize the risk to soldiers in dangerous situations. The US and Chinese militaries, among
others, are also investing heavily in AI and robotics . The US third offset strategy
explicitly aims to keep it ahead in the technology game. The geopolitical dimension to the
third offset strategy indicates an incipient AI arms race. As US Deputy Defence
For obvious reasons,

Secretary Work put it: our adversaries are pursuing enhanced human operation and it scares the crap out
of us, frankly. An AI arms race would be unlikely to be as stable as the Cold War stand-off involving
mutually-assured destruction. A common concern among AI researchers in the recent TechEmergence
survey was the difficulty of predicting what happens when artificial intelligences engage with each other. In
contrast to the Cold War paradigm of military-sponsored cutting-edge research eventually spawning
private sector applications, militaries are not necessarily at the cutting edge. Potentially weaponizable,

dual use AI is increasingly being developed first in the private

sector. For example, quadrocopter development is driven by commercial aims such as package
deliveries. Facial recognition algorithms have a broad array of private sector as well as public security
applications, such as recognizing when valued customers enter a store. According to Mary Cummings, the
prominent robotics professor and former fighter pilot, I guarantee you, Google and Amazon will soon have
much more surveillance capability with drones than the military. She asks, What

happens

when our governments are looking to corporations to provide them

with the latest defence technology? The robotics race right now is
causing a massive brain drain from militaries into the commercial
world. The most talented minds are now being drawn towards the
rewards offered in the private sector. Googles AI budget would be the envy of any
military, and it can leverage its commercial activities to further research for example, launching a photo

The significance of the

private sector taking the lead is enormous: when technologies can
be bought off-the-shelf, AI is potentially weaponizable by any nonstate actor. Sooner or later, it will become trivially easy for organized
criminal gangs or terrorist groups to construct devices such as
assassination drones. Indeed, it is likely that given time, any AI capability that
can be weaponized will be weaponized. As AI develops, early attempts to weaponize
storage service which will help refine its facial recognition software.

it are likely to be buggy and prone to misfiring. But another implication of the brain drain from the military
to private sector is a reduction in capacity to test and verify the effectiveness of technology, to a degree
that would instil confidence in battle situations. Legitimate actors may not want to send a technology that
is considered only 80 percent ready into the battlefield. Rogue actors, though, are unlikely to care about
compliance or a bit of collateral damage. A terrorist organisation such as ISIS might be only too willing to
use an 80 percent-ready AI weapon, with devastating results.

AI causes extinction - especially true in a militarized

context where they dont have extensive knowledge of
the value of humanity
Pamlin and Armstrong 15 [Dennis Pamlin -- Executive Project
Manager @ Global Challenges Foundation and Dr Stuart Armstrong -- James
Martin Research Fellow @ Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School
& Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 12 Risks that threaten human
civilization, Published February 2015 by Global Challenges Foundation,
http://globalchallenges.org/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infiniteimpact.pdf]-DD
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one of the least understood global challenges . There
is considerable uncertainty on what timescales an AI could be built, if at all, with expert opinion shown to
be very unreliable in this domain.481 This uncertainty is bi-directional: AIs could be developed much
sooner or much later than expected. Despite the uncertainty of when and how AI could be developed,

there are reasons to suspect that an AI with human-comparable skills would

be a major risk factor. AIs would immediately benefit from improvements to
computer speed and any computer research. They could be trained in specific
professions and copied at will, thus replacing most human capital in the
world, causing potentially great economic disruption . Through their advantages in
speed and performance, and through their better integration with standard computer software, they could

If
they became skilled at computer research, the recursive self
improvement could generate what is sometime called a
singularity, 482 but is perhaps better described as an
intelligence explosion, 483 with the AIs intelligence increasing
very rapidly.484 Such extreme intelligences could not easily be
controlled (either by the groups creating them, or by some
international regulatory regime),485 and would probably act in a
way to boost their own intelligence and acquire maximal resources
quickly become extremely intelligent in one or more domains (research, planning, social skills...).

for almost all initial AI motivations.486 And if these motivations do

not detail487 the survival and value of humanity in exhaustive
detail, the intelligence will be driven to construct a world without
humans or without meaningful features of human existence . This
makes extremely intelligent AIs a unique risk,488 in that extinction is more
likely than lesser impacts. An AI would only turn on humans if it foresaw a likely chance of
winning; otherwise it would remain fully integrated into society. And if an AI had been able to successfully

it could certainly drive the

remaining humans to extinction.
engineer a civilisation collapse, for instance, then

AI causes extinction paperclips prove

Bostrom et. al 14 [Nick Bostrom is an Oxford University philosopher,
Stephen Cass is a staff writer for IEEE Spectrum, and Eliza Strickland has read
Bostroms book and spoken to him;also IEEE Spectrum Associate Editor,
12/4/14, Nick Bostrom, Nick Bostrom Says We Should Trust Our Future Robot
Overlords, http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/robotics/artificialintelligence/nick-bostrom-says-we-should-trust-our-future-robot-overlords]-DD
There are obviously existential risks that arise from nature,
asteroid impacts, supervolcanic eruptions, and so forth. But the human
species has been around for over 100,000 years. So if these risks from nature
have failed to do us in in the last 100,000 years, they are unlikely to do us in
in the next 100 years, whereas we ourselves will be introducing entirely new
kinds of phenomena into the world in this century by advancing the frontier
of technology. Eliza Strickland: With these brand-new technologies come brandnew risks that our species might not be able to survive. Stephen Cass: Weve seen
Nick Bostrom:

some pretty impressive AIs recently, like IBMs Watson, which tromped the human competition on the TV

Right now,
computer scientists can build very smart AIs, but for very specific tasks . IBMs
game show Jeopardy! But how smart have AIs really gotten? Eliza Strickland:

Watson won Jeopardy! because it can understand conversational English and look up information, but
thats all it can do. Watson cant write you an e-mail describing what its data center looks like, or explain
why its programmers are moving slowly after a big lunch. Were still a long way from creating an AI that
can match a humans level of general intelligence, although Bostrom says we dont know exactly how long.

We did do a survey of the worlds leading AI experts. One of the

questions we asked was: By which year do you think theres a 50 percent
chance that we will have developed human-level machine intelligence? The
median answer to that question was 2040 or 2050, depending on exactly
which group of experts we asked. Stephen Cass: So why should we start worrying about this
now? Eliza Strickland: Because once we do make an AI with human-level
intelligence, things could go bad in a hurry. Heres what Bostrom said. Nick
Nick Bostrom:

Bostrom: Well, at the moment, its computer scientists who are doing AI research, and to some extent
neuroscientists and other folk. If and when machines begin to surpass humans in general intelligence, the
research would increasingly be done by machines. And as they got better, they would also get better at
doing the research to make themselves even better. Eliza Strickland: With this feedback loop, Bostrom
says, an AI could go from human-level intelligence to superintelligence before were really prepared for it.

so lets suppose an AI does achieve superintelligence.

Why would it seek to destroy its human creators? Eliza Strickland: Bostrom
says it wouldnt have any grudge against usbut the AI would have
some goal, and wed just be in its way. It would be similar to the way
Stephen Cass: Okay,

that humans cause animal extinctions, he said. Nick Bostrom: If we think about
what we are doing to various animal species, its not so much that we hate them. For the most part, its
just that we have other uses for their habitats, and they get wiped out as a side effect. Stephen Cass: So
what motivates an AI? What would it be trying to accomplish? Eliza Strickland: It would have some goal
that had been programmed into it by scientists. And Bostrom explains that even simple goals can have
disastrous consequences. Nick Bostrom:

Lets suppose you were a

superintelligence and your goal was to make as many paper clips as
possible. Maybe someone wanted you to run a paper clip factory,
and then you succeeded in becoming superintelligent, and now you
have this goal of maximizing the number of paper clips in existence.
So you would quickly realize that the existence of humans is an
impediment. Maybe the humans will take it upon themselves to
switch you off one day. You want to reduce that probability as much
as possible, because if they switch you off, there will be fewer paper
clips. So you would want to get rid of humans right away. Even if
they wouldnt pose a threat, youd still realize that human bodies
consist of atoms, and those atoms could be used to make some very
nice paper clips. Eliza Strickland: Bostrom thinks that just about any goal we
give an AI could come back to bite us. Even if we go with something like
make humans happy, the machine could decide that the most effective way
to meet this goal is to stick electrodes in the pleasure centers of all our
brains. Stephen Cass: Isnt thatspoiler alert!basically the plot of the sci-fi movie I, Robot? Eliza
Strickland: Oh, yeah. That was the Will Smith movie based on Isaac Asimovs famous three laws of
robotics, which are supposed to guarantee that a robot wont hurt a human being. In the movieand
actually in most of Asimovs robot storiesthe laws dont work quite as intended.

Mil mod dual use

China uses relations as cover for military modernization
through dual use tech
Hoar 10 [William P. Hoar, New American, China Embraces U.S. Debt and
Technology, September 28, 2010,
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/reviews/903-correctionplease/4704-china-embraces-us-debt-and-technology]-DD
China does not want to develop military ties with Washington and reset a
positive course because Beijing loves peace and has warm fuzzy feelings
for Americans and hopes to enhance the influence of the United States.
Anyone who really thinks that is nave beyond help; many of the
policymakers who pretend this to be the case are dangerously duplicitous .
Communist China is on a long march for more power. For decades, as a few
stalwarts in the U.S. Congress used to point out, the Communist Chinese have been
increasingly focused on acquiring U.S. and foreign technology and
equipment in particular dual-use technologies that can be
integrated into the Peoples Republic of Chinas military and
industrial bases. What isnt bought or otherwise transferred is often
stolen. Moreover, as the Cox Committee in the U.S. House noted as long ago as 1999, The PRC has
also purchased weapons systems or their components from Israel, France, Britain, and the United States,
including air-to-air missiles, air-refueling technology, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology,
helicopter parts, and assorted avionics.

