SharedDestinies

Securityinaglobalisedworld
TheinterimreportoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury

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INTERNATIONAL
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SharedDestinies
Securityinaglobalisedworld
TheinterimreportoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury
2 Shareddestinies| Aboutippr

Aboutippr

TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,
producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
sustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe
UK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchange
andprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedas
possible,whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogramme
extendourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-class
reputationforhighqualityresearch.

ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA
T:+44(0)2074706100|E:info@ippr.org
www.ippr.org

RegisteredCharityNo.800065

ThisreportwasfirstpublishedinNovember2008.
ippr2008
 3

ipprCommissiononNational
Securityinthe21stCentury
ThisistheinterimreportoftheongoingipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe
21stCentury.Thisisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependentnationalsecurity
strategyfortheUK.Itisco-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdown
ofNorton-sub-Hamdon.ThefullCommissionmembershipincludes:

LordPaddyAshdown,Co-Chair,formerleaderoftheLiberalDemocratPartyand
formerHighRepresentativeforBosniaandHerzegovina.
LordGeorgeRobertson,Co-Chair,formerSecretaryofStateforDefenceandformer
SecretaryGeneralofNATO.
DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,ippr.
SirJeremyGreenstock,DirectoroftheDitchleyFoundationandformerBritish
AmbassadortotheUnitedNations.
SirDavidOmand,formersecurityandintelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOffice
andformerPermanentSecretaryintheHomeOffice.
LordCharlesGuthrie,formerChiefoftheDefenceStaff.
ShamiChakrabarti,DirectorofLibertyandformerHomeOfficelawyer.
LordMartinRees,PresidentoftheRoyalSocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege,
Cambridge.
SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableofNorthamptonshireandformerPresidentof
theAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers.
ProfessorMaryKaldor,DirectoroftheCentreforGlobalGovernance,LondonSchool
ofEconomics.
ProfessorMichaelClarke,DirectoroftheRoyalUnitedServicesInstituteand
ProfessorofDefenceStudiesatKingsCollegeLondon.
ProfessorFrancescaKlug,ProfessorialResearchFellowattheLondonSchoolof
EconomicsandcommissionerontheCommissionforEqualityandHumanRights
(CEHR).
ProfessorTariqModood,DirectoroftheUniversityofBristolResearchCentreforthe
StudyofEthnicityandCitizenship.
ConstanzeStelzenmller,DirectoroftheBerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund.
ProfessorJimNorton,SeniorPolicyAdviser,InstituteofDirectorsandformerChief
ExecutiveoftheRadioCommunicationsAgency.
IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservativePartyPolicyTask-forceonScience,
Technology,EngineeringandMathematics,ConservativeMPforEsherandWalton
andformerministerforScienceandTechnologyattheDepartmentofTradeand
Industry.
WepublishthisinterimreportinthenameofeveryCommissionmember.
FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommissionpleasegotowww.ippr.org/security
4 Shareddestinies| Acknowledgements|Commentsandfeedback
Comments
andfeedback
Wewelcomewrittencommentsonall
sectionsandaspectsofthematerial
presentedhere,andtheseshouldbe
sentinthefirstinstancetothe
CommissionsDeputyChair,
IanKearns,oni.kearns@ippr.org.
Acknowledgements
Asisthecasewithmostprojectsofthisnature,thisreportistheproductofthelabour
ofmany,andwithouttheirassistanceandsupportwewouldneverhavebeenableto
publish.Wewishtothankallthosewhohavecontributedtoourdeliberationsinthepast
yearandahalf.
Inparticular,wewishtothanktheincomparablestaffattheInstituteforPublicPolicy
Research,especiallyAndyHull,AlexGlennie,KatiePaintinandKatherineGregoryinthe
InternationalandSecurityProgramme,whohaveworkedtirelesslytodeliverthe
Commissionsdemandingworkprogrammeandhavecontributedtothedraftingofthis
interimreport,andmanyothers,includingMatthewLockwood,GeorginaKyriacou,
LemoniaTsaroucha,CatherineBithell,LisaHarkerandCareyOppenheim,whoallhelped
usgettothefinishline.
WethankEDSandRaytheon,whoaresupportersofalltheCommissionsactivities.We
wouldalsoliketothankthefollowingfortheirsupportforspecificstreamsofwork
feedingintotheCommissionsdeliberations:Booz&Co(energysecurityandnational
infrastructure),DeLaRue(bordersecurityandidentitymanagement),theDepartment
forInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistry(conflictpreventionand
peacebuilding),NationalGridandOfcom(resilience),BAESystems(defencecapabilities),
theEconomicandSocialResearchCouncil(policybriefs)andCliffordChance(security
lectures).
TheviewsinthisreportarethoseoftheCommissionersandnotthoseofanysponsoring
organisation.
 5

Foreword

Overthelasttwentyyearsthenationalandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthas
changeddramatically.TheendoftheColdWarandthehorrificattacksof9/11arejust
twodevelopmentsamongmanythathavesignalledthearrivalofanew21stcentury
securitylandscape.
Newdriversofchange,fromglobalisationandclimatechangetoscientificadvance Thereisapressing
andthegrowthandchangingdistributionofhumanpopulations,havecometothe
fore.Technologicaladvances,stretchedglobalsupplychainsandthedesiretostrip needtodomoreto
outcostsinbusinesshavemadeusamorecomplex,infrastructure-reliantsociety, preventandprepare
andmoreinterconnectedacrossbordersthaneverbefore.Theseprocessesfrom forviolentconflict,
whichtheUKisneitherisolatednorinsulatednowchallengebothoutdated
analyticalframeworksandoldpolicyprescriptions. statefailure,nuclear
Policymakersareworkinghardtoadaptandtokeepupwiththepaceofchange,but
proliferation,
thechallengesareprofoundandtheprogressuneven.Asaresult,whilewecommend bioterrorismand
manyoftheeffortsalreadyunderwayandwelcometheGovernmentsrecent globalpandemics
publicationoftheUKsfirstnationalsecuritystrategy,wealsobelievethatthereisa
pressingneedforconstructiveexternalchallenge.
Wearethereforeconductingadetailedassessmentoftheevolvingglobalsecurity
environmentandthespecificchallengesandopportunitiesthisposesforBritain.
Inthisinterimreportweconsiderhowthemodernworldischanging,howthesechanges
manifestthemselvesintermsofthreatstosecurity,andhowthesethreatsinturnaffect
theUK.Weoutlinethenatureofourcurrentresponses,andidentifygapsinthem.
Finally,weproposetheprinciplesthatshouldshapeBritishsecuritypolicyoverthenext
decadeandbeyond,andmakesomespecificpolicyrecommendationsforhowBritain
canmakeamoreeffectivecontributiontothepromotionofglobalsecurityandenhance
thesecurityofitsowncitizensathome.
Inparticular,wesuggestthereisapressingneedtodomoretopreventandpreparefor
violentconflict,statefailure,nuclearproliferation,bioterrorismandglobalpandemics.
Thisisnotscaremongering.Astheanalysisthatunderpinsthisreportdemonstrates,the
dangerswedescribearereal.Wecanfacethemwithconfidence,butonlyifweare
preparedtochangeastheworldarounduschanges,tobringanewgovernancetobear
ondiffusedandunregulatedpowerintheglobalspace,andtorecognisethatinthis
century,morethaneverbefore,ourdestiniesaresharedwithpeoplesandplacesbeyond
ourshores.
Wewillbuilduponthefoundationslaidinthisdocumentinourfinalreportinsummer
2009,settingoutmoredetailedproposalsforanewstrategytoachievenationalsecurity
fortheUnitedKingdomandtopromoteitforthewiderworld.

LordPaddyAshdown LordGeorgeRobertson

November2008
SharedDestinies
Securityinaglobalisedworld
TheinterimreportoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury

Summaryand
Recommendations
8 Shareddestinies| Summaryandrecommendations

Summaryand
Recommendations
Thissummaryisdividedintofourparts:
Acontextualintroduction
Anarticulationof13basicobservationsaboutthecurrentsecurityenvironment
AstatementofeightprinciplesthatshouldshapeandunderpintheUKsresponsetoit
AsummaryofthemainrecommendationsinthefullSupportingResearchand
Analysisbelow.
TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stcenturywillbuildonthese
foundationsinitsfinalreport,tobepublishedinsummer2009,whichwillsetoutmore
detailedproposalsforanewstrategytopromoteanddefendthenationalsecurity
interestsoftheUnitedKingdom.

Introduction
Wepublishthisreportagainstthebackdropofasignificantlyworseninginternational
situation.Recentmonthshaveseenturmoilinandthenearcollapseoftheglobal
financialsystem,thefailureoftalksaimedatanewglobaltradeagreement,amarked
deteriorationinrelationsbetweenRussiaandNATOaftertheconflictintheCaucasus,an
escalationofviolenceinAfghanistanandPakistan,politicalviolenceandarmedconflict
inmanypartsofAfrica,andcontinuinghightensionoverIran.TheUKsextensive
engagementsinIraqandAfghanistancontinue,thelatterinparticularwithnorealend
orprogressinsight.Behindtheheadlinesandtheshort-termchallenges,deeper,historic
andlonger-termchangesarealsounderway,reshapingourworldandstoringup
challengesandpotentialtroubleforthefuture.
Thisreportisbothawarningandacalltoaction.Thedangerswedescribearerealbut
weshouldnotsuccumbtopessimism.Providedwearewillingtolearnlessons,tochange
thewaywethink,tofindthenecessarypoliticalwillandtoadaptourpolicysolutions
andinstrumentstonewcircumstancesthereismuchthatcanbedone.Weofferthis
interimreportasacontributiontothenecessaryprocessofpolicychangethatmustnow
unfold.

Observations
Aswelooktothefuture,weobservethat:
1.Globalisationisdiffusingpoweramongmanydifferentactorsintheinternational
system.Itisfuellingamassiveredistributionofeconomicandpoliticalinfluencefromthe
Complexityhas AtlanticseaboardtoAsiaandthePacific,increasinginterdependencebetweenstates,
empoweringnon-stateactors,andcreatingnewopportunitiesforbothlegitimateand
enteredthe illegitimateactioninalargelyunregulatedanduncontrolledglobalspace.
infrastructureof 2.Theglobalpopulationisgrowingrapidly.Aworldpopulationof9.2billionby2050,
modernlifeandour only1.25billionofwhichwillliveindevelopedcountries,meanstheendoftheWest
relianceon asthepivotalregioninworldaffairs,intensepressureonnaturalresources,an
increasinglymarginalisedglobalmajority,andincreasedmigrationflowsfrompoorto
stretchedand richstates.
interdependent
3.Climatechangeissettotransformthesecurityenvironment.Itislikelytoreduceand
infrastructureshas shifttheavailabilityofhabitableland,foodandwater,toexacerbateinter-statetensions
increased andtogenerateforcedmovementsofpeople.WeakandfailingstatesinAfricaandparts
ofAsiawillfaceseriouschallengesinattemptingtorespondtoclimatechange.The
phenomenonmayevenplayakeyroleinshapingthecharacterandoutlookofmajor
powerssuchasChina.
 9

4.Weakandunstablestatesoutnumberstrongandstableonesbymorethantwoto
one,andstatefailureandsometimescollapsewillbeahighlyvisiblefeatureofthe
internationalsecuritylandscapefordecadestocome.
5.Massiveglobalpovertyisacontributingfactortothisdevelopment andwhen
combinedwithinequality,particularlyhorizontalbetweengroupinequality,actsto
fuelviolentconflict.Withinthis,joblessnessandmigrationfromcountrysidetotown
canalsoprovideacontextinwhichyoungmenjoinextremistmovementsorcriminal
gangs.
6.Conflictitselfremainsanenormousproblem.Whilethefiguresindicatethatinstances
ofviolentconflictaredeclining,thetotalnumberofconflict-relateddeathsremains
huge,theestimatednumberofpeopledisplacedbyconflictisatitshighestsincethe
early1990s,andcampaignsofone-sidedviolenceinwhichcivilians(particularlywomen
andchildren)aretargetedandterrorisedhavebecomeincreasinglyprevalent.Conflict
andthepressuresofpoorgovernance,includingweakorabsentruleoflaw,arenow
convergingonparticularlocations,creatingbothswingstatesinthestrugglefor
internationalpeaceandstability,andtheriskofungovernedspacesthatbecomehavens
forcriminalandterroristactivitythatcouldalsoaffecttheUK.
7.Transnationalcriminalnetworkshaveexpandedtheirtraffickingoperationsindrugs,
armsandpeople andareunderminingandcorruptingstategovernancearrangementsin
manycountries,facilitatingandprofitingfromviolentconflictintheprocess.
8.SincetheendoftheColdWar,wehaveenteredasecondandfarmoredangerous
nuclearage inwhichrenewedstateproliferationisamajorthreat,stockpilesof
dangerousnuclearmaterialsremaininsufficientlysecure,andterroristgroupsactively
seekanuclearcapability.
9.Terrorismusingconventionalweaponsremainsthemostlikelychallengebutthe
threatoftechnologicallysophisticatedchemical,biological,radiologicalornuclear
(CBRN)terrorismisrealandnolongercomesonlyfromorganisedgroupslikeAl
Qaedaanditsimitators,butalsofromloneindividualswithrelevantexpertiseand
accesstothenecessarytechnologicalinfrastructure.Insufficientlysecuregovernment
laboratoriesaroundtheworldremainaparticularworryinrelationtobioterrorism.
10.Rapidadvancesininformationtechnologiesandbiotechnologiesarecreatingnew
vulnerabilitiesfornationalandinternationalsecurity.Cyber-crimeandcyber-terrorismare
alreadyrealities.Newdiscoveriesinbiotechnologyputtodeadlypurposeswouldhave
terrifyingimplications.
11.Humanityisincreasinglyvulnerabletoinfectiousdiseaseandtothepossibilityof
newanddevastatingglobalpandemics.Populationconcentrationsinurbancentresin
thedevelopingworld,globalpeoplemovementonanunprecedentedscale,anincreased
criminaltradeinanimalsandanimal-relatedproductsandthegrowthofdrug-resistant
diseasesarecombiningtoenlargethisthreat.
12. Complexityhasenteredtheinfrastructureofmodernlifeandourrelianceon
stretchedandinterdependentinfrastructureshasincreased.Governmentsaroundthe
worldownlessoftheircriticalnationalinfrastructureandprivatesectororganisations
havebecomemoreimportanttodeliveringsecurityandsocietalresilienceasaresult.
13.TheUKisnotandcannotbeinsulatedfromanyofthesedevelopments.Although
thecountrybenefitsenormouslyfromitsparticipationinanopenworldeconomyand
society,itisalsoreliantonworldenergymarketsandvulnerabletotheirinstability,is
affectedbytransnationalcrime,hasitsownAlQaeda-influencedhome-grownterrorist
threattoaddress,willsufferinfrastructuredamageasmorelocalclimatechangeeffects
unfold,andispotentiallyhighlyvulnerabletothespreadofinfectiousdisease.Whilethe
threatofadirectstate-ledattackonthecountryisremote,thistoocannotbeentirely
discounted.Moregenerally,thecountrywillclearlybelesssecureifthewider
internationalsecurityenvironmentdeterioratesandtheUKhasaclearstakeinensuring
thatthisdoesnothappen.
10 Shareddestinies| Summaryandrecommendations

Principles
Giventheseobservations,webelievethatthefollowingprinciplesareimportantinframing
whatshouldhappennext:
1.Thescopeofnationalsecuritystrategytodaymustinclude,butalsorangewiderthan,a
concernwithpoliticalviolence.Theprotectionofthestatewithstrongandflexibledefence
forceswillremainimportant,butafarbroaderspreadofrisks,fromclimatechangeand
diseasetotransnationalcrimeandenergysecurity,mustalsobeconsideredandmanaged.
Socialandpsychologicaldimensionsofsecurityarealsoincreasinglyimportant.

Governmentwould 2.Inaglobalisedworldofmanyweakstates,measurestopromoteinternationalpeace
andstabilityandtohelpotherstohelpthemselvesofferthebestcourseofactioninour
dowelltofocusnot owndefence.Astheglobalfinancialcrisisdemonstrates,weliveinaworldofshared
onafixedlistof destinieswherefailingsinoneregionquicklygeneratepolicyproblemsandinsecuritiesin
prioritiesbuton others.Inthisenvironment,notonlycannostateguaranteethesecurityofitspeopleby
actingalone,butweak,corruptandfailingstateshavebecomebiggersecurityrisksthan
buildingupcore strong,competitiveones.
nationalcapabilities
3.Amassiveincreaseinlevelsofmultilateralcooperationisthereforenowneeded.
thatarewell Thismustincludebutgowellbeyondaconcernwiththereformofglobalinstitutions.
integrated Weareinfavourofaneweraoftreaty-basedcooperationonspecificissues,from
non-proliferationtoglobalbiosecurity,andbelievegroupsofwillingstateswillbe
neededtoinitiateaction,setstandards,andsustainprogressinmanyareas.Arangeof
differentstrategicpartnershipswillbenecessarywithnewemergingpowersincluding
China,andthecreationofaLeagueofDemocraciesatthisjuncturewouldbeabad
idea.PowerredistributionmeanstheendoftheWesternhegemonyininternational
affairsandWesternpowerswillneedtobeflexible:itisnolongerrealistictoexpect
emergingpowerstosignuptoexclusivelyWestern-ledinstitutionsandpractices.
4.Partnershipactionisneededathomeaswellasabroad.Governmentdepartments
mustgetusedtoworkingwithothersandmustbuildtheirabilitytomanageprojects
encompassingawiderangeofcontributors.Governmentcannottakesoleresponsibility
formakingpeoplesecure.Itneedstoworkinpartnershipwithbusinesses,community
groupsandindividualcitizenstobuildandenhancesecurity.Governmentmustdevolve,
andbusinessesandindividualsmustaccept,moreresponsibilityfornationalsecurityand
thecostswillhavetobeshared.
5.Legitimacyofstateactionisastrategicimperativeincurrentconditions.The
voluntarilyofferedpartnershipandcooperationofcitizensandpotentialallieswillonly
beforthcominginthepresenceofit.Inpractice,thismeansmoreopenandinclusive
policymaking,andtheUKgovernmentworkinghardertoaddressclaimsthatitoperates
adoublestandardwhencomparingitsownbehaviourtothebehaviourofothers.More
particularly,itmeansreaffirmingtheUKscommitmenttopromoting,protectingand
defendingfundamentalhumanrights,suchastherighttobefreefromtorture,and
meansfollowingthroughonthiscommitmentbothathomeandabroad.Itmeans
viewingterrorismasacrime,treatingitthatway,anddealingwithitwithinthecriminal
lawparadigm,notthewaronterrorparadigm.Internationally,ifinterventionsinthe
affairsofanotherstatearedeemednecessary,itmeanstheseshouldcomplywiththe
UNCharter.WherethisisnotpossiblebecausevestedinterestsparalysetheSecurity
Councileveninthefaceofserioushumanrightsviolations,amajorhumanitariancrisis,
oradevelopingthreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity,thenitmeansanyaction
takenshouldbeproportionate,haveaprimaryregardfortheprotectionofcivilians,
haveareasonableprospectofsuccess,andhavewidesupportintheinternational
community.Itshouldalsoonlybetakenasalastresortafterallpeacefulanddiplomatic
avenuestoavertconflicthavebeenexhausted.
6.Weneedmorepreventativeaction.Preventionsaveslives,savesmoney,andinan
interconnectedworld,nipsproblemsinthebudwhilelimitingthepotentialreachof
anyspecificthreatorhazard.Itfollowsthat,individuallyandinternationally,weneed
todevelopacapacityforhorizonscanningandearlyinterventiontopreventconflict
andstatefailurethroughuseofawiderangeofaid,diplomaticandother
instruments.
 11

7.Domestically,whilecarryingonwithnormaleverydaylife,wemustbecomemore
resilient,preparingtowithstandsomedamageandviewingthispreparationitselfasa
formofdeterrence.Sincegovernmentcannotpreventallformsofharmordamageto
thecountryoritspeople,preparingforcertainassessabledangersistheresponsible
thingtodo.Themoreeffectivelywedoso,themoreresilientwebecome,andtheless
attractiveweareasatargetforthosewhowoulddousharm.
8.Flexibilityisneededinnationalcapabilities.Asecurityenvironmentwithsomany
interconnecteddriversandsuchawiderangeofthreatsandhazardsisnotoneinwhich
perfectpredictionispossible.Inthisenvironment,theGovernmentwoulddowellto
focusnotonafixedlistofprioritiesbutonbuildingupcorenationalcapabilitiesthatare
wellintegrated(acrossmilitary,economic,diplomatic,culturalandcommunityfieldsof
engagement),highlyflexibleandreadilylinkedintotheeffortsofpartners,bothbilateral
andmultilateral,athomeandabroad.

Recommendations:Whatweshoulddonow
Inthisinterimreport,wesetoutinitialproposalsonconflictpreventionandintervention,
recommendationsrelatedtoregionalsecurityorganisations,anddetailedproposalson
twofundamentallyimportantareaswhichrequiremultilateralcooperation(namely
nuclearnon-proliferationandglobalbiosecurity).Wefocusontheseissuesbecausewe
arenotconvincedgovernmentiscurrentlydoingenoughintheseareas,becausewe
believethescaleofthechallengeorthreatdemandsurgentaction,andbecauseinsome
instanceswebelievealimitedwindowofpoliticalopportunityforactionexists.

Conflictprevention
InthefullRecommendations(Chapter9below),wecallupontheGovernmentto
developfurtherandmoredeeplyembedthenotionofaResponsibilitytoPrevent
ViolentConflict inUKforeign,defenceandoverseasdevelopmentpolicy.Thisisbecause
violentconflictisahumantragedy,destabiliseswholecountriesandregions,andcan
contributetothegenerationofungovernedspaceswhichmaybecomeasourceofdirect
threattotheUnitedKingdom.
Insupportofthisgoal,wecallfor:
Thegenerationofsharedstrategicassessments ofpossibleconflictsituationsboth
acrossWhitehallandincoordinationwithinternationalpartners(see
Recommendation1).
ThecreationofanindependentConflictModellingPaneltoassesspossibleconflicts
andthelikelyhuman,strategicandfinancialconsequencesofnotactingtoprevent
them(seeRecommendation2).
Theintegrateduseofafullspectrumofupgradedconflictpreventioninstruments,
coveringaid,trade,diplomacyandmilitaryinstrumentscapableofbringingpressure
tobearforpeaceinregionsthatmaybeonthevergeofconflict(see
Recommendation3).Wehaverestructuredwholearmedservicestobeabletoproject
militarypower.Nowweneedasimilarexercisetoprojectacapacityforrebuilding
peace.
TheadditionofaconflictreductiongoaltotheexistingMillenniumDevelopment
Goals (seeRecommendation4).
AfurtherinvestmentinandrefocusingofBritainsin-countrydiplomaticexpertise
tofacilitateinterventionsinconflictpreventionthatarebetterinformedandbetter
targetedatlocalconditions(seeRecommendation5).
Anincreaseinresourceschannelledtonon-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)
promotingconflictpreventionandin-countrypoliticaldialogue andincreased
effortstocoordinatemoreeffectivelytheactivitiesofUK-basedbodiesengagedin
suchactivities(seeRecommendation6),incorporatingthemintoprevention,planning
andpost-conflictintervention.
12 Shareddestinies| Summaryandrecommendations

Thefundingofindependentresearchintosuccessfulconflictprevention
activitiesandfinancialsupportforapublicinventoryofcasestudiesof
successfulpreventativeaction.Thisisvitalbothforlessonstobelearnedbutalso
asapracticaltooltoaddressthedeficitofpoliticalwillinrelationtoearly
preventativeaction(seeRecommendation7).

Interventioninconflictenvironments
Sincewecannotrealisticallyexpectallviolentconflicttobepreventedandsince
therearelikelytobeotherinterventionsrequiredatsomepointinthefuture,we
mustalsoorganiseourselvesfarmoreeffectivelyforthechallengesahead.Wewillbe
returningtothisthemeinmoredetailinourfinalreportbutwebelievesomeofthe
changesrequiredarealreadyclear.
Wethereforecallfor:
Thedevelopmentofcoherentpoliticalobjectiveswithinwhichmilitarystrategy
andtacticsmustresideinfutureoperations.ThisdidnothappeninIraq:coalition
forceswereaskedtodefeattheIraqiarmyandtakeBaghdadratherthanto
developastrategyforthestabilisationofIraqpost-Saddam.Despitesome
improvements,wearealsostrugglingwiththelackofastrategicconceptin
Afghanistan(seeRecommendation8).
Amorefundamentalreviewofmilitarydoctrineandoperationalplanning,as
theyrelatetointerventionsinconflictandfailedstatesituations(see
Recommendation9).
Clearunityofcommandtobeestablished,underawell-resourcedcivilian
leadership,acrossUKmilitary,diplomatic,aidandreconstructionactivitiesin
conflictzones.Thiswillberequiredinfutureandisalsoneedednowin
Afghanistan(seeRecommendation10).
Strongerandmorefocusedpoliticalengagementandleadership,throughthe
creationofasecuritydiplomacyleadershippostwithintheCabinet,to
coordinatetheentireUKeffortinamajorconflictzoneandtogather
internationalsupportfortheactionrequired.Again,thisisneedednowin
relationtoAfghanistan.ThecreationofsucharoleinCabinetwouldembedthe
notionofunityofcommandundercivilianleadershipattheheartofgovernment
andwouldallowoneindividualtocoordinateajoined-upresponsefromacrossthe
entireWhitehallmachine(seeRecommendation11).
OnAfghanistaninparticular,webelievetheUKgovernmentshouldworkwith
thenewUSadministrationtopromotearegionalcontextsupportiveofpeace-
buildinginthecountry,bringinginIran,Russia,Pakistan,Chinaandarangeof
civilsocietyorganisations.Thiswillnotbeeasy,butshouldbeattempted(see
Recommendation12).

Strengtheningandadaptingregionalsecurityorganisations
Inaddition,wealsobelievethereisaneedfor:
TheadaptationandstrengtheningofEurope-basedregionalsecurity
organisationssuchastheEuropeanUnion(EU),theOrganisationforSecurity
andCooperationinEurope(OSCE)andtheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation
(NATO),withthelastoftheseincorporatingthefullengagementoftheUnited
States,asacentralplankofBritishstrategyonmoreeffectivemultilateralsecurity
cooperation(seeRecommendation13).
AmassiveincreaseintheEUsandNATOslogisticalandfinancialhelptothe
AfricanUnion,theregionalsecuritybodythatislikelytobetestedthemostinthe
nextfivetotenyears,butwhichiscurrentlytheleastwellequippedtorespond
(seeRecommendation14).
 13

Issue-specificandtreaty-basedmultilateralism
Nuclearnon-proliferation
Giventhegrowingdangersassociatedwithnuclearweapons,webelieveitisnotsafe
fortheworldtorelyonnucleardeterrenceforlong-termsecurity.Wetherefore
supporttheviewthatthelong-termgoalofourpolicymustbethecreationofa
worldfreeofnuclearweaponsandbelieveactiononnon-proliferationisurgent
aheadoftheNon-ProliferationTreatyReviewConferencein2010.Weknowtheroad
toachievingthisgoalwillbelongandthepathtowardsitnotalwaysclear,butwecall
upontheGovernmenttopursueitactivelyandto:
Usealltheinstrumentsatitsdisposaltoencouragefurtherrapidreductionsinthe
strategicarsenalsofbothRussiaandtheUnitedStates (seeRecommendation15).
PursueastrengtheningoftheNon-ProliferationTreatyprovisionsonmonitoring
andcompliance,toprovidegreaterassurancestoallpartiesontheeffectiveness
oftheTreaty (seeRecommendation16).
IncreasefurtheritsfinancialcontributiontotheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency
(IAEA) andencourageotherstatestodothesame(seeRecommendation17).
Providefurtherpracticalhelptothosestateswishingbutnotfullyableto
implementSecurityCouncilResolution1540onimprovingthesecurityofnuclear
stockpiles (seeRecommendation18).
ProvideafinancialcontributiontotheIAEA/NuclearThreatInitiative(NTI)
nuclearfuelbankfund,whichisaimedatestablishinganinternationally
accessiblenuclearfuelbank (seeRecommendation19).
UseallofitsinfluenceinsideNATOtoensurethatthereviewofNATOsstrategic
concept,beingcarriedoutin2009and2010,producesaresultsensitivetoand
supportiveoftherequirementsofasuccessfuloutcometotheNPTReview
Conferencein2010 (seeRecommendation20).
Moreover,theGovernmentshould:
SeektouseitsmembershipoftheP-5tostimulateadeeperandmoreactive
strategicdialogueonnon-proliferationwithinthisgroupofstates (see
Recommendation21).
InvitetheforeignanddefenceministersoftheP-5toanon-proliferationstrategic
dialoguemeetingpriortothe2010NPTReviewConferenceinpursuitofajoint
P-5positionattheconference (seeRecommendation22).
Fundandcontributetoasecond,lessformaltrackofdiplomaticactivityinvolving
formerseniorofficialsandpolicyexpertsfromtheP-5plusIndia,Pakistanand
Israel,ifpossible.Thiswouldnotbeeasytoputtogether,butshouldbeattempted
andshouldbeaimedatidentifyingandthinkingthroughthepoliticalandstrategic
issuesrequiredforaphasedprogressiontozeronuclearweaponsamongthisgroup,
therepresentativesofwhichwouldcovertheeightkeynuclearweaponsstates(both
signatoriesandnon-signatoriesoftheNPT)(seeRecommendation23).
Inaddition:
Toensurethatnon-proliferationissuesremainattheforefrontofnationalpolitical
debateandtoensuredomesticawarenessoftheneedforthesemeasures,the
DefenceSecretaryandForeignSecretaryshouldmakeannualjointstatementsto
theHouseofCommonsoncurrentproliferationconcernsandtrends,andonthe
Governmentsfullrangeofactivitiesandresourcesbeingdeployedtorespondto
them (seeRecommendation24).

Globalbiosecurity
Wedrawparticularattentiontothechallengesofbioterrorismanddiseasethroughout
ourfullinterimreport.Asemergingproblems,theseexposesignificantweaknessesin
theinternationalinstitutionallandscapeandanurgentresponseisrequired.Sincethere
14 Shareddestinies| Summaryandrecommendations

iswidespreadconsensusthatthearrangementsfordetectingandrespondingtothe
deliberatereleaseofadeadlypathogenarelargelyidenticaltothoserequiredfor
detectingandrespondingtonaturallyoccurringdisease,ourrecommendationshereare
aimedatimprovingglobalreadinesstodealwithboth.
WecallfortheGovernmentto:
Workwithinternationalpartnerstocreateapanelofscientificexperts,equivalent
totheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,forpurposesofreviewingand
bringingtopolicymakersattentiondevelopmentsinthebiologicalsciencesthat
mayhaveimplicationsforsecurityandpublicsafety (seeRecommendation25).
IncreaseitssupporttotheGlobalOutbreakAlertandResponseNetwork(GOARN)
andtoencourageothercountriestodosothesame(seeRecommendation26).
Useitsownbilateralaidprogrammestoupgradedevelopingcountriesskillsand
capacitiesinthefieldofdiseasesurveillanceandresponse(seeRecommendation27).
PromotetheideaofaGlobalCompactforInfectiousDiseases (see
Recommendation28).Thiswouldbeanewtreatydesignedtodeliveranumberof
internationallycoordinatedbiosecurityadvancesincluding:
Thecreationofanetworkofresearchcentresaimedatthecarryingoutof
fundamentalresearchoninfectiousdiseases
Improveddataandknowledgesharingfromresearchandbio-surveillanceactivities
aroundtheworld
Theharmonisationofnationalstandards,regulatorypractices,andbestlaboratory
practices
Amajorexpansionintheproductionofimportantdrugsandvaccines.
CoupleitspromotionoftheCompactwithmovestoexpandtheInternational
HealthPartnership(IHP)asanurgentpriority,toensurethattheCompactdoes
notleadtoalocking-inofvaccineaccessandhealthgovernanceadvantagesalready
enjoyedbythewealthiestcountries(seeRecommendation29).
Supportthecreationofanevent-reportingsystemforanimaldiseases equivalent
tothatsetupinrelationtohumanhealthintheInternationalHealthRegulations
2005.Inaworldwheresomanydiseasescrossthespeciesbarrier,theabsenceof
suchanevent-reportingsystemisamajorweaknessintheinternationalarchitecture
forensuringbiosecurity(seeRecommendation30).

Furtherwork
Beyondtheserecommendations,therearefurtherpolicyareasthatourfinalreportwill
explore,including:
Thepossibilitiesforexpandingalaw-basedapproachtointernationalsecurityissues
andrecommendationsrelatedtodomesticresilience,counter-terrorismandcounter-
radicalisationpolicy.
Energysecuritychallengesandwiderdefencepolicy,andafullerviewonthe
appropriaterolesoftheEUandNATOinfuturesecuritypolicy.Withinthis,wewill
alsoofferamoredetailedexaminationofhowtheUKanditsalliesmightbestlearn
toprojectapost-conflictreconstructioncapabilityinaworldoffailingstatesand
increasingconflictpressures.
KeyquestionssuchastheapproachrequiredtorelationswithRussiaandtheUnited
States,issuesrelatedtothemachineryofgovernment,andtheimplicationsofour
recommendationsfortheallocationofpublicresources.
Thegoalinourfinalreportwillbeasithasbeeninthis:tochallengetheGovernment
andotherstopromoteactionrelevantto21stcenturythreatsandtooffer
implementablestrategiesformovingforward.Thethreatsandhazardsdescribedinthese
pages,andinourfullinterimreport,demandthatthishappen.
SharedDestinies
Securityinaglobalisedworld
TheinterimreportoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury

SupportingResearch
andAnalysis
16 Shareddestinies| Contents

Contents

SUPPORTINGRESEARCHANDANALYSIS

Part1: Introduction
1. Introduction 20
2. Scope:Theterrainofnationalsecuritypolicytoday 22

Part2: Thesecuritylandscapetoday
3. Long-termdriversofchange 26
Globalisation 26
Demographicchange 32
Povertyandinequality 37
Climatechange 40
Scientificandtechnologicalchange 43
SummaryofChapter3 46

4. Competition,conflictandstatefailureintheinternationalsystem 48
Changingpatternsofviolentconflict 48
Weak,failedandcollapsedstates 54
Multiplestresspointsandswingstates 55
Inter-statecompetitionandpossibleconflict 58
SummaryofChapter4 61

5. Transnationalthreatsandrisks 62
Terrorism 62
Transnationalcrime 69
Infectiousdiseaseandpandemics 73
SummaryofChapter5 76

6. ThreatsandrisksintheUK 77
TheterroristthreattotheUK 77
TheUKandtransnationalorganisedcrime 81
ThesecurityimplicationsofmigrationintotheUK 82
EnergysecuritychallengesfortheUK 83
ClimatechangeimpactsontheUK 85

TheriskofpandemicdiseasetotheUK 87
SummaryofChapter6 89

ConclusiontoPart2:Aworldofshareddestinies 90
 17

Part3: CurrentUKsecuritypolicy
7. CurrentUKsecuritypolicy 94
Themachineryofgovernment 94
Thelegislativeframework 95
State-ledthreatsandinter-staterelations 95
Nuclearnon-proliferation 96
Conflict 96
Counter-terrorism 96
Measurestocountertransnationalorganisedcrime 98
Civilemergencies 99
Shadowsecuritypolicy 100
OverallassessmentofcurrentUKgovernmentpolicy 101

Part4: Anewstrategicapproachandimmediatepriorities
8. Principlestounderpinnationalsecuritystrategy 104

9. Policyrecommendations 107

Responsestoviolentconflict 108
Strengthenedmultilateralism 112

References 118
Appendix1: Theterrainofnationalsecuritypolicy 133
Appendix2: Highscorethresholdsforourconflictand 135
statefailureriskindicators
Glossaryofabbreviations 136
20 Shareddestinies| Introduction
Ifglobalisationof Progressonsomeofthebigglobalchallengessuchasclimatechangeispainfullyslow,
powerisoneofthe
keyphenomenaof
ourtime,then
bringinggovernance
totheglobalspace
isoneofitskey
challenges spaceisoneofitskeychallengesandfuturestabilitywillinlargemeasurebedefinedby
1.Introduction
WepublishthisreportinNovember2008inthecontextofachangingand
significantlyworseninginternationalsituation.
Recentmonthshaveseenprofoundturmoilintheglobalfinancialsystem,thecollapseof
theDohatalksaimedatanewglobaltradeagreement,adeterioratingrelationship
betweenRussiaandNATOoverGeorgiaandworryinglevelsofarmedconflictinSomalia,
theDemocraticRepublicofCongoandSudan.Thereiscontinuinghightensionoverthe
Iraniannuclearprogrammeanditspotentialtotriggeranucleararmsraceinthealready
volatileMiddleEast,adegeneratingsecuritysituationbothindrought-hitAfghanistan
andinPakistan,wherelastyeartherewasonaverageonesuicidebombingeveryweek,
andelectionsthathaverecentlybeenmarredbypoliticalviolenceinKenyaand
Zimbabwe,threateningfurtherinstabilityinAfrica.
too,andchangesinscienceandtechnologyandtheirwiderdispersalwhilebringing
enormousbenefitstohumanityareallowingloneindividuals,aswellassmallgroups,to
engageinmoredevastatingformsofterrorism.Newformsofnetwork-enabledand
biologicalwarfare,andnewvulnerabilitiesassociatedwitheachofthemarealsonow
eitheruponusorjustoverthehorizon.Powerisbecomingincreasinglyglobalised,and
thisverticaltransferofpowerfromthenationstate,wherepowerwassubjectto
governance,regulationandlaw,ontotheglobalstage,wheretheseconstraintsareeither
weakornon-existent,isoneofthemajordestabilisersofourage.Ifthisglobalisationof
powerisoneofthekeyphenomenaofourtime,thenbringinggovernancetotheglobal
oursuccessorfailureinthisenterprise.
TheUKsextensiveengagementsinIraqandAfghanistancontinue,thelatterin
particularwithnoendinsightandwithlittlerealprogresstoreport.
Moreover,whilemanyofthechallengeswefacerequiremoreeffectiveandmorediverse
formsofmultilateralcooperation,weareatthesametimemovingrapidlyintoaworld
withmultiplecentresofpower,complicatingandmagnifyingthealreadydifficult
challengesassociatedwithbuildingthemultilateralismweneed.Anditisnotclear,given
thesecircumstances,thatevencurrentbedrockinstitutionssuchasNATOortheEUwill
beadequatetomeetthechallengesthatconfrontus.Eachfacesquestionsastoits
effectivenessandunity:NATOinAfghanistanandtheEUasitaddressesthepressureon
energysuppliesfromRussia.
Wefacedangersthatarebothclearandpresentaswellasdangersbeingstoredupfor
thefuture.Ourreportshould,againstthatbackdrop,bereadbothasawarningandasa
calltoaction.Despitethescaleanddiversityofthechallengesweface,thereisnoneed
tosurrendertopessimism.Periodsofchangeareperiodsofopportunityaswellasthreat.
Negativeoutcomesarenotpreordainedandthereismuchthatcanbedonetorespond
positivelytotodayssecuritychallenges,providedwearewillingtolearnlessons,to
questionoldhabits,toalterthewaywethink,andtoadaptourpolicysolutionsand
instrumentstonewcircumstances.Whilemuchdependsonthestrategicapproach
adoptedbytheincomingadministrationintheUnitedStates,thisisastruefortheUKas
itisfortheUS.
Objectives
Inthissupportingresearchandanalysisdocument,whichunderpinsanddevelopsthe
ideassetoutinourmuchshorterSummaryandRecommendations,wethereforeseekto
laythefoundationsforare-thinkofUKnationalsecuritystrategy.Weoffersomespecific
policyrecommendationsinChapter9,wherewebelievetheissuesconcernedareso
urgentthatactionisrequiredimmediately,butbeyondthat,thebulkofourreportis
 21

focusedonthreesupportingobjectives.Theseare:
Tooutlinethenatureofthesecuritychallengeswefacetoday,andtogiveanaccount
oftheunderlyingandlongertermforcesandtrendsdrivingtheday-to-daysecurity
agenda
TosummarisecurrentUKgovernmentsecuritypolicyandprovideabriefaccountof
thepolicypositionsadoptedbythetwomainoppositionparties
Tosetoutaframeworkofprinciplesandideasthatwebelieveshouldnowshapethe
overalldirectionofnationalsecuritypolicyandthatshouldunderpinaseriesofmore
specificandtargetedpolicyinnovations.
TheCommissionsfullviewonwhatthosemorespecificinnovationsshouldbewillbeset
outinourfinalreportinsummer2009.

Structureofthereport
Inpursuitoftheseobjectives,thematerialthatfollowsisorganisedintofourparts.
Inthisfirstpart,weintroducethereportandofferanaccountofthepolicyterrain
thatwehavedefinedasin-scopeforourdeliberations.
InPart2,weprovideanaccountofthesecuritylandscape,bothinternationallyand
hereathome.
Part3offersanoverviewofgovernmentpolicyandthepoliciesoftheConservatives
andtheLiberalDemocratsinopposition.
Inthefinalpart,wesetouttheoverallprinciplesthatwebelieveshouldnowunderpin
andinformpolicyandweofferourinitialpolicyrecommendationsinanumberof
priorityareas.

Oursources
Throughout,ourreportdrawsonanumberofsources,including:
RecentlypublishednationalsecuritystrategiesinFranceandtheNetherlands(see
PresidentoftheRepublicofFrance2008,NetherlandsMinistryoftheInteriorand
KingdomRelations2007)
TherecentstrategicoutlookassessmentfromtheNationalIntelligenceCouncilinthe
UnitedStates
ExpertviewsofmembersoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurity
Interviewswithseniorministersandofficialsingovernment
Dialoguewithrelevantexpertsandpractitioners
Independentresearchandsynthesisofawiderangeofsecondarysourcesand
literaturebytheCommissionSecretariatwithintheInstituteforPublicPolicy
Research.
ThereportisalsoinformedbytheUKgovernmentsownfirstnationalsecuritystrategy,
publishedinMarch2008.IntheviewoftheCommission,thegovernmentstrategy
containedareasonableaccountofsomeoftheproblemswefacetodaywhileimplying
thattherewaslittleneedforfurtherpolicychange,aconclusionwithwhichwedonot
findourselvesinagreement.Boththisinterimreportandourforthcomingfinalreportare
offeredasconstructivechallengetotheGovernmentsownpublisheddocumentandasa
widercontributiontotheongoingpolicydebate.
22 Shareddestinies| Scope:Theterrainofnationalsecuritypolicy

2.Scope:Theterrainof
nationalsecuritypolicy
Thetraditionalviewofsecuritypolicyfocusesprimarilyontheroleofstates,onthe
tendencytowardscompetitionandconflictbetweenthem,andonthecentralimportance
ofthebalanceofpower.Itdoessoinresponsetoahistoryofmajorandfrequentinter-
statewars,andmanyoftheissueswithwhichitisconcernedremainpivotalto
contemporarysecuritypolicydebates.
Anawarenessandunderstandingoftheconcernstowhichthetraditionalviewgivesriseis,
however,nolongerenough.Assuringsecuritymayoncehavebeenamatterforanations
MinistryofDefencebutitnowinvolveseveryDepartmentofState,notjustinonesown
countrybutinthoseofonesalliesandpartners,too.Thetraditionalviewofsecuritypolicy,
inshort,nowleavestoomuchout.Theprivilegingofstatesandoftheinter-statelevelof
analysismeanstheimportanceofmanynon-stateactors,betheyterroristgroups,private
sectorbodies,internationalgovernmentalorganisationsliketheUnitedNations,ornon-
governmentalorganisations(NGOs),islargelyignored.Theemphasisonmilitaryissues,
whileobviouslystillvital,comesatthepriceofaseriousexclusionofwidersocialand
economicissuesofrelevancetothesecurityagenda.Andtheover-emphasisonsome
strategicdrivers,suchasthebalanceofpowerbetweenstates,leadstoanunder-emphasis
onothersthatarenowcritical,suchasglobalisationandclimatechange.
Consequently,whateverthemeritsofthetraditionalview,thereisnowastrongcasefor
movingbeyondit.
TheGovernmentsignificantlywideneditsowninterpretationoftherelevantterrainwhen
itpublishedtheUnitedKingdomsfirstnationalsecuritystrategyearlierthisyear
(CabinetOffice2008a).Hereinthisinterimreport,theipprCommissiononNational
Securityinthe21stCenturydoesthesame.
Inthematerialthatfollowswehaveadoptedanissue-ledratherthananactor-led
approach.Wefocusonthoserisks,betheyhuman-madethreatsornaturalhazards,that
havetheabilitytothreatenthesecurityandsafetyoftheUKstate,itscommunities,and
thefamiliesandindividualcitizenslivinghere.Thetraditionalconcernwithdefence,with
thethreatofexternalmilitaryattackontheUKfromanotherstate,andwiththeneed
forstrongandappropriatelyconfiguredconventionalforcesremainscrucialbutisnested
withinaframeofreferencethatstretchesfarbeyondtoissuessuchasenergysecurity,
globalpoverty,thestabilityoftheinternationaleconomy,terrorism,transnational
organisedcrimeandthesecurityeffectsofclimatechange.
Theadoptionofthiswiderissue-basedapproachshiftstheemphasisoftheanalysisin
thisreport.Itopensuptherelevantterraintomoreactorsandtoseveralotherlevelsof
analysis,someaboveandsomebelowthelevelofthenationalstate.Again,depending
ontheissue,actorsfromloneindividualsandlocalcommunitygroupsatoneextreme,all
thewayuptoglobalbodiesliketheUnitedNations,aredefinedasin-scope.
Webelievethiswideningoftheterrainbringsanalyticaladvantagesoverthetraditional
view.Indoingso,however,italsoraisesanimportantquestion.Iftheterrainofnational
securitypolicytodayismuchwiderthantraditionalnotionswouldallow,wheredowe
nowdrawthelinebetweennationalsecuritypolicyandotherpolicyareas?Some
attemptstore-thinksecuritypolicyhavegonewiderthanothers,arguablytothepoint
wherealmostallareasofpolicybecomedefinedassecuritypolicy(seeCommissionon
HumanSecurity2003).Thiscanbevaluableinpointingoutriskstohumanlifeand
safetythatgowellbeyondthethreatofpoliticalviolence,butinourviewitcanalso
resultinalossofpolicyfocus.

Applyingathreattest
IndelimitingtheterrainofUKnationalsecuritypolicyandtheterrainwithwhichthe
CommissionisconcernedwehavethereforeappliedaUKthreattest.Thethreattestasks
 23

whetheranissuehasthepotentialtobeadirectthreattoBritishlifeandinterestsinthe
shorttomediumterm.Ifithas,thenitisdefinedasrelevanttoUKnationalsecurity
policyandtoourdeliberationshere.Ifnot,itisexcludedfromourenquiry,though
withoutprejudiceastowhetheritoughtstilltobeafocusofotherareasofUK
governmentpolicy.
Wewouldstressattheoutsetthattheuseofathreattesttodelimittheterraindoesnot Thebestwayto
inanywayimplyacceptanceofanoverlynarrowapproachtothedefinitionofUK
interests.Onthecontrary,andaswillbecomeclearthroughoutthisreport,ina protectourselves
globalisedworldinwhichnostatecanisolateitselforfullyprovideforthesecurityofits andtolookafter
peoplewithoutthehelpofothers,thebestwaytoprotectourselvesandtolookafter ourowninterests
ourowninterestswilloftenbetohaveregardfortheinterestsandconcernsofothers
andtohelpotherstoprotectthemselves. willoftenbeto
Seenthroughthelensofathreattest,nationalsecuritypolicystillalsolegitimately
haveregardforthe
encompassesawidearea.Someelementsofaidandtradepolicyandsomeelementsof interestsand
globalhealthpolicyareincludedwithinourremit,forexample,astheformeraredirectly concernsofothers
relevantnotonlytopovertyreductionandconflictmanagementbutalsotofailedstates
thatmaybecomethesourceofthreats,andthelatterisdirectlylinkedtoinfectious
andtohelpothers
diseasethatmaycomefromoverseasbutstillhavedevastatingimpactshereathome. toprotect
Evenunderthethreattest,weareconcernedwithissuesofclimatechangeandwiththe themselves
potentialforinternationalpovertytocontributetoemergingthreatstoBritishlifeand
interests.Whatthethreattestdoesexclude,however,isaconcernwithall globalhealth
policy,oraconcernwithall developmentpolicy,despitethefactthathealthand
developmentchallengesrepresentmassivethreatstohumanlifeallovertheplanet.

Subsidiarity
Inthisreportwehavealsoadoptedtheprincipleofsubsidiarity.Thisprinciplesuggests
thatresponsibility,aswellaspowerandresources,shouldrestatthelevelbestplacedto
handletheissuebeingfaced.Onsomeissuesthismightbeatthegloballevel,onsome
itmightbeattheleveloftheUKorothernationalstate,andonothersstillitmightbe
atthelocallevel.
Ourargumenthere,therefore,isobviouslynotthatglobalhealthanddevelopment
issuesareunimportant.Rather,thehealthofcitizensofothercountriesisprimarilythe
responsibilityofthegovernmentsofthosecountriesthemselves.Totheextentthatthe
UKhasaresponsibilitytohelpthem,morallyorotherwise,intheabsenceofathreatto
UKlifeandinterests,itshouldseektofulfilthisresponsibilitythroughitsinfluencein
multilateraldevelopmentorganisations,itsemergingglobalhealthstrategy,andthe
wideractivitiesoftheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment,ratherthanthroughits
securitypolicy.
Withalltheseideasinmind,therangeofissues,actors,andthevariouslevelsofanalysis
thatwehavedefinedasin-boundsfornationalsecuritypolicy,andthereforeforthe
workoftheCommission,arecapturedinAppendix1.(Someusethenotionofhuman
securitytodescribetheapproachwehaveadopted.SeeHumanSecurityCentre2005,
CommissiononHumanSecurity2003.)
PART2:
Thesecurity
landscapetoday
26 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange

3.Long-termdriversofchange

Securitychallengesareoftenportrayedinthemediaasaseriesofdisconnectedcrises
eruptingsuddenlywithoutwarning.Manygovernments,underthepressureofdealing
withday-to-dayevents,behaveasthoughthisisthecase,too.However,whilethe
timingandspecificsofindividualchallengescanbehighlyunpredictable,thethreatsand
hazardsvisibleintheinternationalsecurityenvironmenttodaycan,forthemostpart,be
seentoemergeonthebasisofanumberofunderlyingstrategictrendsanddrivers.
Together,theseprovideoverallshapeandcontexttothestoriesintheheadlinesatany
givenpointintime,andtheyofferinsightsintotheboundariesanddynamicsofwhatis
possibleandprobableintheyearsahead.
Anawarenessandunderstandingofthesetrendsanddriversisthereforeourstarting
point.Inthischapterweoutlinethefollowing,whichweconsidertobethemost
importanttrendsanddrivers,notingthecharacterofadvancesortrendsunderwayand
highlightingthesecurityimplicationsthatmayflowfromthem:
Globalisation
Demographicchange
Globalpovertyandinequality
Climatechange
Scientificandtechnologicalchange
Severalofthesetrends,inparticularglobalisationanddemographicchange,are
acceleratingandfacilitatingahistoricshiftofpowerfromWesttoEast,transformingthe
structureoftheinternationalsystemandkeyelementsoftheinternationalsecurity
landscapeintheprocess.

