G.R. No.

125465 June 29, 1999

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO
HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora
Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed
as Civil Case No. 19504. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown by
OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate. Appellate Court,
dated April 12, 1984, which modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Capiz, dated January 23, 1975, in a land registration case 1 filed by private
respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners were deprived of income from the
land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income consisted
of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to
1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the
land registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad
faith. 2
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that
private respondent Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was
single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners of possession of and income
from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of the property in
question had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a
writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court of Capiz, Mambusao, the return thereof having been received by
petitioners' counsel; that since then, petitioners have been directly receiving rentals
from the tenants of the land, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action since
it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made,
considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio
Hontiveros are brothers; that the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in Land
Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and void since it was based upon a ground
which was not passed upon by the trial court; that petitioners' claim for damages was
barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals
due since private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value;
and that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not
married to private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary
interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents

by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private

respondents. 3
On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an
allegation that "earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made between the
parties but the same were unsuccessful."
In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with
Counterclaim, in which they denied, among other things, that earnest efforts had been
made to reach a compromise but the parties was unsuccessful.
On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that private respondents' answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted
the material allegations of the complaint. 4 Private respondents opposed the motion
alleging that they had denied petitioners' claims and thus tendered certain issues of
fact which could only be resolved after
trial. 5
On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. At the same time,
however, it dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as
required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest
efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. The order of the trial court reads:6
The Court, after an assessment of the diverging views and
arguments presented by both parties, is of the opinion and so holds
that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact
that the defendants in their answer, particularly in its paragraph 3 to
the amended complaint, specifically denied the claim of damages
against them, but also because of the ruling in De Cruz vs. Cruz,
G.R. No. 27759, April 17, 1970 (32 SCRA 307), citing Rili vs.
Chunaco, 98 Phil. 505, which ruled that the party claiming damages
must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof and that though the
rule is that failure to specifically deny the allegations in the
complaint or counter-claim is deemed an admission of said
allegations, there is however an exception to it, that is, that when
the allegations refer to the amount of damages, the allegations
must still be proved. This ruling is in accord with the provision of
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
That while the plaintiffs in their amended complaint alleged that
earnest efforts towards a compromise with the defendants were
made, the fact is that their complaint was not verified as provided in
Article 151 of the Family Code. Besides, it is not believed that there
were indeed earnest efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile the

two feuding brothers, Gregorio and Augusto, both surnamed

Hontiveros.
The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no such earnest
efforts were made, the same is not necessary or jurisdictional in the
light of the ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al., petitioner, vs. Hon.
Arsenio M. Ganong, et al., respondents, No. L-44903, April 22,
1977, is, to the mind of this Court, not applicable to the case at bar
for the fact is the rationale in that case is not present in the instant
case considering these salient points:
a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio
Hontiveros and allegedly not a member of the Hontiveros Family, is
not shown to be really the wife of Gregorio also denied in their
verified answer to the amended complaint.
b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have acquired any
proprietary right or interest in the land that was litigated by Gregorio
and Augusto, unlike the cited case of Magbaleta where it was
shown that a stranger to the family acquired certain right;
c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court no mention was
made at all of the name of Teodora Ayson as part-awardee of Lot
37 that was adjudged to Gregorio other than himself who was
therein described as a widower. Moreover, Teodora was never
mentioned in said decision, nor in the amended complaint and in
the amended motion for judgment on the pleadings that she ever
took any part in the act of transaction that gave rise to the damages
allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs for which they now claim some
compensation.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing premises, the Court
orders, as it hereby orders, the dismissal of this case with cost
against the plaintiffs.

TOWARD A COMPROMISE WERE MADE

PRIOR TO THE FILING THEREOF AS
REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY
ERRED IN NOT DENYING THE MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND
ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners should
have brought this case on appeal to the Court of Appeals since the order of the trial
court judge was actually a decision on the merits. On the other hand, even if petition
for certiorari were the proper remedy, they contend that the petition is defective
because the judge of the trial court has not been impleaded as a respondent. 8
Private respondents' contention is without merit. The petition in this case was filed
pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As explained in Atlas Consolidated Mining
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 9
Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved. A similar provision is contained in Section 17, fourth
paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where only
questions of law are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction
with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that the appeal to
the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which
shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial
court on questions of law have to be through the filing of a petition
for review on certiorari. It has been held that:

SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was
denied. 7 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contend:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGE
UNDER OATH THAT EARNEST EFFORTS

. . . when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the

exercise of its original jurisdiction, the correct
mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of
Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ
of error, involving merely the filing of a notice of
appeal except only if the appeal is taken in

special proceedings and other cases wherein

multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in
which even the filing of a record on appeal is
additionally required. Of course, when the appeal
would involve purely questions of law or any of
the other cases (except criminal cases as stated
hereunder) specified in Section 5(2), Article X of
the Constitution, it should be taken to the
Supreme Court by petition for review
oncertiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45
of the Rules of Court.
By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this
Court issued on March 9, 1930 Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of
which provides:
2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme
Court. Except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may
be appealed to the Supreme Court only by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, this being the clear intendment of the
provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to
the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition
forcertiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, the inescapable
conclusion is that herein petitioner adopted the correct mode of
appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Court petition to review
oncertiorari the decision of the Regional Trail Court of Pasig in Civil
Case No. 25528 and raising therein purely questions of law.
In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held: 10
It must also be stressed that the trial court's order of 5 June 1992
dismissing the petitioner's complaint was, whether it was right or
wrong, a final order because it had put an end to the particular
matter resolved, or settled definitely the matter therein disposed of
and left nothing more to be done by the trial court except the
execution of the order. It is a firmly settled rule that the remedy

against such order is the remedy of appeal and not certiorari. That
appeal may be solely on questions of law, in which case it may be
taken only to this Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which
case the appeal should be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this Court should be by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a final
order from which an appeal can be taken. It is final in the sense that it disposes of the
pending action before the court and puts an end to the litigation so that nothing more
was left for the trial court to do. 11 Furthermore, as the questions raised as the
questions of law, petition for review on certiorari is the proper mode of appeal. These
questions are: (1) whether after denying petitioners' motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the trial court could dismiss their complaint motu proprio for failure to
comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code which provides that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it appears from the complaint,
which must be verified, that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made
but the same have failed; and (2) whether Art. 151 applies to this case. These
questions do not require an examination of the probative value of evidence presented
and the truth or falsehood of facts asserted which questions of fact would entail. 12
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint when no motion to that effect was made by any of the parties. They point
out that, in opposing the motion for judgment on the pleadings, private respondents
did not seek the dismissal of the case but only the denial of petitioners' motion.
Indeed, what private respondents asked was that trial be held on the merits.
Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the dismissal of the
case even without a motion to that effect filed by any of the parties. In Baja v.
Macandog, 13 this Court mentioned these cases, to wit:
The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the
plaintiff's right to be heard, except in the following instances: if the
plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to prosecute
his action for unreasonable length of time; or if he fails to comply
with the rules or any order of the court; or if the court finds that it
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.
Moreover, the trial court itself found that "judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate
not only for the fact that [private respondents] in their answer . . . specifically denied
the claim of damages against them, but also because of the [rule] . . . that the party

claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof. . . . " Necessarily, a
trial must be held.
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: 14
Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the
adverse party's pleadings, the court may, on motion of the party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the
answer is filed, the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for
judgment on the pleadings filed by a party. 15 When there are actual issues
raised in the answer, such as one involving damages, which require the
presentation of evidence and assessment thereof by the trial court, it is
improper for the judge to render judgment based on the pleadings
alone. 16 In this case, aside from the amount of damages, the following
factual issues have to be resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora
Ayson's participation and/or liability, if any to petitioners and (2) the nature,
extent, and duration of private respondents' possession of the subject
property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied petitioners' motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
However, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground that,
although it alleged that earnest efforts had been made toward the settlement of the
case but they proved futile, the complaint was not verified for which reason the trial
court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.
The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal
requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true
and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made
to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply have ordered
petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the
rules in order that the ends of justice may be served. 17Otherwise, mere suspicion or
doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest efforts
had been made toward a compromise but the parties' efforts proved unsuccessful is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts
had not really been exerted would the court be justified in dismissing the action. Thus,
Art. 151 provides:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it

should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the
case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this
case since the suit is not exclusively among the family members. Citing several
cases 18 decided by this Court, petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in
the case involving the family members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to
compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson
is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the
requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant
and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151
of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family"
refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants,
and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. 19 As this Court held in Guerrero
v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI: 20
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v.
Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as member of
the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that case,
then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law"
(hence, also "brother-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the
New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of
the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of
"members of the family," we find no reason to alter existing
jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently, the court a quo erred in
ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts
towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal
effect in this jurisdiction. 21Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is
described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for
purposes of Art. 151.

Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the
ground that it in effect amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be
done since the Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion we have
reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon
this question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the
very lis mota of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23, 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET ASIDE and the case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
decision.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO,
JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana 1 against private respondent, this case
assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the
ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that
earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a
compromise and that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G.
Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to
dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7
December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner
Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis
B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the
basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and
amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their
respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege
that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently,
respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order
claiming that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was
not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that
Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to
dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration
holding that "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is
jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case." He warned that unless the complaint was
amended within five (5) days the case would be dismissed.
On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his
complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to
be without prejudice.

G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,
vs.

Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo.
He raises these legal issues: (a) whether brothers by affinity are considered members
of the same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil
Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring
earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted

and maintained; and, (b) whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground
for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as
a basic autonomous social institution. 2 This is also embodied in Art. 149, 3 and given
flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:

Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not

listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art.
150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the
family", we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently,
the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of
private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present suit.

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall

prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

In his Comment, Hernando argues that ". . . although both wives of the parties were
not impleaded, it remains a truism that being spouses of the contending parties, and
the litigation involves ownership of real property, the spouses' interest and
participation in the land in question cannot be denied, making the suit still a suit
between half-sisters . . ." 7

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.

Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his "wife has
no actual interest and participation in the land subject of the . . . suit, which the
petitioner bought, according to his complaint, before he married his wife." 8 This
factual controversy however may be best left to the court a quo to resolve when it
resumes hearing the case.

Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the
requirement is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified,
should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the
same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case
must be dismissed."
Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court
which provides as a ground for motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members
of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made."
The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code,
explains the reason for the requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first
exerted before a complaint is given due course
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder
and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the
same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate
and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers . . . A
litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a lawsuit
between strangers . . . 5
But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon
v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same
family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice

As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our ruling in

O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, 9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 10 that the attempt to
compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of
a suit between members of the same family, the absence of such allegation in the
complaint being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of
cause of action.
It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be
deemed to have waived the aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the
same in the Answer. On the other hand, we cannot sustain the proposition of private
respondent that the case was, after all, also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of
the Rules of Court 11 for failure of petitioner to comply with the court's order to amend
his complaint.
A review of the assailed orders does not show any directive which Guerrero
supposedly defied. The Order of 7 December 1992 merely gave Guerrero five (5)
days to file his motion and amended complaint with a reminder that the complaint
failed to allege that earnest efforts were exerted towards a compromise. The Order of
22 December 1992, which denied Guerrero's motion for reconsideration, simply
stated that "Plaintiff if it (sic) so desire must
amend the complaint otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case (emphasis
supplied) . . ." The Order of 29 January 1993 dismissing the case without prejudice
only made reference to an earlier order "admonishing" counsel for Guerrero to amend
the complaint, and an "admonition" is not synonymous with "order". Moreover, since

the assailed orders do not find support in our jurisprudence but, on the other hand,
are based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law, petitioner could
not be bound to comply with them. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of
7 December 1992, 22 December 1992 and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the
case may now be assigned, is directed to continue with Civil Case
No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006
SO ORDERED.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO, Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to nullify the Orders 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 122, dated November 8, 2001 2 and May 7, 2002 3denying herein petitioners
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial Reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of
Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his
wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan
from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that
his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones
that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage;
that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working
abroad. 4
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided
that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that
since the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts toward
a compromise had been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action. 5

Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike
Out and to Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases where one of the
parties is not a member of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the
Family Code, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground
for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts that since three of the party-defendants are
not members of his family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is
inapplicable and unavailable. Alberto also prayed that defendants be declared in
default for their failure to file their answer on time. 6
Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment with Opposition to the Motion to Strike and
to Declare Defendants in Default. 7 Private respondent, in turn, filed his Rejoinder. 8
On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders denying the
Motion to Dismiss, thus:
The court agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not
required before the filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case
involves parties who are strangers to the family. As aptly pointed out in the cases
cited by plaintiff, Magbaleta v. G[o]nong, L-44903, April 25, 1977 and Mendez v.
[B]iangon, L-32159, October 28, 1977, if one of the parties is a stranger, failure to
allege in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made by
plaintiff before filing the complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.
Insofar as plaintiffs prayer for declaration of default against defendants, the same is
meritorious only with respect to defendants Remedios Moreno and the Register of
Deeds of Kaloocan City. A declaration of default against defendant bank is not proper
considering that the filing of the Motion to Dismiss by said defendant operates to stop
the running of the period within which to file the required Answer. 9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. 10 Private respondent filed his
Comment, 11 after which petitioner filed its Reply. 12 Thereafter, private respondent
filed his Rejoinder. 13
On May 7, 2002, the RTC issued the second assailed Order denying petitioners
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The trial court ruled:
Reiterating the resolution of the court, dated November 8, 2001, considering that the
above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to the family, failure to allege
in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made by plaintiff, is
not a ground for a Motion to Dismiss.

