IMS Unision 4th Nat. Moot Memo (Respondent)

.
TEAM CODE: TE-1-R
IN THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
APPEAL NO.____/2016
CLUBBED WITH
WRIT PETITION NOS.___/2016 & ___/2016
IN THE MATTER
OF
Petitioners
Tomar Rashid & Ors.

v.
Union of Indiana
Respondent
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT

COURT COMPETITION, 2016
IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016
CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES4-7
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.8
STATEMENT OF FACTS.9
STATEMENT OF ISSUES...10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED12
1. THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE...12

1.1.
That the Petitioner No.1s Fundamental Right to Peaceful Assembly was not Infringed by the
State...12-14
1.2.
That there exists an Alternate and Efficacious Remedy14-15
1.3.
That the rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedy is not Violative of Art. 3215
1.4.
That in any case no Fundamental Rights were Violated15
2. SECTION 124A OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL..15
3.
2.1.
That there is a presumption of constitutionality....16-17
2.2.
That Section 124A does not Violate Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution..17-20
2.3.
That Section 124A does not Violate Art. 14 of the Constitution.21
2.4.
That Section 124A does not Violate Art. 21 of the Constitution 21
THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE UPHELD...21-22
4. 24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 IS NOT ULTRA-VIRES THE CONSTITUTION..24
4.1.
That there is Presumption of Constitutionality of a law23-24
4.2.
That 24A does not Violate Art. 14 of the Constitution24-25

1
4.3.
That 24A does not Violate Art. 19(1) (a)25-27
4.4.
That the Restriction Placed by 24A is Reasonable and falls under the Ambit of Art. 21 of the
Constitution.27
PRAYER ..28
BIBLIOGRAPHY...29
INDEX OF ABBREVIATION
Abbreviation
Definition
&
And
AC
Appeal Cases
AIR
All India Reporter
All.
Allahabad
Art.
Article
Cr.P.C.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Govt.
Government
HL
House of Lords
IPC
Indiana Penal Code, 1860
Ker.
Kerala
Mad.
Madras
Para.
Paragraph
PCI
Press Councils Act, 1978
r/w
Read With
Section
SC
Supreme Court
SCALE
Supreme Court Almanac
SCC
Supreme Court Cases
SCJ
Supreme Court Journal
SCR
Supreme Court Report
UOI
Union of India
v.
Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
S.No.
Case
Citation
1.
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras
(1950) SCR 88 (253-4)
2.
AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus
(1957) 1 All ER 49
3.
Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India
AIR 1995 SC 1340
4.
AP Coop All Seeds growers Federation Ltd. V. D.
(2007) 13 SCC 320
Achyuta Rao
5.
Arun Jaitley v. State Of U.P
APPLICATION U/S 482

No. - 32703 of 2015
6.
Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras
AIR 1950 SC 300
7.
Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam
(2011) 3 SCC 377
8.
Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery
AIR 1979 SC 1889
9.
B.R. Enterprises v. State of Uttar Pradesh
AIR 1999 SC 1867
10.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
AIR 1982 SC 1325
11.
Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India
AIR 1973 SC 106
12.
Bombay v. F.N. Balsara
AIR 1951 SC 318
13.
Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer,
1991 (2) SCC 449
Mercantile Marine Deptt.

14.
Charanjit lal Chowdhary v Union of India
AIR 1951 SC 41
15.
Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. LVA Dikshitulu
AIR 1979 SC 628
16.
CIT v. S. Teja Singh
AIR 1959 SC 352
17.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk
(2003) 3 SCC 57
Carriers
18.
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union
(2006) 8 SCC 399
of India
19.
Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
AIR 1961 SC 1457.
20.
Delhi Cloth and Gen. Mill Co. Ltd. V. Union of India
AIR 1983 SC 937

21.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
AIR 1991 SC 101
Congress
22.
Dr. D.C. Saxena v.Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India
(1996) 5 SCC 216
23.
Express Newspapers v. Union of India
AIR 1958 SC 578
24.
Girdharilal & Sons v. Balbirnath Mathur
AIR 1986 SC 1099
25.
Gopalan v. State of Madras
(1950) SCR 88
26.
Harakchand v. Union of India
AIR 1970 SC 1453
27.
Hardik Bharatbhai Patel Thro. His Fater Bharatbhai
Special Criminal Application
Narsibhai Patel v. State Of Gujarat
No. 6330 of 2015
In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary &
(2012) 5 SCC 1
28.
Ors
29.
Indra Das v. State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 380
(2011) 3 SCC 380
30.
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar
AIR 1962 SC 955
31.
Krishna Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala
AIR 1997 SC 128
32.
Laxmi v. State of U.P.
AIR 1971 SC 873
33.
M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa Muddala
AIR 1961 SC 1107
34.
M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka
AIR 1995 SC 1770
35.
Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of
(1978) 3 SCC 544
Maharashtra
36.
Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi
AIR 1959 SC 942
37.
Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
AIR 1970 SC 1126
Gurudasmal
38.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
AIR 1978 SC 597
39.
Maranadu & Anr v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil
(2008) Cr LJ 4562 (SC)
Nadu
40.
Maunsell v. Olins
(1975) I All ER 16 (HL)
41.
Municipal Corporation, City of Ahmedabad v. Jan
AIR 1986 SC 1205
Mohd. Usmanbhai
42.
Municipal Council, Madurai v. Narayanan
AIR 1975 SC 2193
43.
Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu
(2005) 12 SCC 752
44.
Naraindas v. State of M.P.
AIR 1974 SC 1232
45.
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India
AIR 1960 SC 430