Globalisation
Amajortrendimpactingontheinternationalsecurityenvironmentisdeepening
globalisation,whichreferstotheprocessbywhichstatesandcommunitiesarebecoming
economically,sociallyandculturallymoreinterconnectedandinterdependent,with
powerslippingbeyondindividualstatesandintoanoftenuncontrolledandunregulated
globalspaceasaresult.
Globalisationtrends
Headlinefeaturesofdeepeningglobalisation,beyondtheintegrationofinternational
marketsalltoovisibleinthisyearsglobalfinancialcrisis,andbeyondthedevelopment

Figure3.1:WorldinwardForeignDirectInvestment(FDI)stock

14
South-East Europe and the CIS (Transition economies)
12
Developing economies
at current prices (trillions)
Amount in US dollars

10
Developed economies
8

0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006
Year
Source:UNCTAD2007
 27

Figure3.2:Totaltradeexports,1980-2007

20

18

16

14
USD Trillions

12

10

2 Merchandise
Commercial Services
0
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Year
Source:WorldTradeOrganisation2008

Figure3.3:Civilaviationpassengers

2000
1900
1800
Passengers carried (millions)

1700
1600
1500
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Year

Source:InternationalCivilAviationOrganization/UnitedNationsStatisticsDivision2008

ofglobalsocialmovementsonissuessuchashumanrights,includelargeincreasesinthe
cross-borderflowsofinvestment,capital,goods,servicesandpeople.Theseincreases
arecapturedandreflectedinFigures3.1-3above.
Figure3.1showsthattotalworldinwardForeignDirectInvestment(FDI)stockhas
increasedmorethantenfoldoverthepastthreedecadesandthatwhiledeveloped
countriesaccountforthebulkofit,developingandtransitioncountriesandregionsare
beginningtoattractFDIonalargerscale,andtotakeagreatershareoftheworldtotal,
too.Someplaces,suchasHongKonginChina,andtheRussianFederation,are
emergingparticularlystronglyaslocationsforinwardinvestment(UNCTAD2008).
Figure3.2showstheincreaseinvalueofglobaltrade(byexports)overasimilartimeframe.
Figure3.3isindicativeofthemassiveexpansionininternationalpassengertravel
numbers.
Thewholeprocessofglobalisation,partlycapturedandreflectedinthesegraphs,has
itselfbeenfacilitatedbyanumberofunderlyingfactors,includingproactivedecisionsby
28 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange
1.Thedecliningcostofshorter-distance
fares(stimulatedbytheproliferationof
low-costcarriersandoperating
efficiencyimprovements)hasbeen
reasonablysteady,althoughthecostof
long-distanceflightshastendedto
fluctuatedependingontheriseandfall
offuelprices.
2.Bypowerinthiscontext,wemean
theresourcesandcapacitiesthatmay
potentiallybeusedtoachieveinfluence
overthesecurityenvironment.Inthis
sectionofthepaper,wediscussthe
relativedistributionofsuchresources
andcapacitiesamongactorsinthe
internationalsystem.Lateronwereturn
totheissueofwhichresourcesand
capacitiesarethoughtmostimportant
incurrentcircumstances(thehardand
softpowerdebate),andtotheissueof
howtheymightbestbecombinedfor
maximumeffect(integratedpower).
3.Thoughin2005ChinasGDPat
US$5.3trillionwasstilllessthanhalf
thatoftheUSat$12.4trillion,andin
termsofGDPpercapita,Chinalagged
behindLebanon,Kazakhstanand
Armenia.FiguresfromTheEconomist
2007,theUSBureauofLaborStatistics
andUNDP2006.
4.Chinasforeigncurrencyreserves
soaredpastUS$1trillioninearly2007
andkeptracinguptomorethan$1.3
trillionbythemiddleofthatyear.
Reservesofthisscaleeffectivelygive
theChinesegovernmentthepowerto
dumpdollarsonworldmarkets,forcing
acrashinthevalueofthedollarand
potentiallyputtingtheUSandglobal
economyintorecession.
5.ParticularlyinthecaseofChina
wherewemaywellseeatemporary
checkintheChinesegrowthcurveasa
resultofthefactthat,soonerorlater
Chinaisgoingtohavetotackleits
democraticdeficitandintheChinese
contextthiskindofchangehasinthe
pastoftenledtointernaldisturbance.
6.Asnotedinanearlieripprreport
basedontheCommissions
deliberations,despitecurrenteconomic
trendsinbothChinaandIndia,the
continuedriseofbothcannotand
shouldnotbeassumed.Eachcountry
hasenormouschallenges.Chinamust
continuetogrowtoliftitsmassesout
ofpoverty,mustdealwithpervasive
environmentalproblems,andmust
answerfundamentalquestionsabout
thesustainabilityofCommunistParty
ruleinthelongterm.India,too,hasa
massivetasktoimprovethelotofits
poor,hassignificantweaknessesinits
educationalsystem(ithasaliteracyrate
ofonly60percent)andalsohasahigh
incidenceofHIV.BothChinaandIndia,
moreover,mustnavigatedifficult
securitychallenges,Chinainrelationto
Taiwan,andIndiainitsdisputewith
PakistanoverKashmir.SeeKearnsand
Gude2008.
policymakersinthemajordevelopedstatesinrecentdecadestoliberaliseandfurther
integrateglobalmarkets,significantlong-termreductionsinthecostofinternational
transportation,andtheonsetoftheinformationandcommunicationstechnology(ICT)
revolution(asdescribedbelow).Toillustratesomeofthis,between1955and2004itis
estimatedthatthecostperton-kmshippedforallairtrafficfellmorethantenfold,from
US$3.87perton-kmtounderUS$0.30in2000USdollars(Hummels2007).Thiscost
reductionhasbeenmatchedinotherareas,forexampleinaconsiderabledropinthereal
costsofairfares,whichhaspavedthewayfortheexplosionininternationaltravel.1 In
telecommunications,meanwhile,thedeclineincostshasbeensteady,withthepriceof
internationaltelephonecallshavingfallensixfoldbetween1940and1970andthen
tenfoldbetween1970and1990(WorldBank1995).Whileathree-minutephonecall
betweenNewYorkandLondonwouldhavecostUS$293in1931,itisnowalmostfree
onsomeplatforms(Krueger2006).
Againstthisbackdrop,itisnotonlyglobalfinancialmarketsthathavebecomemore
integrated.Businessesinmanyothersectorshavetakenadvantageofthehighspeed
andlowcostoftheevolvingcommunicationsenvironment,oftenworkinginpartnership
withothercompaniesornetworksofcompaniesaroundtheworld.Thisinturnhas
createdopportunitiesforplayersinthedevelopingworldtotapintoandserviceglobal
markets.Theresulthasbeenanewpatternofwinnersandlosersbothwithinand
betweenthestatesandregionsoftheworld.Indeed,globalisationhashadanumberof
effectswhich,collectively,arecreatinganewgeopoliticallandscapeandaretherefore
directlyrelevanttothecontemporarysecurityagenda.
Globalisation:implications
Globalisationandinterdependencearediffusingpowertonewanddifferentactorsinthe
internationalsystem.2 Thisisvisiblebothwithinandacrossthecommunityofstatesand
inadiffusionofpowerfromstatetonon-stateactorssuchasglobalbusinesses,
internationalorganisations,terroristgroups,andtransnationalcriminalnetworks.
Atthestatelevel,wearewitnessingamassiveandhistoricshiftofpowerfromtheAtlantic
seaboardtoAsiaandthePacific,withChinaandIndiainparticularbenefitingfromthe
integrationofglobalmarketsandtheiremergingrolewithinthem.Chinahasbeenenjoying
rapideconomicgrowthandasaconsequenceisnowtheworldsfourthlargesteconomy
behindtheUnitedStates,Japan,andGermany.3 Itsseeminglyendlesssupplyoflow-cost
labourhasbeenparticularlyinstrumentalinthegrowthofitsmanufacturingsector,andthe
unprecedentedtradesurplusesthathavefollowed.4 Itisalsoaccountingforanincreased
shareoftheworldsresearchanddevelopment(R&D).Accordingtodatacompiledbythe
OECD,ChinasR&DspendingreachedanestimatedUS$84.6billionin2003(upfrom
US$12.4billionin1991)andincreasedfrom0.6percentofGDPinthemid1990sto1.3
percentin2006,puttingitinthirdplacegloballyintermsofR&Dexpenditurebehindthe
UnitedStatesandJapan(NSB2006,OECD2006).
Indiaisalsoenjoyinganenhancedpowerposition,basedondramaticallyhigherlevelsof
economicgrowththathaveresultedfromatargetedreallocationofland,capitaland
labourfromlow-productivityagriculturetohigh-productivityandhigh-value-added
servicesandindustryinrecentyears(GoldmanSachs2007).TheIndiangovernments
strategyofpromotingopentrade,providingcheapercredit,andinvestinginITand
communicationstechnologyandinfrastructurehaspaidoff,withGoldmanSachsnow
predictingthattheIndianeconomycansustainagrowthrateofabout8percentuntil
2020.IndiawillsurpasstheUKintermsofGDPwithinthenextdecadeifthisgrowth
trajectorytranspiresdespiteglobalslowdown,andrecentprojectionssuggestthatits
GDPwillalsoexceedthatoftheUSbefore2050,whichwouldmakeittheworlds
second-largesteconomy(GoldmanSachs2007).
ThisshiftofeconomicpowertoChinaandIndia,thoughitsindefinitecontinuation
shouldnotbetakenforgranted,5 isofprofoundimportance.6
Already,solutionstosomeofthemostpressinginternationalproblems,suchasclimate
change,cannotbefoundwithoutChineseandIndianinvolvement.AsChinaandIndia
havegrown,moreover,andtheirdemandforenergyhasincreased,thishashada
significanttighteningeffectonworldenergymarkets,drivingupprices,pushingmassive
 29

revenuesintothehandsofsomeofthemoreestablishedoilexportingstatessuchas
thoseinthePersianGulf,andallowinganewcadreofpotentiallypowerfulenergystates
andregionstoemergeasaresult.
TheRussianFederationhasbeenaparticularbeneficiaryofchangingglobalenergy
marketsandhasseenconsiderablegrowthinannualGDP,inexportsandincurrency
reservesoverthepastfewyears.Despiteworseningglobaleconomicconditions,Russia
postedrealGDPgrowthratesof7.4percentin2006and8.1percentin2007(World
Bank2008b).AccordingtotheCentralBankofRussia,exports,propelledbyhighoil
prices,increasedtoUS$108.1billioninthefirstquarterof2008from$71.8billioninthe
firstquarterof2007,ariseofmorethan50percent(ibid).Thislevelofexportshasalso
allowedRussiatoextendafavourableinternationaltradebalance,withitscurrentaccount
surplushavingincreasedtoanestimatedUS$37billion(inthefirstquarterof2008),from
$22.9billioninthesameperiodof2007(ibid).Asshownbyrecenteventssuchasthe
invasionofGeorgia,thetemporarycuttingoffofgassuppliestoUkraine,andthedecision
toresumelong-rangestrategicbomberpatrols,Russia,onthebackofthesetrends,is

Table3.1:Provedreservesofoil Table3.2:Provedreservesofnaturalgas

Rank Country Provedreserves Rank Country Provedgasreserves

(billionbarrels) (trillionm)

1 SaudiArabia 264.2 1 RussianFederation 44.65

2 Iran 138.4 2 Iran 27.8

3 Iraq 115.0 3 Qatar 25.6

4 Kuwait 101.5 4 SaudiArabia 7.17

5 UnitedArabEmirates 97.8 5 UnitedArabEmirates 6.09

6 Venezuela 87.0 6 US 5.98

7 RussianFederation 79.4 7 Nigeria 5.3

8 Libya 41.5 8 Venezuela 5.15

9 Kazakhstan 39.8 9 Algeria 4.52

10 Nigeria 36.2 10 Iraq 3.17

11 US 29.4 11 Indonesia 3

12 Canada 27.7 12 Norway 2.96

13 Qatar 27.4 13 Turkmenistan 2.67

14 China 15.5 14 Australia 2.51

15 Brazil 12.6 15 Malaysia 2.48

16 Algeria 12.3 16 Egypt 2.06

17 Mexico 12.2 17 Kazakhstan 1.9

18 Angola 9.0 18 China 1.88

19 Norway 8.2 19 Kuwait 1.78

20 Azerbaijan 7.0 20 Uzbekistan 1.74

Top20countries 1162.1(94%) Top20countries 158.41(89%)

Restofworld 75.8(6%) Restofworld 18.95(11%)

Totalworld 1237.9 Totalworld 177.36

Source:BP2008 Source:BP2008
30 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange

becomingmoreassertive.Indeed,despitetheweakandlessthanunitedresponsetoRussia
amongmembersoftheEuropeanUnioninrecentmonths,Russiasdecliningpopulation
anditsrelianceonforeigninvestmentmaymeanithasover-exaggerateditsownstrength
andoverplayeditshand.
Powershiftsareoccurringelsewhere,asenergymarketstighten,withprovedoilandgas
reservesconcentratedinarelativelysmallnumberoflocations.Tables3.1and3.2above
showwheretheprovedreservesofcrudeoilandgasareconcentrated.
Inparticular,countriesinapositiontoexportsubstantialamountsofoil,suchasthosein
theCaspianSearegion,informerSovietCentralAsia,andcountriesincludingIran,Qatar,
NigeriaandLibya,areallincreasinginimportanceontheinternationalstage.
Perhapsthemostemblematicfeatureofachangedandchangingdistributionof
internationaleconomicpowerbetweenstates,however,istobefoundinthelocation
andsizeoftheworldslargestsovereignwealthfunds(SWFs).Accordingtoarecent
report,thesegovernment-ownedfundshaveanestimatedcurrentvalueof
approximatelyUS$2.2trillion,afigurethathasthepotentialtosoarfurthertoUS$13.4
trillionwithinadecadeifgrowthratesremainmoderatelyhealthyoverthelongerterm
(StandardChartered2007).Despitethelackoftransparencyaboutthetotalassetsheld
bythesefunds,analystshavedeterminedthatthesevenlargestareownedbythe
governmentsoftheUAE,SaudiArabia,Singapore,Kuwait,ChinaandNorway.Between
them,thesefundshavemorethanUS$1,810billiontoinvest,andtheyhavebeen
growingfasterthantheworldeconomyasawhole(ibid).Table3.3liststheso-called
supersevensovereignwealthfundsandtheirassets,asofMarch2007.

Table3.3.Thesupersevensovereignwealthfundsandtheirassets(March2007)

Country(fund) Assets*(US$billion) Inceptionyear

UAE(AbuDhabiInvestmentAuthority) 875 1976

Norway(GovernmentPensionFundGlobal) 380 1996

Singapore(GIC) 330 1981

SaudiArabia(various) 300 n/a

Kuwait(ReserveFundforFutureGenerations) 250 1953

China(ChinaInvestmentCorporation) 200 2007

Singapore(TemasekHoldings) 159.2 1974

*Estimated,exceptforNorway
Source:TheEconomist2008a

Thesefundshavebecomeincreasinglyimportantnotonlyasthepossiblelong-term
guarantorsoftheirownersinterestsinapost-oileconomybutalsotothewider
functioningoftheglobaleconomy,andhavebeguntotakelargestakesinimportant
andpreviouslyWestern-ownedandcontrolledenterprisesandsectors.Anumberof
majorbanks,includingCitigroup,MorganStanleyandUBS,turnedtotheminattempts
tooffsettheeffectsoftheglobalcreditcrunchandinrecenttimesthefundshave
startedtakingbiggerstakesinsensitivesectorsindevelopedcountriessuchasenergy
andtelecommunications(seeWray2008,TheEconomist2008a).
Theevidenceofahistoricshiftofeconomicpowerbetweenstates,therefore,isall
aroundus.OldcategorisationsofthepowerfulandwealthyWestsittingalongsideallthe
restarebeingconfinedtohistory.Inter-staterelationsarebecomingmorecomplexwith
moreplayersabletoinfluenceevents.AfterthebipolaryearsoftheColdWarandabrief
unipolarmomentwiththeUnitedStatesastheonlysuperpower,wearemovingback
intoamultipolarworld.This,aswesetoutinChapter4,mayhavedirectsecurity
consequencesintheyearsahead.
 31

Non-stateactors
Inadditiontoitsimpactonthedistributionofpowerbetweenstates,globalisationis
furtherfacilitatingthegrowinginfluenceofanewsetoftransnationalnon-stateactors.
Thisisvisibleinthegrowthinnumbersofinternationalnon-governmentalorganisations,
asshowninFigure3.4.

Figure3.4:Numberofinternationalnon-governmentalorganisations(INGOs)

16000

14000

12000

10000
Number of INGOs

8000

6000

4000

2000

0
1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Years

Source:UnionofInternationalAssociations2008

Itisalsovisibleinthescaleofresourcesavailabletomanytransnationalcorporations:
ExxonMobilforinstance(rankedsecondinthe2008editionoftheFortune500list)
reportedprofitsofUS$11.7billioninthesecondquarterof2008onoverallsalesof
$138billion,afigurewhichisroughlytheGDPofHungary(AssociatedPress2008a).
BeyondcorporationsandNGOs,however,themainbeneficiarieshavebeentransnational
organisedcriminalnetworksandtransnationalterrorists,whohavequicklydiscovered
thattheglobalspace,beinglargelyunregulated,withtheruleoflaweitherweakornon-
existent,isaplacewheretheycanoperatewithareasonableprospectofimpunity,just
astheycouldinthemountainsofAfghanistanbefore9/11.
Criminalgroupshavebeenabletouseglobalisationtobroadenanddiversifytheir
operationsintocross-bordermarketsinintellectualpropertycrime(suchas
counterfeitingandpiracy)andinthetraffickingofpeople,money,armsanddrugs.They
havefrequently,intheprocess,exploitedandcontributedtotheproblemsofweakand
failingstates.
Terroristgroups,meanwhile,havebeenofincreasedsignificancesince9/11,thepointat
whichanewformofsuper-terrorismtookcentrestageininternationalaffairs
(Freedman2002).Theyhaveemergedasalong-termstructuralchallengebothbecause
oftheirpotentialaccesstoincreasinglydestructiveanddangeroustechnologiesviaboth
legalandillicitmarkets(apointwereturntoatsomelengthinChapter5)andbecause
oftheadvantagesnowbestowedbyadvancesindigitaltechnologyandglobal
communications.Thelatterhaveamplifiedthevoice,extendedtheorganisationalreach,
andenhancedthelawenforcementevasioncapabilitiesofterroristgroups.Satellite
communicationshavealsoshrunkdistanceandmadeitmucheasierforterroristgroups
bothtomakeandsustaincross-borderconnections.
Strongencryptiontoolsmeanwhile,availablemorecheaplyandeasilythaneverbefore,
arefacilitatingterroristuseofsuchcommunicationschannelsinamoresecureandsecret
environment(MinistryofDefence2007).Whilesecurityagenciesarenowalivetothislast
development,itnonethelessrepresentsasignificantshiftinrelativepowerfromstateto
non-stateactorssince,onlythreedecadesago,strongencryptiontoolsrequiredsuch
financialandcomputingresourcesthattheyeffectivelyremainedthepreserveofstates.
32 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange

Whileglobalisationhasthereforepermittedthegrowthoflegitimateinternationaltrade,
investmentandeconomicinterdependence,andwhileithasalteredandisalteringthe
Globalisationhas relativedistributionofpowerbetweenstates,ithasalsofacilitatedthegrowthofa
alsofacilitatedthe transnationalsocietywithadarkcriminalandterroristunderside.Thisisdifficultto
manage,especiallygivenacountervailingtendencyinsomeplacestowardpolarisationof
growthofa identity,cultureandreligion.Onefurtherconsequenceofthisisthatnostate,nomatter
transnational howpowerful,canadequatelyaddresstheresultingchallengesalone.Onsomeissues,
societywithadark powerhasshiftedawayfromtheindividualstateleveltothetransnationalandglobal
levelandourmechanismsofgovernance,tobeeffective,willneedtomovewithit.We
criminaland returntothesecuritychallengesposedbythesedevelopments,andtotheapproachto
terroristunderside policythatmighteffectivelydealwithit,atgreaterlengthinChapters4,5,6and9.

Demographicchange
Asecondimportantdriveroftheinternationalsecuritylandscapeisdemographicchange.
Totalworldpopulationgrowth,increasedconcentrationsofpeopleinlargeurbancentres,
thechangingagecharacteristicsofdifferentpopulationsaroundtheworld,andincreased
flowsofinternationalmigrantsarealllikelytohavesignificantinfluenceonthesecurity
environmentintheyearsahead.Wedealwitheachofthesetrendsinturnbelow.
Populationgrowthprojections
Priortothe20thcentury,worldpopulationgrowthwasheldincheckbydisease,famine
andhighinfantandmaternalmortalityrates.However,theeradicationofpandemic
diseasessuchaspolioandsmallpox,otheradvancesinmedicine,developmentsin
agriculturaltechnology,andchangesinreproductivehabitsallcontributedtoan
unprecedentedpopulationexplosionduringthe20thcentury,withglobalpopulation
risingfrom1.6billionatthebeginningofthecenturyto6.1billionatitsclose.Though
therateofgrowthwillslow,therearefewsignsthatthegrowthintotalworld
populationwillcometoanendintheshorttomediumterm.Theglobaltotalnowstands
ataround6.7billionpeople,andrecentUNprojectionssuggestthatthisfigurewillreach
9.2billionby2050:anincreaseofalmost40percentinjustover40years(seethe
mediumvariant,theprojectionpreferredbytheUN,inFigure3.5below).

Figure3.5:Worldpopulationbyvariant(2000-2050)
12 Constant fertility

11
High variant
Population (billions)

10

Medium variant
9

8 Low variant

6
2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Source:UN2007 Year

Populationdistributionbyregion
Perhapsevenmoresignificantthanthesechangesintotalworldpopulationsize,arethe
figuresonpopulationdistribution.Whenthedataisbrokendown,itbecomesapparent
thatgrowthwillbeconcentratedinthelessdevelopedregionsoftheworld,and
especiallyamongthepoorestcountries.AsdemonstratedinFigure3.6,thepopulation
ofthemoredevelopedregionsisexpectedtoremainvirtuallyconstant(atalevelof1.25
 33

billionpeople)betweennowand2050,andmayevenstarttodeclineiffertilityrates
dropsubstantiallybelowthereplacementlevelorifmigrationpatternschange
significantly.7 Withinthis,itisindeedexpectedthatmostEuropeancountrieswill
experiencedecliningpopulationsduringthistimeframe.Russia,sincethefallofthe
SovietUnion,hasseenitsbirthratefallanditsdeathraterise,leadingtheUNtopredict
thattheRussianpopulation,currentlyapproximately143million,willdeclinesharply
betweennowand2050(UNDESA2000).AttheselevelsitseemslikelythatRussiawill
beseverelyunder-populated,especiallyintheEast.
Incontrast,thepopulationoflessdevelopedregionswillincreasemarkedlyoverthenext
fewdecades(toapproximately7.94billionor86.5percentoftheglobalpopulation),
whilethepopulationoftheworlds50leastdevelopedcountriesisprojectedtomore
thandouble,risingfrom0.8billionin2007to1.7billionin2050(UN2007).

Figure3.6:Populationdistributionprojections

10
9
8
Population (billions)

7
6
5
4
3
2
Less developed regions
1
More developed regions
0
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Source:UN2007

GrowthwillbeparticularlypronouncedinIndia,China,Bangladesh,Pakistan,Nigeriaand
Indonesia,whilethepopulationofAfricawillalmostcertainlydoublefromitscurrent
levelofaround740millionbetweennowand2100(IIASA2007).Growthwillbe
especiallyconcentratedinanumberofsub-SaharanAfricancountries,withBurundi,
Uganda,Niger,DRC,Congo,Eritrea,Benin,BurkinaFaso,Guinea-Bissau,Liberia,Mali,
ChadandAngolaexpectedtogrowbymorethan2percentayearuntil2030,and
continuingtoexperiencehigheraveragegrowthratesthantherestoftheworld
thereafter(UN2007).
Populationdistributionbyage
Apartfromtheabovechanges,thereareothernotablepopulationtrendswithin
regionsandcountriesintermsofthecompositionofsocieties.Inthedeveloped
worldespecially,onetrendalreadyapparentistheincreasedageingofpopulations,
asaresultoffallingfertilityratesandincreasedlongevity.Asawholeindeveloped
countries,thenumberofpeopleaged60oroverhasrecentlysurpassedthetotal
numberofchildrenaged15andunder,andby2050,willbemorethandoubleits
size.ThisisillustratedinTable3.4below.
Inlessdevelopedcountriesandregions,althoughpopulationageingwilloccur,the
morenotablecurrentfeatureisoneofgrowthintheyoungpopulation,orwhatis
oftenreferredtoasayouthbulge.Globally,theaveragepercentageofyoung
peopleaged15-24is18percent.However,thisfigurehidesagreatdealofdisparity
betweenregions.InmanyEuropeancountries,theshareofyoungpeopleisjust12 7.Therearedeviationsfromthe
percentorless,whileindevelopingregions,andparticularlyintheMiddleEast, constantinbothdirectionsfor
individualcountrieswithinthegroup
AfricaandpartsofAsia,itisfrequentlyhigherthan20percent(UNDESA2007b). classifiedasdeveloped.Whiledeclines
Table3.5belowillustratesthisinrelationtoselectedcountriesintheMiddleEastand inmostEuropeancountriesare
NorthAfrica(MENA)region. expected,thepopulationisexpectedto
continuetoriseinAustralia,Canadaand
NewZealand,primarilyasaresultof
Althoughtheyouthbulgewillsubsideoverthenextfewdecadesasfertilityratesfall internationalmigration.SeeChamie
acrosstheMENAregionasawhole,theyouthpopulationsofcertaincountriesaresetto 2007.
34 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange

Table3.4:Percentagedistributionofdifferentagegroups,2005and2050(projected)

Percentagedistributionin2005 Percentagedistributionin2050

Agerange(years) 0-14 15-59 60+ 80+ 0-14 15-59 60+ 80+

World 28.3 61.4 10.3 1.3 19.8 58.3 21.8 4.4

Moredevelopedregions 17 62.9 20.1 3.7 15.2 52.2 32.6 9.4

Lessdevelopedregions 30.9 61 8.1 0.8 20.6 59.3 20.1 3.6

Leastdevelopedcountries 41.5 53.4 5.1 0.4 28.2 61.5 10.3 1.1

Africa 41.4 53.4 5.2 0.4 28 61.7 10.4 1.1

Asia 28 62.7 9.2 1 18 58.3 23.7 4.5

Europe 15.9 63.5 20.6 3.5 14.6 50.9 34.5 9.6

LatinAmericaandCaribbean 29.8 61.2 9 1.2 18 57.8 24.3 5.2

NorthAmerica 20.5 62.7 16.7 3.5 17.1 55.6 27.3 7.8

Oceania 24.9 61 14.1 2.6 18.4 56.9 24.8 6.8

Source:UN2007

Table3.5.Proportionofyoungpeopleaged15to24inselectedMiddleEastern
andNorthAfricancountries

1995 2005 2015 2025

Algeria 21 23 17 15

Bahrain 16 16 15 14

Egypt 20 21 18 17

Iran 20 25 17 15

Iraq 21 20 21 19

Jordan 23 20 19 18

Kuwait 16 16 14 14

Lebanon 19 18 17 15

Libya 23 22 16 17

Morocco 21 21 18 15

OccupiedPalestinianTerritories 19 19 21 21

Oman 17 22 19 16

Qatar 14 14 13 13

SaudiArabia 17 18 18 17

SyrianArabRepublic 21 23 19 18

Tunisia 20 21 16 14

UnitedArabEmirates 16 16 14 14

Yemen 19 22 21 20

Average: 19 20 17 16

Source:UN2007
 35

stayhigh,includinginIraq,theOccupiedPalestinianTerritoriesandYemen,where15-to
24-year-oldswillstillconstituteapproximately20percentofthepopulationin2025
(AssaadandRoudi-Fahimi2007).
Urbanisation
Anotherdemographicfeatureofnoteisatrendtowardurbanisation.AccordingtoUN
projections,thepercentageoftheglobalpopulationlivinginurbanareaswillequalthe
percentagelivinginruralareasin2008or2009,andwillthencontinuetogrow.As
Figure3.7shows,aroundsixandahalfbillionpeoplewillliveinurbanareasby2050.

Figure3.7.Urbanandruralpopulations,2000-2050
7
Urban
6
Population (billions)

3
Rural
2

0
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Year
Source:UN2008a

Aswiththeotherdemographictrendsdescribedhere,differentregionswillexperience
urbanisationindifferentways.74percentofpeopleinthedevelopedworldalreadylived
inurbanareasby2007;inthedevelopingworldtheequivalentfigurewasjust44percent.
Thefuturegrowthinurbanisationwillthereforemostlybeconcentratedinlessdeveloped
regionsandcountries,anditisestimatedthat67percentofthedevelopingworlds
populationwillbeurbanby2050(UN2008a).Althoughthemajorityofurbandwellerswill
continuetoliveintownsorsmallcitiesoflessthanhalfamillionpeople,itisalso
anticipatedthattherewillbeanincreaseinthenumberofurbancentreswithapopulation
of10millionormoreoverthenextfewdecades.Therearecurrently19oftheseso-called
megacities,andtheirnumberisexpectedtoincreaseto27by2025(UN2008a).
Internationalmigrationflowprojections
AsdemonstratedinFigure3.8,theestimatedinternationalmigrantpopulationhasrisen
considerablyoverthepast60years.Ithasalsobecomeincreasinglyconcentratedinthe

Figure3.8.Estimatednumberofinternationalmigrantsinlessdevelopedandmoredevelopedregions
140

120
Number of migrants (millions)

More developed regions

100

80
Less developed regions
60

40

20

0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Year
Source:UN2006
36 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange

moredevelopedcountries.While57percentofallmigrantslivedindevelopingcountries
in1960,thisfigurehaddroppedto37percentby2005.
Althoughitisdifficulttomakeaccuratelong-rangeprojectionsaboutthescaleand
directionoffuturemigrationflows,UNdemographicstatisticssuggestthatglobal
economicpatternswillreinforcetheexistingtrendofhighoverallmigrationfrom
developingtodevelopedregions.Betweennowand2050,themoredevelopedregions,
includingEurope,willcontinuetobenetreceiversofinternationalmigrants,withan
averagegainoftwomillionperannum(UN2007).ThisisdemonstratedinFigure3.9.

Figure3.9.Estimatedaverageannualnetmigrationinselectedregions

3000

2000
Number of migrants (thousands)

1000

-1000
More developed regions
-2000 Less developed regions
Sub-Saharan Africa
-3000 Europe
1995-2000 2005-2010 2015-2020 2025-2030 2035-2040 2045-2050

Years
Note:netmigrationisdefinedhereasthetotalnumberofimmigrantsminusthenumberofemigrants
Source:UN2007

Demographicchange:implications
Thedemographictrendsoutlinedabovesuggestanumberofgeopoliticalandsecurity
implications.
First,ataverybasiclevel,thegrowthintotalworldpopulation,whencombinedwiththe
speedofgrowthinsomeofthelargeremergingeconomies,willputenormouspressure
ontheworldsnaturalresources.Thiswillapplytoenergy,foodandwaterandthiscould
bethesourceofrenewedcompetitionandevenconflictbetweenstatesintheyears
ahead(seenextchapter).
Second,theshiftinggeographicdistributionofpopulationlookssettoreinforce,inthe
longterm,theprocessofpowerdiffusionthatisongoingalready,partlyasaresultof
globalisation.ItisemphasisingtheshiftofpowerfromWesttoEastandisreducingthe
centralityofEuropetotheinternationalsystem.Intheabsenceoffurthermass
migration,theworkingagepopulationofWesternandCentralEuropewillstarttoshrink
after2015,fallingfromits2005levelof317millionpeopleto261millionby2050
(Muenz2007).DatapresentedinarecentWorldBankdiscussionpapersuggeststhatall
(native)adultagegroupsbelowtheageof65willbedeclininginsizeinEuropeafter
2030.Meanwhilearound107millionEuropeanswillbe65orolderby2025,andthis
numberwillriseto133millionby2050(ibid).Thistrendofpopulationageingwillput
seriouspressureonbothnationaleconomiesandtheEUlabourmarketasawhole,since
itwillreducetheavailablepoolofworkingagepeopleevenasitincreasesthe
percentageofthosedependentonpensionsandpublichealthservices.
Thesechangesmarkastartlingreversalfromjusthalfacenturyago,andhighlightthe
relativedeclineofEuropeinpopulationterms.In1950,thepopulationofAfricawas
justathirdofthesizeofEuropes;in2050itwillbethreetimesitssize(Chamie
2007).Indeed,theEuropeanpopulationwillconstitutejust7.2percentoftheglobal
totalin2050,andthepopulationoftheUKwithinthatamere0.75percent(UN
2007).
 37

Third,thefiguresalsohighlightthefactthatthevastmajorityofthehumanracewill,for
decadestocome,continuetoliveindifficultanddistressingconditionsofpovertyinthe
manycountriesofthedevelopingworld.Progressinsomeoftheemergingeconomies
willhelp,butnotonasufficientscaletooverturnthisreality.Poverty,asweoutline
below,remainsaseriousproblemandhassecurityconsequencesnotonlyasadirect
threattohumanlifeinitsownrightbutalsoasadriverofpoorgovernanceandthe
phenomenaofweakstates,failedstates,andviolentconflictwithinstatesinmanyparts
oftheworld.
Fourth,youthbulgesmayexacerbatesomealreadyexistingconflicthot-spots.For
countriesandregionswithstrongeducationsystemsandgoodemploymentprospects,
havingalargecohortofyoungpeoplecanbeeconomicallyandsociallyadvantageous.
ButintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,whereunemploymentratesarehigherthan
almostanywhereelseintheworld(oneinfourpeopleundertheageof25intheregion
isoutofwork)andwheresocialandpoliticalunrestisendemic,theexistenceofalarge
populationofeducatedbutunemployedyouthisworryingfromasecurityperspective
(Barber2008).AsNolandandPackhaveobserved:theregionfacesacontestbetween
twoopposingforcesthedemographicpressuretocreatejobsandthelimitedcapacity
oftheeconomytoabsorbnewentrantsproductively(2008:2).Youthbulgesare
thereforeoneofawiderrangeof14conflictandstatefailureriskfactorsthatwereturn
tointhenextchapterofthisreport.
Fifth,urbanisationwillbringnewpolicychallengessuchasthoseitisalready
posingtotraditionalcounter-insurgencydoctrineandpotentiallynew
vulnerabilities.Urbandwellerstendtobebettereducated,havehigherincomesand
enjoybetterhealththantheirruralcounterparts,andstudiescarriedoutbytheOECD
andUN-HABITAT(theUNagencyforhumansettlements)havesuggestedthat
countrieswithhigherlevelsofurbanisationoftenhavemorestableeconomiesand
strongerpoliticalinstitutionsthanthosewithlowerlevels(UN2008b).However,
manyindividualsareunabletobenefitfromtheeconomicopportunitiesavailablein
cities,andasurbanpopulationsgrowlargerinthedevelopingworld,sotoowillslum
areasandlevelsofurbanpoverty.Moreover,asmorepeoplemovefromthecountry
tothecityinsearchofjobsthatdonotinvolvemanuallabour,thenumbers
employedinagriculturalproductionarelikelytofall,whichcouldexacerbatethe
emergingglobalfoodsecuritycrisis.
AccordingtoresearchcompiledbytheUN,85percentofallgovernmentshave
expressedconcernaboutthepotentiallynegativeeffectsofurbanisation,bywhich
theymeantheexcessiveconcentrationofnationalwealthandinfrastructureinurban
centres,theassociatedproblemofresourcedepletioninruralareas,andthepotential
forcollapseorheavystrainonurbanpublichealthinfrastructures.Thislastworryand
therelatedincreasedpopulationexposuretopossiblepandemicdiseasesareof
significanceherebecauseofthewayinwhichbiosecurityandpublichealth
challengesareincreasinginimportancemoregenerally(seeChapter5)(UN2008b).
Sixth,societiesarebecomingmorediverseinplacessuchasEurope,wherethe
Muslimbirthrate,forexample,isthreetimesthenon-Muslimrate,contributingto
Islambecomingthefastestgrowingreligion(TheMuslimNews2003).Aslarge
numbersofskilledandunskilledworkersseektomovefromdevelopingcountriesto
seekjobsonthecontinent,moreover,thiswillbecomeasignificantsourceof
additionaldiversityaswellasofpopulationreplacementandeconomicgrowthfora
regionthatisexperiencingdecliningfertilityratesandageingpopulations.Itmayalso
causeresentmentamongcertainsectionsoftheexistingEuropeanpopulationand,
althoughcertainlynotinevitable,couldcausechallengesintermsofsocialcohesion.

Povertyandinequality
Athirdsetofimportantdriversinthesecurityenvironmenttoday,asindicatedabove,
relatestoglobalpovertyandinequality.Thisisdespitethefactthatsomerecent
progresshasbeenmadeinreducingratesofextremepovertyforindividualswithinstates
andinlesseningthelevelofinequalitybetweenstates.
38 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange
Figure3.10:AnnualglobalGDPgrowthrates
6
Annual growth rate (%)
2
1 Developed
0 Developing
1997
Source:WorldBank2007a
8.Followingtheclassificationsystemof
theUNGeneralAssembly,developed
regionsaredefinedinthispaperasall
regionsofEuropeplusNorthernAmerica,
Australia,NewZealandandJapan,while
lessdeveloped(ordeveloping)regions
compriseallregionsofAfrica,Asia
(excludingJapan),LatinAmericaandthe
CaribbeanplusMelanesia,Micronesiaand
Polynesia.Alistofthe50least
developedcountriescanbeviewedat:
http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?
panel=5.
Trends
Inrecentyears,thelevelofeconomicinequalitybetweenstateshasbeendeclining
becausetherateofeconomicgrowthinlow-andmiddle-incomecountries(whichthe
WorldBankcurrentlydefinesashavinganaverageGDPpercapitaofUS$11,115orless)
haspersistedataround7.5percentmorethandoubletheratesobservedinmost
developedcountries(seeFigure3.10).8
World
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
Thepercentageofpeoplelivinginextremepovertyinthedevelopingworld(whichthe
WorldBankclassifiesasthoselivingonlessthanUS$1aday)hasalsobeendeclining.
Between1990and2004,thisfigurefellfrom31.6to19.2percent,orfrom1.25billion
to980millionpeopleinactualterms.Ifprojectionsofannualpercapitaincomegainsin
thedevelopingworldoverthenextdecadeareborneout,thisfigurecoulddropfurther
stillto624millionby2015,whichwouldenabletheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalon
halvingextremepovertytobemet(WorldBank2008a).
However,suchheadlinefiguresconcealamorecomplexoverallpicture.Reductionsin
levelsofextremepovertyhaveoccurredlargelyasaresultofconcentratedgrowthinthe
largeremergingeconomiesofChina,India,Brazil,RussiaandSouthAfrica,aswellasin
someoftheoil-exportingstates.Consequently,althoughpovertyrateshavefallen
significantlyinEastandSouthEastAsiaoverthepasttwodecades,littlecomparable
progresshasbeenmadeinSub-SaharanAfrica,mostofSouthernAsiaorLatinAmerica
(seeFigure3.11).Therearestill,therefore,hugeareasofextremepovertyaffecting
hundredsofmillionsofpeopleinmanystates.All20stateswiththelowestscoresinthe
mostrecentUNHumanDevelopmentIndexrankings,forexample,arelocatedinSub-
SaharanAfrica.(Theseare:Eritrea,Nigeria,Tanzania,UnitedRepublicofGuinea,
Rwanda,Angola,Benin,Malawi,Zambia,CtedIvoire,Burundi,DemocraticRepublicof
theCongo,Ethiopia,Chad,CentralAfricanRepublic,Mozambique,Mali,Niger,Guinea-
Bissau,BurkinaFasoandSierraLeone[UNDP2007].)
Despiteprojectedlong-termgrowthratesfortheinternationaleconomy(manyofwhich
willhavetobereviseddownwardsasaresultofthedevelopingworldrecession),itisstill
estimatedthatnearlyathirdoftheworldspopulationwillbelivingonlessthanUS$2a
dayin2015.Eventhegainsthathavebeenmadeonpovertyreductiontodatearenot
secure.Hugenumbersoffamiliesindevelopingregionsarealreadysufferingasaresult
ofatrendofrocketingenergyandfoodprices(notwithstandinganyrecent,temporary
drop).RobertZoellick,WorldBankGroupPresident,haswarnedthatifurgentglobal
actionisnottaken,theeffectofthecurrentfoodcrisisonpovertyreductionworldwide
willbeintheorderofsevenlostyears(Zoellick2008,Chalmers2008).Whenviewedin
thislight,theprospectofachievingtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs)by2015
appearsremoteatbest.ArecentreportbytheWorldBankobserves,mostcountriesare
 39

Figure3.11:PopulationlivingonlessthanUS$1purchasingpowerparity(PPP)aday

50
45
40
35
30
Percentage

25
20
15
10
1990
5 1999
0 2004
Developing Northern Sub-Saharan Latin Eastern Southern South- Western Commonwealth Transition
regions Africa Africa America Asia Asia Eastern Asia of Independent countries
and the Asia States of South-
Caribbean Eastern
Europe
Source:UNDESA2007a

offtracktomeetmostoftheMDGs,withthoseinfragilesituationsfallingbehindmost
seriously(WorldBank2008a:xvii).
Levelsofinequalitywithinstatesarealsocontinuingtorise.Althoughpatchydataand
diversenationalmethodologiesmakeitdifficulttocalculateandcomparechangesin
inequalitywithinstateswithahighdegreeofaccuracy,anumberofcrediblesources
suggestthatinallbutafewregions,thedistributionofincomeandwealthhasbecome
increasinglyunequaloverthepastfewdecades(seeIMF2007,WorldBank2008a,
Chalmers2008).Between1990and2004,theshareofnationalconsumptionbythe
poorestfifthofthepopulationindevelopingcountriesdroppedfrom4.6to3.9percent.
TheseinequalitiesareparticularlypronouncedinLatinAmericaandSub-SaharanAfrica,
wheretheshareofthepoorestquintileinnationalconsumptionisaround2.7and3.4
percentrespectively,accordingtorecentestimates(seeFigure3.12).

Figure3.12:Shareofthepoorestquintileinnationalconsumption,1990and2004

Developing regions 4.6

3.9

Transition Countries of South-Eastern Europe 8.3

7.8

Southern Asia 7.2

6.7

Northern Africa 6.2

6.3

CIS 7.9
6.2

South-Eastern Asia 6.2

6.1

Western Asia 5.9

5.4

Eastern Asia 7.1

4.5

Sub-Saharan Africa 3.4

3.4
2.8
1990
Latin America & the Caribbean 2.7 2004
0 2 4 6 8 10
Percentage

Source:UNDESA2007a

Povertyandinequality:securityimplications
Thiscombinationofpersistentpovertyandworseninglevelsofincomeinequalityonthe
scaledescribed(whichisonlylikelytodeteriorateinthefaceofthepresentglobal
40 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange

economiccrisis)hasseriousimplicationsforglobalsecurityfortworeasons(Abbottetal
2006).
First,althoughitisnoteasytopointtoadirectlineofcausalitybetweenhighlevelsof
povertyandinequalitywithinacountryandanincreasedincidenceofviolenceand
conflict,thereissomecorrelationbetweenthesefactors,andcountriescharacterisedby
extremepovertyandhighlevelsofinequalityaremorelikelytoexperienceviolent
conflictthanthosethatarenot.UnequaleconomicdevelopmentinIndiaoverthepast
fewdecadesmaywellbeacaseinpoint.Growthhasnotbenefitedallgroupswithinthe
countryequally,andthereissomeevidencetosuggestthatthishasfuelledaMaoist
insurgencyinanarcrunningfromtheNepaleseborderthroughthestatesofBihar,
Chhattisgarh,Jharkhand,Orissa,andAndhraPradesh(Kanbur2007:3-4).
Anumberofsocialscientistsalsoarguethathorizontalbetweengroupinequalities
severepolitical,economicorsocialinequalitiesbetweenculturallydefinedgroupswithin
acountry(Stewart2003)areparticularlypotent,sincetheycanoftenalignwith
incomeinequalitiestofuelcrime,feedgrievancesexploitedbyextremists,andfoment
hostility.ArecentreportfromtheRoyalUnitedServicesInstituteconsidershorizontal
inequalitiestohaveplayedanimportantandsometimesdominantrolein28ofthe32
activeconflictsin2006,suchasthatbetweenSunni,ShiaandKurdishgroupsinIraq,
andtheongoingstrugglebetweenIsraelisandPalestinians(Chalmers2008).Other
examplesoftensionandviolenceprovokedbygroupinequalitiesandmarginalisation
includethewarbetweenSinhalaandTamilethnicgroupsinSriLanka,andpastand
currentarmedconflictsinSudan,Uganda,Burundi,RwandaandtheDemocratic
RepublicofCongo.
Second,whilepovertyandinequalitycanfeedviolentconflict,thereislittledoubtthat
theeconomic,politicalandsocialdislocationcausedbyconflictalsooftencauses
povertyandsharpenstheinequalitiesbetweenindividualsandgroups.Weexaminesome
ofthedynamicsandwidereconomicandsocialeffectsofconflictatgreaterlengthin
Chapter4.Theseclearlyshowthatapoverty-inequality-conflicttrapexists,suchthat
poorerandmoreunequalcountriesarenotonlymorelikelytofallintoconflictbutonce
theyhavedonesoarelikelytobecomeevenpoorer,moreunequal,andmoreproneto
futureconflictasaresult.Thisinturnweakensgovernancecapacitiesinthecountries
mostdirectlyaffectedandcontributestothephenomenonofweakandfailingstates.