Additionally, the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is defendant Remedios
Moreno who stands to be benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code, being a member
of the same family as that of plaintiff, only she may invoke said Art. 151. 14
xxx
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise
is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other
parties who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit. Corollarily, public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he applied the decision in the case of Magbaleta v. Gonong instead
of the ruling in the case of De Guzman v. Genato.
II. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that a party who is a stranger to the family of the
litigants could not invoke lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for
the dismissal of the complaint. 15
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant Petition for Certiorari should have been
filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Reiterating the established policy for the strict observance of this
doctrine, this Court held in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor 16 that:
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. As we stated in People v.
Cuaresma:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared
by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly

and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious
time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended
or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a
trier of facts.
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances,
such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of
the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the
following cases: (a)Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens right to bear arms;
(b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purgananon bail in extradition
proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on government
contract involving modernization and computerization of voters registration list;
(d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamoraon status and existence of a public office;
and (e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the
President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area. 17
In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its
failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the
instant petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant
petition should be dismissed.
And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by petitioner, the
instant petition likewise fails for lack of merit.
Restating its arguments in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner argues
that what is applicable to the present case is the Courts decision in De Guzman v.
Genato 18 and not in Magbaleta v. Gonong, 19 the former being a case involving a
husband and wife while the latter is between brothers.
The Court is not persuaded.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have

been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under
the Civil Code.
Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken,
essentially contains the same provisions, to wit:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. 20
The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article
151 of the Family Code was taken explains:
[I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward
a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It
is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
between strangers. 21
In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the alleged
owner of the subject property. The Court, taking into consideration the explanation
made by the Code Commision in its report, ruled that:
[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that
such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto,
whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to
the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay
and the complications that wranglings between or among relatives more often than
not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of
a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of
interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to
depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves. 22 x x
x.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same
family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made
towards a compromise before the action can prosper.

In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged
paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by the husband,
through the Philippine Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial
compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the presence of a party who is
not a family member, the requirements that earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been exerted must be complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code,
now Article 151 of the Family Code.
While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in
the Magbaleta is the one that now prevails because it is reiterated in the subsequent
cases of Gonzales v. Lopez, 23 Esquivias v. Court of Appeals,24 Spouses Hontiveros v.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City, 25 and the most recent case of Martinez v.
Martinez. 26 Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is
exclusively between or among family members.
The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in all of the
aforementioned cases should not equally apply to suits involving husband and wife.
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a husband and his
wife while Magbaleta is a case between brothers. However, the Court finds no
specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as
well as in the abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his
wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and
Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits
involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under Article 150 of the
Family Code, to wit:

(2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same family as respondent, may not
invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code.
Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151
of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or
among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be
invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ART. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 217. Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;

G.R. No. 185922

January 15, 2014

HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and

Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVISVILLAFUERTE, Petitioners,
vs.

JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D.

FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents
SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS,Respondents.

Beginning 1992 until his death in 1995, Dr. Favis was beset by various illnesses, such
as kidney trouble, hiatal hernia, congestive heart failure, Parkinsons disease and
pneumonia. He died of "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to multi-organ/system
failure secondary to sepsis secondary to pneumonia."4

PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 April 2008 Decision1 and 7
January 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86497
dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment of the Deed of Donation for failure to
exert earnest efforts towards a compromise.
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with
whom he had seven children named Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo Favis, Consolacion
Favis-Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, and Nelly
Favis-Villafuerte. When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana
Gonzales (Juana) as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G.
Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed
an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is
married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children, named Ma.
Theresa Joana D. Favis, Ma. Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Ma. Thea
D. Favis.
Dr. Favis died intestate on 29 July 1995 leaving the following properties:
1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, consisting an area of 898 square meters, more or less, bounded on the
north by Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by
Bonifacio St., and on the West by Carmen Giron; x x x;
2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an
assessed value of P126,000.00; x x x;
3. A parcel of residential land located in Brgy. VII, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
containing an area of 154 sq. ms., more or less, bounded on the North by
the High School Site; on the East by Gomez St., on the South by Domingo
[G]o; and on the West by Domingo Go; x x x;
4. A house with an assessed value of P17,600.00 x x x;
5. A parcel of orchard land located in Brgy. VI, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, containing
an area of 2,257 sq. ma. (sic) more or less, bounded on the North by Lot
1208; on the East by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on the
West by Lot 1211-B, 1212 and 1215 x x x.3

On 16 October 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation5 transferring and

conveying properties described in (1) and (2) in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.
Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with
Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 against Juana, Spouses Mariano and Larcelita and their
grandchildren as respondents.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents assert that the properties donated do
not form part of the estate of the late Dr. Favis because said donation was made inter
vivos, hence petitioners have no stake over said properties.6
The RTC, in its Pre-Trial Order, limited the issues to the validity of the deed of
donation and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of
Dr. Favis.7
In a Decision dated 14 November 2005, the RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and
cancelled the corresponding tax declarations. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at
the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental
capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. Holding that the subsequent marriage
of Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated the status of Mariano, the trial court also declared
Juana and Mariano as compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. The dispositive portion
reads:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Deed of
Donation dated October 16, 1994 is hereby annulled and the corresponding tax
declarations issued on the basis thereof cancelled. Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. having died
without a will, his estate would result to intestacy. Consequently, plaintiffs Heirs of Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr., namely Purita A. Favis, Reynaldo A. Favis, Consolacion F.
Queliza, Mariano A. Favis, Jr., Esther F. Filart, Mercedes A. Favis, Nelly F. Villafuerte
and the defendants Juana Gonzales now deceased and Mariano G. Favis, Jr. shall
inherit in equal shares in the estate of the late Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. which consists of
the following:
1. A parcel of residential land located at Bonifacio St. Brgy. 1, Vigan City,
Ilocos Sur, consisting an area of 89 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the
north by Salvador Rivero; on the East by Eleutera Pena; on the South by
Bonifacio St., and on the West by Carmen Giron;

2. A commercial building erected on the aforesaid parcel of land with an

assessed value of P126,000.00;
3. One-half (1/2) of the house located in Brgy. VI, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur[,]
containing an area of 2,257 sq. meters more or less, bounded on the north
by Lot 1208; on the east by Mestizo River; on the South by Lot 1217 and on
the West by Lot 1211-B, 1212 and 1215.
4. The accumulated rentals of the new Vigan Coliseum in the amount of One
Hundred Thirty [Thousand] (P130,000.00) pesos per annum from the death
of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr.8
Respondents interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals challenging the trial
courts nullification, on the ground of vitiated consent, of the Deed of Donation in favor
of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners
nullification case. However, it did so not on the grounds invoked by herein
respondents as appellant.
The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of
petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code. The appellate court justified its
order of dismissal by invoking its authority to review rulings of the trial court even if
they are not assigned as errors in the appeal.

3. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously failed to appreciate that the

filing of an intervention by Edward Favis had placed the case beyond the
scope of Article 151 of the Family Code.
4. Even assuming arguendo without admitting that the filing of intervention
by Edward Favis had no positive effect to the complaint filed by petitioners, it
is still a serious error for the Honorable Court of Appeals to utterly disregard
the fact that petitioners had substantially complied with the requirements of
Article 151 of the Family Code.
5. Assuming arguendo that petitioners cannot be construed as complying
substantially with Article 151 of the Family Code, still, the same should be
considered as a non-issue considering that private respondents are in
estoppel.
6. The dismissal of the complaint by the Honorable Court of Appeals
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of
jurisdiction and a complete defiance of the doctrine of primacy of substantive
justice over strict application of technical rules.
7. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely and seriuosly erred in not
affirming the decision of the Court a quo that the Deed of Donation is void.9

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the case is not subject to
compromise as it involves future legitime.

In their Comment, respondents chose not to touch upon the merits of the case, which
is the validity of the deed of donation. Instead, respondents defended the ruling the
Court of Appeals that the complaint is dismissible for failure of petitioners to allege in
their complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted.

The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners contention when it ruled that the prohibited
compromise is that which is entered between the decedent while alive and
compulsory heirs. In the instant case, the appellate court observed that while the
present action is between members of the same family it does not involve a testator
and a compulsory heir. Moreover, the appellate court pointed out that the subject
properties cannot be considered as "future legitime" but are in fact, legitime, as the
instant complaint was filed after the death of the decedent.

The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of
dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made. The appellate court committed egregious error in
dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts decision hinged on Article 151 of the
Family Code, viz:

Undaunted by this legal setback, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the
following arguments:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals GRAVELY and SERIOUSLY ERRED in

DISMISSING the COMPLAINT.
2. Contrary to the finding of the Honorable Court of Appeals, the verification
of the complaint or petition is not a mandatory requirement.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under
the Civil Code.

The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds:
xxxx
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the
grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of
the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or
by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio
dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis
pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action.10Specifically in Gumabon v.
Larin,11 cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr.,12 the Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances
when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the
plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court.
Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of
the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2,
Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a
court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or
evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.13
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is
kept within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of

Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a
ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members
from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the
Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that
such a motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the
motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so
inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia ; res judicata ; and prescription of
action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has
been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense
is deemed waived.
It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas14 cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v.
ALS Management and Development Corporation15 where we noted that the second
sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule that
defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu propio on any of the enumerated
grounds. The tenor of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu
propio dismissal can proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which
is but logical because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.
Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among
members of the same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza
v. Versoza,16 a case for future support which was dismissed by the trial court upon the
ground that there was no such allegation of infringement of Article 222 of the Civil
Code, the origin of Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a
complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a compromise and as such the
absence of the required allegation in the complaint cannot be a ground for objection
against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The
proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the
requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon
the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-matter of the action
remains as one for support, custody of children, and damages, cognizable by the
court below.
To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,17 allowed an amendment which "
merely corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellants cause of action,
because as it then stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action." We there

ruled out as inapplicable the holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista,18 that
an amendment cannot be made so as to confer jurisdiction on the court x x x. (Italics
supplied).
Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a
compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional
defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action. Versoza was cited in
a later case as an instance analogous to one where the conciliation process at the
barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were described as a "condition
precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court."19 In such instances, the consequence
is precisely what is stated in the present Rule. Thus:
x x x The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a
motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.20(Underscoring supplied).
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The
complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents without a prior motion to
dismiss having been filed. The decision in favor of the petitioners was appealed by
respondents on the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention
having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other
words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a
condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as
error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is
wholly applicable to respondent.1wphi1 If the respondents as parties-defendants
could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the
objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise,
the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio
order the dismissal of petitioners complaint.
Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which
provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as "having been
given more teeth"21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that
the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise,
has been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 of the Family Code
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed to
breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.22

The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the
respondents were concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation
was shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss but on the respondents
insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the subject properties. Nor
could it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial Order specifically limited the
issues to the validity of the deed and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano
are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Respondents not only confined their arguments
within the pre-trial order; after losing their case, their appeal was based on the
proposition that it was error for the trial court to have relied on the ground of vitiated
consent on the part of Dr. Favis.
The Court of Appeals ignored the facts of the case that clearly demonstrated the
refusal by the respondents to compromise. Instead it ordered the dismissal of
petitioners complaint on the ground that it did not allege what in fact was shown
during the trial. The error of the Court of Appeals is patent.
Unfortunately for respondents, they relied completely on the erroneous ruling of the
Court of Appeals even when petitioners came to us for review not just on the basis of
such defective motu propio action but also on the proposition that the trial court
correctly found that the donation in question is flawed because of vitiated consent.
Respondents did not answer this argument. The trial court stated that the facts are:
x x x To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the action for
annulment, the mental state/condition of the donor Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. at the time
of its execution must be taken into account. Factors such as his age, health and
environment among others should be considered. As testified to by Dr. Mercedes
Favis, corroborated by Dr. Edgardo Alday and Dra. Ofelia Adapon, who were all
presented as expert witnesses, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had long been suffering from
Hiatal Hernia and Parkinsons disease and had been taking medications for years.
That a person with Parkinsons disease for a long time may not have a good
functioning brain because in the later stage of the disease, 1/3 of death develop from
this kind of disease, and or dementia. With respect to Hiatal Hernia, this is a state
wherein organs in the abdominal cavity would go up to the chest cavity, thereby
occupying the space for the lungs causing the lungs to be compromised. Once the
lungs are affected, there is less oxygenation to the brain. The Hernia would cause the
heart not to pump enough oxygen to the brain and the effect would be chronic,
meaning, longer lack of oxygenation to the brain will make a person not in full control
of his faculties. Dr. Alday further testified that during his stay with the house of Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr. (1992-1994), he noticed that the latter when he goes up and down
the stairs will stop after few seconds, and he called this pulmonary cripple a very
advanced stage wherein the lungs not only one lung, but both lungs are
compromised. That at the time he operated on the deceased, the left and right lung
were functioning but the left lung is practically not even five (5%) percent functioning
since it was occupied by abdominal organ. x x x.

Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. during the execution of the Deed of Donation was already 92
years old; living with the defendants and those years from 1993 to 1995 were the
critical years when he was sick most of the time. In short, hes dependent on the care
of his housemates particularly the members of his family. It is the contention of the
defendants though that Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had full control of his mind during the
execution of the Deed of Donation because at that time, he could go on with the
regular way of life or could perform his daily routine without the aid of anybody like
taking a bath, eating his meals, reading the newspaper, watching television, go to the
church on Sundays, walking down the plaza to exercise and most importantly go to
the cockpit arena and bet. Dr. Ofelia Adapon, a neurology expert however, testified
that a person suffering from Parkinsons disease when he goes to the cockpit does
not necessarily mean that such person has in full control of his mental faculties
because anyone, even a retarded person, a person who has not studied and have no
intellect can go to the cockpit and bet. One can do everything but do not have control
of his mind. x x x That Hiatal Hernia creeps in very insidiously, one is not sure
especially if the person has not complained and no examination was done. It could be
there for the last time and no one will know. x x x.
The Deed of Donation in favor of the defendants Ma. Theresa, Joana D. Favis, Maria
Cristina D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis and Maria Thea D. Favis, all of whom are the
children of Mariano G. Favis, Jr. was executed on [16 October] 1994, seven (7)
months after Dra. Mercedes Favis left the house of Dr. Favis, Sr. at Bonifacio St.,
Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, where she resided with the latter and the defendants.
Putting together the circumstances mentioned, that at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Donation, Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was already at an advanced age of 92,
afflicted with different illnesses like Hiatal hernia, Parkinsons disease and
pneumonia, to name few, which illnesses had the effects of impairing his brain or
mental faculties and the deed being executed only when Dra. Mercedes Favis had
already left his fathers residence when Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. could have done so
earlier or even in the presence of Dra. Mercedes Favis, at the time he executed the
Deed of Donation was not in full control of his mental faculties. That although age of
senility varies from one person to another, to reach the age of 92 with all those
medications and treatment one have received for those illnesses, yet claim that his
mind remains unimpaired, would be unusual. The fact that the Deed of Donation was
only executed after Dra. Mercedes Favis left his father's house necessarily indicates
that they don't want the same to be known by the first family, which is an indicia of
bad faith on the part of the defendant, who at that time had influence over the donor.23
The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The
respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously
though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands
unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it
reversed.

