DISBARMENT NOTES

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting that a lawyer may be

disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya, the Court pronounced:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the

rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are
the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty,
such as temporary suspension, could accomplis~ the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed.

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. x x x x
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR. x x x x
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Liabilities of Lawyers

Civil Liability

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Client is prejudiced by lawyers negligence or misconduct

Breach of fiduciary obligation
Civil liability to third persons
Libelous words in pleadings; violation of communication privilege
Liability for costs of suit (treble costs) when lawyer is made liable for insisting
on clients patently unmeritorious case or interposing appeal merely to delay
litigation

Criminal Liability

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Prejudicing client through malicious breach of professional duty

Revealing clients secrets
Representing adverse interests
Introducing false evidence
Misappropriating clients funds (estafa)

Contempt of Court
a. Kinds of Contempt:

Direct consists of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge

as to interrupt or obstruct the proceedings before the court or the administration
of justice; punished summarily.
Indirect one committed away from the court involving disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court, or
tending to belittle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarrass the court.
Civil- failure to do something ordered by the court which is for the benefit of a
party.
Criminal any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court.

b. Acts Constituting Contempt:

1. Misbehavior
2. Disobedience
3. Publication concerning pending litigation
4. Publication tending to degrade the court; disrespectful language in pleadings
5. Misleading the court or obstructing justice
6. Unauthorized practice of law
7. Belligerent attitude
8. Unlawful retention of clients funds

Administrative Liabilities of lawyers

Main Objectives of Disbarment and Suspension:

1.

to compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his clients;

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney;
to punish the lawyer;
to set an example or a warning for the other members of the bar;
to safeguard the administration of justice from incompetent and dishonest
lawyers;
to protect the public

Characteristics of Disbarment Proceedings:

Neither a civil nor criminal proceedings;
Double jeopardy cannot be availed of in a disbarment proceeding;
It can be initiated motu propio by the SC or IBP. It can be initiated without a
complaint;
It is imprescriptible;
Conducted confidentially;
It can proceed regardless of the interest of the lack thereof on the part of the
complainant;
It constitutes due process.

Grounds for Disbarment or Suspension:

deceit;
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
violation of oath of office;
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
corrupt or willful appearance as attorney for a party to case without authority
to do so (Sec. 27, Rule 138, RRC)
Procedure for Disbarment

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Institution either by:

the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or
the IBP, motu proprio, or
upon verified complaint by any person
Six copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or
Secretary of any of its chapter and shall be forwarded to the IBP Board of
Governors.
6. Investigation by the National Grievance Investigators.
7. Submission of investigative report to the IBP Board of Governors.
8. Board of Governors decides within 30 days.
9. Investigation by the Solicitor-General
10. SC renders final decision for disbarment/suspension/dismissal.
Quantum of Proof Required: CLEAR, CONVINCING & SATISFACTORY evidence.
Burden of Proof:Rests on the COMPLAINANT, the one who instituted the suit

Officers authorized to investigate Disbarment cases:

1.
2.
3.

Supreme Court
IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline or authorized investigator
Office of the Solicitor General

Mitigating Circumstances in Disbarment:

Good faith in the acquisition of a property of the client subject of litigation (In
re: Ruste, 70 Phil. 243)
2. Inexperience of the lawyer (Munoz v. People, 53 SCRA 190)
3. Age (Lantos v. Gan, 196 SCRA 16)
4. Apology (Munoz v. People, 53 SCRA 190)
1.

Lack of Intention to slight or offend the Court (Rhum of the Philippines, Inc. v. Ferrer,
20 SCRA 441).

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard
of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing,25 failing in which whether in his personal or private capacity, he
becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law.26 A lawyers inexcusable
neglect to serve his clients interests with utmost diligence and competence as
well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to
conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively
sanctioned.
A.C. No. 6490

July 9, 2013

(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)

LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his
serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is
the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must

always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand,
suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired.33
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34
As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than
that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." 36
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining
preponderance of evidence:
All the facts and circumstances of the case;
The witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony;
The witnesses interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily
with the greater number.
In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that
respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of
Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, 37 the burden of proof is vested upon the
party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave
Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v.
Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit
evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation
is sustained.
Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and
self-serving allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang as
"it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with
public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,

but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court." 46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing." 47

Rule 139
DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS
SECTION 1. Motion or complaint.Proceedings for the removal or suspension of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court on its own motion or upon the
complaint under oath of another in writing. The complaint shall set out distinctly,
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of, supported by affidavits, if any, of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and shall be
accompanied with copies of such documents as may substantiate said facts.
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SECTION 1. How Instituted.Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline
of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio,or by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.