Climatechange
Aswithglobalpovertyandinequality,andthedemographicandglobalisationtrends
outlinedabove,climatechangemustnowalsoberegardedasanimportantshaperand
contributortothefutureinternationalsecuritylandscape.
Climatechange:trends
Althoughtheexactlong-termrateofclimatechangewilldependtoacertainextenton
theenergypoliciesadoptedbystates,onpatternsofglobaleconomicdevelopment,and
onratesofpopulationgrowthindifferentpartsoftheworld,itisalreadyclearfrom
detailedscientificresearchandmodellingcarriedoutbytheUNIntergovernmentalPanel
onClimateChange(IPCC)thatclimatechangeofaverysignificantscaleisoccurring
(IPCC2007a).
In2007,theIPCCreleasedaseriesofreportsprovidingauthoritativedataonclimate
trends.Thesereportsconcludedthattheevidenceshowingwarmingoftheclimate
systemwasnowunequivocal,with11ofthelast12yearsrankingamongthewarmest
yearssincerecordsbegan.Theyalsoarguedthatitisextremelylikely thathuman
activity,particularlyagricultureandtheheavyuseoffossilfuels,hasplayedthe
determiningroleinthewarmingprocess(IPCC2007a).
Intheshortterm,andwithoutfurthergovernmentintervention,theIPCCprojectsthat
globalemissionsofgreenhousegaseswillincreasebyafurther37percentby2030,and
52percentby2050.Thiswouldraisetheglobaltemperaturebybetween1.7Cand
2.4Ccomparedwithpre-industriallevels(OECD2008).Longertermmodelling,through
totheendofthecentury,suggestsanevenwiderrangeofpossiblewarmingscenarios
 41

between1.8Cand4.0C(relativeto1990levels),withmid-rangeestimatesprojecting
anincreaseofaround2.8C(IPCC2007a).Soberingly,theIPCCalsonotesthatevenif
emissionswerestabilisednow,at2000levels,theworldwouldcontinuetowarmfor
manyyearsbecauseoftheslowresponseofoceansandicesheetstochangesinlevels
ofgreenhousegasemissionsintheatmosphere.
Theimpactsareexpectedtoincludesealevelrise,meltingglaciersandpolaricecaps,
changingprecipitationpatterns,andincreasedfloodinginsomeareasanddroughtin
others.Thesearelikelytomanifestthemselvesindifferentcombinationsandindifferent
waysindifferentpartsoftheworldbutinjustaboutallregionstheyarelikelytohave
consequencesthatarerelevanttothesecurityagenda.
Climatechange:securityimplications
TheIPCCprojectsthatChinawillbeatgreatriskfromclimatechange,comingunder
pressureparticularlyasaresultofwaterstressinagriculturalareasthatwillarisepartly
fromincreasingtemperature[alongwith]increasingfrequencyofElNio,and[a]
reductionin[the]numberofrainydays(IPCC2007c:248).Chinasownfirstnational
reportonclimatechange,releasedinlate2006,alsonotedtheseissuesandwarnedofa
comingfoodproductioncrisis,withasmuchasaone-thirddecreaseofkeycropyieldsto
beexpectedby2030(Li2007).Afurtherworryfortheregimemustbethecountrys
vulnerabilitytosealevelrise,sincemanyofitshighlypopulatedcitiesaresituatedalong
thecoast.
TheprojectedimpactsofclimatechangeonChinamayalsoplayabigroleinshaping
boththecharacterandstabilityofCommunistPartyruleintheyearsahead.Inthelast Theprojected
fewyears,concernsoverenvironmentalissueshavebeenasignificantfeatureofChinese
politics,promptingcitizenstodemonstrateacrossthecountry.Muchofthishasfocused impactsofclimate
ontheissueofindustrialpollution,butclimatechangeimpacts,too,rankhighlyinthe changeonChina
mindsofChinesecitizens.A2007pollconductedinChinabytheChicagoCouncilon mayalsoplayabig
GlobalAffairsandWorldPublicOpinion.orgfoundthat80percentofrespondentsagreed
thatwithin10yearsglobalwarmingcouldposeanimportantthreattotheircountrys roleinshapingboth
vitalinterest(ChicagoCouncilonWorldAffairs2007).KeyquestionsfortheChinese thecharacterand
leadershipthereforerelatetowhetheritcanmaintainrobusteconomicgrowthwhile stabilityof
respondingandadaptingtothesechallengesandwhetheritcandosotosuchadegree
andatsuchapaceastoavoidtheneedforrepressivemeasures.Howtheregime CommunistParty
handlesthesechallengescouldhaveaprofoundeffectoninternationalaffairsinthe ruleintheyears
decadestocome. ahead
WarminghassignificantimplicationsforRussia,too.Floodingtherehasbecomeamajor
challenge.Thecountryshydrologicalregimeisdeterioratingasthefrequencyofboth
floodsanddroughtsincreases.In2001thetownofLenskinYakutiawasinundated
duringtheworstfloodstohitSiberiaforacentury.Oncurrentpredictions,within10
yearstheremaybecatastrophicfloodsinStPetersburg,withwaterlevelsrisingasmuch
asthreemetres(WWFandOxfam2008).
However,innorthernRussiaanditscoastalwaters,themeltingoficeandpermafrostis
affordingnewopportunitiesforoilexplorationandtransportation.Untilnow,Russiahas
derivedonlylimitedutilityfromthefactthatithasthelongestcoastlineintheworld,as
itscoastalwatershavebeenfrozenformuchoftheyear.Withtheexceptionof
MurmanskontheArctic,allmajorRussianharbourslieonborderseassuchastheBlack
andCaspian.But,asPereletetalhaveobserved,meltingoftheArcticicecapwill
prolongboththenorthernseaandSiberianrivernavigationseasons,[and]makethe
ArcticmarineroutealongtheRussiancoastlinenavigablemostoftheyear(Pereletetal
2007:15).ThiswillgiverisetotheconstructionofnewharboursalongRussiasnorthern
coast.Theassociatedincreaseinshippingmuchofitrelatedtoincreasedmineral
extractionthroughouttheentireRussianArcticregionwillraisedifficultquestionsof
maritimelawandmaythreatentodestabiliseinternationalrelations,givendisputes
amongpolarnationsregardingsovereigntyoverArcticwaters.
Anotherarealikelytobeseriouslyaffectedbyclimatechangeinthenearandmedium
termistheHimalayanregionofAsia(IPCC2007c).TheHimalayanglaciersarethe
largestbodyoficeoutsidethePolaricecaps,occupyingapproximately500,000square
42 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange
Higher inpotablewater,possiblybyasmuchas50percentby2050.EastAfricawilllikelysee
temperaturesand
lowerandmore
seasonalrainfallwill
alsoplaceupto250
millionmorepeople
inAfricaunder
severewaterstress
by2020 2020,migrationintheregionwillcreateaWestAfricanurbansprawlof50million
kilometres,andtheyarerecedingatanalarmingrate,farfasterthananyotherglacial
areaintheworld.OncurrentIPCCprojections,thereisaveryhighchancetheycould
disappearaltogetherby2035andavirtualcertaintythattheywillshrinkbyatleast80
percenttocoveronly100,000squarekilometres.Thiswillhavetheeffectofdepriving
theIndus,Ganges,andBrahmaputrariversystemsoftheirmainsourceofwater,likely
makingthoseriversseasonalandbringingmassivechangesinagriculturalfood
production,decliningcropyields,andseverewaterstress.Atthesametime,risingsea
levelswillalsoharmfreshwaterecosystemsinthemanymega-deltasintheregion,
furtherstressingagricultureandfoodsuppliesdependentonfishing.
ItishighlylikelythatthesedevelopmentswillputstressonBangladeshtosuchan
extentthatthewiderstabilityofSouthAsiaisthreatened.ThepopulationofBangladesh
isexploding(itisprojectedtonearlydoubleto250millionby2035)evenasclimate
changedestroysasignificantportionofthecountrysalreadylimitedhabitableland,
forcingmanypeopletomoveinlandandtoseekastableenvironmentwithoutregardto
theregionsmanycontestedborders(Barnett2001).India,whichwillalsofaceclimate
stressalthoughnotassevereasitsneighbour,isalreadybracingitselfforawaveof
Bangladeshienvironmentalmigrantsbyconstructinganeight-foot-highironfencealong
the2,100-mileIndia-Bangladeshborder(Joehnk2007).
TurningtotheMiddleEast,thealreadycomplexpoliticsofthatregionwillalsobe
complicatedfurtherbywhatsomehavedescribedasanewhydrologicalsecurity
complex(Schultz1995).TheMiddleEastregionishometo6.3percentoftheworlds
populationbutonly1.4percentoftheworldsrenewablefreshwater(Roudi-Fahimiet
al 2002).Thewaterthatisavailable,moreover,isconcentratedinonlyafewcountries,
namelyTurkey,Iran,LebanonandSyria.Thecomplexsetofwaterdependency
relationshipsthatexistintheregionaresettogetworse,withIsraelinoneofthemost
vulnerablepositions(Campbelletal 2007).Israelwillhavefewerthan500cubicmetres
ofwaterpercapitaperannumby2025inacontextinwhich1,000cubicmetresper
capitaperannumisconsideredtheminimumreasonableamountforadeveloped
country(Homer-Dixonetal 2004).Muchofthatmeagrewatersupplyisalsolocatedin
politicallyfraughtterritory:onethirdofitintheGolanHeightsandanotherthirdinthe
mountainaquiferthatunderliestheWestBank.Thiscouldaddfurtherflash-pointsto
theIsraeli-SyrianandIsraeli-Palestinianrelationshipsandwaterscarcityingeneralcould
becomeasignificantnewdriveroftensionandconflictintheregion(Bitar2005).
Highertemperaturesandlowerandmoreseasonalrainfallwillalsoplaceupto250
millionmorepeopleinAfricaunderseverewaterstressby2020.ThiswillaffecttheEast,
WestandNorthofthecontinent,withNorthAfricasufferingarapidandseveredecline
upto20percentmorewinterraincausingfloodingandsoilerosion,whileatthesame
timethesummermonthswillbesignificantlydryer,resultinginseveredroughtsand
additionalstressonagriculturalregions(Case2006).Agriculturalproductionmakesup
nearlyhalfofEastAfricasGDPandemploysfouroutofeveryfiveworkersintheregion.
Anylossinsovitalaneconomicsectorcouldhavedevastatingconsequencesonthe
regionsoveralleconomicandpoliticaldevelopment(ibid).WestAfrica,foritspart,is
alreadysufferingasevereproblemofdesertification:approximately1,350squaremiles
ofNigerianlandturnstodeserteachyear,uprootingfarmersandherdsmanandcausing
internalmigrationtowardscoastalareas(PodestaandOgden2007).Asaresult,by
inhabitantsthatextendsfromAccrainGhanaacrossthebreadthoftheNigerRiver
delta,thougheventhisreliefwillbetemporaryforthoseconcernedsincetheentirearea
isalsoatmajorriskfromsealevelrise(McCarthy2006).
Thissetofdevelopmentsinsomeoftheworldspoorestregionsmaywelladdfurther
stresstotheexistingconditionsofpovertyandconflictdescribedinearliersections.
Climateeventsthemselvesarelikelytoclaimhumanlivesonaverysignificantscalebut
migrationflowsarealsolikelytobeafurtherfactoroverwhelmingthecapacityofstate
authoritiestorespondinanumberofareas.Thismaybeaparticularlyacuteproblemin
EastAfrica,wheretheconcentrationofweakorfailingstatesisalreadyhighand
numerousunresolvedpoliticaldisputescharacterisetheregion.Inshort,climatechange
 43

maybeasignificantdriveroffurtherstatefailureinAfrica.
Movingclosertohome,manyoftheclimatepressuresandimpactsdescribedabove
pointtosignificantadditionalinternationalmigratorypressures,possiblyelevatingthe
trendsandeffectsalreadyexpectedandpresentedabove.Itcannotbeassumedthat
theseflowsofpeoplewillstaywithintheregionsmostdirectlyaffected.Indeed,itis
highlylikelythatsomeoftheseflowsofpeoplewillbedirectedtowardstheEuropean
UnionandtheUKinparticular.BritishcolonialandfamilytiestoSouthAsia,for
example,meanthatflowsfromBangladeshandthesurroundingareamustbe
anticipated.Waterstress,massivepopulationdisplacementandtheongoingmixof
conflictandpovertyinAfricawillalsomeanthatSouthernEuropegrowsasanEUentry
pointofchoiceformanyseekingtoescapetheharshdifficultiesoflifeinAfrica.Ifentry
isrefusedorhighlyrestricted,thepotentialforgrowingpoliticalresentmentwillrise.
Twofurtherobservationscanbemaderegardingourresponsetoclimatechange.First,
failuretoadapttoitsconsequencesisbynomeansconfinedtodevelopingnations,as
wastragicallydemonstratedwhenHurricaneKatrinahitNewOrleans.Second,the
mitigationofclimatechangeanditsimplicationsmayitselfposeproblemsintermsof
maintainingourenergysecurity,asubjectweexploreinChapter6(seeTaylor2008).

Scientificandtechnologicalchange
Wenowturntoexaminationoftheswiftadvancesinscienceandtechnologyinrecent
yearsandtheextenttowhichwehavebecomeatechnology-rich,technology-driven,
andtechnology-dependentsociety.Thisencompassesadvancesinphysics,
nanotechnology,informationandcommunicationstechnology(ICT)andthe
biotechnologyrevolution.
Here,weconcentrateprimarilyonbiotechnologyandonadvancesinICT,outliningsome
ofthemostimportantdevelopmentsbeforegoingontoexaminethesecurity
implicationsofthechangesunderway.Wefocusonbiotechnologybecausewhilethe
securityenvironmentofthe20thcenturywasdominatedbyphysics,itislikelythatthat
ofthe21stcenturywillbedominatedbyadvancesinthebiologicalsciencesandtheir
applications(Daschle2008).WefocusonICTbecauseitsitsattheheartofmuchelse
thatisgoingon,includingglobalisationanditspower-diffusingeffects,andbecauseour
relianceonit,aswellasbringingenormousbenefits,isexposingustonew
vulnerabilities.
Scienceandtechnology:trends
Advancesinthebiologicalsciences,thoughcontroversial,havethepotentialto
transformmanyareasofhumanlifeandtooffersolutionstomanyoftheproblemsand
pressureswehavedescribedalreadyinthischapter.
Inthefieldofhumanhealthwehaveseenthegreatscientificventureintheattemptto
mapthehumangenome:toanalysetheorder,chemicalcharacteristics,spacingand
functionofthemorethan23,000genesonhumanchromosomes(Shapiro2008).As
progressismadeinthisfield,medicalapplicationsarestartingtoemerge.Amongthese
sofarhavebeennewtestsforgeneticpredispositionstobreastcancer,cysticfibrosis,
andliverdisease.Inthenearfuture,accordingtotheUSNationalInstituteofHealth,
stemcellsmaybecomearenewablesourceofreplacementcellsandtissuestotreat
ParkinsonsandAlzheimersdiseases,spinalcordinjury,stroke,burns,heartdisease,
diabetesandmore(Shapiro2008:307).Britishscientistshavealreadyusedstemcells
fromumbilicalchordstogrowsmallversionsofthehumanliverintheirlaboratoriesand
itishopedthatby2020thistechnologywillhaveadvancedtothestageatwhichnew
liverscanbegrownfortransplant(MacRae2006).
Thesedevelopmentsinmedicineareparalleledbyothersinagricultureandenergy.In
agriculture,despitethepoliticalresistanceofsomecountriestothegeneticmodification
ofcrops,itappearshighlylikelythatstrainsofgoldenricehighinbeta-carotenewill
soonbeintroducedinsomedevelopingcountrieswherepopulationssufferfromsevere
vitaminAdeficiencies.DrNormanBorlaug,oneofthearchitectsoftheagricultural
revolutionofthe1960s,hasalsoarguedthatgeneticallymodifiedfoodsourcescouldbe
44 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange

crucialtofeedingtheworldsrapidlyexpandingpopulationinthedecadesahead
(Shapiro2008).Inenergy,agri-biotechapplications(andparticularlybiologicalfuel
sources)havealsobecomeapriorityresearchareainrecentyears,astheworldlooksfor
waystorespondtoclimatechangeand,forbothenvironmentalandpoliticalreasons,to
reduceitsdependencyonfossilfuelsuppliesfrompotentiallyunstableregions.
Thesedevelopmentshavestimulatedconsiderablegrowthinthebiotechnologyindustry.
ArecentreportbyErnst&Youngwhodefinebiotechnologycompaniesasthosethat
usebiologicalprocessestodevelopproductsorservicesforhumanandanimalhealth
care,agriculturalproductivity,food-processing,renewableresources,industrial
manufacturingorenvironmentalmanagementrecordedahugeleapintheprofitsof
biotechnologycompaniesin2006:therevenuesofpubliclistedcompaniesrose14per
centfrom2005levelstoreachalmostUS$73.5billionglobally(Ernst&Young2007).If
thisrateofgrowthcontinues,biotechnologyissettobecomeaUS$100billiondollar
industryby2010.
Muchofthisbiotechnologyrevolutionhasitselfbeenbuiltonthebackofadvancesin
ICTaswellasadvancesinscientificknowledge:increasesincomputationalpowerand
advancesinsoftware,forexample,havebeenrequiredtomakequickprogresson
endeavourssuchasthehumangenomeproject.
ICTs,inturn,havethemselvesbeenchangingveryrapidlyacrossanevenwiderfront
spanningaconvergingsetoftechnologiesinmicroelectronics,computing(hardware
andsoftware),telecommunications,broadcasting,andoptoelectronics(Castells
1996).Inadditiontofacilitatingscientificadvance,progressineachoftheseareas
overthelastfourdecadeshasmadepossiblemajorleapsforwardinnetworkingand
transmissiontechnologies(suchasthoseseeninthedevelopmentofsatellites,fibre
opticcabletechnology,theelectronicswitchersandroutersthatallowtraffictoflow
overtheinternet,andintheuseofradiospectrumfordigitalcellulartelephony).
Exponentialgrowthcontinuesinperformanceperunitcostacrossallthekeyareasof
processing,storageandcommunicationstoo,facilitatedbytheminiaturisationand
increasingpowerofmicro-chips,whichhavebeendoublinginpower(foragiven
price)aboutevery18monthsformanyyearsnow.Thesecombinedadvanceshave
transformedthespeedandeaseofhumancommunicationandhaveusheredinanear
instantaneousandtrulyglobalcommunicationsenvironmentthathasbeencentralto
globalisationitself.
Take-upofthenewtechnologiesinvolvedhasbeenrapid.In1990therewere
approximately530millionfixedormobiletelephonesubscriptionsbutby2004there
werealmost3billion(ESRC2007).Muchofthisincreasehasoccurredviamobile
technologywithwholedevelopingcountrieseffectivelychoosingtoleapfrogthe
developmentofanoldfixedlineinfrastructureinfavourofthestraightadoptionof
mobile.Therehasalsobeenexplosiveuptakeoftheinternet,withrecentestimates
suggestingthatmorethanafifthoftheglobalpopulationisnowconnected(see
Figure3.13).
Inadditiontomakinginformationandknowledgeeasiertoacquire,andthe
empowermentofindividuals,groups,businessesandgovernmentsthroughitsuse,ICTs
havebecomefarmoreembeddedinthestructureofoursocietiesandhaveincreased
thecomplexityoftheinfrastructureuponwhichmodernsocietydepends.
Satellitecommunicationsandimagingtechnology,forexample,areessentialforsecure
inter-governmentalcommunicationandmilitarycoordination,particularlyinrelationto
maritimeandaviationsecurity.Satellite-basednavigationaldataisutilisedbythemilitary
inweaponssystemsandsurveillancecapabilities,andinciviliancommunicationsystems
relatedtotransportsystems,weatherforecastingandenvironmentalmonitoring.
Telecommunicationsbetweensatellitegroundstationsalsofunctionasbackupforland-
basedcommunicationssuchasmobiletechnology,emergencyservicesandmedia
broadcasting.
Inadditiontoformingthebackboneofthecommunicationsinfrastructureuponwhich
weallrely,ICTsarenowalsoheavilyembeddedintherunningofmoretraditionaland
 45

Figure3.13:Numbersofinternetusers,1994-2008

1600

1400
Number of users (million)

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008
Year

Source:InternetWorldStats2008

familiarinfrastructures,playingimportantrolesinthemanagementofwater,powerand
transportsystemstonamejustafew.Thesignificanceofthisisallthegreaterwhenone
considerstheextenttowhichwehavebecomeaninfrastructure-reliantsocietymore
generally.Overthelastdecade,companiesaroundtheworldhavetakenstepstoadopta
leanapproachtobusinessoperations.Movingtojustintimemanufacturingand
delivery,squeezingoutstock,removingwarehousingandintermediaries,andshedding
excessstaffarealldevelopmentsthathavebeenseenascentraltocompetitiveedgeina
globaleconomy.Ataconsequence,thesupplychainsofbusinesses,includingBritish
businesses,havebecomegloballystretched.Thishasincreasedefficiencybutitalso
comeswithadownsideintermsofanincreasedrelianceonasmoothlyfunctioningset
ofinfrastructuresinenergy,transportationandcommunications(Norton2008).Inother
words,themoreefficientlyweoperate,thelessslackthereisinthesystemtocopewith
majordisruption.
Scientificandtechnologicalchange:securityimplications
Allofthisisofgreatimportancetoushereforseveralreasons.
First,ourrelianceonICTswhilebringingenormousbenefits,notleastforsecurity(inthe
formofdatamining,patternrecognition,radiofrequencyidentification[RFID]
technologies,terahertzdevices,lightdetectionandranging[LiDAR],andintelligence
motes),hasalsoexposeddevelopedsocietiestonewpointsofinfrastructure
vulnerabilityandnewkindsofmaliciousact.Someofthesehavebeenvisibleinthe
TitanRaincampaignofcoordinatedcyber-attacksonUScomputersystemssince2003
andintheEstonianCyberwarofApril-May2007.Wereturntotheseissuesinlater
chaptersindiscussionsofcyber-crimeandcyber-terrorismandinadiscussionofthreats
tooursatellite-dependentsocietyfromboththepossiblemilitarisationofouterspace
andthefurtherdevelopmentofweaponsortacticscapableofdisruptingspace
communications.Additionally,asthearmytransformationdebateintheUSinrecent
yearsmakesclear,itispossiblethatnewmilitaryvulnerabilitiesmightemergeasaresult
ofover-relianceonhigh-techweaponssystemsandcommandandcontrol.
Biotechnologyforitspart,whilepromisingtodeliversignificantmedical,agricultural,and
energyadvances,maynotbebenigninallitsapplications,giventhatweliveinaworld
wherebiologicalweaponshavealreadybeenused.AnimportantreportbytheBritish
MedicalAssociationin2004observedthatourawarenessoftheneedandpractical
abilitytopreventthemanufactureandreleaseofharmfulbiologicalagentshasnotkept
pacewithscientificdevelopments.
Thereisabasicdifficultyoverwhattodowiththeresearchdataandscientific
knowledgealreadyavailable.Astechnicaldataaboutthegenomestructureofviruses
46 Shareddestinies| Long-termdriversofchange
Ahistoricshiftof tendencythatmaybeacceleratedbytheeffectsofthecurrentglobalfinancialcrisis,
powerfromWestto
Eastisunderway...
andweappearto
bemovingback
intoamultipolar
world Wehavecommented,too,ontheriseofnon-stateactors,theirincreasedorganisational
andbacteriabecomesmuchmorewidelyavailableforlegitimateresearchpurposes,for
example,thereisasignificantdangerthatthisinformationwillbeappropriatedand
misusedbythosewithhostileintentions(BritishMedicalAssociation2004).
Asiftomakethepoint,in2005theUnitedStatesDepartmentofHealthandHuman
Servicespublishedthefullgenomeofthe1918influenzavirusontheinternetinthe
GenBankdatabase.Whileitwasarguedthatsharingknowledgeabouttherapidspread
oftheviruscouldaidscientistsindevelopingsolutionstothethreatofnewglobal
pandemicssuchasavianflu,criticsobservedthatthisgenomeisessentiallythedesign
ofaweaponofmassdestruction,sinceitcouldbeusedtomodifyanexistingfluvirus
soastodramaticallyincreaseitsdeadlyeffects(KurtzweilandJoy2005).
Morewidely,scientificresearchadvancesthemselvesarealsopotentiallyverydangerous.
Forexample,researchersfromtheStateUniversityofNewYorkatStonyBrookwere
successfulin2002inproducingasyntheticversionofthepoliovirus,leadingtofears
thattheapplicationofsimilartechniquescouldresultinthecreationofsomethinglike
theEbolavirusorsmallpox.Inthesameyear,itwasreportedthatresearchintothe
humanimmuneresponsetoVariolamajor,thecauseofsmallpox,hadresultedinthe
creationofenzymesthatcouldeffectivelyinhibitproteinsinthebodythatrecogniseand
attempttodestroyit.Thisresearchwaspartofawidereffortaimedatfindingmore
effectivetherapeuticresponsestosmallpox,shoulditeverreappear.Butthereisalsoa
riskthatitcouldassistthoseinterestedindeliberatelyre-engineeringthesmallpoxvirus
inordertoturnitintoanevenmoredeadlybio-weapon(BritishMedicalAssociation
2004).
Inshort,withoutmoreeffectiveregulationandcontrolofbiotechnologyresearch,there
isaseriousthreatthatthesamesciencethatmaycuresomeofourworstdiseasescould
alsobeusedtocreatesomeoftheworldsmostfrighteningweapons(CIA2003:1).
SummaryofChapter3
Inthischapter,wehavereviewedawiderangeofinterlockingtrendsanddriversof
relevancetotodayssecuritylandscapeandhavepointedtothesecuritychallengesthat
eitherdoormayflowfromeachofglobalisation,povertyandinequality,demographic
change,climatechangeanddevelopmentsinscienceandtechnology.
AhistoricshiftofpowerfromWesttoEastisunderway,partlyfacilitatedandaccelerated
byseveralofthesetrends,andweappeartobemovingbackintoamultipolarworld,a
particularlyifoneofitseffectisalossofAmericanconfidenceandsometurninginward
onthepartoftheAmericanpeople.Withinthisbroadershift,andpartlyasaresultofit,
statesendowedwithlargeandexportablefossilfuelreservesinaworldoftightenergy
marketsareabletoincreasetheirwealthandinfluenceaccordingly.Russia,ontheback
ofthistrend,isbecomingmoreassertive,thoughtherehavebeenrecentsignsof
hesitancyinMoscowasoilpriceshavediminishedwiththeemergingeconomic
downturn.
reach,andtheincreasedlevelofthreatthatsomeofthemarenowabletopose,andwe
havedescribedsomeofthewaysinwhichpersistentandlarge-scalepoverty,inequality,
andviolentconflictinteract.
Demographicchangeandclimatechange,aswellasinteractingwithandfeedingoff
eachother,arebothlikelytoreinforcesomeofthesewidertrendsinthelongterm,
contributingtoshiftsinpower,atighteningofmarketsrelatedtobasicresources,and
thestokingoffurtherconflictpressureintheinternationalsystem.Whilescienceand
technologyhavebeenadvancingatatrulyextraordinarypace,bringingnewhopeand
newtoolstoaidhumanityinmeetingthechallengesahead,each,too,hasalsobeen
notedasasourceofnewvulnerabilitiesandnewpotentialthreats.
IntheremainingchaptersofPart2weanalysethesecurityenvironmentcreatedby
thesetrendsanddriversingreaterdepth.InChapter5,wefocusexplicitlyonthethreats
48 Shareddestinies| Competition,conflictandstatefailureintheinternationalsystem

4.Competition,conflictand
statefailureinthe
internationalsystem
Whilesomeanalystsbelievethatthetrendsoutlinedinthepreviouschapter,inparticular
economicglobalisation,pointtoafundamentallynewcontextinwhichmajorpower
competition,mutualstatedistrust,andinterstateconflictwillinevitablygivewayto
deepenedformsofmultilateralcooperation,itisfarfromclearthatthisisgoingtobe
thecase.Wemaywishit,andwecertainlyshouldworkforit,butweneedtodosowith
arealisticoutlook.
Widerevidenceonongoingconflictanditseffectsisacauseforgraveconcern.Muchof
theconflictongoingtoday,whileoccurringwithinandnotbetweenstates,is
contributingto,butalsopartlybeingdrivenby,asevereandgrowingproblemofstate
weaknessandfailure:justaboutallfailedstatesareexperiencingseriouspolitical
violenceofonekindoranotherontheirterritories.Moreover,alargenumberofconflict
andstatefailureriskfactorsareconvergingonparticularregionsandstatesofconcern,
creatingwhatmightbetermedswingstatesorpivotalpointsinthewiderstrugglefor
internationalpeaceandsecurity.
Inthischapter,wereviewsomeofthetrenddataoncurrentpatternsofviolentconflict
andtheireffects,andassessthescaleoftheprofoundproblemofweakandfailing
states.Wealsopresentdataonthelocationsinwhichavarietyofconflictandstate
failureriskpressuresareconvergingandanalysetheremainingcausesforconcernin
relationtopossiblerenewedinter-statecompetitionandconflictintheyearsahead.
Notethatallavailabletrenddataonviolentconflicthastobetreatedwithsomecaution.
Differentdatasetsusedifferentcodingregimes,therearevariationsinthewaydividing
linesaredrawnbetweenpoliticallymotivatedviolenceandviolentcrimeandmuch
relevantdataisunavailableorgoesunreported.Inthissectionofourreportweusedata
fromtheUppsalaConflictDataProgramasthisisclearlycodedandcoversareasonably
longtimeperiod,allowingtrendsinthedatatobeobserved.

Changingpatternsofviolentconflict
Totakethegoodnewsfirst,whiletheperiod1946to1990sawsteepifuneven
increasesinthenumberofstate-basedviolentconflicts,theperiodsincethenhasseena
dramatic,ifuneven,decline(HumanSecurityReportProject2007).(State-basedviolent
conflictisacontestedincompatibilitythatconcernsgovernmentand/orterritorywhere
theuseofarmedforcebetweentwoparties,ofwhichatleastoneisthegovernmentof
astate,resultsinatleast25battle-relateddeaths[UppsalaConflictDataProgram
2008].)
Figure4.1presentsthetrenddataonstate-basedviolentconflictfortheperiod1946to
2006.Justaboutalloftheconflictsongoingtoday,inwhichatleastoneofthepartiesis
thegovernmentofastate,areoccurringwithinstatesratherthanasclassic
confrontationsbetweenstates.(ItshouldbenotedthatbothIraqandAfghanistan,
whichmanymayconsiderasinterstateconflicts,areclassedbyUCDPas
internationalisedintrastateconflicts.)
Thisdecliningtrendinconflictsinwhichatleastonepartyisagovernmentisreflected
inthreefurthertrends.First,therehasbeenanincreaseinthenumberofconflict
terminations,relativetothenumberofconflictonsets.AsFigure4.2shows,forthethree
decadesbetween1960and1990,thenumberofstate-basedarmedconflictsbeginning
outweighedthenumberofconflictsbeingterminated.Since1990,however,thistrend
hasbeenreversedwiththenumberofconflictterminationsoutweighingthenumberof
newarmedconflictscommencing.
 49

Figure4.1:State-basedarmedconflictsbytype,1946-2006
60

50

40
Number of Conflicts

30

20

Intrastate Conflicts
10 Internationalised Intrastate Conflicts
Interstate Conflicts
0 Extrastate Conflicts
1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Year
Notes:Internal/intrastateconflicts:conflictoccurringbetweenthegovernmentofastateandoneormoreinternaloppositiongroupswithoutintervention
fromotherstates;Internationalisedinternal/intrastateconflicts:conflictoccurringbetweenthegovernmentofastateandoneormoreinternalopposition
groupswithinterventionfromotherstates(secondaryparties)ononeorbothsides;Interstateconflicts:conflictoccurringbetweentwoormorestates;
Extrastate/extrasystemicconflicts:conflictoccurringbetweenastateandanon-stategroupoutsideitsownterritory.(SeeUCDP/PRIO2007)

Source:HumanSecurityReportProject2007

Figure4.2:Averagenumberofstate-basedarmedconflictonsetsandterminationsperyear,1950-2005

14

12
Onsets and Terminations (Average)

10

2
Onsets
0 Terminations
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-05

Years

Source:UCDP/HumanSecurityReportProjectDataset,HumanSecurityBrief2007

Second,themethodofterminationhasalsoshifted.Intheperiod1950-1999thenumberof
state-basedconflictsbeingterminatedbyavictoryofonepartyoranothertotheconflict
outweighedthenumberofconflictsbeingterminatedthroughanegotiatedsettlement.
However,since2000therehasbeenadramaticreversalinthesenumbers,with17conflicts
beingterminatedbynegotiatedsettlementbetween2000and2005andonlyfivebeing
terminatedbyavictoryofonesideortheother(HumanSecurityReportProject2007).
Thoughthedataisrecentandstillemerging,andfirmconclusionsthereforedifficultto
make,earlyindicationsarethatconflictterminationsachievedthroughnegotiationarealso
becomingmoredurablethanvictories.Ofthe17state-basedarmedconflictsendedby
negotiationbetween2000and2005,onlytworestartedinlessthanfiveyears,representing
are-startrateof11.8percent.Ofthefiveconflictsterminatedbyavictoryinthesame
period,onere-startedinlessthanfiveyears,representingare-startrateof20percent.
50 Shareddestinies| Competition,conflictandstatefailureintheinternationalsystem

Third,thenumberofreportedbattledeathsfromstate-basedviolentconflict,as
presentedinFigure4.3,hasalsodeclineddramatically,sincethelate1980s,ashasthe
averagenumberofbattledeathsincurredperconflictperyear.In1950,theaverage
state-basedconflictkilled38,000people.By2006thisnumberhadshrunktojustover
500(HumanSecurityReportProject2007).

Figure4.3:Numberofreportedbattledeathsfromstate-basedarmedconflictsbytype,1946-2006
Number of Deaths (Hundreds of Thousands)

8
7
6
5
4
3 Intrastate Battle-Deaths
2 Internationalised Intrastate Battle-Deaths

1 Interstate Battle-Deaths
Extrastate Battle-Deaths
0
1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Year
Source:HumanSecurityReportProject2007

Thepositivedataonstate-basedconflictismatchedbypositivedevelopmentsonconflict
betweennon-stateactorsinrecentyears(althoughdataonsuchconflictshasonlybeen
collectedsystematicallysince2002).Non-stateconflictisTheuseofarmedforcebetween
twoorganizedgroups,neitherofwhichisthegovernmentofastate,whichresultsinat
least25battle-relateddeathsinayearUppsalaConflictDataProgram(2008).
Figure4.4showsabreakdownofnon-statearmedconflictsbyregion,fortheyears
2002-2006.Inadditiontocapturingtheoveralldeclineinnon-stateconflictnumbers,
thedataalsoindicatesthatSub-SaharanAfricaisthemajorcentreofnon-statearmed
conflictglobally,withmoreconflictsongoingineachofthelastfouryearsinthatregion
thanareongoingintherestoftheworldasawhole.EvenwithinSub-SaharanAfrica,
however,thenumberofnon-statearmedconflictsdeclinedby54percentbetween
2002and2006,helpingtodrivedownthetotalnumberofsuchconflictsgloballyfrom
36in2002to24in2006.

Figure4.4:Numberofnon-statearmedconflicts,2002-2006

40
35
Number of Conflicts

30
25 Middle East & North Africa
20 Europe
15 East & Southeast Asia & Oceania
10 Central & South Asia
5 Americas
0 Sub-Saharan Africa
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

Source:HumanSecurityReportProject2007

Thisdeclineinthenumberofnon-statearmedconflictsismatchedbyadeclineinthe
numberofreportedbattledeathsfromthiskindofconflict.Figure4.5showsa62per
centdeclineinbattledeathsinnon-statearmedconflictbetween2002and2006,and
alsohowlowthetotalnumberofbattledeathsinnon-statearmedconflictisoverall.
 51

Whilestate-basedconflictskilledanaverageof17,000peopleperyearbetween2002
and2006,thenumberofbattledeathsinnon-stateconflictsamountedtolessthana
quarterofthat,withtotalreporteddeathsgloballybeingunder4,000ineachofthe
yearsbetween2004and2005.

Figure4.5:Reportedbattledeathsfromnon-statearmedconflicts,2002-2006

8,000
7,000
Number of Deaths

6,000
5,000
Middle East & North Africa
4,000 Europe
3,000 East & Southeast Asia & Oceania
2,000 Central & South Asia
1,000 Americas
0 Sub-Saharan Africa
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year
Source:HumanSecurityReportProject2007

Theseapparentlypositivetrendsinrelationtobothstateandnon-stateconflictappearto
reflectanumberofotherunderlyingdevelopments.Thedrop-offinoverallconflict
numberssincetheearly1990sandtheincreaseinthenumbersanddurabilityof
negotiatedsettlements,isattributedbymanytotheendoftheColdWarandits
superpowerproxywarsaswellastoanupsurgeininternationalactivisminthefieldof
conflictresolution,stabilisationandpost-conflictreconstruction(HumanSecurityReport
Project2005).TheUNalonehasseenitstroopdeploymentsincreasebyover500percent
between2000and2005,andasof31December2006ithadatotalof80,368troops,
policeandmilitaryobserversinthefield(CenteronInternationalCooperation2007).
Positivethoughallofthesedevelopmentsmaybe,however,itisalsoimportanttosound
anoteofcaution.Evenassumingthatthedatapresentedaboveoffersanaccurate
accountofwhatisactuallygoingonintermsofconflictpatternsandbattledeaths(and
asnotedattheoutsetofthissection,therearemethodologicalquestionmarksin
relationtoallsuchdata),thisstilldoesnotcapturethefullpictureinrelationtoviolent
conflict.Whilethedataisvaluableandimportant,itshouldnotmaskthefactthatthe
costsandcasualtiesofconflictinvolvemorethanbattledeaths,northefactthat
pressurestowardsconflictarefarfromdecliningand,ifanything,areincreasinginmany
respects,asweshowlaterinthischapter.
Thetruecostsofconflict
Themeasuredoveralldeclineinstate-basedviolentconflictsisinlargepartduetothe
sharpdeclineinthenumberofsuchconflictsinSub-SaharanAfricafrom13in2000to
justsevenin2006(HumanSecurityReportProject2007).Thishasbroughttheglobal
numberdownbecausein2002,40percentoftheworldsstate-basedviolentconflicts
occurredinthisregion.Otherregions,however,havealessupbeatstorytotell.Someof
thedeclineinSub-SaharanAfricahasbeenoffsetbynetincreasesinthenumberof
state-basedviolentconflictsinbothCentralandSouthAsiaandintheMiddleEastand
NorthAfrica.CentralandSouthAsiawentfromsevensuchconflictsin2002to10in
2006whiletheMiddleEastandNorthAfricasawanincreasefromfourtoseven
conflictsoverthesameperiod.
Moreover,thenumbersofconflictsongoing,andthenumberofbattledeathsassociated
withthem(forbothstateandnon-statebasedviolence),donotcapturethewider
character,costsandimpactsofviolentconflict.
Onedimensionofthechangingcharacterofconflictrelatestocampaignsofone-sided
violence:theuseofarmedforcebythegovernmentofastateorbyaformally
organizedgroupagainstcivilianswhichresultsinatleast25deathsinayearUppsala
52 Shareddestinies| Competition,conflictandstatefailureintheinternationalsystem
9.Thisdefinitionexcludescivilians
killedinbombingraidsagainstmilitary
targets,orthosekilledincombat
crossfire,whicharecountedinthe
battledeathtollsdescribedearlierin
thissection.
ConflictDataProgram(2008).9 Between1989and2004thenumberofcampaignsof
one-sidedviolenceincreasedfrom19to38cases,in2004surpassingthetotalnumber
ofstate-basedarmedconflictsforthesameyear(HumanSecurityReportProject2007).
Althoughthedatafor2004to2006showadeclineincampaignsofone-sidedviolence,
at26thenumberofsuchcampaignsongoingin2006wasstillatoneofthehighest
levelsregisteredoverthelasttwodecades.Itisclear,onthisbasis,thatoverthisperiod
thetargetingofcivilianshasbecomeincreasinglyprevalent.(Thenumberofcasualties
fromsuchviolenceisverydifficulttoascertain,however,andwithoutdetailsonthe
perpetratorsthereisnowayofdistinguishingpoliticallymotivatedviolencefromcriminal
violence.SeeHumanSecurityReportProject2007.)
Theeffectsandimpactsofviolentconflictalsogowellbeyondthenumberofbattledeaths,
ofcourse.ArecentreportfromtheInternationalRescueCommittee(IRC)ontheDemocratic
RepublicofCongo,forexample,estimatesthat5.4millionexcessdeathshaveoccurredin
thatcountryasaresultofmorethanadecadeofarmedconflictsincethelate1990s.Most
ofthesedeathsarethoughttohavebeencausedbyinfectiousdiseaseandmalnutrition,
andbyneo-natalandpregnancy-relatedconditions.Thewidereffectsofviolencetherealso
includewidespreadsocialandeconomicdisruption,collapsinghealthsystems,lowfood
securityandpopulationdisplacement.Ofthe5.4milliondeaths,some2.1millionare
estimatedtohavediedsincetheformalendofthewarin2002.Childrenmadeup47per
centofthedead,despiterepresentingonly19percentofthetotalpopulation.Only0.4per
centofthedeathsinthemostrecentIRCsurveyperiodarethoughttohavebeenthedirect
consequenceofviolence(InternationalRescueCommittee2007).
WhilethescaleoftheseestimatedexcessdeathfiguresfortheDRCshowsthecrisisin
thecountrytobeoneofthedeadliestanywhereintheworldsincetheendofWorldWar
II,thewiderstorytheytellisnotspecifictothatcountry.Threeyearsafterthedecade-
longconflictinSierraLeone,forexample,astudyconcludedthattheaveragecrude
mortalityrateinfourruraldistrictssurveyedwasnearlyfourtimeshigherthantheSub-
Saharanbaseline.Similarfindingshavebeenmadeinrelationtoindirectconflicteffects
inAngola,LiberiaandsouthernSudan.Onewiderstudyof51countriesaffectedby
armedconflictalsoshowsastronglinkbetweenconflictandtheriskofdeathand
disabilityforyearsaftertheviolencehasended(seeMdecinsSansFrontires2006,
SapirandGomez2006,Becker etal 1993,Ghobarahetal 2004).
Afurthermajoreffectofconflictwithincountriesrelatestopopulationdisplacement.In
2007,theestimatednumberofpeopleinternallydisplacedasaresultofconflictand
violenceexceeded26millionforthefirsttimesincetheearly1990s(Internal
DisplacementMonitoringCentreandNorwegianRefugeeCouncil2008).Thisglobal
totalaffected52countriesaroundtheworld,thoughonlythree,Sudan(5.8million),
Colombia(4million),andIraq(2.5million)accountedforalmosthalfoftheglobaltotal.
Africawastheregionhardesthit,itselfaccountingfornearly50percentoftheglobal
total,withthehighfigureinSudanbeingaddedtobyheavyconcentrationsofdisplaced
peopleintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(1.4million),Uganda(1.3million),Somalia
(1million)andZimbabwe(570,000)(InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre2008).
OutsideAfrica,theregionwiththelargestrelativeincreaseintheIDPpopulationin2007
wastheMiddleEast,whereariseofalmost30percentoccurred,primarilyasaresultof
thesecuritysituationinIraq(InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre2008).
Thesenumbershighlighthumanvulnerabilityandsufferingonatragicscale.Internally
displacedpeopleoftenhavelimitedornoaccesstothebasicnecessitiesoflifesuchas
food,waterandshelter,andtheyoftenalsosufferappallingviolationsoftheirhuman
rightsthroughattacks,detentionsorarrestswithnoreferencetoanydueprocessoflaw.
Womenandgirlsamongtheinternallydisplacedpopulationareexposedtorapeand
exploitationwhilechildrenoftenloseanyeducationalopportunitiestheymayhavehad
andbecomeincreasinglyvulnerabletorecruitmenttoarmedgroups.Addedtothisisthe
heightenedriskthatinternallydisplacedpopulationsfacefrominfectiousdiseaseasaresult
oftheoftensqualidconditionsinmanyinternallydisplacedpersons(IDP)camps.Inthe
campsofDRCsNorthernKivuprovince,forexample,outbreaksofcholeraandother
water-bornediseasesareroutinelyrecordedandrapidlyspreadamonginhabitants(IRIN
2008).AndwithinfectiousdiseasespreadingsoquicklywithinIDPcamps,thereisthevery
 53

realriskthatitmayalsobetransmittedtothoseoutsidecampsasIDPsreturntotheir
homesorareforcedtomovetoothercampsinordertoavoidconflictandpersecution.
Theeconomicconsequencesofallthisarehuge.AWorldBankreportin2003notedthat:
Bytheendofthetypicalcivilwarincomesarearound15percentlowerthantheywould
otherwisehavebeen,implyingthatabout30percentmorepeoplearelivinginabsolute
poverty(Collieretal 2003).Furthermore,theeconomicimpactsofviolentconflictcontinue
wellafterthefightinghasended.Inmanycasestherearelong-termconsequencesinterms
ofincreasedexpenditureonarmsandpossibleregionalarmsraces,andalsoadamaging
patternofcapitalflight,allofwhichlimitpost-conflicteconomicgrowth.
Notsurprisingly,giventhescaleofdeathanddisruptionassociatedwithconflict,the
consequencesarerarelycontainedinonecountry.Alltoooftenthereareseriousspill-over
effectsbothregionallyandinrelationtospecificneighbouringcountries,asmercenary
groups,smallarmsandlightweapons,anddisplacedpeoplecrossborders,oftenwithviolent
orpoliticallydestabilisingresults.TheinterconnectedconflictsinWestAfricaoverthepast
decadeinLiberia,SierraLeone,Guinea,CotedIvoire,GuineaBissauandSenegalarea
primeexampleofhowinstabilityinonecountrycanaffectthestabilityofothers.Duringthe
warinSierraLeone,forexample,itiswelldocumentedthattheRevolutionaryUnitedFront
wasreceivingarmsfrombothCharlesTaylorsregimeinLiberiaandfromBurkinaFaso(Ero
andNdinga-Muvumba2005).Moreover,inunstableregions,rebelgroupsarepronetocross
nationalbordersinordertofindsafe-havensinneighbouringcountries,oftenleading
governmentforcestofollowsuit,thusspreadingconflictacrossborders(Chalmers2008).A
starkexampleofthishasbeeninsouthernSudan,whereUgandanGovernmenttroopshave
enteredthatterritoryinpursuitoftherebelLordsResistanceArmy.
Spill-overeffectsasaresultoflarge-scaledisplacementhavebeenparticularlyvisiblefrom
theconflictinIraq,withanestimated2.5millionIraqirefugeesdisplacedintoneighbouring
countries,themajoritytoJordanandSyria,withpotentiallyseriousconsequences(seeBox
4.1fornoteondisputesoverrefugeefigures).InJordan,thelarge-scaleinfluxofIraqishas
putadditionalstrainonthealreadyfragilepoliticalanddemographicmakeupofthe
countryandhasincreasedthepopulationpressureonvitalbutscarcenaturalresources
suchaswater.TheregimeinAmmanhasrespondednervously,tighteninginternalsecurity
andbordercontrolswhileexpressingfearsoverIraqiterrorismandconcernsthatShiite
refugeescouldbecomeaTrojanhorseforinfluencefromIran.Allthisoccursagainstthe
backdropofthestillscarringexperienceofinternalviolencein1970,followinglarge-scale
PalestinianrefugeeinflowslinkedtotheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict.
InSyria,theinflowofIraqishasimpacteddifferentlybutnonethelessseriously,withthe
maineffectbeingasignificantworseningofsocialtensions.Pressureonhousinghas
becomeacute,leadingtoinflationinhousingcostsandthepricingoutofmanyof

Box4.1.Measuringrefugeenumbers
Thereisamajordisputeoverthenumbersofrefugeespresentinthecountries
neighbouringIraqasaresultoftheconflictthere.Thisispartlybecausethetermrefugee
isbeingusedlooselyinthiscase.Technically,apersonqualifiesasarefugeeonlyif
determinedbytheUNHCRtohaveawellfoundedfearofpersecutionforreasonsofrace,
religion,nationality,membershipofaparticularsocialgroup,orpoliticalopinion.
(InternationalCrisisGroup2008:3)

Perhapsmoresignificantarethepracticalandpoliticalissuesassociatedwiththeaccurate
measurementofrefugeenumbers.InbothSyriaandJordantheauthoritieshavenothadthe
capacitytoaccuratelykeeptrackofthoseenteringandleavingthecountry.Therecanalsobe
politicalincentivestoinflatethenumbersinvolved(tosecureadditionalinternational
assistanceortousemanagementofalarge-scalerefugeeproblemasleverageinnegotiations
onotherissues)andincentivestominimisethenumbers(tomanageinternaltensionsthat
maygrowasaresultoftherefugeepresence).

Despitedisputesovertheexactnumbers,however,allconcernedagreethatrefugeeflowsout
ofIraqhavebeenhuge,withseriousconsequencesforthecountriesreceivingthem.
54 Shareddestinies| Competition,conflictandstatefailureintheinternationalsystem

Syriasurbanpoorfromthehousingmarket.Furthermore,competitioninthelabour
markethasincreased,justasthegovernmenthasbeenforcedtoscalebackincreasingly
costlysubsidiesdesignedtoeasepressureonthepoor.
Beyondtheproblemsassociatedwithlarge-scalerefugeeflowsandtheireffects,spill-over
alsooccursintheformofeconomicdisruptiontothosecountriesadjacenttoconflict
zones.Notonlyaregrowthratesreduced,butneighbouringcountriesoftenincreasetheir
militaryexpenditureinanattempttomanageperceivedincreasesininsecurity.
Giventhisrangeofconsequencesitisallthemoreconcerningthatin2006therewere
around29countriesexperiencingconflicts(UCDP/PRIO2007),affectingover2.5billion
people(UnitedNationsStatisticsDivision2008)directlyorindirectly,andpotentially
affectingupwardsof50neighbouringstates.

Weak,failedandcollapsedstates
Thesecurrentpatternsofconflictarevisiblewithinthecontextofanalreadyveryserious
andvisibleproblemofstateweaknessandfailureintheinternationalsystem.
First,abriefdefinitionoftheterms.Inusingthelabelsofweak,failedandcollapsed
stateshere,wearedrawingexplicitlyontheframeworksetoutbyRobertRotberg(see
Rotberg2004:1-49).Thisframeworkassumesthemainfunctionalroleofstatestobethe
provisionofarangeofpublicorpoliticalgoodsandservicestothecitizensinhabiting
theirterritories.Suchgoodsandservicesmightincludetheprovisionofsecurity,
opportunitiesforcitizenstoparticipateinthepoliticalprocess,medicalservices,transport
infrastructureandsoon.Strongstatesperformwellinjustabouteveryarea.Weakstates
performwellinsomeareasbutbadlyinothers.Failedstatesperformbadlyinjustabout
allareasandaremoreoftenthannotcharacterisedbyhighlevelsofinternalviolence.
Collapsedstates,extremeformsoffailedstate,areplacesinwhichtherehasbeena
completecollapseofformalauthorityandinwhichsub-stateactorsfightforcontrol.
Overthelast95years,wehavemovedfromaworldof55statestooneofover200,
throughprocessessuchasthedecolonisationofAfricaandthecollapseandbreak-upof
theSovietUnion.Thelegacyofthishistoricalprocesshasbeenagroupofstateswith
vastlydifferingcapacities.Indeed,itisimportanttorememberthatdespiteformal
equalityforallstatesintermsoflegalsovereignty,thereishugeinequalityamongthe
communityofstatesintermsoftheiravailableresources.
Therealitytodayisthatmanystatesareweakinthesensethattheyarebroadlyina
stateofcrisis,onlyabletoprovidesomeofthefullrangeofgoodsandservicesthat
citizensmightexpectofthem.Thismaybedowntogeographicalorphysicalconstraints,
oritmaybedowntofundamentaleconomicweakness.Itmayalsobedownto
temporaryfactorssuchasinternalpoliticaltensionanddivision,poorleadership,orasa
resultofexternalattack.Overthelast12months,significantadditionalstrainshave
beenplacedonweakstatesbyrisingfoodandfuelprices,whichinseveralinstances
haveprovokedmajorpublicdisturbancesandcivilunrest.
IntheFailedStatesIndex2008,whichexamines177states,only50statesare
consideredstableand127unstabletoonedegreeoranother(FundForPeaceand
ForeignPolicy2008).Inaddition,afurthergroupofstatescanalsobesaidtohave
alreadygonebeyondweaknessintovaryingdegreesoffailureandcollapse.Insomeof
thesestates(themostextreme,forexample,suchasSomalia),therehasbeenatotal
breakdownofformalauthorityandwarringfactionsarevyingforcontrol.Inothers,
centralgovernmentisonlyabletocontrolsome,notallofitsterritory,itspowerperhaps
beinglimitedtocontrolofacapitalcityanditssurroundingarea,ortoazoneofterritory
thatisethnicallylinkedtothoseinpower.Highlevelsofviolencearenoticeableinjust
aboutallofthesecases,fewofthemaredeliveringeffectivepublicgoodstocitizens,
andacorruptbureaucracyismoreoftenthannotinevidence.Alistofthe20statesthat
canbesaidtofallintothiscategoryispresentedinTable4.1below.
Althoughthereisnostraightcausallinkbetweenstatefailureandconflict,thereissome
correlationbetweenthetwo,andmanyfailedandfailingstates,alongwiththeir
neighbours,areaffectedbythedevastatinganddisruptiveeffectsofconflictalready
 55

describedinthischapterwhilestateweaknessandfailureinturnarecontributingfactors
toconflict.Ofthetop20statesintheFailedStatesIndex2008,allarecurrently
experiencingviolentconflictorpoliticalviolenceontheirterritory.

Table4.1:ToptwentystatesintheFailedStatesIndex,2008

Rank Country Rank Country

1 Somalia 11 Guinea

2 Sudan 12 Bangladesh

3 Zimbabwe 13 Burma

4 Chad 14 Haiti

5 Iraq 15 NorthKorea

6 D.R.Congo 16 Ethiopia

7 Afghanistan 16 Uganda

8 CotedIvoire 18 Lebanon
10.Relatedreferences:
1. See:Collieretal 2003,Collieretal
9 Pakistan 19 Nigeria 2002
2. See:Ostby2008,Chalmers2008,
10 CentralAfricanRepublic 20 SriLanka Kanbur2007,Stewart2003,Collier
etal 2003
Source:ForeignPolicyandFundforPeace2008 3.See:Ostby2008,Chalmers2008,
Kanbur2007,Stewart2003
4.See:CabinetOffice2005b,
DepartmentforInternational
Development2005,Vallingsand
Multiplestresspointsandswingstates Moreno-Torres2005(onthelinks
Clearly,thereisnosinglecauseofconflictorstatefailurebutthepolicyliteratureon betweenweakstatesandarmed
bothisfairlyclearinrelationtotheimportant(andoftenoverlapping)riskfactors conflict/statefailure);Andvig2007
(onthelinksbetweencorruption
associatedwitheach.Theseriskfactorsreflect,amongotherthings,manyofthe andarmedconflict)
underlyingandlong-termtrendsrelatedtotheinternationallandscapedescribedinthe 5. See:Matthew2008,Diamond2004,
Klare2001,Homer-Dixon1999,
lastchapter.Poverty,growinginequalitywithinstates,increasingpressureandimpacts WencheandEllingsen1998.Forthe
fromclimatechange,andelementsofdemographicchangeallfeaturestrongly. effectsofclimatechangeon
resourcescarcitysee:German
Below,wepresentalistofwhatappeartobethemainconflictandstatefailurerisk AdvisoryCouncilonGlobalChange
2008,InternationalAlert2007,
factors,astheseapplyatthestatelevel(withreferencestosomeofthesupporting BarnettandAdger2007,CNA
literaturerelatedtoeachprovidedinthefootnote10): Corporation2007.Forwater
scarcitysee:WolfandPriscoli2006,
1. Ahistoryofrecentconflictinthelocationconcerned Bitar2005.
6. See:UnitedNationsSecretary
2. Highlevelsofunderdevelopmentandpoverty General2008,IRIN2006,Small
ArmsSurvey2005,UNDP2005
7. See:Urdal2006,Cincottaand
3. Highlevelsofinequalitywithinthestateparticularlyhorizontalinequality,i.e. Leahy2006,Cincottaetal2003
inequalitiesthatmapcloselytoethnicorothergroupidentitieswithinthestate 8. See:Kolmannskog2008,Gleditsch
etal2007
4. Poorgovernance,manifestedincorruption,crime,anincapacitytomanageconflict 9. See:ElbadawiandHegre2008,
DubeandVargas2008
peacefully,ariseoffactionalisedelites,lossofconfidenceinthelegitimacyofthe 10.See:ThomsandRon2007
state,and/orinstitutionalisedpoliticalexclusion 11. See:Evans2008,JohnsonK2008,
ODI2008(onfoodinsecurityand
5. Resourcescarcity recentfoodpriceinflation);German
AdvisoryCouncilonGlobalChange
6. Easyaccesstosmallarmsandlightweapons 2008,Cohen2007,Messerand
Cohen2006,Messeretal 2001(on
7. Thepresenceofayouthbulgeinthepopulation foodscarcityanditsrelationshipto
armedconflictandstatefragility)
12. See:GermanAdvisoryCouncilon
8. Largeorsuddenmovementsofpopulation GlobalChange2008,International
Alert2007,CNACorporation2007,
9. Asuddenand/orsevereeconomicdownturn HendrixandGlaser2007,Nords
andGleditsch2007,Barnettand
10. Widespreadviolationsofhumanrights Adger2007(onlinksbetween
climatechangeandinsecurity).
11. Highlevelsoffoodinsecurity NorwegianRefugeeCouncil2008
(onlinksbetweenclimatechange
12. Highlevelofvulnerabilitytotheeffectsofclimatechange andforcedpopulationmovements).
56 Shareddestinies| Competition,conflictandstatefailureintheinternationalsystem

Themoreastatehasthesecharacteristics,themorelikelyitistobeatriskofarmed
conflict,statefragilityorstatefailureandcollapse.Moreover,asnotedinthelast
chapter,manyofthetrendsrelatedtotheseriskfactorsareworsening.Therearealso
signsthatriskfactorsfeedoffeachotherandthatmultiplerisksmaybeconvergingin
particularlocations.
Tocapturethis,wehaveanalysedriskfactorconvergenceinparticularstates.Oppositewe
presentamapandaccompanyinglistofthestateswhereweconsiderthistobehappening
mostacutely.Themapandlisthavebeencompiledfollowingananalysisofdatarelatedto
the14indicatorslistedinBox4.2.