The issue of the validity of donation was fully litigated and discussed by the trial court.
Indeed, the trial court's findings were placed at issue before the Court of Appeals but
the appellate court chose to confine its review to the procedural aspect. The judgment
of the Court of Appeals, even if it dealt only with procedure, is deemed to have
covered all issues including the correctness of the factual findings of the trial court.
Moreover, remanding the case to the Court of Appeals would only constitute
unwarranted delay in the final disposition of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in
an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home
constituted under the Family Code.
The facts are undisputed.
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 09218 entitled"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the
dispositive part of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is
hereby, reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered
finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as
hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-appellees are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to:
1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death
of their son Audie Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of
said Audie Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato
Culan- Culan; and
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLANSALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO
PLATA respondents.

3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for

attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1

The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods
and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag,
Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value
of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 8700801359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial
Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market
value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-0801848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial
Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose
Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case
and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152
and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and
that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is
not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the
agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still
part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper
government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit
on September 2, 1988.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial
court erred and acted in excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to
quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in denying petitioner' motion for
reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a
question of law is involved in this petition. He asserts that the residential house and
lot was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a
family home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus,
petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of
the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in
this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on
March 16, 1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one of those instances
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code when the family home may be
levied upon and sold on execution. It is further alleged that the trial court erred in

holding that the said house and lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988
when the Family Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be
interpreted in such a way that all family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy prior to the effectivity of the
said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred when it declared that
Article 162 of the Family Code does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
have a retroactive effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and
the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before
extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,

material men and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of
the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as
a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a
family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on
August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time
it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article
162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also
govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does
not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time
of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment
aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was
incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.
Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does
not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that
the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have
on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992

FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., respondents.
MELO, J.:
Following the dismissal of his petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 23651 by the
Thirteenth Division of respondent Court (Justice Buena (P), Gonzaga-Reyes and
Abad Santos, Jr., JJ.; Page 60, Rollo), petitioner airs his concern over the propriety
thereof by claiming in the petition at hand that the disposition, in practical effect,
allows a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the court of origin against his
corporation to be implemented on his family home which is ordinarily exempt from the
mesne process.
Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment
signed between petitioner's corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed
on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary
attachment, against the former. As a consequence of the order on July 28, 1989, the
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued on August 11, 1989 which
triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by Manacop
Construction President Florante F. Manacop, herein petitioner.
In lieu of the original complaint, private respondent submitted an amended complaint
on August 18, 1989 intended to substitute Manacop Construction with Florante F.
Manacop as defendant who is "doing business under the name and style of F.F.
Manacop Construction Co., Inc.". After the motion for issuance of summons to the
substituted defendant below was granted, petitioner filed his answer to the amended
complaint on November 20, 1989.
Petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed on September 5, 1990 grounded on (1) irregularity
that attended the issuance of the disputed writ inspite the absence of an affidavit

therefor; (2) the feasibility of utilizing the writ prior to his submission as partydefendant, and (3) exemption from attachment of his family home (page 3, Petition;
page 8,Rollo), did not merit the serious consideration of the court of origin. This
nonchalant response constrained petitioner to elevate the matter to respondent court
which, as aforesaid, agreed with the trial court on the strength of the ensuing
observations:
Anent the petitioner's claim that the writ of attachment was issued
without jurisdiction because of the lack of supporting affidavit, We
subscribe to the recent ruling of the Highest Tribunal that a verified
statement incorporated in the complaint without a separate affidavit
is sufficient and valid to obtain the attachment (Nasser vs. Court of
Appeals, 191 SCRA 783). In the case at bar, the original as well as
the amended complaint filed by herein private respondent were
verified, in substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family
home, having been occupied by him and his family since 1972, and
is therefore exempt from attachment.
The contention is not well-taken.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home
is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article
has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences,
petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 (Mondequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766).
Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means
that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code (Mondequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner's debt was
incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity
of the Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from
attachment (Annex "O", Plaintiff's Position Paper and Memorandum
of Authorities, p. 78). (pp. 5-6, Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo).
The attempt to reconsider respondent court's stance was to no avail (page 75, Rollo);
hence, the petition at bar.

Did respondent court err in dismissing the challenge posed by petitioner against the
denial of his omnibus motion?
We are not ready to accept the negative aspersions put forward by petitioner against
respondent court in the petition before Us.
Petitioner harps on the supposition that the appellate court should not have pierced
the veil of corporate fiction because he is distinct from the personality of his
corporation and, therefore, the writ of attachment issued against the corporation
cannot be used to place his own family home in custodia legis. This puerile argument
must suffer rejection since the doctrine in commercial law adverted to and employed
in exculpation by petitioner, during the pendency of his petition for certiorari in the
appellate court and even at this stage, may not be permitted to simply sprout from
nowhere for such subtle experiment is prescribed by the omnibus motion rule under
Section 8, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived.
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the movant to raise
all available exceptions for relief during a single opportunity so that multiple and
piece-meal objections may be avoided (Rafanan, et al. vs. Rafanan, 98 Phil. 162
[1955]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court with Notes and Comments, 1989 Rev. Edition, p. 492;
Savit vs. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310 [1941]).
Another mistaken notion entertained by petitioner concerns the impropriety of issuing
the writ of attachment on August 11, 1989 when he "was not yet a defendant in this
case." This erroneous perception seems to suggest that jurisdiction over the person
of petitioner, as defendant below, must initially attach before the provisional remedy
involved herein can be requested by a plaintiff. A contrario, Chief Justice Narvasa
obliterated this unfounded assertion in Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (204 SCRA [1991]) whose dissertation on the subject as related and applied
to the present inquiry is quite enlightening:
It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been
commenced and jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff has
been vested in the court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or
his voluntary submission to the court's authority), nothing can be
validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is wrong to assume that
the validity of acts done during this period should be dependent on,
or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over
the defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction

over the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the
subject-matter or nature of the action, or the res or object thereof.
An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter or nature of the action or proceeding is
invoked or called into activity, and it thus that the court acquires
over said subject matter or nature of the action. And it is by that
self-same act of the plaintiff (or petitioner) of filing the complaint (or
other appropriate pleading) by which he signifies his submission
to the court's power and authority that jurisdiction is acquired by
the court over his person. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is obtained, as above stated, by the
service of summons or other coercive process upon him or by his
voluntary submission to the authority of the court.
The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of
routine are well known. After the complaint is filed, summons issues
to the defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the sheriff,
and finally, service of the summons is effected on the defendant in
any of the ways authorized by the Rules of Court. There is thus
ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of
filing of the complaint and the day of service of summons of the
defendant. During this period, different acts may be done by the
plaintiff or by the Court, which are of unquestionable validity and
propriety. Among these, for example, are the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, the grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute
the suit as a pauper litigant, the amendment of the complaint by the
plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court, authorization by
the Court of service of summons by publication, the dismissal of the
action by the plaintiff on mere notice.
This, too, is true with regard to the provisional remedies of
preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction, receivership or
replevin. They may be validly and properly applied for and granted
even before the defendant is summoned or heard from.
A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules
of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or
other proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at
any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken
into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered. It is a remedy which is purely

statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of

the provisions granting it. Withal no principle, statutory or
jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Rule in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter," The phrase,
"at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date
of the filing of the complaint which, as above pointed out, is the
date that marks "the commencement of the action; and the
reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the
defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying
quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced by the
filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and
other fees the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites
laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before
or after service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has
been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts: for the
plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for
attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading
(counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court
to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement application
otherwise sufficient in form and substance. (at pp. 347-350.)
Petitioner seeks to capitalize on the legal repercussion that ipso facto took place
when the complaint against him was amended. He proffers the idea that the extinction
of a complaint via a superseding one carries with it the cessation of the ancilliary writ
of preliminary attachment. We could have agreed with petitioner along this line had he
expounded the adverse aftermath of an amended complaint in his omnibus motion.
But the four corners of his motion in this respect filed on September 5, 1990 are
circumscribed by other salient points set forth by Us relative to the propriety of the
assailed writ itself. This being so, petitioner's eleventh hour effort in pressing a crucial
factor for exculpation must be rendered ineffective and barred by the omnibus motion
rule.
Lastly, petitioner is one of the belief that his abode at Quezon City since 1972 is a
family home within the purview of the Family Code and therefore should not have
been subjected to the vexatious writ. Yet, petitioner must concede that respondent
court properly applied the discussion conveyed by Justice Gancayco in this regard
when he spoke for the First Division of this Court in Modequillo vs. Breva (185 SCRA
766 [1990]) that:
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from

execution, forced sale or attachment except:

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the

money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability which was the
basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January
29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the Family Code. (at pp. 771-772).

(1) For non-payment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, materialmen and others who
have rendered service for the construction of the
building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of
the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in 1987 or prior to the effectivity
on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22, Rollo). This fact
alone will militate heavily against the so-called exemption by sheer force of exclusion
embodied under paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited inModequillo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially
under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a
family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family
home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in
1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is
provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said
Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

G.R. No. 170829

November 20, 2006

PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner,

vs.
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second
Division, Respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
annul and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 9,
20051 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for partition filed by
petitioner for being contrary to law and evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford
corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of
Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or
less.2
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially
settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992)
was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private
respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private
respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc
instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002,3 the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the
following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino
G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction
wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject
property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner.4
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial
court on August 11, 2003,5hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which
denied the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially
reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and
Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite
the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The
heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to
rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent,
who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor
beneficiary of the family home.6

Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH
AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03
OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC
AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF
THE FAMILY CODE ON FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON
CO-OWNERSHIP.7
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the coowners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly
constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor
beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of
the decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the
same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent
insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino
on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be
considered as the family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family
home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997,
which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues
that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were already of
age at the time of the death of their father,8 hence there is no more minor beneficiary
to speak of.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during ones lifetime.9 It is the dwelling house where husband and
wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is
situated.10 It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family.11 The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied

as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and
to the extent of the value allowed by law.12
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is
something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not
be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by
the "beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include
the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But
the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries
contemplated by the Code.13
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family
home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who
depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in
the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons
who constituted the family home.1wphi1 Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the
effect of death of one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the
continuing existence of the family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the
family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate
property as family home, the property will remain as family home for ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more beneficiary left
at the time of death, we believe the family home will be dissolved or cease,
because there is no more reason for its existence. If there are beneficiaries who
survive living in the family home, it will continue for ten years, unless at the

expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the
family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the heirs
who are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not partitioning the property
after the period provided by this article? We believe that although the heirs will
continue in ownership by not partitioning the property, it will cease to be a
family home.14 (Emphasis supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued existence
is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing
therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or
both spouses are already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts. 153,
159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and within
this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there are
compelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule applies regardless of
whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home.15 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there
are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10
years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which
case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family
home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the
spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the
spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family
home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall
be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The
intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of theminor
beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting
himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled
to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the
minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154
of the Family Code.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and
wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate
or illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must
necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who
constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where
the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents
minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the
first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family
home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV,
also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent
Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years
from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand
support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of
his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the
shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the
obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandmother, but from his father.1wphi1Thus, despite residing in the family home
and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV
cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did
not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It
is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his
own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law,
comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.16 Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on
family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot
be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or
execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.17
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly
from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are

capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support
under Art. 199.18 We agree with this view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the
relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation
to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed
first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son;
neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother,
was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons legal support. On the contrary,
herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an intention to
dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results
in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded
every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these
situations from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,19 no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a coownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any
time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.20
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have
ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court. Not more than three competent and disinterested persons should be appointed
as commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff
and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court
shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion
thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the
court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he
pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem
equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of
being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the
real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly.21

The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule
embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil Code.22 Under the law of intestate succession, if the
widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as that of each
of the children. However, since only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned
by the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to
be given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of the property),
the widow will have the same share as each of her two surviving children. Hence, the
respective shares of the subject property, based on the law on intestate succession
are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3)
Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,23 we held that an action for partition is at once
an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court after trial should find the
existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the
partition of the properties in the same action.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who
is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual
physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein,
in the following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and
Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical
metes and bounds of the property and the proper share appertaining to each heir,
including the improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When
it is made to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be
divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may order
it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the
other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable,
unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate
at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter
distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each heir. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in

favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938
up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then
prevailing, entered the land in question.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano
Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in
question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the
plea that only question of law are involved.
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her
son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his
favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueas. If the son born to the couple is
deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then
the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to
succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined hinges on
the legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is
concerned. The determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship that
had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife during the period of conception of
the child up to the date of his birth in connection with the death of the alleged father
Emiliano Andal.

G.R. No. L-2474

May 30, 1951

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as guardian ad litem, and

MARIA DUEAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad
litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of
Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal
was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother

The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of
tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in
his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became
worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife,
eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle
of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each
other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence
of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas
gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts,
can the child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of
the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first

one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth
of the child.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1,
1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he
having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the
marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of
the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was
physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was
sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his
bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?
Manresa on this point says:
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during
the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and
incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation
took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Manresa, 492-500,
Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942
and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to
show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under
the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and
the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude
cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already
suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly
move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But
experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases
where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most
crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has
said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is
probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the
disease." (An Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p.2202). There is
neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent,
continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The
presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore,
been overcome.

