SECOND DIVISION

[G. R. No. 156747. February 23, 2005]

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and

ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
and
JOSELITO
TRINIDAD, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision dated 22 March 2002
and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alfie
Lorenzo, et al.
[1]

The factual antecedents are as follows:

In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen
Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist,
publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the
newspaper Abante were charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The information,
which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court, reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET,
NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN CASTILLO,
of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN
MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor,
ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO,

conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one

another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES
TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD to public
hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and maliciously
write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written,
published, exhibited and circulated in the aforesaid newspaper, in
its issue of July 13, 1996 an article which reads as follows:
Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para
magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na
baluktot at binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala
siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto
Natividad siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin
sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan
dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami
naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya
ng T-shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing
pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang
mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang ang
rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamangtama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa niya
ang kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero.
Naaawa nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang
pagkain ko sa kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa
niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng
utang na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng
gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang
klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare!

Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi

mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga
si Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang
matanda hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga
inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo,
natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming
binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng
tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate
na hate ka nga ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan
mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng
pinagsasabi mo para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie, ani Jordan sa
mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers.
Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi
ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya
kuno Liberty Boys!
thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or
imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
and causing in view of their publication, discredit and contempt
upon the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD a.k.a.
JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and
prejudice.
[2]

In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas,

Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, set the
arraignment of the petitioners on 27 August 1997.
[3]

On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the court a quo an

Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings
dated 21 August 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the
adverse Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite this
motion, the scheduled arraignment of petitioners pushed through
on 27 August 1997. During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo
and Quijano, Jr., together with their co-accused Parajes and
Castillo, refused to enter any plea and so the trial court ordered

that a plea of not guilty be entered into the records on their

behalf. As for petitioner Macasaet, his arraignment was
rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his failure to attend the
previously calendared arraignment.
[4]

On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss

the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as
the information discloses that the residence of private respondent
was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or citywhere the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense (Emphasis supplied.)
[5]

Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received

by way of registered mail, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997. Petitioners
argued therein that the trial court committed grave error when it
denied the petitioners Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment
and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled
arraignment on 27 August 1997. According to petitioners and
their co-accused, by the trial judges denial of their Urgent Motion
to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively
denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of
Justice. Moreover, banking on the case of Roberts, et al. v. Court
of Appeals, the petitioners and their fellow accused contended
that since they had already manifested their intention to file a
petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of
Quezon City before the DOJ, it was premature for the trial court to
deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners
and their co-accused claimed that regardless of the outcome of
[6]

[7]

their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their
not guilty pleas is in order as they planned to move for the
quashal of the information against them.
In an Order dated 26 September 1997, Judge Bruselas, Jr.,
ruled that with the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the court
considers the accused to have abandoned their Motion for
Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea and sees no further need to
act on the same.
[8]

In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 23 September

1997, the public prosecutor argued that the RTC, Quezon City,
had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time
material to this case, private respondent (private complainant
below) was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay
St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St., Paliparan, Sto.
Nio, Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11
October 1996 filed during the preliminary investigation of the
case.
[9]

For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered

that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to the
affidavit purportedly executed by private respondent as it is
axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is limited to a
consideration of the information as filed with the court, and no
other. Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed by private
respondent and the information filed before the court state that
private respondents residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of
the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined
solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or
information.
[10]

On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow accused filed

a Supplemental Reply attaching thereto certifications issued by
Jimmy
Ong
and
Pablito
C.
Antonio, barangay captains
of Barangay Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina
City,
respectively.
The
pertinent
portion
of
[11]

the barangay certification

states:

[12]

issued

by

Barangay

Captain

Ong

This is to certify that this office has no record on file nor with the
list of registered voters of this barangay regarding a certain
person by the name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.
This further certifies that our BSDOs (have) been looking for said
person seeking information regarding his whereabouts but to no
avail.
On
the
other
hand,
the
by Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part:

certification

[13]

issued

This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal age,

single/married/separate/widow/widower, a resident of Karen
Street, Sto. Nio, Marikina City is a bonafide member of this
barangay.
...
This is being issued upon request of the above-named person
for IDENTIFICATION.
During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial court
received and marked in evidence the two barangay certifications.
Also marked for evidence were page 4 of the information stating
the address of private respondent to be in Marikina City and the
editorial box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the
tabloid maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm.
301/305, 3/F BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts.,
Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was then given five (5) days
within which to submit its comment to the evidence submitted by
the petitioners and their fellow accused.
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply, private respondent
contended that the certification issued by the barangay captain
of Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of
[14]

the apartment unit he was renting in Sikatuna Village, Quezon

City; that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they
rent out rooms to boarders in order to avoid payment of local
taxes; and that there is no showing that a census was conducted
among the residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he
resided therein.
As regards the certification issued by the barangay chairman
of Sto. Nio, Marikina City, private respondent argued that it is of
judicial notice that barangay and city records are not regularly
updated to reflect the transfer of residence of their constituents
and that a perusal of said certification reveals that
the barangay captain did not personally know him (private
respondent). Finally, private respondent claimed that his receipt
of the copy of petitioners Appeal to the DOJ, which was sent to his
alleged address in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, proved that he
did, in fact, reside at said place.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order
dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction. The court a
quo noted that although the information alleged the venue of this
case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence
submitted for its consideration indicated otherwise. First, the
editorial box of Abante clearly indicated that the purported
libelous article was printed and first published in the City of
Manila. In addition, the trial court relied on the following matters
to support its conclusion that, indeed, jurisdiction was improperly
laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the address of
private respondent appeared to be the one in Marikina City
although right below it was a handwritten notation stating 131
Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC; b) the
two barangay certifications submitted by the petitioners; and c)
the Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and AffidavitComplaint attached to the information wherein the given address
of private respondent was Marikina City.
[15]

On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a motion for

reconsideration insisting that at the time the alleged libelous
article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City.
According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of
Marikina City at the time of publication of the claimed defamatory
article because he understood the term address to mean the
place where he originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was
rectified by his supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon
City as his actual residence at the time of publication of the 13
July 1996 issue of Abante.
[16]

On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a supplemental

motion for reconsideration to which he attached an affidavit
executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner
of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, where
private respondent supposedly lived from July 1996 until May
1997. She also stated in her affidavit that she was not aware of
any
inquiry
conducted
by
the barangay officials
of Barangay Malaya regarding the residency of private respondent
in their locality.
Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the trial court
denied private respondents motion for reconsideration, ruling
thus:
[Del Rosarios] affidavit appears to have been executed only on 19
January 1998 to which fact the court can only chuckle and
observe that evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a curative
evidence, the weight and sufficiency of which is highly suspect.
[17]

Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a

notice of appeal before the court a quo. In the Decision now
assailed before us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the trial courts conclusion and ordered the remand of the case to
the court a quo for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of
the appellate courts decision reads:
[18]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated

November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the
case filed against herein accused-appellees on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one entered remanding the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
[19]