Box4.2.Conflictandstatefailureriskindicators
Thefollowingindicatorsmapcloselytotheriskfactorsidentifiedabove.Somearedrawn,whereappropriate,fromotheralready
existingindicessuchastheFailedStatesIndex(FSI)ortheGlobalPeaceIndex(GPI);othersarebasedonUNdataorotherpublicly
availableconflictdatasets,andsomedrawonspecialistpoliticalandenvironmentalriskconsultancydataseenotesinbracketsnext
toeachitem.(Thefulllistofsourcesusedisprovidedbelowtheindicators.)

Economicindicators
ThelevelofHumanDevelopment,asdefinedbytheUNDPHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)
Theexistenceandextentofuneveneconomicdevelopmentalonggrouplines,includinghighlevelsofunemploymentincertain
groups(FSI)

Evidenceofarecentsharporsevereeconomicdecline(FSI)
Theleveloffoodsecurity,asdefinedbyMaplecroftsFoodSecurityIndex
Socialindicators
Evidenceofayouthbulge,asdefinedbythepercentageofthepopulationundertheageof24(UnitedNationsPopulation
Division)

Currentorprojectedlargemovementofrefugeesorinternallydisplacedpersons(FSI)
Politicalindicators
Poorgovernance,measuredascriminalisationorde-legitimisationofthestate(FSI)
Potentialforterroristacts(GPI)
Widespreadviolationofhumanrights(FSI)
Riseoffactionalisedelites(FSI)
Military/conflictindicators
Interventionofotherstateorexternalactor(FSI)
Thepresenceofarmedconflictonacountrysownterritorybetween2001and2006(UCDP/PRIOdataset)
Easeofaccesstosmallarmsandlightweapons(GPI)
Environmentalindicators
Climatechangevulnerability,asdefinedbyMaplecroftsClimateChangeVulnerabilityIndex

Sources:
ForFailedStatesIndex(FSI)seeFundforPeaceandForeignPolicy2008
ForGlobalPeaceIndex(GPI)seeInstituteforEconomicsandPeace2008
ForUppsalaConflictDataProgram(UCDP)/PeaceResearchInstituteOslo(PRIO)ArmedConflictdatasetseeUCDP/PRIO2007
For2007/2008HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)rankingsseeUNDP2007
ForMaplecroft,aprivatepoliticalandenvironmentalriskconsultancy,seewww.maplecroft.com
FortheUnitedNationsPopulationDivisionseeUnitedNations2007
Acknowledgement:WeareparticularlygratefultoMaplecroftforallowingustouseitsindicesanddatasetsonstatelevelfoodinsecurityandstate
levelvulnerabilitytotheeffectsofclimatechange.
Map4.1:Statesunderacutepressureinrelationtoconflictandstatefailure

Uzbekistan
eachindicatorcanbefoundinthetableinAppendix2.

Iraq Afghanistan

Pakistan
Burkina Faso
Haiti
Burma
Chad Sudan Yemen
Guinea Bissau
Nigeria Somalia
CAR Ethiopia Sri Lanka
Guinea
Liberia Uganda
DRC Kenya
Cote d'Ivoire Congo-Brazzaville
Burundi
pressureinrelationtoconflictandstatefailure.ThesestatesarepresentedinMap4.1.

Angola Malawi
eachofwhichhasbeenweightedequally.Anoteonwhatconstituteshighinrelationto

Onthebasisofthisanalysis,webelieve27statesarenowundermultiplesourcesofacute
Tobeincludedinourmapandlistofstatesunderthemostacutepressure,astatemustbe
categorisedasbeingathighriskinrelationtoeightormoreofthe14indicatorsinthebox,

Zimbabwe

Inalphabeticalorder,thestateshighlightedare:Afghanistan,Angola,BurkinaFaso,Burma,Burundi,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,Congo(Brazzaville),CotedIvoire,D.R.Congo,Ethiopia,Guinea,GuineaBissau,
Haiti,Iraq,Kenya,Liberia,Malawi,Nigeria,Pakistan,Somalia,SriLanka,Sudan,Uganda,Uzbekistan,Yemen,Zimbabwe
57
58 Shareddestinies| Competition,conflictandstatefailureintheinternationalsystem

InadditiontoparticularpressurepointssuchasthoseinHaiti,Burma,SriLankaand
Zimbabwe,themapshowsahugeconcentrationofpressuresinSub-SaharanAfricaand
whatmightbecalledanarcofinstabilitystretchingfromthecoastofWestAfrica,right
acrosstotheeastcoastofthecontinentandupthroughthePersianGulfregionand
intocentralAsia.BothIraqandAfghanistanwheretheUKhasitslargestmilitary
commitmentsfeatureonthelist,asdoesnuclear-armedPakistanandincreasingly
importantenergy-producingstatessuchasNigeriaandSudan.Thetotalpopulationof
thesestatesclassifiedashighriskisapproximately880million(UN2007),meaningthat
ahugenumberofpeoplearelivingdirectlyunderconditionswheretheseriskfactors
converge.
Wedonotclaimpredictivepowersforthisanalysis.Predictingindividualinstancesof
conflictorstatefailureisextremelydifficult,preciselybecausealargenumberoffactors
canbeinvolved,indifferentmixandmeasureinindividualcases.Thatsaid,thiskindof
analysiscanstillhaveutilitytopolicymakersseekingtomakejudgementsaboutactions
andthedeploymentofresourcesinaturbulentandfastchangingworldandinmany
waysthestateswehaveidentifiedcanbeseenasswingstatesinthestrugglefor
internationalpeaceandstabilityoverthenextfivetotenyears.
Ifthesestatescanbeliftedoutofconflictorkeptfromfallingintoit,andassistedto
re-formorstrengthenstateinstitutionscapableofdeliveringarangeofpublicgoods,
thiscouldbeanimmensecontributiontointernationalpeace,stabilityandprosperity
morewidely.If,ontheotherhand,theycannotachievethisstatusandareallowedto
deterioratefurther,theyarelikelytobecomeincreasinglyvulnerabletoinstability,
conflictandstatefailurewherethishasnotalreadyoccurred,andtobecomethefocus
forawiderangeofforcedpolicyinterventionsaimedatcontainingtheensuing
disruptionandviolence.Theycouldalsobecome,ascouldsomeotherfailedorfailing
states,thesourcesofsignificantdirectthreattotheUK.Thepointofpresentingthe
analysishereisthereforenotonlytopointtothestatesunderthemostacutepressure
butalsotoshowthesheerscaleandseriousnessoftheproblem.

Inter-statecompetitionandpossibleconflict
Aswellastheriskposedbyfragileandfailingstatesandthepotentialforincreased
conflictwithinstates,wemustalsoaddtothispictureapossiblereturntoincreased
competitionandconflictbetweenstatesintheyearsahead,includingamongthemajor
powersatgloballevel.Hereweaddressthefollowingissuesastheyrelatetoapossible
returntointerstatecompetition:
Balanceofpowerpolitics
Competitionovernaturalresources
Competitioninouterspace
Protectionism
Nuclearproliferation
Balanceofpowerpolitics
TheriseofChinaandIndia,there-emergenceofRussia,exemplifiedbythissummers
Caucasusconflict,andtheroleoftheEUallhavefundamentalandlong-term
implicationsforthestructureandshapeoftheinternationalsystem.Whilethereis
nothinginevitableaboutareturntoasystemofgreatpowerrivalries,theviewthatthis
isbecomingmorelikelyisgainingmomentumincertaincircles.Someconservative
analystsintheUnitedStatesnowcharacterisetheinternationalsystemasonedominated
byareturntogreatpowernationalisminaworldofonesuperpower,manygreat
powers(Kagan2008).ThereisalsoevidencethattheBushadministrationhasbeen
influencedinsomeimportantrespectsbytheseincreasedperceptionsofareturnto
balanceofpowerpolitics.Perhapstheclearestsignofthiswastherecentand
controversialnucleardealbetweentheBushadministrationandtheIndiangovernment.
ThisdealeffectivelycondonedIndiandevelopmentanduseofarangeofnuclear
technologiesoutsideofafullinternationalinspectionregimeandwasrightlycriticisedby
 59

manyforpotentiallydealingaseriousblowtothenuclearnon-proliferationregime.It
hasbeenjustifiedbyitssupporters,however,asadealdesignedtodrawIndiacloserto
theWest,helpingtobalancetheriseofChinesepowerintheprocess.
Competitionovernaturalresources
Anothersourceofpossibletensionmaycomeintheformofcompetitionovernatural
resources.Whilethiswouldnotbeanewphenomenon,someofthetrendsoutlinedin
thelastchaptermaynowbringitbacktotheforewithavengeance.Thereisachance,
forexample,thatinternationalstrugglesforenergyresourceswillincreasewiththeUS,
theEU,RussiaandChinaallvyingforinfluenceinanumberofstrategicallyimportant
regionssuchastheCaucasusandCentralAsia.TheArcticisalsobecomingmore
contestedastheicecapsrecede,allowingeasieraccesstoresourcesinthearea.
Africaisalsobecomingasiteofincreasingcompetitionwithitsoilandgasreservesand
itsvastrangeofpreciousmetals.Chinaalreadyreceivesabout33percentofitsoil
importsfromAfricaaswellassignificantamountsofcopper,timberanddiamonds
(Hanson2008).Inlate2007,theCongolesegovernmentannouncedthatChinesestate-
ownedbusinesseswouldinvestUS$12billioninrefurbishingrailways,minesandroads
throughoutthecountryinreturnfortherighttominecopperoreofanequivalentvalue
(TheEconomist2008d).Thissumisapproximatelytentimestheamountpromisedto
theDRCeachyearbytheconsultativegroupofWesterndonors(WorldBank2007b)
(thisgroupincludesbilateraldonorssuchastheUSandUKandmultilateraldonors
includingtheEU,UNandWorldBank).Inoil-richAngola,too,Chineseinvestmentis
outstrippingthatofmoretraditionalaiddonorsasChinesedevelopmentaidis
exchangedforaccesstooil.Thisaidforresourcespolicyhasruffledthefeathersof
Westernpowers,notonlybecauseChinaisviewedasapotentialheavy-weight
competitorintheregion,butalsobecauseitsno-strings-attachedaidpoliciesareguided
byshort-termeconomicandtradeconsiderations,oftenattheexpenseoflonger-term
politicaldevelopment(TheEconomist2008c).Therearesigns,asaresult,thattheUSis
beginningtore-organiseandre-focusitsAfricapolicywithaviewtoaddressinggrowing
Chineseinfluence.
Competitioninouterspace
Elsewhere,theactivitiesofthemajorpowersinouterspacemayaddfurthertension.The
USistheunambiguousleaderintermsofinternationalactivityinspace,operatinghalf
ofthemilitarysatellitesinorbitandaccountingforaround90percentofworldwide
R&Dexpenditureonmilitaryspace(IISS2008).AtmorethanUS$22billionayear,the
spacebudgetoftheUSDepartmentofDefensefarexceedsthatofotherwould-be
spacepowers,includingRussia,wherespendinghasfallenfromColdWarlevelstojust
US$170millionannually(ParliamentaryOfficeofScienceandTechnology2006).
However,Chinaisbecomingmoreactiveinouterspace.In2003itbecamethethird
countrytoputanastronautintoorbit,andinSeptember2008thefirstChinese
spacewalkwasconductedsuccessfully.
Moreworryinglyfromaninternationalsecurityperspective,inJanuary2007China
launchedananti-satellite(ASAT)missilefromamobilelauncher,destroyinganold
Chineseweathersatelliteandaddingafurtherfieldofdebristothedetritus-strewn
orbitalspacearoundtheEarth.Althoughofficialsclaimedthatthistestwasnotaimedat
anycountryinparticular,ithasbeenwidelyinterpretedasadirectchallengetoAmerican
superiorityinspaceandasignalthatChinaseekstodevelopspacecapabilitiestohelp
preventandresistUSmilitaryinterventionoverTaiwan(TheEconomist2008b).
Meanwhile,theIndianSpaceResearchOrganisationhasseencommercialsuccessandin
October2008launchedtheunmannedChandrayaan1spacecrafttoperformthe
countrysfirstlunarmission.
Developmentslikethesearetakingplaceinthecontextofamajorgapinthe
internationalarmscontrolarchitectureasitrelatestoouterspace.Theuseofspaceis
currentlygovernedbythe1967OuterSpaceTreaty,auniversallyacceptedandbinding
UNconventionwhichbansthedeploymentofweaponsofmassdestructionbutwhich
otherwiseplacesnorestrictionsonmilitaryuse(IISS2008)(thetreatysfullnameisthe
TreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseof
60 Shareddestinies| Competition,conflictandstatefailureintheinternationalsystem
11.Theexceptiontothisbeingthat
Israelwasallowedcovertlytodevelopa
nuclearweaponscapability.
OuterSpace,includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies).Itsclausestipulatingthat
theMoonandothercelestialbodiesmustbeusedexclusivelyforpeacefulpurposeshas
beenwidelyinterpretedaspermittingtheuseofspacefordefenceandintelligence-
gatheringactivities,invalidatingthefrequentlyrepeatedassertionthatspaceisorshould
beamilitary-freezone.
Inaworldsoreliantonsatellitecommunicationsforaverywiderangeofbothciviland
militarypurposes,theseissuesarenotasperipheralastheymayoncehavebeen.The
deliberatetargetingofsatellitesinparticularwouldhavethepotentialtocausemajor
damageanddisruptiontosocietiesandpopulationsworldwideandastheInternational
InstituteforStrategicStudiesnotedinarecentreport,thereisreasontobeconcerned
aboutthreatstohumansecurityandsocialstabilityifprotectionagainstdisruptionof
satellitesystemsthatunderpinmanypublicservicesisnotpursuedasanissueofwide
internationalconcern(IISS2008:81).
Protectionism
Whilenoonewouldarguethatthesortsofissuesdescribedabovearelikelyaloneto
causemajorpowerconflict,thesearenonethelesssignsthatconflictpressuresand
pointsoffrictionremainandmaybegrowingintheinter-statesystem.Itispossible,too,
particularlyalongsidetheglobalfinancialcrisisandthecollapseoftheWorldTrade
OrganisationsDohatraderoundinJuly2008,thatthesepointsoffrictionwillmultiply
asaresultofgrowingpressurestowardprotectionism.Thispressureisevidentinmany
regionsoftheworld.
AlthoughtheDoharoundsspecificintentionhadbeentoconsolidatefreertradeinfarm
goods,whichwouldhavesignificantlybenefitedpoorercountriesbyopeningup
markets,thetalkswereultimatelyderailedbecauseofIndianandChineseinsistenceon
maintainingtherighttoimposesafeguardtariffsinordertoprotecttheirownfarmsin
theeventofsuddenimportsurges(TheEconomist2008e).Thereispressureinthe
UnitedStates,too,bothforknee-jerktraderestrictionsonimportsofgoodsfromChina
andforthepossiblerenegotiationoftheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)
toprotectAmericanjobs.
InEurope,evenagainstthebackdropofrestrictivetradepoliciesthathavebeen
enshrinedintheEUsCommonAgriculturalPolicy(CAP)formanyyears,therehasbeen
afreshsurgeofprotectionistrhetoricandtheEuropeanpublicisclearlyfearfulofthe
effectsofanincreasinglyglobalisedworldeconomy.A2007FinancialTimes/HarrisPoll,
forexample,foundthatofthetotalnumberofpeoplepolled,majoritiesinBritain(53
percent),France(53percent),Spain(54percent)andItaly(55percent)believedthat
globalisationwashavinganegativeeffectontheircountries(HarrisInteractive2007).
Thisallhastobeamajorconcernnotonlybecauseitcouldexacerbatetendencies
towardsinterstatecompetitionbutalsobecauseoverall,tradehasprovedtobeoneof
themosteffectiveleversforgreaterequalityandpovertyreduction.
Nuclearproliferation
Thereisoneotherchallengethatisamajorcauseofconcerninrelationtointerstate
competitionandconflict:nuclearproliferation.Althoughthenuclearnon-proliferation
regimeremainedrelativelystableuntilthelate1990s,withthefivedeclarednuclear
powerstheUS,Britain,Russia,ChinaandFrancelargelymaintainingamonopoly
overnuclearweaponscapabilitiesuptothatpoint,11 thelastdecadehaswitnesseda
disturbingtrendtowardswiderstateproliferation.IndiaandPakistaneachconducteda
seriesofnuclearweaponstestsin1998,bringingthetotalofacknowledgednuclear
weaponsstatestoseven,anddemonstratingthepotentialforexistingregionaltensions
tounderpinnewnucleararmsraces.
In2006NorthKoreaconductedalow-yieldnucleartest,becominganewmemberofthe
nuclearweaponsclubintheprocess.Itdidthisfollowingitsdecisiontoresumethe
reprocessingofplutoniumin2002atafacilitythathadbeenunderInternationalAtomic
EnergyAgency(IAEA)inspectionsince1994and,despitehavingnowsuspended
reprocessingactivityatitsYongbyonnuclearreactoroncemore,isthoughttohave
developedenoughnuclearfueltoconstructtwonuclearbombsperyear(Niksch2008).It
also,inrecentmonths,hasbeenthreateningtore-opentheYongbyonfacilityonceagain.
 61

Iranisalsoofgreatconcern.Thereisreasontobelievethatitsgovernmentispursuinga
nuclearweaponsprogramme,eventhoughitmaintainsthatitseffortsarepurely
intendedtoproducepeacefulnuclearenergy.Westernintelligenceagenciesand
independentanalystsbelievethatonitscurrentcourse,Iranisfromtwototenyears
awayfromobtaininganuclearweapon.Thesedevelopmentshavespurredatleast
another11countriestohedgeagainstanIranianbombandtoseekassistancefromthe
InternationalAtomicEnergyAgencytodeveloptheirownnuclearenergyprogrammes.
Egypt,TurkeyandSaudiArabia,allSunniMuslimcountriesfearfulthatmasteryof
nucleartechnologybyShiaIrancouldentrenchtheIslamicRepublicasaregional
hegemonicpower,areleadingthisnewwaveofnucleardevelopment.Turkeyhas
pledgedtobuildthreenewreactors,Egyptfour,andSaudiArabiahaspushedthefive
othermembersoftheGulfCooperationCounciltopursuenucleartechnology(Cirincione
andLeventner2007).Ifcurrenttrendsarenotreversed,by2015theperpetuallyvolatile
MiddleEastcouldhavetwonuclear-weaponsstates(IsraelandIran)andadozenother
countrieswithscoresofnuclearreactorsrequiringlargeamountsofnuclearfuel.These
areprofoundshiftsaffectingthestabilityofanalreadytroubledregion.
AddedtothisisthecontinuedfailuretobringtheComprehensiveTestBanTreatyinto
force,theworseningofrelationsbetweentheworldstwomainnuclearpowers,the
UnitedStatesandRussia,unilateralUSwithdrawalin2002fromtheAnti-BallisticMissile
Treaty(ABMT)afterthreedecadesasasignatory,andafailed2005ReviewConference
oftheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty.Themainfeatureofthelatter,inthewordsof
theconferencepresident,wastheprogressivedriftingapartofthenuclearandnon-
nuclearweaponsstatespartytotheTreaty.Some,particularlyintheUnitedStates,have
alsobegunexpressingmuchmoreseriousinterestinsmallerandmoreusablenuclear
weapons,so-calledbunker-busters,designedtopenetrateanddestroyfacilitiesdeep
underground.Intothismixmustalsonowbethrownthepotentialproliferation
consequencesofarenaissanceintheglobalnuclearindustryinresponsetoclimate
changeand,ashighlightedbytheA.Q.Khanscandal,concernsoverongoingtradein
nuclearblackmarkets(Barnabyforthcoming).
Incombination,thisrangeoffactorsanddevelopmentshascreatedthemostserious
nuclearproliferationenvironmentfordecades,andsincetheworldhasalreadyseen
atomicweaponsusedinwar,andtodaysweaponsarefarmorepowerfulthanthose
responsibleforthedeathofmorethan150,000peopleinJapanin1945,thishastobe
oneofthemostpressingissuesontheinternationalsecurityagendatoday.

SummaryofChapter4
Itisemphaticallyclearfromthematerialpresentedinthischapterthatthereisnoroom Thereisnoroom
forcomplacencyoverconflictbetweenstates,oroverconflictwithinandacrossthem, forcomplacency
despitesomerecentprogress.Notonlyarethelong-termtrendsdescribedinChapter3
increasingconflictpressureinavarietyofways,butthisconflictpressureandtherisk overconflict
factorsassociatedwithitarealsoconverginginanumberofstateswithpotentiallyvery betweenstates,or
seriousanddestabilisingconsequencesfortheviabilityofthosestatesthemselvesand overconflictwithin
fortheentireregionsinwhichtheysit.
andacrossthem,
Moretraditionalinter-statecompetitionandconflictconcernsarealsore-emerging,not
leastonthecrucialissuesofnuclearproliferationandcompetitionovernaturalresources,
despitesomerecent
andthisisoccurringagainstabackgroundofrapidlyworseningandpotentiallymuch progress
moredivisiveinternationaleconomicconditions.Itmustbeexpected,infact,thatthe
globalfinancialcrisiswillexacerbatesomeoftheproblemswehavedescribedinthis
chapter(notleastthosecausedbypovertyanddeprivation),particularlyifwealthier
statesturninward,reducetheirdevelopmentassistanceandweakenfurtherthemany
statesintheinternationalsystemthatarealreadyweakandsufferingconvergingconflict
andstatefailureriskpressures.Stormclouds,inotherwords,aregathering,creating
profoundanddirectchallengestoUKandwiderinternationalsecurity,andforcingUK
policymakerstogowellbeyondcurrentpreoccupationswithIraqandAfghanistan,
importantthoughtheseare.
62 Shareddestinies| Transnationalthreatsandrisks
12.Eventhesenumbershavefallenin
morerecenttimes,followingthedeath
ofAlQaedainIraqleaderAbuMusab
al-ZarqawiinJune2006andtheUS
troopsurgein2007(IraqBodyCount
2008).Thispromptedtheassertionin
May2008byGeneralMichaelHayden,
CIADirector,ofnearstrategicdefeatof
AlQaedainIraq(Warrick2008).
Nonetheless,whilethepredicamentin
Iraqmaybeimproving,theaverage
dailyciviliandeathtollinthecountry
throughout2007was,at66,stillhigher
eachandeverydaythanthenumber
killedbytheLondonbomberson7July
2005(IraqBodyCount2008).
5.Transnationalthreats
andrisks
HavingoutlinedinChapter3long-termtrendssuchasthoserelatedtodemographic
change,scientificandtechnologicalchange,increasinginequality,andglobalisation,and
havinganalysedinChapter4existingandgrowingpressurestowardsfurtherinter-state
competitionandtheproblemsofconflictandweakandfailedstates,wenowturnto
examiningtherangeoftransnationalthreatsandrisksthatemergeoutoforare
facilitatedbythecombinationofallofthesefactors.
Stateweaknessandfailure,scientificandtechnologicalchangeandtheeffectsof
globalisation,forexample,havecometogethertoincreasetheimportanceandto
changethescaleofthethreatwefacefromterrorismandtransnationalorganisedcrime.
Demographicchange,intheformofanincreasingglobalpopulation,itsincreasing
urbanisation,andpeoplemovementonanunprecedentedscaleintheeraof
globalisationarecombiningtocreatenewhumanvulnerabilitiestoglobaldisease
pandemics.Eachofthese,thoughlesstraditionally(beyondtheissueofterrorism)part
ofthenationalsecuritypolicyterrain,mustnowbetreatedassuch.
Consequently,inthischapterwefirstreviewthenatureoftheterroristthreat,focusing
principallyonAlQaedaandontheincreasedthreatofchemical,biological,radiological
ornuclear(CBRN)terrorism.Second,weanalysethechangingroleoftransnational
organisedcrime,andbrieflytouchuponthewaysinwhichitoverlapswithterrorism.
Third,weoutlinethenatureoftheincreasedriskfromglobaldiseasepandemics,and
someofthefactorsunderpinninganddrivingit.Weconcludebydrawingoutwider
implicationsfromthisrangeoftransnationalrisksandthreats.
Terrorism
Box5.1:Definitionofterrorism
Thereisnowbroadinternationalagreementonthefundamentalsofadefinitionofterrorism.
TheUK,EUandUN,whiledifferingslightlyonspecificssuchasunrealisedthreats,
motivation,interferencewithordisruptionofelectronicsystems,andthecivilianornon-
combatantstatusofvictims,alldefineasterrorismanyactioninvolvingseriousviolence
againstaperson,personsorpropertywiththeintentionofintimidatingapopulation(or
subsectionthereof)orinfluencingorcompellingagovernment(orinternationalorganisation)
todoorabstainfromdoinganyact(UnitedKingdomParliament2000and2006,European
Council2002,UnitedNations2004).Thislimitedconsensusissufficienttoenablemeaningful
internationaldebateaboutathreatthatistrulyglobalinitsorigins,reachandambitions.
Onthefaceofit,thescaleoftheterroristthreatisincreasing.Dataonglobalterrorist
incidentsduringtheperiod1998-2006,absentthesignificantoutliersofthe7August
1998car-bombingsofAmericanembassiesinTanzaniaandKenyaandthe11September
2001aeroplaneattacksontheUS,displaysatrendofmarkedincreaseintheworldwide
numberofattacks,fatalities,andfatalitiesperattack,asshowninTable5.1.
Theincreaseinfatalitieshasbeenexacerbatedbythemorewidespreadadoptionof
suicideasatacticbyterroristsaroundtheworld,enhancingtargetingprecisionand
explosiveproximitytomagnifykillingpower(Table5.2).
However,thesefigurestellonlypartofthestory.Furtheranalysisoftheavailabledata
forthesameperioddemonstratesthatciviliandeathsinsomeregions,includingthe
West,duetoterrorismhaveinfactdroppedinrecentyears.Theglobalriseindeaths
appearstobeduetonow-routinesuicidebombingsintheMiddleEast,andinparticular
inIraqsincetheUSinvasionof2003,whichhaveincreasedpredominantlyMuslim
casualtiesthere(LaGuardia2008).12 Indeed,theglobaldataonterrorismheldbythree
 63

Table5.1:Globalterroristincidents Table5.2:Suicideterroristattacks

Year Attacks Fatalities Fatalitiesperattack Year Attacks Fatalities Fatalitiesperattack

1998 1286 2172 1.69 1981-97 50 853 17.06

1999 1171 864 0.73 1998 9 299 33.22

2000 1151 783 0.68 1999 15 31 2.06

2001 1732 4571 2.64 2000 10 72 7.20

2002 2648 2763 1.04 2001 46 3175 69.02

2003 1898 2346 1.23 2002 66 617 9.34

2004 2647 5066 1.91 2003 75 717 9.56

2005 4995 8194 1.64 2004 111 1730 15.58

2006 6653 12,065 1.81 2005 337 3055 9.06

Total 24,187 38,824 1.61 2006 261 2005 7.68

Source:RANDCorporation2007 Total 980 12,554 12.81

Sources:RANDCorporation1997,2007

majorUSrepositories,theMemorialInstituteforthePreventionofTerrorism(MIPT),the
NationalCounter-TerrorismCentre(NCTC)andtheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyof
TerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START),showsthat,absentIraq,therehasbeen
nomajorincreaseinfatalitiesfromterrorismgloballysince2001(HumanSecurityReport
Project2007)seeFigure5.1.

Figure5.1:Globalfatalitiesfromterrorism,excludingIraq,1998-2006

8000
NCTC
7000

6000
Number of fatalities

5000

4000
START
3000
MIPT
2000

1000

0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year
Source:HumanSecurityReportProject2007

13.Whichmightbesaidtoincludethe
Thepolicyconclusiontodrawfromthis,however,isnotthatterrorismisadeclining damagedonetoitscapabilitiesinIraq
threattoournationalsecurity.Thereareatleasttworeasonswhythiswouldbea bytheUStroopsurgeinandaround
Baghdadandtheformationandspread
mistake. oftheSunniAwakeningCouncils,its
failuretoariseandstandupinSaudi
First,despiterecentapparentprogressinthefightagainstAlQaeda,13 bothitandother Arabia(Hussein2005),itssetbacksin
terroristgroupshavekilledBritishcitizensintheUK,Bali,Egypt,Turkeyandelsewherein Indonesia(Schmitt2008)andmore
widelyitsencounteringaconsiderable
recentyears,andthesegroupsareassessedbyalmostallsecurityexpertstoremaina backlashacrosstheMuslimworld
seriousthreattoday. (Barrett2008).
64 Shareddestinies| Transnationalthreatsandrisks
14.PKKissuspectedofcarryingout
thedoublebombattackinIstanbulon
27July2008thatkilled17people;the
LTTEpioneeredtheterroristuseof
suicidebombing;JemaahIslamiyahwas
responsibleforthemurderof222
peopleintheBalibombingson12
October2002and1October2005.
15.Languageinthisarenaisstill
settling.Thereiscurrentlyno
internationallyacceptedwayof
describingthefollowersoftheideology
promotedbyAlQaeda.Theyreferto
themselvesasjihadis,supposedly
defendingtheworldofIslamfrom
attackbytheWestthroughaholywar
orjihad.Wedonotacceptor
condonethismodernperversionand
narrowinterpretationofthetermjihad
(asnecessarilyviolentandglobal),and
sointhisreportwerefertothese
extremistsasneo-jihadis.
16.DuringthisperiodArabandAfghan
fighters,trainedandfinancedbytheUS
CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)via
PakistaniInter-ServicesIntelligence
(ISI),wagedaguerrillacampaignof
armedresistanceagainsttheSoviets,
whichbecameajihad.Afterthe
expulsionoftheSovietforcesfrom
Afghanistanin1989,Pakistanco-opted
manyofthehardenedmujahideen
(religiousstrugglers)andtransitedthem
fromAfghanistantoPakistanicampsin
KashmirtofightagainsttheIndiansin
thatdisputedterritory.Thisgroup,
underOsamabinLadensleadership,
wasthendevelopedfromaparamilitary
outfittoaterroristorganisation,issuing
itsfirstanti-westernfatwa(legalruling)
andperpetratingitsfirstattacksin
1992,andenjoyingbasesfirstinSudan
andthen,from1996onwards,backin
whathadbecomeTaliban-controlled
Afghanistan.
17.AlQaedaexploitsthenotionofthe
ummah(globalIslamiccommunity)
whichdoesnotrecognisefrontiersor
borders,toappealtoallMuslimsto
participateinitsglobaljihadagainstthe
USanditsallies,justifiedbyreference
tobelligerentsuras(chapters)inthe
Quran,which,itargues,provide
liturgicalbasisforarmedstruggle
againstunbelievers.AccordingtoAl
Qaedasinterpretation,whichdistorts
classicalscholarsanddismissesmany
contemporaryones,alltheworldis
currentlyuntilstrictIslamicruleis
imposedaDaral-Harb(Houseof
War)inwhichrighteousviolenceis
authorised.
AlQaedaisnot,ofcourse,theonlyterroristgroupofrecenttimes.Othersincludesecular
nationalistgroupssuchastheKurdishseparatistsofPartiyaKarkerenKurdistan(PKK),the
LiberationTigersofTamilEelam(LTTE)inSriLanka,theEuskadiTaAskatasuna(ETA)of
SpainsBasqueCountry,andtheal-AqsaMartyrsBrigadeoftheOccupiedPalestinian
Territories;andavowedlyreligiousterroristgroupssuchastheChristianguerrillasofthe
LordsResistanceArmyinUganda,theShiaMuslimsofHezbollahinLebanon,andthe
SunniMuslimsofJemaahIslamiyahinIndonesia.14 Wedonot,however,attempta
comprehensivereviewofactiveterroristgroupsheregiventheirnumber;wefocusonAl
QaedaandAlQaeda-influencedgroupsasthemostpressingandimmediatethreat.
Thesecondreasonfornotconcludingthatterrorismisdecliningasathreatisthatwhile
theexplosionofimproviseddevicesusingconventionalmaterialsremainsthemostlikely
formofterroristattack,themostfearsomefeatureofterrorismatthispointinourhistoryis
thecatastrophicattacksthatcouldtakeplaceinthefuturethroughterroristsuseof
chemical,biological,radiologicalornuclear(CBRN)weapons.Belowwesetoutbackground
materialonbothofthesedimensionsofthecontinuingterroristthreat.
AlQaedaandAlQaeda-influencedterrorism
ThemostsignificantterroristgroupofthepresenteraisAlQaeda(TheBase),aneo-
jihadi15 enterpriseinitiatedtowardstheendofthe20thcenturyandthathasdefined
terrorismatthebeginningofthe21st.AlthoughthetermAlQaedaonlycameinto
popularusageaftertheattacksontheUnitedStatesof11September2001after
whichOsamabinLadenboastedthattheawakeninghasoccurred(seeBBC2004a)
thegroupsoriginsliefurtherbackintheSovietinvasionandoccupationofAfghanistan
between1978and1989.16
Inanorganisationalsense,AlQaedahasperforceoperatedonthebasisofathree-tiered
model.Thefirsttier,AlQaedascoreOsamabinLaden,hisseniordeputies,suchas
Aymanal-Zawahiri,andthecadreofquasi-professionalfull-timeoperativesdirectly
undertheircontrolwasbadlydamagedanddisruptedbytheUS-ledinvasionof
Afghanistanin2001.Itstill,however,functions,andOsamabinLadenremainsatlarge.
AsecondtierconsistsofindividualsandgroupsthatcanbedescribedasAlQaeda
linked.TheysharetheAlQaedaideology,andhaveoccasionalcontactwithcore
members,butarenotundercoreAlQaedacommandandcontrol.Athird,muchwider,
tiercanbetermedAlQaeda-influenced,consistingofgroupsandindividualsthatshare
AlQaedasideologybuthavenocurrentcontactwithitscore.Itisthought,forexample,
thatthoseinvolvedinthe7July2005attacksinLondonandthoseintheNetherlands-
basedHofstadtGroup,linkedtothemurderofDutchfilmmakerTheovanGoghon2
November2004,fallintothisthirdcategory.
AsdirectcommandandcontrolhasbeenmademoredifficultforAlQaeda,sothe
importanceofitsideologyhasincreased,andAlQaedahasevolvedunderWestern
pressurefromanorganisationinthetraditionalsenseintoamodern,transnational,
networked,revolutionarymovementabsolutelypredicatedonglobalisation.Originally
configuredaccordingtoaconventionalparamilitarymodel,AlQaedahasrapidlybecome
amilitantnetworkofnetworks,operatingthroughasystemofoftenself-directingcells.
Thisglobalised,opportunisticoperatingmodelhasbeendescribedvariouslyby
commentatorsasafranchisingoperation,aresistancemovement,asubcultureof
rebellion,ayouthcultofanger,andaventurecapitalistundertakingthatinvestsin
promisingplottersandplots(LaGuardia2008).
AlQaedasappealtopotentialrecruitsisrootedprimarilyinthesinglenarrativeitemploys
ofoppressionthroughouthistoryoftheIslamicummahbytheWest.17 Referenceismade
towarsinChechnyaandBosniawhereMuslimsaresaidtohavebeenpersecutedwhile
theWesthasstoodby;toMuslimskilledinAfghanistanandIraq,includingspecific
instancessuchastheallegedmassacrebyUSmarinesinNovember2005ofatleast15
non-combatantsinHaditha,theassaultbyforeignforcesonFallujah,theCityofthe
Mosques,inNovember2004usingwhitephosphorousshells,andtheabuse,tortureand
murderofprisonersinAbuGhraib;andtotherunningsoreofPalestine.
Theapproachisparasitic,hijackingandappropriatingothersgrievancesandcauses,
suchasthroughthecontinuationoftheAlgerianCivilWarbytheIslamistrevolutionaries
 65

oftheSalafistGroupforPreachingandCombat(GSPC),nowAlQaedaintheIslamic
Maghreb(AQIM).Thesinglenarrativenotonlyexplainsandlegitimisesterrorismasa
strategybutalsoidentifiesdutiesandrewardswhichjustifyindividualrisk-takingand,
ultimately,martyrdom.Theideologyitcommunicatescaststerroristoperationsaspartof
aglobalgenerationalstruggle,explainingfailureandsetbackandcommittingviolent
extremiststoalongwaragainstthefarenemyoftheUnitedStates.
AlQaedahasasitslong-term,non-negotiablestrategicaims(toparaphrase):
TheevictionoftheJewish-Crusaderalliance(Zawahiri2002)fromMuslimlands
Thedepositionofcorrupt,apostategovernments,suchastheHouseofSaud,across
theMuslimworld
Theimpositionofsharia(Islamiclaw)
Therestorationofthecaliphate(singleIslamicnation,gonesincethedemiseofthe
OttomanEmpireandrisetopowerofAtaturk)
ThedestructionoftheZionistsIsrael.
HallmarksofAlQaedaorAlQaeda-influencedterrorismincludesimultaneousattacks,
attacksonciviliantargets,indiscriminatemurder,theattempttocausemasscasualties,
shahid(martyr)suicidebombers,givingnonoticeorwarningofattacks,andtheattempted
useofspectacularstylesofattack.ThesetacticscanbereadilyobservedinAlQaedaorAl
Qaeda-influencedatrocitiessuchasthesea-bornesuicidebombingoftheUSSColein
Yemenon12October2000,whichkilled17sailors,thenear-simultaneousair-borne
attacksontheUSon11September2001,whichkilled2,998(including67Britishcitizens),
thenear-simultaneousbombingoffourcommutertrainsinMadridon11March2004,
killing191,andthenear-simultaneousdetonationoffoursuicidebombsontheLondon
transportnetworkon7July2005,whichkilled52peopleandinjuredover700.
AlQaedasexploitationofungovernedspace
AlQaedaexploitsungovernedorpoorlygovernedspace.Nowhereisthismoreevident
todaythaninPakistanstribalbelt,intowhichPresidentZardariswritdoesnotextend,and
whichisthecurrentepicentreofAlQaedaterrorism.ThesevendistrictsoftheFederally
AdministeredTribalAreas,ashortborder-crossingsouthoftheToraBoracavecomplex
whereOsamabinLadenisoncethoughttohavehidden,arenowaprimarylocusfor
terroristtrainingandahavenforneo-jihadis.There,andaroundPeshawarinthe
neighbouringNorth-WestFrontierProvince,areconstitutedPakistaniTalibanisonceagain
supportingandworkingcloselywithAlQaeda.Thisgroupisespeciallystrongamongthe
PashtuntribesaroundQuetta,theprovincialcapitalofBalochistan,fromwherethe
Helmandinsurgencyisbeingdirected.ItissuspectedoftheassassinationofBenazir
Bhuttoon27December2007.
TherearealsocrediblereportsofelementsofPakistansmilitaryandsecurityservices
workingincahootswiththeextremiststomanipulate,misdirectandfrustrateWestern 18.HEMakhdoomShahMahmood
Qureshi,thePakistaniForeignMinister,
intelligenceeffortsintheregion,althoughthePakistanigovernmentnaturallyrefutes saidinavisittoLondonon24July
this.18 ButAlQaedaisalso,ofcourse,activeoutsidePakistan.Anotherweaklygoverned 2008:Trustus:thismenaceofterrorism
regionthatitisthoughttohavepenetratedandbeguntoexploitisthesemi-aridSahel isourconcernasmuchasyours.He
hasclaimedthereareinexcessof
BeltthattraversesNorthAfricabetweentheSudaniansavannahandtheSaharaDesert. 100,000Pakistanitroopsstationed
IncreasingconcernoverAlQaedaincubationintheSahelpromptedfirsttheUSPan- alongthePakistan-Afghanistanborder
atmorethan1,000checkpoints,
SahelInitiativeandthenitsmoreexpansivesuccessor,theTrans-SaharaCounterterrorism monitoring40,000border-crossingsa
Initiative(IISS2008). day.Thegovernmentalsoclaimsthat
therehavebeenmorethan600high-
Despiteitsviolentrejectionofliberalmodernity,AlQaedaandAlQaeda-influenced valuearrestsofmilitantsbyPakistans
securityofficialsandarguesthatits
groupshavealsolearnedtoexploitnotjustfrontierterritoriesandungovernedplaces effortsneedstobemoreeffectively
buttheungovernedandunregulatedspacesofthevirtualworldtoo.Theyhavedone matchedontheothersideofthe
borderinAfghanistan.However,
thiswithsomesuccess. PresidentBushreportedlycomplained
thatthesharingofUSintelligencewith
AwebpostinginMarch2004bytheleaderofAlQaedaintheArabianPeninsula Pakistaniofficialsoftenresultedinthe
(AQAP),AbdulAzzizal-Moqrin,forexample,suggestedstagingattacksandkidnappings targetsofUSoperationsontheground
inthePakistan-Afghanistanborderarea
targetingtheoilsectorinSaudiArabiainordertodriveoutforeigners(Hoffman2006). escapingbeforeactioncouldbetaken
Thefollowingmonth,fiveforeignworkerswerekilledatapetrochemicalplantand againstthem.
66 Shareddestinies| Transnationalthreatsandrisks

furtherattacksinMayandJunethatyearpromptedmanycompaniestoevacuatetheir
foreignworkers(NewYorkTimes2004).Al-Moqrinstargetingadvicesoonspreadto
Iraq,withthefirstkidnappingofaforeignnationalthereoccurringon8April,andover
thefollowingthreemonthsmorethan60othersweretakenbyavarietyofinsurgent
andterroristgroups(Hoffman2006).
TheAlQaeda-influencedMadridbombersin2004usedavirtualdeaddropto
communicate,avoidingdetectionbycreatingdraftemailmessagesonfreeinternet-
basedemailaccountsthatweresharedamongtheplotters(InternationalHeraldTribune
2006b).Themessageswereneversent,makingthemextremelydifficulttomonitor,but
eachterroristcouldlogintotheaccountandreadandrespondtothedrafts.Itis
thoughtthattheHamburgcellwhichplannedthe11September2001attacksmayhave
usedsteganographictechniquestomasktheircorrespondence,embeddingsecret
messagesindigitisedinformationsuchasaudio,videoorimagefilestoevadedetection
byallbuttheintendedrecipients(seeBBC2001a,2001b,2004b).
PopularwebtoolssuchasGoogleEarthhavealsobeenusedforhostilesurveillanceand
targetingpurposes.Americanprosecutorsallegetheconspiratorswhowereplanningto
attackthejetfuelpipelinesinandaroundJFKairportinNewYorkusedimagesfrom
GoogleEarthtoimproveidentificationoftheirtargets.Allegedly,theplotsringleader,
AbdulKhadir,decreedtheterroristsJFKvideotobeinsufficientlydetailedfor
operationalpurposes,tellinghisco-conspiratorstouseGoogleEarthsoftwaretogain
moredetailedpicturesoftheairport(TheSmokingGun2007).InsurgentsinIraqhave
alsobeenusingGoogleEarthtotargetBritishforcesinBasra.InJanuary2007araidby
theBritishuncoveredsatellitephotographs[that]showedindetailthebuildingsinside
thebasesandvulnerableareassuchastentedaccommodation,lavatoryblocksand
wherelightlyarmouredLandRoversareparked(Harding2007).
TheinternetisalsousedtoinciteviolenceintheUK.Afterthepublicationofcartoons
thatcaricaturedMohammedbyDanishnewspaperJyllands-Postenon30September
2005,TheSavedSect(aproscribedsuccessororganisationtothenow-defunctal-
Muhajiroun)useditswebsitetoincitethemurderofthosewhoinsulttheProphet.
Asthemainlibraryforjihadistliteratureandterroristmanuals,theinternetisaconduit
forextremistpropagandaandindoctrinationandhasbeenseentoplayanimportantrole
inradicalisation.TheCanadianSecurityIntelligenceServicehasreportedaworryingtrend
thatyoungIslamistsaremovingfromradicalstoterroristsinaveryrapidprocess(Bell
2007).Thistransformation,whichmaywitnessindividualspassingthroughempathetic
andsympatheticstagesandfinallytotheoperational,isthoughtattimestohave
takenaslittleastendays(Burke2008).ThisechoesthenMetropolitanPolice
CommissionerSirIanBlairsassessmentinsummer2006ofthemeninvolvedinthe
allegedplottoblowuptransatlanticairlinersmid-flightwithliquidexplosives.Blairsaid
theyoungmenwentfromwhatwouldappeartobeordinarylives,inamatterofsome
weeksandmonths,notyears,toapositionwheretheywereallegedlypreparedto
commitsuicideandmurderthousandsofpeople(Holden2007).Oneofthereasons
citedforthefasttransformationinthesecasesisconstantaccesstoterroristpropaganda
ontheinternet.
AlQaedaseffectivemasteryoftechnologicaldevelopments,particularlyinclandestine
communicationsandtheuseofweb-basedmultimedia,hasamplifieditsvoice,
extendeditsorganisationalreachandenhanceditscapabilitytoevadelaw
enforcement.Indeed,itisinternet-basedpropagandathathasenabledAlQaedato
regroupafteritwascrippledbytheUS-ledinvasionofAfghanistanalongwiththe
recruitingsergeantroleplayedbythewarinIraqandpolicyfailuresbytheUSsuchas
theuseofGuantanamoBaytoholdterroristsuspectsoutsideofanyrecognisedlegal
process.AlQaedacannowspot,recruit,radicaliseandorganise,allonline,allowingit
effectivelytolinkitsideologicalandgeopoliticalmessagetothestreetin
neighbourhoodsineverycorneroftheglobe.
ThedangerofCBRNterrorism
AlQaedaisknowntohavesoughtortobeseekingunconventionalweapons
capability.FormerUSAssistantSecretaryofDefense,GrahamAllison,drawingonhis
 67

Box5.2:DefinitionofCBRNweapons
Chemicalweaponsareagentsthatcanattackthebodyinanumberofways(nerveagents
suchassarinthatattackthecentralnervoussystemforexample,orbloodagentssuchas
cyanidethatpreventabsorptionofoxygenbytheblood).

Biologicalagentsareeithermicro-organismsthatsurviveandmultiplywithinahostbodyand
canbebothcontagious(forexample,smallpox)andnon-contagious(forexample,anthrax)
orinanimateagentsthatcannotreproduceandthereforehavesimilareffectstochemical
agents(forexample,botulin).

Radiologicalweaponsaremostoftenconsideredtobeexplosivedevices(dirtybombs)that
areusedtospreadradioactivematerialoverawidearea.

Nuclearweaponsarefissiondevicesgeneratingmassiveexplosivepowerthroughatomic
chainreactions,theessentialingredientsofwhichareeitherHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU)
orplutonium.

ForareviewofCBRNterrorisminmoredetailseeCornish2007.

periodinsidetheUSgovernmentandonseniorintelligencesources,notesthatOsama
binLadenattemptedtoacquireHighlyEnrichedUraniumfromtheSouthAfricansin
1992,andthatbothbinLadenandotherseniorAlQaedafiguresmetwith
representativesofthePakistaninuclearweaponsprogrammein2001(Allison2006).
TheJuly2004ReviewofIntelligenceonWeaponsofMassDestructionintheUK,
chairedbyLordButler,alsonotedthatAlQaedahadabiologicalweaponslaboratory
inKandahar,andthatscientistssuitableforabiologicalweaponsprogrammehadbeen
hiredbyAlQaeda(HouseofCommons2004).AbuKhababal-Masri,AlQaedaschief
chemistandbombmaker,whoisbelievedtohavetrainedRichardReid(theBritish
ShoeBomber)andZacariasMoussaoui(thetwentieth9/11hijacker),isalsothought
tohaveuseddogsforchemicalexperimentsattheDeruntatrainingcampin
Afghanistan.
Thethreatofterroristsusingunconventionalweapons,however,maynotcomeonly
fromAlQaedaorfromorganisedgroups.Theglobalisation-induceddiffusionof
scientificknowledgeandexpertise,themoreextensiveembeddingandemploymentofa
rangeofdualusetechnologiesinsociety,andthechallengesfacedbysomeweak
stateswhenitcomestoeffectiveregulationandenforcementofthelawinrelationto
theuseofsuchtechnologies,haveopenedupmuchgreaterpossibilitiesforthe
destructiveapplicationofscienceandtechnology.Inthiscontext,loneindividualswith
relevantexpertisecannowbemoredangerousthanbefore,andthecombinedeffectof
thesedevelopmentsispotentiallyalargeincreaseinthedestructiveanddisruptive
potentialofterrorismoverall.
Theeffectsoftheuseofachemical,biological,radiologicalornuclearweaponby
terroristswouldmostlikelybemeasurednotonlyinlossoflife,butalsoinpanic,andin
majoreconomicandpoliticalconsequences.Wepresentacombinationofbothrealand
asyethypotheticalattackscenariosandtheirpossibleeffectsinBox5.3(nextpage),for
illustrativepurposes.
Manyofthetechnologiesrequiredinputtingtogetherachemical,biologicalor
radiologicalweaponarewidelyavailableandincommercialuse.Thechemicalingredients
forsarin,forexample,areinflameretardants,whilethiodiglycol,whichisusedinball-
pointpenink,isjustonestepremovedfrommustardgas(Cornish2007).Manylow-
graderadioactivematerialsarealsousedinhospitals,inindustry,theuniversityresearch
sectorandelsewhere,oftennotcoveredbytightsecurity.Asforbiologicalagents,the
explosioninbiotechnologyforbothcommercialandmedicalpurposesmeansthatmany
morefirmsnowoffertosynthesisecompletegenesforclientswithoutconducting
thoroughsecurityscreeningchecksonthebuyer.Thisinturncouldallowaterroristto
buygenesforuseintheengineeringofanexistinganddangerouspathogenintoanew
andmorevirulentstrain.
68 Shareddestinies| Transnationalthreatsandrisks

Box5.3:CBRNscenariosandtheireffects
Chemical
TheJapaneseAumShinrikyosectattackedtheTokyosubwaywithsaringasin1995,killing
12.