Dual use tech can actually be linked to the development

of WMDs and devastating conventional weapons
Goldman and Pollack 97 [Charles and Jonathan, both work @ RAND
and prepared this release for the Secretary of Defense, Engaging China in
the International Export Control Process, 1997,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a325273.pdf]-DD
To assess these issues, we first examine the relevant policy context. In the post-Cold War/post-CoCom

the United States and its

allies and security partners are trying to devise new mechanisms
and arrangements to restrain or prevent the sale or transfer of
military technology or dual-use technology linked to weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) or destabilizing conventional weapons.
(post-Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) era,

Chinese involvement in the export control process was not solicited historically. Indeed, the United States
believes that the Chinese have made destabilizing transfers in the past and they could do so again.
Because of its previous lack of involvement in this process, China is tied to few binding international norms
with respect to export control and nonproliferation, and its adherence to different international agreements

The
world is entering an era where the challenges of technology transfer and
technology control are becoming much more complicated. Technology
transfer activities will rely less on delivery of finished military systems, and
an increasing number of suppliers will be involved in these processes. Now
and in the future, technology transfer will often require delivery of
is mixed at best. U.S. policymakers also face growing problems in controlling technology flows.

only certain critical components of a weapon system or production

facility. As technological capability spreads, technology transfer will
rely increasingly on sharing engineering know-how, techniques, and
designs, much of which seems to fall principally in the realm of
civilian technologies. These intellectual property transfers present much greater challenges for
international regimes than transfers of finished weapons systems. Scientific transfers and
cooperation are harder to detect since they 3 do not require
shipments of large physical objects. In addition, scientific transfers have many
legitimate peaceful purposes, making it difficult to distinguish a scientific
exchange for weapons system purposes from transactions for power
generation, space exploration, or civilian manufacturing technology .
Because of changes in the nature of technology transfer and the radically altered international
environment following the end of the Cold War, international agreements have become much less powerful
instruments in controlling exports of destabilizing technologies. This briefing starts from the proposition
that more fully engaging China in the international export control system will foster a reduction in
destabilizing transfers, even though the linkage between regimes and transfer behavior appears to be
weakening worldwide.

Defense

A2: Militarization
Relations dont solve militarization-Chinese sovereignty
claims, power acquisition, deterrence against US
Bergerson 3-15
(Kristien Bergerson, Senior Policy Analyst, Security and Foreign Affairs,
March 15, 2016, Chinas Efforts to Counter U.S. Forward Presence in the Asia
Pacific, pg. 3-4, HY)
While China benefits from the security and stability the United States and
U.S. allies bring to Asia, China is seeking to reduce the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLA)
vulnerability to U.S. forces in the region should a conflict occur. China continues to build antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD)* capabilities to deter or delay a U.S. military response to a
conflict. Beijing also appears to be pursuing other optionsincluding nonmilitary options prior to a conflict likely intended to erode the
United States strategic position, freedom of action, and operational space. These other options are engagement, coercion, and alliance

China engages states within the region through military-to-military

exchanges to create leverage for applying pressure on U.S. allies and
partners. China uses economic engagement and economic coercion to attempt to shape the behavior of U.S. allies and partners
splitting:

Beijing considers instrumental to supporting U.S. presence and force projection capability within the U.S. Pacific Commands area of

China conducts activities intended to drive a wedge between U.S.

allies and partners to undermine the development of a unified, U.S.-led
security architecture in the Asia Pacific, and hinder U.S. presence and force
projection capability should a conflict occur. Chinas Perceived Position in Asia: China is
seeking to become the dominant power in Asia and a counter or balancing
power to the presence of the United States in the Asia Pacific .1 China intends
to achieve this goal by expanding its comprehensive national power during what
Chinese leaders see as a period of strategic opportunity, which Beijing
believes will allow China to better shape its security environment and defend
its core interests.2 Chinese President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping articulated these efforts
responsibility.

in his 2014 foreign policy directive, which calls for a mix of soft and hard power to achieve Beijings foreign policy goals and address security
challenges. 3 Chinas Security Challenges and Concerns: The most salient challenge to Chinese interests perceived by leaders in Beijing

Should Chinese leaders decide to

employ military force to address these sovereignty concerns, it would destabilize
the region, put pressure on the United States to respond, and would affect
American allies. In planning military campaigns, the PLA has adopted a series of contingency
measures designed to counter potential military intervention in the region by the United
relates to sovereignty vis--vis Taiwan and in the East and South China seas.

States.4 Oriana Mastro, a professor at Georgetown University, argues that Chinese official statements, white papers, and semi-official writings

China ... sees U.S. military presence [and its proximity to the Mainland] as a destabilizing
factor in the region that threatens Chinas ability to return to its rightful place
of regional preeminence.5 To illustrate Professor Mastros point, Chinas 2015 defense white paper states that the United
suggest

States is enhancing military alliances and presence in this region, meddling in South China Sea affairs, and maintaining constant close-in air
and sea surveillance and reconnaissance, all of which negatively impact Chinas perceived security.6 The reality of the situation is that
because of its own assertive and aggressive actions, China has been the primary driver of instability in the region. One recent example of this
is Beijings island-building campaign in the South China Sea, which has been widely criticized by the United States, the region, and the wider
community. 7 Another example is the stationing of batteries of long-range surface to air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracel Island chain.8
The perceived threat to China from the U.S. and its allies is perhaps best summed up by Senior Captain Xu Qi, a PLA naval officer writing in an
authoritative PLA military journal, stating that Chinas heartland faces the sea ... [and the] United States has deployed strong forces in the
Western Pacific and has formed a system of military bases [in] the First and Second Island Chains* with a strategic posture involving Japan and
South Korea as the northern anchors, Australia and the Philippines as the southern anchors, and with Guam positioned as the forward base.9
He continues, some maritime powers may employ long-range strike weapons to attack into the depths of China ... [and] precision attacks ...
[from] beyond the first island chain ... threaten important political, economic, and military targets.... 10

Cooperation allow Chinese territorial claim under

justification of US agreement
Thayer 3-10
(Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the
Australian Defence Force Academy, March 10, 2016, New Model of Major Power Relations:
China-U.S. Global Cooperation and Regional Contention, pg. 5-7 HY)
Since September 2014, according to Glaser and Douglas, there has been a significant rollback in US official discourse on
Chinas new model of major power relations as a result of irreconcilable differences of interpretation over key terms and

differing attitudes between China and the United

States on the new type of major country relations were starkly apparent at the Beijing summit in November 2014, with
issues.16 According to a Japanese scholar, the

Chinese media reporting that Obama had agreed to jointly establish such a relationship while the White House could show
that Obama had never mentioned the term. At least five bundles of issues may be identified that

illustrate U.S.

reservations:

First, almost as soon as China and the United States began to discuss how to manage their relations,
U.S. allies expressed concern over the prospect of power sharing between Beijing and Washington at their expense
captured in the term G2 (Group of 2). The Obama Administration preferred to give emphasis to a new model of relations
by dropping the term major power/major country. In other words, the Chinese formulation was perceived excluding other
powers from the new model. Second, and related to the first issue, the Obama Administration became increasingly
frustrated by Chinese constant efforts to persuade the US to publicly reaffirm support for the NTGPR [New Type of Great

US patience has been stretched to the

by Chinese state media repeatedly spinning Americas acceptance of the
framework in ways it does not support . Frustration builds every time Beijing says
Power Relations] label. Further, according to Glaser and Douglas:
breaking point

Washington has already agreed to what the United States sees as an aspiration that requires hard work on both
sides to achieve. US

officials privately complain about the Chinese misrepresenting

Washingtons position to ASEAN countries, suggesting the United States is
privileging Chinese interests at their expense .18 Third, the United States objected to
Chinas unilateral actions in defining the new power relations framework
to include an expanding list of core interests and the exclusion of the United
States and its alliance system from the Asia-Pacific. As noted by Glaser and
Douglas, China expanded its three initial core interests Taiwan, Tibet and Chinas
development path to include sovereignty and territorial integrity
(Xinjiang, the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands).19 Statements by Chinese officials that the Pacific Ocean
was big enough for both countries,20 and Xi Jinpings May 2014 advocacy of Asia for the Asians security concept were
widely viewed by the Obama Administration as aimed at undermining the U.S. alliance system and excluding the U.S. from
the western Pacific.21

No effective US-China military coop-5 strategic barriers

Thayer 3-10
(Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the
Australian Defence Force Academy, March 10, 2016, New Model of Major Power Relations:
China-U.S. Global Cooperation and Regional Contention, pg. 5-7 HY)
Since September 2014, according to Glaser and Douglas, there has been a significant rollback in US official discourse on Chinas new model of major power relations as

differing attitudes
United States on the new type of major country relations were starkly apparent at the Beijing summit in November

a result of irreconcilable differences of interpretation over key terms and issues.16 According to a Japanese scholar, the

between China and

the

2014, with Chinese media reporting that Obama had agreed to jointly establish such a relationship while the White House could show that Obama had never mentioned
the term. At least five bundles of issues may be identified that

illustrate U.S. reservations: First, almost as soon as China and the

United States began to discuss how to manage their relations, U.S. allies expressed concern over the prospect of power sharing between Beijing and Washington at their
expense captured in the term G2 (Group of 2). The Obama Administration preferred to give emphasis to a new model of relations by dropping the term major

Chinese formulation was perceived excluding other powers from

the new model. Second, and related to the first issue, the Obama Administration became increasingly frustrated by Chinese constant efforts to
power/major country. In other words, the

persuade the US to publicly reaffirm support for the NTGPR [New Type of Great Power Relations] label. Further, according to Glaser and Douglas:

US patience

has been stretched to the breaking point by Chinese state media repeatedly spinning Americas
acceptance of the framework in ways it does not support . Frustration builds every time Beijing says
Washington has already agreed to what the United States sees as an aspiration that requires hard work on both sides to achieve. US officials privately
complain about the Chinese misrepresenting Washingtons position to ASEAN
countries, suggesting the United States is privileging Chinese interests at
their expense.18 Third, the United States objected to Chinas unilateral actions in defining the new
power relations framework to include an expanding list of core interests and the exclusion of
the United States and its alliance system from the Asia-Pacific . As noted by Glaser and Douglas,
China expanded its three initial core interests Taiwan, Tibet and Chinas development path
to include sovereignty and territorial integrity (Xinjiang, the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands).19
Statements by Chinese officials that the Pacific Ocean was big enough for both countries,20 and Xi Jinpings May 2014 advocacy of Asia for the Asians security concept

Fourth,
strategic trust between Washington and Beijing was severely undermined by
allegations of Chinese state involvement in increasing cyber-espionage directed not
only against the U.S. defense security community but also the U.S. business community and its commercial secrets and intellectual property. Fifth, Chinas
aggressive program of building artificial islands in the South China Sea and militarizing the
infrastructure on them has emerged as the major point of contention between Beijing
were widely viewed by the Obama Administration as aimed at undermining the U.S. alliance system and excluding the U.S. from the western Pacific.21

and Washington. The United States views Chinas actions as a threat to freedom of navigation and over-flight. Admiral Harry Harris, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific
Command, has stated bluntly that China was seeking hegemony over East Asia.22