WALTER T. YOUNG,
Complainant,
A.C. No. 5379
May 9, 2003
-versus-

CEASAR G. BATUEGAS,
MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO
AND FRANKLIN Q. SUSA,
Respondents.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. [7]

He swore upon his admission to the Bar

that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he
shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." [8]

He

should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. [9] The courts, on the other hand,
are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. [10] While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and
is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct
must never be at the expense of truth. [11]
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. [12]

craftily concealed the truth

Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby
contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the
pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated
their oath when they resorted to deception.
However, he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving the
discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of
justice. [16] Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act
or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of
procedure.
[7] Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Flores, A.C. No. 4058, 12 March 1998, 287
SCRA 449, 463.
[8] Form 28, Appendix of Forms, Revised Rules of Court.
[9] Artiaga, Jr. v. Villanueva, A.C. No. 1892, 29 July 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 643.
[10] Far Eastern Shipping Company v. CA, 357 Phil. 703, 718 (1998)
[11] Flores v. Chua, A.C. No. 4500, 30 April 1999, 366 SCRA 132, 151.
[12] Tapucar v. Tapucar, 335 Phil. 66, 74 (1998)
[13] A.M. RTJ-99-1518, 14 August 2000, 337 SCRA 656, 667.
[14] Te v. Perez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1286, 21 January 2002.

[15] Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 10.03

[16] Escanan v. Monterola, A.M. No. P-99-1347, 6 February 2001, 351 SCRA 228,
234.
OCA IPI No. 12204CAJ, March 11, 2014
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC.
(REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON.
RICARDO R. ROSARIO.
DECISION

Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations of the complaint by substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so will lead to the
dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative
charge against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial
evidence.10 But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the
judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the
showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short
of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in
character.11
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense.
Article 204, Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who knowingly render[s] an
unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision is punished with prision
mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender
must be a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not
one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a
controversial point of law.12 The term knowingly means sure knowledge, conscious
and deliberate intention to do an injustice.13 Thus, the complainant must not only
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge
of rendering an unjust decision.14 In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred,
revenge, greed or some other similar motive in issuing the judgment. 15 Bad faith is,
therefore, the ground for liability. 16 The failure of the judge to correctly interpret the
law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable.17

But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial
officer knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May such determination and
declaration be made in administrative investigations and proceedings like a
preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor? The answers to these queries are
obvious only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory
jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make such determination and
declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer may be
usurping a basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or
by law elsewhere in the appellate court.
9

Datuin, Jr. v. Soriano, A.M. No. RTJ011640, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 1, 5.

Santos v. Tanciongco, A.M. No. MTJ061631, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA
134, 138; Kilat v. Macias, A.M. No. RTJ051960, October 25, 2005, 464 SCRA
101, 110.
10

See Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual, Adm. Mat. No. MTJ93783, July
29, 1996, 259 SCRA 604, 612613; Raquiza v. Castaeda, Jr., January 31, 1978,
81 SCRA 235, 224.
11

Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, First Edition (2000), National Book Store,
Inc., p. 409.
12

Guevara, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, Fourth

Edition (1946), Filipino Book Dealers Association, Manila, p. 418.
13

Basa Air Base Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Pimentel, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ01
1648, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 542, 548.
14

Guerrero v. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ90617, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 88,
98.
15

16

Guevara, supra at 418.