5

46.
Nazir Khan And Others v. State Of Delhi
(2003)8 SCC 461
47.
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph
AIR 1963 SC 812
48.
Om Kumar v. Union of India
AIR 2000 SC 3689
49.
Osmania University Teachers Assoctn. v. State of A.P.
(1987) 4 SCC 671
50.
P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India
1982 C.C. (Cr.)341
51.
Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court
(1985) 3 SCC 103
52.
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner
AIR 1963 SC 996.
53.
Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India
AIR 1982 SC 1413
54.
R.K. Garg v Union of India
1985 1 SCC 641
55.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar
AIR 1958 SC 638
56.
Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer
AIR 1951 SC 97.
57.
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar
AIR 1957 SC 532
58.
RMD Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India
AIR 1957 SC 628
59.
Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration
AIR 1973 SC 1091
60.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India
(2015) 5 SCC 1
61.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co.
AIR 1996 SC 1628 at 1641
62.
State of Madras v. V.G. Row
1952 AIR 196
63.
Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.
(1978) 1 All ER 948 (HL)
64.
Sukhnandan v. Union of India
AIR 1982 SC 902
65.
Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India
AIR 2000 SC 1023
66.
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia,
AIR 1960 SC 633
67.
Thakorebhai v. State of Gujrat
AIR 1975 SC 270
68.
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam
AIR 1990 SC 123
69.
Union of India v Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving
AIR 2001 SC 724
Co. Ltd.
70.
Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
AIR 1970 SC 129
BOOKS REFERRED
1. V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959)
2. ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (2nd ed. Reprint 2010)
3. DR. DURGA BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (20th ed. Reprint 2012)
4. DR. J.N.PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (38th ed. 2002)
5. DR.DURGA BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (8th ed. 2011)
6. H.M.SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed.)
7. A. SABITHA, PUBLIC HEALTH: ENFORCEMENT AND LAW (1st ed. 2008).
8. JUSTICE G.P.SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (12th ed. Reprint 2011)
9. M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2003)
10. DARREN J OBYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (1st ed. 2003).
11. DURGA DAS BASU, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 2008).
12. COLETTE DAIUTE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT & POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1st ed. 2010).
13. DARREN J OBYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (1st ed. 2003).
14. R. SATYA NARAYANA, NATURAL JUSTICE: EXPOANDING HORIZONS (1st ed. 2008).
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, CONVENTIONS, ARTICLES ET AL.

1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966.
2. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
3. United Nation Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
4. Constitution of India, 1950.
5. Indian Penal Code, 1966.
6. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1925.
7. Press Council of India Act, 1978.
ARTICLE
1. Goran Simic, Universal Jurisdiction and its Interplay with Sovereign Immunity 1 INDIAN JOURNAL OF
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 121 (New Delhi 2016)
7
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners have approached the Honble Supreme Court of Indiana that has the jurisdiction to hear
this matter under Art. 131, Art. 139A and Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indiana. The Respondent
humbly submits to the same.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I
Indiana is a federal republic country situated in south-east Asia along the equator. The country gained
freedom in 1957 after a long drawn struggle against a European nation which established the common
law system. New Delporto is an education hub of the country as the city has some of the best colleges &
universities of the nation. One such university is Great Northern University (GNU) which has earned
special reputation in the field of research and academic contributions.
II
On June 8, 2016, a countrywide strike was called by the parent body of GNUSU and during the strike; a
national highway was allegedly blocked by the supporters of AISU in Utkal, another Union Territory in
Indiana. The protestors were lathi charged by the police and some of them were seriously injured and
were subsequently admitted to the hospital.
III
On 16th of June, 2016, a rally was organized in New Delporto by GNUSU to show solidarity to the
injured students of Utkal. Meanwhile, some posters were put up across the campus of GNU which
claimed that the rally was also in solidarity with the hanging of Chengiz Khan. As the rally began, the
protestors began to shout slogans against the so called dictatorship of the government and pledged to
fight against the government till the date
IV
As the monsoon session began, the government by virtue of its majority made an amendment to the
Press Councils Act, 1978. 14A was incorporated into the Act. One of them, Mr. Kamal Kapoor filed a
petition in the Supreme Court of Indiana and challenged the constitutionality of 14A of the Press
Councils Act, 1978. The Supreme Court of Indiana in the interest of justice clubbed the 3 matters given
their inter connection and listed them for final hearing.
9
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT 124A OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE QUASHED.
4. WHETHER OR NOT 24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 IS ULTRA-VIRES THE CONSTITUTION.
10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
It is the humble submission of the Respondent that the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable because
Petitioner No.1s Fundamental Right to Peaceful Assembly has not been infringed by the as the
Petitioner was part of an unlawful assembly and the Police rightfully dispersed them using necessary
force and consequently Petitioner No.1 is not entitled to compensation.
2. 124A OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is respectfully urged that 124A is not unconstitutional because it does not violate any Fundamental
Rights given in Part III of the Constitution.
3.
THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE UPHELD.
The Respondent vociferously argues that the conviction of the accused should be upheld, as the speech
made by Petitioner No.2 was seditious.
4. 24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 IS INTRA-VIRES THE CONSTITUTION
It is respectfully submitted that 24A of the PCI Act, 1978 is intra-vires the Constitution as it falls
within and is constitutionally protected by Art.19(3) that lays out the reasonable restrictions that can be
put on free speech.
11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