A2 Mil mod no threat

Chinese military modernization is not a threat- their army
is barely comparable to Taiwan and the US outpaces China
regardless
Eland 03 [Ivan, Cato Institute Analyst, 1-3-2003, Is Chinese Military
Modernization a Threat to the United States?, Policy Analysis No. 465,
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa465.pdf]-DD
The ongoing modernization of the Chinese military poses less of a threat to
the United States than recent studies by the Pentagon and a congressionally
mandated commission have posited. Both studies exaggerate the strength of
Chinas military by focusing on the modest improvements of specific sectors
rather than the still-antiquated overall state of Chinese forces . The state of
the Chinese military and its modernization must also be put in the
context of U.S. interests in East Asia and compared with the state
and modernization of the U.S. military and other militaries in East
Asia, especially the Taiwanese military. Viewed in that context,
Chinas military modernization does not look especially threatening .
Although not officially calling its policy in East Asia containment, the United States has ringed China with
formal and informal alliances and a forward military presencmoe. With such an extended defense
perimeter, the United States considers as a threat to its interests any natural attempt by Chinaa rising
power with a growing economyto gain more control of its external environment by increasing defense
spending. If U.S. policymakers would take a more restrained view of Americas vital interests in the region,
the measured Chinese military buildup would not appear so threatening. Conversely, U.S. policy may
appear threatening to China. Even the Pentagon admits that China accelerated hikes in defense spending
after the United States attacked Yugoslavia over the Kosovo issue in 1999. The United States still spends
about 10 times what China does on national defense$400 billion versus roughly $40 billion per yearand
is modernizing its forces much faster. In addition, much of the increase in Chinas official defense spending

Chinas spending on
new armaments is equivalent to that of a nation that spends only
$10 billion to $20 billion per year on defense. In contrast, the United
States spends well over $100 billion per year to acquire new
weapons. Even without U.S. assistance, Taiwans modern military
could probably dissuade China from attacking. Taiwan does not have
to be able to win a conflict; it needs only to make the costs of any
attack unacceptable to China. The informal U.S. security guarantee
is unneeded. Both the Pentagon and a congressionally mandated commission recently issued
is soaked up by expenses not related to acquiring new weapons. Thus,

studies on the Chinese military that overstated the threat to the United States posed by that force. The
pessimism of both studies was understandable. The Department of Defenses studythe Annual Report on
the Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China1 was issued by a federal bureaucracy that has an
inherent conflict of interest in developing assessments of foreign military threats. Because the department
that is creating the threat assessments is the same one that is lobbying Congress for money for weapons,
personnel, fuel, and training to combat threats, its threat projections tend to be inflated. Because China,
with an economy that is seemingly growing rapidly, is the rising great power on the horizon that should
shape the future posture of American conventional forces (the brushfire wars needed to combat terrorism
are likely to require only limited forces), the threat from Chinas armed forces is critical for bringing
additional money into the Pentagon. The U.S.-China Security Review Commissions workThe National
Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and Chinadrew at least
partially on the Pentagons effort and was written by antiChina hawks and those with a desire to restrict

modernizing Chinese
military in the context of a more balanced and limited view of U.S. strategic
interests in East Asia. In addition, when the distorting perspectives of both
studies are removedthat is, their focus on recent improvements in Chinese
commerce with China.2 In contrast, this paper attempts to place the

military capabilities rather than on the overall state of the Chinese military
the threat from the Chinese armed forces is shown to be modest. The bonecrushing dominance of the U.S. military remains intact. In fact, the Chinese
military does not look all that impressive when compared even to the
Taiwanese armed forces. Putting the Modernizing Chinese Military in Context Frequently,
improvements in the Chinese military are reported in the world
press without any attention to context. That is, those flows are highlighted but the
stockthe overall state of the Chinese militaryis ignored. The state of the Chinese military and how
rapidly it is likely to improve will be examined in the second half of this paper. But first, additional context
is needed. Pockets of the Chinese military are now modernizing more rapidly than in the past, but
compared to what? Both the modernization and the actual state of the Chinese military must be compared
with those of the U.S. military and other militaries in the East Asian region (especially Taiwans armed
forces). In addition, the geopolitical and strategic environment in which Chinese military modernization is

Western students of the Chinese military often speak

abstractly about when growing Chinese military power will adversely affect
U.S. interests. It is very important to concretely define such interests
because the wider the definition, the more likely even small increments of
additional Chinese military power will threaten them.
occurring needs to be examined.

A2 Dual-use tech
US companies inevitably produce dual use tech with China
regardless of relations which makes their impacts
inevitable- PWC proves
UNZ News 16 [UNZ&CO, Provides Training for International Trade Experts,
Enforcement of U.S. Government Export Control Regulations, 6-20-2016,
https://www.unzco.com/export-enforcement/]-DD
(PWC) pleaded guilty to violating the Arms
Export Control Act and making false statements in connection with its illegal
export to China of U.S.-origin military software used in the development of
Chinas new Z-10 military attack helicopter. PWC, its U.S. parent company United
On June 28, 2012, Pratt Whitney Canada

Technologies Corporation (UTC), and UTCs U.S. subsidiary Hamilton Sundstrand (HSC) agreed to pay $75
million as part of a global settlement with the departments of Justice ($20.7 million) and State ($55 million)
in relation to the violations. $20 million of the penalty can be suspended if UTC applies it to enhance its
compliance program. The high-dollar penalty and the debarment are a direct result of various aggravating

PWC appeared to apply its own favorable interpretation

that its exports were for commercial or dual-use engines that were
used in the Z-10 so they were not subject to the ITAR. PWC also
provided electronic engine control software, made by HSC in the U.S.
and modified for the military helicopter. The government said PWC
took such actions so it could make money, as opposed to it being an
honest misinterpretation of the ITAR. Also, PWC allegedly lied to the
U.S. government many times in its 2006 disclosure to the U.S.
government regarding the violations. While the financial penalties
certainly are a big deal for UTC, HSC and PWC, for the rest of you reading this
factors. First,

article, the key issue is how does the debarment of PWC impact your ability to do business with PWC
involving defense articles controlled by the ITAR? These examples are just a few of the relatively serious
cases that have occurred recently. As you can see from these cases, the violations were not immediately

Cases involving the

illegal export of night vision devices and related technology and the
export of aircraft navigation systems designed for military end use
with a stated end use for civilian aircraft are also well-known
examples. In all of the cases internal compliance controls were
either nonexistent, inadequate, or simply not followed . The end results were
identified but were ultimately found and enforcement actions were taken.

severe penalties as a result of enforcement action by federal law enforcement agencies acting both
individually and jointly.

A2 AI
It takes way too long to even develop AI with the
intelligence of a lizard- no existential threat, the most
dangerous AI we have come up with for a long time to
come just has the capability to clean dirt off of floors
which means no risk of a threat
Brooks 14 [Rodney, PhD in Computer Science from Stanford, artificial
intelligence is a tool, not a threat, 11-10-2014,
http://www.rethinkrobotics.com/blog/artificial-intelligence-tool-threat/]-DD
Recently there has been a spate of articles in the mainstream press, and a spate of high profile people who

speculating about the dangers of malevolent AI being

developed, and how we should be worried about that possibility. I say relax. Chill. This all comes
from some fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of the
undeniable progress that is being made in AI, and from a
misunderstanding of how far we really are from having volitional or
intentional artificially intelligent beings, whether they be deeply
benevolent or malevolent. By the way, this is not a new fear, and weve seen it played out in
are in tech but not AI,

movies for a long time, from 2001: A Space Odyssey, in 1968, Colossus: The Forbin Project in 1970,
through many others, and then I, Robot in 2004. In all cases a computer decided that humans couldnt
be trusted to run things and started murdering them. The computer knew better than the people who built
them, so it started killing them. (Fortunately that doesnt happen with most teenagers, who always know
better than the parents who built them.) I think it is a mistake to be worrying about us developing
malevolent AI anytime in the next few hundred years. I think the worry stems from a fundamental error in
not distinguishing the difference between the very real recent advances in a particular aspect of AI, and
the enormity and complexity of building sentient volitional intelligence. Recent advances in deep machine
learning let us teach our machines things like how to distinguish classes of inputs and to fit curves to time
data. This lets our machines know whether an image is that of a cat or not, or to know what is about to
fail as the temperature increases in a particular sensor inside a jet engine. But this is only part of being
intelligent, and Moores Law applied to this very real technical advance will not by itself bring about human
level or super human level intelligence. While deep learning may come up with a category of things
appearing in videos that correlates with cats, it doesnt help very much at all in knowing what catness is,
as distinct from dogness, nor that those concepts are much more similar to each other than to
salamanderness. And deep learning does not help in giving a machine intent, or any overarching goals or

And it doesnt help a machine explain how it is that it knows

something, or what the implications of the knowledge are, or when that
knowledge might be applicable, or counterfactually what would be the
consequences of that knowledge being false. Malevolent AI would need all
these capabilities, and then some. Both an intent to do something and an
understanding of human goals, motivations, and behaviors would be keys to
being evil towards humans. Michael Jordan, of UC Berkeley, was recently interviewed in IEEE
wants.

Spectrum, where he said some very reasonable, but somewhat dry, academic, things about big data. He
very clearly and carefully laid out why even within the limited domain of machine learning, just one aspect
of intelligence, there are pitfalls as we dont yet have solid science on understanding exactly when and
what classifications are accurate. And he very politely throws cold water on claims of near term full brain
emulation and talks about us being decades or centuries from fully understanding the deep principles of

The Roomba, the floor cleaning robot from my previous company,

iRobot, is perhaps the robot with the most volition and intention of any robots
out there in the world. Most others are working in completely repetitive
environments, or have a human operator providing the second by second
the brain.