The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled

that the residence of a person must be his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or abode and for the
purpose of determining venue, actual residence is a persons place
of abode and not necessarily his legal residence or domicile. In
this case, the defect appearing on the original complaint wherein
the residence of private respondent was indicated to be Marikina
City was subsequently cured by his supplemental-affidavit
submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case.
Moreover, as the amendment was made during the preliminary
investigation phase of this case, the same could be done as a
matter of right pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court.
[20]

[21]

As
for
the barangay certifications
issued
by
the barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto.
Nio, the Court of Appeals ruled that they had no probative value
ratiocinating in the following manner:
. . . With respect to the requirement of residence in the place
where one is to vote, residence can mean either domicile or
temporary residence (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer,
3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of Quezon City
can be a voter of Marikina if the latter is his domicile. Conversely,
a person domiciled in Marikina can vote in Quezon City if he
resides in the latter. It is just a matter of choice on the part of the
voter. Thus, logic does not support the supposition that one who is
not a registered voter of a place is also not a resident theref.
Furthermore, the right to vote has the corollary right of not
exercising it. Therefore, one need not even be a registered voter

at all. The same principle applies to the certification issued by the

barangay in Marikina.
[22]

The appellate court likewise gave weight to the affidavit

executed by Del Rosario and observed that petitioners failed to
controvert the same.
The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
promulgated on 6 January 2003.
[23]

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL ROSARIO.
III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT

TRINIDADS PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A CRIMINAL CASE.
[24]

Petitioners insist that the evidence presented before the trial

court irrefutably established the fact that private respondent was
not a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous
publication saw print. According to them, the information dated
10 July 1997 filed before the RTC of Quezon City indicated private
respondents address to be in Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio,
Marikina City. Further supporting this claim were the affidavitcomplaint and
the
memorandum
for
preliminary
investigation where references were explicitly made to said
address. Thus, petitioners are of the view that the Court of
[25]

[26]

Appeals erred in relying on the supplemental affidavit executed

by private respondent claiming that its execution amounted to
nothing more than a mere afterthought.
In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred
when it took into account the affidavit executed by Del Rosario.
They insist that its belated submission before the trial court and
the prosecutions failure to present the affiant to testify as regards
the veracity of her statements undermined the evidentiary value
of her affidavit. More, as the affidavit was not formally offered as
evidence, it was only proper that the trial court disregarded the
same in dismissing the case.
Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent did not
have the requisite personality to appeal from the decision of the
trial court as it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which is authorized by law to institute appeal of criminal cases.
Thus, the Court of Appeals made a mistake in holding that While it is true that only the OSG can file an appeal representing
the government in a criminal proceeding, the private complainant
nevertheless may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case. The
case at bar was dismissed due to the alleged improper laying of
venue resulting in the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
and not based on the merits of the case. It cannot therefore be
argued that private complainants appeal pertains to the merits of
the criminal case as what happened in accused-appellees cited
case in the motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay vs. Court of
Appeals (GR No. 112995, July 30, 1998). Needless to say, the
private complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the
dismissed criminal case which he had the right to protect. In the
interest of justice and fair play, therefore, the Brief filed by private
complainant in the present case should be treated as pertaining
only to the civil aspect of the case.
[27]

In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003, private

respondent reiterated his position that the RTC of Quezon City had
[28]

jurisdiction over this libel case. According to him, the affidavit

executed by Del Rosario, the alleged owner of the house he
leased in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, established, beyond
doubt, that he resided in said place during the time the claimed
defamatory article appeared on the pages of Abante. In addition,
he draws attention to the fact that petitioners and their coaccused furnished him a copy of the petition for review, filed
before the DOJ, at the aforementioned address in Quezon City.
Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private respondent
maintains that the prosecution exerted efforts to present the
affiant before the trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of
town when she was supposed to be presented and so the public
and the private prosecutors decided to submit for resolution their
motion for reconsideration sans the affiants testimony. Citing the
case of Joseph Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,
private respondent avers that this Court had previously
admitted the affidavits of witnesses who were not presented
during the trial phase of a case.
[29]

As regards the petitioners contention that he (private

respondent) did not have the personality to bring this case to the
appellate level, private respondent contends that the proper party
to file the Notice of Appeal before the trial court is the public
prosecutor as what happened in this case.
On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07 July
2003 wherein it prayed for the dismissal of this petition based
on the following: First, as the petition is concerned with the
determination of the residence of private respondent at the time
of the publication of the alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should be
unavailing to the petitioners because this remedy only deals with
questions of law.
[30]

Second, venue was properly laid in this case as private

respondents residency in Quezon City during the time material to
this case was sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the

errors appearing in the memorandum for preliminary investigation

and in the affidavit complaint with regard to private respondents
residence were corrected through the supplemental affidavit
private respondent executed during the preliminary investigation
before the Quezon City prosecutors office.
Third, the OSG takes the view that the public prosecutor was
the proper party to file the notice of appeal before the trial court
since its (OSGs) office is only authorized to bring or defend
actions on appeal on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Honorable Court
of the Court of Appeals.
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same.
Jurisdiction has been defined as the power conferred by law
upon a judge or court to try a case the cognizance of which
belongs to them exclusively and it constitutes the basic
foundation of judicial proceedings. The term derives its origin
from
two
Latin
words jus meaning
law
and
the
other, dicere meaning to declare. The term has also been
variably explained to be the power of a court to hear and
determine a cause of action presented to it, the power of a court
to adjudicate the kind of case before it, the power of a court to
adjudicate a case when the proper parties are before it, and the
power of a court to make the particular decision it is asked to
render.
[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is

jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction. In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals and
People of the Philippines, this Court had the occasion to expound
on this principle, thus:
[35]

[36]

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by

courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed

or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the

territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
[37]

The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The

possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil
aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It
provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous
article is printed and first published, and in case such public
officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case
one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall

be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where

he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed and first published.
In Agbayani v. Sayo,
following manner:

[38]

we summarized the foregoing rule in the

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private

person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action
may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila
at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of
Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.
[39]

In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at

the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence,
he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila
whereAbante was first published or in the province or city where
he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was
printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case
easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly
insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other
than perfunctorily stating Quezon City at the beginning of the
information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the

information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of

RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed
in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at
the time the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters
deal with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either
one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself
and the absence of both from the very face of the information
renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent,
the information filed before the trial court falls way short of this
requirement. The assistant city prosecutors failure to properly lay
the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City,
effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of
this case.
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this
Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement
in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal
action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was
committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private
individual and where he was actually residing at that time.
Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was
printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That
allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to
where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis
of the venue of the action.
[40]

Anent private respondent and OSGs contention that the

supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary
investigation of this libel suit cured the defect of the information,
we find the same to be without merit. It is jurisprudentially settled
that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by
the allegations of the complaint or information. In resolving a
motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is
[41]

that the facts contained in the complaint or information should be

taken as they are. The exception to this rule is where the Rules
of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to
quash such as when the ground invoked is the extinction of
criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the
accused. In these instances, it is incumbent upon the trial court
to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion
to dismiss. As the present case obviously does not fall within any
of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed
this action.
[42]