We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule
123, of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son
d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section provides:
The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty
days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration of three
hundred days following its dissolution.
We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had
access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within
three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other
presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also seen that
this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally
impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof.
The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery can not also overcome this
presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).
In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not err
in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueas.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,

vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious.
Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old
at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor
by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the
legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the
cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly,
the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto.4
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the
Court, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as
null and void "ab initio";
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel
from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE
recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the
City Prosecutor, counsel for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to
counsel for petitioner.
G.R. No. 138493

June 15, 2000

SO ORDERED.
The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition
for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred
to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 3046.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is the only
surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on
September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by "hilot" in the house of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of
said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording
of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the
spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and
made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her
signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and
personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their
house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is
void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant
forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear
as the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of Hermogena Cariosa, the
mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name
BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her
mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an
illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it; that the
respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is
patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for
the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth
was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already
65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto
would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of
cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication,
notice and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of
birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective
and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the
registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry
No. 16035.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of
hearing thereof in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the
office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the petition states
no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as
the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa Babiera;
that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to
Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred
by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an
answer/opposition in behalf of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who]
was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent."
In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always known as
Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only
surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C.
Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal
and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate
of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . . Certificate of
Baptism, . . . Student's Report Card . . . all incorporated in her answer, are
eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative
defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause
of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child
of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Carioza Babiera; that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article
171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that
petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no
evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further
observed that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy
had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took place at
home, notwithstanding the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical
complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil
registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena,
was different from her other signatures.

The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which
stated that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was
not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation
wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this
case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being
void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the
mother.
Hence, this appeal.6
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal
capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031
subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 is
improper and is barred by [the] statute of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to
hold, that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the selfserving oral testimony of respondent.7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of
the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 1718 of
the Family Code states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or,
in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not
subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the
present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in
interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit."9 The interest of respondent in the civil
status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the

former. 10 The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her
parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A
close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that
the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer
herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does
not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171
of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles
provide:
xxx

xxx

xxx

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate
a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the
child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child
of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological
or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in
case of children conceived insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading
as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of
his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these
articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the
heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not horn to
Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art.
170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision

refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this

case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child
of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all.
Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. 12(Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late
Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170 of the Family Code
which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought
within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in
the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of
birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to
the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of
petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive
period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to
nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio. 1
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's
testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the presumption of
regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.

While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys
the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as
the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate
itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. 14 More important, the Court of
Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her
signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena
is not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's
pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
Hermogena during that time.1awphil Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given
birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home,
when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a
hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena
Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was
not hers nor her husband Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:
q Who are your children?
a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your
husband Eugenio Babiera, what can you say about that?
a She is not our child.
xxx

xxx

xxx

q Do you recall where she was born?

a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in
your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.

q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your
daughter with your husband?
a No, sir. 15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has
presented no other evidence other than the said document to show that she is really
Hermogena's child; Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother
would make a deposition stating that the former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the
appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1

The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned
various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente
followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990,
private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister
and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San
Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They
alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so,
that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who predeceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extrajudicial, were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever,
and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by
them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor
legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the
sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.
The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the
estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of
the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal
Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership
with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4)
School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared an
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private
respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses
failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36)
years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetriciangynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister
of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, 2 categorically declared that petitioner was
not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed
the private respondents petition for letters and administration and declared petitioner
as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by
the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the Decision of
the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED
and another one entered declaring that appellee Marissa Benitez is
not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of
the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for
the appointment of an administrator of the intestate of the deceased
Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED; said petition and the
proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the lower
court is directed to proceed with the hearing of Special proceeding
No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee. SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles
166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and
misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the provisions,
more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in
this case and in adopting and upholding private respondent's theory
that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or
impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still
the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence of
witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and demeanor
have not convinced the trial court of the truth and sincerity thereof,
than the documentary and testimonial evidence of the now
petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;

3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way

not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the supreme
Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the
Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife
with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise
legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both
of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the
child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together
with the birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following
grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been that of the husband except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or

3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination,

the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the
birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the
place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was
recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs,
the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the
birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, which
ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the
child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article only in the
following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed
for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having
desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature
or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where
a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166,
it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that
for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3)
that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading
as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his
heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the

appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.
For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending
that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner
was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable
to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child
of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all.
Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is
not a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the
biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as
follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's
evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood
kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is
strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being
childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late
Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby,
and without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for,
reared, considered, and loved her as their own true child, giving her
the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she
was really their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian
never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child.
Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted
that his sister had already been married for ten years and was
already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten or still
could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to the late
Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetriciangynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his

sister for a number of years. There is likewise the testimony of the

elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez
Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy
and the youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through
law school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and
consulted on family matters, that her brother Vicente and his wife
Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter
and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere,
that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as
she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that
Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister
Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child.
Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to
travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her
testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held
at her residence in Paraaque, MM. Considering, her advanced
age and weak physical condition at the time she testified in this
case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and
credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time,
she would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can
be expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness.
There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna
(Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who
testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel
almost everyday especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor
of her house, but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in
1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born,
according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and
that it is also true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A.
Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her
hair once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that
she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that
Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby
Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the
latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the baby
came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by Atty.
Benitez and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with
child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be
hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby
at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a
baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36

(the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was

allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of
that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O.
Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly questionable and
suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36 years
old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of
that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the
child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced,
skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr.
Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by
Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and
even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth
certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a
midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a
practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense
and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as their
supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a
lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if not the
expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings
by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents of the child in
her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the
child when she grew a little older but did not come around doing so
either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But
definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological
daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr.
Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the
extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs
of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without
descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness
stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty.

Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he signed

the same only because the latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn, Nov.
22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make such a statement in
said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really his
and his wife's daughter and descendant and, therefore, not his
deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely
explained that he signed said document without understanding
completely the meaning of the words "descendant and ascendant"
(p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian
being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to the United
States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee,
the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother-in-law, as
against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is
really the daughter and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her death,
would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my
husband and my child or only daughter will inherit
what is legally my own property, in case I die
without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband
that any inheritance due him from my property
when he die to make our own daughter his
sole heir. This do [sic] not mean what he legally
owns or his inherited property. I leave him to
decide for himself regarding those.
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the
daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian,
it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for
the foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa would be
their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian
had to implore and supplicate her husband to give appellee
although without any legal papers her properties when she dies,
and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the properties that he
would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is
not truly their daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her
(Isabel's) husband makes her so.

Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria

Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because
that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is
indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the
mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday unless it
is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by
Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her the birth
date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record.
The weight of these findings was not negated by documentary evidence presented by
the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3")
purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28,
1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article
410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related above, the totality of contrary
evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the
content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence, the most
telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel
Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated that
"(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died
without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that
he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he
signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-49162

July 28, 1987

JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE
S. SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51078R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s action for recognition and

support against private respondent, and from the respondent Court"s resolution,
dated 11 October 1978, denying petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said
decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her
mother and guardian-ad-litemArlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V.
Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which
was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon
order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969,
indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and
Arlene S. Salgado.1
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon
plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on
the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his
monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to
appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing
whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao
argued that the result of the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable
evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial court"s
decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that JAO
was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by
Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not long
thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived
together as husband and wife. ...
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied ARLENE
to the Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and her confinement
was with JAO"s consent. JAO paid the rentals where they lived, the salaries
of the maids, and other household expenses. ...
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16,
1968, after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE
must have conceived JANICE on or about the first week of December, 1967.
"Thus, one issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether on or about that
time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse and were already living with
one another as husband and wife.

In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in the
third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside
Club; that after several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at her
house at 30 Long beach, Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the evening of
November 30, 1967, and that he started to live with her at her dwelling after
December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the Saddle
and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December
14, 1967 because the day following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin
Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went to Mindoro by boat. He dated
ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He remembered he had carnal
knowledge of her for the first time on January 18, 1968, because that was a
week after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started
cohabiting with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the
paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the
NBI and which resulted in the negative finding that in a union with ARLENE,
JAO could not be the father of JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a
position to determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage by
blood grouping test, considering the rulings of this Court ... where the blood
grouping tests of the NBI were admitted; especially where, in the latter case,
it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who conducted the test and it appears that in the
present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the findings and report. ... In
Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had given
weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has
been recognized as early as the 1950"s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of
blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it
can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of the
child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the father
of a particular child, but at least can show only a possibility that he
is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized
the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions
have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where
the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in

which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely

accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred
where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting
with the results of the test.
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact
of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or
any one of many others with the same blood type may have been
the father of the child. But the Uniform Act recognizes that the tests
may have some probative value to establish paternity where the
blood type and the combination in the child is shown to be rare, in
which case the judge is given discretion to let it in (I Jones on
Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific opinion is
now in accord in accepting the fact that there is a causative relation
between the trait of the progenitor and the trait of the progeny. In
other words, the blood composition of a child may be some
evidence as to the child"s paternity. But thus far this trait (in the
present state of scientific discovery as generally accepted) can be
used only negatively i.e. to evidence that a particular man F is not
the father of a particular child C. (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed.,
pp. 610-611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood test,
JANICE claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in cases
where they tended to establish paternity; and that there has been no case
where the blood test was invoked to establish non-paternity, thereby
implying that blood tests have probative value only when the result is a
possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This contention is
fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would
be recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood
grouping test itself for if the result were negative, the test is regarded
worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an admitted test, it is admissible in
subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be in the negative or in
the affirmative. ...
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner"s
contention that JAO"s actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount to
recognition. Said the respondent appellate court:
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his
own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the
latter"s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather

than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE, the
attention given to her during her pregnancy and the financial assistance
extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping test.
These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE
as his own as the possession of such status cannot be founded on
conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier said, JAO
refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of
Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which provides:
"When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter.
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said
article which states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived
from November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that
her first sexual intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the
latter avers it was one week after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy
paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must have been conceived when
ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE
herself testified that their cohabitation started only after December 16, 1967,
then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during this
cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot
be had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her
alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of
conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying"
Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and considering
that it was Melvin Yabut, who introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside
Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not wholly reliable. When the
trial court said that "the Court is further convinced of plaintiff"s cause by
ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and candid
manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have
been overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by her acts,
whether she was lying or not.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new
one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s complaint. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm
paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an action for declaration of
filiation, support and damages. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests
stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible
father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that the child must
have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI
expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can
only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the
other facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish
that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel."3
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests
to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For
the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal
scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the child
is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove
that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the
possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are
crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.4
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove
non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin5 the
positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that
proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as
final on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity
consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the
alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation. The Court
said that the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff,
and to reject such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it
was stated, should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result was to deny progress.7 This ruling was
also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph,8 a filiation proceeding where an uncontradicted
blood grouping test evidence, excluding paternity, was held conclusive.9 Legislation
expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several
states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-paternity, thus

Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which
can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type
of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the
other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the impossibility
of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the
alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and
child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood test
exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-paternity. 12

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without

pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover,
The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a
ground for compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have
produced the conception of the child. This would be the case, for instance, if
the cohabitation took place outside of the period of conception of the child.
Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child and the supposed
father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot be a
ground for recognition. 13
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the
instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the
tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear
to be without merit. The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a
serologist, and has had extensive practice in this area for several years. The blood
tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood
grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System,14 under witness and
supervision.15
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper
subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood
test, she, represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to
prove or disprove their allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test
again.161avvphi1
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the
result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and
conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No
evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or
failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result
of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore quoted,
which are binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further pass upon the
issue of recognition raised by petitioner.

G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented by her
mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
NOCON, J.:
After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill the
earth. Others did not heed the sequence of this command because they multiply first
and then go. Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate
offspring to sue his father for recognition and support.
The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to
Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less that
a year's time, she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco
distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they
renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of goods.
Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate and
with his promise of marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They
stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company

branch office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came home to
her three or four times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid
rentals, lights and water bills. 1 Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was
provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner used to give
her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner
and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a
still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by
petitioner. 2 Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54, Makati, private
respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila
Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of
Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. 3 Leoncia submitted
receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from
December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. 4
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of
cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) 5 or
thru Merceditas herself; 6 and sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532, 7 the signature appearing thereon having been
identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her checks which he
issues at home and saw him sign the checks. 8 Both petitioner and his daughter
admitted that the check and the signature are those of the former. 9
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he
showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the
St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth
grading periods 10 as her parent. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia
and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their presence and of
Elynia. 11 Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one
whom she recognized as her Daddy. 12 He treated her as a father would to his child.
He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her
for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. 13
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia
his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong." 14
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and
petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the
morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon.
When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it

was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already
past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning
for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for
her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.
Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes
with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila,
upon his instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes of
explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt. 15 They stayed at
112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to
Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped
coming home.
Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia
and Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite
column 16 of the death certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although in
column 13 thereof opposite father's name the typewritten name, Artemio G. Ilano,
appears. He also denied the following: all the notes alleged to have been received
from him by Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in Merceditas'
Report Card; and being the source of a photo of himself with a handwritten
dedication. He admitted that Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 including
the signature is his. He was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized on
January 7, 1964. 16 He does not understand why this case was filed against him. 17
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia,
leased it in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and
Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. They later transferred to San Juan
St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped visiting her in March or April,
1963 because he planned to get married with another which he eventually did in
September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by
Melencio which were received by Leoncia.
Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has she
been brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite. On December 30, 1963, her father
was at their home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was advised to
have a complete bed rest. Her father was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. She
denied that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December 30, 1963; that he
fetched a certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Sanitarium because he
was at their home at that time; and that her father lived with a certain woman in 1963
up to June, 1971 because all this time he was living with them in Imus, Cavite. He

was working and reporting to the office everyday and when he goes to Guagua or
Manila on business, her mother or brother goes with him.
Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies about
petitioner's sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It
could not be true that her husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three (3)
times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her husband never slept
out of their house and that in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of
the Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a year
because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court
was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on the basis of the
following:

Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the

rate of EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the date
of the filing of the complaint on August 16, 1972 up to August 15,
1975; ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a month from August
16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED (P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1978 to
August 15, 1981; and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time she
reached the age of majority on December 30, 1984.
Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the costs.
SO ORDERED. 19

1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of Merceditas'
conception;

The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26,
1992. 20

2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia was living,
took care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her;

Hence, the present petition.