Sacmar v. ReyesCarpio, A.M. No. RTJ031766, March 28, 2003, 400 SCRA 32,
35.
17

A.M. No. 1551 July 21, 1977

LUIS D. SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. NILO S.
TUASON, Respondent.
A lawyer may be disbarred "for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanr

A.C. No. 10207, July 21, 2015

RE: DECISION DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-28361
ENTITLED "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO C. BARROZO"
FORMER ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR JOSELITO C. BARROZO, Respondent.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. And with the finality of respondent's conviction for direct bribery, the next
question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves
moral turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same
must have been "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [It must
involve] an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."20cha
In Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa,21 the Court already had the occasion to answer the same
question posed in this case, viz:
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
y
'Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority [to do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.'
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public
office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in
private practice.25

Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his
oath as a government official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively
affect his qualification as a lawyer, respondent must be disbarred from his office
as an attorney.

As a final note, it is well to state that:

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be
competent, honorable and reliable - lawyers in whom courts and [the public at
large] may repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile
behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate
to rid [the] profession of odious members.26
20

Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the

Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24,2012,670 SCRA 366,
371.
21

A.C. No. 7360, July 24,2012, 677 SCRA 352.

22

439 Phil. 339, 346-347 (2002).

23

Id at 361-362.

24

Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez, A.C, No. 9116, March 12, 2014.

25

Ramos v. Atty. Imbang, 557 Phil. 507, 516 (2007).c

Adm. Case No. 6475 : January 30, 2013
FE A. YLAYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.

In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner
Anna Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice).26 She recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.27?r?l1
The Issues
From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:
(1) whether the IBP violated the respondents right to due process; and

(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. ??
a. Due process violation
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process
means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. As a rule,
no denial of due process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to
be heard and to present his case;35 what is prohibited is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma, 39 we held that due
process, as applied to administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain ones
side. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,40 due process in an administrative context does
not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where the
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or through pleadings, is
accorded, no denial of procedural due process takes place. The requirements of due
process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President,41 we held that "due
process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a
trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations,
position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude[,
provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable
for being violative of due process, for an administrative agency to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted
by the parties."42?r?l1
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of
a motion for reconsideration. A denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked
by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Undoubtedly in this case, the requirement of the law was afforded to the
respondent."43?r?l
1b. Merits of the Complaint
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to
discharge."49 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side
is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other. It means
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief compared to the
presented contrary evidence.

Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether

preponderance of evidence exists, the court may consider the following:
(a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, and the probability or improbability of their testimony;
(c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far
as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
(d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.50
By law, a lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
against him until the contrary is proven, and that as an officer of the court, he
is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. 51?r?l1
We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the
complainant; the Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes her case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. 73 Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has a greater weight than that of the other party. When the pieces of evidence of the
parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence,
the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the burden
of proof.74?r?l1
In this case, we find that the complainants evidence and the records of the case do not
show the respondents deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such
proof, the complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility must perforce be dismissed.
Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 108625, March
11, 1996, 254 SCRA 565, 574.
36

See rollo, page number not assigned; Petition for Review, p. 14.

37

Rollo, pp. 254- 290; TSN of Mandatory Conference, October 6, 2005.

38

Supra note 31.

39

Supra note 35, at 574.

40

G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 462, 473.

41

G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 494.

42

Id. at 502.

43

Id. at 503.

44

Supra note 19.

45

Supra note 28.

46

Supra note 31.

47

Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444, 453.

48

Garrido v. Garrido, A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 508, 516.

49

Solidon v. Macalalad, A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 472, 476.

50

Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 371.

51

Id. at 371, citing In Re: De Guzman, 154 Phil. 127 (1974); De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68

Phil. 554 (1939); In Re: Tiongko, 43 Phil. 191 (1922); and Acosta v. Serrano, 166 Phil.
257 (1977).
72

Arienda v. Aguila, A.C. No. 5637, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 282, 286-287.

73

Id. at 287.

74

Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., supra note 50, at 372.

75

Id. at 89-90, 242.

[A.C. No. 6580. August 3, 2005]
DELA CRUZ vs. SALADERO

Well-settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations. If the
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show
in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[17]cralaw
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault
or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [18]cralaw But
his guilt cannot be presumed.[19]cralaw A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing will
not suffice.[20]cralaw There must be sufficient evidence to support the charge.[21]cralaw
[17]

cralaw Sps. Boyboy vs. Yabut, A.C. No. 5225, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 622, 627.