Estimatesoftheeffectsofopen-airdispersalofsarininanurbanenvironmentrangefrom
50deathsfor10kgofreleasedagentallthewayuptotensofthousandsofdeaths,
dependingonthequantityreleased(Cornish2007).

Biological
TheanthraxattacksthattookplaceintheUSinthedaysimmediatelyfollowingthe
attacksof11September2001killedfivepeopleandinjured17others(Daschle2008).
However,thisattack,whichinvolvedanthraxsporesbeingmailedthroughtheUSpostal
systemtoSenateofficesandothergovernmentbuildings,causedwidespreadpanicand
thetemporaryshutdownofpartsoftheUSgovernment(Gumbel2001).Theanthraxis
thoughttohaveoriginatedfromaUSgovernmentlaboratory.

Alarge-scalebiologicalattackcouldresultintheneedformassdecontaminationoreven
thecontainmentbyforceofinfectedindividualsbythepoliceormilitarytoavoidthe
contagionspreading.Foramoredetailedaccountofsuchascenario,see
www.atlanticstorm.organinvented,scenario-basedgameinwhichalarge-scale
biologicalattackwasimagined.

Radiological
TheassassinationofAlexanderLitvinenko,theformerRussiansecretagentwhodiedon23
November2006,waseffectedbyacuteradiationsyndromeinducedbytheingestionof
Polonium-210plantedinLondon.Forthepostmortemstherewereonlytwosurgeonsand
onemortuaryintheUKcapableofhandlingacorpseofthistype.Inotherwords,this
singlemurdertestednationalcapacity.

Therehasbeenrelativelylittlemodellingoftheeffectsofaradiologicalweaponinacity.
However,itisthoughtthatanexplosivedevice,combinedwithasufficientquantityof
radioactivesourcematerial,couldcauselethaldosesofradiationwithinahalf-mileradius
fromthepointofdetonation.Detonationofaradiologicaldeviceofthiskindcouldalsobe
expectedtocausesevereeconomicdamage(Cornish2007).Buildingsandofficesin
contaminatedareaswouldhavetobeshutdown(possiblyforverylongperiodsoftime).
Suchsitedenialcouldcausebusinessestocollapse,financialdistrictscouldbeseverely
disrupted,andrevenuesfromsourcessuchastourismwoulddryup.

Nuclear
FormerUSUnderSecretaryofStateforDefenseGrahamAllisonhasprojectedthata10
kilotonnucleardeviceexplodedinacitywoulddestroymoststructureswithinonethirdof
amile,withthoseleftstandingreducedtoemptyshells.Therewouldbea100percent
fatalityrateinthisarea.Uptothreequartersofamile,therewouldbefatalradiation
dosesforanyonedirectlyexposedtotheblastandsignificantriskoffirestorm.Most
peopleinthisareawouldalsobeleftdeadorseriouslyinjured.Intheremainingareaupto
amilefromtheblastpointinanydirection,theareawouldberavagedbyradiationand
fires(Allison2004).Forfurtherinformationonnuclearterrorism,see
www.nuclearterror.organdBennett2004.

However,althoughtheexpertisemaybeavailabletoterroristgroupsorevenlone
fanatics,thesepeopleneedaccesstorelativelysophisticatedequipmentand
infrastructuretoweaponisetheseagents.Thebiggestdangerheremaycomefromstate
weaknessandthepossibilitythatterroristsmightgainaccesstostatelaboratoriesand
facilitiesthatareinsufficientlysecure.Thisistrueinrelationtobioterrorismwhere,inthe
nameofbio-defence,researchandexperimentationusingdeadlypathogensin
governmentlaboratoriescanitselfbecomeapointofvulnerability.
Itisevenmoretrueinrelationtoaccesstonuclearwarheadsandtothematerials
requiredtomakethem.Weknow,forexample,thatnuclearblackmarkets,oftenfedby
 69

theftsfromstateresources,doexist.TheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies
(IISS),usingestimatesdrawnfromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyandthe
DatabaseonNuclearSmuggling,TheftandOrphanRadiationSources(DSTO)hasshown
thatroughly38kgofHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU)andplutoniumwereseizedbylaw
enforcementbodiesintheperiod1991to2006.Notallofthismaterialwasofweapons
grade,butaround8kgofitwas,andthisfigureinanycase,ofcourse,representsonly
theknownamountsofthesematerialsstolenbycriminalsandthenrecoveredbylaw
enforcementagenciesinthatperiod.Wedonotknowhowmuchhasbeenstolenand
notrecoveredoverthesameperiod;norisiteasytocalculatethatamountwithout
knowingexactlyhowmuchofeachhasbeenproducedsince1945(Plutaand
Zimmerman2006).Giventhatonly15.9kgofHEUor4.1kgofplutoniumarerequiredto
achieveanuclearexplosion,thesuggestivefiguresonthescaleofblackmarketactivity
inthisarearemaindeeplytroubling.
Uptonow,terroristshavealmostexclusivelyusedrelativelyunsophisticatedconventional
weaponsexplosivesorevenaeroplanes.Thatdoesnot,however,meanthatterrorists
arenottryingtoacquireunconventionalweaponswithwhichtoterrorise.Policymakers
mustbefullyalerttothesedangers.

Transnationalcrime
Turningtoorganisedcrimenetworks,these,too,arebecomingmorethreatening.
Increasingly,theyareoperatingacrossborders,facilitatedbydecreasingtransportation
costs,improvedglobalcommunicationsandtheincreasedcross-borderflowsofboth
peopleandgoods.Thisgivesrisetothephenomenonoftransnationalorganisedcrime,
broadlyaseriesofseriouscrimesoroffencescommittedbygroupsofthreeormore
persons,actinginconcertforaperiodoftimetoobtain,directlyorindirectly,afinancial
orothermaterialbenefit(UN2000b).
Transnationalorganisedcriminalnetworksflourishinareaswherestateauthorityisweak
orsusceptibletocorruption,whereenforcementoftheruleoflawispatchyandwhere
bordersarepermeable.Thisnowincreasinglyappliesnotjusttoindividualstates,butto
theglobalspace,too.Thesenetworksstimulateviciouscyclesofcrimeandinstabilityin
whichcriminalgroupslocatethemselvesinstatesorregionswheretheycanescape
detection,onlytoperpetuateconflictandfurtherunderminetheruleoflawinthese
areasasaresultoftheiractivities.Forthisreasonin2004,theUNSecretaryGenerals
HighLevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangedescribedtransnationalorganised
crimeasafacilitatorofmanyofthemostseriousthreatstointernationalpeaceand
security,observingthat:corruption,illicittradeandmoney-launderingcontributeto
Stateweakness,impedeeconomicgrowthandunderminedemocracy(UN2004:15).
Transnationalorganisedcrime,then,isamajornationalsecurityconcern.Inthissection,
weprovideanoverviewofitsglobalscaleandcharacterandbrieflyaddressthequestion
oflinkagesbetweenorganisedcrimeandterrorism.InChapter6wereturntolookatthe
specificimplicationsoftherangeofissuesraisedfortheUK.
Globalscaleandcharacteroftransnationalorganisedcrime
Thecharacteroftransnationalorganisedcrimehaschangedinrecentyears(Glenny
2008a).TheoldimageofMafia-styleorganisationswithrigidtop-downhierarchiesisno
longeraccurate;whilecentralisedcrimegroupslikethisdostillexist,theyhavebeenjoined
bytransnationalorganisationsthatemployaloosernetworkedstructureandcollaborateas
necessarytoengageinspecificcriminalventures.Thiskindofstructurelendsitselfwellto
activitiessuchasdrugtraffickingorthesmugglingofotherillicitcommodities,wherelarge
hierarchicalnetworksorcartelsinsourcecountrieswillorchestratetheproductionsideof
thetrade,butwheresmallanddiscretegroups(orcells)willorganisationthe
transportationandsaleofgoodsaspartofadispersedchain.Asrecenteffortstocombat
terrorismhavedemonstrated,itismuchmoredifficulttotrackanddisrupttheactivitiesof
theseflatternetworks,manyofwhichcommunicateprimarilyviatheinternet.
Drugtrafficking
Althoughadiverserangeofactorsprofitfromtheglobaltradeinillicitdrugs,frompoor
farmersandcultivatorsofpoppiesinAfghanistanandcocainColombiatowealthyurban
70 Shareddestinies| Transnationalthreatsandrisks

drugdealersinWesterncountries,organisedcriminalgroupsaretheprimarybeneficiaries
ofanindustrythatisestimatedtobewortharoundUS$320billionayear,makingitthe
mostlucrativeofalltransnationalorganisedcriminalactivities(UNODC2007:170).

Figure5.2:Estimatedglobalvalueofillicitmarkets(US$billion)

350
322
300

250
Value (US$ billion)

200

150

100

50 32
1
0
Drugs Human beings Small arms

Market

Source:UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime2007

Thescaleoftheactivity,moreover,isgrowing.InEurope,forexample,wheretheopen
bordersthatunderpinthecontinentseconomictradeanddevelopmentalsogive
organisedcriminalgroupsunprecedentedopportunitiestoexpandtheiroperations
throughout,therehasbeenamajorincreaseindrugsimportation.Theavailabledata
indicatesthatEuropeanpoliceandothersecurityservicesseized20,694kgofcocainein
1995,forexample,butby2005,seizurestotalled106,057kg,representinganincreaseof
morethan400percentoverthedecade(seeEMCDDA2008).Althoughthisrisein
reportedseizuresmaybedueinparttoimprovedintelligenceandpolicing,thefigures
alsosuggestaconsiderablegrowthintheabsolutesizeofthetransnationaldrugstrade
onthecontinent.
Thedrugstradehasadevastatinglocalisedimpactonindividualsandcommunities
worldwide,causinghealthriskstousersandbreakdownsinpersonalrelationshipswhile
fuellingothercriminalactivitiessuchasprostitution,theftandviolence.However,italso
hasdeeplynegativeimplicationsforpeaceandsecurityinmanycountriesandregions.
Afghanistan(whichsupplies90percentoftheworldsopium)isaprimeexampleof
this.ThevalueoftheAfghannarcoticsindustryisalmosthalfthesizeofthecountrys
legalGDP,andthedrugmoneyproducedbythistradebothunderminesstate
institutionsandempowerstheTaliban(RubinandSherman2008).AccordingtoAntonio
MariaCosta,executivedirectoroftheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime
(UNODC),theTalibanandothermilitantsareexpectedtoearnbetweenUS$50and70
millionfromAfghanistansopiumandherointradeasaresultofthe2008harvest,which
willenablethemtocontinuetheiroffensiveagainstNATOforcesinthecountryand
prolongawarthathasdirectlyorindirectlyledtothedeathoftensofthousandsof
civilianssince2001(AssociatedPress2008b).Inthiscontext,theclaimthatthefailure
oftheWestswarondrugsiscreatinganAfghanistanthatwillbehometoIslamic
militantsandanunstoppableheroinindustry(Glenny2008b)maynotbeamajor
overstatement.
ThedrugstradeinAfghanistanhasalsohadanimpactonregionalsecurity,affecting
countriessuchasIranandPakistanthatliealongtheBalkanRouteusedbytraffickers
totransportdrugstoEurope.Iranianofficialsrecentlyclaimedthatthevolumeofopium-
baseddrugsbeingsmuggledthroughIranfromAfghanistanbytransnationalorganised
 71

criminalgroupshasincreasedfivefoldoverthepastfiveyears,makingcheapandpotent
drugsavailablethroughoutthecountry(seeBorger2008andTehrani2008).
Transnationalorganisedcrimecanthusbecharacterisedasathreatmultiplierina
regionalreadybesetbysocialandeconomicproblems.
Armstraffickingandnaturalresourcesmuggling
Comparativelyspeaking,thetraffickingofgoodsandnaturalresourcessuchassmall
armsanddiamondstakesplaceonamuchsmallerscalethantheglobaltradeindrugs.
TheSmallArmsSurveyhasputthevalueoftheillicitfirearmstradeatnomorethan
US$1billion(UNODC2007).However,theimpactofthistypeoftradeoninternational
securityshouldnotbeunderestimated.Althoughtherearedifficultiesingathering
accuratedataonthissubject,asindicatedinthelastchapter,itisbelievedthatthe
presenceoflargenumbersofsmallarmsinacountryisasignificantconflictriskfactor
andthatsmallarmscontributetohundredsofthousandsofdeathsandmillionsof
injurieseachyear.Somehavesuggestedthattheyareresponsibleforupto90percent
ofallconflictdeaths(SchroederandLamb2006).
Thetraffickingofsmallarmsandlightweapons,oftenleftbehindinmassivenumbersin
poor,war-ravagedcountriesafterterminatedconflicts(suchasintheBalkans),hashada
destabilisinginfluenceinmanycountries,inAfricaandelsewhere.Theproliferationof
theseweaponshasexacerbatedandprolongedconflict,andhasresultedinthe
emergenceofacultureinwhichgunownershipiscloselylinkedtoidentityandstatus.
Someanalystshavenotedthatinsomesocieties,gunculturemayevenresultinthe
perceptionofviolenceasanacceptableandlegitimatemeansofsocialinteraction
betweenpeople(SchroederandLamb2006:73).Thishasbeenobservedinplacessuch
astheDemocraticRepublicofCongoandSomalia,wherestateauthorityisweakor
entirelyabsent,andhasmadepeace-buildingimmeasurablymoredifficult.
Diamondsmugglinghasbeenanothermajordriverofconflictandinsecurity,particularly
inpartsofAfricathatcontainlargedepositsofalluvialdiamonds.Aswithsmallarmsand
lightweapons,diamondsareeasilyconcealedandtransported,makingtheman
attractivecommoditytotransnationalcrimegroups.Theyarealsovirtuallyuntraceableto
theiroriginalsourceoncetheyhavebeenmixedorpolished,dueinparttothelackof
transparencyinthediamondindustry:although,since2000,theinternationalKimberley
Processofdiamondcertificationhasmadetheworkingsoftheindustrymuchless
opaque,illegaltradeinconflictdiamondspersists,estimatedtobeworthupto20per
centoftheglobaltrade(GlobalWitness2006).
Conflictdiamondsarethereforefrequentlyusedinlieuofcurrencyinillicitarmsdeals,
moneylaunderingorothercrimes,andconflictsinSierraLeone,Liberia,Angolaandthe
DRChaveallbeenperpetuatedbytheproductionandtradeindiamonds(USGAO
2002).TheRevolutionaryUnitedFrontinSierraLeonewasaparticularbeneficiaryof
thistradeduringthe1991-2002conflict,financingitsmilitaryoperationsthroughthe
saleofdiamondsforweapons.Diamondsarealsothoughttohavefundedtheactivities
ofHezbollahinLebanon,andthereisevidencetosuggestthatAlQaedahaslongbeen
involvedintheillicittradeindiamondsaswellasothergemstones.Forexample,Al
QaedareportedlyconvertedUS$20millionintountraceableblooddiamondsinthe
monthsbeforetheattacksof11September2001(Hill2002).
Peopletrafficking
Afinalformoftraffickingisthesmugglingofhumanbeings.ArecentUNODCreporton
globaltraffickingtrendsdocumentedtheforcedtransferofpeoplefrom127countries
(UNODC2006).Belarus,theRepublicofMoldova,theRussianFederation,Ukraine,
Albania,Bulgaria,Lithuania,Romania,China,ThailandandNigeriawereclassifiedasthe
stateswiththehighestrecordedlevelsoftrafficking.Incontrast,destinationcountries
aremorelikelytobelocatedintheWest,withBelgium,Germany,Greece,Italy,the
Netherlands,Israel,Turkey,Japan,ThailandandtheUnitedStatesidentifiedasreceivers
ofthegreatestnumbers(ibid).
Peoplearetraffickedfortwomainreasons:forcedlabourandsexualservitude.The
InternationalLabourOrganisationhasestimatedthatthereareapproximately12.3
millionindividualstrappedintheseactivitiesatanygiventime,with9.8millionexploited
72 Shareddestinies| Transnationalthreatsandrisks

byprivateagentsandanother2.5millionforcedtoworkbygovernmentsorbyrebel
militarygroups(ILO2005).Globalprofitsfrompeoplesmugglingareestimatedtobein
theregionofUS$10billionannually(UNInformationService2003).
Internationalfinancialcrime
Althoughsometimesdescribedasvictimlesscrimes,alsosignificantarefiscalfraud
andmoneylaundering(definedbyInterpol[2008]asanyactorattemptedactto
concealordisguisetheidentityofillegallyobtainedproceedssothattheyappearto
haveoriginatedfromlegitimatesources).TheInternationalMonetaryFundhas
estimatedthattheaggregatesizeofglobalmoneylaunderingcouldbesomewhere
between2and5percentoftheworldsGDP,whichwouldrangebetweenUS$590
billionand$1.5trillionin1996prices.Toputthisintocontext,thelowerfigureis
roughlyequivalenttothevalueofthetotaloutputofaneconomythesizeofSpain
(FinancialActionTaskForce2008b).ItisoneofthekeymandatesoftheFinancial
ActionTaskForce,theintergovernmentalfinancialbodysetupin1989toaddressthe
problemofglobalmoneylaundering,toworkinpartnershipwithnational
governmentsandtheprivatesectorinthefightagainstthisactivity.Ithasmadesome
progressnotablyinitscreationofglobalstandardsandrecommendationstocombat
thethreatbuttheincreasingsophisticationofbothinformationandcommunication
technologiesandcriminalgangsandterroristgroupsthemselvesmakesthescaleof
thechallengeconsiderable.

National Fraud,too,isamajorproblem,notjustineconomicterms,butalsobecausethefunds
raisedthroughitareusedtofinancearangeofothercriminal,andsometimesterrorist,
governments activities.
andglobal
Today,fraudandtheftareincreasinglyoccurringonlineandasaformofcyber-crime.
cyber-governing Nationalgovernmentsandglobalcyber-governingbodieshavebeenoverwhelmedby
bodieshavebeen theingenuityandpervasiveonlinepresenceoforganisedcriminalgangsinrecentyears.
overwhelmedby Cybercriminalshaveadoptedtacticsincludingspoofingimpersonatingsomeoneelse
throughdatafalsification,phishingtrickinganindividualintorevealingprivate
theingenuityand informationviaemailingofamessagedesignedtoappearasifitoriginatesfroma
pervasiveonline legitimatesource,andhackingelectronicallybreakingintodatabasesthatcontain
presenceof financialorpersonaldatathatisthencopiedandusedfraudulently.Theyarealso
becomingincreasinglyproficientintheuseofmalwaremalicioussoftwarethatinfects
organisedcriminal thevictimscomputer,capturingconfidentialdatathatisthenforwardedtothecriminal,
gangsinrecent andbotnetswhichaimtodisrupttargetedcomputersystems,blockinternettraffic,
years harvestinformationordistributespam,virusesandothermaliciouscode.Theyaremade
upofavastnumberofcomputersthathavebeeninfectedandareremotely-controlled
throughcommandssentviatheinternet.
Cybercriminalshavegraduatedfromusingemailattachmentstoinfectcomputers,to
encodingspammessages,bannersandmalicioussoftwareinordinarywebsites.Research
byGoogle,forexample,identified4.5millionsuspiciouswebpages,450,000ofwhich
werefoundtolaunchdownloadsofmaliciousprogrammes.Morethantwothirdsofthe
maliciousprogrammesidentifiedwereofakinddesignedtocollectdataonbanking
transactionsandtoemailittothecriminals(Hecht2007).
Transnationalorganisedcrimeandterrorism
Manyanalystshavedescribedtherelationshipbetweentransnationalorganisedcrime
andterrorismasanexusofmethods,notmotives.Thissuggeststhattheoperational
methodsofterroristsandorganisedcrimegroupsfrequentlyoverlap,whilethegoals
theyseektoachieveideologicalrevolutionandpoliticalchangeinthecaseofthe
former,andpersonalprofitinthecaseofthelatterusuallydiffer.However,whileitis
righttobecarefulabouttreatingterroristsandseriousorganisedcriminalsasoneand
thesame,itisevidentthatinmanyplaces,thegridofconnectionsbetweenterrorism
andcriminalnetworkshasbeenhighlycrisscrossed(BerdalandSerrano2002).Thisis
particularlytrueofgroupssuchastheRevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia(FARC),
whichisheavilyinvolvedintheillegalnarcoticstradeinSouthAmerica,butclassifiedas
aterroristorganisationbystateauthoritiesandinternationalgovernments.Meanwhile,
theterroristgroupthatorchestratedtheMadridtrainbombingsin2004financedthe
 73

operationalmostentirelythroughthesaleofillicitdrugs,drawingontheorganisedcrime
connectionsofoneofthemembersofthecell(Shelleyetal2005).
Someseriousandrespectedanalysts,moreover,arescepticaloftheideathatclearlines
canbedrawnbetweentransnationalorganisedcrimeandterrorism,notinganumberof
similaritiesandlinksbetweenthetwo.Forexample:
Terroristsderivefinancialsupportfromorganisedcriminalactivities
Organisedcrimegroupsandterroristsbothfrequentlyemploynetworkstructures,
whichsometimesintersect(suchastheFARCinColumbia)
Crimegroupsandterroristsbothoftenoperateinareaswithminimalgovernment
authority,weakenforcementofthelaw,andopenborders
Organisedcriminalsandterroristsusecorruptioninordertoachievetheirgoals
Organisedcrimegroupsandterroristsbothusesimilarcommunicationmethods,
particularlyinrelationtotheiruseoftheinternetandothercommunications
technologies
Organisedcriminalsandterroristsbothlaundertheirmoney,oftenusingthesame
methodsandeventhesameoperatorstomovetheirfunds.(Shelley2002)
Researchhasindicatedthatlargerandmoretraditionaltransnationalorganisedcrime
groupsarelesslikelytodobusinesswithterrorists,sincetheyhaveastrongstakein
maintainingpoliticalstructuresandthelegaleconomyandexploitbothinorderto
facilitatetheiractivities.However,newertransnationalgroupsthatoperateasloose
networksoftenhavelittle,ifany,affiliationwithparticularstates,andcarelessaboutthe
ultimateconsequencesoftheiractions.Theyalsothriveinconditionsofanarchyor
conflict,givingthemfewerqualmsaboutwhotheydealwith(Shelleyetal 2005).The
Tri-BorderareabetweenBrazil,ArgentinaandParaguayisagoodexampleofthis:there,
drugcartelsandterroristsminglewithrelativelylittlefearoftheiractivitiesbeing
discoveredordisrupted.Hezbollah,forexample,isbelievedtohavebasedoperatives
therewhileplanningandcarryingoutthe1992bombingoftheIsraeliembassyin
BuenosAires(Abbott2004).
Theimportanceoftransnationalcrime,then,isnotmerelyasanadd-ontomore
importantfeaturesoftheinternationalsecuritylandscape.Transnationalcrimeexploits
andperpetuatesstateweaknessandfailure,itfeedsviolentconflict,andthereisreason
toworrythatcriminalsandterroristscanoverlapandsometimescollaborate.

Infectiousdiseaseandpandemics
Worriesovercrimealsointersectwithconcernsovernewoutbreaksofdisease.Thecross-
borderandsometimescriminaltradeinanimalsandanimal-relatedproductsisthought
tobeasourceofincreasedrisk,forexample,andaccordingtoanofficialoftheUNFood
andAgricultureOrganisation,muchofthespreadofHPAI(HighlyPathogenicAvian
Influenza)canbeattributedtotradeinpoultryandpoultryproducts,particularlythe
informaltrade(HouseofLords2008:44).
Thisisworryingbecausehumanvulnerabilitytodiseaseisontheincreaseagainafter
decadesofprogressonthatfront.AccordingtotheWorldHealthOrganisation(WHO),
therearenownearly40diseasesthatwereunknownagenerationagoandtheWHOhas
verifiedmorethan1100epidemiceventsworldwideinthelastfiveyearsalone.New
diseasesarenowsaidtobeemergingatthehistoricallyunprecedentedrateofoneper
year(WHO2007).
Thesedevelopmentsreflectanumberofunderlyingfactors,somemedical,sometodo
withthepatternofhuman-animalinteractionandsometodowithglobalisationand
urbanisation.
First,atthemedicallevel,thereisanotabletrendtoantimicrobialresistance.Mainstay
antimicrobialsarenowfailingfasterthannewdrugscanreplacethemanddrug-resistant
malaria,HIVandextensivelydrug-resistanttuberculosis(XDR-TB)areallnowafeature
74 Shareddestinies| Transnationalthreatsandrisks

ofthelandscape.Thisisanominousdevelopmentandonethatisnotwidelyunderstood
outsidespecialistpolicycircles.Indeed,inthegeneralpopulationcomplacencyonthe
effectivenessofmoderntreatmentsismorethenorm.
Second,thepatternandlevelofinteractionbetweenhumans,animals,andanimal-
relatedproductsischanging.Theexplosioninthehumanpopulationandthesearchfor
morelivingspacemeanshumanityisincreasinglyencroachingontopreviously
uninhabitedland,exposingitselftonewanimalpopulationsandpotentiallytonew
sourcesofanimal-bornediseases.Threeoutoffournewemerginginfectionsinhumans
arethoughttohavecomefromanimalsanditisnowwidelyaccepted,forexample,that
contactwithanimalsisthemostlikelysourceoftheHIVepidemic,andalsoalikely
factorintheemergenceofSARS(HouseofLords2008).
Third,humanvulnerabilitytoinfectiousdiseaseoutbreaksisincreasingasaresultof
urbanisationandglobalisation.Aspeoplemoveintoincreasinglylargeurbancentres,
oftenwithoutaccesstobasicsanitationandpublichealthinfrastructures,theymoveinto
conditionsinwhichinfectiousdiseasescanthrivemoreeasilyandspreadmorequickly.
Whenadiseaseoutbreakdoesoccur,inaglobalisedworldtheeffectsarewideranging
andfarreaching.Airlinestransportover2billionpassengersayearbetweentheworlds
urbancentres,forexample,ensuringthatadiseaseoutbreakinonepartoftheworld
canquicklybecomeanoutbreakinmanyothers.Communicationsareinstantandglobal,
meaningnewsofadiseaseoutbreakinonelocationcancreatesocialanxietyandeven
panicelsewhereandbusinessesandfinancialsystemsaresointimatelyconnectedacross
bordersthateconomicdisruptionislikelywaybeyondtheareasdirectlyimpactedbythe
disease.
TheoutbreakofSARSin2003confirmedwhattheemergenceofaneworunfamiliar
pathogencoulddointheseconditions.Spreadingfrompersontoperson,incubatingfor
overaweek,andmimickingthesymptomsofmanyotherlessseriousconditionswhile
killingaround10percentofthoseinfected,itwastransportedtofourcontinentsinjust
24hoursbyaverysmallnumberofinfectedpeople.Asaresult,andbecauseitwas
initiallypoorlyunderstood,itcausedseriouspublicanxietyandseriouslyimpacted
internationaltravel,tourism,andrestaurantandotherretailsectorsinmanycountries.
Althoughastrongsurveillanceandepidemiologicalresponselimitedthenumberofcases
to8,422withan11percentcasemortalityrate,theWHObelievesalesseffective
responsecouldhaveseenSARSkillmillionsofpeopleworldwide(WHO2007).Asitwas,
eventhislimitedoutbreakisestimatedtohavecosttheeconomiesofAsiaUS$60billion
ingrossexpenditureandbusinesslossesin2003(RossiandWalker2005).Itwouldbe
navetothinkthatotherneworunfamiliardiseaseswillnotemergetocreatesimilar
challengesandthreatsoverthecomingyears.
Concernisnowshiftingtothethreatofanewinfluenzapandemic.Suchapandemicis
consideredabiologicalcertainty,theonlyuncertaintiesbeingoverthetimingofthe
outbreak,thestraininvolved,andtheseverityoftheoutcome.Manyexpertsbelieve
thatH5N1birdfluwillbethemostlikelysourceandasweknow,thisisadiseasethat
canalreadykillhumanbeings(therewere79fatalitiesin2006alone).IfH5N1mutates
intoavirusthatcanbepassednotonlyfrombirdstohumansbutalsodirectlybetween
humans,however,thenitwouldprobablybecomeakillerofmillions.Onerecentstudy
hasominouslysuggestedthat,incontrasttoseasonalinfluenza,whichprimarilyinvolves
lunginfection,theH5N1virusmightbedisseminatedthroughoutthebodyandaffect
multipleorgansthanksinparttoaconditionoftheimmunesystemknownasacytokine
storm.Thisisasignificantfindingsincecytokinestormshelptoexplainwhythe1918-19
pandemicwassodeadly(Osterholm2007:50).Furthermore,influenza(unlikeSARS)is
infectiouswellbeforesymptomsappear,makingmanagementofitsspreadmuchmore
difficult.Consequently,inassessingthelikelyoutcomeofaninfluenzapandemic,the
WHOandothersbelievetheeffectswouldlikelybefargreaterthanthoseexperiencedin
theSARSoutbreakjustdescribed.
Forareasonableprojectedinfluenzainfectionrateof1percentoftheworlds
population,theWHO(usingOxfordEconomicForecastingGroupdata)suggestsa5per
centreductioninglobalGDPwithsubsequentGDPreductionsforfurtherincreasesin
 75

theinfectionrate.Figure5.3presentsprojectionsonthescaleofGDPlossesforasliding
scaleofinfectionratesupto2percentoftheworldspopulation.

Figure5.3:Theestimatedeconomicimpactofpandemicinfluenza
7
Scenario: global pandemic flu impact over one year
6

5
World GDP % loss

0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2

Average % of world population infected at any time

Source:OxfordEconomicForecastingGroup

Atacertaincritical(thoughunspecified)infectionrate,theWHOalsoprojectsapossible
shut-downoftheglobaleconomyontheproportionalscaleofthatexperiencedinthe
UKagriculturaleconomyduringthe2001FootandMouthDiseaseoutbreak(WHO
2007).Otherstudiessuggestsimilarorworseoutcomes.ArecentstudybytheLowy
InstituteforInternationalPolicyfoundthatwereapandemicassevereasthatof1918-
19tooccur,over142millionpeoplewoulddieandtheworldsGDPwouldsufferaloss
ofsomeUS$4.4trillion(Osterholm2007:48;McKibbin2006).Withsuchpredictionsin
mind,theWHOhascalledthecontrolofsuchapandemicaglobalpublicgood.
Wewouldacknowledgethattherehavebeensomeimportantdevelopmentsonthe
internationalpolicylandscapeinrelationtothisglobalpublichealthagendainrecent
years.Inparticular,theInternationalHealthRegulations(IHR)2005,whichreplacedan
earlierversionoftheregulationsagreedin1969,areamajorstepforwardinimproving
theglobalapproachtoinfectiousdiseasesurveillanceandcontrol.
TheIHRsof1969offeredalegalframeworkforinternationalnotificationofand
responsetojustsixdiseases:cholera,plague,relapsingfever,smallpox,typhusand
yellowfever.Theyalsoplacedaheavyemphasisontheuseofbordercontrolsatmajor
airportsandseaportstopreventthespreadofdisease.
TheIHRsof2005areasignificantdeparturefromthispositioninanumberofrespects.
Theyarebroaderthantheversionoftheregulationstheyreplace,puttingagreater
emphasisontheresponsibilityofallstatestoinstalleffectivesystemsby2012forthe
detectionofpublichealthrisks.Theirapplicationisalsoaimedatallpublichealthrisks
andnotonlyatthoseemanatingfromalistofnameddiseases.Moreover,whereasthe
1969regulationsrequiredformalstatenotificationofadiseaseoutbreakbeforethe
WHOcouldact,theIHRs2005explicitlyallowinformationfromnon-stateactorsand
mediaoutletstobetakenintoaccountwhenweighingtherisksofapotentialemerging
risktopublichealth.Thiscapacitytotakeonboardnon-statesourcesofinformation,
particularlyintheinternetandglobalmediaera,makesitfarharderforastatefearing
theeconomicconsequencesofadiseaseoutbreaktoattempttodenyorcoveritup.
Welcomethoughthesedevelopmentsare,thereisnoroomforcomplacency.Quiteapart
fromthethreatofbioterrorismasdiscussedearlierinthechapter,anexpansionof
activitiesrelatedtoinfectiousdiseaselaboratoryresearchhasincreasedthedangerof
accidentalreleaseofdangerousinfectiousagentsandpathogens.Seriousgapsinthe
76 Shareddestinies| Transnationalthreatsandrisks

capacityoftheinternationalcommunitytorespondtoinfectiousdiseaseoutbreaksalso
remain.Despitethepredicteddireimpactofaninfluenzapandemic,fewcountriescan
claimtohavesufficientstocksofvaccinesortherequiredlevelsofanti-viralmedications
torespondtothechallenge(WHO2007).Moregenerally,thereisalsoalackofbasic
healthinfrastructureinmanyweak,pooranddevelopingstateswhichmeansthatnotall
thecommitmentsenteredintoundertheInternationalHealthRegulations2005canbe
deliveredeverywhereinpractice.Effectivedeliveryrequirescorenationalcapacitiesin
diseasedetectionaswellasinternationalcollaborationandthesecapacitiesarenot
alwayspresent.
Thereisalsoagrowingconfusionovertherolesofthemanydifferentorganisations,
bothstateandnon-state,nowseekingtoplayaroleinrelationtoglobalhealthsecurity
(HouseofLords2008).IntergovernmentalbodiessuchastheWorldHealth
Organisation,UNAIDS,UNICEFandtheWorldBankareallactiveinthisspace,asare
nationalgovernmentbodiessuchastheUSCenterforDiseaseControl,private
foundationssuchastheBillandMelindaGatesFoundation,andotherNGOsandpublic
privatepartnershipssuchasMdecinsSansFrontiresandtheGlobalAlliancetofight
Aids,TBandMalaria.
Insummary,despiterecentprogress,thespreadofdiseaseonamassiveanddevastating
scaleonthebackofagrowing,increasinglyurban,andmobileglobalpopulationisareal
threat.Itismademorelikelybytheexistenceofweakstateinstitutionsinsome
jurisdictions,bytheillegalcross-bordertradeinanimalsandanimal-relatedproducts,
andbyconfusionovergovernanceandleadershiparrangementsatthegloballevel.The
risksandpolicydeficienciessurroundingthissetofissuesneedurgentlytobeaddressed.

Transnational
terrorism,
transnationalcrime
andtheriskofthe
rapidspreadofa
deadlydiseaseare
nottemporary
additionsor
modificationstothe
policyagenda
SummaryofChapter5
Thesecuritythreatsandrisksdiscussedinthischapterhavethreethingsincommon.
First,theyall,fundamentally,originateinandarefacilitatedbyseveraloftheunderlying
trendsanddevelopmentsoutlinedinChapter3.Globalisationandtechnologicalchange,
unprecedentedmobilityandadiffusionofpowertonon-stateactors,sitinthe
backgroundtoeachoftheissuesjustdiscussed.Forthisreason,transnationalterrorism,
transnationalcrimeandtheriskoftherapidspreadofadeadlydiseasearenot
temporaryadditionsormodificationstothepolicyagenda.Eachisrootedinhistorical
processesandeachishereforthelongterm.
Second,non-existent,weakorcorruptstateinstitutionsinsomejurisdictions,whichas
weoutlinedinChapter4areamajorandpotentiallygrowingproblemininternational
affairs,playafacilitatingroleinrelationtoallofthem.
Third,alldefynationalboundariesandalldefysolutionsthatmaybedeliverablebya
singlestate.All,inotherwords,needmultilateralsolutions.Thisneedformultilateralism,
andforstrongstatestomakeitworkable,issomethingwereturntolaterinourreport,
bothinrelationtotheframeworkofprincipleswesetoutinChapter8andinourpolicy
recommendationsinChapter9.
Beforethat,however,weturntoanexaminationofhowsomeofthetrends,driversand
featuresoftheinternationalsecuritylandscapecapturedinthischapterandtheprevious
twoareplayingoutin,andimpactingupon,theUK.
 77

6.ThreatsandrisksintheUK

ThesecurityoftheUKischallengedverydirectlybysomeofthefeaturesofthe
internationallandscapedescribedinpreviouschapters.Wearevulnerable,forexample,
toterroristattackslaunchedorinspiredfromtheterritoryofweak,failed,orcrime-
capturedstatesaswellastoattackslaunchedfromclosertohome.Wearevulnerableto
spill-overeffectsthatmayflowfromconflictandinstabilityelsewhereintheworld,and
totransnationalcrime,increasedvolatilityanduncertaintyintheworldstightenergy
markets,andtotheriskofpandemicdisease.Oursecuritywouldbediminished,too,by
developmentssuchasacollapseofthenuclearnon-proliferationregime,byaslidefrom
anemergingmultipolarorderintoaworldofseriousgreatpowerrivalryandconflict,and
byanymovementawayfromasystemofopenmultilateraltradetoonedominatedby
protectionistmeasuresandarecession-fuelledeconomicnationalism.
Inthischapter,however,weexaminehowthiswiderinternationallandscape,and
Britainsplacewithinit,iscombiningwithdomesticfactorsandvulnerabilitiestoproduce
asecurityagendathatismorespecifictotheUK.Indoingso,weexaminehomegrown
threatstosecurity,theincreasingvulnerabilitiesassociatedwitheconomic
interdependence,andtheUKdimensionsofsomeofthetransnationalthreatsandrisks
justdescribed.Wecover:
TheterroristthreatinsidetheUK
UKimpactsoftransnationalorganisedcrime
ThesecurityimplicationsofmigrationintotheUK
Britainsenergysecuritychallenge
Pandemicdisease
ClimatechangeimpactsontheUK,andthedamagetoinfrastructureandlifethat
mayresultfromincreasinglysevereweatherevents.
Wedonotcoverthepossibilityofadirectconventionalattack,oroneusingweaponsof
massdestruction(WMD),ontheUKfromanotherstate.Thiscanneverbediscounted
altogether,andthereisaclearneedfortheUKtomaintainstrongandflexibledefence
forces,properlyequippedandconfiguredtodealwiththenewworldweface,butwe
believethepossibilityofsuchanattackonthecountrytoberemoteincurrent
circumstances.
Similarly,wedonotcoverBritainswiderlinkstotheworldeconomyoroureconomic
securitybeyondthecrucialissueofenergy,andwedonot,inourtreatmentoftheterrorist
threatintheUK,seektoofferacomprehensiveexplanationofwhattheradicalisation
processisorhowitworks.Wewillreturntothelatterinourfinalreport.Ontheformer,we
believethatbeyondthecentralissueofenergysecurity,wecanaddlittlevaluetothe
debatethatisalreadyragingonthisissueintheguiseoftheglobalfinancialcrisis,which
hastorankasthemostsignificantcurrentthreattothesecurityandstabilityoftheUKand
itseconomy.Atthetimeofthedraftingofthisreport,boththecharacteristicfeaturesof
thiscrisis,andpolicymakersresponsestoit,werechangingonadailybasis.Inthiscontext
wedonotcommenthereexcepttomaketheobservationthataworldofeconomicchaos
isunlikelytobeoneofstrongandstablestates,internationalharmonyandpeace.Aglobal
financialsystemthatfailstoregulateandmanageriskeffectivelyisadirectthreatnotonly
tothesecurityandstabilityofourowneconomy,therefore,butalsototheeconomic
foundationsofwiderinternationalpeaceandsecurity.

TheterroristthreattotheUK
TheUKfacesmultipleterroristthreats.NorthernIrishsplintergroupsresponsiblefor
terrorismhavenotaltogetherdisappeared,single-issuefanaticssuchastheAnimal
78 Shareddestinies| ThreatsandrisksintheUK
Violentextremists
areconductinga
deliberatecampaign,
demonstratinga
cleardetermination
tomountterrorist
attacksagainstthe
UKandthe
indicationsarethat
thisisageneration-
longchallengeto
confront
LiberationFrontpersist,extremerightwingoutfitssuchasCombat18remainactive,and
thethreatfromlonewolvessuchastheLondonnailbomberDavidCopelandcannotbe
discounted.However,theprimaryterroristthreattotheUKtodayisfromAlQaedaand
theneo-jihadisinfluencedbyit.Thisthreatisjudged(atthetimeofwriting)bythe
JointTerrorismAnalysisCentretobeSevere,suggestingahighlikelihoodoffuture
terroristattack(seeMI5swebsitewww.mi5.gov.ukforfurtherdetails).
Therehavebeenatleast15attemptedterroristplotsonBritishsoilsince2001.The
policeandsecurityservicesarecurrentlycontendingwithabout30knownplots,
monitoringover200groupingsornetworks,andinvestigatingmorethan2,000
individuals(Hull2008).MI5currentlyhaveabout200operationsunderwayatanyone
time,ofwhicharound5percentreachexecutivelevel.Therehavebeenmorethan200
terroristconvictionsintheUKsince11September2001andinthefirsthalfof2008,31
peoplewereconvictedofterrorism-relatedoffences.Ofthese,11peoplepleadedguilty.
In2007,36individualswereconvictedofterrorism-relatedoffences.Ofthese,21people
pleadedguilty(MetropolitanPoliceService2007).Thesefiguresareallrisinganditis
unlikelythatthethreathasreacheditspeak.
TherewillnotbeatimeinthenexttwoyearswhenthereisnotamajorBritishcounter-
terrorismtrialatcourt.
ThethreatposedbyAlQaedaandAlQaeda-influencedterrorismisthereforesignificant,
growingandevolving.Itconstitutesthemostimmediateandacutepeacetimethreatin
thepastcentury(Evans2007).Violentextremistsareconductingadeliberatecampaign,
demonstratingacleardeterminationtomountterroristattacksagainsttheUKandthe
indicationsarethatthisisageneration-longchallengetoconfront.
Terroristmodesandlocations
DifferentmodesofterroristattackhavebeenattemptedintheUKintherecentpast.
Vehicle-borne(VB)improvisedexplosivedevices(IEDs),forexample,wereused,forthe
firsttimeinBritainsincetheIRAsterroristcampaignended,inLondonsHaymarketand
GlasgowAirporton29and30June2007,inaplotthatoriginatedwithAlQaedainIraq.
Person-borne(PB)IEDssuicidebombswereusedon7July2005ontheLondon
Undergroundandabusandthenagain,thistimefailing,twoweekslater.Thwarted
conspiracieshaverevealedterroristsintentionstousefertiliserbombsatBluewater
shoppingcentreinKentandtheMinistryofSoundnightclubinLondon,limousines
packedfullofgascylindersinundergroundcarparks,liquidbombsonboardtransatlantic
aircraft,high-poweredweaponrysuchasmortarsandrockets,andpoisons.Counter-
terroristpoliceareonthelook-outforterroristsattemptingtostealmilitaryvehicles,blue
lightvehicles,andvehiclescontaininghazardousmaterialsandfuel.Thelastoftheseis
ofparticularconcern,becausepetroltankerspotentiallydevastating,ifweaponised
havebeenhijackedandriggedusingfuel-airexplosivetechniquestomountattacksona
synagogueinTunisiaandoncheckpointsinIraq,anditisfearedthatsimilartacticscould
beusedintheUK.
Itwouldalsobeamistaketobelievethattheterroristthreatisathreatonlytoour
capitalcity,orevennecessarilytomajorconurbations.Significantterroristactivityhas
beenobservednotonlyinthemetropolisesofLondon,Manchester,Birminghamand
Leeds,butalso,forinstance,insmallercitiesandlargetownssuchasExeter(BBC
2008a)andHighWycombe(BBC2008b),smalltownssuchasCrawley(BBC2007c)and
Alva(BBC2007d),andvillagessuchasMarksCross(BBC2006).
Homegrownterrorists
WhileitisclearthattherearelinksbetweenUK-basedterroristsandwiderAlQaedaand
AlQaeda-influencednetworksoperatingoverseas,theavailableevidenceatpresent
suggeststhattheterroristswhothreatentheUKareprimarilycitizensandresidents
ratherthanforeignnationals.WhilethereisnoUKterroristprofile,twothirdsofterrorist
suspectshavebeenBritishnationals,andveryfewhavebeenillegalimmigrants.Often
cleanskins(someonewithnohistoryorrecordofcriminalactivity),theyaremostly
Muslimmales,sometimesmarriedandwithchildren,andusuallyunder30yearsofage
(childrenasyoungas15havingbeenimplicated[BBC2008c]).Theycoverwide
educational,economicandemploymentspectrums.Thosethathavestudiedhaveusually
 79

donesointechnical,medicalorsciencefaculties.Theirknowledgeofreligionandpolitics
hasinitiallybeenscant(ACPO2008andTravis2008).
Theseterroristsaredrawnfromahugelydiverse19 andoverwhelminglylaw-abiding
populationofroughlytwomillionMuslimsintheUK,andthereappearstobeawell
establishedlinktoPakistan.Ofthe2,000suspectindividualsidentifiedintheUKbyMI5,
65percentareofPakistanioriginorheritage,andofthe200groupingsofconcerninthe
UK,60areintheManchester-Bradford-Leedsregion,wherethereisalargeconcentration
ofBritishcitizensofPakistanidescent(ACPO2008).Otherterroristsuspectshavebeen
ofAfrican,MiddleEasternorCaucasianbackground,withsomehavingfledtraumaand
persecutionintheircountriesoforigintoclaimasylumintheUK.
Explainingwhyanyindividualchoosestobecomeaterroristisfraughtwithdifficulty.Itis
notalwayssafeeventoassumealinearprocessofpassagefromtheradicalisationofan
individualsviewstothedecisiontobecomeanactiveterrorist.Theradicalisationprocess
presentscomplexissuesandtherearearangeoftheological,political,sociologicaland
psychologicalexplanationscoveredinrelevantjournalistic,academicandpolicyliterature
(forexample,Burke2008,Innes etal 2007,HMGovernment2006).Wedonotbelieveit
iswisetosearchforortoofferasingleexplanationforthisphenomenon.
Wedo,however,believethatterroristgroupsfunctionmosteffectivelywhenawider
tacitcircleofsupportiveopinioninsocietyappearstosuggestthattheactivitiesofthe
terroristsaresomehowjustified.Thattacitcircleofsupportiveopinionappearstoexistin
theUKandtobereflectedinvariousopinionpolls.20percentofadultBritishMuslims,
forexample,whensurveyed,saidtheyhadsympathywiththefeelingsandmotivesof
thosewhocarriedoutthe7July2005bombings(ICM/SundayTelegraph2006).In
anothersurvey,7percentagreedwiththestatementTherearecircumstancesinwhichI
wouldcondonesuicidebombingsonUKsoil(TheTimes2006).And,inathirdsurvey,
1.9percentequatingto38,000individualsdeclaredabeliefthatitisjustifiableto
commitactsofterrorismagainstciviliansintheUK(The1990Trust2006).
Webelievethesepollfindingsaresignificant,notbecausetheyimplyanysimplisticlink
betweensympatheticopinionsandadecisiontocarryoutactsofterrorismonthepart
ofanyparticularindividual,butbecausetheydemonstrateaclearbreakdownoftrust
betweenpublicauthorityinthiscountryandaverysignificantnumberofitscitizensand
becausetheypointtoafairlywidelyheldsetofbeliefsthatmayprovideasupportive
contextwithinwhichterroristgroupsandrecruiterscanthrive.Theyalso,moreover,point
toingredientsofthepoliticalcontextwithinwhichactsofterrorismaretakingplace.
ThatpoliticalcontextisoneinwhichtheMuslimpopulationoftheUKoverallsuffers
fromveryextensiveformsofsocialexclusion,beingunder-representedinallspheresof
publiclife,enjoyingverylimitedeconomicsuccessorsocialmobility,andsufferingvery
highlevelsofunemployment(Masood2006,MayorofLondon2006,Naqshbandi2006,
WiltonPark2006).Whileitwouldbeover-simplistictosuggestthatthisreality,andthe
corollaryperceptionofcommunitydeprivationandevenpersecutionitselfdrivesthe
19.OftheUKstwomillionMuslims,38
radicalisationprocess,itseemslikelythatthiscouldbeoneofarangeofbackground percentliveinandaroundLondon,
factorsthatmayberelevant. makingup8.5percentofthecapitals
population.ThediversityofLondons
Otherfactorscouldinclude: Muslims,whospeakover50languages,
isexceptionalandthereare
AsenseofalienationamongyoungergenerationsofMuslimswhofeelneitherclose concentrationsofspecificMuslim
communitiesinparticularpartsofthe
allegiancetothelesspoliticisedbeliefsoftheirparents,norasenseofacceptanceor city,suchasthatofBangladeshi
belonginginthecountryinwhichtheywerebornandarecitizens MuslimsintheEastLondonboroughof
TowerHamlets.OutsideLondon,there
PerceivedmisrepresentationofMuslimsbythemainstreammedia(68percentof areconcentrationsofPakistaniMuslims,
whosefamiliescamepredominantly
BritishMuslimsthinkthatMuslimsinBritainaresubjecttounjustifiedcriticism fromtheMirpurruralprovincein
[Channel42008]) southernPakistaniKashmir,in
Birmingham,Bradford,Blackburn,
Perceivedvictimisationbylawenforcementandsecurityagencies Burnley,Dewsbury,Glasgow,Leeds,
ManchesterandOldham.Justunder1
percentofBritishMuslimsareconverts
Specificindividualexperiencesofdiscriminationandinequality(asingleIslamophobic toIslam(thisgroupisoverrepresented
incidentcanbeatrigger) amongsuspectedterrorists).Britains
Muslimsarealsopredominantlyyoung,
Abeliefthatparticipationinthepoliticalprocess,eitherthroughelected withhalfagedbelow25.
representativesorformsofpublicpetitionandprotest,ispointless
80 Shareddestinies| ThreatsandrisksintheUK
Widerpolitical
realitiesand
perceptionsmust
alsobeaddressedby
policymakersinan
attempttowinthe
heartsandminds
ofthosecurrently
withinthetacitcircle
ofsupport
Subscriptiontoconspiracytheoriesinsomecases,forexample51percentofBritish
Muslimsaged18-24believethattheattacksof11September2001wereaconspiracy
bytheUSandIsrael(Channel42006);24percentofadultBritishMuslimsthinkthat
theBritishgovernmentorsecurityserviceswereinvolvedinsomewayinthe7July
2005bombings,andthesameproportiondonotbelievethatthefourmenidentified
asthebombersweretheonesactuallyresponsiblefortheattacks(Channel42007).
AnothersuchtheoryistheassertionthatPrincessDianawaskilledtostopher
marryingaMuslim.
Internationalfactorswhichmayberelevantincludeaperceptionthat:
Muslimlandsareshamefullyoccupied,colonised,orculturallysubjugatedbythe
hypocritical,neo-imperialistWest
TheWestismanipulatingtheprocessofglobalisationinadeliberateand
calculatedattempttoreplacetraditionalstructureswithWesternmodels
TheUKiscomplicitinaglobalattackonIslamoraconspiracytounderminethe
unityoftheummah,asevidencedbyeventssuchasthewarsinIraqand
Afghanistan.
Thefactthatthesefactorsmayberelevantdoesnotmeanthattheyarethecauses
ofterrorism,butitdoesmeanthatwhatevercounter-terrorismmeasuresmaybe
necessarytodealwiththeterroristthreatintheUKintheshortterm,itisclearthat
widerpoliticalrealitiesandperceptionsmustalsobeaddressedbypolicymakersinan
attempttowintheheartsandmindsofthosecurrentlywithinthetacitcircleof
support.Gainingtheirconsentisfundamentaltothesuccessofourcounter-terrorist
effort.Communitiescandefeatterrorism,butonlyifalltheirmemberswantto.
Moreover,itisurgentthatwegetontopofthesituationbothincounter-terroristterms
andinpoliticalterms.OntheonehandthisisbecauseterroristsoperatingintheUKare
likelytohaveplansthatgobeyondthekindsofterroristattacksalreadycarriedout.We
know,forexample,thattheyhavetheambitiontocarryoutattacksagainstelementsof
ourcriticalnationalinfrastructure.InMarch2004,policeraidedthehomeofOmar
Khyam,the24-year-oldringleaderoftheso-calledOperationCreviceplotandfound
CD-RomswithdetailedplansofBritainselectricityandgassystems.Khyamwasalso
recordedtalkingaboutaplannedsimultaneousattackonBritainsgas,electricityand
watersystems(Laville2006).Wehavealsoseenconvictionsofterroristsintentonusing
chemicalorbiologicalagents,suchasthe2005convictionofKamelBourgassfor
conspiringtogetherwithotherpersonsunknowntocommitpublicnuisancebytheuse
ofpoisonsand/orexplosivestocausedisruption,fearorinjuryintheso-calledWood
Greenricinplot.
Ontheotherhand,gettingtogripswiththeUKterroristthreatisalsoimportantfor
thesecurityofothersoutsidetheUK.TheUKhasbeenknowntoexportAlQaeda-
influencedterroristactivity.AsifMohammedHaniffromHounslow,WestLondon,for
example,becamethefirstforeignsuicidebomberinIsrael,killinghimselfandthree
othersinTelAvivinApril2003.RichardReidfromBromley,Kenttriedtoblowupan
AmericanAirlinesflightfromParistoMiamion22December2001withexplosives
concealedinhisshoes.AhmedOmarSaeedSheikhfromWalthamstow,EastLondon
mastermindedtheabductionanddecapitationofWallStreetJournalreporterDaniel
PearlinPakistanin2002.Someofthesemen,andmanyothers,wereencouragedin
theirradicalbeliefsatahandfulofBritains1,600masjids(mosques)bypreachersof
hatealsobasedinthiscountry,includingideologuessuchasAbuQatada,AbuHamza
al-Masri,OmarBakriMohammadandAbdullahelFaisal.
TheterroristthreatfacingtheUKisthereforereal,asarethepoliticalchallenges
associatedwithit,andwhileitdrawsinspirationfromoutsidethecountryitalsohas
rootshere.Politically,itisarguablythemosthigh-profilechallengefacingthecountry
andrespondingtoitcomprehensively,bothincounter-terrorismandinpoliticalterms,
mustbeapriority.
 81