[43]

[44]

In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise put

premium on the affidavit executed by Del Rosario which was
attached to private respondents supplemental motion for
reconsideration. According to the appellate court, said document
supports private (respondents) claim that indeed, he was a
resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous article
was published. The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court,
under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof, states:
[45]

Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the

court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are
just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse
party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the
order admitting the supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to
reinforce and augment the allegations contained in the principal
pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely
supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the latter. Further,
the admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that
parties may impose upon the court for we have consistently held
that its admittance is something which is addressed to the
discretion of the court.
[46]

Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the

requirement that the contents of a supplemental pleading should
deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took
place after the date of the pleading it seeks to supplement. A
reading of the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by
private respondent discloses no additional or new matters which
transpired after he filed his original motion for reconsideration.
The fact that he attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor
fails to persuade us into giving to said supplemental motion the
same evidentiary value as did the Court of Appeals. For one,
private respondent did not even bother to explain the reason
behind the belated submission of Del Rosarios affidavit nor did he
claim that he exerted earnest efforts to file it much earlier in the
proceedings. He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his
own lethargy.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor
and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice of
appeal before the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG
should have been the one to file said notice in its capacity as the
sole representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in
criminal cases.
[47]

Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers

and functions of the OSG was to represent the government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings. This provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12
thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it
only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the
appellate courts.
[48]

The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction
of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals commence?
Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41,
Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal,

the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties. When a party files a notice of
appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease
as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed
perfected as to him. As explained by our former colleague,
Justice Florenz Regalado
[49]

[50]

. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over
the case. However, where all the parties have either thus
perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due
time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for
those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over
the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the
expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.
[51]

Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of

appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors before
the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of
the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to
perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has
jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these
two incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins
and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case
on behalf of the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22
March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24
November 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,
JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and
DANNY G. FAJARDO,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 167764

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
October 9, 2009
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City,
dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in
Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the

CA Resolution[2] dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed
before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr.
and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel
committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City
of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
court, both the accused as columnist and EditorPublisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of
Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent
of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent
of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the
regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a
certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:
MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all
their best to promote the health of their
patients. Especially if they are employed by a
company to serve its employees.
However, the opposite appears to be
happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation
office, SMC employees are fuming mad about
their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because
the latter is not doing well in his sworn

obligation in looking after the health problems

of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee
Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos,
Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about
Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last
year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr.
Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her
under observation, taking seven months to
conclude that she had rectum myoma and
must undergo an operation.
Subsequently, the family sought the services of
a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's
Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also
maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry,
sources said, after knowing that the family
chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own
without his nod as he had one to recommend.
Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last
March and was released from the hospital two
weeks after. Later, however, she again
complained of difficulty in urinating and
defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to
the hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's
recommendee, was devastating to the family
and the patient herself who woke to find out
her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a
catheter punched on her right side.
This was followed by a bad news that she had
cancer.

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation,

this time to bore another hole on the left side of
Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the
referral frankly turned it down because it would
only be a waste of money since the disease
was already on the terminal state.
The
company
and
the
family
some P150,000.00 to pay for the
diagnosis of the company physician.

spent
wrong

My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the

good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your
side, May the Healer of all healers likewise
touch the conscience of physicians to remind
them that their profession is no license for selfenrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad
to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar
experience where physicians treat their
patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to
act like agents of multinational corporations
prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are
equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much
lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals,
owned by a so-called charitable religious
institutions and so-called civic groups, too
greedy for profits. Instead of promoting babyand mother-friendly practices which are
cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the
expensive yet unhealthy practices.
The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote
infant milk formula although mother's milk is
many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic)
than the brands they peddle. These hospitals
separate newly born from their moms for days,
conditioning the former to milk formula while at

the same time stunting the mother's mammalia

from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family
of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her
body lies at the Payunan residence located
at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City.May you
rest in peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in

high sense of professional integrity, trust and
responsibility expected of him as a physician, which
imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were
entirely false and malicious and without foundation in
fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and
derogatory to the good name, character and reputation
of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon being arraigned[5] on March 1, 1995, petitioners,

assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
On December
4,
1997,
the
RTC
rendered
its
[6]
Decision finding petitioners guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the
jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz,
Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime
of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3)
Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as
Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and TwentyOne (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum,
and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[7]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an

Order[8] dated February 20, 1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed

Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the
following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE
SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS WITHIN THE MEANING AND
INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE
EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT
FINDING
THAT
THE
SUBJECT
ARTICLE
IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED
AS
PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO
HAPPENS
TO
BE
MERELY
PUBLISHER
OF PANAY NEWSAND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL
THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION
COLUMNISTS.[9]

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the

element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when
petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an
incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched
himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the
question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who
sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses
the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the
columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it,
and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not
entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was

written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the

public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding
the existence of malice in the publication of the article;
that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the
prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to
the bounden duty of the press to report matters of public
interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject
article was an opinion column, which was the columnists
exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor
and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those
views and should not be held responsible for the crime of
libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that
only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that
petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not
the element of malice required in every indictment for
libel was established by the prosecution, which would
require the weighing anew of the evidence already
passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual
findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are
accorded finality, unless there appears on records some
facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which,
if properly considered, may alter the result of the case
a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues
presented in their petition do not require the evaluation
of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an
element of libel, has always been discussed whenever
raised as an issue via a petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue
that the information charging them with libel did not

contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the

RTC of Iloilo City.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is
whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had
jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the
Information dated October 17, 1994.
The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first
time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense
charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and
finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,[10] the Court ruled:
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the
CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the
rule is settled that an objection based on the ground
that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by
the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such
jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organized the court, and is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law. While an
exception to this rule was recognized by this Court
beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction
by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was
considered to be barred by laches, we find that the
factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case,
which justified the departure from the general rule are
not present in the instant criminal case. [11]

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of

jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People[12] that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed
outside
of
that
limited
territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)[13]

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to
the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall
publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of
any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for
the defamations contained therein to the same extent
as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in

cases of written defamations, as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
the court of first instance of theprovince or city
where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the
offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the
City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published,
and in case such public officer does not hold office in
the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed and first
published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article

360 were restated as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a
private person, the criminal action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the
criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at
the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is
in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,

the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of

Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office
outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office
at the time of the commission of the offense. [15]

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since

Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of
the libel case may be in the province or city where the
libelous article was printed and first published, or in the
province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of
the commission of the offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed
in this case which for convenience the Court quotes
again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the
City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this court, both the accused as columnists and EditorPublisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of
Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent
of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent
of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the
regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a
certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN....