[18]

cralaw Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV,

Tagbilaran City, against Atty. Samuel Occea, A.C. No. 2841, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA
636, 649.
[19]

cralaw Id., pp. 649-650

[20]

cralaw Sps. Boyboy vs. Yabut, supra, p. 627.

[21]

cralaw Ibid.

also no proof anywhere in the records

888888888888888888888888
LOURDES R. BUSIOS,
Complainant,
A. C. No. 4349

December 22, 1997

-versusATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT,
Respondent.

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in
the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his client, his
profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a
lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should
be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.
Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became a
guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair
an impartial administration of justice a vital function of democracy a failure of
which is disastrous to society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must
follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court
as the disciplining authority.
888888888888888888888

A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN

PEDRO, ILOILO CITY,Complainant, v. ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT

PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court
proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all
lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent
transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent
was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act
made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of
the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a
person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they
should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the
public in their professional fidelity and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to
wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail
to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for them to:
x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or
malice, and x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers] according to the best of [their]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients
x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is
always a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court
may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the
Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private
capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for
acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but
also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that
reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the
privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the
disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and
punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.28 The
test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character,

honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.29Cha
25

Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of

Judicial Conduct, p. 62 (2001).

26

Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, A.C. No. 4073, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 6, 10.

27

Lizaso v. Amante, A.C. No. 2019, June 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 1, 10; citing In Re Vicente

Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 (1923).

28

Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C No. 9000, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 527, 532.

29

Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 699, citing Ronquillo v.

Cezar, A.C. No. 6288, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 1, 5-6.

888888888888888888888888888888888

Note!!!!!!!
A.M. No. MTJ 92-6-251 February 7, 1994
JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI, Complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE O.
RAMOS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, ECHAGUE,
ISABELA, Respondent.
chanrobles virtual law library

The Investigating Judge found Judge Ramos to have violated Rule

112 of the Amended Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides the
guidelines in conducting preliminary investigations.
We sustain the findings of the Investigating Judge on the guilt of
respondent. Indeed, the evidence clearly shows that respondent
Judge committed acts amounting to gross ignorance of the law,
dereliction of duty, and serious misconduct. Section 3, Rule 112, of
the Amended Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Procedure - Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no
complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted in the following manner: . . . (b) within ten
(10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer
shall either dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with
the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching
thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting

documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the

respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant . . . (d) If the respondent cannot be
subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed does not submit counter-affidavit
within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base
his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant . . . (f)
Thereafter, the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten
(10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the
investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
From the foregoing, it is clear that it is the ministerial duty of
respondent Judge to resolve the case within ten (10) days from the
date the investigation is terminated or deemed concluded. Thus,
respondent Judge was remiss in the performance of his duties when
he failed to resolve the four (4) criminal cases within the period
prescribed by law after the preliminary investigation was concluded.
When the law is elementary, so elementary, not to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 5
chanroble s vi

A judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or

resolution, and is expected to keep his own record of cases so that
he may act on them promptly without undue delay. It is incumbent
upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his
court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their
speedy disposition. A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or mismanagement by court personnel. Proper and
efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is the
one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official
functions. 6
ual law library

chanroble s virtual law library

We cannot countenance such unreasonable delay of respondent

Judge in acting on the criminal cases pending before his sala,
especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not
totally eliminate, the problem of docket congestion in the courts.
The law detests delay in the disposition of cases because it may
result in loss of evidence, abandonment of cases and the ultimate
denial of justice.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble s virtual law library

The unjustified failure of respondent Judge to immediately conduct

the preliminary investigation of the criminal cases as required in
Sec. 3, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court is the epitome of dereliction

of duty. 7 A judge should always be imbued with a high sense of

duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
and properly administer justice.
chanroble svirtualawlibr

5 Santos v. Judge Isidro, Adm. Mat. MTJ-89-300, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA
597.chanrobles virtual law library
6 Nidua v. Lazaro, Adm. Matter No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA
581.chanrobles virtual law library
7 Veronica v. Judge Son, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-436, 17 October 1991, Minute
Resolution.
888888888888888888888