It is humbly submitted that Petitioner No.1s Fundamental Right to assemble peacefully and without
arms was not violated by the State and same is contended on the following grounds:
1.1. PETITIONERS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
TO
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
WAS NOT INFRINGED BY THE
STATE.
141 (fourth) of the IPC defines Unlawful Assembly as:
An assembly of five or more persons is designated an Unlawful Assembly, if the
common object of the persons composing that assembly is by means of criminal
force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any
property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use
of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or
to enforce any right or supposed right.
The right to peacefully assemble and without arms is given in Art. 19(1) (b) of the Constitution and,
idem quod other rights, a bar has been placed on the same provided under Art. 19(3) which lists the
reasonable restrictions that can be constitutionally put on the same and it states:
Art. 19(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any
law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public
order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub clause
12
In the present factual matrix, the members of GNUSU and AISU blocked a National Highway, with the
present and immediate purpose of carrying a protest into effect. 1 This act of blocking a National
Highway potentially caused the citizens using and/or depending on the highway for business, transit of
goods, medical emergencies, or other purposes a considerable loss.
The respondents submit that the blocking of highway by the protester amounted in violation of law as
the National highway is for the regular movement of traffic making it of paramount importance. The
decision to choose national highway as the location of protest is in itself violation of law. The right
which flows from Art. 19 (1) (b) is not a right to hold a meeting at any place and time. It is a right which
can be regulated.2
It is not surprising that the Constitution makers conferred a fundamental right on all citizens
'to assemble peaceably and without arms'. While prior to the coming into force of the Constitution
the right to assemble could have been abridged or taken away by law, now that cannot be done except
by imposing reasonable restrictions within Art. 19(3). It is urged that the right to assemble does not
mean that that right can be exercised at any and every place.
The action of lathi charge by police is just as they followed due process. Any action taken by a public
authority which is entrusted with the statutory power has to be tested by the application of two
standards- first, the action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and, second, it
must be reasonable. If any action, within the scope of the authority conferred by law is found to be
unreasonable, it means that the procedure established under which that action is taken is itself
unreasonable.3
The concept of 'procedure established by law' changed its character after the judgment of this Court in
the case of Maneka Gandhi v. UOI 4 where this Court took the view as under:
The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically is an
essential element of equality or non arbitrariness, pervades Art. 14 like a brooding
Maranadu & Anr v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2008) Cr LJ 4562 (SC).
In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary & Ors, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
3
In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary & Ors, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
4
AIR 1978 SC 597.
2
13

omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Art. 21 must answer the test of
reasonableness in order to be right and just and fair and not arbitrary fanciful or
oppressive otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of
Art. 21 would not be satisfied.
This was also noted in the case of Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra5 where this
Court took the following view:
Procedure established by law are words of deep meaning for all lovers of liberty and
judicial sentinels.
It is furthermore submitted by the respondent that the right to protest of the petitioner does not have to
be at the cost of others. It is pertinent to mention that the protesters blocked the highway which is of
paramount national interest while stopping the movement of the traffic; thus taking away the
Fundamental Right to movement of the masses which has been enshrined under Art. 19(1)(d) of the
Constitution.
In Dr. D.C. Saxena v.Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India 6 , this Court held:
There is a correlative duty not to interfere with the liberty of others. Each is entitled
to dignity of person and of reputation. Nobody has a right to denigrate others' right to
person or reputation.
The Police, in compliance with the law, dispersed the unlawful assembly using standard practice as
given in various police manuals, upon the mob conducting itself in such a manner that showed a
determination
not
to
disperse,
and
by
continuing
to
block
National
Highway.
1.2. THAT THEIR EXISTS AN ALTERNATE AND EFFICACIOUS REMEDY.

It was held this Honble apex court in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery 7 where there
is alternative statutory remedy court should not intervene. In the instant matter, it is the humble
(1978) 3 SCC 544.