volition for what they should do next. When a Roomba has been scheduled to
come out on a daily or weekly basis it operates as an autonomous machine
(except that all models still require a person to empty their bin). It comes out
and cleans the floor on its schedule. The house might have its furniture rearranged since last time, but the Roomba finds its way around, slowing down
when it gets close to obstacles, it senses them before contact, and then
heading away from them, and it detects drops in the floor, such as from a
step or stair with triply redundant methods and avoids falling down. Furthermore
it has a rudimentary understanding of dirt. When its acoustic sensors in its suction system hear dirt
banging around in the air flow, it stops exploring and circles in that area over and over again until the dirt
is gone, or at least until the banging around drops below a pre-defined threshold. But the Roomba does not
connect its sense of understanding to the bigger world. It doesnt know that humans existif it is about to
run into one it makes no distinction between a human and any other obstacle; by contrast dogs and even
sheep understand the special category of humans and have some expectations about them when they
detect them. The Roomba does not. And it certainly has no understanding that humans are related to the
dirt that triggers its acoustic sensor, nor that its real mission is to clean the houses of those humans. It
doesnt know that houses exist. At Rethink Robotics our robot Baxter is a little less intentional than a
Roomba, but more dexterous and more aware of people. A person trains Baxter to do a task, and then that
is what Baxter keeps doing, over and over. But it knows a little bit about the world with just a little
common sense. For instance it knows that if it is moving its arm towards a box to place a part there and for
whatever reason there is no longer something in its hand then there is no point continuing the motion. And
it knows what forces it should feel on its arms as it moves them and is able to react if the forces are
different. It uses that awareness to seat parts in fixtures, and it is aware when it has collided with a person
and knows that it should immediately stop forward motion and back off. But it doesnt have any semantic
connection between a person who is in its way, and a person who trains itthey dont share the same
category in its very limited ontology. OK, so what about connecting an IBM Watson like understanding of
the world to a Roomba or a Baxter? No one is really trying as the technical difficulties are enormous, poorly
understood, and the benefits are not yet known. There is some good work happening on cloud robotics,
connecting the semantic knowledge learned by many robots into a common shared representation. This
means that anything that is learned is quickly shared and becomes useful to all, but while it provides larger
data sets for machine learning it does not lead directly to connecting to the other parts of intelligence
beyond machine learning. It is not like this lack of connection is a new problem. Weve known about it for
decades, and it has long been referred to as the symbol grounding problem. We just havent made much
progress on it, and really there has not been much application demand for it. Doug Lenat has been working
on his Cyc project for twenty years. He and his team have been collecting millions, really, of carefully
crafted logical sentences to describe the world, to describe how concepts in the world are connected, and
to provide an encoding of common sense knowledge that all of us humans pick up during our childhoods.
While it has been a heroic effort it has not led to an AI system being able to master even a simple
understanding of the world. Trying to scale up collection of detailed knowledge a few years ago Pushpinder
Singh, at MIT, decided to try to use the wisdom of the crowds and set up the Open Mind Common Sense
web site, which involved a number of interfaces that ordinary people could use to contribute common
sense knowledge. The interfaces ranged from typing in simple declarative sentences in plain English, to
categorizing shapes of objects. Push developed ways for the system to automatically mine millions of
relationships from this raw data. The knowledge represented by both Cyc and Open Mind has been very
useful for many research projects but researchers are still struggling to use it in game changing ways by AI
systems. Why so many years? As a comparison, consider that we have had winged flying machines for well
over 100 years. But it is only very recently that people like Russ Tedrake at MIT CSAIL have been able to
get them to land on a branch, something that is done by a bird somewhere in the world at least every
microsecond. Was it just Moores law that allowed this to start happening? Not really. It was figuring out the
equations and the problems and the regimes of stall, etc., through mathematical understanding of the
equations. Moores law has helped with MATLAB and other tools, but it has not simply been a matter of
pouring more computation onto flying and having it magically transform. And it has taken a long, long
time. Expecting more computation to just magically get to intentional intelligences, who understand the
world is similarly unlikely. And, there is a further category error that we may be making here. That is the
intellectual shortcut that says computation and brains are the same thing. Maybe, but perhaps not. In the
1930s Turing was inspired by how human computers, the people who did computations for physicists
and ballistics experts alike, followed simple sets of rules while calculating to produce the first models of
abstract computation. In the 1940s McCullough and Pitts at MIT used what was known about neurons and
their axons and dendrites to come up with models of how computation could be implemented in hardware,
with very, very abstract models of those neurons. Brains were the metaphors used to figure out how to do
computation. Over the last 65 years those models have now gotten flipped around and people use

computers as the metaphor for brains. So much so that enormous resources are being devoted to whole
brain simulations. I say show me a simulation of the brain of a simple worm that produces all its
behaviors, and then I might start to believe that jumping to the big kahuna of simulating the cerebral

And then only if

we are extremely lucky. In order for there to be a successful volitional AI,
especially one that could be successfully malevolent, it would need a direct
understanding of the world, it would need to have the dexterous hands
and/or other tools that could out manipulate people, and to have a deep
understanding of humans in order to outwit them. Each of these requires
much harder innovations than a winged vehicle landing on a tree branch. It is
going to take a lot of deep thought and hard work from thousands of
scientists and engineers. And, most likely, centuries . The science is in and accepted on
cortex of a human has any chance at all of being successful in the next 50 years.

the world being round, evolution, climate change, and on the safety of vaccinations. The science on AI has
hardly yet been started, and even its time scale is completely an open question. Just how open the
question of time scale for when we will have human level AI is highlighted by a recent report by Stuart
Armstrong and Kaj Sotala, of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, an organization that itself has
researchers worrying about evil AI. But in this more sober report, the authors analyze 95 predictions made
between 1950 and the present on when human level AI will come about. They show that there is no
difference between predictions made by experts and non-experts. And they also show that over that 60
year time frame there is a strong bias towards predicting the arrival of human level AI as between 15 and
25 years from the time the prediction was made. To me that says that no one knows, they just guess, and

If we are
spectacularly lucky well have AI over the next thirty years with the
intentionality of a lizard, and robots using that AI will be useful
tools. And they probably wont really be aware of us in any serious
way. Worrying about AI that will be intentionally evil to us is pure
fear mongering. And an immense waste of time. Lets get on with
inventing better and smarter AI. It is going to take a long time, but
there will be rewards at every step along the way. Robots will
become abundant in our homes, stores, farms, offices, hospitals, and
all our work places. Like our current day hand-held devices we wont
know how we lived without them.
historically so far most predictions have been outright wrong! I say relax everybody.

***U.S.China war***

Relations Good

Relations good U.S.China mod***

Misperceptions cause nuclear war between the United
States and China communication and coop solve.
Peter Symonds, 5/30/2016, THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN
THE US AND CHINA, World Socialist Website,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/05/30/pers-m30.html
An arms race is underway that finds its most acute expression in the arena of
nuclear weaponry, delivery systems and associated technologies. Determined
to maintain its supremacy in Asia and globally, the US is planning to spend $1
trillion over the next three decades to develop a broader range of
sophisticated nuclear weapons and means for delivering them to their
targets. The unstated aim of the Pentagon is to secure nuclear primacythat
is, the means for obliterating Chinas nuclear arsenal and thus its ability to
mount a counter attack. The Chinese response, which is just as reactionary, is
to ensure it retains the ability to strike back in a manner that would kill tens
of millions in the United States. The reality of these dangers was underscored
last week by the release of a report by the US-based Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS). It chillingly warned: Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a
year, the governments of the United States and the Peoples Republic of
China are a few poor decisions away from starting a war that could escalate
rapidly and end in a nuclear exchange. Mismatched perceptions increase both
the possibility of war and the likelihood it will result in the use of nuclear
weapons. Miscommunication or misunderstanding could spark a conflict that
both governments may find difficult to stop.

Relations good U.S. China war

Relations key to prevent US-China war- resolving distrust
solves
Lieberthal and Wang 12
(Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Kenneth Lieberthal is Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the
John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Wang Jisi is
Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the
School of International Studies at Peking University March 2012 Addressing
U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph
Series Number4, pg 1-3, HY)
The above analysis is both candid and sobering. It does not bode well for the long-term ability of the U.S.
and China to maximize cooperation for mutual benefit. Looking to the future , it is possible that growth in
strategic distrust cannot be avoided and that the two countries can, at best, strive to develop means to
limit the resulting damage to their respective interests .

Both sides should prepare to do this

if efforts to reduce strategic distrust prove ineffective. But such efforts are
vitally necessary. In the context of growing strategic distrust, an accident
could trigger a devastating political or military crisis between China and the
United States. The enemy image about each other could be easily invoked in
the populations, as was exemplified in China after the NATO bombing of
Chinas embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the collision between an American
spy plane and a Chinese air fighter in 2001 . Even more important, strategic distrust
can produce, over time, a self-fulfilling prophecy of antagonistic relations that are
basically zero sum on both sides, to the severe detriment of all concerned. It is, therefore, worth
considering the very difficult issue of how to address strategic distrust with
the goal of reducing it over time. During 2012, leaders in China and the United States are
rightly concentrating on their domestic priorities. They have good reason to believe that they have so far
managed the complicated and sometimes difficult U.S.-China relationship rather successfully. Indeed, the
top leaders have met frequently in bilateral and multilateral settings, and have been working through
official channels like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue to improve broad mutual understanding and
cooperation. This is a presidential election year in the U.S. and a year of leadership transition in China. It is
unlikely to be a time for significant new initiatives by either side barring some unanticipated major event

For the longer term, though, both sides need to think in

terms of initiatives that can significantly alter the current narratives that
enhance strategic distrust. Building strategic trust will be difficult because the sources of distrust
that requires fresh efforts.

are deep, multifaceted, and not well understood by either side. The above narratives seek to make these
sources and the related mindsets clearer. We make the following recommendations to illustrate the types

constructive thinking about the long-term

U.S.-China relationship. To be successful, such initiatives should focus on increasing
mutual understanding on key issues and on taking steps that challenge
conventional assumptions that are integral to the narratives of strategic
distrust on each side. The coauthors recognize that many of the following suggestions will be
of new initiatives that might encourage more

controversial in either or both countries, and even we do not necessarily agree with each other on the
details of each of them. We therefore do not put them forward as a specific action program. Rather, we are
providing these ideas in the spirit of illustrating the types of actions in various spheres that may be
necessary to move thinking in both countries beyond the narratives of strategic distrust laid out above.

The possibility of an arms race between the US and China

is only increasing as a result of the squo.
Peter Symonds, 5/31/16, CHINA PREPARES TO SEND NUCLEAR
SUBMARINES INTO PACIFIC OCEAN, World Socialist Website,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/05/31/chin-m31.html
An article last week in the British-based Guardian reported that the Chinese
military is poised to send submarines armed with nuclear missiles into the
Pacific Ocean for the first time, arguing that new US weapons systems have
so undermined Beijings existing deterrent force that it has been left with no
alternative. While the timing is uncertain, the move ups the ante in an
intensifying nuclear arms race between the US and China that heightens the
risk of war. Since coming to office, the Obama administration has engaged in
a military build-up and strengthening of alliances throughout Asia in
preparation for war with China. It has committed more than $1 trillion over 30
years to the upgrading and expansion of the US nuclear arsenal and delivery
systems.

US engagement with China reduces the possibilities of

conflict between the two countries.
Joshua Eisenman, assistant professor at the University of Texas at Austin's
Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs and senior fellow for China
studies at the American Foreign Policy Council, 1/21/16, RETHINKING U.S.
STRATEGY TOWARDS CHINA, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International
Affairs,
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756
How can the U.S. improve its policy towards China to avoid, and yet be
prepared for, conflict? Since the Nixon Administration, the U.S. strategy
towards China has been predicated on the assumption that if the bilateral
relationship is properly managed conflict can be avoided. Many contend that
through engagement the U.S. can shape China's choices in ways that reduce
the chances the U.S. and China will come into conflict . Whether a conflict
occurs, the argument goes, depends on whether China is dissatisfied with the
prevailing international order, because as James Steinberg and Michael
O'Hanlon have written: "only if it believes that it is disadvantaged will China
necessarily choose to use its newfound power to create a world more to its
own liking in potentially disruptive ways. Jeffery Bader, who served as a top
White House official in the first Obama administration, agrees that China
could play a more constructive role than it would by sitting outside of that
system. So the prevailing wisdom holds and the thinking behind
engagement goes, if China participates extensively in the international
system, then it will help create a system it likes and not become revisionist.