EN BANC
[A.M. NO. 03-7-170-MCTC : July 14, 2009]
RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, JIMENEZ-SINACABAN,
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL/JUDGE PRISCILLA HERNANDEZ.
RESOLUTION
An order or resolution of this Court is not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively.29To do so shows disrespect to the Court, an act only too
deserving of reproof.30
'[Respondent] refused to heed the directives of this Court and the
OCA to explain his shortcomings. Respondent ought to know that a
resolution of the Court is not to be construed as a mere request not
should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. At
the core of the judge's esteemed position is obedience to the
dictates of law and justice. A judge must be first to exhibit respect
for authority.31
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all
lower courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the
time they are submitted for decision.34Respondent repeatedly
ignored this mandate. She also violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to dispose of
the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.

Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious

violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases.35 The Court has always considered a
judge's delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period of three
months as gross inefficiency.36 It undermines the people's faith and
confidence in the judiciary,37 lowers its standards and brings it to
disrepute.38 Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when
the clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of the
judiciary.39 The raison d' etre of courts lies not only in properly
dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.40
Delay derails the administration of justice. It postpones the
rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted.
It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all
litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the
prompt and deliberate disposition of those causes in which all
parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the
entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility. More
than this, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly as
time elapses between the original fact and its judicial determination.
If the facts are not fully and accurately determined, then the wisest
judge cannot distinguish between merit and demerit. If courts do
not get the facts right, there is little chance for their judgment to be
right.41
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in
the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Respondent's delay also runs counter to Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of
the CPR which provides:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
88888888888888888888888

Note!!!!!!
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE AND BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 130191 April 27, 1998
-versusTHE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondent.
DECISION

The right to a preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right; it is a

substantive right. To deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of
due process.
Sections [2] and [4], Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 [Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman] provide:
Sec. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer
shall recommend whether or not it may be:

(a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

(b) referred to respondent for comment;
(c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction
over the case;
(d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
(e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
(f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.

Sec. 4. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted
in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject
to the following provisions:

(a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to

execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.

(b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue
an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting
documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of
service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits
within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
(c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer
may consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint.
In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
(d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither
may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any
matter in the complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the particularization
thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner
provided in paragraph [f] of this section.
(e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6
hereof, or having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall
be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
(f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences,
there are facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to
be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties
shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where the appearance
of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may
be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be asked by the
investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the
witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and
under oath.
(g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating
officer shall forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the
designated authorities for their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the
written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all
other cases.

A preliminary investigation, on the other hand, takes on an adversarial quality

and an entirely different procedure comes into play. This must be so, because
the purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind
before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of
public trial. [18] It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct
useless and expensive trials. [19] While the right is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before
being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is
a substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. [20]

-palpable non-observance by the Office of the Ombudsman of the fundamental

requirements of preliminary investigation.
In Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, [21] this Court, speaking through
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, emphasized that it is mandatory requirement for
the complainant to submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses before the
respondent can be compelled to submit his counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents. Thus:
Even in investigations looking to the prosecution of a party, Rule I, Section 3
can only apply to the general criminal investigation, which in the case at bar
was already conducted by the PCGG. But after the Ombudsman and his
deputies have gathered evidence and their investigation has ceased to be a
general exploratory one and they decide to bring the action against a party,
their proceedings become adversary and Rule II Section 4[a] then applies. This
means that before the respondent can be required to submit counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents, the complainantt must submit his affidavit
and those of his witnesses. This is true not only of prosecutions of graft cases
under Rep. Act No. 3019 but also of actions for the recovery of unexplained
wealth under Rep. Act No. 1379, because Section 2 of this latter law requires
that before a petition is filed there must be a "previous inquiry similar to
preliminary investigation in criminal cases."
Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen cases for trial,
only evidence may be considered. While reports and even raw information may
justify the initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation
can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated

warranting the eventual prosecution of the case in Court. As this Court held in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG:
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to
usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer
conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the
commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an
information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary
investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case.
Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the
case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It
is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to
be heard and for the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is
rendered thereof.