The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a

daily publication with a considerable circulation in the
City of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed
that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in
considerable circulation but did not establish that the
said publication was printed and first published
in Iloilo City.
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel
case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a
portion of the Information of which reads:
That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat]
conspiring and confederating with others whose true
names, real identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, with malicious
intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and
reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former
Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the
evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public
ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be
published in Smart File, a magazine of general
circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as
Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....[17]

the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently

vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel
charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made
the following disquisition:
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case
reveals that the word published is utilized in the precise
context of noting that the defendants cause[d] to be
published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general
circulation in Manila. The Information states that the

libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not

that they were published in Manila. The place Manila is
in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in
general circulation, and not where the libel was
published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was
in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily
establish that it was published and first printed in
Manila, in the same way that while leading national
dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or
the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it
does not mean that these newspapers are published
and first printed in Cebu.
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand
sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the
publication is in general circulation in Manila, there
would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action
in other locations where Smart File is in general
circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star,
the granting of this petition would allow a resident of
Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter
or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in
general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is
precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid. [18]

In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel

case filed by a private individual, the Acting General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of
Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that
the libelous article was published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Baguio and the entire Philippines, the Court did not
consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio
City was the venue of the printing and first publication of
the alleged libelous article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
provides that a private individual may also file the libel
case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided
at the time of the commission of the offense. The

Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the

residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges
that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly
and positively indicate that he was actually residing
in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the
offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually
residing in another place.
Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information
for libel alleged that the offended party was the Acting
General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good
standing and reputation in the community, the Court did
not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the
offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The
Court explained its ruling in this wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or place of
abode provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency; no particular length of time of residence is
required. However, the residence must be more than
temporary. The term residence involves the idea of
something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to
be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a
house therein. To create a residence in a particular
place, two fundamental elements are essential: The
actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a
freely
exercised
intention
of
remaining
there
permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is
possible that as the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been
actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not
state that he was actually residing therein when the
alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible
that the private complainant may have been actually
residing in another place. One who transacts business
in a place and spends considerable time thereat does

not render such person a resident therein. Where one

may have or own a business does not of itself
constitute residence within the meaning of the statute.
Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of
residence there for purposes of venue.[21]

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a

criminal case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information, and the offense must have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
[22]
Considering that the Information failed to allege the
venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the
Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to
hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of
the crime of libel should be set aside for want of
jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of
competent jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April
8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522
are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, Iloilo City. Criminal
Case
No.
44527
is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 141154-56. January 15, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. FERNANDO
"Ando"
COSTALES
and
FERNANDO RAMIREZ (at-large), accused.
FERNANDO "Ando" COSTALES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Traditionally, religious fervor nourishes love, respect and

concern for one another among brethren; it was not so however in
the case of one whose adherence to his faith became the
harbinger of his tragic end, sending his wife hanging by the
thread of death, and worse, the crimes were perpetrated
apparently by their brethren professing to be "denizens of the
temple."
Accused Fernando "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez, the
latter being still at large, stood charged with the murder of Miguel
Marcelo and the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo. As the
perpetrators were found to be in unlawful possession of firearms
they were also charged with violation of PD 1866, as amended by
RA 8294.

Since accused Fernando Ramirez remained at large, only

accused Fernando "Ando" Costales was arraigned and tried.
For violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended (Crim. Case No. T2054), accused Fernando "Ando" Costales was found guilty and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.
[1]

For the murder of Miguel Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T2057), accused Fernando "Ando" Costales was found guilty and
meted the ultimate penalty of death.
For the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo (Crim. Case No.
T-2056) he was found guilty only of attempted murder and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years ofprision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Additionally, he was ordered "to pay the heirs of the
two (2) victims P250,000.00 in damages to be shared by and
among them in a manner that suits them best."
Sitio
Raniag,
Barangay
Capas,
was a
placid but
forlorn barrio in Pangasinan where the spouses Miguel and Crispin
a Marcelo resided in a small one-room shanty with concrete
flooring and cogon roofing. Although their married daughters
Donabel, Jessie and Erlinda already had their own houses they
would spend the night with them every once in a while. And so it
was on the night of 27 November 1997.
Jessie Molina recalled that at around 11:30 o'clock in the
evening of 27 November 1997, she and her sisters Donabel and
Erlinda together with their parents Miguel and Crispina had taken
their own corners of their small house to prepare for the
night. Miguel laid in a folding bed beside the door while the others
occupied a bamboo bed with the exception of Jessie who for want
of available space settled instead on the concrete floor. Jessie and
Erlinda had just watched tv when two (2) persons suddenly
barged into their house passing through the door kept ajar by
sacks of palay and strangled her father Miguel. Jessie readily
recognized the two (2) intruders because the entire room was
illuminated by a nightlamp which the family kept burning
overnight.

Jessie narrated that Fernando "Ando" Costales, one of the

assailants, poked a gun at the head of her father and shot him
once in cold blood. Thereafter the other assailant Fernando
Ramirez sprayed on their faces what she described as "something
hot and pungent," and with his firearm pumped a bullet on her
mother's chest.
Erlinda Marcelo was also awakened when the two (2) accused
suddenly entered their house and strangled their father
after which Fernando Costales shot him point blank
in
the
head.According to Erlinda, when tear gas was sprayed by
Ramirez, she ducked and almost simultaneously she heard a
gunshot towards the direction of her mother. When she opened
her eyes, she saw her mother Crispina clutching her breast,
reeling from the blow and collapsing on the floor in a heap. In her
testimony Crispina herself confirmed that Ramirez shot her once
on the right chest which caused her to bleed and lose
consciousness.
Both Jessie and Erlinda affirmed that they were familiar with
the two (2) accused because, like the rest of the family, they were
members of the "Baro a Cristiano" also known as Lamplighter, of
which Fernando "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez were the
high priests in their respective areas. According to Jessie, her
parents decided to quit the brotherhood because Ramirez warned
them not to sever their ties with the sect if they did not want any
harm to befall them. In fact, according to her, a month earlier
Ramirez even threatened her sister Erlinda with bodily harm.
Like her sister, Erlinda stated that their family distanced
themselves from the congregation when Ramirez threatened her
father. According to her, on 16 November 1997, Miguel tried to
fetch her from the house of Ramirez but Miguel relented only after
Ramirez threatened her with a bolo. Her father tried to get her
when he learned that Ramirez was molesting her every time his
wife was away. She however did not report this matter
immediately to the authorities because she feared for her life.
Dr. Alex E. Trinidad, Rural Health Physician of Umingan,
Pangasinan, after conducting an autopsy on the body of Miguel
Marcelo reported: (a) The gunshot wound penetrating the left lobe