Defense

A2 cooperation relations fail

US-China relations dont prompt increased cooperation
Tiankai 5-8
(Cui Tiankai, Ambassador of the Peoples Republic of China to the United States, May 8, 2016,
Brookings U.S.-China Leadership Forum, Making the Right Choices China-U.S. Relations at a
Critical Point, pg.1 HY)
It is a real pleasure to come to Sunnylands again. There is no better place in America to host this forum. Three years ago next month, our
leaders, President Xi and President Obama, had their first presidential meeting here. It was the beginning of a new model of presidential
dialogue, one with less formality and fewer aides but greater candor and a clearer focus on issues of strategic importance. Such top-level
communication has now become a prominent feature of our relationship, from Sunnylands to Yingtai, from the Blair House to the recent
Nuclear Security Summit. It has enabled our leaders to build up a good mutual understanding not only of priorities and policies, but also of
each other as people. Thanks to the strong guidance of our two presidents and the joint efforts of both sides, the China-U.S. relationship in the

Today, our
bilateral cooperation is more extensive and comprehensive than what is
usually reported in the media. The relationship is stronger and more resilient
than many people have realized. At the same time, this relationship now seems to be more difficult to manage than
ever before. While our cooperation is expanding and deepening, our differences
stand out more and more. While there is growing evidence that our two countries are
increasingly connected to each other, there are also mounting worries that
we might eventually clash. This is, I believe, partly because of the inherent
complexities of the relationship, and partly because fundamental changes in the
global political and economic structure have made these complexities even
more complicated and have magnified their impact.
last three years has withstood one test after another and has by and large moved forward on a positive and stable track.

***Russia***

Relations Good

Relations good solve China-Russia alliance

China and Russia are expanding aggressively now

because relations are framed as zero sum, but the US can
reign in China through cooperation and improved
relations- previous negotiations prove.
Ratner and Wright 14 [Ely and Thomas, senior fellor of Asia-Pacific
Security Program @ Center for a New American Security AND fellow director
of Project on International Order and Strategy @ Brookings Institutions, How
the United States can counter the ambitions of Russia and China, 11-212014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-america-can-counterthe-rise-of-russia-and-china/2014/11/21/f9bfabd0-5949-11e4-8264deed989ae9a2_story.html]-DD
Since the fall of the Soviet Union,

U.S. foreign policy has assumed that major powers

largely share common interests and threats or that they will over time, as
emerging powers integrate into the global economy. As a result, policymakers
have regarded Asia and Europe as stable and self-sustaining regions relative
to the scourge of dictatorship, failed states and transnational threats in the
Middle East. But the great lesson so far this century is that the U.S.-led order
is neither as universally accepted nor as binding as many in Washington have
assumed. After the global financial crisis threw American leadership into question, Russia and
China have increasingly engaged in actions that reflect an attitude
of zero-sum competition with the United States. With a mix of hubris and
historical grievance, both are redrawing their regions maps by grabbing new territory and bullying their
neighbors with calibrated exercises of coercion and force. In Europe, Russia annexed Crimea in the first
instance of European irredentism since World War II and invaded eastern Ukraine. The Baltic states are

China has deftly

pulled economic, legal and military levers to advance its expansive
maritime claims in the South China Sea, and it has worked to erode
U.S. alliances by driving wedges between Japan and South Korea
while cozying up to other U.S. allies such as Thailand . The Economist recently
rightly worried that Vladimir Putin may test NATOs security commitment. In Asia,

suggested that fortunately, there is scant evidence to support the idea of a global Chinese effort to upend
the international order. But this should provide little comfort. Historically, most revisionism has begun
regionally including Russia in the 19th and 20th centuries, and even Nazi Germany and imperial Japan in
the 1930s. Global consequences came later. Rising powers usually care more about their neighborhoods

there is little solace in arguing that Russian and

Chinese revisionism is self-defeating in the long run. From this perspective,
the United States should be heartened that Putins Russia is in economic and
demographic decline and that Chinas assertiveness is merely tightening the
coalition against it as Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam all
seek closer military ties with the United States and one another . But even if
such trends continue, isolated and anxious powers can be just as
troublesome as confident ones precisely because they believe
time is not on their side. It doesnt matter that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping may be
than far-away continents. Moreover,

pursuing bad grand strategies: The costs of their mistakes will reverberate well beyond their borders, just
as the world often paid a price for the follies of revisionists past. The good news is that, unlike Putins
Russia, China is not committed or destined to a revisionist path. President Obamas trip to Beijing this

it is possible to steer the relationship with China

toward a more stable course but it required the full attention of
the U.S. government, including months of negotiations and shuttle
diplomacy by Secretary of State John Kerry and national security
adviser Susan Rice. This is all the more reason Washington can ill afford another decade
month demonstrated that

narrowly focused on battling insurgents and refereeing sectarian and tribal feuds in the Muslim world.

Preventing the rise of revisionism will require different military, diplomatic

and economic tools than those honed over 13 years of war and nationbuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia and China present distinct
challenges. Russia is a declining power focused on the acquisition of land on a continent that has left
nationalism behind. China is a rising power focused on expanding its maritime territory in a regional
cauldron of nationalist sentiments. But in both cases the United States will have to focus its policies on
maintaining peaceful competition. Obamas playbook in China was right: Seek to expand areas of
cooperation such as climate change and trade while pursuing military and diplomatic means to

But equally important will be committing resources to

develop new military and economic approaches that better deter and punish
revisionist moves. Sanctions have been the weapon of choice against Russia
but have not succeeded in altering Putins ambitions. In addition to designing
more sophisticated economic instruments, the United States must also
rethink its approach to military deterrence including tailoring responses to low-level
prevent and manage crises.

provocations in the South and East China seas, providing assistance to non-allied governments such as
Ukraine and Vietnam if they are excessively coerced, and shoring up U.S. alliances for tests that are surely
coming, including deploying NATO troops to the Baltic states and repositioning forces in the Pacific.
Complementing these military relationships, Washington should regard conclusion of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership and its sister trade agreement in Europe as top priorities in order to renew U.S. economic
leadership. Finally, rising to the revisionist challenge will require a degree of national strength that can be
sustained only through a thriving economy, a powerful military, and a government and society that are
admired by much of the world. This places a premium on improving domestic governance; leveraging
Americas advantages in technology, immigration and energy; and enacting sustainable fiscal policies on

The preservation of vital American interests in Asia and

Europe is no longer guaranteed if the United States buries its head in the
sands of the Middle East.
revenue and entitlements.

***Regional stability***

Relations Good

Relations good ASEAN mod***

Positive relations between the U.S. and China is key to

ASEAN solidarity
Greg Earl, Financial Affairs editor, June 19, 2016, Kishore Mahbubani
says US-China tension could split southeast Asia Australian Financial
Review, http://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/kishore-mahbubani-saysuschina-tension-could-split-southeast-asia-20160618-gpmh25
We are now moving into an era where

competition between the United States and China

will step up in the decades to come and when it does ASEAN and to some extent Australia could also be
torn apart in this competition," Professor Mahbubani said, ahead of a major lecture in Canberra on Tuesday. "Clearly all
the ASEAN countries want to be friends with the US and they want to be friends
with China, they don't want to choose but events might arise which force them to
choose." Even in a worst-case scenario they won't formally break up for five to 10 years but there could be paralysis
and inefficiency before that." Professor Mahbubani said this would have profound implications for Australia because it had
benefited from the stability provided by peace in southeast Asia and a steady relationship with ASEAN. "Let's say

in the

worst-case scenario ASEAN breaks apart, among the biggest losers will be Australia. Australia
actually should have been living in an uncomfortable geopolitical neighbourhood but the success of ASEAN
and the calm that ASEAN has created has been a geopolitical gift to Australia.

A2 China kicks USA out

China does not mind American involvement in ASEAN
Xinhua News Agency, February 17, 2016, U.S.-ASEAN relationship
should benefit regional peace: FM spokesman, Xinhua News,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/17/c_135106984.htm
China said on Wednesday that the development of relationship between the
United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN) should
be conducive to regional stability and development. Foreign Ministry spokesman
Hong Lei made the remarks when asked to comment on a gathering between
U.S. President Barack Obama and leaders of Southeast Asian countries on
Monday and Tuesday. In a joint statement issued after the meeting, the two sides
shared a commitment to "maintain peace, security and stability in the region,
ensuring maritime security and safety, including the rights of freedom of
navigation and overflight." "We have taken note of the attempt by some country
to use the summit to stir up the South China Sea issue, but most of ASEAN
members did not agree, because such a move will not only damage trust among
countries in the region, but will interfere with their efforts in safeguarding the
peace and stability in the South China Sea," said Hong at a routine press
briefing.

Relations Bad

Relations bad ASEAN mod***

US-China Relations increase cultural and economic tensions via
ASEAN
Adam Wade Matteson, Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Professors of
Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy,The ASEAN Split: Why Southeast
Asian Nations Are Being Divided by China and the United States,
Shanghai Jiaotong University, January 8, 2014,
file:///C:/Users/KLu/Downloads/The_ASEAN_Split_Why_Southeast_Asian_
Nati.pdf
One might be tempted to believe that ASEAN countries would be more likely to bandwagon with China, and
less likely to align strategically with the U.S. After all, ASEAN countries seem more similar to China
culturally, the countries share a region and borders in some cases, and there is a large population of
overseas Chinese living in ASEAN countries. However, these observations do not necessarily lead to
peaceful China-ASEAN relations. On closer inspection there are more cultural, geographic, and
demographic differences than there are commonalities. One might be tempted to juxtaposition ChinaASEAN relations with U.S.-Europe relations. It would seem logical ASEAN, a group of neighboring countries,
might choose to align with China, their Eastern power, just as the Western powers have aligned with each

cultural differences between China and ASEAN countries, as

well as the differences between individual ASEAN countries, should not
be underestimated. Their complex histories notwithstanding, modern
policies on human rights and democracy make it hard to find
similarities. It might also be tempting to argue that ASEAN countries hold a grudge
to either the U.S. or China due to previous historical conflicts. Though
this may be the case in Sino-Japanese relations, it does not necessarily hold true
other. But the

here. If it did, Vietnam would not be so willing to accept John Kerry, a purple-heart winning Vietnam War
veteran and current U.S. Secretary of State, back into the country with open arms. (Johnson 2013) (U.S.