3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;

4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas; and
5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by petitioner to
Merceditas.
Thus it rendered judgment on April 24, 1981 dismissing the complaint. 18
Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share the
same view as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary evidenced
adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the firm conclusion that
petitioner is her father, entitling her to support. The dispositive portion of its decision
dated December 17, 1991 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and
judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S.
ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child
of defendant ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the right appurtenant to
such status.

We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by respondent

court:
1) in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition or of a judgment
declaring petitioner father of Merceditas with finality;
2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition; and
3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established decisions of this
Court.
Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial
court, therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to Merceditas.
It would have been only from the date of the judgment of the trial court that support
should have commenced, if so granted. Under the law in force when the complaint
was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain an action for compulsory recognition. In
order that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition, it must be signed
by the father. Equivocal act, such as signing under the caption "parent" in the report
card, is not sufficient. Merceditas has never been to the family home of petitioner at
Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family; nor brought around town by him, treated as
his child, introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe that she was
part of his family.

The petition utterly lacks merit.

Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those
who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups:
(1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of
parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil
Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal impediments. 21 Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to
another at the time Merceditas was conceived, 22 she is a spurious child. In this
regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than
natural in accordance with Article 269 23and other than natural children by legal fiction
are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code.
The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of social
conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were
born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the
disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents. 24 However, before
Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity 25 either
voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized
spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate
because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from his
acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose
not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he
had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. 26 The relevant law on the
matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of
the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to recognize
the child as his naturalchild, for the purpose of the present case, petitioner is obliged

to recognize Merceditas as his spurious child. This provision should be read in

conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other
illegitimate) children . . . under the circumstances specified in
articles 283 and 284.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is likewise our
finding, that private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and the
paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the
highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak
denials of petitioner:
Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's mother and
defendant carried an intimate relations. It nonetheless was not
satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is not
convinced that her mother and defendant were in cohabitation
during the period of her conception, and took into account the
testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment
where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified
that he took care of all the bills and that he shared the same bed
with plaintiffs mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at
Guagua was rented by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes,
who was a mere employee and godson of the defendant with a
monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere subaltern of the latter, and
only frequented the place upon instruction of the defendant to take
care of the needs of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an
apartment at the back of the Guagua Telephone System owned by
and of which Artemio was the General Manager (TSN, p. 46,
8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in the absence of
Artemio whose residence and main office was in Cavite. There, for
the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The
apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio. As
Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50,
8/18/73), Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon
Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-12, 1/25/74).
Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and services
needed in the apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to
Leoncia the corresponding receipts of payment for liquidation of
cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or

Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32,

8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).

"Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.

Exh. "F-3"

At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three of four

times a week and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio was
giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00 a month (TSN, p. 38,
7/18/73).
Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute
between Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio
transferred Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20,
7/18/73) where they were known as husband and wife (id. p. 41). In
leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was fetched by
Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11, Appellant's
Brief)
Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several
places heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted
man Friday of Artemio who would deliver notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1"
and "F-3") and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference,
among the notes identified by Leoncia as having come from
defendant were the following:
Exh. "F-1"
"Dear Ne,
Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng
diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay masakit pa.
Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis
diyan ay si Miling na lamang ang utusan mo sa Makati kung may
kailangan ka dian.
"Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio
ng Makati. Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.
Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta
ako.
Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.
Exh. "F-2"

"Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako

diyan (11:30 am). Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na,
sigurado yon.
Exh. "F-4"
"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng
mataas ang dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta sa
oficena.
Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong
makarating dian sa Jueves
The address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia
whose nickname is "Nene" but which Artemio shortens to "Ne".
Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The "Gracing" mentioned in
Exh. "F-1" refers to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia
who was with Artemio when Leoncia was removed from the hospital
during the birth of Merceditas. (pp. 17-19, Appellant's Brief). These
tiny bits of evidence when pieced together ineluctably gives lie to
defendants' diversionary defense that it was with Melencio S.
Reyes with whom the mother lived with during her period of
conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of
Leoncia being in the apartment and sharing the same bedroom and
the same bed hardly inspires belief.
xxx xxx xxx
Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the
relationship between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that of a man
Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to the hilt and
unwittingly required him to submit to Leoncia an accounting of his
expenditures
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia,
Artemio or Guagua Telephone System which would not have been
the case, if it were true that there was an intimate relationship
between him and plaintiff's mother.

Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather,

Melencio foisted on the court a quothe impression that he was the
lover and paramour of Leoncia but since there was really no such
relationship, he could not state the place in San Juan or Highway
54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long they stayed there belying
his pretense (sic) of an intimate relationship with plaintiffs mother. 27
Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then
applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as
sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession of
status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his paternity,
and there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was
really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated denial of paternity after
the action has been filed against the putative father is not the denial
that would destroy the paternity of the child which had already been
recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing
that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is
irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would
be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the
permanence of which affects public interest. Even when the act in
which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such act will
not revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983
Ed.).
To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain
jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however,
mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only
that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues (De
Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status
means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and
not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though
without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp.
269-270 citing Coquia vs. Coquia, CA 50, O.G. 3701) There must
be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991.)

It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of

Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the
delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by Artemio (TSN,
p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their residence at
EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any
objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic)
had her discernment she had always known and called Artemio as
her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time
Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her
for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with
Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for
his child bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he
can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives Merceditas
(sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that
Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio
as such. Special attention is called to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was
telling Leoncia the need for a "frog test" to know the status of
Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally
delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2"
and "E-3",
and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74)
and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature
appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of
Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio would
write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p.
49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and
signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband
and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas
(sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas
(sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. "H-1"
and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of
Artemio were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and

"H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic)

and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite,
Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To
Nene, with best regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp. 19-20,
Appellant's Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to
offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the
signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of
Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as
married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee's daughter.
This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in
order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere
dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan
to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total stranger
to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process
falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting. 28
Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not sufficient proof
of continuos possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied next
paragraph (4) of Article 283:
. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is) too
replete with details that are coherent, logical and natural which
cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an inventive and
malicious mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown to
possess.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the
genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their
living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of
appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support
from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no
room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed
by his belated denials.
Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's evidence as
lacking in credibility but did not deem as convincing proof that

defendant is the father since the Certificate of Live Birth was not
signed by appellee and since the monthly report card is not
sufficient to establish recognition, considering the denial of the
defendant of his signature appearing thereon.
While defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate of
Live Birth, the evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia gave
birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the
Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25,
5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id. p. 26) who made
inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The inquiries were
directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who heard the
answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper
(id. p. 28). The inquiries were about the name of the father, mother
and child. After the interview the nurse told them that the
information has to be recorded in the formal form and has to be
signed by Artemio (id. p. 30) but because there is no office, as it
was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in the morning for
Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to
give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very
early the following morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of
December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33). Artemio stayed in the hospital in the
evening of December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As pointed out in Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:
The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of
Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958] andBerciles
v. Government Service Insurance System (128
SCRA 53 [1984] that if the father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by
the mother, doctor, register, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity does not apply
to this case because it was Eustaquio himself
who went to the municipal building and gave all
the data about his daughter's birth. . . .
. . . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the
father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx xxx xxx

. . . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status
by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed affiliation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, . . . Such
evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence,
the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 29
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers
all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that
the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory
recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may
still be enough under the last paragraph. 30 This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation. 31
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious
child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent
court took into account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time
the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial
or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the
Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff,
having been born on December 30, 1963, was about nine (9) years
old at the time and was already of school age spending about
P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while
defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She attained
the age of majority on December 30, 1984 (Article 234, Supra). She
is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of twelve (12)
years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which is hereby fixed
at P800.00 a month for the first three (3) years; and considering the
declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows

older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next

three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3)
years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last three (3) years, four (4)
months and fourteen (14) days until she attained the age of
majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees
is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover,
the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts and
circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered. 32
We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was arrived at
arbitrarily.
The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten years
after the decision of the trial court was rendered does not deserve any consideration
because it appears that it is being raised for the first time in this petition. 33
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26,
1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon.
Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and
Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review,
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the
court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil
action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.
In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and
legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint
denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of
the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said
complaint are as follows:
2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad
Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real
and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty.
Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28,
1983;
3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan,
for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other
that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was
christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and
behest of said Atty. Ocampo;

G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992

4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who
was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired,
showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his
putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from
indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder
reproduced;

. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself

for me alone and for me all the time. As I have
now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad.
. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio
for our sake and for the child sake.
. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.
. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm
proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my
name and let me entitle him to all what I am and
what I've got.
. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my
heir.
. . . How is CHAD and you . . .
. . . Why should we not start now to own him,
jointly against the whole world. After all we love
each other and CHAD is the product of our love.
5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is
nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his
deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving
heirs;
6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death
was the owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City,
Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate
value of several millions of pesos;
7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving
heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;
8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag,
Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in
whose behalf this instant complaint is filed;

9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the

charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad,
such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be
extended financial support from the estate of his putative father,
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for
defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said
demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refused
and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against
the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties
left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child
Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987,
disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of
affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the
action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan
has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes
of action. 4
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative
defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of
further proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of
the parties so as to hear their respective sides
WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which
partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional
evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to
Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set for pre-trial . . . 5
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19,
1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was
granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined
respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the

complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice
thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and
thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative
defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the
said motion in the following manner:
The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists
in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to
redress a wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which
apparently on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to
enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that there is no
sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not
premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then
recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the
defendant by filing one action after another is definitely violative of
the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the
Court. It is (her) spurious child that she represents as natural
guardian that is instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious
child may file an action for recognition within four years from his
attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether
the letters of the putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that
should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as
was done in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a
misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special
jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a
complaint such as the one now before it.
The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not
control the body of the complaint.

From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is
sufficient' in form and substance and, therefore, the motion to
dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it
should be shown that the allegations of the complaint are
unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on
January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent
court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24,
1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review
on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed
Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER
DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the general
rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the
special civil action of certiorari;
b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by
Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent
Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not
theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the
interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring
judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child
does not take place in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par.
2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate
filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action for recognition of a
natural child; and

c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the

Regional Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings. 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private
respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the
complaint states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor
child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be
established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the
estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such
recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists
no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint
should be dismissed.
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the
petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as
defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late
Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of
the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had
been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver
her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants
therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the
dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that,
even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.

and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al., 12 wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present
plaintiff can any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior
relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this
court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action
are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no
absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff
seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is
nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to
require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported
by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and
the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in
fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for
the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the
same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of
the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of
these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious
reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the
other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court;
and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the
time of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already
reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor.
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to
the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative
father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition
which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of
the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the
prescription of the action.

The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has
prescribed.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that
the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad
Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to
compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition

Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel
recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that
since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family
Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought

during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that
the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed
and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that
Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead,
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The
theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely
procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply
retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four
years from the attainment of his majority;
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record
of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's
filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based
on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate
child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view
has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the
complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing
which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent,
however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged
parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within
four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether
the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action
of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the
regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein
adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
et al. 15where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question
is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may
affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes
them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or
invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be
governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises
especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the
Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably
affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child
she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in
court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of
the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order
of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the
subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and
allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied
upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution
of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994

JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil Case No.
Q-45567 for support against the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City.
The complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P.
Solano, 1 who found that "(t)here is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint
that seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners)
as his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and competent evidence
to prove the petitioners filiation. 2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at bench, another
action for recognition and support against the private respondent before another
branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and
guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN
PAUL FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts.
A Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends
regularly at said courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started
their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted
in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul
on not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred
they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she
discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their
certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal
certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito;
photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of
respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, 3 Dr. Milagros
Villanueva, 4 Ruby Chua Cu, 5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. 6 The first three witnesses
told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times, 7 introduced the private
respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that
Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the
latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two
petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of
petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan,

an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro

during his baptism. The Private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua,
a waiter of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and
respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated
he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant.
Private respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the birth
certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was sued for support in Civil
Case No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the
plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein) are entitled to the relief's
prayed for in the complaint. The defendant (herein private
respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito
Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 41/2
as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he has a
supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs support in
the amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to be delivered to
Violeta Esguerra, the children's mother and natural guardian, with
arrears reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on February 19,
1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint dismissed by the
respondent Court of Appeals 8in its impugned decision, dated October 20, 1992. It
found that the "proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the
(private respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further held that the
doctrine of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on
December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not giving full
faith and credit to the testimony in of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and value
to the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value to the
numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken during the baptismal
ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving probative value
to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so much credence to the self-serving
and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6) holding that the
principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.

We find no merit in the petition.

The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed
by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such situation is when the
findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in the case at
bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the
issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private respondent is not the
father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners which the
respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that
petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and
Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is the father
of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as
one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante
Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent
showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity
(Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192
SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou
Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness between
Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him
paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels and
Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other.
Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and much less
would prove violation of complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming private
respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private
respondent participated in its preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles vs.
Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although
the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of
the record the decedent had no intervening, the baptismal record
cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The
reason for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the
authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove the
legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply

proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by reason of his
personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like
the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof
of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the
child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require separate
and concrete evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that while
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are
not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying
private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of
their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the
respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil
Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958),viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the naming of the father
or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of
any information or circumstances by which he could be identified.
Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when
signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of
fathership of said child. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate no
signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners
and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly calibrated their
weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez who
solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness
stand:
Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion
when you called for the father and the mother of
the child, that both father and mother were
present?

A Yes.

A It must be in 1986.

Q Would you able to recognized the father and

the mother who were present at that time?

Q What month in 1986.

A It is difficult. . .

A Yes.
Q Please point to the court?
A There (witness pointing to the defendant,
Carlito Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically
what question do you remember having asked
him?

Q When was the first time you know you are

going to testify here?
A Let us see, you came there two times and first
one was you want to get a baptismal certificate
and then the second time was I asked you for
what is this? And you said it is for the court.

A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan

and his works?

Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra

went to your place, you were already informed
that you will testify here before this Honorable
Court?

Q What was the answer of Fernandez?

A Yes.

A Yes, I do.

Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta

Esguerra that this man wearing the blue T-shirt is
the father?

Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please

look at the defendant again. I want to be sure if
he is the person who appeared before you on
that occasion?

A Yes, sir.
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .

A I am sure.
A Yes.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown
a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private
respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately, when you were
first shown this picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?

Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra
and the private respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of
the private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof,
we are not prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous
baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of the children
he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of
Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is
insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners.

We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent appellate court
applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners
action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering our findings that
petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the respondent
court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar
planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a
servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to
her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This
displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told to look for another job.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124814

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after
their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San
Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent her
home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a
house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in
Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo
Regodos.

October 21, 2004

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the March 15, 1996 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708
which in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60
in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to
acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give
support to the latter in the amount of P500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by
Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who
was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She
recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to
Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as petitioners
household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982,
petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel
and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend
New Years Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for
San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that
she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the
night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something
jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child
of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to
petitioners house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners
wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed that her
stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told
petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she was
again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.
Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias
counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already
pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking
in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2,
1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia
despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her
husband was alive. Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this
case, based on the personal appearance of the child then there can never
be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiffminors mother, Florencia Regodos.

xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the
evidence of the plaintiff in support of the claim to "be meritorious; defendant
admitted having a sexual intercourse with the plaintiffs mother, Florencia
Regodos, but denied paternity to the child. The child was presented before
the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal
appearance of the child, then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiffminor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia
Regodos."2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:
The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a
widow should not prejudice the right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the
Supreme Court, even where a witness has been found to have deliberately
falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the whole of her
testimony be rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts
and disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199 SCRA
574, 575). There is therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first
intercourse with appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months
later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to appellee (TSN, Hearing of
June 10, 1991 and Exhibit "A").
In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced
before the trial court and there being no evidence that the latter had
overlooked or misappreciated, we find no cogent reason to disturb the trial
courts findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.3
Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE
283 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND
AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
CAMELO REGODOS;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT.4

Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts.
As a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual
findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals,
become final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooks certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, justifies a different
conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The
Court is convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions.5
The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private
respondent was based on the testimony of the childs mother and "the personal
appearance of the child."
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation.6An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.7
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates,

the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.8
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered
a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the
childs paternity.9 Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.10
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of
voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the
appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for
recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did
not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is
living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the
presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.11 The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in
the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.12
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the
extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not
suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C
is reversed and set aside. Private respondents petition for recognition and support
is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who
was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed
her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower.
Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all
expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and
hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioners
family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and
left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she
attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and
their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount
of P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
He described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child
also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the
country, respondent spent time riding on petitioners jeepney which was then being
utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had
seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against
said police officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges
against respondents brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It
was at that time respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for
charity as she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child
Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when
he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of
respondents chicanery and deceit designed to scandalize him in exchange for
financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered
submitted for decision based on respondents evidence.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners,
v.
ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his kumadre
Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their
subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no more
companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned that
petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision
(petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at
the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former
boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of
her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought

that she and her child will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly
and petitioner gave her money for her child. When she became pregnant with
petitioners child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower. She
wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to have
another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she
stayed with a housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to
their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City.
Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room and massaged her
stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the childs
birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also
petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was excited and
happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his look-alike, and this was
witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment
unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the babys birth, petitioner went
to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter and eventually
his wife was also informed about his having sired an illegitimate child. His family then
decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent money so she can go abroad.
When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money to her.
She and her baby survived through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she
tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by Murillo
who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police Station which
set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was only petitioners wife who showed up
and she was very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the payment by petitioner of
apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his
presence during and after delivery of respondents baby, respondents attempted
suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the bill,
her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioners wife at the
headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1.

Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND

(P2,000.00) PESOS for the child Christian Paulo through the mother;

2.

Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way of
litigation expenses; and

3.

To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case without

affording him the right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court
erred in finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering
him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal. The appellate
court found no reason to disturb the trial courts exercise of discretion in denying
petitioners motion for postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for the
initial presentation of defendants evidence, and the motion for reconsideration of the
said order denying the motion for postponement and submitting the case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling that respondent
satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and
consequently no error was committed by the trial court in granting respondents
prayer for support. The appellate court thus held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in the
civil registry which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiffs evidence, however, that during her pregnancy,
Annabelle was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00
which he paid for (TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso provided her with a
household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month (TSN, October 6, 1995, ibid). He
also provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was
with Annabelle at the hospital while the latter was in labor, walking her around and
massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented
apartment after Annabelles discharge from the hospital. People living in the same
apartment units were witnesses to Narcisos delight to father a son at his age which
was his look alike. It was only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him
Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace Murillo,
the owner of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record.
Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiffs
evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the
Supreme Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of
Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision provides that the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child x x 3) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers
all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. Any other evidence or proof that the
defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs
of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition
is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be
enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation
evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of
defendant Narciso Salas, he is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).

It shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover the
same needs it for maintenance x x. (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO,
NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT
PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING
PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM
THE PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the
convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the
principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the
matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the option of
choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or
any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where
the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the Answer
itself and no prior motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules
of Court before the 1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be
made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived.15 Not
having been timely raised, petitioners objection on venue is therefore deemed
waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the resetting
of the initial presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was
not the first time petitioners motion for postponement was denied by the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondents last
witness on November 29, 1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the

continuation of hearing for the reception of evidence for the defendant (petitioner) on
January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order dated December 17,
1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence at those hearing dates
earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioners former counsel,
Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested for the cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997
hearings in order to give him time to prepare for his defense, which request was
granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17,
1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection
from respondents counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the
hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997. With the non-appearance of both petitioner and
Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco
declared their absence as a waiver of their right to present evidence and accordingly
deemed the case submitted for decision.16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael E.
Villarosa filed his appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date
he filed entry of appearance, Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the
March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and magnanimity of the trial court,
without offering any explanation for Atty. Balas failure to appear for the initial
presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its March 14,
1997 Order, finding it better to give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On
August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the presentation of
their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the trial court
received his motion requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October 10, 1997 for
the reason that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another case
which was incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for,
the trial court reset the hearing to October 10, 1997. On said date, however, the
hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On February 16, 1998, the trial
court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear whether Atty.
Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court
received on April 16, 1998 an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa.
The reason given by the latter was the scheduled hearing on the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998 Order issued by the
RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 1946. But as clearly stated
in the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of the
hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he had a
previous commitment considering that the April 17, 1998 hearing was scheduled as
early as February 16, 1998. Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial court
denied for the second time petitioners motion for postponement. Even at the hearing
of their motion for reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998,
Atty. Villarosa failed to appear and instead filed another motion for postponement.
The trial court thus ordered that the case be submitted for decision stressing that the
case had long been pending and that petitioner and his counsel have been given
opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a second motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing thereof on
December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have
absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be

prepared on the day of the hearing.19Indeed, an order declaring a party to have

waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial
courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to
proceed on the part of one party.20
Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view of his
own negligence in failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As
we held in Tiomico v. Court of Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is evidence
of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The
inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take note of the trial dates and in
belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court
appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should be borne in mind that a
client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the
case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial courts denial of the
motion for postponement filed by petitioners counsel, petitioners contention that he
was deprived of his day in court must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that
a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of ones defense. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of
due process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited
without violating the constitutional guarantee.23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred in
ruling that respondents evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is
the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit A-1) of Christian Paulo
Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by

him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said
document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote
therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the
birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other
person is incompetent evidence of paternity.26Neither can such birth certificate be
taken as a recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no probative value to
establish filiation to the alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating
petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration
of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity.30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and
letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their
rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits E and F32 showing petitioner
and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value.
The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit C) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital
where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to
prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioners admission in
his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondents child as
an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits D to D-13) of petitioner and respondent
showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not
sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed
by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the
father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify
under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In the said
case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the
father of private respondents daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein
considered the totality of evidence which established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner was indeed the father of private respondents daughter. On the other hand,
in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained the appellate courts finding that
private respondents evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner
was overwhelming, particularly the latters public acknowledgment of his amorous
relationship with private respondents mother, and private respondent as his own child
through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient
proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.

Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and
continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the
testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal certificate,
a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondents evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of
Christian Paulo, petitioners financial support while respondent lived in Murillos
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with
details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence, documentary and
testimonial presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate courts ruling
anchored on the following factual findings by the appellate court which was quoted at
length in the ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went
home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p.
36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of Ilano since birth without any objection on the
part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had
always known and called Artemio as her Daddy (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact
that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for
a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34)
and does all what a father should do for his child bringing home goodies, candies,
toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to
Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic)
is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called
to Exh. E-7 where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a frog test to know the
status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio,
thru Elynia (Exhs. E-2 and E-3, and D-6), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p.
40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation
Check No. 81532 (Exh. G) and the signature appearing therein which was identified
by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio
would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73).
Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of Artemio
(TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio
has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in
Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of

Merceditas (sic) (Exh. H) for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. H-1 and
H-2) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio [were] both
identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. H-1 and H2 at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN,
p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong. (Exh. I). (pp. 19-20, Appellants Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of
the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry
in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as
married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellees daughter. This particular entry
was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not
competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondents evidence failed to
establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioners counsel informing
this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still
alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held
that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his
lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.43 The rule on substitution of parties
provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAGR. CV No. 64379 are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.

husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL

SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to
inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that
right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,
1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife
died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession
of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in
Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate
as the decedents' lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for
the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the
defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the
adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As
such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence.

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was
their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27,
1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and
Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil
Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from
sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In
its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042
(CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that
Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the
estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is
affirmed in all other respects.

In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued.
They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10)
days before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners
could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and
perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have
filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption
(although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for
the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the
considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and
EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the
present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.

SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the
respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the
petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the
private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of
adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents
from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who
manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural
mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to
annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel
already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish
this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge
the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back
in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have
done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel
that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial
judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter
alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the
validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but
in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts
exists, whether erroneous or not,cannot be questioned in a
collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where
the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I,
Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the
party attacking it; it cannot be considered void
merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption,
may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to

enter the order of adoption, this does not make it

essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree
that the fact be determined upon proper
evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the
truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction,
and the determination must stand until reversed
on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of
adopted children would always be uncertain,
since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with
different effect by different tribunals, and the
adoption might be held by one court to have been
valid, while another court would hold it to have
been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as
affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under
Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the
case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is
of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of
public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the
present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a
complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have
this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental
purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy
of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense

or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted
children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents
in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in
acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love
for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of
the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one who the person
represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased
father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981,

quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had
he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these
rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the
adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted
children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel
Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of
their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in
holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive
children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. 138961

March 7, 2002

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND
LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO,respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 453941 which reversed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring
William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and
ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir
of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to
pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G.
Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an

action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late
William Liyao" against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.2 The complaint was later amended to
include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession and enjoyment of
the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner having been "recognized and
acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime."3
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely
demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two
(2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in
Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting
marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice
president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale.
She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the
necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land
located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East
Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited
and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and
hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to
secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a
bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company4 and gave
weekly amounts to be deposited therein.5 William Liyao would bring Billy to the office,
introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.6
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among
others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio.7 Corazon also
presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao
while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings.8 During the

occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence
of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I
can still make a good looking son."9 Since birth, Billy had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of
William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and
paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyaos
death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition
fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections,
clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where
he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G.
Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit
Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some
housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions
like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples
residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually see
William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was
pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a
week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would often see William
Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and
knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of
grocery supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the two
(2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on
November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy
and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage,
"Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy."10He then talked about his plan for the
baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it "engrande" and "make the
bells of San Sebastian Church ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since William
Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and
helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue
and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph13 as well as another shirt of lime
green14 as belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented with the following
inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From William."15 Maurita remembered having invited the
couple during her mothers birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while
exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still
married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon
legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of
William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other
man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew
that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter
being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout
Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to
see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to
White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr.
Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that
she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon
how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had
mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon
with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave
Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from
Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in
the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from
the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about
six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the
latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of
Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying
Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated by his
sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao
carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the
possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.16 Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San
Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were not
separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents
would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in
San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips
or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes
at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had
trouble sleeping in other peoples homes. Linda described him as very conservative
and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate
for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what
he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal
attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office
sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in
the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment.
He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her
sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while

her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and
had personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary restrictions.
Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to October
1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt
depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office
unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon
was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil
Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment17 of their marriage.
Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the
company garage. Immediately after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went to
Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged investments with the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda
added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to take out
documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office.
There was one instance when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and
taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the
office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did
not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been
shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts
and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never
been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village,
Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975.19 Her father suffered
two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart
attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected
and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication,
taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for
high blood pressure and cholesterol level control.20 Tita Rose testified that after the
death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment
Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand that they
recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William
Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not
come across any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as
rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the
laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of
the deceased which were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and
bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for
work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the

morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin
Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr.
Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in
September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that
as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was
buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda
was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the
table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him
to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter,
Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.

(d) Costs of suit.21

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of
evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was
conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial
court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter
such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary,
Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son;
providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the
law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption
of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy
between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257
in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the
testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon
Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were seen
in each others company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the
deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and
the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are
not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the
deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and
considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated
that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to
the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court
observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William
Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos signature and
name do not appear thereon.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present
petition.

Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of
the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her
husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr.
Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo
who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon.
He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic
Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the
latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that
he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes,
Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers
wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving
for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.

(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad

litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of
the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan,
Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the
minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao,
entitled to all succesional rights as such; and

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a
number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by
petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately,
both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner
impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate.22The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only

flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.23
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of
the New Civil Code24 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration
of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way
that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten
(10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late
William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with
Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation,"25 executed and signed by
Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that
Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.26
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code
may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.27Impugning the legitimacy of
the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs
for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide

whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved.28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest
such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.29
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as
guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by
respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William
Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.30 We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a
valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then
the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption.31
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon
Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of
the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the
husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the
records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth
of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case
at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not
through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can
be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties
and within the period limited by law.1wphi1
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the
evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation with
the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged

Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some
real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners
filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the
Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and
subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15
February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of
Appeals.