The inordinate delay in the conduct of the "preliminary investigation"

infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy
disposition of their case. [22] In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,[23] We held
that an undue delay of close to three [3] years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances obtaining in
that case warranted the dismissal of the case:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad
umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
[both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution], the inordinate delay is violative of
the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three [3] years can not
be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan
to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the
delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as
to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place,
such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the

petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and
grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery
and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the
period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True,
but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet
invented a device for setting back time.
In the recent case of Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, [24] the Court upheld
Angchangco's right to the speedy disposition of his case. Angchangco was a
Sheriff in the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City. In
1990 criminal complaints were filed against him which remained pending
before the Ombudsman even after his retirement in 1994. The Court, thus,
ruled:
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal
charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the
constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to
act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner
has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he
has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government
for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we
wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement
benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice
which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for. [25]

We are not persuaded by the Ombudsman's argument that the Tatad ruling
does not apply to the present case which is not politically motivated unlike the
former, pointing out the following findings of the Court in the Tatad decision:
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial

process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after
petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing
from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred
the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding
investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious,
but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the
prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution
was politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors
should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office
is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective
observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and
all litigants alike whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty.
Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may be public's
perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced. [26]

The Ombudsman endeavored to distinguish the present suit from the

Angchangco case by arguing that in the latter, Angchangco filed several
motions for early resolution, implying that in the case at bar petitioners were
not as vigilant in asserting or protecting their rights.
We disagree. The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases does not
come into play only when political considerations are involved. The
Constitution makes no such distinction. While political motivation in Tatad may
have been a factor in the undue delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation therein to justify the invocation of their right to speedy disposition
of cases, the particular facts of each case must be taken into consideration in
the grant of the relief sought. In the Tatad case, We are reminded:
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called
"radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and
expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due
process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes
without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those
cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to its case. [27]

In Alviso vs. Sandiganbayan, [28] the Court observed that the concept of

speedy disposition of cases "is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept" and that the factors that may be considered and balanced are the
"length of the delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay."
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy resolution of
their case because they were completely unaware that the investigation against
them was still on-going. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that
petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which
is the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving
their explanation and after four long years of being in the dark, petitioners,
naturally, had reason to assume that the charges against them had already
been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any
plausible, special or even novel reason which could justify the four-year delay in
terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay - the many layers of review
that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail - has
lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad
case. The incident before us does not involve complicated factual and legal
issues, specially in view of the fact that the subject computerization contract
had been mutually cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft
League filed its Complaint.
The Office of the Ombudsman capitalizes on petitioners' three motions for
extension of time to file comment which it imputed for the delay. However, the
delay was not caused by the motions for extension. The delay occurred after
petitioners filed their comment. Between 1992 to 1996, petitioners were under
no obligation to make any move because there was no preliminary investigation
within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule II of A.O. No. 07 to speak of in the
first place.

III.
Finally, under the facts of the case, there is no basis, in law or in fact, to charge
petitioners for violation of Sec. 3[g] of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable
cause against the offender for violation of Sec. 3[g], the following elements must
be present: [1] the offender is a public officer; [2] he entered into a contract or
transaction in behalf of the government; and [3] the contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The second element
of the crime - that the accused public officers entered into a contract in behalf
of the government - is absent. The computerization contract was rescinded on

6 May 1991 before SAR No. 91-05 came out on 31 May 1991 and before the
Anti-Graft League filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 August 1991.
Hence, at that time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint and the
Ombudsman issued its Order on 12 November 1991, there was no longer any
contract to speak of. The contract, after 6 May 1991 became in contemplation
of law, non-existent, as if no contract was ever executed.
18] Rodis, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618 [1988]; People vs. Poculan,
167 SCRA 155 [1988].
[19] Tandoc vs. Resultan, 175 SCRA 37 [1989].
[20] Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 [1980]; Go vs. Court of
Appeals, 206 SCRA 138 [1992].
[21] 239 SCRA 283 [1994].
[22] Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
[23] 159 SCRA 70 [1988].
[24] 268 SCRA 301 [1997].
[25] Id., at 306.
[26] See note 23 at 81.
[27] Id., at 80.
[28] 220 SCRA 55 [1993].