The distances between individual ASEAN countries

make it difficult for them to integrate. The ten different nations are
spread out between the Indian and Pacific Oceans; furthermore many
are made up of poor populations who have little contact with foreign
countries. Buddhism, Islam and Christianity all play important roles in the countries, some of whom
have had wars with each other. (CIA World Factbook n.d.) A large percentage of the
population of many Southeast Asian countries is made up of overseas
Chinese and ethnic Chinese account for. This bamboo network is
responsible for controlling large parts of industries such as
manufacturing, banking, transportation, retail and construction. Many start
Department of State n.d.)

out as family-run businesses with capital coming from mainland China, Hong Kong or Taiwan, and are built

this diaspora of does not necessarily

lead to better China-ASEAN relations. In fact, key ASEAN industries
being controlled by Chinese investment can often lead to resentment.
up into dominant enterprises. (Quinlan 2007) But

As one observer put it, while overseas Chinese may be well endowed financially, their considerable wealth

often evokes unwanted attention and jealousy. As it is, overseas Chinese are frequently the target of envy

Instead of being a boon, wealth paradoxically became the bane

of overseas Chinese in their respective countries. It is only after an arduous
and scorn.

process of nation-building that overseas Chinese are integrated with the local community. (Beng 2002)

ASEAN internal meltdown escalates alliance structure

Robert Farley, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce, June 9, 2014, Asia's Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War,
The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-chinawar-10621?page=show
This has changed. The

expansion of Chinese interests and capabilities means that we

can envision several different scenarios in which direct military conflict between
China and the United States might begin. These still include a Taiwan scenario and North Korea
scenario, but now also involve disputes in the East and South China Seas, as well
as potential conflict with India along the Tibetan border. The underlying factors are the growth
of Chinese power, Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance commitments to a
variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure. Whatever the trigger, the war
does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. Although the US
military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets before they can target US planes, bases, and
ships, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay the political costs
associated with climbing the ladder of escalation. Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow.
This doesnt necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for Chinese missiles to
rain down upon them, but the United States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese intent to
escalate to high-intensity, conventional military combat before it can begin engaging Chinese forces. If the history of World
War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike,
or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a bolt from the blue strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing
crisis will steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate
to Beijing that Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting
deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment,
China will need to decide whether to push forward or back down. On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both
press for sanctions (the US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as
those of any co-belligerents. This will begin the economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the
rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe
bottlenecks in industrial production. How do the Allies Respond Whether US allies support American efforts against
China depends on how the war begins. If war breaks out over a collapse of the DPRK, the United States can likely count
on the support of South Korea and Japan. Any war stemming from disputes in the East China Sea will necessarily involve
Japan.

If events in the South China Sea lead to war, the US can probably rely on
some of the ASEAN states, as well as possibly Japan. [and] Australia may also
support the US over a wide range of potential circumstances. China faces a less
complicated situation with respect to allies. Beijing could probably expect benevolent neutrality, including shipments of
arms and spares, from Russia, but little more. The primary challenge for Chinese diplomats would be establishing and
maintaining the neutrality of potential US allies. This would involve an exceedingly complex dance, including reassurances
about Chinese long-term intentions, as well as displays of confidence about the prospects of Chinese victory (which would
carry the implicit threat of retribution for support of the United States). North Korea presents an even more difficult
problem. Any intervention on the part of the DPRK runs the risk of triggering Japanese and South Korean counterintervention, and that math doesnt work out for China. Unless Beijing is certain that Seoul and Tokyo will both throw in for
the United States (a doubtful prospect given their hostility to one another), it may spend more time restraining Pyongyang
than pushing it into the conflict. The PLA will pursue these ends: 1. Achieve the affirmative expeditionary purpose. 2.
Destroy as much of the expeditionary capability of the USAF and USN as possible. 3. Hurt America badly enough that
future US governments will not contemplate intervention. 4. Disrupt the US-led alliance system in East Asia. The first task
requires the deployment of PLAN surface forces, possibly in combination with PLAAF airborne forces, to seize an

objective. The second involves the use of submarines, aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles to destroy US and
allied installations and warships across East Asia. The third and fourth tasks rest upon the second. The PLA will attempt to
inflict sufficient casualties on US forces that future US decision-makers will hesitate to use force against the PRC.
Similarly, the survival of the US-led alliance system requires that the United States successfully defeat Chinese
aggression; if it cannot, the alliance system could deteriorate and collapse. The United States hasnt lost a fighter in action
since the 1999 Kosovo War, and hasnt lost a major warship since World War II. The sinking of a warship would likely also
result in the greatest loss of life of any single action for the US military in action since the Vietnam War. However, both US
and Chinese strategists may overestimate US casualty aversion. The loss of a major warship and its crew might serve to
solidify US commitment (at least in the short term) rather than undermine it. The Hold Your Breath Moments The
biggest moment will come when

the PLA makes an overt attack against a US aircraft

carrier. This represents the most significant possible escalation against the
United States short of a nuclear attack. If China decides to attack a US carrier, the war no
longer involves posturing and message sending, but rather a full-scale commitment of
capabilities designed to defeat and destroy enemy military forces. The means for this attack matters.
An attack launched from a ship or a submarine makes any PLAN military vessel fair game for the United States, but
doesnt necessarily incur US attacks against PLAAF airbases, Second Artillery missile installations, or even naval
installations. The most dangerous form of attack would involve a ballistic missile volley against a carrier. This is true not
simply because these missiles are difficult to intercept, but also because such missiles could carry nuclear warheads.

The prospect of a nuclear state using a conventional ballistic missile against

another nuclear state, especially one with a presumptive nuclear advantage, is
laden with complexity.

Relations bad ASEAN

US intervention is viewed as unwelcome.
Mark Landler, White House correspondent, July 23, 2010 Offering to
Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html
Opening a new source of potential friction with China, the Obama
administration said Friday that it would step into a tangled dispute
between China and its smaller Asian neighbors over a string of strategically
significant islands in the South China Sea. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,
speaking at an Asian regional security meeting in Vietnam, stressed that the United States remained
neutral on which regional countries had stronger territorial claims to the islands. But she said that the
United States had an interest in preserving free shipping in the area and that it would be willing to

Though presented as an offer to help ease

tensions, the stance amounts to a sharp rebuke to China. Beijing has
insisted for years that all the islands belong to China and that any
disputes should be resolved by China. In March, senior Chinese officials
pointedly warned their American counterparts that they would brook
no interference in the South China Sea, which they called part of the
core interest of sovereignty.
facilitate multilateral talks on the issue.

Intervention of any kind undermines state sovereignty, no

matter the form it takes
Stuenkel 13 [(Oliver, School of Social Science (CPDOC) of Fundao Getulio
Vargas (FGV) in So Paulo, Brazil) Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy
Promotion: the case of Brazil and India Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2,
2013, pp 339355
Emphasizing the legality aspect of sovereign right, many thinkers are also critical of the practice, pointing

Foreign
intervention of any kind, even benevolent advice, is thus generally
considered an inappropriate intrusion into anothers domestic affairs,
something democracy promoters often overlook, as they are seduced
by a notion of unity of goodness, according to which responsible institutions and all
other desirable things flow from democracy.18 In addition, excluding non-democratic
regimes, e.g. by launching the idea of a League of Democracies,
creates an insider vs. outsider dynamic that sows mistrust and
possibly even conflict, reducing the space for dialogue. Concerns about the
internal character of regimes may provoke resistance and endanger world order.19 Accordingly, US
foreign policy during the Cold War reflected American policy makers
out that it invariably violates another countrys sovereignty and self-determination.17

conviction that it was safer to ally oneself with elites one could trust
rather than the masses whom one could not.

Relations bad Asia instability

US-China alliance will increase tensions with East Asian
allies who rely on US to deter China
Lohaus 16 (Phillip Lohaus, former Department of Defense analyst, currently
a research fellow with the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the
American Enterprise Institute. June 9, 2016. China Plays By Its Own Rules,
US NEWS, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-06-09/chinasactions-require-more-us-cooperation-with-pacific-allies)
Every year, the top decision-makers of the international security world and
those who follow them meet for the Shangri-La Dialogue , named after the Singapore hotel at
which the conference is typically held, to discuss Asian security issues. These dialogues are usually genteel
and formal, the kind of meeting where one is more likely to hear bromides than to exchange barbs. But this
year's conference was different. China's increased assertiveness especially in the waters of
the South China Sea, through which $1.2 trillion of American trade flows, and the East China Sea, which
borders Japan and Taiwan was at the forefront of everyone's mind. Fortunately, recent
developments in Asian capitals have created an opportunity for the U.S. to take a lead on constraining
China's advances, but whether the U.S. government is up to the task remains to be seen. Why is China's
behavior a concern? China has been improving its strategic position for decades. It's hardly news that
China's tolerance for risk has correspondingly increased, and that its military has modernized at an
alarming clip. For years, many chose to look past these facts, hoping that as China rose, it would behave in
ways that were in line with the rules-based international order. But its recent activities suggest that it is
more interested in playing by its own rules. Beijing likely rejects the American position, for example, that
the Law of Armed Conflict should be applied to cyberspace, and recently reorganized its military to better
compete in this realm. Through its openly published "three warfares" strategy, it has pursued activities
aimed at wearing down the populations of its adversaries, at manipulating information to suit its interests
and at exploiting loopholes in international law for its own advantage. Actions such as the building of
artificial islands in the South China Sea or the unilateral declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in
the East China Sea in 2013 are just parts of an incremental strategy to expand control. America's response
to Chinese provocations has been insufficient. Although the "pivot to Asia" is commonly thought of as a
tool to create a counterbalance to Chinese power in the region, the administration's public position toward
China has been one of increased cooperation. The implementation of "the pivot" has hardly curtailed
Chinese aggression; if anything, its anemic implementation may have worsened the situation. The
declining readiness of America's navy and the reduction of its regional maritime presence to "photo ops"
signaled to Beijing that a window of opportunity had opened for it to assert its ambitions more quickly and
with more aplomb. Deterring China from acting counter to U.S. interests will take more than a "pivot," it
will take persistence and presence, in the maritime domain, yes, but also in the realms of information,
cyber and space. But because deterring China is also in the interest of the nations that surround it,

and now is a particularly auspicious time for

the U.S. to deepen cooperation with its Pacific allies and partners. Take Japan. In
America won't have to deter China alone,

addition to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's internal reforms to Japan's national security infrastructure, such as
establishing a National Security Council to coordinate responses to threats, his government recently
implemented an initiative that expands Japan's ability to cooperate with the U.S. and other allies on
defense issues. In 2014, Japan overturned a ban on defense exports, which makes available one more tool
to cement relations between Japan and countries that share a similar outlook on security issues.

cooperation guidelines between the U.S. and

Japan specifically call for enhanced cooperation on a number of issues,
including in the realms of cyberspace and outer space, where Chinese actions
have been of particular concern. Or take Taiwan. Former President Ma Ying-jeou sought to
Furthermore, the recently revised security

expand economic ties to mainland China, and made history by meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in

President Tsai Ing-wen, from the pro-independence

Democratic Progressive Party, has cooled relations between the two capitals . Tsai
has already shown that she is far less risk-averse than her predecessors when
January of this year. But the recent election of

it comes to relations with the mainland, marking an opportunity for the U.S.
to expand its ties with Taipei. Expanding military-to-military cooperation with Taiwan will better
deter China from launching an attack against the island, which the U.S. is bound by treaty to defend .
Allies in other parts of Asia are also increasingly willing to work together and
with the U.S. to curtail the Chinese threat. The Philippines recently agreed to
allow U.S. troops to position there on a rotational basis, for example, and the
recent souring of relations between South Korea and China, coupled with the
rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo on the "comfort women" issue, signals an opportunity
for enhanced trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea and the
United States. As evidenced by the recent lifting of a decades-old weapons embargo, the U.S. is in the
process of turning Vietnam, a prior enemy, into a security partner, and further to the south, America's
staunch ally, Singapore, is increasing its cooperation with another U.S. ally, Australia.