of the liver of deceased Miguel Marcelo was fatal; (b) Considering

the trajectory of the gunshot wound, the assailant was probably
pointing slightly downward; (c) The cause of death of the
deceased was internal hemorrhage arising from the gunshot
wound; and, (d) Considering the wound of the victim, he could
have survived for a few minutes after he was shot.
To show that he could not have been a party to the crimes
charged, accused Fernando Costales gave a detailed account of
his activities by retracing his steps from late afternoon of 27
November 1997 until dawn of the following day. He narrated that
at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 27 November he was irrigating
his land in Barangay Libeg, then proceeded to a nearby chapel to
pray. At past 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he went to see a certain
Isidro who was irrigating his own land with the use of his
(Fernando's) water pump. That being done he went back home.
A couple of hours later, in the company of his wife and
children, he returned to the mission house to attend another
religious service. At past 9:00 o'clock that same evening he
dropped by Isidro's farmland to verify if the latter had finished
irrigating. He went back home at around 11:00 o'clock to sleep
and was awakened by Isidro at about 11:45 o'clock only to inform
him that he (Isidro) was through. When Isidro left, Fernando went
back to sleep only to be roused again by Gregorio Baguio who
also wanted to borrow his water pump. With his sleep disrupted,
he decided around midnight to visit as he did the nearby mission
house to pray. Shortly after, he resumed his sleep but woke up
again at 4:00 o'clock in the morning to see ifBaguio had already
finished watering his farm.
Defense witnesses Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio
corroborated the claim of Fernando Costales that he could not
have perpetrated the crimes as he was with them all the time
they were irrigating their farms. Likewise, Elvie Costales, wife of
accused Fernando Costales, presented an "attendance notebook,"
purportedly prepared by her, showing that her husband, who was
the chapter's religious leader, was worshipping in the Barangay
Libeg chapel from 4:45 to 4:47 o'clock and from 5:30 to 5:37
o'clock at daybreak, from 7:22 to 8:00 o'clock after sunset, and
from 12:10 to 12:15 o'clock midnight of 27 November 1997,
[2]

[3]

[4]

although he would periodically leave the prayer meeting to check

if Isidro had already finished watering his farm so that Baguio
could also use the pump.
But the trial court viewed the alibi of the defense with askance
and assigned full credit to the declarations of the prosecution
witnesses.
In disbelieving the veracity of the "attendance notebook," the
court a quo opined that Exh. "2" could have been more
impressive had it borne the confirming signatures or thumbmarks
of the "Baro a Cristiano" faithful, including their leader Fernando
Costales, or had Exhs. "2-B" and "2-C" been corroborated on the
witness stand by a less interested member, or had the church
secretary who allegedly kept record of attendance been some
member other that Mrs. Costales or the nearest of kin.
[5]

The court below also virtually jettisoned the testimonies of

Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio when it said that "they had
every reason to come to the rescue of the accused Costales, their
admittedly common nephew." Further, it pointed out that the
accused and his witnesses issued contradictory and irreconcilable
statements when, on one hand Isidro testified that before
midnight of 27 November 1997 he went to the house of his
nephew Fernando Costales to inform him that the irrigation of his
farm was already through; on the other hand, Baguio claimed that
at around 11:00 o'clock that night he roused the accused who
thereafter went to operate the pump and stayed put beside it
until Baguio's farm was completely irrigated at 4:00 o'clock the
next morning.
The above statements, the court a quo observed, did not jibe
with those made by the accused that his uncle Isidro woke him up
at around 11:45 o'clock in the evening and told him that the
irrigation of his farm was finished, after which he returned to bed
and when he awakened at past 4:00 o'clock the following
morning, he met Baguio who told him that he too was through
irrigating.
In contrast, the trial court saw no dark motives behind the
respective testimonies of Crispina Marcelo and her two (2)
daughters. The Costaleses and the Marcelos used to be members

of the same religious sect and accused "Ando" Costales even

stood as a sponsor at the wedding of Jessie Marcelo, and again
when Crispina's brother got married. In short, the Marcelos could
not have mistaken "Ando" Costales and Fernando Ramirez for
other felons.
In this automatic review, accused Fernando Costales takes
exception to the findings of the trial court and thus seeks reversal
of his convictions on the ground that it erred: (a) in according
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
although the same are perforated with material inconsistencies
and bias; (b) in not giving weight to the defense of alibi despite
the weakness of the prosecution evidence; (c) in convicting him of
violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended, since the same was
absorbed in the crime of murder; (d) in finding that the crime was
attended by conspiracy despite the fact that no aggravating
circumstance was established beyond reasonable doubt; and, (e)
in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in his favor.
The first and second assigned errors will be discussed jointly
since they are interrelated.
Accused-appellant argues that the seemingly flawless and
unwavering testimonies of the three (3) key prosecution
witnesses on the assault of the Marcelo household are obviously
biased that they invite suspicion and disbelief.
Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform
observations on how the malefactors carried out their detestable
crimes, i.e., the identity of the assailants, that Miguel was
strangled by both intruders and almost simultaneously shot on
the head, that one of them sprayed a chemical on the other
occupants of the house and after a split second fired at
Crispina.Such consistency and uniformity may be irregular at first
blush, but accused-appellant failed to take into account the
following factors which account for the "near flawless" statements
of the prosecution witnesses: (a) the one-room shanty was very
small with no substantial obstruction to impede the vision of the
occupants; (b) the room was lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient
enough for the occupants to recognize accused-appellant and his

cohort, especially so since the assailants were prominent and

venerated leaders of their church; and, (c) at the time of the
incident the Marcelo spouses and their children were lying very
near each other because of the very limited space of their shanty
such that every perceived action could be seen, felt, or at least
sensed, by all of them.
Accused-appellant is seeing ghosts where there is
none. Contrary to his submission, it would be highly irregular
indeed if the prosecution witnesses failed to observe the events
that transpired on that fateful night of 27 November 1997 and
their statements did not dovetail, at least on material points,
despite very favorable conditions for a fairly accurate
observation.
Neither should we ascribe importance, as the accusedappellant seems to suggest, to an apparent "inconsistency" by
witness Jessie Molina when she mentioned that the unwanted
intrusion occurred shortly after she turned off the television set,
contrary to her earlier claim that barangay Capas was without
electricity. Jessie Molina dispelled this obscurity when she clarified
that the television set was powered by Motolite battery which is in
fact a common practice in unenergized "barrios," as the trial court
would put it, and Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas did not still have
electricity at that time.
[6]

Clearly, the straightforward and consistent narration of facts,

as the trial court observed, by the three (3) prosecution
witnesses, especially Crispina Marcelo, a victim herself,
immensely fortifies the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty
as charged. Moreover, no impure motive on their part has been
established by the defense to sully their truthfulness and erode
their credibility.
Accused-appellant cannot insist on his alibi, especially so since
he and his co-accused were positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses. More so when it is undisputed that the
proximity of their place to the scene of the crimes did not
preclude the possibility that they were in fact present at the time
of their commission.