(1996) 5 SCC 216.
7
AIR 1979 SC 1889.
6
14

submission of the Respondent that the Petitioners remedy, if any, lays in tort and not under writ
jurisdiction of the Apex Court. Thus, the present writ petition in not maintainable and should be
dismissed at once.
1.3. THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IS NOT A VIOLATION OF ART. 32.
The Petitioner may contend that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies is unconstitutional and volatile
of the guarantee in Art. 32(1). However, it is submitted that the right under Art. 32(1) is not so absolute
that no rules of procedure apply to it. Art. 32(1) confers a right to move the SC by "appropriate
proceedings". Appropriate proceedings interpreted to mean procedure relating to form, conditions of
lodgment of petitions, and compliance with a reasonable directions8. Indeed, procedural factors such as
res judicata,9 delay in filing the petition and parallel proceedings in another Court are considered before
entertaining the appropriateness of a particular proceeding. It is submitted that the rule of exhaustion of
local remedies is another such procedural guideline and does not violate the right under Art. 32.
1.4. IN ANY CASE, NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED.
The jurisdiction under Art.32 can be invoked only when Fundamental Rights are violated. It has been
held that if a right, other than a fundamental right, is claimed to be violated then such questions can be
addressed only in the appropriate proceedings and not on an application under Art. 32. 10 In the instant
case, it is submitted no fundamental rights of the Petitioner have been violated; therefore, this petition
must fail.
2. 124A OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is the humble submission of the Respondents that S. 124A of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860 is not
unconstitutional. This is extremely necessary for the security of state and maintaining peace and
public tranquility.
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996.

Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457.
10
Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1951 SC 97.
9
15

2.1 THAT THERE IS A PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The power to legislate is a plenary power vested in the legislature and unless those who challenge the
legislation clearly establish that their fundamental rights under the Constitution are affected or that the
legislature lacked legislative competence, they do not succeed in their challenge to the enactment
brought forward in the wisdom of the legislature. Challenge on ground of wisdom of legislation is not
permissible as it is for the legislature to balance various interests. 11
The Legislature composed as it is of the elected representatives of the people is presumed to know and
be aware of the needs of the people and what is good or bad for them and that a Court cannot sit in
judgment over the wisdom of the legislature. 12 The Legislature appreciates and understands the needs of
the people, that it knows what is good or bad for them, that the laws it enacts are directed to problems
which are made manifest by experience, that the elected representatives in a legislature enact laws which
they consider to be reasonable, for the purposes for which these laws are enacted and that a legislature
would not deliberately flout a constitutional safeguard or right.13
The courts are not to be concerned with the need or propriety of laws. The judicial function is not to
canvass the legislative judgement, or to hold the impugned statute to be ill-advised or unjustified or not
justified by the facts on which it is based. The function of the Courts is to see whether the law in
question transgresses any constitutional restriction imposed on the legislature. 14
First, attempt should be made by the Courts to uphold the charged provision and not to invalidate it
merely because one of the possible interpretations leads to such a result, howsoever attractive it may
be.15
Therefore usually the presumption is in the favour of the Constitutionality of the statute and the onus to
prove that it is unconstitutional lies upon the person who is challenging it. 16 The allegations regarding
the violation of a constitutional provision should be specific, clear and unambiguous and it is for the
person who impeaches the law as violative of the constitutional guarantee to show that the particular
11
Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 12 SCC 752.

State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1628 at 1641.
13
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 638; Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
1970 SC 129; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1325.
14
Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
15
B.R. Enterprises v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 1867.
16
Charanjit lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41; Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318; Mahant Moti
Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101.
12
16

provision is infirm for the reasons stated by him. 17 Such grounds must be corroborated by Constitutional
provisions, such as, Art. 14, 19 or 21.
Moreover, it is a well settled principle of interpretation that a statute must be interpreted in the light of
the intention of the legislature the mens or sentential legis,18 as a whole in its context ex visceribus
actus
19
and
in
way to
make
it
effective
ut
res
magis
valeat
quam
pereat.
20
When more than one interpretation may be given to a legal provision, it must uphold that interpretation
that makes a provision constitutional. Any interpretation that makes a provision ultra vires the
Constitution must be rejected. 21 Therefore, the court is to presume that the impugned law is
constitutional until it has compelling grounds to declare it unconstitutional.
In Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar,22 which is the locus classicus and binding authority on the issue of
sedition, 124A was interpreted in the narrower sense and was thus sustained against a challenge under
Art. 19(2). Sedition was defined as meaning words, deeds or writings having a tendency or intention to
disturb public tranquility, to create public disturbance or to promote disorder. The Supreme Court
rejected the broader view of 124A that incitement to public order was not an essential element of the
offence of sedition under this section. This broad view would have made 124A unconstitutional vis-avis Art. 19(1)(a) read with Art. 19(2).
2.2 THAT 124A
OF THE
INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860
DOES NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE 19(1)(a)
While it is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of speech and expression in a democracy, so also
it is necessary to place some curbs on this freedom for the maintenance of social order. No right is an
absolute right in a welfare state, all individual rights are subservient to the rights of the public at large.
17
Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1340 at 1343.