A2 ASEAN good impacts

Only US alliances can solve- organizations like ASEAN and
EAS trade off with superior channels of influence
KINU-ASPI 14 [Korean Institute for National Unification Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, Proceeding and Outcomes Statement, 8-26-2014,
https://www.aspi.org.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/29177/2nd-KINU-ASPIoutcomes.pdf]-DD
the power
transition between the US and China is one of the key issues shaping the
future of Asia-Pacific regional order. He pointed out that security alliances
with the US and territorial disputes with China are key factors influencing the
foreign policies of Asia-Pacific states. Dr. Jung categorised Asia-Pacific states into four groups:
Dr. Sung Chul Jung from the Korean delegation opened the dialogue by stating that

core American allies, American friends, non-aligned countries and Chinese partners. Each group of states
takes a different approach towards the power transition between the US and China. On the future of the

the US still maintains its superior military

position over China. This balance of power remains even when allies and
partners are considered. Dr. Benjamin Schreer from the Australian delegation analysed four
Asia-Pacific region, Dr. Jung added that

models of the future security order in the Asia-Pacific: 1) continued US hegemony despite a relative
decline; 2) a US-China strategic condominium; 3) power-balancing between multiple actors in a concert of

as middle
powers, South Korea and Australia needed to readjust their strategies for the
emerging strategic dynamics which includes building up their capabilities,
expanding defence ties with the US and/or other powers bilaterally or
trilaterally, bilateral engagement with China, and multilateral regional
security 7 26 August 2014 Mr. Brigadier Peter Clay, Mr. John Langtry and Dr. Benjamin Schreer (Left to
powers; and 4) power-dilution through increased multilateralism. Dr. Schreer suggested that

Right) engagement. As US allies, South Korea and Australia needed to assume greater responsibility for
their own security and wider maritime security. In turn, this could provide opportunities to enhance South
Korea-Australia security and defence cooperation. In the proceeding discussion, the effectiveness of

Many participants viewed

regional multilateral organisations such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) as
not showing noticeable progress in resolving crises or tensions,
especially territorial disputes in South China and East China Sea.
Rather, it was noted that bilateral or trilateral ties are more efficient
mechanisms and draw countries with similar objectives closer.
However, some argued that while multilateral organisations have
limitations, their influence will expand in the long term due to
stronger bilateral and trilateral relations.
multilateralism and Chinas economic influence were key issues.

***Prolif***

Relations Good

Relations good prolif solvency

Increase relations solve prolif and Chinese nuclear reactor

export
Holt and Nikitin 15
(Mark Holt, Specialist in Energy Policy, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in
Nonproliferation, May 6, 2015, Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, pg.4-6, HY)

Chinas plans to export nuclear power plants based on Westinghouse technology have raised a
number of concerns. A key question is the level of U.S. control that would continue to be exercised
over the export of reactors based on U.S. designs and the use of nuclear
materials produced by those reactors. The potential for Chinese dominance of
the world nuclear power market with U.S. help is also an issue . A related area of concern is
the extent to which U.S. nuclear power technology could be transferred to the Chinese naval reactor program, particularly the unique sealed
pumps used by the AP1000. According to Baker Donelson, the Westinghouse technology transfer agreement for the AP1000 reactor grants the
Chinese only a nonexclusive license to use that technology in China, with Westinghouse retaining all its intellectual property rights. The
agreement allows the Chinese to modify the AP1000 design but they cannot export such variants unless they do so with Westinghouse under

Westinghouse agreement does give China the right to

export a large passive plant, essentially a larger version of the AP1000. Such plants could be sold to any country
a marketing alliance. However, the

except the United States and Japan, subject to U.S. export control laws, according to Baker Donelson. Westinghouse would have the right to
participate in such export projects to the extent that they incorporated AP1000 technology. If China did not include Westinghouse in such

China is currently
developing a large passive plant, as envisioned by the Westinghouse
agreement. The first of these reactors, called the CAP1400, is to begin construction in China in 2015, with exports planned to
follow.20 Aggressive Chinese exports of nuclear technology, particularly to
countries that do not currently have nuclear power, could pose proliferation
risks, as noted above. Chinas policies for ensuring that countries that import its
reactors are fully compliant with international safeguards will be of particular
concern. Moreover, even fully safeguarded nuclear power programs could raise
U.S. concerns if they create a perceived need to develop fuel cycle facilities
such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing plants, which can be
used to produce nuclear weapons material. Without Westinghouses
advanced reactor technology, China was not generally believed to have a
reactor that could compete in world markets. Therefore, the AP1000 technology transfer appears to be
exports, then Westinghouse would have to be compensated for any of its technology that was used.19

crucial to Chinas planned nuclear export program.21 Transfers of nuclear technology to a foreign country require authorization by the
Secretary of Energy under 10 C.F.R. Part 810. Such Part 810 authorizations must be based on assurances from the recipient government that
the technology will be used for peaceful purposes only and will not be retransferred without approval of the supplying country, as explained by
this statement from Export.gov website: Government-to-government assurances obtained by either the Department of State or the
Department of Energy are required for the 810 approval and 110 licensing process. The assurances for 810 approvals affirm that the recipient
government pledges to use the acquired technology exclusively for peaceful purposes and will not re-transfer it to another country without the
consent of the supplier-country government.22 As discussed above, the Agreed Minute to the 123 Agreement prohibits China or the United
States from retransferring any technology received from the other country to a third country without the agreement of the country that
originally provided the technology. It goes on to specify: Prior to any such transfer of items, technology, or information subject to this
Agreement, the Parties shall by mutual agreement define the conditions (transfer conditions) in accordance with which such items,
technology, or information may be transferred to the jurisdiction of a third country or destination beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
transferring Party. Any transfer to which the non-transferring Party consents in writing shall be subject to the transfer conditions agreed to by
the Parties.23 Increased

reasons to

nuclear safety and reduced carbon emissions have been cited as

U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement.

support the extension of the

US-China cooperation key to solve global issues like prolif

and climate change
Lieberthal and Wang 12
(Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Kenneth Lieberthal is Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the
John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Wang Jisi is
Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the
School of International Studies at Peking University March 2012 Addressing
U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph
Series Number4, pg 1-3, HY)

The U.S. and China have a wide-ranging, deep and relatively mature
relationship. The presidents of both countries have repeatedly indicated the
value of developing a cooperative relationship for the future. Both sides have
a pragmatic awareness of the issues on which they disagree, and both
appreciate the importance of not permitting those specific disagreements to
prevent cooperation on major issues where cooperation can be mutually
beneficial. In addition, the leaders and top working-level officials on both
sides have gained substantial experience in dealing with each other and, in
many cases, have come to know each other fairly well.1 The above are
promising dimensions of U.S.-China relations and should bode well for the
future. There is no more important bilateral relationship, and thus its future
direction is of enormous importance to each country, the region, and the
world. For regional and global issues such as nonproliferation and
climate change, active U.S.-China cooperation or at least parallel
actions makes issues more manageable; having the U.S. and China
work at cross purposes makes those issues more difficult, or even
impossible, to manage. Despite both sides tacit agreement on the above,
there are grounds for deep concern about the future. As of early 2012 the
U.S. has withdrawn its forces from Iraq and is on schedule to draw down its
involvement in the Afghan conflict, and Washington is rebalancing its policy in
the direction of Asia and the Pacific. This shift reflects President Obamas
basic perspective, as Americas self-described first Pacific president, that
because Asia is the most important region of the world for the future
of the United States, it is vitally important that America maintain and
enhance its leadership role there. In November 2011 the Obama
Administration publically committed to devote the necessary resources to
sustain this leadership role in Asia, even as its domestic fiscal challenges
threaten substantial cuts in the overall defense budget and make funding of
major overseas commitments potentially more controversial at home.2 China
is expanding its roles in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2000, virtually
every Asian country, as well as Australia, has shifted from having the U.S. as
its largest trade partner to having China as its largest trade partner. Most of
these countries have also invested directly in Chinas economy. In short,
almost every Asian country now builds continued participation in Chinas
economic growth into its own strategy for future prosperity. Although Chinas

economic and political interests are increasingly reaching around the world,
its geoeconomic and geopolitical center of gravity remains in Asia, or what
the leaders of China refer to as its periphery. In addition, Chinas military
capabilities are improving substantially as a result of double-digit annual
growth in its defense expenditures nearly every year since the mid-1990s. A
significant portion of that growth has been in force projection capabilities,
especially in the navy and also in the air and missile forces. The Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) is still many years away from being a global military
power, but its capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region have expanded markedly
over the past fifteen years.

Stable US-China relations key to preventing prolif, arms

race and US-China war
Guoliang No date
(Gu Guoliang, Director, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies
Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciencesotentlal
rivals, Cooperation and differences between China and the United States in
the field of arms control and nonproliferation,
https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Gu_Guoliang.pdf HY)
Although China and the United States have a cooperative relation, the militaries of both countries view each other as
potential rivals. The US National Security Strategy and defense reviews regard China as the biggest potential threat and
rival. China also views the United States as the greatest potential threat, and suspects that the United States is containing
and encircling China. The recent US rebalances strategy has increased Chinas suspicion of US strategic intention. While
Pentagon is going to cut its general defense budget in the coming years, it is enhancing its military deployment in Asia
Pacific, using 60% of its defense budget in Asia-Pacific, increasing its joint military exercises, expanding its military bases
and enhancing its military allied relations in the region, with a clear goal of rebalancing China. As China is becoming more
resolute in defending its integrity of sovereignty, US continuous arms sale to Taiwan, its support of the separatist activities
of Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer will cause more frictions between the two countries. In particular, if the United States
continues to play a partial role over the territorial disputes between China and Japan and the Phillippines, there is the
possibility of US being dragged into some military conflict with China by its military allies in the region. If the United States
continues to take China as its major rival and take further measures to contain China, there will be more suspicions and

The right way to enhance strategic reassurance and

cooperation China and the United States should enhance their strategic
reassurance through dialogues at different levels . Over the past years, both sides have got
frictions between the two countries.

better understanding of their common interests and their major differences, and understand how to expand their common

Strategic dialogues at various levels and crisis

management mechanisms have been well established and working well. It is
particularly important to strengthen military to military relations between the
two countries, as exchanges and dialogues between the US and Chinese
militaries have lagged behind exchanges and dialogues in other fields. The
two sides should strengthen their communication so as to have better
understanding on their respective threat perceptions, military strategies, and
national defense planning, instead of basing their military preparation on the
"worst case scenario" category. The military leaders and experts should have in-depth dialogues on
interests and manage their differences.

specific issues such as nuclear doctrines and policies, nuclear security, ballistic missile defense, outer space, cyber

two militaries should enhance their cooperation

in countering terrorism, anti-pirates and UN peace-keeping . They should have more
security, military transparency and etc. The

regular exchanges of visits and restore their lab to lab projects. Greater efforts should be made to remove the three major
obstacles, the concerned provisions of US National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 in particular, which hinder further
improvement of military to military exchanges between the two countries. Conclusion Over the past years, China and the
United States have had good cooperation and major differences in the fields of arms control and nonproliferation. These

the
development of the overall China-US relations also affects
cooperation of the two countries in handling arms control and
proliferation issues. It is important for both sides to expand their
cooperation and differences have played an important role in shaping China-US relations. At the same time,

overlapping interests, properly handling their differences, and

safeguarding a stable and cooperative China-US relationship which
match both countries' fundamental interests . Strategic dialogues are the
best platforms for the two countries to reassure each other about
their strategic intentions, with a view to avoid misunderstanding,
misjudgment and especially the possible military conflict both sides
do not want to see.