On the third issue, accused-appellant decries the Decision of

the court a quo in qualifying the crimes of murder and attempted
murder with illegal possession of firearm and at the same time
convicting him for violation of PD 1866, as amended.
We agree. Although the prosecution duly established that the
crime of illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866 was
committed, RA 8294, which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the
decree and now considers the use of unlicensed firearm as a
special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide, and
not as a separate offense.
[7]

As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license

should aggravate the crimes of murder and frustrated murder as
herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs. 8 and
9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1
December 2000, now require the qualifying as well as aggravating
circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the
complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be
considered by the court even if proved during the trial. Withal, in
the absence of any allegation in the Information in Crim. Case No.
T-2057 that accused-appellant committed murder with the use of
unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in imposing
the proper penalty.
Moving now to the modifying circumstances raised under the
fourth assigned error, accused-appellant points out that the trial
court grievously erred in appreciating unlicensed firearm, evident
premeditation and nighttime which were alleged in the
Informations in Crim. Case No. T-2056 for frustrated murder and
Crim. Case No. T-2057 for murder.
While we yield to the trial court's finding of treachery, we take
exception to its view that evident premeditation and nighttime
also aggravated the offenses. Without doubt, treachery has been
established by the prosecution evidence which showed that
accused-appellant Fernando Costales and his confederate
Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the
Marcelo residence in the middle of the night, shot Miguel Marcelo
to death as well as his wife Crispina who almost lost her life, and
sprayed a substance which temporarily blinded the other

occupants of the house. The suddenness of the attack gave the

victims no opportunity whatsoever to resist or parry the assault
thereby ensuring the accomplishment of their dastardly deed
without risk to themselves. Since the attack on the victims was
synchronal, sudden and unexpected, treachery must be properly
appreciated.
We cannot however give our assent to the view that nighttime
and evident premeditation accompanied the commission of the
crimes. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is absorbed by
treachery, while evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in
the absence of proof of the planning and preparation to kill or
when the plan was conceived.
[8]

[9]

The convergence of the wills of the two (2) executioners amply

justifies the imputation that they acted in concert and in unity in
their unlawful objective when in the stillness of the night they
both crashed into the Marcelo residence, strangulated the victim
Miguel, then one of them shot him in the head while the other
sprayed tear gas on the other members of the family obviously to
disable them, and thereafter pumped a bullet at the horrified
Crispina. This series of actions betrays a concerted design and
concurrence of
sentiments
to
cause
mayhem
and
murder. Accordingly, conspiracy was properly appreciated by the
trial court.
Neither can we sympathize with accused-appellant's misplaced
sentiment that he had been denied the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. As found by the trial court, his alleged
surrender was made too late, and in a place too distant from the
crime site as well as his place of residence.
[10]

We observe that the trial court awarded P250,000.00 to the

heirs of the deceased on the justification that the same had been
stipulated upon by the parties. This is patently wrong.Award of
damages is dictated, not by the agreement of the parties;
worse, "in a manner that suits them best," but by the mandate
of law and jurisprudence. Accordingly in conformity with
established law and jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as
civil indmenity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages should
be awarded to the heirs of the victim.
[11]

Pursuant to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by

RA 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no modifying circumstances found in Crim.
Case No. T-2057, and applying par. 2 of Art. 63 of the Code, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
In Crim. Case No. T-2056, accused-appellant was charged by
the trial court with frustrated murder but was convicted only for
attempted murder. In its Decision, the trial court explained that
the failure of the prosecution to present a medical certificate or
competent testimonial evidence showing that Crispina would have
died from her wound without medical intervention, justified the
accused's conviction for attempted murder only.
We call to mind People v. De La Cruz where this Court ruled
that the crime committed for the shooting of the victim was
attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason
that "his injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal
such that without timely medical intervention, they would have
caused his death." In fact, as early as People v. Zaragosa, we
enunciated the doctrine that where there is nothing in the
evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically
attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime
committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated
murder.
11

[12]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding accused-appellant

Fernando "Ando" Costales guilty of murder and attempted murder
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: In Crim. Case No.
T-2057, the crime of murder not being considered to have been
attended by any generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is sentenced to
suffer only the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In Crim. Case No. T2056, the crime of attempted murder not likewise considered to
have been attended by any generic mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is
accordingly sentenced in addition to his penalty imposed in Crim.
Case No. T-2057 herein before mentioned, to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months

of prision correccional medium as minimum, to eight (8) years

and six (6) months of prision mayor minimum as maximum;
Accused-appellant Fernando "Ando" Costales is further ordered
to pay the heirs of the victim Miguel Marcelo P50,000.00 as death
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 167526

Petitioner,

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*

-versus-

ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

DANTE TAN,

July 26, 2010

Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,

[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the June 14, 2004 Resolution[2] and February 24,
2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
SP No. 83433.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of

Rule 36 (a)-1,[4] in relation to Sections 32 (a)-1[5] and
56[6] of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by petitioner
People of the Philippines against respondent Dante Tan in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 153.
They were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and
119832.

The Information[7] in Criminal Case No. 119831 reads:

That on December 10, 1998, or thereabout, in the City

of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the beneficial owner of 84,030,000 Best
World Resources Corporation shares, a registered
security sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the
Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership
constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the
company, way above the 10% required by law to be
reported, and covered by Certificate Nos. DT-UK
55485704 and DT-UR 55485776, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and with the
Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the
amount of all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial
owner, within ten (10) days after he became such
beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities

Act and/or the rules and regulations prescribed and

pursuant thereto.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

The Information[9] in Criminal Case No. 119832 reads:

That on June 18, 1999, or thereabout, in the City of

Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the beneficial owner of 75,000,000 Best
World Resources Corporation shares, a registered
security which has been sold pursuant to Sections 4
and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial
ownership constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares
of the company, way above the 10% required by law to
be reported, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a
sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of
which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days
after he became such beneficial owner, in violation of
the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and
regulations prescribed pursuant thereto.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]

After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty[11] to

both charges and the trial ensued.

On November 24, 2003, petitioner made its formal offer

of evidence,[12] consisting of Exhibits A to E with subexhibits, Exhibits K-1, K-10 and K-11, Q, R, S, T and W with
sub-exhibits, and Exhibit X.

On December 11, 2003, the RTC issued an

Order[13] admitting Exhibits A, B, W and X, but denied
admission of all the other exhibits on the grounds stated
therein.

Aggrieved,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in an
Order[14] dated January 27, 2004.

In the meantime, on December 18, 2003, respondent

filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence[15] and to admit the attached Demurrer to
Evidence.

On January 29, 2004, the RTC issued another

Order[16] granting respondents Motion for Leave to File the

Demurrer and forthwith admitted respondents attached

Demurrer. The RTC also ordered petitioner to file an
opposition.

On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition [17] to

the Demurrer to Evidence. Respondent then filed a Reply.
[18]

On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order [19] granting

respondents Demurrer to Evidence, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the Demurrer to Evidence filed by

accused Dante Tan to be meritorious, the same is
GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.[20]

On April 12, 2004,[21] petitioner filed a Petition

for Certiorari[22] before the CA assailing the December 11,
2003, January 27, 2004, and March 16, 2004 Orders of
the RTC.

On June 14, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the

petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the context of all the foregoing

considerations, it would be futile to take further action
on the herein petition, which is therefore DISMISSED
outright for evident want of merit.

SO ORDERED.[23]

In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of

a criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence
is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for
which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom
as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.[24]

Aggrieved,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated February 24, 2005.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the lone

assignment of error, to wit:

RESPONDENT
COURT
GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
PRECLUDING THE PEOPLE FROM PROSECUTING ITS
CASES AGAINST DANTE TAN.[25]

The petition has no merit.