G.R. No. 142877

October 2, 2001

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors,

represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,
CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as
proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS
PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce
their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July
1982.

On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and
ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that
the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering
that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to have effectively
contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.1wphi1.nt
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several
other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel
the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G.
Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would
have been able the establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine that
an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question
of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit
or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed
the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper.1 It
decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding in
asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review
on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate
children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to

establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial
approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.2
In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by
petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn
legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the
complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,3 which has
ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but must be seasonably brought up in direct action frontally addressing
the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is
time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open
and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.4 The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record,
or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement
of the child, and no further court action is required.5 In fact, any writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that
does not require a separate action for judicial approval.6 Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or
an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statue of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement.7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of
their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their
father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate.8 this presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the
periods set forth in Article 170,10 and in proper cases Article 171,11 of the Family Code

(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable,12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because
the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and only the father,13 or in exceptional instances the
latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor
in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had
claimed to be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private document.
Signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case
of legitimate children asserting to be somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners
totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances
particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly
opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de
Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so
born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.17
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.
CORONA, J.:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard
and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth.1 In case
of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and
vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of
upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma.
Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married on December 29, 1989.2 After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas
parents in Fairview, Quezon City.3 Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma.
Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.4
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On
December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa
annulled on the ground of bigamy.5 He alleged that nine years before he married Ma.
Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage
was never annulled.6 Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was
residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.7
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She,
however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at
all.8
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting
when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The
custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights.9

G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled.
She held him responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the
reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the
decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called visitation rights between the
hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday."10 She argued that there was
nothing in the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an
illegitimate child."11 She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be
changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an
illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.

Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of
Concepcion as Jose Gerardos surname.

proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the
correction in the civil registry.15

Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas
motion and made the following observations:

Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the
appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she
could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy.

It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the
other, something they should never do if they want to assure the normal development
and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father,
especially as he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize something that
the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and
psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he were allowed to
maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this
matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby
DENIED.12
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling
of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the
continued use of Gerardos surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo
had already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname
(Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court.13
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a
putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed
the "best interest of the child" policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t
bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and not the convenience of the parents which
(was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours once a
week."14
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers
surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate

After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the
appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling
and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the
appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never
entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called
"marriage" with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had
established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to
Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990.
Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child of the legal
and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be
deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate
and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family
Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither
custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot
impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the
child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy
the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible
rapproachment between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an
illegitimate relationship.16
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth
certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that
appellee and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child.
But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code
mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring
ours)

Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of
his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less,
the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot
ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his
status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or
the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it
is.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but
the same was denied.18Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.19 Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate.20
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167
of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy.22 We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v.
Court of Appeals23:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no
standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband
Mario or, in a proper case,25 his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife.26 Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal
right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.27 Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

particularly during the period of conception.28 To overthrow this presumption on the
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the
child.29 Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of
physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to
make marital intimacy impossible.32 This may take place, for instance, when they
reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the
period of conception.33 Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception,
unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison
regulations.34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in
Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon
City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no
evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them.
Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her
lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for
them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such
evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer35 to the petition for
annulment of marriage36 that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an
admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an
admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate
son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by
the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code.

The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within
a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was
never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that
there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she
never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material
to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital
intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus,
the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto
herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.37 A
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.38 Hence,
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that
she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.39 The
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also
promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.40
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the
trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was
immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the
Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the
mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the
denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very
acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.41 Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to
exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial
court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered.42
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his
birth.43 Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence

of the filiation of a child,44 as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof
of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or
when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is
sought to be established.45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could
not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary
cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein.46 As prima facieevidence, the statements in the record of birth may be
rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to
the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties.47Between
the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and
the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is
also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the
purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose
Gerardos illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart.
The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable
to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior
status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support
and full inheritance.48 On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support
only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate
counterpart.49 Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against
him), in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or
mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon
Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble
between the very persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The
paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness
should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is
that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these
proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of
incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy
which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.

Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on surnames.50 A persons surname or family name identifies the family to
which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child.51 Hence, Gerardo cannot
impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him
in any way.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January
10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the
entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out
in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to
each others company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them,
Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody,
education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years.52 Through its laws, the State safeguards
them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual
development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in
this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and
lineage.

G.R. No. 162571

June 15, 2005

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.

CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari 1 is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA)
gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
issuing a decision2 and resolution3 upholding the resolution and order of the trial
court,4 which denied petitioners motion to dismiss private respondents complaint for
support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente
lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.5
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th
birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided
otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at
the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills
Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door
hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On
March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.6
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and
intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He
claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their
relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because
(she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be
scheming and overly demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy onand-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults
eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed
with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she
resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and
family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated
the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential
customers to the car aircon repair shop"7 where she worked. Later on, Arnel found out
that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family
went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned

that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge
the child as his because their "last intimacy was sometime in 1998."8 Exasperated, Fe
started calling Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin
as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion
became so heated that he had no "alternative but to move on but without bumping or
hitting any part of her body."9 Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins
birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as
single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should
have been 1964.10
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired
Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case.11
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court.12
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination.13 He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action,
considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the
law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative
father.14 In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for
falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition
for cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be
converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be
ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination.15
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because
the private respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action

against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary
right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful
act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been
violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by
the facts alleged.16

allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition

which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of
the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the
prescription of the action.

In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the
petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer,
petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered
Martin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the childs conception
and birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual
relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such
sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged,
then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are
strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no
obligation to give support.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that
the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad
Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to
compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint
is not new in our jurisprudence.

Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same
time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this
court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions
justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular
case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to
compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to
the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x

Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness
and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the
father. He also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for
recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as
an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first establish his
filiation in a separate suit under Article 28317 in relation to Article 26518 of the Civil
Code and Section 1, Rule 10519 of the Rules of Court.

As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763
[1922]) wherein we said:

The petitioners contentions are without merit.

The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated
an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in
accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,20 we allowed the
integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones
inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to
the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative
father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court,
is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held
in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been
in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the
division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural
father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for
the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason
is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take
by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to
such proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the
basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent

Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A

separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related
the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is
entirely appropriate to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a
conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing
violates his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under
the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means
for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief
historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called
for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee21 where the appellant was convicted of
murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that
"while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as
the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test
result (emphasis supplied)."
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade.
In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,22 promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of
DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded
official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the
putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of
parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:23
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.

The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in

Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v.
Vallejo24 where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained
clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of
DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected
to various chemical processes to establish their profile."
A year later, in People v. Janson,25 we acquitted the accused charged with rape for
lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real
malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our
doubts!"
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC26 where the Court en banc was faced with the
issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,27 we affirmed the conviction of
the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA
test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the
reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in
all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin
tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in
human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on
Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types:
vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with
semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the
semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court
during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the
wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken
from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily substances.30 We have also declared as
constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests
for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of morphine from ones mouth32 and the
tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.33 In Jimenez v.
Caizares,34 we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an action
for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her
orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure,
rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA
testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Torres,36 where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification
system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds
of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the
case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since
it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures,37 and
the infringement of privacy of communication38 where the constitutional right to
privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already
stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no
water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the
simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an
accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we
see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire
consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.

Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the

admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from
semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel "Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction
of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right
against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.

DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded
its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly
found widespread general acceptance.39 Several cases decided by various State
Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of
procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb40 shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that,
in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The
Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already
acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The
Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family

Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to
order DNA tests:41
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity
executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services
law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health
law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child
pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and
filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public
health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in
which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of
paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one
hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one
hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by either
signators filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment
within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or
the date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding
to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a
party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial
proceeding" shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer
the petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the
acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of
paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an
acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA
tests for the determination of the childs paternity and shall make a
finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article.
Neither signators legal obligations, including the obligation for child support
arising from the acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge
to the acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find. If a
party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court determines
that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that
an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the
acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the
order to the registrar of the district in which the childs birth certificate is filed
and also to the putative father registry operated by the department of social
services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social
services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject of the
acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A
of article three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide

a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social
services district that provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an
administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if
and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section
452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:42
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test
results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic
marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or the motion of
any party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit
to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally
acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the
secretary of the federal department of health and human services and
performed by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by
the commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the
determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of the
child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by
the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of
res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a
child born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any
such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or
pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be
received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five
hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely
objection in writing has been made thereto and that if such timely objections
are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the
court. If the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker
or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of
paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted,
the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this
article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this
section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be

received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil

practice law and rules if offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section
shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is
financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any qualified public
health officer to conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise, the court may
direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district.
In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any
such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective
abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the
issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis
supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,43 a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used
to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between
A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time
of conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.

more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were
often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity
action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father
was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the mother could prove
to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one man--the putative
father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving
paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of
proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have included the use
of DNA testing:46
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother,
child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification
profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling;
compensation of expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary
report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.

In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg

G.,44 the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed
G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said
judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a genetic marker
test that he was not the childs father. In this case, G.G. only requested the tests after
the Department of Social Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as
T.M.H.s father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,45 the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the
constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements
pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the
advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has
increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support
agreement(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to
99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the
disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results of
modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported
results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a
decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could exclude some males
from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively
pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement
between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far

(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own motion,
shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to blood or
tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not limited to,
determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human
leukocyte antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to
determine whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father
of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA
identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to
the typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other
remedies available, the court may do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate
party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the
refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact
of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted
by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally
recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited to, the American
association of blood banks.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person
described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or
DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and the DNA identification
profile and summary report are admissible as provided in subsection
(4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic
testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of
paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory shall conduct
additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers
is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers
who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in
subsection (5), either party may move for summary disposition under the
court rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child
support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7.
(emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,47 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results
showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child
born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test
eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not
Justin's father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA
testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,48 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for
genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had
concluded without such order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first
filed the case for paternity and support with the District Court, neither party requested
genetic testing. It was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate
court remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme
Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,49 decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota,
demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the
adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case,
Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of Amundsons child through DNA testing,
was able to have the default judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling
ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for
child support. The Court said "(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the

father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her
child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default judgment was entered,
but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment
for the amount withheld from his wages."
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,50 another case decided by the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity was established
through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could
still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named
individual to be the biological father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this
doctrine in Williams v. Williams.51
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing.
Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only
available "when any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law."52 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of
Appeals53 where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we
discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by "grave
abuse of discretion":
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of
the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment
would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not
survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision
the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand,
if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was

perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis
supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion,
prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction
in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been
an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent
court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We
have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as
much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore
take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means
of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented
by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners,
vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, Respondents.
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented
by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change
of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered
name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.

The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed
a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei
Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate
that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current
registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be
asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.2 The trial court
found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is,
that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore
because of his middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The
trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child.
Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to
suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is
no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that
he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of
majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his
middle name.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a
resolution dated 20 May 2004.4 The trial court maintained that the Singaporean
practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle
name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the
middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the
laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of
name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose
would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not
reasonable.5

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)6 arguing
that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by
the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is
contrary to Article 1747 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith
globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on
the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for
consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest
of the child."8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing
the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out
that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment and the
difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and
integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the
trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age
of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous cases9 decided by
this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
petition. The OSG filed itsComment11 positing that the trial court correctly denied the
petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family
Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and
mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same.
According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name
"Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not
sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.12The
OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the
change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners
allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and
difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument
raised before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle name could only
trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while
petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since
both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in
Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such
middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a
change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which
may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.14

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and
reasonable cause for which the change is sought.15 To justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented
need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with
the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.17

This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean
that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to
identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him
from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not
simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but
instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction
involving petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change of
surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the
given name18 and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name.
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have
to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We
quote, thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience
of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are
used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive
of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has
frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to

protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable
and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.19

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code gives legitimate children
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,21 while illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him
as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name
and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or
an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires
that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or
proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as
this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean
society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic23 andCalderon v. Republic,24 which,
however, are not apropos both.

In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena

Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name
from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based
on the following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship
have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese
surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War;
and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent
purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate
minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change
her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather,
Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The Court held that a petition for change
of name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of
the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor
petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she
continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that
justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his
social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family
Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the
mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even
the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter
of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry)
to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school
records and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her petition but this
Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that
she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no
legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which she is
entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her
petition,i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his
justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on
his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all
analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the
cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed

their petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have
exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to
change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the
grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of
reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the
tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a
result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of
Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had
been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name and she
had not used her registered name in her school records and voters registration
records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a
mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his
argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of
name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for
change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor
petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which
his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.26 As
he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the
change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in
his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED

The CA summarized the antecedents of the case in this wise:

"On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda
Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.

G.R. No. 156343

October 18, 2004

"On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta
P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,

vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P.
MIGUEL, respondents.

"A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002
ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the
minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

"The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate
son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September
17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P.
Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in
Japan.

An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise
of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not
deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to
exercise such authority and care.
The Case
The Petition for Review1 before the Court seeks to reverse and set aside the August
28, 2002 Decision2 and the December 11, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR SP No. 69400.4 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:

"The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the

minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him
and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled
him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan
City, where he finished the nursery course.
"According to the petitioner, his parents, who are both retired and receiving
monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.

"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Loreta P.

Miguel shall have custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he
reaches ten (10) years of age. Once the said child is beyond ten (10) years
of age, the Court allows him to choose which parent he prefers to live with
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones, shall help support the child, shall
have visitorial rights at least once a week, and may take the child out upon
the written consent of the mother.

"On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel

came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they
were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the
said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that
they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed.
However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them.

"Acting on the petitioners Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order, and
finding it to be without merit, the same is DENIED."5

"The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza,

Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the latters mother
at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, respondent Francisca
P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at
Tuguegarao City.