RMD Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628; Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. LVA Dikshitulu,
AIR 1979 SC 628; Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413; Girdharilal & Sons v. Balbirnath
Mathur, AIR 1986 SC 1099; Maunsell v. Olins, (1975) I All ER 16 (HL); Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.,
(1978) 1 All ER 948 (HL).
19
Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1985) 3 SCC 103; Osmania University Teachers Association v. State of A.P.,
(1987) 4 SCC 671; Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Deptt., 1991 (2) SCC
449; Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (2001) 4 SCC 139 (Constitution Bench); AG
v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49.
20
CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352; M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107; Tinsukhia
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123; Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Gurudasmal, AIR 1970 SC 1126; Municipal Council, Madurai v. Narayanan, AIR 1975 SC 2193; Commissioner
of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57.
21
RMD Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 930.
22
AIR 1962 SC 955.
18
17

There cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly freed from restraint for that
would lead to anarchy and disorder. The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such
reasonable conditions as may be deemed to be essential to the safety, health, peace, general order and
morals of the community. What the Constitution attempts in declaring the rights off the people is to
strike a balance between individual and social control. Art. 19 gives a list of individual liberties and
prescribes in the various clauses the restraints that may be placed upon them by law so that they do not
conflict with public welfare or general morality. 23
Accordingly, under Art. 19(2), the state may make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of the securities of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, sovereignty and integrity of India,
or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
The Constitution of India guarantees the right to freedom of Speech and expression, under Art. 19(1)(a),
but the same are subject to reasonable restriction imposed under Clause (2) of Art. 19.
The test of reasonableness of restriction has to be considered in each case in the light of the nature of
right infringed, the purpose of the restriction, the extent and nature of the mischief required to be
suppressed and the prevailing social order and conditions at the time. There can be no abstract standard
of reasonableness and our Constitution provides reasonably precise general guidance in that matter.24
In determining the reasonableness of a law challenged as an unreasonable restriction upon a
Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 19, the court has to balance the need for individual liberty with
the need for social control and the magnitude of the evil which is the purpose of the restrictions to curb
or eliminate so that the freedom guaranteed to the individual subserves the larger public interests. 25 The
expression reasonable restriction signifies that the limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of
the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the
public.26
The question of what constitutes a reasonable restriction upon an Art. 19(1) fundamental right, for the
purposes of Art. 19(2) to 19(6), was answered by the Supreme Court as early as 1952, in State of
23
Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88 (253-4); Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1973 SC.
Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1973 SC 1091.
25
Harakchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453.
26
P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India; 1982 C.C. (Cr.)341.
24
18

Madras v. V.G. Row27. The Court outlined a classic proportionality enquiry, holding that in adjudicating
reasonableness:
the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction
imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the
imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict...
While upholding the constitutinal validity of 124A of the IPC, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court through its pronouncement in Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar28 observed that:
..the security of the State, which depends upon the maintenance of law and order is the very basic
consideration upon which legislation, with a view to punishing offences against the State, is undertaken.
Such a legislation has, on the one hand, fully to protect and guarantee the freedom of speech and
expression, which is the sine quo non of a democratic form of Government that our Constitution has
established But the freedom has to be guarded again becoming a licence for vilification and
condemnation of the Government established by law, in words which incite violence or have the
tendency to create public disorder. A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the
Government, or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not incite people to
violence against the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder.
It is the fundamental right of every citizen to have his own political theories and ideas and to propagate
them and work for their establishment so long as he does not seek to do so by force and violence or
contravene any provision of law. What is not permissible in order to attain such object is any act which
have the effect of bringing or which attempt to
bring
into
hatred
or
contempt or excites or
attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law.29

In another landmark judgemnet,30 the Apex Court made certain observations about the freedom under
Art. 19(1)(a). The Court observed that:
"There are three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach of
this most basic of human rights. The first is discussion, the second is advocacy,
and the third is incitement. Mere discussion or even advocacy of a particular
27
1952 AIR 196.

supra note 22.
29
Hardik Bharatbhai Patel Thro. His Fater Bharatbhai Narsibhai Patel v. State Of Gujarat, Special Criminal
Application (Quashing) No. 6330 of 2015.
30
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
28
19

cause howsoever unpopular is at the heart of Article 19(1)(a). It is only when such
discussion or advocacy reaches the level of incitement that Article 19(2) kicks in.
It is at this stage that a law may be made curtailing the speech or expression that
leads inexorably to or tends to cause public disorder or tends to cause or tends to
affect the sovereignty & integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign States, etc."
Under certain circumstances, therefore, a law depriving a citizen of his Fundamental Right may be
regarded as reasonable.31 The offence of sedition does not penalize discussion or advocacy. It does
not curb the freedom to have healthy political discussions. It only comes into the picture when the words
or actions of a person reach the level of incitement, which is likely to disrupt the security of state, public
order and public tranquility. Hence, there is no extinction of the Freedom of Speech and Expression. If
at all, it is merely a regulation.
Under Art. 19(2), a restriction can be imposed in the interests of public order, security of state, etc.
However, the restrictions imposed in the interest of security of state to be a reasonable restriction,
should be one that has a proximate and reasonable connection32 or nexus with security of State.33
The provisions of the 124A read as a whole, along with the Explanations, make it reasonably clear that
the sections penalises only such activities that are intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or
disturbance of public peace by inciting violence. The Explanations appended to the main body of the
section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however
strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the fundamental right
of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken etc., which have the
pernicious tendency or intention of creating public dis order or disturbance of law and order that the law
steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. So construed the section strikes the
correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order.
124A has a direct and proximate nexus to its object i.e. security of state. It is a regulatory measure
which inter-alia provides against apprehended threat the security of the state. It has a direct nexus to
preservation of public tranquility. Therefore, even if it operates harshly in isolated cases, its ultimate
object is the maintenance of security of state and public order.
31
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430.

Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 300.
33
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812.
32
20

2.3. THAT 124A DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14
It is humbly submitted that 124A is not violative of A.14 of the Constitution. When a statute is
impugned under Art. 14, it is the function of the court to decide whether the statute is so arbitrary or
unreasonable that it has to be struck down. Mere factor that some hardship or injustice is caused to
someone is no ground to strike down the rule altogether if otherwise the rule appears to be just, fair and
reasonable and not constitutional.34 The test of arbitrariness lies in whether the provision is reasonable,
and whether there is a nexus between the restriction imposed by the provision, and the object sought to
be achieved by it. 124A imposes restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and
expression in the interest of security of state and for maintenance of public order. Therefore, there is a
nexus between the restriction imposed by 124A and the its object. Therefore, 124A doesnt violate
Art. 14.
2.4. THAT 124A DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 21
It is reverentially submitted that 124A is not violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. The right of life
and liberty so guaranteed under Art. 21 is subject to the rule of proportionality. Where individual liberty
comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the state or public order, the liberty of the
individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation. 124A penalizes those acts which induce
discontent and insurrection, stir up opposition to the Government, and bring the administration of justice
into contempt; and the very tendency of sedition is to incite the people to insurrection and rebellion. 35
Since the restriction imposed under 124A is a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2), this penal
provision constitutes procedure established law. Hence, it is not a violation of Art. 21 of the
Constitution.
3. THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE UPHELD.
It is the humble submission of the Respondents that the Petitioner is guilty of committing the crime of
Sedition under 124-A, IPC. In order for an individuals words to be within the ambit of 124A, they
34
35
AP Coop All Seeds growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320.
Nazir Khan And Others v. State Of Delhi, (2003)8 SCC 461 at para 37.
21

would necessarily have to qualify as having a ''pernicious tendency of creating public disorder or
disturbance of law and order. Only then would the law step in to prevent such activity. 36
The essentials of the offence under 124-A is:
1.
Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt or exciting or
attempting to excite disaffection towards, the Government of India.

2.
Such act or attempt may be done (i) by words, either spoken or written, or (ii)
by signs, or (iii) by visible representation.37

The Supreme Court of United state laid down the test of clear and present danger in the case of
Brandenburg v. Ohio38, which requires that restrictions cannot be placed on speech unless it is directed
to inciting, and is likely to incite imminent lawless action. The Supreme Court has applied the same
test in deciding several cases.39
In the instant case, the speech of the Petitioner satisfies the conditions that are necessary for it to be
considered as seditious under the meaning of 124A. The students of the political bodies in GNU have
a notorious reputation for resorting to violence40 and the GNUSU has always been opposed to the IPP
government because of opposite political ideology. The Petitioner claimed in his speech that they will
seek independence of Mashkir at any cost.41 This statement was clearly aimed at exciting disaffection
towards the government. Moreover, the petitioner holds an important post as the President of largest
student union of GNU, and has a substantial influence over other members. 42 Making provocative
remarks about a Mashkir is bound to add fuel to the unrest. The petitioners comments also gained
endorsement from the Prime Minister of Paristan.43 This created a situation of clear and present danger
capable of inciting imminent lawless action.
Therefore, it is humbly contended that the Petitioners speech was seditious in nature, inciting hatred
against the established order and harms the systematic peace of the country; hence, this Honble Court
should uphold the conviction.
36
Arun Jaitley v. State Of U.P, APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 32703 of 2015.
PILLAI, Criminal Law 1131 (K. I. Vibhute eds., 2009).
38
23 L Ed 2d 430: 395 US 444 (1969).
39
Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380; Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 377; Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
40
Moot Proposition, Para 4.
41
id, at para 11.
42
id, at para 5.
43
id, at para 13.
37
22

4. 24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION.
It is reverentially submitted by the Respondents that 24A of the Press Council Act, 1978 is not in
violation of the provisions of the Constitution.
4.1 THAT THERE IS A PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW.
The power to legislate is a plenary power vested in the legislature and unless these who challenge the
legislation clearly establish that their fundamental rights under the Constitution are affected or that the
legislature lacked legislative competence, they do not succeed in their challenge to the enactment
brought forward in the wisdom of the legislature.
A statute cannot be struck down merely because the Court thinks it to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Any
such ground of invalidity must be related to a Constitutional provision, such as, Arts. 14, 19 or 21.
Challenge on ground of wisdom of legislation is not permissible as it is for the legislature to balance
various interests.44
The Legislature appreciates and understands the needs of the people, that it knows what is good or bad
for them, that the laws it enacts are directed to problems which are made manifest by experience, that
the elected representatives in a legislature enact laws which they consider to be reasonable, for the
purposes for which these laws are enacted and that a legislature would not deliberately flout a
constitutional safeguard or right.45
The Legislature composed as it is of the elected representatives of the people is presumed to know and
be aware of the needs of the people and what is good or bad for them and that a Court cannot sit in
judgment over the wisdom of the Legislature. 46 Therefore usually the presumption is in the favor of the
Constitutionality of the statute and the onus to prove that it is unconstitutional lies upon the person who
is challenging it. 47 The allegations regarding the violation of a constitutional provision should be
44
Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 12 SCC 752.

Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 638; Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970
SC 129; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1325.
46
State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1628.
47
Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41; Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318; Mahant Moti
Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101.
45
23

specific, clear and unambiguous and it is for the person who impeaches the law as violative of the
constitutional guarantee to show that the particular provision is infirm for the reasons stated by him. 48
The Courts are not concerned with the need or propriety of laws. The judicial function is not to canvass
the legislative judgement, or to hold the impugned statute to be ill-advised or unjustified or not justified
by the facts on which it is based. The function of the Courts is to see whether the law in question
transgresses any constitutional restriction imposed on the legislature.49 Therefore a law cannot be struck
down merely because the court thinks it to be unjustified or unwise.50
In the case of Delhi Cloth and Gen. Mill Co. Ltd. V. Union of India, the Supreme Court has stated:
What form a regulatory measure must take is for the legislature to decide and the
court would not examine its wisdom or efficacy excepts to the extent that Art. 13 of
the Constitution is attracted.51
4.2. THAT 24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. 14.
Firstly, the print media is a disseminator of information, and is responsible for educating the masses
about various socio-political issues, making it imperative to have a legal provision that covers
expediently the need of the country. Like individual rights, the freedom of press cannot be absolute and
should be reconciled with collective interests of the Society. Sovereignty and integrity of a state are
crucial to its existence. Therefore, it becomes the impediment of the state to ensure that there is no threat
to its existence. 24A intends to achieve the same.
Secondly, the possibility of abuse of a statute otherwise valid does not impart to it any invalidity. 52 Some
constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. Once the policy is laid down by law
it cannot be held invalid merely on the ground that the discretion conferred by it may be abused in some
cases and may be exercised in a manner, which is in fact discriminatory. 53 If the power is actually
48
Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1340.

Charanjit lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
50
State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1628.
51
AIR 1983 SC 937.
52
R.K. Garg v. Union of India, 1985 1 SCC 641; Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 2001
SC 724.
53
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, AIR 1957 SC 532.
49
24

abused in any case the exercise of the power is actually abused in any case, the exercise of the power
may be challenged as discriminatory or mala fide,54 but the statute will not fail on that ground.55
The Supreme Court has reiterated the principle that mere likelihood of abuse of discretionary power
conferred under statute would not render the statutory provision unconstitutional. Mere factor that some
hardship or injustice is caused to someone is no ground to strike down the rule altogether if otherwise
the rule appears to be just, fair and reasonable and not constitutional.56
A statute carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. Such a presumption extends also in relation
to a law, which has enacted for reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right. A further presumption
may also be drawn that the statutory authority would not exercise the power arbitrarily. 24A is the
substantive law whereas the safeguards against its improper use have been adequately provided in the
Press Council (Procedure for Enquiry) Regulations, 1979.
4.3. THAT 24A DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. 19(1)(a).

Firstly, that 24A is reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. There cannot be any
such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly freed from restraint for that would lead to anarchy
and disorder. Art. 19 give a list of individual liberties and prescribe in the various clauses the restraints
that may be placed upon them by law so that they do not conflict with public welfare or general
morality. 57 While it is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of speech and expression in a
democracy, so also it is necessary to place some curbs on this freedom for the maintenance of social
order. Accordingly, under Art. 19(2), the state may make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of the securities of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, sovereignty and integrity of India,
or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
In Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration,58 it was held that the test of reasonableness of restriction has
to be considered in each case in the light of the nature of right infringed, the purpose of the restriction,
the extent and nature of the mischief required to be suppressed and the prevailing social order and
54
Naraindas v. State of M.P., AIR 1974 SC 1232; Thakorebhai v. State of Gujrat; AIR 1975 SC 270.
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, AIR 1957 SC 532.
56
AP Coop All Seeds Growers Federation Ltd. v.. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320.
57
Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88; Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1973 SC 1091; Laxmi v. State
of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 873.
58
AIR 1973 SC 1091
55
25

conditions at the time. There can be no abstract standard of reasonableness and our Constitution
provides reasonably precise general guidance in that matter.
When a law is impugned as having imposed a restriction upon a Fundamental Right, what the Court has
to examine is the substance of the legislation without being beguiled by the mere appearance of the
legislation.59 Regulation and not extinction is, generally speaking, the extent to which permissible
restriction may go in order to satisfy the test of reasonableness. 60 The possible or remote effects of
legislation upon any fundamental right cannot be said to constitute a restriction upon the right. 61
In determining the reasonableness of a law challenged as an unreasonable restriction upon a
Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 19, the court has to balance the need for individual liberty with
the need for social control and the magnitude of the evil which is the purpose of the restrictions to curb
or eliminate so that the freedom guaranteed to the individual sub serves the larger public interests. 62 No
restriction can be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case it operates harshly. 63
24A lays down mere regulatory measures for control of publications that threaten the sovereignty and
integrity of the country or manipulate the public opinion against the elected govt. 64 Hence, there is no
extinction of the Freedom of Speech and Expression. If at all, it is just regulation. Hence, it is
submitted that the restriction imposed by 66A is a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2).
Secondly, that 24A has a Direct and Proximate nexus to its object. The limitation imposed in the
interests of public order to be a reasonable restriction, should be one which has a proximate connection
or approximate and reasonable connection65 or nexus with public order, but not one which is far-fetched,
hypothetical, problematic or too remote. 66 It must be rationally proximate and direct to be called
reasonable.67
59
Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578; Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC
106; Sukhnandan v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 902.
60
Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106.
61
Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578; Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC
106; Sukhnandan v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 902.
62
Harakchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453.
63
Krishna Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 128; See also, Municipal Corporation, City of Ahmedabad v. Jan
Mohd. Usmanbhai, AIR 1986 SC 1205; M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770.
64
Moot Para 14.
65
Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 300.
66
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.
67
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812.
26

