Impact of probabilistic

damage stability rules (SOLAS2009)

on passenger ship design

Henning Luhmann, MEYER WERFT

Anna-Lea Routi, STX Europe
Luc Lemoine, STX Europe
Fabrizio Cafagna, Fincantieri

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

From SOLAS90 to SOLAS2009

Deterministic approach since first SOLAS convention 1929

Requirements increased in several steps

SOLAS60
SOLAS74
SOLAS90 (+ Stockholm agreement)

Designs have been continuously adapted and optimized

SOLAS90 has been an acknowledged standard

Easy to use and to understand

Several weak points

No damages beyond B/5 line

No damage extent greater than 11m
Different interpretations of floodable length for lower holds
All ships carrying more than 400 person fulfil the same 2 compartments standard

Probabilistic concept of A.265 rarely reached the industry

Introduction of regulation 25 (damage requirements for cargo ships)
required harmonization of damage stability requirements

SOLAS2009 was born

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

Probabilistic concept What is new?

SOLAS90

B/5 Line
1 and 2 compartment damage
Minimum distance of bulkheads
Floodable length curve
Margin line
safe Area inside B/5
Maximum flooding after damage
1 Critical damage case
All calculated damages have to be
survived
Only watertight subdivision to be
considered

SOLAS2009

Damage penetration up to B/2

multiple compartment damages
Free distance between bulkheads
Only horizontal escapeways, control stations
and vertical exits to be kept dry
No safe area
Maximum flooding Sinking of the ship
Some damage cases will not be survived
A-class boundaries considered as
intermediate stages of flooding
Instantaneous flooding within 60 seconds to
be verified

Are the ships safer now, or only more complicated?

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

SOLAS90 vs SOLAS2009

SOLAS90 ships survive a limited number of

damages
The behaviour at other damages is unknown
Survived
damages

SOLAS2009 investigates much more cases

S=1 more stringent than SOLAS90
Degree of survival ranges from s=0 to s=1
S-formulation does not fully reflect real ships
behaviour

Sufficient to survive 4m waves for conventional

ships only
Safety margins not considered
Non GZ related limits (escape routes, max heel)
Result of a political compromise

All
damag
es

Not
survived
damages

Harmonization for cargo and passenger ships

Simplification

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

Flexibility of design

Probabilistic approach gives

theoretically more freedom for the
designers
Examples.

Lower holds also for cruise ships

Separated engine rooms
Escape routes instead of margin line

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

Real experiences

SOLAS2009 still has deterministic elements limiting the flexibility of design

Other design constraints limit the application of novel designs

Regulation 8, minor damages B/10

Regulation 9, minimum double bottom height
Collision bulkhead and forward damages
Size of engines
Location and length of main vertical fire zones

Heel penalizes formula for si transverse subdivision preferred as before

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

Real experiences

Passenger ships with large number of persons (N>1500) need higher GM values
than before
Subdivision of small ships dominated by regulation 8

Below 400 persons 1 compartment status lower stability requirements as before

possible

Definition of R was political decision

Requirement for smaller ships reduced

Higher requirements for large ships

A-f _heel_int

Formula-Rnew (sf _heel_int)

C1=5000
C2=2.5
C3=15225

1
0.9
0.8

A, R

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

L+N

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

Real experiences

Extreme designs for RoPax are possible according the rules

Shown in EMSA study

Not common practice due to Stockholm Agreement, which is still in force in EU
Designers at shipyards follow best practice to meet the best compromise between
economics and safety

Source: EMSA Study 2009

Larger RoPax are dominated by required index R

higher stability requirements as SOLAS90 + SA

SRtP has larger influence on RoPax design than

SOLAS2009

Main engines and gear boxes in separate

compartments

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

Real experiences

Requirements on internal watertight integrity significantly increased

All piping, ducting, remote operated valves and control cables to be
surveyed during design, production and life time
More than 80 different systems on a cruise vessel
Huge education process for designers, surveyors and crew

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

Real experiences

Removal of margin line criterion leads

to different subdivision on bulkhead
deck
Splash tight doors on bulkhead deck to
be water tight doors now

Higher requirements lead to increased

watertight subdivision on bulkhead
deck
Higher pressure head for watertight
structure due to immersion of
bulkhead deck higher steel weight

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

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The way ahead

New damage stability requirements should better reflect real physics

Built-in safety margins to be reflected

Reserve buoyancy above watertight subdivision not fully considered today

Influence of actual loading

conditions to be better reflected
For about 80-85% of damage
case the si-value remains
constant for actual loading
conditions
Is the distribution between DS,
DP and DL correct?
Source: SLF 50/3/2

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

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The way ahead

New damage stability requirements to

be independent of ship type

Cruise vessels
RoRo Passenger ferries
Super yachts

The same safety level for all

passenger ships needed.
Actual geometry and operational
profile to be reflected
Dynamic behaviour and internal
flooding progress to be considered
Close links to SRtP and operation
needed

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

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The way ahead

Probabilities better to reflect lesser extent

damages

E.g. damages above tank top or lower decks

Bottom damages may be included in a

probabilistic approach

Grounding is more frequent than collision

B/20 deterministic rule causes strange design
solutions

Shape of
tanktop

B/20
B/20
8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

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Summary and conclusions

Probabilistic damage stability has had a major impact on the design work on the
shipyards
The design principles of passenger ships have not changed dramatically
Regulations based on probabilistic concepts have to take into account all flooding
scenarios and actual ship behaviour, in order to ensure a given safety level.
Safety levels have been increased due to

better knowledge of more damages

Improved internal watertight integrity
Higher GM requirements for large ships

Passenger ships are assumed to be a very safe way of transportation

The industry needs to improve the level of safety continuously.

A continuous evolution of designs instead of a revolution is the

most practical and economic way.

8/9 September 2010

Public Workshop Glasgow

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