TheUKandtransnationalorganisedcrime
Beyondthechallengeofterrorism,theUKisimpactedonandpenetratedby
transnationalorganisedcrime.ArecentThreatAssessmentfromtheSeriousOrganised
CrimeAgency(SOCA)estimatedtheoverallcosttotheUKeconomyofsuchcrime
(includingthecostoftacklingit)tobemorethan20billionayear(SOCA2008).
Thecriminalactivityinquestioncomesinanumberofdifferentforms.
Drugtrafficking,althoughdisruptedwithsomesuccessintheUKandabroad,isthought
tofeedanillicitmarketintheUKthatisworthbetween4billionand6.6billion
(SOCA2008).Itisalsobelievedthattherearearound300majordrugimporters,3,000
wholesalers,and70,000streetdealersoperatingthroughoutthecountry,supplyingan
estimated385,000problemdrugusersinEngland,WalesandScotlandaswellasa
largergroupofrecreationaldrugsusers.AstheSOCAThreatAssessmentnotes,both
marketsarecriticaltothesuccessandspreadofseriousorganisedcrime,enablingmore
drugstobebought,fundingotherformsofcrimeintheprocess,andsupportingcriminal
lifestyles(SOCA2008:32).
Widespreadabuseofaddictivedrugssuchasheroinandcocaineiscausingserioussocial
problems,bothintermsofthephysicalharmexperiencedbyusersandintermsof
relatedbreakdownsinfamilialandotherimportantsocialrelationships.Drugusealso
fuelsarangeofassociatedacquisitivecrimes,includingtheft,robberyandprostitution,
andcancausedeepriftsincommunities.TheHomeOfficehasestimatedthatClassA
drugusealonegeneratesanestimated15.4billionincrimeandhealthcostseachyear,
ofwhich99percentisaccountedforbyproblemdrugusers(HomeOffice2008).Illegal
drugusershereintheUK,bytheircomplicityinthisillicittrade,alsobothharmand
endangerindividualsandcommunitiesoverseasusuallythepoorinthecountriesfrom
whichthedrugscome.
DrugsentertheUKfromavarietyofsourcecountries.Afghanistanisofparticular
concern,sinceitistheoriginofmorethan90percentofboththeglobalandUKsupply
ofheroin.Intelligenceestimatessuggestthattheprimarytraffickingrouteforherointo
theUKisoverlandfromAfghanistan,viaIran,TurkeyandtheBalkans.Muchofthe
heroinseizedintheUKhasalsobeenfoundtohavebeentransporteddirectlyfrom
Pakistan.Meanwhile,Venezuela,ColombiaandPeruaretheworldsprimaryproducersof
cocaine,withthistypicallybeingshippedintoEuropeonmerchantvesselsandyachtsvia
SpainandHolland(McSweeneyetal2008).
Drugs,ofcourse,arenottheonlyproblem.Wealsohaveaseriousissueinrelationto
armstrafficking,particularlythetraffickingofsmallarmsandlightweapons.Theseoften
comefromconflict-proneregionsorfromstateswherelawenforcementisweakand
organisedcrimestrong.SmallarmsseizedatUKentrypointsinrecentyearshave
originatedfromanumberofdifferentcountries,includingbutnotlimitedtoAlbania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina,Bulgaria,CroatiaandLithuania,andareincreasinglybeing
smuggledinrelativelylargebatchesofupto30weaponsatatimebycrimegangsbased
inthesecountries.InsidetheUK,London,Manchester,BirminghamandLiverpoolserve
ashubsforcriminalsupplyanddistributionoftheseweapons,accountingforthefact
thatoverhalfofallrecordedguncrimesoccurintheMetropolitanPoliceDistrictof
London,GreaterManchesterandtheWestMidlands(SOCA2008).
Whileitisimportantnottogetthisproblemoutofproportion(during2006-7,the
HomeOfficerecordeda13percentfallinthenumberoffirearmsoffencesinEngland
andWalescomparedwiththepreviousyear),itisclearthatguncrimesaremost
pervasiveinthepoorerareasoftheUK,andoverlapwithareaswithlargedrugsmarkets.
Guncrimealsostillfeatureshighlyinpublicperceptionsofimportantissuesfacingthe
UK,promptedinlargepartbytheincreasingnumberofyoungpeopleinvolvedin
firearmoffences,andtheriseinthenumberofseriousinjuriescausedbyfirearmsinthe
10-18agerange(SOCA2008).
Organisedhumantraffickingandpeoplesmugglingaddfurthertothismix.TheUKisan
attractivedestinationforthosewishingtoenterthecountrylegitimatelyforthepurpose
ofworkorstudy.However,thepullfactorswhichencouragelegalmigrationastrong
82 Shareddestinies| ThreatsandrisksintheUK
20.See:Blanchfloweretal 2007,Gott
andJohnston2002,Sriskandarajahetal
2005,Ernst&Young2006,Portesand
French2005,Gilpinetal 2006,Home
Office2005andHansard2002.
21.Thenumberofindividualsresident
intheUKwhowerebornelsewhererose
from7.8percentto10.6percentof
thepopulationbetween2001and
2007.Partlyasaconsequenceofthis,
thenumberofUKresidentsofethnicity
otherthanWhiteBritishroseduringthe
sameperiodfrom13.1percentto18.6
percentofthepopulation(Labour
ForceSurveyandipprcalculations).
economyandrangeofemploymentopportunities,ourextensivestatesupportsystem
anddiversepopulationalsoappealtoillegalmigrants.Transnationalorganisedcrime
groupshavebeenquicktoexploitthisopportunity,andorganisedimmigrationcrimeis
nowaseriousproblemfortheUK,withsomeestimatingthatitiscostingthecountry
around3billionayearinlostrevenues(Eads2006).Immigrationcrimetakesanumber
offorms,withsomeorganisedcriminalgroupsarrangingthetransportofillegalmigrants
throughEuropeandintotheUKinordertousethemasasourceofcheapandcasual
labour.Othergroupsprovideservicessuchasthefalsificationofidentitydocuments,
workpermitsandvisas.
HumantraffickingisaconcernintheUKfortwoprimaryreasons.First,itsimpact
bothontheindividualvictims(whoareoftensmuggledintothecountryforthe
purposeofsexualexploitationfromtheBalkans,China,South-EastAsiaandAfrica)
anditscorrosiveimpactonourcommunities.Second,peoplesmugglingonalarge
scalehasthepotentialtounderminetrustintheUKimmigrationsystemandto
createadrawbridgementalityamongindigenouspeople.(Peoplesmugglingis
definedbySOCA2008asthefacilitationoftheillegalentryofapersonintoastate
ofwhichthepersonisnotanationalorpermanentresidentinordertoobtain,
directlyorindirectly,afinancialorothermaterialbenefit.)This,inturn,ifnot
properlyhandled,couldcometoundermineouropennessasacountryandto
threatenthebenefitsweaccruethroughbeinganopenandintegratedplayerinthe
modernglobaleconomy.
Thereissomecontroversyanddebateovertheextenttowhichcriminalsandterrorists
collaborateintheUKandtheevidenceseemsinconclusive.Theevidencethatdoesexist
relatesprimarilytothesharedmethodsandtacticsused.Terroristcellsactiveinthis
country,forexample,havebecomeincreasinglyreliantonlower-levelorganisedcrime
oftenperpetratedviatheinternetore-commercetosupporttheiractivities.
InternationalterroristinvestigationsconductedintheUKoverrecentyearshaverevealed
regularusebyterroristsofforgedtravelandidentitydocuments,andtheuseof
counterfeitmoneyorbankcardstoobtaincashandtomakephonecallsandpurchase
goods.Forexample,inApril2008Scottishpoliceuncoveredcreditcardfraudwitha
potentialvalueof1million,inwhichindividualshiredbyaninternationalterrorist
networkbribedpetrolstationemployeesinEdinburghinordertogainaccesstomore
than5,000creditcarddetails(Bain2008).
Ifterroristsandcriminalscanoperateinthesamemilieuforthispurpose,itmustbea
concernthattheycandosoforothers.Inparticular,andgiventhewidersecuritycontext
outlinedinearlierchapters,inwhichterroristsmayseektouseweaponsofmass
destructionordisruption,therehastobeaconcernthattheroutesandtacticsusedto
smugglepeople,drugsandsmallarmsintothecountrycouldalsobeusedtobringmore
destructiveweaponryandpartsforsuchweaponshere,too.Whenseeninthislight,
transnationalorganisedcrimemustbetreatednotjustasasocial,economic,and
policingproblembutalsoasapotentiallymajorthreattoUKnationalsecurity.Waiting
forclearerevidencethatcriminalscollaboratewithterroristsandviceversaisaluxurywe
cannotafford.
ThesecurityimplicationsofmigrationintotheUK
TheUKisadestinationofchoiceformanyinternationalmigrants.Duringthelast15
yearstherehasbeennetimmigrationintotheUK,broughtaboutbyasylummigrationat
theturnofthecentury,sustainedstudentmigration,and,morerecently,bylabour
migrationfrominsideandoutsidetheEU.Thismigrationisoverwhelminglypositivefor
theUK:immigrantsbolstertheUKeconomy,20 andthediversitytheybring21 servesoften
tostrengthencommunitycohesion(DCLG2008,Dorling2007),aswasdemonstratedin
London,themostdiversecityonearth,intheaftermathofthe7July2005terrorist
attacks(Hull2007).
Immigrationdoesalso,however,raisecertainsecurityissues,oftenfeltmostkeenlyby
immigrantcommunitiesthemselves,andsomeofwhichoverlapwiththeorganisedcrime
problemsjustdescribed.Forinstance,irregularimmigrants(alsodescribedasillegal,
 83

undocumentedorunauthorisedmigrants)areoftenvictimisedbyvirtueoftheir
necessarilytwilightexistence.Afraidofbeingdeported,andthereforeunwillingtoreport
crimescommittedagainstthem,suchvulnerableimmigrantsaresubjectedtowidespread
exploitationbygangmasters(BBC2007b)andpimps(MPA2002).
Theso-calledBattleofGreenLanesinHaringey,London,inNovember2002,whichleft
43-year-oldAlisanDogandeadand20peopleinjured,wassparkedbyrivalrybetween
heroin-dealinggangs,whosetradeandstrifeisbasedmoreinIstanbulthanLondon,in
thewordsofChiefSuperintendentStephenJames,thenHaringeyBoroughCommander
fortheMetropolitanPoliceService(Thompson2002).
Morewidely,migrantcommunitiesaresometimesimportersofoverseasconflictand
violenceontothestreetsoftheUK.ElementsoftheUKpopulationsupportivetotheSri
LankanTamilTigers,forexample,haveemployedextortionintheUKtoraisefundsfor
theircampaignsoverseasandpeoplewhohaveresistedtheirdemandshavebeen Migrant
attacked(HumanRightsWatch2006).Somalis,thefifthlargestrefugeepopulationin
theworld(Kleist2004)andthelargestrefugeecommunityinBritain(Rutter2006),have communitiesare
playedoutclanconflictsintheUK.This,mixedwithaviolentUKgangculture,is sometimes
thoughttohavebeenafactorintheassaultormurderofanumberofyoungSomalison importersof
thestreetsofLondoninrecentyears,suchasthebrutalkillingof18-year-oldMahir
OsmaninCamdenon28January2006(BBC2007a). overseasconflict
Thesearepowerfulillustrationsoftheglobalbecomingthelocal,andofthemore
andviolenceonto
negativeconsequences,forUKsociety,thatcanaccompanywidertrendsassociatedwith thestreetsof
globalisationanddemographicchange. theUK

EnergysecuritychallengesfortheUK
Britainsinterconnectednesswiththewiderworldeconomy,starklydemonstratedbythe
globalfinancialcrisis,isalsoevidentwhenitcomestosuppliesofenergy.Thisisbecause
theUKisbecomingmoreexposedtointernationalenergymarketsandtheireffects,
almostbytheday.
TheUKenergymix
Thecontextforthisisthataround90percentofthecountrysdemandforenergyis
nowmetfromthefossilfuelsoil,coalandgas.ThemainusetowhichtheUKputscoal
iselectricitygeneration,forwhichitiscurrentlyourmostimportantfuel.Aboutthree-
quartersoftheoilweusegoestothetransportsector,intheformofpetrolanddiesel
forroadvehicles,andasjetfuelforaviation(BERR2008a).Gas,whichnowmeetsmore
than40percentofourenergyneeds,isacrucialfuelfordomesticheatingandindustry,
andsincethedashforgasinthe1990shasalsobeenusedforelectricitygeneration.
Despitesomecontributionfromnuclear,andfutureplanstoincreaseboththatandthe
amountofenergycomingfromrenewablesources,forthenextdecadeatleast,this
basicrelianceonfossilfuelsislikelytocontinue.
DomesticUKproduction
WhileoilproductionfromtheUKContinentalShelf(UKCS)allowedtheUKtobean
exporterofoilfromthe1980sonwards,ouroilproductionhasnowpeakedandisin
decline,andtheUKislikelytobecomeentirelydependentonoilimportswithin20
years(BERR2007).GasproductionfromtheUKCSalsopeakedin1999,andsince
2004theUKhasbeenanetimporter(mainlyfromNorway).Oncurrentdemand
projections,by2020wewillalsohavetorelyonimportsforaround80percentofour
gasneeds(BERR2007).ThisshiftinUKproductionofoilandgasiscapturedin
Figure6.1(followingpage).
Thestoryforcoalissimilar.Importsofcoalhaverisensteadilysincethe1970s,andnow
meetaround70percentofdemand(Bird2007),thoughtheshiftfromdomestic
productionofcoaltoimportsisduetocostfactors,ratherthantoalackofUKphysical
reserves,whichremainconsiderable.
FutureUKenergyneeds
ThisshiftfromexportingenergytoimportingitishappeningevenasUKdomestic
demandforenergycontinuestoincrease.Historically,demandhasgrownasthe
84 Shareddestinies| ThreatsandrisksintheUK

Figure6.1:UKproductionofoilandgas,1970-2007

1,400,000 160,000

Oil production (thousand tonnes)

1,200,000 Total crude oil production 140,000

Gas production (GWh)

120,000
1,000,000
100,000
800,000
80,000
600,000
60,000
400,000
Total gas production 40,000
200,000 20,000
0 0

1970

1973

1976

1979

1982

1985

1988

1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

2006
Sources:BERR2008c,2008d

economyhasgrownbutatthesametimeouruseofenergyhasbecomemore
efficient.Asaresult,totaldemandforenergyintheUKhasgrownbyjustover4per
centsince1990(BERR2008b).Ifenergyisusedmoreefficiently,asprojectedinthe
2007EnergyWhitePaper,demandcouldfallbyaround6percentby2020(BERR
2008e),buteveninthatscenario,theUKwillstillbeconsumingenergyequivalentto
around140-150milliontonnesofoilineveryyearoverthenextdecade,andonmost
projections,demandforenergywillinanycasecontinuetogrow(BERR2007,Ryan
2007).
Moreover,asdemandincreasestheUKmustalsomeetaloomingelectricitygeneration
gap,becauseanumberofageingpowerstations(bothcoal-firedandnuclear)are
expectedtocloseby2015(BERR2007).Thisgap,too,willhavetobemet,toprevent
interruptionsinsupply,eitherfromnewcoal,gasorrenewablesources,because
althoughthereislikelytobearenaissanceinnuclearpowerinthelongerterm,thiswill
nothappenbefore2020,giventhetimetakentoapproveandbuildnuclearpower
stations.GiventhattherearerealquestionmarksovertheGovernmentsabilityfullyto
meetitsrenewableenergytargets,itisunlikelythatrenewablesourceswillcomeon
streamquicklyenough.Again,theimplicationseemstobesomecontinuedrelianceon
fossilfuelsandcontinuedconcernoverthesecurityoftheirsupply.
Implicationsforenergysecurity
ThisallleavestheUKinitsmostexposedpositionfordecadesintermsofitsexposure
toandrelianceoninternationalmarkets,andthisisaseriousconcernfortworeasons.
First,astheUKbecomesmorereliantonimports,thereisafearthatphysical
interruptionscausedbygeopoliticalfactorswillincrease(BERR2007,Bird2007,JESS
2006).Someofthisrelatestooil,andtoamedium-termincreaseinrelianceon
countriesthatmaybelessthanstableandreliable.
Mainly,however,intheshorterterm,theconcernisaboutgas.Unlikeglobally-traded
oilandcoal,gasimportscomemainlyfromaregionalmarketdominatedbyRussia,
andwhilethemajorityoftheUKscurrentgasimportscomefromNorway,with
liquefiednaturalgas(LNG)viatankerfromotherpartsoftheworldsettoplayan
increasingrole(HMGovernment2007,BERR2007)theroleofRussiaisgoingtobe
key.Thisis,first,becauseNorwayeffectivelypricesitsgasaccordingtothelevelset
bytheRussians(Helm2007).However,second,andevenmorefundamentally,itis
becauseinwinterUKgassuppliesdostilldependcriticallyonthesmallbutgrowing
volumeofgasimportedfromRussiaviacontinentalEurope.ThisgasreachestheUK
throughpipelinescontrolledbyenergycompaniesinotherEUcountries,whichtendto
meettheneedsoftheirowncustomersbeforeensuringasmoothsupplytotheUK.As
aresult,intightmarketsduringthewintermonths,supplycanbeconstrainedand
wholesalepricescanriseverysharply(HouseofCommonsBusinessandEnterprise
Committee2008).
 85

DuetothelongyearsofNorthSeaproduction,theUKalsoonlyhasasmallgasstorage
capacityabletoprovideabufferagainstshortterminterruptionsinsupplyorsudden
pricerises.
Inthiscontext,concernsaboutthereliabilityofRussiaasasupplierofgastoWestern
Europehavetobetakenseriously.Suchconcernsareheightenedbyageneralworsening
inrelationswithRussiafollowingitsinvasionofGeorgiaandbyeventssuchasthe
disputebetweenRussiaandUkraineinthewinterof2005/06,inwhichgaspressureto
someEuropeancountrieswasreduced(Helm2007).
Second,wearebecomingmoredependentonworldmarketsforenergyjustasthese
marketsaremovingfromalongperiodofstabilityandlowpricestooneofinstability
andhighprices,notonlyforoilandgas,butalsoforcoal.Oneimportanttrendisthat
productionnotonlyintheUKbutalsoinotherOECDcountries,includingtheUSand
Norway,hasbeeninlong-termdecline.Oilandgasproductionwillinfuturebe
increasinglyconcentratedinnon-OECDcountries,partlymajorOPECplayerssuchas
SaudiArabia,IranandKuwait,butalsocountriessuchasRussia,AzerbaijanandSudan
(EurActiv2008,Horsnell2008).Another,relatedtrend,aswenotedinChapter3,isthat
afteralongperiodofexcesssupply,theworldmarketforoilhasbecomeincreasingly
tightoverthelastfiveyears,asituationthatisexpectedtocontinueoverthelongterm,
evenifglobalrecessioneasesthepressureintheimmediatefuture(IEA2008,Euractiv
2008).
Thispictureisfurthercomplicatedbythefactthatincreasesindemandandhigherprices
havenotproducedtheexpectedincreaseinsupply.Whetherthisisduetoglobaloil
reservesrunningoutandproductionpeakingasaresultthepeakoilhypothesisis
thesubjectoffiercedebatebetweenpeakoilproponents(seeLeggett2005and
Simmons2005)andsceptics(seeHowellandNakhle2008).Whatisclear,however,is
thattheexpectedresponseofnewinvestmentinnewexplorationandexpanded
productionintheoilmarketsisnotfunctioningsmoothly.Behindthisisalongperiodof
under-investmentinrefinerycapacity.Butmorefundamentalisasetofdevelopments
concernedwithincentivesforoil-andgas-producingcountries.Theseproducersappear
increasinglyunwillingtoinvestlargesumsinnewexplorationandincreasingproduction
iftheythinktheirmarketsmaybeunderminedbyenergysavingandrenewableenergy
shiftsinEuropeanandAmericanmarkets(seeOstrovskyandDaneshkhuin2006,Blas
andKhalaf2007).Anotherissueisthatsomeproducers,nowrelativelywealthy,intend
tomeettheirexpandingdomesticconsumption,butareincreasinglyuninterestedin
exportingtoworldmarkets(ippr2008).
Theresultisaglobaloilmarketwithlowbufferstocksandpricesthatarehighly
sensitivetopotentialinterruptions,whethergeopolitical,suchasattacksoninstallations
inIraqandNigeria,orweather-related,suchashurricanesintheGulfofMexico.Thereis
someevidencethatthisvolatilityhasbeenfurtherincreasedbythespeculativeactivities
ofhedgefunds(AllsopandFattouh2008).Mostlong-termgassupplycontractsinthe
restofEuropearealsolinkedtooilprices22 sothegeneralriseandvolatilityinoilpricesis
thereforetransferreddirectlytogasmarketsaswell.
SomeofthesesamefactorsstrongdemandgrowthinAsia,togetherwithinvestment
lagsandeventsdisruptingproductionhavealsostartedtoappearintheglobalcoal
market,withpricesrisingsharplysincemid-2007(Lekanderetal 2008).
Itisnotanexaggeration,therefore,tosaythattheUKisenteringanewenergyworld,and 22.Theeffectofhighoilpricesfeeds
onethatposessomestarkchallengesforpolicymakers.Thesechallengesmustbehandled, throughtoUKgaspricesthroughthe
interconnectorpipelinebetween
moreover,withinapolicyframeworkthatcansimultaneouslyaddressissuesofsecurityof Zeebrugge(Belgium)andBacton.
supplywhilealsoaddressingthethreatofclimatechange.Failuretoaddressbothtogether Britainimportsgasthroughthe
interconnectorsotheoillinkedpriceof
wouldcauseenormousproblemsnotjustinternationallybutalsohereathome. EuropeangasdirectlyaffectsUKgas
prices.Duringthesummer,higher
Europeangaspricesmeanhigherprices
ClimatechangeimpactsontheUK intheUKasgasisexportedtoEurope.
Thisalsoincreasesthecostofputting
TheexactimpactofclimatechangeontheUKwillobviouslydependonfuture gasintostorageforthecomingwinter.
greenhousegaslevelsandonanymitigationandadaptationmeasuresthatareputin Sotheoilpricerisesaffectwinterprices
toothroughhigherstoragecosts
placetolimitit.Thatsaid,however,someoutlineeffectsarealreadyclear.Undermost (Ofgem2005).
86 Shareddestinies| ThreatsandrisksintheUK

models,thesewillincludeacombinationofbothmoreextremeweatherevents,suchas
heatwaves,stormsandflooding,andageneralriseinlandandseatemperatures.(Note
thatsomeofourdiscussionhereisbasedonanassumptionofwarmingtemperatures.
However,weacknowledgethattherearestillquestionmarksoverthelikelyeffectsof
greenhousegasemissions,withagrowingbodyofopinionfocusingonpossiblechanges
totheGulfStreamthatmayfollowArcticmelting.Thiscouldcauseacoolinginthe
NorthEastAtlantic,makingtheBritishclimatecolder,especiallyinwinter.)
DespitecommonlyperceivedbenefitsofhighertemperaturesintheUK,suchasless
wintertransportdisruption,reduceddemandforwinterheating,andfewerhealth-
relatedconcerns,theproblemsassociatedwithmoreextremeweatherandhigher
temperatureswillcertainlyoutweighanysuchbenefits(UKCIP2005).Floodingand
extremeweatherwillnotonlyspelldisasterforhundredsofthousandsofpeoples
homesintheUK,butwillalsodamageaspectsofthecountrysinfrastructureand
agriculture.Highertemperaturesandhottersummerswillalsoexacerbatewater
scarcity,particularlyintheSouthEast,increasethefrequencyofdroughts,disrupt
agriculturalproductivity,raisemortalityrates,andincreasedemandforenergy.The
economicconsequencesareexpectedtobesignificant,aspressureonstateand
privatebudgetstomeetthecostsofrepairingdamagedonebysevereweather,
combinedwithhigherinsurancepremiums,putsadditionalstrainonmanypartsofthe
economy.
Whileitishardtopinparticularcurrentweathereffectsdirectlytohuman-madeCO2
emissions,somechangesarealreadyapparent.Thereisevidenceofdecreasedrainfallin
summerandincreasedraininwinter(UKCIP2008).UKCIPalsoestimatesthatwinters
willbecomewetterbyupto15percentbythe2020sandbyupto25percentbythe
2050sforsomeregionswhilesummerswillbe20percentdrierbythe2020sand40per
centdrierbythe2050s.Thispatternisalreadyevidentoverthepastcentury,as
presentedinFigure6.2.

Figure6.2:WinterandsummerrainfallinEnglandandWales,1853-2003

300 Winter

250

200 Summer
Rainfall (mm)

150

100

50

0
1853 1883 1913 1943 1973 2003
Year
Source:OfficeforNationalStatistics2008

Severewindstormshavealsobecomemorefrequentinrecentdecades,inpartdueto
sea-surfacetemperaturerisesaroundtheUKofabout0.7Coverthepastthreedecades
(UKCIP2008).Partlyasaresult,climatechangeisindirectlyincreasingtheriskof
floodingintheUKandinfrastructuredamagefromfloodingandstormsisexpectedto
escalate,particularlyincoastalareas.InEnglandandWales,overfourmillionpeople,and
propertiesvaluedintotalatover200billion,areatriskofdamagefromflooding
(Foresight2004).FloodlossesandfloodmanagementcurrentlycosttheUKabout2.2
billioneachyear,butprojectedcostsofdamagefromfuturefloodingrangebetween1
billionand27billionperannumbythe2080s,dependingonthemodelused(UKCIP
2005).Furthermore,annualdamagesassociatedwithcoastalerosionasaresultof
floodingareexpectedtoincreasebetweenthreeandninetimes,costingupto126
millionbythe2080s(Foresight2004).
 87

TheeffectsofextremeweatheronUKnationalinfrastructurearelikelytoprovecostly,
dangerousanddisruptive.Railwaysthattravelclosetothecoast,inSouthWestEngland
forexample,arethreatenedbystormsurges,hightides,coastalfloodingandcliff
instability;telecommunicationssystemsareexpectedtoexperiencemoredowntimeasa
resultofextremeweather;andLondonisatparticularrisk,vulnerabletotidalsurges
fromtheThames,localfloodingasaresultofinefficientdrainagefailingtocopewith
intenserain,andriveroverflowsintoitsfloodplain.Mostofthecity,andanestimated
125billionworthofitsassets,iswithinthefloodplainoftheThamesanditstributaries
(AssociationofBritishInsurers2005).
The2007summerfloods
Thefloodsof2007mustbeseenasatasterofwhatistocome.Inthatinstance13
peoplelosttheirlives,approximately48,000householdsandnearly7,300businesses
wereflooded,andbillionsofpoundsworthofdamagewasdone.Infrastructurewas
severelyaffectedinGloucestershire:350,000peoplewereleftwithoutmainswater
supplyorpowersupplies,andinmanyotherflood-affectedareastransportlinksand
telecommunicationsweredisrupted.Thefarmingsectorwasoneofthemostseverely
affectedpartsoftheeconomy.Croplosseswerehuge,particularlysincetheflooding
occurredduringthepeakproductionperiodofthesummermonths.Approximately
42,000hectaresofagriculturallandacrossEnglandwereflooded,15,600ofwhichwere
grasslandusedforgrazing,hayandsilagefields.Intotalthefloodedareaconstituted0.5
percentofEnglandstotalagriculturalarea.
Itisalsoestimatedthatbetween2,600and5,000farmswereaffected,rangingfrom
partialcroplossestototalcroploss,totallinganestimated11.2million(Pitt2008).
Althoughonlyarelativelysmallareawasaffectedandtherewasnodiscernableimpact
onfoodpricesnationally,theimpactandscaleoffloodinginthefutureareexpectedto
bemuchworse(GreaterLondonAuthority2002).
Therehasbeenmuchdebateabouttheroleofclimatechangeinthe2007floods,asother
naturallyoccurringeventssuchasthepositionofthePolarFrontJetStreamandhighNorth
Atlanticsea-surfacetemperatureshavealsobeenblamed.However,evidencesupportsthe
viewthatthelocationandstrengthofthePolarFrontJetStreamissubjecttowarmersea
temperaturesaconsequenceofclimatechangeandthatclimatechangeistherefore
implicated(Pitt2008).Furthermore,althoughtheassociatedriverfloodingdoesnot
conformtothecurrentclimatechangescenarioofdriersummers,itisclearthatthe2007
floodsweretheresultofextremeweatherintheformofintensesummerstorms,whichare
expectedtoresultfromclimatechangeinthefuture(seeMarshandHannaford2007).

TheriskofpandemicdiseasetotheUK
Finally,inthisreviewofthethreatsandrisksfacingtheUK,wereturntotheriskto
publichealthandsafetyfromadiseasepandemic.23 TheUKmustexpectandbereadyto
dealwiththisintheyearsahead.Weareaglobalhubforthemovementofpeopleand
goods,withanestimated218millionpassengerjourneysand440milliontonnesof
freightcrossingtheUKbordereachyearandwithfurtherincreasesinthesenumbers
expected(CabinetOffice2007b).Intheworldofmorethreatening,moredrugresistant,
andnewlyemergingdiseasesoutlinedattheendofChapter5,wemustrecognisethat
wearenotonlyopenforbusinessbutalsovulnerabletoimporteddisease.
TheGovernmentacknowledgedthisinAugust2008,whenitpublishedaNationalRisk
Register,settingoutitsassessmentofarangeofdifferentrisksthatmaydirectlyaffect
theUK.Toppingthislistwasthethreatofpandemicinfluenza,bothintermsofrelative
likelihoodandrelativeimpact(CabinetOffice2008b).Differentdiseases,ofcourse,
23.AccordingtotheWorldHealth
wouldhavedifferenthealthandwidersocio-economicimplicationsbuttodemonstrate Organization,apandemiccanstart
theseriousnessofthepossibleimpactsandissuesraisedbypandemicdisease,wefocus whenthreeconditionshavebeenmet:
theemergenceofadiseasenewtothe
belowontheprojectedimpactsontheUKofaninfluenzapandemic. population;theagentinfectshumans,
causingseriousillness;theagent
Impactsofaninfluenzapandemic spreadseasilyandsustainablyamong
Healthimpacts humans.Adiseaseorconditionisnota
pandemicmerelybecauseitis
AninfluenzapandemicwouldhaveseverehealthimpactsintheUK,as,unlikeseasonal widespreadorkillsmanypeople;itmust
influenza,themajorityofpeopleaffectedbyapandemicviruswouldhavenoimmunity. alsobeinfectious.
88 Shareddestinies| ThreatsandrisksintheUK

Asaresult,thediseasewouldspreadrapidlyandcausewidespreadpublichealth
damage.Withestimatedclinicalattackrates(thepercentageofthepopulationwho
becomeillfrominfectionbyaspecificvirus)anywherebetween25and50percent
(LondonResilience2007),theDepartmentofHealthhasforecastthataninfluenza
pandemiccouldinfectuptohalfoftheUKpopulation,andcausebetween50,000and
750,000deathsoverandabovetheusualmortalityrate(CabinetOfficeandDepartment
ofHealth2007).InLondonspecifically,excessdeathfiguresrangefrom7,200(fora25
percentclinicalattackrateanda0.4percentcasefatalityratethepercentageof
peoplewhosubsequentlydiefromtheinfection)to89,700(fora50percentclinical
attackrateanda2.5percentcasefatalityrate)(LondonResilience2007).
AcuteRespiratoryInfections(ARIs),thecategoryunderwhichpandemicinfluenzafalls,
areconsideredtobeparticularlydamagingintermsofpublichealthimpactbecausenot
onlyaretheyfast-movingandhighlyinfectious,butmanycarriersofARIsdonot
developsymptomssevereenoughtobereportedtolocalhealthauthorities,allowing
extensiveandundetectedtransmissioninaveryshorttimeperiod(Foresight2007).
Evenwithrelativelylowinfectionrates,anypandemicoutbreakwillplaceincreasedstrain
ontheUKsNationalHealthService,creatingparticularpressuresacrossprimarycare,
communityhealthservices,socialcareandthehospitalsector.Capacityproblemsmay
ariseaspandemicflucasesareprioritisedaboveother,non-criticalcases(Departmentof
Health2007).
Economicimpacts
Beyondlossoflifeandpressureonhealthservices,therewouldalsobeeconomic
impactsand,intheabsenceofquickandeffectiveactiononthepartofthe
Government,thoseeconomicimpactscouldbedire.
ApandemicoutbreakcouldhaveanegativeimpactontheUKsabilitytodeliver
essentialservices,couldresultinlowerproductionlevelsandpotentiallyleadto
shortagesofessentialgoodsandproblemswithdistributionchains,allofwhichcould
leadtooveralleconomiclosses(CabinetOffice2008b).Individualbusinesseswouldalso
feeltheeffectsofapandemic,particularlyifthevirusaffectspeopleofworkingage.
Reducedstaffnumbersasaresultnotonlyofillnessbutofabsenteeismduetotransport
disruption,bereavement,theneedtocareforothers,andfearofinfectioncouldallhave
damagingknock-oneffectsforbusinesscontinuity,especiallyforthosebusinesseswith
weak(ornon-existent)businesscontinuityplans(CabinetOfficeandDepartmentof
Health2007).
Illness-inducedabsencefromworkof25percentofemployeesoverthecourseofone
influenzapandemic(whichisonlyhalfofwhatmightbeexpectedinawidespread
pandemicoutbreak),couldreducetheyearsGDPbybetween3billionand7billion.
FurtherprematuredeathscouldcauseadditionallossestooverallGDPintherangeof
1-7billion,dependingonfatalityrates.Overallitisestimatedthatasingleinfluenza
pandemichasthepotentialtoreducecurrentyearGDPintheUKby0.75percent
(CabinetOfficeandDepartmentofHealth2007).(Thesepredictionsassumethata
proportionoflostoutputduetoabsenteeismwillbemadeupbyunaffectedworkersand
bytheresumptionofnormalworkingpatternsoncetheoutbreakhasended.)
MorealarmingfigureshavebeenproducedbyresearchersatNottinghamUniversity,who
havesuggestedthatanavianflupandemiccouldcauseUKGDPtodeclinebyupto95
billion,or8percent.Thesamestudyshowedthat941,000jobscouldbelost,totalling
3.3percentoftotalemployment(BlakeandSinclair2005).
Moreover,ifapandemicoutbreakresultedintheneedtorestrictthemovementof
humansandcargothroughairportsandports,thiswouldimpactontradeandcause
furthereconomicdamage.Ithasbeensuggestedthatthelossofexportincomedueto
two-monthborderclosureswithnon-EUcountrieswouldbeapproximately13billion,
whilelossofincomeduetotwo-monthborderclosureswithEUandnon-EUcountries
wouldbe32billion(CabinetOffice2007a).Themedicalconsensus,however,appears
tosuggestthatthereisnopointintheUKtryingtoshutitsbordersonceapandemic
starts,irrespectiveofwhatothercountriesdo,andhoweverloudanymediaorpublic
clamourtodosomaybe.
 89

Impactsonsociety
Thesocialandpsychologicalimpactsofaninfluenzapandemiccouldalsobe
considerable.
FurthermodellingcarriedoutbytheUniversityofNottinghamshowsthatapandemic
outbreakofavianinfluenzacoulddirectlyaffectupto15millionpeopleintheUKovera
periodoffourmonths(BlakeandSinclair2005).Thiswouldeitherbebycontracting
avianflu,havingafamilymemberinfected,contractinganotherformoffluandbeing
restrictedfromnormalactivitiesasaprecaution,orbeinginanareaofhighincidence
andbeingquarantinedasaresult.Heightenedlevelsofconcernamongthepopulation
intheeventofanoutbreakarethereforeinevitable,aspeoplecometotermswith
changestotheirdailylivesandtheloss(orprospectiveloss)oflovedones.
TheemergenceofatrulyglobalpandemiccouldalsoresultinthereturntotheUKof
largenumbersofBritishnationalsnormallylivingabroad,ofwhomtherearecurrently
5.5million(DrewandSriskandarajah2006).Largenumbersofpeoplereturningtothe
UKinarelativelyshorttimeperiodmayhavesignificantsocialeffectsupontheareasin
whichtheychoosetoresettle,evenifonlytemporarily(CabinetOffice2008b).
Effectivepubliccommunicationstrategiescandomuchtoallaypublicfears,butin
extremecases,certainfactorssuchasmedicalcarebeingprioritised,quarantine
measuresbeingimplementedandthedeliveryofessentialservicesandgoodsbeing
disruptedmayresultincivildisorderifappropriatemeasurestomitigatesuch
circumstancesarenottakenswiftly.
Giventheseprojectedimpacts,andthewiderbackdropofpeoplemovementonan
unprecedentedscale,Britainsroleasaglobalhub,andtheprospectbothofnewly
emergingdiseasesandapossiblyheightenedthreatfromtheuseofdiseaseasaweapon
byterrorists,itisclearthatglobalandnationalhealthsecuritypolicymustbeafforded
elevatedstatusbypolicymakersconcernedwithsecurityandpublicsafety.

SummaryofChapter6
Thischapterhasoutlinedsomeofthesecurityandpublicsafetyissuesandchallenges
directlyfacingtheUK,amongthemthethreatsfromterrorismandtransnational Thereare
organisedcrime,thedangersposedbydiseasepandemicsandsevereweather,the questionsaboutthe
challengesposedbyincreasedexposuretoworldenergymarketsandincreased adequacyofthe
internationalpoliticalpressure,andsomeofthesecurityimplicationsassociatedwith
migrationflows. countrysnational
Britainthereforenotonlyfaceshomegrownsecuritythreats,risksandvulnerabilities
infrastructureand
butisalsodeeplypenetratedby,dependentupon,andlockedintotheinternational ourabilitytoprove
economyandtherapidlyexpandingtransnationalsocietythatisafeatureof aresilientsociety
globalisation.Thischapterhasshown,too,thatBritainislikelytosufferdirectlyasa
resultofclimatechangeandthattherearequestionsabouttheadequacyofthe
andeconomyinthe
countrysnationalinfrastructureandourabilitytoprovearesilientsocietyandeconomy faceofshocks,
inthefaceofshocks,whethernaturalorhuman-made. whethernaturalor
Clearly,thispresentsmanyquestionsforpolicymakers. man-made
90 Shareddestinies| ConclusiontoPart2:Aworldofshareddestinies

ConclusiontoPart2:
Aworldofshareddestinies
Inthefourchaptersinthispartofourreport,wehaveidentifiedmanyoftheunderlying
andinter-relatedtrendsanddriversthatareshapingtheinternationalandnational
securityenvironment.Globalisation,demographicchange,povertyandinequality,
climatechangeandscientificandtechnologicaladvancehaveallbeenconsidered.Each
ofthesehasbeenshowntobeimpactingontherangeofissuesfacingpolicymakers.
Somearedrivingandfeedingexistingpatternsofviolentconflictandthetendency
towardsstateweaknessandfailure.Someareredistributingpowerandinfluenceamong
states,openingupnewpointsofcompetitivepressureandpossiblyconflictbetween
themintheprocess.Otherssuggestthepossibilityofnewweaponsorarefacilitatingthe
emergenceofflowsofpeople,goodsandcapitalaroundtheworldandwiththatthe
creationofatransnationalsocietywithadarkundersideofcriminalandterroristintent.
Wehavenotedaserioussituationinrelationtoviolentconflictandhaveidentified
countrieswebelievetobeatgreatriskofeitherfurtherconflictorstatefailureinthe
yearsahead.Amongthemarenuclear-armedPakistanwhichoccupiesacrucialposition
inrelationtotheconflictwithAlQaedaandtheTalibaninAfghanistan,andseveral
statesinregionsofresourceandenergyimportanceinCentralAsia,thePersianGulfand
Africa.Wehavenotedthelinksbetweentransnationalcrime,conflictandthespreadof
diseaseandhaveanalysednotonlythethreatofbiologicalandwiderCBRNterrorism,
butalsothedangersandgovernanceweaknessesassociatedwithsomeofthemore
pressingchallengesinglobalpublichealth.
Wehavedemonstrated,too,thatinsecuritytermstheUKisnotanisland.Thecountry
notonlyhashomegrownterroristchallenges,butitisalsoreliantonimportedsources
ofenergyindifficultmarketcircumstances,andisincreasinglyopennotonlyforlegal
tradeandmovementbutalso,inherently,tocriminalandterroristpenetrationandtothe
vulnerabilitiesthatcomewithbeingaglobalhubinaworldofpeoplemovementonan
unprecedentedscale.
ThissituationsuggestsanumberofpressingpolicychallengesfortheUK.Achievinga
satisfactoryoutcometotheconflictinAfghanistanisone,forexample,becauseifitcan
beachievedthecitizensofthiscountrywillbesaferfromAlQaeda,andthedrainonour
economyandsocietyfromillegalinflowsofAfghanheroinwillbereduced.Limitingour
exposuretoRussianenergyinfluence,andourrelianceonunstableorpolitically
questionableenergyproviderselsewhere,isanother.
Theconclusionstobedrawnfromtheanalysispresented,however,gomuchwiderthan
this.Bothindividuallyandcollectivelyglobalisation,demographicchange,povertyand
inequality,climatechange,andtheprocessofscientificandtechnologicaladvanceare
creatinganewsetofdynamicsandanewsetofchallengesforpolicymakerstodeal
with.Thedistributionofpowerbetweenstatesischangingandthismay meanmore
instabilityandconflictintheyearsaheadiftheprocessofchangeisnotwellmanaged.
Non-stateactorsareincreasinglyimportantbothintheirownright,butalsoduetotheir
capacitytoinfluencetheverycharacterandbehaviourofstates.Poverty,inequalityand
conflictareinteractinginpartsofthedevelopingworldtocreateinstabilityanda
growingproblemofungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspaces.Theseinturnare
becomingjumpingoffpointsforterroristgroupsandtransnationalcriminalgangsintent
onexportingharmtotheUKandotherlocations.
Wearewitnessingenvironmentaldamageandresourcestressonenergy,waterandfood
sourcesinparticularwithapotentialforsuchdamageandstressnotonlytobecome
independentdriversoftensionandconflictbutalsotofuelotherrelatedbutdistinct
dynamicsofinter-staterivalryandpoliticalconflict.Closertohome,wehavewitnessed
theemergenceofarangeofnewandchangedsocio-economicvulnerabilitieswithinthe
UK,partlyasaresultofourinterfacewiththeglobaleconomy,partlyduetothe
 91

changestodomesticbusinesspractices,economicsystemsandinfrastructuresthat
togethergotomakeupthemoretightlycoupledsocietythatwehavedescribed,and
partlybecauseofalreadyvisibleextremeweathereventsassociatedwithclimatechange.
Againstthisbackdropwedrawtwowiderconclusions.
First,tosomeextentandinrelativeterms,webelievewearewitnessingadowngrading Stateactorshave
oftheabilityofstateinstitutionstocontrolthesecurityenvironmentandtoprovide
publicprotection.Powerhasmovedtonewlocationsandthemechanismsof literallylostprimary
accountablepubliccontrolhavenotmovedwithit.Thisisevidentinthepotentialendto controlofsome
statemonopolisationofweaponsofmassdestruction,inthereducedcapacityof territoriesand
individualstatestodelivertheirownsecurityinaworldofinterdependenceandinthe
proliferationofungovernedspacesintheinternationalsystem.Stateactorshaveliterally environments
lostprimarycontrolofsometerritoriesandenvironments,astheearlierdiscussionof
weak,failedandfailingstatesandencryption-protectedpartsoftheinternetmakes
clear.Moreover,onsomeissuessuchasclimatechange,wherewehavenotyetbeen
abletoconstructeffectivemultilateralgovernanceframeworks,thereisevenaquestion
markoverthecurrentcapacityoftheentirecommunityofstates,actingcollectively,to
deliverwhatisnecessaryforsecurity.
Second,andconsistentwiththisdevelopment,itfollowsthatnoindividualstateor
government,nomatterhowpreponderant,hasthepowertoguaranteeitsownsecurity.
Wenowliveinaworldofshareddestiniesinwhichinsecuritiesorpolicyfailingsinone
partofthesystemquicklygeneratepolicyproblemsandinsecuritiesinothers.Thebasic
realityofwhatwehavejustwitnessedintheglobalfinancialsystemappliestothe
securityenvironment,too.Inthisenvironment,werelyoneachotherforsecurityand
securitymusteitherbecommontoallindividuals,communitiesandstatesoritwillnot
beenjoyedbyany.
Norcanwhatthismeansforpracticalpolicybedecoupledfromthewiderglobalcontext:
massiveshiftsinpower;thelossofAmericanpoliticalandfinancialhegemony;huge
globalinequalities;andvastnumbersofpeoplelivinginpoverty,manyinthelarge
numberofweakandfailingstatesintheinternationalsystem.Thisisnotahopeful
startingpointfromwhichtobuildcommonsecurityanditisnotanylongeracontextin
whichtheUK,actingalone,canexertdecisiveinfluence.Totheextentthatwecanplay
arole,however,wemustaddressnotonlyspecificsecurityissuesbutalsothewider
structuralcontextthatgivesrisetothem.How,forexample,dowebuildeffective
multilateralisminanincreasinglymultipolarworld?Howcanwebuildstabilityandpeace
inaworldinwhichfouroutofeveryfivehumanbeingsisstrugglingforbasicsurvival?
WereturntosomeofthesechallengesinChapters8and9,andwilladdressthemagain
inourfinalreport.Nextweturntoabriefdescriptionofcurrentgovernmentpolicyin
responsetothechallengesweface.
PART3:
CurrentUK
securitypolicy
94 Shareddestinies| CurrentUKsecuritypolicy

7.CurrentUKsecuritypolicy

Therehasbeenmuchgovernmentactivityonsecuritypolicyinrecentyearsinresponse
tothechangedsecuritylandscapedescribedinearlierchapters.TheUKGovernmenthas
madeanumberofstructuralchangestoitsinternalmachinery,hasmadesomerelevant
changestothelegislativeframework,andhaspublisheditspolicyinanumberof
importantdocuments,notablytheNewChapter(2002)oftheStrategicDefence
Review,whichsetsouttheArmedForcescontributiontocounter-terrorism,the
comprehensiveUKcounter-terrorismstrategyknownasCONTEST(2006),thenew
strategicframeworkfortheForeignandCommonwealthOffice(2008),theNationalRisk
Register(2008),andthefirsteversingle,overarchingNationalSecurityStrategy(2008).
Inthischapter,wedescribethemainchangestostructureandlegislationandsummarise
theGovernmentsownaccountofitspolicypositionsandpracticesastheyrelateto
theissueswithwhichweareconcerned.Wealsooutlinenotabledifferencesbetweenthe
twomainoppositionpartiesandtheGovernment,beforegoingontoabriefoverall
assessmentoftheGovernmentscurrentactivities.