Under Art. 19(2), a restriction can be imposed in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India.
The expression in the interests of gives a greater leeway to the legislature to curtail freedom of speech
and expression. However, the restrictions imposed must have a reasonable and rational relation with the
integrity and sovereignty of state.
It is, therefore, humbly submitted that Art. 24A has a direct and proximate nexus to its object i.e.
protecting sovereignty and integrity of the state. It has a direct nexus to preservation of public tranquility,
as it can be used to make sure that the press doesnt exercise its freedom in a way that threatens peace
and security.
4.4 THAT
THE
RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY 24A IS REASONABLE
AND
FALLS UNDER THE AMBIT
OF
ART. 21.
Individual rights cannot be absolute in a welfare state. It has to be subservient to the Rights of the public
at large. 68 The right of life and liberty so guaranteed under Art.21 is also subject to the rule of
proportionality.69 Where individual liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the state
or public order, the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation. 70
68
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 399; AIR 2006 SC 2945.
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; AIR 2000 SC 3689.
70
Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1023.
69
27
PRAYER
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honble Court
may be pleased to:
1.
DISMISS the Writ Petition filed by Petitioner No.1.

AND
2.
DISMISS the Writ Petition filed by Petitioner No. 2s Counsel and uphold Petitioner No.2s
Conviction.
AND
3.
DISMISS the Writ Petition filed by Petitioner No. 3.

AND
4.
PASS any other order and directions, as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and in favour of the Respondent.
Respondent
Date:
Place:
Through:
Advocate
28
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS REFERRED
1.
V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959)
2.
ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (2nd ed. Reprint 2010)
3.
DR. DURGA BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (20th ed. Reprint 2012)
4.
DR. J.N.PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (38th ed. 2002)
5.
DR.DURGA BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (8th ed. 2011)
6.
H.M.SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed.)
7.
A. SABITHA, PUBLIC HEALTH: ENFORCEMENT AND LAW (1st ed. 2008).
8.
JUSTICE G.P.SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (12th ed. Reprint 2011)
9.
M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2003)
10.
DARREN J OBYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (1st ed. 2003).
11.
DURGA DAS BASU, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 2008).
12.
COLETTE DAIUTE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT & POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1st ed. 2010).
13.
DARREN J OBYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (1st ed. 2003).
14.
R. SATYA NARAYANA, NATURAL JUSTICE: EXPOANDING HORIZONS (1st ed. 2008).
ARTICLE
1. Goran Simic, Universal Jurisdiction and its Interplay with Sovereign Immunity 1 INDIAN JOURNAL
OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
121 (New Delhi 2016)
29

IMS Unision 4th Nat. Moot Memo (Respondent)

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TEAM CODE: TE-1-R

IN THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

Tomar Rashid & Ors.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

1. THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE...12

That there exists an Alternate and Efficacious Remedy14-15

That in any case no Fundamental Rights were Violated15

2. SECTION 124A OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL..15

That there is a presumption of constitutionality....16-17

That Section 124A does not Violate Art. 14 of the Constitution.21

That Section 124A does not Violate Art. 21 of the Constitution 21

THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE UPHELD...21-22

That there is Presumption of Constitutionality of a law23-24

That 24A does not Violate Art. 14 of the Constitution24-25

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

That 24A does not Violate Art. 19(1) (a)25-27

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

All India Reporter

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Indiana Penal Code, 1860

Press Councils Act, 1978

Supreme Court Almanac

Supreme Court Cases

Supreme Court Journal

Supreme Court Report

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras

(1950) SCR 88 (253-4)

AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus

Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India

AIR 1995 SC 1340

AP Coop All Seeds growers Federation Ltd. V. D.

(2007) 13 SCC 320

Arun Jaitley v. State Of U.P

APPLICATION U/S 482

Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras

AIR 1950 SC 300

Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam

(2011) 3 SCC 377

Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery

AIR 1979 SC 1889

B.R. Enterprises v. State of Uttar Pradesh

AIR 1999 SC 1867

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab

AIR 1982 SC 1325

Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India

AIR 1973 SC 106

Bombay v. F.N. Balsara

AIR 1951 SC 318

Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer,

1991 (2) SCC 449

Mercantile Marine Deptt.

Charanjit lal Chowdhary v Union of India

Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. LVA Dikshitulu

AIR 1979 SC 628

CIT v. S. Teja Singh

AIR 1959 SC 352

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk

Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union

(2006) 8 SCC 399