The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts

"He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social
Welfare to locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts
were futile.
"Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711.
However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte.
"The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be
given to him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated his
capability to support and educate him.
"On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their Comment, in compliance with
the May 2, 2002 Resolution of this Court.
"In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of
the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines
and stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their
agreement.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies petitioners allegation that
respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who
took the child from the petitioner or the latters parents. She averred that she
was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she
returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented.
"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001, the
petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato
Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of
the laws of Japan. She further stated that since the time the petitioner
arrived in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed. The custody
of the child, according to respondent Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to
petitioners parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that
even before the custody of the child was given to the petitioners parents,
she has already been living separately from the petitioner in Japan because
the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until
his deportation.
"She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese
national is for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily
in Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to send money regularly to
her son in the Philippines. She further stated that she has no intention of
staying permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the Philippines
every six (6) months or as often as she could.

"Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be
given to her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and
Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of
Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While
acknowledging that petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and considering the
trouble and expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it
nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother.
Petitioner, however, was granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the "ultimate" issue as follows: "x x x
[w]hether or not [he], as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental
care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away."7
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision should be modified in
regard to its erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor
child. He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she
leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays there. In other words, he wants
joint custody over the minor, such that the mother would have custody when she is in
the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have
custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she
cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of
the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28,
2001,8 granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor.

At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is
studying,9 thus rendering petitioners argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas
Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent
Motion for a Hold Departure Order,"10 alleging therein that respondents were
preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and her
Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.11

Obviously, Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there
is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their
son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him
resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of
him.

Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child
of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the
Philippines12 explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits
paternity.13

David v. Court of Appeals23 held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the
father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of,
the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an
illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and
authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate
child;24 in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive
parent.25

Previously, under the provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children were generally
classified into two groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2)
spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit.14 A natural child is one born outside
a lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other.15 On the other hand, a spurious
child is one born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry
each other on account of certain legal impediments.16
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of
majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them.17 If both
acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was
awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children
applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the
father and the mother.18
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code.19Now, there are only two classes of children -legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.20
Article 54 of the Code provides these exceptions: "Children conceived or born before
the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has
become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or
born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate."
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed
under one category, without any distinction between natural and spurious.21 The
concept of "natural child" is important only for purposes of legitimation.22 Without the
subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having
sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him.26 She has
the right to keep him in her company.27 She cannot be deprived of that right,28 and she
may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law."29
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the
court finds cause to order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else.30 In the past, the following grounds have been considered
ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or
abandonment,31 unemployment, immorality,32 habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling
factor,33 we hold that the CA did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the
child to Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge
of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court
of Appeals,34 the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his
children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children.35 Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or
imminent threat to the well-being of the child.

However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This
provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to
each other, but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or
because they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been
established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that
portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is
deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10)
years of age, to choose which parent to live with isDELETED for lack of legal basis.
Costs against petitioner.

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in
May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of
the children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and
physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the
following:

SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonios]

prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently,
the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the
Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the
entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in
their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change
and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live
Birth from Grande to Antonio;
G.R. No. 206248

February 18, 2014

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,

vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the
July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:

b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with

[Grande] over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and
Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties
minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall
stay with [Antonios] residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday
evening and to [Grandes] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of
minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the
days covered by the Order;

e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors
outside of the country, without the written consent of the other and
permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre
Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of P30,000 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7(Emphasis
supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro
forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part
of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the
grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the
appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of
Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only
take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the fathers
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental

custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons.10Since respondent Antonio
failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the
welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be
deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in
conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels
the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering
that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a
consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor children.12 Lastly, the CA
ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right
especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their
children.13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the
change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the
Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in
permissive languagemay not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is
the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten

instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate
child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255
is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname
of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before
a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish
the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as
Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the
mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a
legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of
respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it
must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from
any interpretation.16 Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use
his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision

readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use

the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to
confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of childrens
surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the
fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for
instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of
her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and
there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best
interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a
childs surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best
possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an
illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest,
thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to
his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a
legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to
deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in
favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father
while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase
the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest
as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
(Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the
fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall
use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following
documents:

8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the
Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new
surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and
Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.

xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of
Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use
the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has
reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument
duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register
of Births.

8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper
annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby
changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a
legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the
law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot
be broadened by a mere administrative issuance an administrative agency
certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity
in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the
constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary to
statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:

xxxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)

d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,

Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by
the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA
9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers
surname upon the latters recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an
illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given
the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged
thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have
their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered
before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to
sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation
of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.

G.R. No. 157043

February 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the
dispositive portion of which shall read:

CORONA, J.:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of

the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is
MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte
dated September 14, 1999 granting a petition for change of name.

a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and

Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only
take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and

Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso toGiovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special
Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovannis guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor
GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old
and both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be
served with summons and other court processes;

2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N.

Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated
[August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a petition for change
of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his mother [who is
residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan,
Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years prior to the filing
of this instant petition, the former since 1970 while the latter since his birth
[in 1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine
(9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of
Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9,
1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his
mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of
marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since
birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San
Juan, Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and
up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of
financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovannis pleas] for
attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he
desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname;
8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United
States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of
his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child; and
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI
NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change
of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having found respondents petition sufficient in
form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition.5 Publication of the
petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once

a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered.6 The trial court also
directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.7
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to
present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG,
acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court
granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an
appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in
a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador11 and
claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely
affected by the childs change of name should have been made respondents to make
the proceeding adversarial.12
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to
distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name."13 Understandably, therefore,
no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.14 This is a
reasonable requirement for those seeking such change because a persons name
necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved
in the process and decision to change the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name.
Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103,15 a separate and distinct
proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil
registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon).16
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the
court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is
whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.

Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the
reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not sufficient to
deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name,
meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights.17 Such issues are ventilated only
in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is observed.18
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family
Code of the Philippines),19the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his
use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall
employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname from
birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovannis putative
father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which
repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang20 is
enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children
shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore
identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname
as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as
a legitimated child or an acknowledged child.1awphi1.net21

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to

his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a
legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to
deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in
favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father
while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase
the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest
as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner22 in support of its position
deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a proceeding
separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases
deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while this
case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are
irrelevant and have no bearing on respondents case. While the OSG is correct in its
stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG
cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to
participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical
errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding.
There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged
that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief
sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although
by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the
entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In this regard, [appellee]
Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting
in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The
lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one
came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one
opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court
is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is
meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded.

Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its
evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that
the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.23 (emphasis
supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.24 Respondent gave
notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules.25 With this, all
interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the
judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a
copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial
were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the
OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995

MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE
SANTOS, respondents.

On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her

administration, the court a quopassed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the
case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]),
declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and
declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio
de Santos.

ROMERO, J.:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court's
order dated January 9, 1992.

There being no explicit provision of law in point, the Court is called upon to cast
illumination in a gray area even as it fills up unintentional interstices in the fabric of
Civil Law with overlays of philosophical, historical and sociological strands. For an
understanding of how the issue arose, we now proceed to unravel the pertinent
factual background.

Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that
since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as
legitimated her half brothers and sisters.

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time,
their relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in
love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a
formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada
court in 1949.

Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:

Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction
which then, as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in
1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de
facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967,
Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and
private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under
Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an
estimated value of P15,000,000.00.

In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each
other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court 1 asking for the issuance of letters
of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's
estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve
legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There
being no opposition, her petition was granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to
intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter
alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by
private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children
were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.

This argument is tenable.

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born

outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural.

In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private
respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the
latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private
respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in
Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact,
for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time.
Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that
he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate,
though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private
respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of
"Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89, a
provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals principally with void
and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of said marriages on their
offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate children, those who are
"conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning," but because

there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as "acknowledged

natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations as
such kind of children. In the case at bench, the marriage under question is considered
"void from the beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage
was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be
considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents
were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage.
What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children proper
(those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other")? A legal fiction
had to be resorted to, that device contrived by law to simulate a fact or condition
which, strictly and technically speaking, is not what it purports to be. In this case, the
term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another
category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as
defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural
children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter.
Does this cluster of rights include the right to be legitimated?
Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the basis of
rights granted by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing the substantive
provisions of the law in force.
Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the new
provisions of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid on the
classification of children vis-a-vis their parents, and the corresponding rights they are
entitled to under the law. Thus, the title on "Paternity and Filiation" devotes two whole
chapters to legitimate children alone, and one chapter on those deemed by law to be
possessed of the rights of the former, such as legitimated children, because of their
compliance with certain requisites laid down by law; two other chapters deal with
illegitimate children composed of recognized natural children, and those other than
natural, or spurious, whether recognized or not. The well-ordered delineation of such
distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the
framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize and separate one from the other, for
legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the substantive rights accruing to the different
categories of children.
It must be noted that before said Code was enacted, other classes of illegitimate
children were recognized, such as, "manceres" or the offspring of prostitutes and the
"sacrilegious" or children of those who had received Holy Orders. Subsequently, the
Civil Code, in an effort to keep in step with modern times, limited illegitimate filiation to
those which are incestuous, adulterous and illicit.

At the core of the institution of legitimacy held sacrosanct by Spanish tradition and
culture, lies the "inviolable social institution" known as marriage. This union, absent
any formal or substantial defect or of any vice of consent, is virtually adamantine. On
the whole, the status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant
issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside
of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the
child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently do
so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child
eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy. Without such
marriage, the natural child's rights depend on whether he is acknowledged or
recognized by his parents, but he does not rise to the level of a legitimate child in the
manner that the legitimated child does.
A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is
declared a nullity is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it is the law
which accords him the rights of an acknowledged natural child.
Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or derisively
denominated as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins. There is no marriage
valid or otherwise which would give any semblance of legality to the child's
existence. Nothing links child to parent aside from the information appearing in the
birth certificate. When such child is recognized by one or both parents, he acquires
certain rights nowhere approaching those of his legitimate counterparts.
The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by
children, depending on their filiation: use of surname, succession, and support.
Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. 2 Thus, they "shall
principally use the surname of the father," 3 and shall be entitled to support from their
legitimate ascendants and descendants, 4 as well as to a legitime consisting of onehalf of the hereditary estate of both parents, 5 and to other successional rights, such
as the right of representation. "These rights as effects of legitimacy cannot be
renounced." 6
Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction shall
principally use the surname of the father. 7 If a natural child is recognized by only one
parent, the child shall follow the surname of such recognizing parent. 8 Both types of
children are entitled to receive support from the parent recognizing them. 9 They also
cannot be deprived of their legitime equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of
the legitimate children or descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the
free disposable portion of the latter's estate. 10
Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their
minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally, take the latter's

surname. 11 The only support which they are entitled to is from the recognizing
parent, 12 and their legitime, also to be taken from the free portion, consists of fourfifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child or two-fifths that of each
legitimate child. 13
It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly secured
by law, 14 the legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as it is from the free
portion of the hereditary estate which the child shares with the surviving spouse, may
be reduced if it should exceed said portion. 15
Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above
mentioned. 16
These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a legitimated
child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate children, a natural
child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to which an acknowledged natural child
is entitled, insofar as his hereditary rights are concerned.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's
half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons:
First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they
be natural children within the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal
fiction cannot demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of the rights
enjoyed by acknowledged natural children.
It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged natural
children and, therefore, by the same token, to natural children by legal fiction. This
conclusion is arrived at through a syllogism as simple as it is deceptive, which runs as
follows:
The respondent's children are natural children by legal fiction.
Therefore, they have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children.
Acknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated.
Ergo, respondent's children have the right to be
legitimated (as in fact they were "deemed
legitimated" by the subsequent valid marriage of
their parents in the Philippines in 1967).

The above line of reasoning follows the Euclidian geometric proposition that things
equal to the same thing are equal to each other. This may hold true in the realm of
instructional, as opposed to descriptive science, where the former calls for the
application of absolute, mathematical rules with precision but not to the latter,
particularly those which deal with the social sciences where human relationships are
central to a study whose main concern is not to leave out anything of significance.
The former deals with inanimate things, those which a scientist has described as the
"dead aspect of nature," excluding all factors regarded as superfluous to obtaining
absolute results and nothing more. It does not concern itself so much with the whole
truth as with those aspects or parts only through which the inexorable result can be
obtained. To apply the strict rules of syllogism, where the basic premise is defective,
to the arena of paternity and filiation, especially in the determination of the status and
rights of the different kinds of illegitimate children vis-a-vis the legitimate ones, is
bound to spawn mischief and results never intended by the framers of the provisions
of the law under review.
Pursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it may eventually be postulated that
"adulterous children shall enjoy the status, rights and obligations of legitimate
children," a doctrine which no moral philosophy under our social and cultural milieu
can countenance.
This conclusion not only presumes that children other than those who are "natural"
can be legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged natural children
(and, consequently, natural children by legal fiction) a "right" to be legitimized when
no such right exists. Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is
a privilege, available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269.
Although natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged
natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they
likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in
this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father and his
estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents.
The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring of the second
union affected by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of a valid marriage
between her widower and his ostensible second wife?
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our archaic law
on family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns upon illegal
relations such that the benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not
extend, nor were they intended to extend, to natural children by legal fiction. Article
269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined
thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children
conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.

Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized,

and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children,
this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction
can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is involved here
than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the
petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share
may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed
on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share.
The provisions of law invoked by private respondent are couched in simple and
unmistakable language, not at all subject to interpretation, and they all point to the
correctness of petitioner's claim. If it should be asserted that we now trench on a gray
area of law that calls for interpretation, or a lacuna that cries for filling up, then we
have to pierce the shroud unintentionally created by the letter of the law and expose
its spirit as evincing intent, in this case one which decidedly favors legitimacy over
illegitimacy. The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the

corresponding gradation of their rights may conceivably be shattered by elevating

natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children to the level
of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their
parents blessed their union with a valid marriage.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two
classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are
nothing if not pure fiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the
court a quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE
LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos and, as such, entitled to all
the rights accorded to her by law. SO ORDERED.