Themachineryofgovernment
Themachineryofgovernmenthasbeendevelopedinanumberofareasinrecentyears.
Significantdevelopmentsinclude:
Theestablishmentin2001oftheConflictPreventionPools,jointlyadministeredby
theForeignandCommonwealthOffice(FCO),theDepartmentforInternational
Development(DfID)andtheMinistryofDefence(MoD),whichhavebeenfusedinto
asingle327millionGlobalConflictPreventionPoolin2008
ThecreationoftheCivilContingenciesSecretariatwithintheCabinetOfficein2001,
tojoinupgovernmentthinkingonpreparednessformajoremergencies
TheestablishmentoftheJointTerrorismAnalysisCentre(JTAC)in2003,bringing
togetherexpertsfromtheSecurityService(MI5),theSecretIntelligenceService(MI6)
andGovernmentCommunicationsHeadquarters(GCHQ)withothersfromthe
DefenceIntelligenceStaff,theFCO,theHomeOfficeandthePolicetoanalyseall-
sourceintelligenceontheactivities,intentionsandcapabilitiesofinternational
terroristswhomaythreatenUKandalliedinterestsworldwide
Thecreationin2007ofregionalpoliceCounterTerrorismUnits(CTUs),Counter
TerrorismIntelligenceUnits(CTIUs)andSecurityServiceStations(RGs)tospreadand
decentralisepoliceandMI5counter-terroristactivity
TheformationoftheCentrefortheProtectionofNationalInfrastructure(CPNI)in
2007toprovideprotectivesecurityadvicetobusinessesandorganisationsacrossthe
nationalinfrastructure
Theadventin2006oftheSeriousOrganisedCrimeAgency(SOCA)asanExecutive
Non-DepartmentalPublicBody
ThecreationoftheOfficeofSecurityandCounter-Terrorism(OSCT)withintheHome
Officein2007tocoordinateCONTESTacrossgovernment
TheformingoftheUnitedKingdomBorderAgency(UKBA)in2008tojoinupthe
authoritiesefforttosecureUKborders
TheconstitutionoftheCabinetCommitteeonNationalSecurity,International
RelationsandDevelopment(NSID)in2007tooverseethenationalsecurityeffort
TheestablishmentofaNationalSecurityForum(nominationshavenowbeensought
foritsinterimmembership)tobringtogethercivilservantsacrossdepartmentsand
securitypractitionersfromoutsidegovernment.
 95

Thelegislativeframework
Inadditiontothesechangesinthemachineryofgovernment,newsecurity-orientated
legislationhasbeenintroducedtothestatutebooks.Keydevelopmentsherehave
included:
TheRegulationofInvestigatoryPowersAct2000(RIPA),whichregulatesstate
surveillanceandinformationgatheringforsecurityandotherpurposes
TheTerrorismAct2000(TACT),whichcreatedasnewoffencesthecommissioning,
preparationorinstigationofactsofterrorism,enhancespolicepowers,andproscribes
terroristgroups
TheAnti-Terrorism,CrimeandSecurityAct2001(ATCSA),which,foratime,
legitimisedtheindefinitedetentionwithoutchargeofforeignnationalssuspectedof
terroristinvolvementinBelmarshprison,pendingdeportation,untilin2004theLaw
LordsruledthistobeincompatiblewiththeEuropeanConventiononHumanRights
TheCivilContingenciesAct2004(CCA),whichenablespreparationforemergencies
anddisasters
ThePreventionofTerrorismAct2005(PTA),whichcontroversiallyintroducedcontrol
orders(preventativeordersthatplaceobligationsonindividualsthataredesignedto
prevent,restrictordisrupttheirsuspectedinvolvementinterrorism-relatedactivity)
TheTerrorismAct2006,whichenactedasoffencesactspreparatorytoterrorism,such
asitsencouragement,disseminationofterroristpublications,andterroristtraining
TheCounterTerrorismBill2008,whichisbeingdebatedinParliamentatthetimeof
writingthisreport.FollowingnarrowvictoryintheHouseofCommonsand
overwhelmingdefeatintheHouseofLords,theGovernmentshelvedplanstoextend
stillfurtherto42daysthemaximumperiodofdetentionwithoutchargeforsuspected
terrorists.Italsodroppedproposalsforsecretinquests.Proposalsremainforpost-
chargequestioning,longerterrorismsentences,aterrorismregisterandmonitoring
regime,changestorulesregardinginterceptionofcommunications,andnewpowers
bothfortheseizureofassetsandforthegatheringofevidence.
Policy
Itisinthecontextofthesestructuralandlegislativechangesthatsubstantive
governmentpolicyonthethreatsandhazardscoveredearlierinthisreportisdevised
anddelivered.Herewedescribethispolicyasitrelatestostate-ledthreats,nuclear
non-proliferation,andconflictontheonehand,andtoterrorism,transnational
organisedcrimeandcivilcontingenciesontheother.Wedonotofferinthesesections
anycommentorjudgementonthepoliciesoutlined:thematerialbelowisdescriptive
only,largelypresentingtheGovernmentsownaccountoftheactivitiesinwhichitis
engaged.Wepasscommentontheoverallsuitabilityandeffectivenessofpolicyatthe
endofthechapter,andviaourrecommendationsforfurtheractioninanumberof
areasinChapter9.

State-ledthreatsandinter-staterelations
State-ledthreatstoUKsecurityareallbutdiscountedintheGovernmentsNational TheGovernment
SecurityStrategyand,aswesaidinChapter6,wedonotfocuscloselyontheminthis
report.TheGovernmentassesses,rightlyinourview,thatnostateoralliancewillhave
assesses,rightlyin
boththeintentandthecapabilitytothreatentheUKdirectlyfortheforeseeablefuture. ourview,thatno
Thatsaid,wehavealsopointedoutthatareturntocompetitionandconflictbetween stateoralliancewill
majorpowersintheinternationalsystemcannotbewhollyruledout.Governmentpolicy
clearlymustinsureagainstthatpossibility.
haveboththe
intentandthe
TheGovernmentsresponsetopossiblefuturestate-ledthreatshasbeencontinued
emphasisonthepartnershipwiththeUnitedStates,NATO,andtheEUandsupportfor capabilityto
somenewdefencecapabilityacquisitions.Thelatterhasincludeddecisionstobuildtwo threatentheUK
65,000tonneaircraftcarriersequippedwithadvancedmulti-rolestrikeaircraft,the directlyforthe
renewaloftheUKsTridentnuclearweaponscapability,andsupporttoUSplansfor
furthermissiledefenceassetsinEurope. foreseeablefuture
96 Shareddestinies| CurrentUKsecuritypolicy
Importantthreats
toglobalsecurity,
unlikeinthepast,
maynowcomenot
fromstrongstates,
butfromweak
ones
Inaddition,theGovernmenthasreactedtothechangingdistributionofpowerbetween
statesbycallingforanexpansionofthepermanentmembershipoftheUnitedNations
SecurityCouncil(UNSC)toincludeIndia,Brazil,Germany,JapanandpermanentAfrican
representation,andhassaiditwishestoworktowardsamorerepresentativeand
expandedgroupingthanthecurrentG8.
Nuclearnon-proliferation
TheGovernmentsaysitconsidersnuclearweaponsandotherweaponsofmassdestruction
tobethemostdestructivethreattoglobalsecurity.Inresponse,itsupportsaFissile
MaterialCut-OffTreaty,thebringingintoforceoftheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty,
targetedEUandUNsanctionsagainststatesnotcomplyingwithnon-proliferationtreaty
obligationsandtheE3+3processonIranandtheSix-PartytalksonNorthKorea.Ithas
alsodeclaredsupportforaccelerateddisarmamentamongexistingnuclearweaponsstates.
Inaddition,theUKsupportsastrengtheningoftheinspectionregimesoftheInternational
AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA),atighteningofinternationalexportcontrolsonproliferation
sensitivematerialsandtheideaofauraniumenrichmentbondtoallowstatestouse
nuclearfuelforpeacefulpurposeswithoutneedingtheirownenrichmentand
re-processingfacilities.
TheUKisalsoactivelyengagedintheProliferationSecurityInitiative,aninitiativeaimedat
theinterdictionofbannedweaponsandweaponstechnology,primarilynuclear,chemical
andbiologicalweaponsmaterial.Itcontinuestodevelopforensiccapabilityindetermining
thesourceofmaterialusedinanynucleardeviceandispursuingtheideaofBritainasa
disarmamentlaboratorywhileworkingparticularlyonissuesrelatedtotheverifiable
eliminationofnuclearweapons.WhilemaintainingtheUKsnucleardeterrent,ministerial
statementshavealsorecentlybecomebolderinsupportofwidereffortsattheelimination
ofnuclearweaponsaltogetherandtoshowwilling,theGovernmenthasreducedthe
numberofitsoperationallyavailablenuclearwarheadsfromfewerthan200tofewerthan
160.Amongitsforward-lookingpolicyprioritiesarestepstoensureapositiveoutcomefor
the2010Non-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons(NPT)ReviewConference.
Conflict
Governmentpolicyalsoacknowledgesthatinstabilityandconflict,andtheissueoffailed
andfragilestatesarecrucialcurrentchallenges,andthatimportantthreatstoglobal
security,unlikeinthepast,maynowcomenotfromstrongstates,butfromweakones.
Inresponse,policycoversbothdevelopmentandsecuritymeasures.TheUKsmosthigh
profileandstrategicallyimportantcommitmentisinAfghanistan,where8,000British
troopsarecurrentlyinvolvedinaconflictwiththeTalibanandAlQaeda.Beyondthis,it
isactiveacrossawidefront.TheGovernmenthighlightsitssupportforWorldBank
effortstoaddressissuesattheheartofthesecurity-developmentnexusandpointsto
theresourcescommittedtoconflicthot-spotsliketheMiddleEast,whereithasoffered
243millionoverthreeyearstotheOccupiedPalestinianTerritoriesinsupportof
attemptstocreatepeaceintheregion.Itsaysitisagitatinginternationallyforenhanced
conflictpreventionandpeace-buildingactivityonthepartoftheinternational
community,isactiveinpromotingsecuritysectorreform,andisvocalinitsadvocacyofa
globalArmsTradeTreatywhilepursuingeffortstobancertainclustermunitions.
A269millionStabilisationAidFundandajointFCO/DfID/MoDStabilisationUnithave
beenestablishedtosupportpost-conflictreconstructionandpeace-building.Future
statedprioritiesinthisareaincludeincreasingcivilian/militaryintegrationandenhancing
theUKsabilitytodeployciviliansoverseasinconflictaffectedareas.Morewidely,the
GovernmenthasdeclaredcontinuedsupportforattemptstodelivertheeightMillennium
DevelopmentGoals(MDGs),supportfortheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture,
andsaysitviewstheMiddleEastasaclearconflictpriorityarea.
Counter-terrorism
TheGovernmentpresentsitspolicyoncounter-terrorismasframedbythefourstrands
ofCONTEST:pursue,protect,prepare,andprevent.
 97

ThePursue strandisconcernedwithstoppingplannedterroristattacks,andisdelivered
primarilybytheAgenciesandthepolice.Itinvolvesthecollectionandassessmentof
intelligenceonsuspects,disruptionofplansandplots,deportationofsuspectforeign
nationals(supportedbytheImmigration,AsylumandNationalityAct2006),useof
controlorders(ofwhichon12June2008therewere15intotalinforce),impositionof
financialcontrols,theseizingofassets,theproscriptionofgroups,andthearrestingand
chargingofindividualswithcrimes.Pursuealsohasinternationaldimensions,andinthat
context,theGovernmentispushingforacoordinatedG8approachtointernational
transportsecuritycoveringstandardsinaviation,shipping,portsandcontainer
distribution,andintendstousetheTransportSecurityBilloutlinedinitsDraftLegislative
Programme2008toaddresscurrentdeficienciesinmaritimecounter-terrorismand
airportsecurity.UKinvolvementinthewarinAfghanistanisrelevanttoo,seekingasit
doestodenyAlQaedaabasethere,andtheGovernmentisalsoliaisingwithforeign
governmentsandtheirintelligenceagenciestolocateandidentifyterroristsandtheir
supporters,proscribeterroristgroups,andattacktheirfinancing.Itisalsoofferingother
countriestrainingandstrategic,tacticalandoperationaladviceoncounter-terrorism
matters.
TheProtectstrandofcounter-terrorismpolicyincludeseffortstoimprovetheprotection
ofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,hazardoussitesandmaterials,andcrowdedplaces,
andworktosecureourphysicalandvirtualborders.ProgrammeCyclamen,forexample,
involvesroutinescreeningatportsandairportsfortheillicitmovementofradioactive
materialsbyseaorairorthroughtheChannelTunnel.Keyfeaturesoftheongoing
upgradeoftheProtectstrandalsoincludesignificantchangestoborderprotectionwith
theintroductionoftheUKsbiometricvisasystemanddevelopmentofthee-borders
programme.
ThePrepare strandofCONTESTisconcernedwithidentifying,assessingandmitigating
risk,andoptimisingtheUKspreparednessformajoremergenciesandresilienceifthey
occur.Thisincludesscenariotestingandexercisingemergencyplans,andencouraging
citizenstotakeresponsibilityfortheirownpreparednessforemergencysituations.
ThePreparestrandisincreasinglythefocusofGovernmentattention.TheCivil
ContingenciesSecretariatintheCabinetOfficehasassessedallthemany(200+)security
riskswhichtheUKfaces,andsummarisedthemintheNationalRiskRegister.Websites
suchastheGovernmentsPreparingforEmergenciessiteatwww.pfe.gov.ukoffer
advicetoordinarycitizens.Since2001theGovernmenthasinvested1billioninFire
andRescueServicesresilienceprogrammes,topreparefortheaftermathofnational
emergencies.Thismoneyhasbeenspentoncapabilitiessuchasurbansearchand
rescue,massdecontaminationandtheFirelinkwide-arearadiosystem.80millionisto
bespentinthenextthreeyearsonCBRNpreparedness.Relatedworkoncommunity
cohesion,ledbytheDepartmentforCommunitiesandLocalGovernment(CLG)aimsto
makeourcommunitiesmoreresilient.
Totesttheseandotherrelevantcapabilities,aNationalCounter-TerrorismExercise
Programmeisunderway.Exerciseshaveincluded:NorthernSynergy,anexercisealong
thelinesofaBeslan-stylesiege;LionsKeepinSurreyandSussex,whichsimulateda
shoulder-launchedsurface-to-airmissile(SAM)attackatGatwickairport;andWhite
RoseinWestYorkshire,anintelligence-ledscenariototestthecountysCounter-
TerrorismUnit.
Finally,thePrevent strandisabouttacklingtheradicalisationofindividualsand
deterringthosewhofacilitateterrorismorwhoexplicitlyencourageotherstobecome
terrorists.Itisfocusedonthepursuitofsevenstrategicobjectives,whichfocusefforts
to:
Challengetheviolentextremistsideologyandsupportmainstreamvoices
Disruptthepromotersofviolentextremismandstrengthenvulnerableinstitutions
Supportindividualswhoarebeingtargetedandrecruitedtothecauseofviolent
extremism
98 Shareddestinies| CurrentUKsecuritypolicy

Increasetheresilienceofcommunitiestoviolentextremism
Addressthegrievanceswhichideologuesareexploiting
Improvetheevidencebase,understanding,analysisandevaluation
Improvepubliccommunicationswithrelevanttargetaudiences.
EmergingoutofastrategicrefreshofthewholeCONTESTstrategy,theseideasarenow
cascadingdowntodeliverylevel,through,forexample,thenewAssociationofChief
PoliceOfficers(ACPO)PreventPolicingStrategy,therolloutofCounter-Terrorism
IntelligenceOfficersandtheexpansionofOperationDelphinus,whichseekstodrive
counter-terroristpolicingrightdowntothelocal,neighbourhoodlevel.Thewiderpolice
familyarebeingtoldtolookoutforsuspiciouspurchasesoflargequantitiesofitems
thatterroristscanweaponise,suchascastorbeans(ricin),barbecuelightercubes
(hexamine),hairdye(hydrogenperoxide),fertiliser(ammoniumnitrate)andballbearings
(shrapnel).Thepublic,throughadvertisingcampaignsfortheAnti-TerrorismHotline,are
beingtoldIfyoususpectit,reportit.Communitypartners,suchastheMosquesand
ImamsNationalAdvisoryBoard(MINAB),theNationalMuslimWomensAdvisoryGroup
(NMWAG)andtheMuslimSafetyForum(MSF)areengagedandcontributingtothe
preventativeeffort.
LocalauthoritiesandcommunitygroupsfurthersupporttheChannelProject(April
2007+)insitessuchasLambeth,Preston,Luton,DerbyandWalthamForest,which
seeks,throughaMultiAgencyPublicProtectionArrangement(MAPPA)approach,to
supportindividualswhoarethoughttobeatriskofbeingradicalisedtowardsviolent
extremism.Programmesarenowinplacetocounterradicalisationinprisons,universities,
andfurthereducationcolleges,and400millionhasbeenmadeavailableoverthree
yearsforaddressingradicalisationoverseas.
ThereisalsoasignificantmilitarycomponenttoCONTESTbasedaroundsupportto
theciviladministrationintheUKundertheEmergencyPowersAct1964.Themilitary
componentincludes,asnecessary,hostagerecovery,maritimecounter-terrorism,bomb
disarminganddisposal,CBRNcapabilities,logisticalsupport,airlift,counter-propaganda
operationsoverseas,andtheinterceptionofrenegadeaircraft.TheSpecialAirService
(SAS),SpecialBoatService(SBS)andSpecialReconnaissanceRegiment(SRR),
supportedbytheSpecialForcesSupportGroup(SFSG),allmakecontributions.
CONTESTasawholethereforeemploysthelogicthatrisk=likelihoodxvulnerabilityx
impact.ThePreventandPursuestrandsaimtoreducethelikelihoodofattack.The
Protectstrandaimstoreduceourvulnerabilitytoattack.AndthePreparestrandaimsto
reducetheimpactofanysuccessfulattack.
UKcounter-terrorismstrategyhasbeenthefocusofincreasedexpenditureinrecent
years:thetotalresourcesmadeavailableforcounter-terrorismandintelligencehave
increasedfrom1billionin2001to2.5billionin2008,andwillriseto3.5billionin
2010.
TheGovernmentiscurrentlyrevisingCONTEST.TheHomeSecretaryhassaidtherevised
versionwilllookverydifferentfromits2006predecessor(ipprSecurityLecture2008).

Measurestocountertransnationalorganisedcrime
TheGovernmentsoverallstrategyforrespondingtotransnationalorganisedcrimehasa
numberofelements,butthemostimportantbyfarhasbeenavarietyofchangestothe
institutionstaskedwithhandlingit.Recognisingthelimitationsoftraditionalpolicingin
dealingwithtransnationalcriminalthreats,in2006theGovernmentestablishedthe
SeriousOrganisedCrimeAgency(SOCA),pullingtogetherandmerginganumberof
differententities.TheseincludedtheNationalCriminalIntelligenceService(NCIS),the
NationalCrimeSquad(NCS),theNationalHi-TechCrimeUnit(NHTCU),theinvestigative
andintelligencesectionsofHMRevenue&Customsdealingwithseriousdrug
trafficking,andelementsoftheImmigrationServiceworkingonorganisedimmigration
crime.SOCAnowoperatesaworldwidenetworkofagentsseekingtotackleproblemsat
source,includinginplacessuchasAfghanistan,sharesinformationattheEuropeanlevel
 99

viaEuropolandEurojust,collaboratesextensivelywithwiderinternationalpartners,and
isfocusedontheprioritychallengesofdrugs,armsandpeopletrafficking.
ItseffortsarecomplementedathomebytheUnitedKingdomBorderAgency(UKBA),
whichwascreatedinApril2008byunitingtheBorderandImmigrationAgency,Customs
attheborder,andUKvisas.SincethentheUKBAhas:
preventedmorethan10,200individualsfromattemptingtocrosstheChannelillegally
searchedmorethanhalfamillionfreightvehiclestoensurethattheywerenot
attemptingtobringillegalimmigrantsintothecountry
detectedandconfiscatedmorethan1,000forgeddocuments
installedfacialrecognitiongatesatManchesterAirportthatusethelatestinbiometric
technologytocheckEUnationalsintothecountry
unveiledforeignnationalIDcardstogoliveon25November.(UKBA2008)
ThereisalsoanationalstrategyagainstorganisedimmigrationcrimecalledREFLEX,
whichconsistsofspeedinguptheprocessofassessingasylumclaimsandremoving
unsuccessfulclaimants,educatingthosetemptedtousetheservicesoftraffickersin
sourcecountriestotherealitiesofthetraffickingbusiness,andfocusingenforcement
actionagainstthetraffickers(HomeOffice2004).

Civilemergencies
TheCivilContingenciesAct(CCA),introducedbytheGovernmentin2004,istheprimary
legislationrelatingtocivilemergencies,suchaspandemicfluorothermajorbiosecurity
alerts,majorfloodsandarangeofothercontingencies.TheCCAseekstoprovidea
singleframeworkforcivilprotectionintheUnitedKingdomcapableofmeetingthe
challengesofthetwenty-firstcentury(CabinetOffice2005a:1).TheCivilContingencies
Secretariat(CCS),establishedbytheGovernmentinJuly2001andbasedintheCabinet
Office,playsfiverolesincoordinatingthiscivilprotection:
Spottingtrouble,assessingitsnatureandprovidingwarning
Beingreadytorespond
Buildinggreaterresilienceforthefuture
Providingleadershipandguidancetotheresiliencecommunity
Effectivemanagement.
Recentgovernmentactivitytoplanforcivilemergenciesandbuildresilienceintheface
ofthemalsoincludestheongoingreviewprocessandenhancementprogramme
attachedtotheCCA2004,theprovisionofadditionalguidancetoarangeoflocal
respondersandemergencyplanners,andinvestmentinweather-forecastingandflood-
managementcapability.
Onthelastofthese,theMetOfficeisakeyplayerintacklingallformsofsevere
weatherintheUK.Ithasresponsibilityforissuingsevereweatherwarnings.Itissues
earlywarningswhenitisatleast60percentcertainthatsevereweatherwillimpact
upontheUKoverthefollowingfewdays.Flashwarningsforextremeweatherareissued
whentheMetOfficeisatleast80percentcertainthatextremeweatherwillhittheUK
inamatterofhours(CabinetOffice2008b).Similarearlywarningsystemsexistforhigh
orlowtemperatures,operatedbytheMetOfficeandDepartmentofHealth.Ifadrought
occurs,watercompaniesarerequiredtohaveplansinplaceinordertoregulatesupplies
anddemand.EmergencyDroughtOrders(EDOs)canauthorisesupplyrestrictions.
Alsoonflooding,theMetOfficeandEnvironmentAgency(withitstelephone
floodline),overseenbytheDepartmentforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs
(DEFRA),bothhavemonitoringandforecastingsystemsforrainfall,riverandsea
flooding.Atthelocallevel,theGovernmenthasafloodriskmanagementprogramme
aimedatreducingthelikelihoodofflooding,andLocalResilienceForums(LRFs)are
requiredbytheCivilContingenciesAct2004tohavesufficientplansinplacebothto
100 Shareddestinies| CurrentUKsecuritypolicy

assesstheriskoffloodingintheirareaandtodevelopeffectivecontingencyplansfor
handlingit.ExpenditureonfloodmanagementinEnglandisincreasingfrom600
millionin2007/8to800millionin2010/11,insupportofthisrangeofactivities.
Intermsofpreparationforthepossibilityofaflupandemic,largevolumesofthe
prescription-onlyanti-viraldrugOseltamivir(proprietarynameTamiflu)havebeen
purchased,andplansareinplacetomakeitavailabletopriorityworkersasneeded,to
maintainthefunctioningofessentialpublicservicesintheeventofapandemic.Abroad
rangeofpublicserviceprovidershavefurtherbeenrequiredtodrawupspecific
contingencyplansforawiderangeofscenariosinthecivilcontingenciesspace.The
police,forexample,arepreparingforthepossibilityofanincreaseinsuddendeathsin
theeventofapandemicorotherbiosecurityalert,andforenforcingmassquarantine
arrangementsinthefaceofpossiblecivildisorder,shouldthisbecomenecessary(Lewis
2005).

Shadowsecuritypolicy
ConservativePartypolicy
ConservativePartypositionsconcurwithGovernmentpolicyinanumberofareas,
especiallythoserelatedtosomeofitsinternationaldimensions.LiketheGovernment,
theConservativessaytheyplacehighpriorityonnuclearnon-proliferation,United
NationsSecurityCouncilenlargement,thecriticalUKrelationshipwiththeUSandNATO
andtheneedtoenhancetheUKscivilexpeditionarycapacity.Athome,the
ConservativesandtheGovernmentbothwanttoreformtheIntelligenceandSecurity
Committee(ISC)torendertheAgenciesmoreaccountabletoParliament.
Thereare,however,anumberofkeyareasinwhichConservativePartypolicydiffers
fromthatoftheGovernment.Oninternationalissues,theConservativesputagreater
emphasisontheUKsneedtodevelopacloserrelationshipwithIndia.OntheMiddle
East,wheretheyadvocatehumilityandpatience,theyproposeaPartnershipforOpen
SocietiesintheMiddleEast.TheyarguethattheUKmilitaryisnotjuststretchedbut
overstretchedandcriticiseUKforeignpolicyasmerelyanechoofUSforeignpolicy
(Neville-Jones2007).TheConservativesalsocontendthatBritishdiplomacyisinneedof
somerepair.
Oncounter-terrorism,theConservativesadvocatetheadmissibilityofinterceptevidence
inCourtandopposethefurtherextensionofpre-chargedetentionforsuspected
terrorists.TheyalsoargueforaCabinet-levelMinisterforSecurityintheHomeOffice
andaNationalSecurityCounciltobringtogethersecurityexpertsacrossWhitehall.They
criticisetheGovernmentonthreespecificcountsinthisfield:foritspreviousshort-
sightedfaithinthecovenantofsecurity(itsallegedpastattitudethatradicalMuslims
canpreachhateintheUKaslongastheyonlyfomentviolenceabroad);for
underplayingtheroleoftheArmedForcesincounter-terrorism;and,mostcritically,for
denyingthattheIraqwarhasaggravatedthedomesticsecuritythreatandmadeusless
safethanwewerebefore.
LiberalDemocratpolicy
TheLiberalDemocratssecuritypolicyalsosharesmanycharacteristicswithcurrent
Governmentpolicy.Bothstatesupportforinternationalismandmoreeffective
internationalcooperationwithpartnersintheEU,NATOandtheUN.Bothwantmore
statestocontributetoEuropeanUnionandNATOendeavours,andbothemphasisethe
importanceofpreventativeworkintermsofconflictprevention.
However,aswithConservativepolicy,thereareanumberofimportantpointsonwhich
theLiberalDemocratsdisagreewiththeGovernment.IntheLiberalDemocratsown
words:LabourandConservativeapproachesbothrelyonanarrativeoffear,arguing
thatlibertymustbesacrificedonthealtarofsecurityauthoritarianresponsesand
warlikepsychology(LiberalDemocratParty2008:1).TheLiberalDemocratsarguethat
theGovernment,initsdesiretoheightensecurityintheUK,haserodedcivilliberties
withaglutofknee-jerk,posturinganti-terrorismlegislation,muddyingtheconstitutional
separationofpowers.TheLiberalDemocratsconsidertheGovernmentsidentitycard
schemeilliberalandunnecessaryandareagainstbiometricpassports,statingthatwe
 101

donottrustgovernmentagenciestoprotectcentralisedrecordsfromfraudulentuseor
otherabuse.Alsoonthematteroftrust,theLiberalDemocratscriticisetheGovernment
foritsunwillingnesstotakealeadonnucleardisarmamentwhilelecturingothernations
aroundtheworldonnon-proliferation,foritsallegedlycorruptAlYamamahdealwith
SaudiArabia,compromisingourethicalstandinginternationally,andforputtingthe
MilitaryCovenantatriskbynottakingadequatecareofourservicemenand-women.
Oncounter-terrorismtheLiberalDemocrats,liketheConservatives,opposeextending
pre-chargedetentionandsupporttheadmissibilityofinterceptevidenceincourt.They
alsoproposeawillingnesstotalktoradicalideologues.TheMinistryofDefence
budget,theLiberalDemocratsargue,alsoneedstobeopentocloserParliamentary
scrutiny.Onthedevolutionofresponsibilityforsecuritymatterstothecitizen,the
LiberalDemocratsarguetheywouldreversewhattheyperceivetobetheGovernments
centralisinginstincts,andwouldcreateaforceofcivilianreserviststorebuildlocal
capabilities.Internationally,theLiberalDemocratsstresstheimportanceoftheUKs
relationshipswithitsneighboursinEurope,andcriticisetheGovernmentsattitude
towardstheUSasthatofanuncriticalcheerleader.Theyquestiontheutilityofthe
impositionofsanctionsinconflictprevention.

OverallassessmentofcurrentUKgovernmentpolicy
Sofarinthischapterwehavebeendescriptive,notjudgemental,inrelationtocurrent
governmentpolicyandinconcludingthechapterwedonotintendtoofferapointby
pointviewoneveryareaofpolicydescribed.Rather,wemakethreegeneralobservations
whichserveasabackdropforourlatercallsformoreurgentactioninparticularareas.
First,whilerecentdevelopmentsonlegislation,structuresandthecontentof
governmentpolicymaptomanyareasoftheproblemterrainoutlinedinthisreport,and
whiletheGovernmenthascertainlybeenbusyinrecentyearsandmanyofficialsand
othersareworkingveryhardinanumberofareas,westillbelievethereisamajorgap Westillbelieve
betweentheproblemsandchallengesbeingfacedandthelevelofpolicyactionbeing
initiatedorproposed.Infact,amajorweaknessoftheGovernmentsownfirstnational thereisamajorgap
securitystrategywasthatitdescribedanewworldbutessentiallyclaimedcurrentpolicy betweenthe
wasadequatetomeetthechallenge.Itdidnotfaceuptotheneedforastep-changein problemsand
activityandstructuresinordertoenhanceourcapacityforgenuinelyjoined-upand
creativeapproaches.Wewouldarguethatmuchmorecanandshouldbedoneto challengesbeing
demonstratetheUKsseriousnessofpurposeonnearlyalloftheissueswithwhichwe facedandthelevel
areconcerned.Ourrecommendationsinthisinterimreportandinourfinalreportin ofpolicyaction
2009areaimedatfillingsomeofthisgap.
beinginitiatedor
Second,despitethechangesinstructuresdescribedinthischapter,thereremainmajor
weaknessesinthemachineryofgovernmentrelatedtonationalsecurity.Inourview,the
proposed
Governmentlacksacoherentplanforensuringanintegratedapproachtopolicymaking
inaworldthatincreasinglyrequirespolicysolutionstobejoinedup.Thecreationofa
NationalSecurityForumandasmallnationalsecuritysecretariatintheCabinetOffice
willnotbeenough.Thisisanotherissuetowhichwewillreturninourfinalreport.
Third,therearesomeareasofgovernmentpolicythathavebeenhugelycontroversial,
particularlyinareasrelatedtoterrorismandtothelegalframeworkinplaceorsoughtby
theGovernmenttorespondtoit.Asourbriefaccountofthepositionsofthemain
oppositionpartiesaboveindicates,weareadividedcountryinthisareaatatimewhen
wereallycannotaffordtobe.Thereisaneednowforgovernment,oppositionparties
andeveryoneelsetoseekoutanddevelopanationalconsensustounderpintheUKs
responsetoterrorism.Webelievewearewellplacedasanall-partyCommissionandasa
groupofindividualswithdiverseviewsontheseissuestomakeacontributioninthis
area.Webegin,inthenextchapter,byarticulatingasetofprinciplesthatwebelieve
shouldunderpintheUKsentireapproachtotodayschallengingsecurityenvironment.
PART4:
Anewstrategic
approachand
immediatepriorities
104 Shareddestinies| PrinciplestounderpinUKnationalsecuritystrategy

8.PrinciplestounderpinUK
nationalsecuritystrategy
If,aswehaveargued,currentpolicyisnotboldenough,howandinwhatwaysshould
ourresponsebebolder,andwhatprinciplesshouldunderpinandshapeit?Inthis
chapter,weaddressthislatterquestiondirectly,settingouteightprinciplesthatinour
viewprovideatleastsomeoftheanswer.Wereturntotheissueofspecificpolicy
recommendationsinChapter9.
Theprinciplessetoutherearebuiltonthebeliefthatthebasicchallengeofsecurity
policytodayisoneofweakeninggovernance.If,aswearguedattheendofPart2,the
powertocontrolthesecurityenvironmenthasbeenslippingbeyondthecontrolof
states,thenthecorechallengenowistoextendourmechanismsofgovernancetore-
exertameasureofstateinfluenceandcontroloverit.Inattemptingtodothis,
moreover,weneedtoabsorbanimportantlessonaboutinfluenceinthemodernworld.
Itisnotjustthatpoweritselfhasbecomemorewidelydiffusedamongactorsinthe
securityenvironmentorthattherangeofissuesanddrivershasbecomemorevariedand
complex,butthatwhatisrequiredtohaveinfluenceoverthatenvironmenthaschanged
too.
Thisispartlyaboutawiderrangeofpolicyinstrumentsbeingrelevanttosecuritypolicy
todayandpartlyaboutsuccessfulinfluencerequiringadistributedandcoordinated
responseacrossawiderangeofactors.Thisdistributedresponseisanecessityina
systemthathasmanycentresofpowerandahighlevelofsecurityinterdependenceand
thisrealisationitselfimpliestheneedforacollaborativeapproachtosecurity
policymakingandimplementation.Asaresult,inthematerialbelow,wesetoutwhatwe
believearethecoreprinciplesfitforpurposeinthesecircumstances.

1.Thescopeofnationalsecuritystrategytodaymustincludebut
encompassmorethanaconcernwithpoliticalviolence
Theprotectionofthestatewithstrongandflexibledefenceforceswillremainimportant,
butafarwiderrangeofrisksmustalsonowbeconsideredandmanaged,asindicated
throughoutthisdocument.

2.Inaglobalisedworldofmanyweakstates,thebestcourseofaction
inourowndefencewilloftenbetohelpotherstohelpthemselves
Astheglobalfinancialcrisisdemonstrates,weliveinaworldofshareddestinieswhere
failingsinonepartoftheworldquicklygeneratepolicyproblemsandinsecuritiesin
others.Inthisenvironment,notonlycannostateguaranteethesecurityofitspeopleby
actingalone,butweak,corruptandfailingstateshavebecomebiggersecurityrisksthan
strongstates.

3.Amassiveincreaseinlevelsofmultilateralcooperationisnowneeded
Thismustincludebutgowellbeyondaconcernwiththereformofglobalinstitutions.
Weneednotonlymoreeffectiveandrelevantinternationalinstitutions,butalsoan
enhancedcapacityforthemtoworktogetherandwithindividualnationstates.Inthe
kindofworldwehavedescribed,acrucialelementofcapacityisthecapacitytowork
together.Wearealsoinfavourofaneweraoftreaty-basedcooperationonspecific
issues,fromnuclearnon-proliferationtoglobalbiosecurity,andbelievecoalitionsofthe
willingwillbeneededtoinitiateaction,setstandards,andsustainprogressinmany
areas.ThecreationofaLeagueofDemocraciesatthisjuncturewouldbeabadidea.
Partnershipswillbenecessaryandshouldbesoughtwithstateswithdifferentsystemsof
governmenttoourown,includingwithChina.Westernpowerswillalsoneedtobe
flexible:giventhescaleofpowershiftnowunderway,itisnolongerrealisticsimplyto
expectemergingpowerstosignuptoWestern-ledinstitutionsandwaysofworking.
 105

4.Partnershipworkingisneededathomeaswellasabroad
Dependingontheissueathand,partnerships,andtheabilitytodockeffectivelywith
otherorganisationswillberequirednotonlyatglobalandregionallevelbetweenstates
butalsooftenbetweendifferentinstitutionsandelementswithinthesamestate(across
centralandlocallevelsandacrossdifferentfunctionalresponsibilities)andbetween
publicsectoractorsandprivateandvoluntarysectorbodies.Innearlyallcases,
Governmentdepartmentswillnotbedoersintheirownright,butprojectmanagers,
bringingtogetherawiderangeofstakeholdersinsideandoutsideGovernment.Thisis
anobviousnecessityonissuessuchasprotectionofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,
wheremanyprivatesectorplayersareinvolved,andcounter-terrorism,wherethe
securityservicesandthepolicewillbemuchmoreeffectiveifworkinginclose
partnershipwithmembersofthecommunitiestheyaretryingtoserveandprotect.
Governmentmustthereforealteritsapproachandnotseektodosecuritytopeoplebut
workinpartnershipwithbusinesses,communitygroupsandindividualcitizenstobuild
andenhanceit.Governmentsmustoffer,andbusinessesandindividualsmustaccept,
moreresponsibilityfornationalsecurity.

5.Legitimacyofstateactionisastrategicimperativeincurrent
conditions
InaworldinwhichtheUKgovernmentisnotalwaysgoingtobepowerfulenoughto
controleventsaloneorevenwithcloseallies,thevoluntarilyofferedpartnershipand
cooperationofotherswillonlybeforthcominginthefaceoflegitimacy.Inpractice,this
meanstwothings.
First,itmeansmoreopenandinclusivepolicymakingandaseamlessthroughlife Legitimacymeans
approachtomanagingcrisesinwhichtheplayers,governmentalandnon-governmental,
requiredtoresolveproblemswilldifferduringthedifferentphasesofacrisis.Whilethere theUKgovernment
willalwaysbeaneedforsecretoperationsandtoprotecttheanonymityofsomesources, workingharderto
andwhilethespecificsofparticularsecurityarrangementsshouldalwaysbemanagedona addressclaimsthat
strictlyneed-to-knowbasis,muchsecuritypolicymakingtodayistooremoteandclosedoff
fromthewiderrangeofactorsthatcouldnotonlybenefitfrombutalsocontributetoit. itoperatesadouble
Governments,inanycase,themselvesnolongerownandcontrolalloftherelevantand standardwhen
necessaryexpertiseandassetsrequiredinthemakingofaneffectivesecuritypolicy.From comparingitsown
emergencyplanningtoclimatechangeandfromtheprotectionofcriticalnational
infrastructuretocounter-terrorism,citizens,privatebusinessesandinternational behaviourtothe
organisationscanalladdvaluetothepolicymakingprocess.Thisallraisesdifficult behaviourof
questionsforthoseinofficialpositions,particularlyinrelationtohowmuchinformationto others
shareandwhere,andwhenandhowtoopenupparticulardecision-makingprocesses,but
again,theeffortshouldberewardedasmorepartnershaveagreatersenseofbuy-into
boththeprocessandthesubstanceofpolicy,andmorepartnersactivelyplayarolein
policyimplementation.Addedsocialdepthinthedecision-makingprocessshould,inother
words,contributetogreaterpolicyreachandeffectiveness.
Second,legitimacymeanstheUKgovernmentworkinghardertoaddressclaimsthatit
operatesadoublestandardwhencomparingitsownbehaviourtothebehaviourofothers.
Moreparticularly,itmeansreaffirmingtheUKsunwaveringcommitmenttopromoting,
protectinganddefendingnon-negotiableandfundamentalhumanrights,suchastheright
tobefreefromtorture,andmeansfollowingthroughonthiscommitmentbothathome
andabroad.Whereinsurgentssupportiveofterroristsarenotbeingconfrontedonthe
battlefield,itmeansclearlyviewingterrorismasacrime,treatingitthatway,anddealing
withitwithinthecriminallawparadigmandnotthewaronterrorparadigm.
Ontheinternationalstage,whilenogovernmentcanorshouldbedeniedtherighttotake
unilateralactiontoprotectitscitizensfromaclearandimminentdanger,thelessonto
drawfromthecontextwehavedescribedinearlierchaptersofthisreportisclear:
establishingthewidelyperceivedlegitimacyofanyactionwillbenecessarytocarrying
publicsupport(essentialforanyoperationtobesuccessful),willmobilisemorepartners
withmoreresources,andwillmoreoftenbearoutetosecuritypolicyeffectivenessthana
barriertoit.Legitimacy,inotherwords,actsasaninternationalinfluencemultiplier,turning
potentialpowerresourcesintogreateractualinfluenceovertheenvironment.Moreover,
106 Shareddestinies| PrinciplestounderpinUKnationalsecuritystrategy

theopportunitycostofunilateralactiontoamedium-sizedpowerliketheUnitedKingdom
willriseexponentiallyintheyearsahead.Ifweareseentoactunilaterallyinanythingother
thanacontextofextremeandimminentthreattocorenationalinterests,otherswillfeel
freetodothesame,andthemultilateralcooperationandrules-basedorderthatweall
needwillnotfunction.
Inpractice,thisallmeansthatifinterventionsintheaffairsofanotherstatearedeemed
necessary,theseshouldcomplywiththeUNCharter.Wherethisisnotpossiblebecause
vestedinterestsparalysetheSecurityCouncileveninthefaceofserioushumanrights
violations,ahumanitariancrisis,oradevelopingthreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity,
thenitmeansanyactiontakenshouldbeproportionate,shouldhaveareasonable
prospectofsuccess,andshouldonlybetakenasalastresortandafterallpeacefuland
diplomaticavenuestoavertconflicthavebeenexhausted.

6.Weneedmorenon-militarypreventativeaction
Preventionsaveslives,savesmoney,andinaninterconnectedworld,nipsproblemsinthe
budwhilelimitingthepotentialreachofanyspecificthreatorhazard.Weneedtoget
ourselvesoutofamindsetthatviewsinterventionasapurelymilitaryaffair.Aidtotackle
povertyandactionstopreventastatefailingarealsoformsofintervention,and,usedearly
andeffectively,canoftenpreventtheneedtoinvolvethemilitary,withhugesavingsforall
incostandlives.Earlyactiononthechallengeswefacemustthereforebecomemoreofa
realityandweneedtothinkcreativelyabouthowtoincreasecollectivepoliticalwillinthis
areathroughbothreducingthepoliticalrisksassociatedwithpreventativeaction,and
throughincreasingtheincentivesalignedandassociatedwithit.

7.Wemustpreparefortheworstandviewpreparationasaformof
deterrence
Inacknowledgementofthefactthatgovernmentcannotrealisticallyprevent,despiteits
bestefforts,allformsofharmordamagetotheUKanditscitizensandbusinessesin
currentcircumstances,weneedagreaterfocusonpreparingfor,respondingto,and
recoveringfromsomeofthemorechallengingscenariosthatwemayface.Themore
effectivelywedothis,themoreresilientwebecome,andthelessattractiveweareasa
targetforthosewhowoulddousharm.

8.Flexibilityisneededinnationalcapabilities
Asecurityenvironmentwithsomanyinterconnecteddriversandsuchawiderangeof
threatsandhazardsisnotoneinwhichperfectpredictionispossible.Inthisenvironment,
theGovernmentwoulddowelltofocusnotonafixedlistofprioritiesbutonbuildingup
flexibleandinter-operableplatformsforaction.Thishastwoimplications.
First,itmeansmakingabetterjobofintegratingawiderangeofpolicyinstrumentsand
thinkingnotintermsofhardorsoftpowerbutintermsofintegratedpower(CAP2006).
Tobemorespecific,itmeansbeingcommittedtoabetterlinkageofmilitary,diplomatic,
economic,socialandculturalpolicyinstrumentsinanyactivityfocusedonrestoring
governancetoafailedorfailingstatesuchasAfghanistanontheonehand,andbeing
committedtobettercoordinationofintelligence,policing,andlocalcommunitypolicy
instrumentsusedtocombatradicalisationandterrorismathomeontheother.Italso
meanssometimesintegratinginstrumentsacrossthetraditionaldomesticandforeignpolicy
divide,suchthatelementsofpolicyfrombothdomainsformpartofawiderstrategic
responsetoachallengethatisnorespecterofborders,suchasthatoftransnational
organisedcrime.
Second,flexibilitymeansbuildingupacorecapabilitybothtoproject-manageactivity
acrossdepartmentsinWhitehallandfocusinguponacorecapabilityeasilyandeffectively
todockUKgovernmentactivitieswiththeeffortsofpartnersathomeandabroad.
Iftheseprinciplesareallowedtoshapeandunderpinpolicy,inourviewthiswillprovidea
soundbasisuponwhichtodeliversecurityfortheUK,itsbusinesses,ourmanydiverse
communitiesandindividualcitizens.
 107

9:Policyrecommendations

Weareawarethatmanypeople,bothinsideandoutsidegovernment,willfindmostof
theprincipleswehaveoutlinedeasytoagreewith.Thechallenge,ofcourse,ishowto
usethemtoinformpracticalaction.Thismustnowhappenfarmoreeffectivelythanit
hastodate.
IfwefailtocombinepolicyinstrumentsmoreeffectivelyinplaceslikeAfghanistan,the
credibilityof,andconfidencein,coreorganisationslikeNATOcouldcollapse.Ifwefailto
turntheearly21stcenturyintoaneraofrenewedmultilateralcooperation,wewillpaya
heavypriceinfailure,whetherthisrelatestofailuretohandletheglobalfinancialcrisis,
torisetothechallengeofclimatechange,orinoneormoreofthemanyotherareaswe
haveidentifiedinthisreport.Ifwedonotacttopreventmanycountriesfallinginto
conflictorintoconditionsofstatefailure,wewillpayapriceininstabilityinmanyparts
oftheworld,inlostmarkets,inthecostsofhumanitarianreliefandpost-conflict
reconstruction,andwillsimultaneouslyofferterroristsandtransnationalcriminalsa
hospitableenvironmentinwhichtobaseandplantheiroperations.Ifwefail,inother
words,totaketheprinciplessetoutaboveseriouslyandtoturnthemintoeffective
action,ourownnationalinterestwillbenegativelyaffectedandwewillbeless
prosperousandlesssecureasaresult.
Inthisfinalchapter,wesetoutsomeconcretepolicyproposalsthatflowfromthe Ifwefailto
precedinganalysisandembodysomeoftheprinciplesjustexpounded.
combinepolicy
Inthematerialbelow,wesetoutproposalsintwobroadareas.Theseare:
instrumentsmore
Conflictpreventionandinterventioninconflictenvironments effectivelyinplaces
Strengthenedmultilateralism(withparticularreferencetoregionalsecurity likeAfghanistan,
organisations,nuclearnon-proliferation,andglobalbiosecurity)
thecredibilityof,
Violentconflictisafocusbecauseofthescaleofconflictpressuresbuildingupand andconfidencein,
converginginpartsofAfricaandCentralAsiainparticular,asoutlinedinChapter4,and
becauseconflictisoftenlinkedtoterrorismandtransnationalorganisedcrime.Weneed coreorganisations
tolaythefoundationsnowforaneffectivestrategicresponse. likeNATOcould
Wefocusonmultilateralcooperationandtouchbrieflyonthearchitectureof collapse
internationalcooperationindirectresponsetotheprocessofpowerdiffusionthatis
occurringintheinternationalsystem.Itistimenotsimplytoinvitesomeofthelarger
emergingeconomiestoplaybiggerrolesininstitutionsdesignedforanotherera,butin
thewakeoftheglobalfinancialcrisisandtheshiftingdistributionofeconomicpower
globally,tostartnegotiationsonanewarchitectureofcooperation,ofwhichallthe
majorplayerscanfeelownershipandwithwhichtheycanfullyengage.
Morespecifically,however,wefocusonregionalsecurityorganisationsbecauseoftheir
centralitytosecuritypolicy,andinlinewithourcallfortreaty-basedactiononspecific
issues,wehighlighttwoareasaboutwhichwehavedeepconcerns.Wefocusonnuclear
non-proliferationbecauseofthedangerstotheglobalnon-proliferationregimenow
emerging(asoutlinedinChapter4)andbecauseoftheurgentneedtostrengthenthis
regimeattheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT)ReviewConferencein2010.Weneed
moreurgencyinadvanceofthatconferenceifthebargainbetweennuclearweaponsstates
andnon-nuclearweaponsstatesattheheartoftheNPTistosurvive,andtimeformore
effectiveactionisalreadyrunningshort.Ourproposalsonglobalbiosecurity,fortheirpart,
arearesponsetothedangersofpandemicdiseaseandfearsaboutbioterrorismoutlinedin
Chapters5and6andthoughfocusedonglobalresponsestothechallengesarealso
motivatedbytheidentificationofanewinfluenzapandemicasthenumberonerisktothe
UKintheGovernmentsownrecentlypublishednationalriskregister.
Ourproposalsoverallreflectaconcernwiththekindofmultilateralcooperationthatwe
havesaidisnecessary.Theyreflectadeterminationtotakepreventativeactionina
108 Shareddestinies| Policyrecommendations
Itisabsolutely andwehavenotattemptedacostingofourproposalsinthisreport.Thisisanissuewe
clearthatthe
effectsbothof
climatechangeand
ofglobalpoverty
arevastand
negativeintermsof
theinternational
security
environment managementatbest.
numberofareasmoreseriously,andtheydemonstrateacommitmenttolegitimacyof
actionintheperiodahead.
Beforepresentingourrecommendations,weentertwobriefcaveatsandoneprefaceby
wayofcontextforwhatfollows.
Onthecaveats,first,andasstatedintheintroductiontothisinterimreport,wewould
emphasisethatourmainfocusinthisdocumenthasbeenonidentifyingtheproblems
andchallengesfacingusandonoutliningthenatureoftheUKscurrentresponses.We
havesetoutprinciplesthatshouldguidetheUKsoverallapproach,butthemainbody
ofourpolicyproposalswillemergeinourfinalreportintheearlysummerof2009.The
proposalssetoutherearenotintendedtobecomprehensiveandrelateprimarilyto
areaswherewebelievethescaleofthechallengeorthreatdemandsespeciallyurgent
actionortoissueswherealimitedwindowofpoliticalopportunityforactionexists.We
willreturninourfinalreporttootherpressingissuessuchastheappropriateroleforthe
EuropeanUnion,relationswithRussia,widerdefencepolicy,Britainsenergysecurity
needs,domesticcounter-terrorismandcounter-radicalisation,andtheprotectionofthe
criticalnationalinfrastructureandresilienceathome,aswelltoissuesrelatedtothe
appropriateorganisationofgovernment.
Second,weareawarethatsomeofwhatwesuggestbelowwillhavecostimplications
willreturntoinourfinalreportbut,atthisstage,wewouldstressthatevenindifficult
economictimesnationalsecurityisanareaweunder-investinatourperilandunder-
investmenttodayoftenstoresuptroubleandevengreatercostsfortomorrow.
Theprefacetotherecommendationsbelowisthis:althoughwedonotaddressclimate
changeorinternationaldevelopmentpolicyhead-oninthisreport,itisabsolutelyclear
thattheeffectsbothofclimatechangeandofglobalpovertyarevastandnegativein
termsoftheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Doingsomethingaboutboth,whichis
primarilythetaskofotherareasofgovernmentpolicy,isinourviewvital,notonlyfor
moralandenvironmentalreasonsbutalsoforreasonsofnationalselfinterest.Ifwefail
ontheseissues,manyoftheotherproposalsthatwecanofferwillbeshort-termcrisis
Responsestoviolentconflict
Sincemanyareasoftheworldexperiencingviolentconflictareathighriskoffalling
backintoitevenaftersomeformofinitialstabilityorpeacehasbeenestablished,the
distinctionbetweenpeaceandconflictisnotasclear-cutasitoncewas.Somestates
andregionsexistinamurkyspacethatinvolvesacriss-crossingoftheboundary
betweenthetwo.Itisimportantforpolicymakersbithtobeclearaboutthedifferent
phasesofconflict(namelyprevention,conflictitself,andpost-conflictstabilisationand
reconstruction)inthisenvironment,andtomakesurethatpolicytoolsdevelopedfor
eachphasearewoventogetherinaseamlessgarment.Consequently,wepresentinitial
proposalsbelowonconflictpreventionandsomeelementsoftheoverallapproach
requiredtointerventionsinconflictenvironments.Wewillreturntothemoredetailed
requirementsofaneffectivecapacitytoprojectpost-conflictreconstructioninourfinal
report,pickingupissuessuchasrequiredciviliancapacityandimprovedcivil-military
cooperationintheprocess.
Conflictprevention:theresponsibilitytoprevent
Despiterecentandwelcomeincreasesingovernmenteffortinthisarea,conflict
preventionisstillnottakenseriouslyenough.Whilemostanalystsandcitizenswould
agreeinprinciplethatpreventionispreferabletopost-conflictintervention,bothin
termsofcostandintermsofliveslost,inpracticeconflictpreventionactivityfrequently
lackspoliticalsupportandmediaattention,and,asaresult,isveryrarelyprosecuted
withanythinglikesufficientconvictionandpoliticalwill.ThoughtheGovernmentis
alreadyraisingitsgameinthisarea,thisisafaircriticismofBritishgovernmentsofall
politicalpersuasionsovermanyyears,andafaircriticismoftheinternationalcommunity
atlarge.
 109