Notwithstanding the RTCs grant of respondents

Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner contends that the CA
erred in applying the rules on double jeopardy.
Specifically, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does
not apply in cases decided by the trial court without
jurisdiction and in violations of petitioners right to due
process.[26]

In People v. Sandiganbayan,[27] this Court explained the

general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence
operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable, to wit:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as

the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested
its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant
of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do
so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The
verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. [28]

The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or

information was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the
accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.[29]

These elements are present here: (1) the

Informations
filed
in
Criminal
Cases
Nos. 119831 and 119832 against
respondent
were
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the RTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Cases
Nos. 119831 and 119832; (3) respondent was arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty; and (4) the RTC
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 on a
demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence which amounts to an acquittal from which no

appeal can be had.

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without

exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr.,[30] this Court stated
that the only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion, thus:

x x x The only instance when double jeopardy

will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present
its case or where the trial was a sham. However,
while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. [31]

After an extensive review of previous Court decisions

relevant to herein petition, this Court finds that the
abovementioned exception is inapplicable to the factual
milieu herein. This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse
its discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings

of the trial, as well as its grant of respondents demurrer

to evidence.

Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but

it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.[32]

In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[33] this Court ruled that

the prosecution was denied due process of law when the
trial was but a mock trial, to wit:

More so does the rule against the invoking of

double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we
have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where
the authoritarian president ordered respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total
absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused.
[34]

In addition, in People v. Bocar,[35] this Court ruled that

there is no double jeopardy when the prosecution was not
allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the
trial court, to wit:

It is evident from the brief transcript of the

proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that the parties were
not placed under oath before they answered the queries
of the respondent Judge (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, no
evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records
of the case before respondent Court. Respondent Court's
issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary,
whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion
which this Court cannot permit.
Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that
the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and
offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules
of Court (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, the prosecution was
denied due process.
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated. x x x[36]

Likewise, in People v. Judge Albano,[37] this Court held

that there is no double jeopardy when the trial court
preemptively dismissed the case, thus:
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
practically held that the prosecution failed to establish
the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does

not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with

grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction, when it preemptively dismissed the cases
and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution
of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby
violating its fundamental right to due process." With this
violation, its Orders, dated 28 October 1976 and 20
December 1976, are therefore null and void. Likewise,
for being null and void, said orders cannot constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. [38]

In Saldana v. Court of Appeals,[39] this Court ruled

that the prosecutions right to due process is violated
when the trial court aborted its right to complete its
presentation of evidence, thus:

The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the

criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does
not violate the rule on double jeopardy. One of the
elements of double jeopardy is a competent court. The
trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction
when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process by aborting its right to complete the
presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy
had not been terminated. The remand of the case for
further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the
first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy. x x x[40]

Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual

molding of herein petition, is did the RTC violate
petitioners right to due process? On this note, this Court
rules that petitioner was given more than ample
opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the
factual antecedents which led to the grant of respondents
demurrer.

On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its

presentation of evidence and, on the day after, filed its
formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002,
respondent filed an opposition to petitioners formal offer.
Instead of filing a reply as directed by the RTC, petitioner
filed a Motion to Withdraw Prosecutions Formal Offer of
Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of Evidence.
[41]
Said motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner
thus continued its presentation of evidence.

On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its

presentation of additional witnesses and was then
ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On
February 26, 2003, petitioner filed a request for marking
of certain documents and motion to admit attached
formal offer of evidence.[42] The motion was initially
denied by the RTC, but on motion for reconsideration the
same was granted by the RTC. The RTC, thus, ordered
petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally,

on November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its Formal Offer of

Evidence.[43]

After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the

RTC, in an Order dated January 29, 2004, directed
petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February 18,
2004, petitioner filed its Opposition[44] to the demurrer.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC never

prevented petitioner from presenting its case. Unlike
in Bocar and Saldana where
the
prosecution
was
prevented from completing its presentation of evidence,
petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case,
formally offer its evidence and oppose respondents
demurrer. It even bears to point out that the RTC even
allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal offer of evidence
after having initially rested its case and then continue its
presentation by introducing additional witnesses. Thus,
no grave abuse can be attributed to the RTC as
petitioners right to due process was not violated.
Even Galman finds no application to the case at bar as
clearly such trial cannot be considered a sham based on
the abovementioned considerations.

Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias

when it chose to grant respondents demurrer to evidence

notwithstanding that it had filed a Motion to Hold in

Abeyance the Resolution of Accused Dante Tans Demurrer
to Evidence and The Prosecutions Opposition Thereto.
[45]
Petitioner contends that instead of acting on the
motion, the RTC peremptorily granted respondents
demurrer to evidence which prevented petitioner from
its intention to file a petition for certiorari to question the
December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the
RTC.

While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in

abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence,
nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so.
Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same
as an error on the part of the RTC, the same would merely
constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not
an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by
petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the
proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois
acquit.[46] We are bound by the dictum that whatever
error may have been committed effecting the dismissal of
the case cannot now be corrected because of the timely
plea of double jeopardy.[47] To reiterate, the only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction which cannot be attributed
to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in
abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence.
Consequently, petitioners attempt to put in issue

theDecember 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of

the RTC which denied admission of certain documentary
exhibits in evidence must fail. As correctly manifested by
the CA, the said Orders have already been overtaken by
the March 16, 2004 Order, which already granted
respondents demurrer to evidence. Hence, this Court
would be violating the rules on double jeopardy if the twin
orders were to be reviewed after a finding that the CA did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the
demurrer to evidence.

Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken

by the RTC in granting the demurrer to evidence, no
grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the
29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after
due consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly
observed by the CA, the RTC extensively discussed its
position on the various issues brought to contention by
petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTCs decision
to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to
prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources
Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are
preferred shares as well as common shares, or even
which type of shares respondent had acquired, thus:

To secure conviction for the violations of RSA Secs. 32 (a1) and 36 (a), it is necessary to prove the following: (1)
the BW Resources Corporation (BW) has equity securities

registered under the Revised Securities Act; [2] that the

equity securities of BW Resources Corporation are
divided into classes, and that these classes are
registered pursuant to the Revised Securities Act; (3) the
number of shares of BW Resources Corporation
(authorized the number of shares of BW Resources
(authorized capital stock) and the total number of shares
per class of stock; (4) the number of shares of a
particular class of BW stock acquired by the accused; (5)
the fact of the exact date, the accused [becomes] the
beneficial owner of ten (10%) percent of a particular
class of BW shares; and (6) the fact, the accused failed
to disclose his ten (10%) percent ownership within ten
days from becoming such owner.