Defense

A2 Relations solve prolif

US/China nuc agreement was what enabled nuclear
reactor dangers (nuc terrorism, bombs, prolif) and new
nuc submarine techWestinghouse tech identified by Holt
and Nikitin card literally the result of US/China coop
Mufson 15 (Steven, reporter for The Washington Post, Obamas quiet
nuclear deal with China raises proliferation concerns, The Washington Post,
5/10/2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obamasquiet-nuclear-deal-with-china-raises-proliferationconcerns/2015/05/10/549e18de-ece3-11e4-8666-a1d756d0218e_story.html)
KC
It seemed like a typical day for President Obama. He taped a TV interview on trade, hosted the champion
NASCAR team on the South Lawn and met with the defense secretary in the Oval Office. Not so typical was
something that didnt appear that day on the presidents public schedule: notification to Congress that he
intends to renew a nuclear cooperation agreement with China. The deal would allow Beijing to buy more
U.S.-designed reactors and pursue a facility or the technology to reprocess plutonium from spent fuel.
China would also be able to buy reactor coolant technology that experts say could be adapted to make its
submarines quieter and harder to detect. The formal notice initially didnt draw any headlines. Its
unheralded release on April 21 reflected the administrations anxiety that it might alarm members of
Congress and nonproliferation experts who fear Chinas growing naval power and the possibility of
nuclear technology falling into the hands of third parties with nefarious intentions. Now, however, Congress
is turning its attention to the agreement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is set to hear from five
Obama officials in a closed-door meeting Monday to weigh the commercial, political and security
implications of extending the accord. The private session will permit discussion of a classified addendum
from the director of national intelligence analyzing Chinas nuclear export control system and what
Obamas notification called its interactions with other countries of proliferation concern. The White
Houses willingness to push ahead with the nuclear accord with Beijing illustrates the evolving relationship
between the worlds two largest powers, which, while eyeing each other with mutual suspicion and
competitiveness, also view each other as vital economic and strategic global partners. The Nuclear Energy
Institute, an industry trade group, argues that the new agreement will clear the way for U.S. companies to
sell dozens of nuclear reactors to China, the biggest nuclear power market in the world. Yet the new

a 123 agreement under the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954 would give China leeway to buy U.S. nuclear energy technology at a
version of the nuclear accord known as

sensitive moment: The Obama administration has been trying to rally support among lawmakers and the
public for a deal that would restrict Irans nuclear program a deal negotiated with Chinas support.
Administration officials are using arguments similar to those deployed in the debate over Iran. They say
the negotiations over the 123 agreement persuaded China to go a long way and agree to controls on
technology and materials that are tighter than those in the current accord. Congress can vote to block the
agreement, but if it takes no action during a review period, the agreement goes into effect. If Congress
rejects the deal, that would allow another country with lower levels of proliferation controls to step in and
fill that void, said a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity so he could
talk more freely. We go into it with eyes wide open, he added. Without it, we would be less able to press
the Chinese to do better on this front. Although the current nuclear agreement with China does not expire
until the end of the year, the administration had to give Congress notice with 90 legislative days left on the
clock. Obama also hopes to seal a global climate deal in December featuring China less than three
weeks before the current nuclear accord expires. Congress isnt convinced yet. We are just beginning
what will be a robust review process, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.)
said in an e-mail. These agreements can be valuable tools for furthering U.S. interests, but they must
support, not undermine, our nations critical nonproliferation objectives. A quieter submarine? Henry
Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, has been urging lawmakers to
insist on requiring advance consent for the reprocessing of spent fuel from U.S.-designed reactors into
plutonium suitable for weapons. He also is concerned about the sale of certain nuclear energy
technologies, especially coolant pumps with possible naval use. Charlotte-based Curtiss-Wright developed
advanced coolant pumps for the U.S. Navys submarines. The same plant produces a scaled-up version for

AP1000 series reactors, each of which uses four big pumps. These pumps
reduce noises that would make a submarine easier to detect . That has become a bigger
concern since China occupied and started building what looks like a military base on strategic
(and disputed) reefs in the South China Sea . An Obama administration official said the reactor
coolant pumps are much too big to fit into a submarine. However, a 2008 paper by two former
nuclear submarine officers working on threat reduction said that the reverse
engineering would likely be difficult but added that certainly, the Chinese have already
reversed engineered very complex imported technology in the aerospace and
nuclear fields. Sokolski thinks the choice between reactor sales and tighter controls is a clear one.
the Westinghouse

Since when does employment trump national security? he asked rhetorically. The United States has
bilateral 123 agreements with 22 countries, plus Taiwan, for the peaceful use of nuclear power. Some
countries that do not have such agreements, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Malaysia, have expressed

China and the United States

reached a nuclear cooperation pact in 1985, before China agreed to safeguards with the
International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA safeguards went into force in 1989 , but Congress
interest in clearing obstacles to building nuclear reactors.

imposed new restrictions after the Chinese governments June 1989 crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen

President Bill Clinton waived

the 1989 sanctions after China pledged to end assistance to Pakistans
nuclear weapons program and nuclear cooperation with Iran. In December 2006,
Westinghouse Electric majority-owned by Toshiba signed an agreement to sell its
AP1000 reactors to China. Four are under construction, six more are planned, and the company
Square. The 123 agreement finally went into effect in March 1998;

hopes to sell 30 others, according to an April report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). When
it comes to nuclear weapons proliferation, China is in a different category from other 123 agreement
nations. It first tested a nuclear weapon in 1964 and now has an arsenal of about 250 nuclear warheads.
So U.S. concerns have focused more on whether China has transferred technology to other countries.

Concerns persist about Chinese willingness as well as ability to detect and

prevent illicit transfers, the CRS report said. Missile proliferation from Chinese
entities is a continuing concern. The United States wants China to refrain from selling missiles
capable of carrying nuclear weapons, a payload of 1,100 pounds, as far as 190 miles. A State Department
compliance report in 2014 said that Chinese entities continued to supply missile programs in countries of

Reprocessing plutonium Reprocessing is another key issue. China has

a pilot plant engaged in reprocessing in Jiu Quan, a remote desert town in
Gansu province. Satellite photos show that it is next to a former military reprocessing plant,
concern.

according to Frank von Hippel, a Princeton University physics professor who specializes in nuclear arms
control. There is not even any fencing between the sites, he says. Thats been one of the hang-ups of the
[reprocessing] deal that China has been trying to negotiate with France for several years, von Hippel said.
Sokolski said the agreement proposed by Obama lacks a requirement for explicit, case-by-case U.S.
permission for a reprocessing project using American technology or material from U.S. reactors. It gives

China might
want to compete with Russian and U.S. arsenals and make more bombs, for
which plutonium is the optimal material. Other weapons experts note that China
already has enough surplus highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make
hundreds of new bombs. China has indicated that it is interested in
reprocessing so it can use plutonium as part of the fuel mix in civilian nuclear
power plants. And it must offer the IAEA access. Von Hippel is still concerned. So if China right
now is the great hope for the future of nuclear energy, soon it will be a major
reactor exporter to the extent theres a market, he said. So its a proliferation
concern, and its also a nuclear terrorism concern. The more plutonium there
is lying around, the more likely it is that someone will steal it. But the most
politically sensitive issue in Congress might turn out to be dual-use
applications of nuclear reactor parts . The latest appropriations bill issued by House Armed
consent in advance. And he fears that over the 30-year life of the new 123 agreement,

Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.) last month would require an intelligence
assessment of whether there was minimal risk that civilian nuclear technology would be diverted to any
foreign states nuclear naval propulsion program. Economy & Business Alerts Breaking news about
economic and business issues. Sign up Rep. Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) said that the bill doesnt mention
China by name, though I cant think of another country for which it would be more applicable.

Prolif treaties and coop cant checkChina ignores its

own implication in illicit nuc business to NoKo and Iran
Wall Street Journal 16 (Chinas proliferation Double Game, The Wall
Street Journal, 1/28/2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-proliferationdouble-game-1454027211) KC
John Kerry was in Beijing Wednesday to beseech Chinese leaders to help
punish North Korea for its escalating nuclear misbehavior. To see why the
Secretary of States efforts are unlikely to bear fruit, consider the recent war
of words between Beijing and a Kerry lieutenant who dared utter an
inconvenient truth about Chinas role in illicit weapons proliferation. Assistant
Secretary of State Thomas Countryman told reporters last week that when
North Korea and Iran seek to purchase high-technology materials or
equipment for their nuclear and missile programs, the place that they like to
shop is China. He added a plea that China exercise the same degree of
vigilance and control on strategic trade with Iran and North Korea as other
countries do. Mr. Countryman is right. For decades North Korea has turned to
Chinese companies for missile essentials such as specialty steel, gyroscopes
and precision-grinding machinery. North Korean aircraft with suspicious cargo
have used Chinese airspace and refueling facilities, and North Korean ships
that have visited China have later been found trafficking arms and missile
technology to Iran and elsewhere. Chinese specialists began helping Iran
mine uranium and produce uranium hexafluoride in the 1980s, around the
time that China also began selling Iran missile components. As nuclear expert
and former U.S. Air Force Secretary Thomas Reed has noted, China helped
Iran build its uranium-conversion facility at Esfahan and its laser-enrichment
plant at Karaj. The United Nations first sanctioned Tehrans nuclear program
in 2006, but Chinese entities continued exporting illicit metals and chemicals
to Iran anyway. Since 2009, even as most Obama Administration officials
have avoided the candor displayed by Mr. Countryman, the U.S. has
sanctioned Chinese entities for illicit-weapons proliferation at least 18 times.
The personification of Chinas continuing racket is Li Fangwei, also known as
Karl Lee, a prolific trader and manufacturer of high-tech missile technology
who is under U.S. indictment for sanctions-busting and money laundering.
There is an Interpol red alert out for Mr. Li, but Beijing pretends he doesnt
exist. If you were to take apart an Iranian missile, theres a good chance
youd find at least one component inside thats passed through Lees hands,
a British analyst told Newsweek last year.