888888888888888888888888
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1760, November 16, 2015
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, v. RETIRED
JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES
(MTCC), CALBAYOG CITY, SAMAR AND RONALDO C. DIONEDA, CLERK
OF COURT OF THE MTCC, CALBAYOG CITY, SAMAR, Respondent.
DECISION
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
order is classified as a less serious charge17 and is punishable by any of the
following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for a period of not less than one (1) month but not more than three (3)
months; or (b) fine of more than PI 0,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
The Manual for Clerks of Court provides that the Clerk of Court is the
administrative officer of the court who controls and supervises the safekeeping

of court records, exhibits, and documents, among others.20 Furthermore, Rule

136, Section 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the clerk of court shall safely
keep all records, papers, files, exhibits, and public property committed to his
charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture
belonging to his office.
Simple neglect of duty under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is classified as a less grave offense,
punishable by suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six
(6) months for the first offense. We find the OCA's recommended penalty welltaken. Thus, we hereby impose on Dioneda a fine in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for failure to comply with the Court's
Resolutions, with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with
more severely.
8888888888888888
CELESTINA B. CORPUZ, CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, URDANETA PANGASINAN,
Complainant,
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1106
June 17, 2003
-versus-

JUDGE ORLANDO ANA F. SIAPNO, PRESIDING JUDGE,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, URDANETA, PANGASINAN,
Respondent.

Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when a complaint or

information is filed even without any allegation of damages and the intention to
prove and claim them, it is understood that the offended party has the right to
prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made, [14]or unless
in the meantime, the offended party instituted a separate civil action. [15] In
such case, the civil liability arising from a crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or
does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the
defendant. [16] Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability,
evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries
suffered. [17] chanrobles virtual
The rule expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with
respect to the civil liability arising from the offense, if no reservation has been

made to ventilate it in a separate action. [18] Indeed, even in case of an

acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil
liability of the accused in favor of the offended party. [19] Therefore, it was
error for respondent not to have entered judgment with respect to the civil
liability. [20]
A]n offense causes two classes of injuries-the first is the social injury produced
by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the
corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the
victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated thru indemnity
which is civil in nature. Hence, when no civil action is expressly instituted it
shall be impliedly instituted with the criminal action. That means that if two
actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete with the same
completeness as any of the two normal persons composing a twin. It means
that the civil action may be tried and prosecuted, with all the ancillary
processes provided by law. [21] (Emphasis and italics supplied.)chanrobles
virtual law library
The methods for indemnifying the private complainant is provided for under the
provisions on civil liability which, under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code,
includes: restitution; [22] reparation for the damage caused; [23] and
indemnification for consequential damages. [24] Pursuant to these statutory
provisions, it behooves respondent to require the production of evidence to
make a finding on civil liability. This is especially so where the accused has
pleaded guilty and has therefore admitted his liability.cralaw
When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he
erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and
the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of
laws and prevailing jurisprudence. [25] Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice. [26]
14] Francisco, R.J. Criminal Procedure, 3rd ed. (1996), p. 124, citing People v. Orosa,
83 Phil. 683 [1949] and People v. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287 [1959].
[15] Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 111 of
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[16] Roa v. Dela Cruz, 107 Phil. 8. [1960]. chanrobles virtual law library
[17] People v. Celorico, 67 Phil. 185 [1939]. chanrobles virtual law library
[18] Francisco, R.J. Criminal Procedure, supra, p. 124. chanrobles virtual law library
[19] Id., p. 134, citing Section 2, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court, now Section
2, paragraph 2, Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[20] Id., p. 125, citing Springer v. Odlin, 3 Phil. 344 [1904]. chanrobles virtual law
library
[21] Francisco, R.J., Criminal Procedure, 3rd ed. (1996), p. 124.

[22] Article 105, Revised Penal Code. chanrobles virtual law library
[23] Article 106, Revised Penal Code.
[24] Article 107, Revised Penal Code. chanrobles virtual law library
[25] Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Eddie Monserate, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1255, 16 April 2001, 356
SCRA 443.
[26] Mutilan v. Judge Santos B. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581, 2 July 2002, citing
Espino, et al. v. Salubre, 352 SCRA 668 [2001].