Weneedtobehonestandacceptthatthebasicproblemwithpreventativeactionon
conflictisalackofpoliticalincentivestoact,coupledwithsometimeshighrisksand
uncertaintiesassociatedwithdoingso.Thisneedstochange.
Consequently,wecallupontheGovernmenttofurtherdevelopandmoredeeplyembed
thenotionofaResponsibilitytoPreventViolentConflict inUKforeign,defenceand
overseasdevelopmentpolicy.Tomakethisreal,webelieveactioninanumberofareasis
necessary.
Recommendation1:Sharedstrategicassessments
TheGovernmentneedstoworkwithinternationalpartnersintheEU,NATOandtheUN
tomakesurethathorizon-scanningandearlywarningsystemsareusedtodevelop
sharedstrategicassessments ofpotentialconflictareas.Thesesharedassessments
shouldalsobeusedacrossWhitehallandwhereappropriateshouldincludeassessments
ofwhyahotspotmaybeasecuritythreattotheUKoritsallies.Thiswouldallhelpwith
unityofpurposebothwithintheUKgovernmentandacrossawidevarietyof
internationalactors.Improvedinformationandintelligenceexchangewillberequired,
andattheEUlevel,someoftheworkofcreatingsharedstrategicassessmentscouldbe
performedthroughSITCENandtheCIVMILcell.24 Moreeffortshouldalsobemadeto
drawinbottomupcivilsocietyinputstowarningsystemsandstrategicassessments,
andoncesuchassessmentshavebeendeveloped,effectivewaysofpresentingthemto
thepublicmustbefound.
Recommendation2:ConflictModellingPanel
Toenhancetheimprovedfocusonearlywarningsystemsandthebuildingofshared
strategicassessments,theGovernmentshouldappointandresourceanindependent
ConflictModellingPanel.Thiswouldhaveaccesstotheoutputsofofficialearly
warninganalyses,wouldbestaffedbyindependentexperts,beatarmslengthfrom
governmentandwouldbeexplicitlytaskedwithgeneratingbothconflictscenario
modelsandassessmentsofthelikelycostsandconsequencesofconflictsshouldthey
occur.Itwouldalsobetaskedwithissuingpublicwarningsonthelikelyhuman,social
andeconomiccostsofsuchconflictsandwithpublishingcostestimatesbothforthe
internationalcommunityatlarge,andfortheUKinparticular,ofhumanitarianand
otherinterventionslikelytoberequiredshouldaconflictbreakout.Thiswouldnot
ofcoursebepossibleinveryfastmovingandtotallyunexpectedconflictsituations
butitwouldbepossibleformost.Manycountriesandregionsatriskofviolent
conflictare,afterall,oftenknownaboutbutlefttofesterformonthsandsometimes
yearsbytheinternationalcommunity.
Althoughconflictscenariomodelscouldnotlayclaimstoofferprecisepredictions,the
literatureonpreviousconflictsandtheireffects,andonthecostsofwarbothforthose
directlyaffectedandsubsequentlyforawiderangeofneighbouringcountriesand
internationalactorsincludingtheUKgovernment,hasmovedoninrecentyears
sufficientlytoallowreasonableassumptionstobemadeandcrediblemodelstobebuilt.
Ministerspubliclyconfrontedbyreasonablycredibleassessmentsoftheopportunity
costsofinaction,andwithapossiblelong-termfinancialaswellasmoralandstrategic 24.SITCENistheEUJointSituation
responsibilitytoprevent,aremorelikelytoactinpreventativeways. Centre.Itmonitorsandassesses
potentialcrisisregions,terroristactivity
Recommendation3:Fullspectrumofmeasures anddevelopmentsinWMD-
proliferation.Itdoesthisthrougha24-
Intakingpreventativeactiononconflict,theGovernmentshouldfocusontheuseofa hourobservationsystemofworldwide
fullspectrumofmeasures,andwhilemilitaryinterventionmaybejustifiedand eventsandsituations.Thecentrealso
requiredquicklyinacrisis,thepurposeofpolicyshouldbetousethewholegamutof providesstrategicintelligenceassistance
totheEUCouncil,particularlyon
aid,developmentandotherconflictpreventionmeasurestomakesurethatthis counter-terrorismissues,aswellas
eventualityiseitheravoidedaltogether,oreffectivelyviewedasapolicyoflastresort. backupforEUmilitaryandciviliancrisis
managementoperations.TheCIVMIL
Wealsoneedtomakebetteruseofdiplomacyforconflictpreventionpurposes,and cellistheEUCivilian/MilitaryCell.It
investinthejudicioususeofcarrotsandsticks,personaldiplomacywithkeyplayers, providesassistancetotheEUscrisis
responseteams,aswellasstrategic
andcoordinateddiplomaticpressure,workingwithpartnersandthroughinternational planningformilitary,civilianorjoint
institutionswhereverpossible.Itisvitaltounderstandthatanessentialcomponentof military/civilianoperations.Italso
capacityinthemodernageisthecapacitytoworkwithothers.Insupportofthis contributestothedevelopmentofcrisis
responsedoctrinesandconceptsbased
toolboxapproach,webelievethefollowingmorespecificrecommendationshavearole onexperienceincivilianandmilitary
toplay. exercises.
110 Shareddestinies| Policyrecommendations
25.CurrentlynearlyUS$100milliona
dayisbeingspentbythecoalitionon
thewar,butonlyUS$7millionadayon
theAfghansthemselves(BBC2008d).
Recommendation4:ConflictreductionMDG
AconflictreductiongoalshouldbeaddedtotheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals both
toemphasisetheimportantrolethatdevelopmentandaidpolicyneedstoplayin
conflictpreventionandinacknowledgementofhowimportantconflictitselfisasa
driverofglobalpovertyandinequality.WhileprogresstowardtheMDGsisfrustratingly
slow,theyneverthelessprovideanimportantfocalpointforpoliticalpressureinthisarea
anditisamajoromissionthataconflictreductiongoalisnotalreadyapartoftheMDG
process.
Recommendation5:Diplomaticresourcesandin-countryexpertise
WeneedamajorinvestmentinandexpansionofBritainsdiplomaticresourcesand
levelsofoverseasin-countryexpertise.Thisconstitutesavitalpartofthenecessary
infrastructureofprevention,canfacilitateearly-warningintelligence-gatheringand
strategicassessmentdevelopment,andcanprovidethelocalexpertiseand
understandingofwhatmeasuresmaysuccessfullyimpactonasituationontheground.
Gooddiplomaticresourcesandlocalknowledgecanleadtomorenuancedandeffective
coercivediplomacy,moreeffectiveuseofeconomicincentivesonpossiblepartiestoa
conflict,andtomoretargetedandeffectivemeasurestoaddressinternalinequalities
thatoftencausetensionsinsideacountry.Wetotallyreject,byimplication,thekindof
isolationistapproachtoIranadoptedbytheBushadministrationinWashington.
Diplomacyanddeeplocalknowledgeisakeypartofeffective,includingcost-effective,
conflictprevention.Wealsoneedtore-focussomeofourdiplomaticeffort.Itisa
perennialfailingofBritishpolicymakingthatweputmostofoureffortintoanalysisand
alltoolittleintopolicyimplementationorally-gatheringinresponsetothechallenges
weface.
Recommendation6:ResourcestoNGOs
WeneedanincreaseinresourceschannelledtoNGObodies workingonconflict
preventionorthepromotionofpoliticaldialogueinpotentialconflicthotspots.The
WestminsterFoundationforDemocracyisagoodexampleofsuchaninstitutionand
thereareobviouslymanyothers.TheGovernmentshouldalso,incollaborationwiththe
NGOsthemselves,seekmoreeffectivewaysofcoordinatingNGOactivity.
Recommendation7:Publicinventoryofcasestudiesofsuccessfulpreventativeaction
TheGovernmentshouldfundindependentresearchintosuccessfulconflictprevention
activitiesandsupportapublicinventoryofcasestudiesofsuccessfulpreventative
action.Thisshouldactasaresourceforpolicymakersandthemediaandshouldbe
basedwhereverpossibleonprimaryin-countryresearch.Themanypositivestories
surroundingintervention(suchasthoserelatingtoSierraLeoneandMacedonia)are
oftennotheard.Decision-makersneedtoknowaboutexamplesofsuccessandtolearn
thelessonsofthoseexamples.Casestudiesshouldfocusonwhatinstrumentswere
deployed,howsuccesswasachieved,andhowsuccessmightbereplicatedinothercases
andcircumstances.Theyshouldalsoprovideafeedbackloopintothetoolboxapproach
calledforaboveandinsodoingshouldbepartofeffortstoaddressthedeficitof
leadershipandthecollectivefailureofpoliticalwill relatedtoconflictprevention.
Interventioninconflictenvironments
Whereconflictpreventionfails,andviolentconflictbreaksout,thisexacerbatesmanyof
theotherriskfactorsassociatedwithstateweakness,failureandcollapsethatwe
describedinChapter4.Thewiderproblemofweakandfailedstatesisclearlyonethat
goeswellbeyondtheindividualinstancesofAfghanistanandIraq,crucialthoughthese
are.
Thechallengeofconflictandofweakandfailingstatesisgoingtobeachallengethatis
withusforthelongterm.Weneedtobeclearaboutboththestrategicrationalefor
respondingtoitandtheoverallshapeoftheresponsethatisrequired.Thisisallthe
moreimportantgiventhecostofourinvolvementinAfghanistaninhumanandfinancial
termsalready25,andgiventheproblemsofoverstretchbeingexperiencedbythearmed
forcesasaresult.Politiciansofallpersuasionsmustworkhardertoexplainwhythese
issuesmatterandwhattheconsequencesoffailurearelikelytobe:morepossible
terroristattacksinstigatedbygroupsexploitingpoorlygovernedspaces;thefurther
 111

effectsoftransnationalcrimeonourstreetsandinourcommunities;possible
undetectedandunmanageddiseaseoutbreaksorfailurestoproperlyregulateorcontrol
sensitiveresearchinareassuchasbiotechnology,thatmayultimatelycauselargelossof
lifehereintheUK.
Ofcourse,thepublicwillwanttoknowthatweareactinglegitimatelyandnotspreading
ourselvestoothinly.Wheremoresubstantialinterventionisnecessary,itmustbejustified
incleartermsagainstasetofcriteria.(Cantheconflictandthecharacterofthe
interventionbedescribedasjustinthecontextofasetofjustwarprinciples?26 Has
therebeenagrossbreachofinternationallaworstandards,especiallyinrespectof
humanrightsorahumanitariancrisis?Doesthisthreatenthewiderpeaceoftheregion
or,inthecaseofweaponsofmassdestruction,theworld?Istheconflictareaor
ungovernedspaceinwhichweareinterveningadirectthreattoourvitalnational
interests?Isitbeingusedasabasetoattackus,orfromwhichtoexportdangerousand
damagingcriminalactivityintoourterritory,oristhereareasonableexpectationthatit
imminentlywillbe?Doesithavethepotentialtounderminekeyalliancesand
relationshipsforus?).But,withthesecaveats,andwherelong-termmeasurestoaddress
underlyingstructuralandsystemicdriversofconflicthavefailed,wemuststandreadyto
addressshort-termpressuresandcrisesinthisareamoreeffectively.
Tofacilitatethis:
Recommendation8:Contextformilitaryinterventions Theconflictphase
Militaryinterventions,whenunavoidable,mustalwaystakeplaceinthecontextofa shouldnotbeseen
coherentpoliticalplanthatisdevelopedseamlesslyfromthepreventionphasethat
precedesconflictandleadsseamlesslyintotheconstructionphasethatfollowsit.This assomething
didnothappeninIraq,wherecoalitionforceswereaskedtotakeBaghdadandother separatetopost-
importanturbancentresratherthantodevelopastrategyforthestabilisationofthe conflictstabilisation
countrypost-Saddam.Despitesomeimprovements,wearealsostrugglingwithitin
Afghanistan.Thepointhereisthattheconflictphaseshouldnotbeseenassomething andreconstruction
separatetopost-conflictstabilisationandreconstructionbutasanintegralpartofitand butasanintegral
militarytacticsandgoalsshouldbeshapedbythewiderpoliticalobjective. partofitand
Recommendation9:Reviewofmilitarydoctrineandoperationalplanning militarytacticsand
Thisimpliesaneedtoinstigateamorefundamentalreviewofmilitarydoctrineand
operationalplanning asthisrelatestointerventionsinconflictandfailedstate
goalsshouldbe
situations.Italsomeanstheroleofthemilitaryneedstobeadaptedtobejustone shapedbythewider
elementinamorecomprehensiveapproachand,sinceitishighlyunlikelythattheUK politicalobjective
willbeengagedininterventionsunilaterally,itmeansinvestmentinanationalcapability
toeffectivelydockourownactivities,militaryandcivilian,withtheactivitiesof
internationalpartners.
Recommendation10:Unityofcommand
UnityofcommandacrossUKmilitary,diplomatic,aidandreconstructionactivitiesin
conflictzonesisalsovital,andshouldideallybeunderacivilianleadershipthatis
sufficientlywellresourcedtoensurethatinpracticeitisnotentirelyreliantonthe
militaryforon-the-groundinformation,intelligenceanddelivery.Thisistrueingeneral,
andalsoappliestotheparticularcaseofAfghanistan.
Recommendation11:AsinglememberoftheCabinettolead
Thisprincipleofunityofcommandundercivilianleadershipshouldapplyalltheway
backtoCabinetlevelinLondon.OnememberoftheCabinetshouldeffectivelytake
leadresponsibilityfortheentireUKeffortinrelationtosecuritydiplomacyandany
majoroverseasintervention,includinginthecurrentcaseofAfghanistan,andbe
taskedwithgatheringinternationalsupportforactionrequired.Thisindividualshould
bebackedupbyanimprovedcorecapabilityforcross-departmentalproject
managementinWhitehallandbeabletocalluponresourcesfromacrossgovernmentto
ensureaneffectiveandjoined-upUKcontributionontheground.Thiswouldmake
26.TwomembersofourCommission
politicallinesofaccountabilitytoParliamentandthecountrymuchclearerthantheyare panel,LordAshdownandLordGuthrie,
atpresent.TheUKshouldpushitsinternationalpartnersforunityofcommandand haverecentlywrittenonthethemeof
voiceinthewidermultilateraleffortinthesesituations,too.Whileweunderstandthe justwar(seeAshdown2007:43-64
andGuthrieandQuinlan2007).
sensitivitiesaroundcommandofnationalforces,itislackofunityinthisareathatis
112 Shareddestinies| Policyrecommendations

unnecessarilyunderminingoureffortstomakeprogressinAfghanistanatpresent.
Thepackageofproposalsoutlinedaboveshould,ifimplemented,substantially
strengthenouroverallapproachtodealingwiththechallengesofviolentconflictand
post-conflictreconstruction.
Recommendation12:Promotearegionalcontextsupportiveofpeace
InrelationtotheconflictinAfghanistaninparticularwebelievetheUKgovernment
shouldalsonowworkwiththenewUSadministrationtopromotetheideaofa
regionalcontextsupportiveofpeace,possiblythrougharegionalpeaceconference,
bringinginIran,Russia,PakistanandChina. Thiswillnotbeeasy,butshouldbe
attempted.

Strengthenedmultilateralism
WewelcomeattemptstoreformtheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilandmovesto
widengroupingssuchastheG8toawidergroupofemergingeconomiesbut,onthe
securityfront,ourrecommendationshereonstrengtheningmultilateralismcomprisetwo
mainelements.Theseare:
Anenhancedandadaptedroleforkeyregionalorganisations
Thepursuitofaneweraofissue-specificfunctionalcooperation,throughnew
treatieswherenecessary,theshoringupofoldoneswhereneeded,andthecreation
ofotherinnovativemechanismsandprocedurestoextendandimprovegovernanceat
globallevel.
Eachoftheseelementsisdealtwithinturnbelow:
Strengtheningandadaptingregionalsecurityinstitutions
Recommendation13:Strengtheningandadaptationofregionalcooperation
ThestrengtheningandadaptationofregionalcooperationthroughtheEuropean
Union,theOSCE,andNATO,withthelastoftheseincorporatingthefullengagement
oftheUnitedStates,shouldbeacentralplankofBritishstrategyonmultilateralism.
ThisisconsistentandnotintensionwithcontinuedcommitmenttotheUnitedNations,
sincetheUNCharterrecognisestheroleofregionalorganisations.
WeseeEU WeseeEUinstitutionsasacrucialmechanismforincreasingthesecurityofEuropean
institutionsasa andUKcitizensandwewillsaymoreabouttheroleoftheEUinourfinalreport.Wewill
alsogointomoredetailabouttheimportanceofUS-EUrelations,andofAmerican
crucialmechanism leadershiponthebroadrangeofsecurityissuescoveredinthisinterimreport,especially
forincreasingthe inthelightofthepolicyapproachesdemonstratedintheearlymonthsoftheObama
securityof Administration.
Europeanand NATOalsoremainsvital,butitshouldcontinuetoadaptitsroletoensurerelevanceto
UKcitizens newthreatsandtoassistontheemerginghomelandsecurityandemergencyresponse
agendas.Anexampleofgoodworkalreadyundertakenwouldbethechangetotherole
ofNATOsStandingNavalForceMediterranean,inthepost-9/11era.Thisinvolved
re-taskingtohavetheForcemonitorseatrafficfortransnationalcriminalactivity,suchas
trafficking,andtointerceptthatactivitywherenecessary.Again,wewillreturntomore
detailedrecommendationsonNATOinourfinalreport.
Recommendation14:Logisticalandfinancialhelptoregionalsecurityorganisations
BeyondtheEuro-Atlanticarea,itisessentialthat theEUandNATOmassivelyincrease
logisticalandfinancialhelptootherregionalsecurityorganisationsinneedof
support.ThisappliesespeciallytotheAfricanUnion,theregionalsecuritybodythatis
likelytobetestedthemostinthenextfivetotenyears,butwhichiscurrentlytheleast
wellequippedtorespond.
Aneweraofissue-specificfunctionalcooperation
Whileglobalandregionalinstitutionalreformiscrucialtothenewmultilateralismthatwe
need,wecannotwaitforallofourlong-termobjectivesineachoftheseareastobe
met.TheUKstrategyonmultilateralismmustalsothereforefocusonspecificissues
wherecooperationisurgentandwhereexistingtreatiesandarrangementseitherneed
 113

shoringuporwhollynewonestobecreatedtodealwithparticularproblems.Wemust
findandworkwithwillingpartnersinthisendeavour.Inthematerialbelow,wefocuson
twosuchareas:nuclearnon-proliferationandglobalbiosecuritypolicy.
Nuclearnon-proliferation
Giventhecurrentsituation,andonthebasisoftheanalysisalreadypresentedinthis
report,itisclearthattheeffectivehandlingofrelationswithIran,andcontinued
progressinrelationtoNorthKorea,willbevitalifsomeoftheworst-casescenarioson
nuclearproliferationandregionalnucleararmsracesaretobeavoided.Itisimperative
forpeaceandstabilityintheMiddleEast,oneoftheworldsmostimportantenergy-
producingregions,thatIrandoesnotacquirenuclearweapons.
However,wealsoneedtomovebeyonddealingwithnon-proliferationissuesonacase-
by-casebasis.
WefullyagreewithGeorgeShultz,WilliamPerry,HenryKissingerandSamNunninthe
UnitedStates,thatnucleardeterrenceisadecreasinglyeffectiveandincreasingly
hazardousbasisuponwhichtobuildourlong-termsecurity.Thethreatoffurtherstate-
basedproliferation,ofnuclearterrorism,ofanincreaseddispersalofpotentially
dangerousnucleartechnologyandknow-howaroundtheworld,andofafundamental
breakdowninmultilateralnon-proliferationdiplomacyatthe2010NPTReview
Conference,hasbroughtustothebrinkofasecond,moredangerousnuclearage.We
thereforesupporttheviewthatthelong-term,strategicgoalofourpolicymustnow
bethecreationofaworldfreeofnuclearweapons.
WerecognisethattheUKgovernmentisalreadyseekingtomakeacontributiontothis
overallagenda.Since1995ithashadamoratoriumonproductionoffissilematerialfor
nuclearweaponspurposesandhaspermanentlyplacedexcessdefencematerialunder
internationalsafeguards.Italso,inthe2006DefenceWhitePaperontheFutureofthe
UnitedKingdomsNuclearDeterrent,declareditsintentiontoreducethenumberofits
operationallyavailablewarheadstoaround160(MinistryofDefence2006).Theformer
ForeignSecretary,MargaretBeckett,andformerSecretaryofStateforDefence,Des
Browne,moreover,havefurtherfloatedtheideaofBritainbecomingadisarmament
laboratoryandtestinggroundformeasuresthattheinternationalcommunitycouldtake
onkeyaspectsofdisarmament,particularlyinrelationtotheverifiableeliminationof
nuclearweapons(Browne2008).
Thesemeasuresarealltobewelcomed,asisactiveUKdiplomacyinrelationtothe
IranianandNorthKoreancases,UKsupportforaFissileMaterialCut-OffTreaty27 andUK
diplomacyinpursuitofimplementationoftheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty28 atthe
earliestdatepossible.WealsowelcomethePrimeMinisterscommitmenttotheideaof
auraniumbond.
Currentmeasuresinandofthemselves,however,arenotenough.
Toachievethelong-termgoalweseek,weneedtogofurtherandtodomore.
Recommendation15:EncouragereductionsinthearsenalsofRussiaandtheUS
TheUKgovernmentshouldnowusealltheinstrumentsatitsdisposaltoencourage
further,rapidreductionsinthestrategicarsenalsofbothRussiaandtheUnited
27.Thisisanagreementtoprohibitthe
States.Betweenthem,thesetwostatespossessaround95percentoftheworlds productionoffissilematerialfornuclear
nuclearweaponsandasameasuretokick-startthewiderprocess,suchreductionsarein explosivesandtheproductionofany
suchmaterialoutsideofinternational
thefundamentalnationalinterestoftheUnitedKingdom.Thenegotiationofanew safeguards.
treatytofurtherreducestockpilesandtoreplacetheprovisionsoftheStrategicArms
ReductionTreatyof1991,currentlysettoexpireon5December2009,isnowvitaland 28.Thistreatybansthetestingof
nuclearweaponsandthereforehinders
shouldbeurgedonbothparties.Thiswouldalsohavewiderbenefits,sinceoneofthe thedevelopmentofnewgenerationsof
factorsweakeningtheNPTtodayistheperceptionbymanynon-nuclearweaponsstates weaponsintheprocess.Itisawaiting
ratificationbyanumberofcrucial
thatthenuclearpowersarenotlivinguptotheirobligationunderarticleVIofthetreaty states,includingtheUS,anditsentry
topursuenucleardisarmament. intoforcewouldsendafurther
importantsignaltonon-nuclear
Recommendation16belowismadetoaddressconcernsbysomestatesthatcurrent weaponsstatesthatthosewithnuclear
weaponsdonotenvisagedeveloping
non-proliferationarrangementsarenotstrongenoughtopreventproliferationand andtestingthemindefinitelyintothe
thereforenotastrongenoughfoundationonwhichtobuildnationalsecurity,andto future.
114 Shareddestinies| Policyrecommendations
29.TheP-5consistsofBritain,France,
Russia,ChinaandtheUnitedStates;
thesesamefivestatesarealsotheonly
nuclearweaponstatestohavesigned
theNon-ProliferationTreaty.
30.SeethetextoftheTreatyonthe
Non-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons
(UnitedNations2005).
addresstheconcernthatterroristsmayacquireanuclearweaponorthematerials
requiredtomakeone.
Recommendation16:StrengtheningoftheNon-ProliferationTreatyprovisionson
monitoringandcompliance
ThereisafurtherneedtopursueastrengtheningoftheNon-ProliferationTreaty
provisionsonmonitoringandcompliance,toprovidegreaterassurancestoallparties
ontheeffectivenessoftheTreaty.TheIAEAAdditionalProtocol,requiringastateto
provideaccesstoanylocationwherenuclearmaterialispresent,shouldbeacceptedby
allnationssigneduptotheTreatyandthepolicygoalshouldbetomakesuch
acceptancemandatoryattheNPTReviewConferencein2010.
Recommendation17:IncreaseUKsfinancialcontributiontoIAEA
TheUKgovernmentshouldalsoincreasefurtheritsfinancialcontributiontotheIAEA
anditshouldencourageotherstatestodothesameinsupportofthisvitallyimportant
partofthenon-proliferationinstitutionallandscape.
Recommendation18:PracticalhelptothosestateswishingtoimplementSecurity
CouncilResolution1540
WealsocallformoreenergeticimplementationofSecurityCouncilResolution1540,
whichobligatesnationstoimprovethesecurityofnuclearstockpilesandallowsforthe
formationofteamsofspecialiststobedeployedinthosecountriesthatdonotpossess
theinfrastructureorskillstodoso.TheUKshouldprovidefurtherpracticalhelpto
thosestatesthatwishtoimplementSecurityCouncilResolution1540butarewithout
theskillsandcapacitiestodosoalone.
Noneofthesemeasuresshouldinanywayhinderthelegalrightofallstatespartyto
theNPTtoengageinthepeacefuluseofnucleartechnology.Inordertoensurethat
thosestateswishingtousenuclearpowerforthefirsttime,orthosewishingtoexpand
theiruseofcivilnuclearpower,candosowithoutthisresultinginaproliferationof
enrichmentfacilitiesaroundtheworld,theremustalsonowbeprogresstowards
implementingtheideaofanIAEA-controllednuclearfuelbank.
Insupportoftheseendeavours:
Recommendation19:UKfinancialcontributiontotheIAEA/NTInuclearfuelbank
fund
TheUKgovernmentshouldfurtherprovideafinancialcontributiontotheIAEA/NTI
nuclearfuelbankfund,whichisaimedatestablishingsuchabank.
Inadditiontothesemeasures:
Recommendation20:ReviewofNATOsstrategicconcept
TheUKgovernmentshoulduseallofitsinfluenceinsideNATOtoensurethatthe
reviewoftheorganisationsstrategicconcept,beingcarriedoutin2009and2010,
producesaresultsensitivetoandsupportiveoftherequirementsofasuccessful
outcometotheNPTReviewConferencein2010.
TheUKintheP-5
ThereisalsoscopefortheGovernmenttoengageinmoreactivediplomacywithinthe
fivepermanentmembersoftheUNSecurityCouncil(P-5)29 andtogobeyonditscurrent
technicalapproach.Theproliferationchallengeswefacetodayareinherentlypolitical,
whichispreciselywhythepreambletotheNon-ProliferationTreatyasksallpartiesto
worktowardstheeasingofinternationaltensionandthestrengtheningoftrust
betweenstatesinordertofacilitatethecessationofthemanufactureofnuclear
weapons,theliquidationofalltheirexistingstockpiles,andtheeliminationfromnational
arsenalsofnuclearweaponsandthemeansoftheirdelivery.30
Nonetheless,thereisafundamentallackofseriousandfocusedstrategicdialogueon
nucleardisarmamentandonnuclearthreatreductioningeneralamongtheP-5.Thereis,
asaresult,noagreementonperceptionsofthreatoronthemosteffectivewaysto
strengthenthenon-proliferationregime.Ifthissituationcontinues,itislikelythatmany
ofthemeasureslaidoutabove,badlyneededthoughtheyare,willbehardto
implementandwillnotfullydealwiththethreat.
 115

Recommendation21:DeeperandmoremeaningfulstrategicdialoguewithintheP-5
TheGovernmentshouldthereforeseektouseitsmembershipoftheP-5andthefull
diplomaticresourcesatitsdisposaltostimulateadeeperandmoremeaningful
strategicdialoguewithinthisgroupofstates.
Suchadialogueshouldhaveasitsobjectivethedevelopmentofasharedagendafor
movingbeyondthestatusquo,inafashioncapableofdeliveringgenuinefurther
progressonnucleardisarmamentandnon-proliferation.Wherenecessary,thiswillalso
needtoconsiderwhateverchangesinconventionalforcelevelsandposturesmaybe
necessarytoensuretheconfidenceofallpartiesinfurtherstepstowardsnuclear
disarmament.BuildingontheprecedentofthejointP-5statementtotheNon-
ProliferationTreatyPreparatoryCommitteeinGenevainMay2008,theaimshouldbe
thedevelopmentofajointvisiondocumenttobesubmittedtotheNPTReview
Conferencein2010.
Alongtheway,theP-5shouldalsoengageindebateanddiscussiononanumberof
specificissuesincluding:
Measurestoreducetheriskofaccidentalorunauthoriseduseofnuclearweapons,
includingthroughpossiblemalicioushackingofrelevantdefencecomputersystems
Thepossibilityofamultilateralcommitmentwithinthegroupnottobethefirstto
resumetestingofnuclearweapons,pendingentryintoforceoftheComprehensive
TestBanTreaty
Identificationoftheelementsthatwouldbekeytoanyverifiablefissilematerialcut-
offtreaty
Viewsontherelationshipbetweenoffensiveanddefensivemissilesystemsandtheir
implicationsforstrategicstability
Theroleoftacticalnuclearweaponsandtheconditionsunderwhichallmembersof
thegroupmightbewillingtoconsiderpossibleconstraintsontheirdeployment
ThepossibilityofpromotingajointSecurityCouncilresolutionsettingoutinclear
termsthestepsthatwouldbetakentodealwithanystatewithdrawingfromthenon-
proliferationtreaty.31
Recommendation22:Non-proliferationstrategicdialoguemeetingfortheP-5
Toensureelevatedprioritisationofnon-proliferationissuesoverthenext18months,andto
ensureafocuseddialogueaimedatproducingasuccessful2010NPTReviewConference,
theUKgovernmentshouldalsoinvitetheforeignanddefenceministersoftheP-5toa
non-proliferationstrategicdialoguemeetingpriortothatreviewconference.
Recommendation23:Alessformaltrackofdiplomaticactivity
TheGovernmentshouldalsofundandcontributetoasecond,lessformaltrackof
diplomaticactivityinvolvingformerseniorofficialsandpolicyexpertsfromtheP-5plus
India,PakistanandIsrael.Thiswouldbeaimedatthinkingthroughthepoliticaland
strategicissuesrequiredforaphasedprogressiontozeronuclearweaponsamongthis
group.Representativesoftheseeightcountries,crediblewithbutatarms-lengthfromtheir
governments,wouldcovertheeightkeynuclearweaponsstates(bothsignatoriesand
non-signatoriesoftheNPT)andwouldhavemorescopetothinktheunthinkable.
Recommendation24:StatementsbytheDefenceSecretaryandForeignSecretaryto
theHouseofCommons
Toensurethatnon-proliferationissuesremainattheforefrontofnationalpoliticaldebate
andtoensuredomesticawarenessoftheneedforthesemeasures,theDefenceSecretary
andForeignSecretaryshouldalsomakeannualjointstatementstotheHouseof
Commonsoncurrentproliferationconcernsandtrends,andontheGovernmentsfull
rangeofactivitiesandresourcesbeingdeployedtorespondtothem.
Globalbiosecurity
31.Forafulleraccountofthese
Wehavedrawnparticularattentiontothechallengesofbioterrorismanddisease proposalsandawiderdiscussiononthe
throughoutthisreport.Asanemergingproblem,itisexposingsignificantweaknesses, roleoftheP-5seeCenterforStrategic
whichwemustrespondtourgently,intheinternationalinstitutionallandscape. andInternationalStudies2007.
116 Shareddestinies| Policyrecommendations
Wedonotbelieve widercontextwithinwhichtheseissuesneedtobeconsidered.Wedonotbelieveitis
itispossibleto
addressthe
challengesofglobal
healthinisolation
fromotherdrivers
ofsocio-economic
wellbeing improvingglobalbiosecurity.
Sincethereiswidespreadconsensusthatthearrangementsfordetectingandresponding
tothedeliberatereleaseofadeadlypathogenarelargelyidenticaltothoserequiredfor
detectingandrespondingtoanaturallyoccurringdiseaseoutbreak,wemake
recommendationsherethatareaimedatimprovingglobalreadinesstodealwithboth.
Beforedoingso,wewoulddrawattentiontothelinkagesbetweenbiosecurityandthe
possible,forexample,toaddressthespecificchallengesrelatedtobioterrorismand
infectiousdiseaseswithoutalsoaddressingtheweaknessesinthegeneralhealthsystems
ofmanydevelopingcountries.Equally,wedonotbelieveitispossibletoaddressthe
challengesofglobalhealthinisolationfromotherdriversofsocio-economicwellbeing.
Thereareimportantconnections,asnotedatseveralpointsinthisreport,between
poverty,poorgovernance,conflict,statefailureandthespreadofandvulnerabilityto
infectiousdiseases.Asaresult,webelievetherecommendationsalreadymadein
relationtoconflictreduction,andwidercallsforarenewedinternationalcommitmentto
meettheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,allhaveimportantsupportingrolestoplayin
Beyondthesesuggestions,however,wealsobelievemorespecificmeasuresare
necessary.
Recommendation25:Panelofbiologicalsciencesexperts
TheGovernmentshouldworkwithinternationalpartnerstocreateapanelof
scientificexperts,equivalenttotheIPCConclimatechange,forthepurposesof
reviewingandbringingtopolicymakersattentiondevelopmentsinthebiological
sciences thatmayhaveimplicationsforpublicsafetyandmayneedaregulatory
responsefromgovernmentsandothers.
Recommendation26:SupporttotheGlobalOutbreakAlertandResponseNetwork
TheGovernmentshouldlooktoincreaseitssupporttotheGlobalOutbreakAlertand
ResponseNetwork(GOARN) andshouldencourageothercountriestodosothesame.
TheGOARNhasacrucialroletoplayinearlywarningbutisinneedofgreater
investmentandconsiderablestrengtheninginmanycountries.Giventhatadisease
outbreakelsewhereintheworldcouldveryquicklyleadtolarge-scalelossoflifeinthe
UK,andgiventhattheglobalsystemforpreventingsuchanoccurrenceisonlyasstrong
asitsweakestlink,thereisastrongcaseforspendingUKtaxpayersmoneyinthisarea.
Recommendation27:Diseasesurveillanceandresponseindevelopingcountries
Inlinewithourbeliefthateffectivemultilateralactionrequiresstrongstatestoagree
andimplementit, theGovernmentshouldalso,throughitsownbilateralaid
programmes,increasetheprioritygiventomeasurestostrengthendeveloping
countriesskillsandcapacitiesinthefieldofdiseasesurveillanceandresponse.
Recommendation28:GlobalCompactforInfectiousDiseases
TheGovernmentshouldfurtherpromotetheideaofaGlobalCompactforInfectious
Diseases. Thiswouldbeanewtreatydesignedtodeliveranumberofinternationally
coordinatedbiosecurityadvances,including:
Thecreationofanetworkofresearchcentresaimedatthecarryingoutof
fundamentalresearchoninfectiousdiseases
Improveddataandknowledgesharingfromresearchandbio-surveillanceactivities
aroundtheworld
Theharmonisationofnationalstandards,regulatorypractices,andbestlaboratory
practices
Amajorexpansionintheproductionofimportantdrugsandvaccines.(SeeHouseof
Lords2008:375-379)
Inpractice,theGlobalCompactwouldachievethesegoalsbyembodyingaprincipleof
mutualitythatwouldgeneraterealincentivesforstatesignatoriestodeliverontheir
commitments.Thosestatesinvestinginbio-surveillanceandputtingdataintothe
Compact,forexample,wouldbeatthefrontofthequeueforreceivingvaccinesfrom
 117

theinternationallyenhancedstockpiles.Thosewhoharmonisestandardsandregulatory
practiceswouldenjoyagovernanceroleinthemanagementofthenetworkofresearch
centres,andsoon.Withtheseincentivesandtheprincipleofmutualityenshrined,the
Compactshouldalsoincreasethechancesthatthepositivecommitmentsonsurveillance
andresponseenteredintointherevisedInternationalHealthRegulations2005(as
describedinChapter5)willactuallybedeliveredinpracticeandnotonlyonpaper.
PrivatebusinessesandrelevantNGOsshouldbeencouragedtocollaboratewith
Compactactivitiesandbeinvitedtobecomeassociatesignatoriestoitsprovisions.
Recommendation29:DevelopmentoftheInternationalHealthPartnership
InordertoensurethattheCompactwouldnotsimplyleadtoalockinginofvaccine
accessandhealthgovernanceadvantagesalreadyenjoyedbythewealthiestcountries,
theGovernmentshouldcoupleitspromotionoftheCompactwithfurther
developmentoftheInternationalHealthPartnership(IHP)asanurgentpriority.
TheIHP(asnotedinChapter5)focusesondevelopingrecipientcountryhealthsystems
asawhole,developsandsupportsthenationalhealthplansofrecipientcountries,and
coordinatestheactivitiesofawiderangeofactorstotheseends(includingdonor
countries,recipientcountries,IntergovernmentalOrganisationsandNGOs).Asaresult,
inembryonicformitnotonlyhasthemakingsofbeingamuchneededimplementation
armforWHOstandardsandguidancebutinperformingthatfunction,couldbeamore
effectivetoolforreducinginequalitiesinglobalhealthcaresystemsandcapacities.
However,withonlyeightdonorcountrymembersandsevenrecipientcountriessigned
upatpresent,itisseverelyhamperedinitsabilitytoplaythisrole.TheGovernment
shouldthereforeseek,workingwithothersintheinternationalcommunity,arapid
expansionofitsdonorandrecipientstatemembership.
Recommendation30:Eventreportingsystemforanimaldiseases
Toaddressthelinksbetweenanimalandhumanhealth,theGovernmentshouldthrow
itsweightbehindthecreationofaneventreportingsystemforanimaldiseases
equivalenttothatsetupinrelationtohumanhealthintheInternationalHealth
Regulations2005.Itshouldalsoseekstrongercoordinationbetweensuchasystemand
thesystemformonitoringdiseaseoutbreaksinthehumanpopulation.
118 Shareddestinies| References

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Issue Policychallenge Sub-national UKNational UKbilateral Euro/Atlanticregional Global
relationships

Externalmilitary Notanimmediatethreat.Butobvious ArmedForces NATOAlliance;EU UNSecurityCouncil

attackontheUK requirementtobereadyfordefenceof
nationalterritory

International Ensurelegitimacyandeffectivenessof Foreign& Permanent5(UK,US, EU(possibleEUseaton UNSecretaryGeneral;

institutionalreform keyinstitutionssuchasUNSecurity CommonwealthOffice France,Russia,China) SecurityCouncil) SecurityCouncil,
Council (FCO) plusIndiaandpossibly specificUNagencies;
Brazil G8

Terrorism Understandchallengeandthe Localauthorities(e.g. HomeOffice;Cabinet UnitedStatesandother EUcounter-terrorism Interpol;G8Counter-

radicalisationprocess.Createpolicies preventingpolitical Office;Intelligence alliedcountries strategy;Europol.EU TerrorismCooperation
towinheartsandminds;prevent extremismpilots);Police Services;GCHQ;Serious (intelligenceservice diplomacyonMiddle
attacksonUKsoil(through Constabularies, andOrganisedCrime cooperation). Eastconflict;EUpolicy
intelligencework/policing/protection includingtheMet; Agency;BorderPolice; Intelligencesharing onTurkishentrytothe
ofUKborders;builddomestic PoliceCommunity TransportPolice; relationshipswith Union
consensusaroundcounter-terrorism TensionsTeams; organisationsprotecting countriesintheMiddle
strategy;combatthe communityandreligious criticalnational East
terrorism/organisedcrimeinterface groups;individual infrastructure;Armed
citizens Forcesasaidtocivil
power

Weak,failedand Eliminateterroristsafehavens;build UK-baseddevelopment FCO;ArmedForces; EU(HumanSecurity UNSecurityCouncil;

nationalsecuritypolicy

failingstates governancecapacityinotherfailed andaidNGOssuchas MinistryofDefence Force?);NATO(asin otherregionalbodies,

andfailingstatesthrough Oxfam,Savethe (MoD);Departmentfor Afghanistan) suchasAfricanUnion,
developmentandclimatechange Children International actingunderUN
Appendix1:Theterrainof

adaptationassistance,conflict Development(DfID); mandates;G8;

preventionmeasures,peace-building, Police IMF/WorldBank;World
post-conflictreconstruction TradeOrganisation

Humanitarian Preventgenocideandhumanrights UK-baseddevelopment ArmedForces;MoD; EU;NATO UNSecurityCouncil

intervention abuses;respondtoemergency andaidNGOssuchas DfID
situations Oxfam,Savethe
Children

WMDproliferation Preventproliferationofnuclear, Actorsandinstitutions FCO/MoDworkon WithUnitedStatesand EUnuclearexports IAEA;NuclearNon-

chemical,biologicalandradiological securingnuclear counter-proliferation; Russia,toencourage controlregime;EU ProliferationTreaty;
weaponstostateornon-stateactors facilitiesandmaterials Departmentfor denuclearisationefforts counter-proliferation NuclearSuppliers
withintheUK Business,Enterpriseand efforts Group;G8Cooperative
RegulatoryReform ThreatReduction
(BERR) Programme;
ProliferationSecurity
Initiative
133
 134

Climatechange Preventionoffurtherglobalwarming Individualbusinesses Departmentfor UnitedStates,India, EU(EmissionsTrading KyotoProcess;

throughpost-Kyotoglobalagreement; andbusinessgroups; EnvironmentFoodand China Scheme) IntergovernmentalPanel
adaptationtoalreadyinevitable localauthorities;energy RuralAffairs(DEFRA), onClimateChange
climatechange,bothforbasichuman consumers BERR,Environment
survivalandtoeaseconflict,migration Agency
andfailedstatepressures
OPEC,International
Energysecurity Ensuresecurityofsupply,minimum Energycompanies; DEFRA,BERR,FCO Withsuppliercountries EU EnergyAgency
exposuretounstableregionsand energyconsumers (Norway,Russia,
climatechangemitigation Nigeria,Algeria,Caspian
Searegionandothers)
WorldBank/IMF/WTO;
Globalpoverty Reduceitandwidenthecircleof UK-baseddevelopment, DfID,FCO,HMTreasury EU(tradeandaid increasinglyimportant
economicopportunitybothforitsown aid,andpoverty policy) privatefoundations
Shareddestinies| Appendix1

sakeandtoremoveakeybackground reductionNGOs
factortoconflictandfailedstates
Globalcorporations;UN
Socio-economic Protectcriticalnationaland Localauthorities; CabinetOfficeCivil EUcoordinationon (onsomeissues,suchas
resilience internationalinfrastructurefrom regionalgovernment Contingencies criticalnational spaceinfrastructure)
terroristattacks,climateeventsand offices;privatesector Secretariat;Home infrastructureissues
accidents;ensurestrongemergency companiesinkey Office;BERR;
planningandpreparedness;ensure infrastructuresectors ConfederationofBritish
strongbusinessresilienceandrecovery andthroughout Industry/Instituteof
economy;community Directors.
groups
WorldHealth
Disease/ Prevent,containandifnecessary Localauthoritiesand CabinetOfficeCivil Forwardactivityin EUpublichealth Organisation
biosecurity eliminateseriousdiseaseoutbreak, localemergency Contingencies possiblesource coordination
whetheroccurringnaturally,oras services;transport Secretariat;Health countries,suchas
resultofbioterrorism authorities;localmedia ProtectionAgency; Vietnamandother
possiblytheArmed countriesinSouthEast
Forcesasaidtocivil Asia
power;borderpolice;
nationalmedia
Interpol
Transnational Tolimitscaleinoverseassource Localcommunities; HomeOffice;Cabinet Arrangementswith Europol;EUforuseof
organisedcrime countries;tightenUKbordertomake PoliceConstabularies, Office;Intelligence individualcountrieson widereconomicpolicy
penetrationofUKmoredifficult; includingtheMet Services;Seriousand extraditionandjoint instrumentsaimedat
achieveprosecutionswherepossible OrganisedCrime investigationteams tacklinginternational
Agency;BorderPolice; corruption
TransportPolice;FCO
forassistanceon
sourcecountrypolicy
(e.g.inWest
Africa)
 135

Appendix2:Highscore
thresholdsforourconflict
statefailureriskindicators
INDICATOR HIGHSCORETHRESHOLD

Economicindicators
Thelevelofhumandevelopment,asdefinedbytheUNDPHuman The22statescategorisedbyUNDPashavinglowhumandevelopment
DevelopmentIndex

Theexistenceandextentofuneveneconomicdevelopmentalong Scored8oroveroutof10ontheFailedStatesIndex2008ranking
grouplines,includinghighlevelsofunemploymentincertaingroups system,where0isthelowestintensity(moststable)and10isthehighest
intensity(leaststable)

Evidenceofarecentsharporsevereeconomicdecline Scored7.5oroveroutof10ontheFailedStatesIndex2008ranking
system,where0isthelowestintensity(moststable)and10isthehighest
intensity(leaststable)

Theleveloffoodsecurity,asdefinedbyMaplecroftsFoodSecurity The48statescategorisedbyMaplecroftasbeingatextremeriskoffood
Index insecurity

Socialindicators
Evidenceofayouthbulge,asdefinedbythepercentageofthe 60%ormoreofthetotalpopulationundertheageof24
populationundertheageof24

Currentorprojectedlargemovementofrefugeesorinternally Scored8oroveroutof10ontheFailedStatesIndex2008ranking
displacedpersons system,where0isthelowestintensity(moststable)and10isthehighest
intensity(leaststable)

Politicalindicators
Poorgovernance,measuredascriminalisationorde-legitimisationof Scored7.5oroveroutof10ontheFailedStatesIndex2008ranking
thestate system,where0isthelowestintensity(moststable)and10isthehighest
intensity(leaststable)

Potentialforterroristacts Scored3oroveroutof5ontheGlobalPeaceIndex2008rankingsystem,
where1isverylowand5isveryhigh

Widespreadviolationofhumanrights Scored7.5oroveroutof10ontheFailedStatesIndex2008ranking
system

Riseoffactionalisedelites Scored8oroveroutof10ontheFailedStatesIndex2008ranking
system,where0isthelowestintensity(moststable)and10isthehighest
intensity(leaststable)

Military/conflictindicators
Interventionofotherstateorexternalactor Scored8.5oroveroutof10ontheFailedStatesIndex2008ranking
system,where0isthelowestintensity(moststable)and10isthehighest
intensity(leaststable)

Thepresenceofarmedconflictonacountrysownterritorybetween Hasexperiencedarmedconflictonownterritorybetween2001and2006
2001and2006

Easeofaccesstosmallarmsandlightweapons Scored4oroveroutof5ontheGlobalPeaceIndex2008rankingsystem,
where1isverylowand5isveryhigh

Environmentalindicators
Climatechangevulnerability,asdefinedbyMaplecroftsClimate The95statescategorisedbyMaplecroftasbeingatextremeorhighrisk
ChangeVulnerabilityIndex ofclimatechangevulnerability

Forafullanalysisofconflictandstatefailure,includingalistofstatesconsideredtobe
atthemostacuteriskfromtheconflictandstatefailureriskfactorslistedabove,please
refertopages4861,Chapter4,ofthisreport.
136 Shareddestinies| Glossaryofabbreviations

Glossaryofabbreviations

ABMT Anti-BallisticMissileTreaty
ACPO AssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers
ALF AnimalLiberationFront
AQAP AlQaedaintheArabianPeninsula
AQIM AlQaedaintheIslamicMaghreb
ASAT Anti-SatelliteMissile
ATCSA Anti-Terrorism,CrimeandSecurityAct2001
BERR DepartmentforBusinessEnterpriseandRegulatoryReform
CAP CommonAgriculturalPolicy
CBRN Chemical,Biological,RadiologicalorNuclear
CCA CivilContingenciesAct
CCS CivilContingenciesSecretariat
CIA CentralIntelligenceAgency
CIVMIL Civilian/Military
CTBT ComprehensiveTestBanTreaty
CPNI CentrefortheProtectionofNationalInfrastructure
CTIU CounterTerrorismIntelligenceUnit
CTU CounterTerrorismUnit
DCLG DepartmentforCommunitiesandLocalGovernment
DEFRA DepartmentforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs
DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment
DRC DemocraticRepublicofCongo
DSTO DatabaseonNuclearSmuggling,TheftandOrphanRadiationSources
EDO EmergencyDroughtOrder
EEA EuropeanEconomicArea
ETA EuskadiTaAskatasuna(BasqueHomelandandFreedom)
EU EuropeanUnion
FARC FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia
(RevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia)
FATF FinancialActionTaskForce
FCO ForeignandCommonwealthOffice
FDI ForeignDirectInvestment
FSI FailedStatesIndex
GCHQ GovernmentCommunicationsHeadquarters
GOARN GlobalOutbreakAlertandResponseNetwork
GPI GlobalPeaceIndex
 137

GSPC GroupeSalafistepourlaPrdicationetleCombat
(SalafistGroupforPreachingandCombat)
HEU HighlyEnrichedUranium
HPAI HighlyPathogenicAvianInfluenza
IAEA InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency
ICT InformationandCommunicationTechnology
IDP InternallyDisplacedPerson
IEA InternationalEnergyAgency
IED ImprovisedExplosiveDevice
IHP InternationalHealthPartnership
IHR InternationalHealthRegulation
ILO InternationalLabourOrganisation
IMF InternationalMonetaryFund
INGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisation
IPCC IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange
IRC InternationalRescueCommittee
ISC IntelligenceandSecurityCommittee
ISI InterServicesIntelligence
JTAC JointTerrorismAnalysisCentre
LiDAR LightDetectionandRanging
LTTE LiberationTigersofTamilEelam
MAPPA MultiAgencyPublicProtectionArrangement
MDG MillenniumDevelopmentGoal
MENA MiddleEastandNorthAfrica
MI5 SecurityService
MI6 SecretIntelligenceService
MINAB MosquesandImamsNationalAdvisoryBoard
MIPT MemorialInstituteforthePreventionofTerrorism
MoD MinistryofDefence
MSF MuslimSafetyForum
NAFTA NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement
NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation
NCIS NationalCriminalIntelligenceService
NCS NationalCrimeSquad
NCTC NationalCounterTerrorismCentre
NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation
NHTCU NationalHi-TechCrimeUnit
NMWAG NationalMuslimWomensAdvisoryGroup
NPT NuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty
NSID NationalSecurity,InternationalRelationsandDevelopment
138 Shareddestinies| Glossaryofabbreviations

NTI NuclearThreatInitiative
OECD OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment
OSCT OfficeforSecurityandCounterTerrorism
PKK PartiyaKarkerenKurdistan
PRIO PeaceResearchInstituteOslo
PTA PreventionofTerrorismAct2005
RFID RadioFrequencyIdentification
RG SecurityServiceStation
RIPA RegulationofInvestigatoryPowersAct2000
RUF RevolutionaryUnitedFront(SierraLeone)
SARS SevereAcuteRespiratorySyndrome
SAS SpecialAirService
SBS SpecialBoatService
SFSG SpecialForcesSupportGroup
SITCEN SituationCentre
SOCA SeriousOrganisedCrimeAgency
SRR SpecialReconnaissanceRegiment
START NationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismand
ResponsestoTerrorism
SWF SovereignWealthFund
TACT TerrorismAct2000
TOC TransnationalOrganisedCrime
UAE UnitedArabEmirates
UCDP UppsalaConflictDataProgram
UKBA UnitedKingdomBorderAgency
UKCIP UnitedKingdomClimateImpactsProgramme
UKCS UnitedKingdomContinentalShelf
UN UnitedNations
UNAIDS UnitedNationsProgrammeonHIV/AIDS
UNCTAD UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment
UNDESA UnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs
UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme
UNHABITAT UnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgramme
UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionforRefugees
UNHDI UnitedNationsHumanDevelopmentIndex
UNICEF UnitedNationsChildrensFund
UNODC UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime
UNSC UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil
WHO WorldHealthOrganisation
WMD WeaponofMassDestruction
WTO WorldTradeOrganisation