It is very clear from the evidence formally offered,

that the foregoing facts were not proven or
established. These cases were for Violations of
RSA Rule 32 (a)-1 and Section 56 of Revised
Securities Act, however, it is very surprising that
the prosecution never presented in evidence the
Article
of
Incorporation
of
BW
Resources
Corporation. This document is very vital and is the
key to everything, including the conviction of the
accused. Without the Article of Incorporation, the
Court has no way of knowing the capitalization
authorized capital stock of the BW Resources
Corporation, the classes of shares into which its
stock is divided and the exact holdings of Dante
Tan in the said corporation. Its not being a
prosecutions evidence renders impossible the
determination of the ten (10%) percent beneficial
ownership of accused Dante Tan, as there is no
focal point to base the computation of his

holdings, and the exact date of his becoming an

owner of ten (10%) percent.[48]

There is no showing that the conclusions made by

the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is
manifestly mistaken. Assuming, however, that there is an
error of judgment on the denial of admission of certain
exhibits of the prosecution and the appreciation of the
prosecutions case, there is to this Courts mind, no
capricious exercise of judgment that would overcome the
defense of double jeopardy.

Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental

philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against
double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been
acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes.[49] While petitioner insists that the RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that none
can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did
not err when it affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC.

On a final note, this Court is aware of this Courts Third

Division Decision dated April 21, 2009 entitled Dante Tan

v. People of the Philippines[50] wherein respondent argued

that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the
prosecution. This Court denied the petition and ruled for
the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. It must be pointed out that said decision
involves Criminal Case No. 119830,[51] which is distinct
and
separate
from Criminal
Case
No.
119831 and Criminal Case No. 119832 which are the
subject matter of herein petition. Thus, the resolution of
the case at bar is without prejudice to the proceedings
that are being conducted in Criminal Case No. 119830 at
whatever stage it may be.

WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition
is DENIED. The June 14, 2004 Resolution and February
24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83433 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

G.R. Nos. L-48707-48709 December 5, 1941

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs. VICTOR TAYCO, defendant-appellee
chanrobles virtual law library

OZAETA, J.:

chanrobles virtual law library

The Solicitor General moves to dismiss the appeal interposed by

the City Fiscal of Manila from the order of the Court of First
Instance dismissing the three above-numbered cases on the
ground that the offense complained of had prescribed.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual law library

The offense in question is unjust vexation alleged to have been

committed by the defendant Victor Tayco against Marcelina
Alcacetas, Flora Carreon and Rosalina Valenzuela on May 5, May
6, and May 2 and May 6, 1941, respectively. The offended parties

complained to the City Fiscal on May 24, 1941, but the City
Fiscal's office did not file the corresponding information in the
Municipal Court until July 10, 1941, that is to say, more than two
months after the commission and discovery of the offense. The
Municipal Court denied defendant's motion to quash, but upon
appeal the Court of First Instance (Judge Jose R. Carlos presiding)
dismissed the three cases, and the City Fiscal appealed to this
Court.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual law library

Unjust vexation is classified as a light offense, it being punished

under the second paragraph of article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code with arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5 to P200 or
both. Under article 90 of the same Code, light offenses prescribed
in two months; and article 91 provides that "the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him."
chanrobles virtual law library

We gather from the order of dismissal appealed from that the

contention of the City Fiscal is that the running of the prescriptive
period was interrupted from the time the offended parties
reported the offense to his office on May 24, 1941. We agree with
the lower court and the Solicitor General that such contention is
untenable. Section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon
which the City Fiscal relies, requires him to investigate "all
charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances,
and have the necessary informations or complaints prepared or
made against the person accused. "From this it is claimed by the
City Fiscal that he has the power to conduct a preliminary
investigation like a justice of the peace, and that the lodging of a
complaint in his office by the offended party is like the filing of a
complaint in a justice of the peace court. But under article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code, the running of the period of prescription
is interrupted not by the act of the offended party in reporting the
offense to the fiscal but by filing of the complaint or information.
Said article further provides that the period of the prescription

shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by

the filing of the complaint or information terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted. Thus, it is clear that the
compliant or information referred to in article 91 is that which is
filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation
lodged by the offended party in the City Fiscal's office. It is
needless to add that such accusation in the City Fiscal's office
cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the
accused.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual law library

We consider the Solicitor-General's motion to dismiss the appeal

as a brief on the merit; and since the result is favorable to the
defendant-appellee, we deem it unnecessary to hear the
latter.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual law library

The order of dismissal entered by the court below is affirmed and

the appeal herein is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual law library

Abad Santos, Diaz, Moran, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for
violations of municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit
in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the

police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30,
1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed,
but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was
sustained by the respondent judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge
against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the
offenses charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within
the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered
cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further,
That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding
complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:

Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the
charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with
the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as
follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the
purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation
therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the
complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the
fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office
of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum
in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for
Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether
the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months
before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other
hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was
added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply
to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in
the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those
offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to
the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest
of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that
rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to
Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,

nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses

involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the

prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the

case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary
to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of
fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should
prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would
have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral
defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the
instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed
six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays
the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May

30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
SANRIO COMPANY G.R. No. 168662
LIMITED,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
EDGAR C. LIM, doing
business as ORIGNAMURA
TRADING, Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 19, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside

the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74660[2] and its resolution[3] denying reconsideration.
Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese
corporation, owns the copyright of various animated
characters such as Hello Kitty, Little Twin Stars, My
Melody, Tuxedo Sam and Zashikibuta among others.
[4]
While it is not engaged in business in the Philippines,
its products are sold locally by its exclusive distributor,
Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI).[5]
As such exclusive distributor, GGI entered into licensing
agreements with JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper
Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing
Corporation.[6] These local entities were allowed to
manufacture certain products (bearing petitioner's
copyrighted animated characters) for the local market.
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit
Sanrio products, GGI asked IP Manila Associates (IPMA) to
conduct a market research. The research's objective was
to identify those factories, department stores and retail
outlets manufacturing and/or selling fake Sanrio items.
[7]
After conducting several test-buys in various
commercial areas, IPMA confirmed that respondent's

Orignamura Trading in Tutuban Center, Manila was selling

imitations of petitioner's products.[8]
Consequently, on May 29, 2000, IPMA agents Lea A.
Carmona and Arnel P. Dausan executed a joint affidavit
attesting to the aforementioned facts. [9] IPMA forwarded
the said affidavit to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which thereafter filed an application for the
issuance of a search warrant in the office of the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[10]
After conducting the requisite searching inquiry, the
executive judge issued a search warrant on May 30,
2000.[11] On the same day, agents of the NBI searched the
premises of Orignamura Trading. As a result thereof, they
were able to seize various Sanrio products.[12]
On April 4, 2002, petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact
Teodoro Y. Kalaw IV of the Quisumbing Torres law firm,
filed a complaint-affidavit[13] with the Task-Force on AntiIntellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) against respondent for violation of Section
217 (in relation to Sections 177[14] and 178[15]) of the
Intellectual Property Code (IPC) which states:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. 217.1. Any person
infringing any right secured by provisions of Part IV of
this Act or aiding or abetting such infringement shall
be guilty of a crime punishable by:

(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years

plus a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000)
to One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) for the
first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to
six (6) years plus a fine ranging from One hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P150,000) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000) for the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
nine (9) years plus a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000) to One million five hundred
thousand pesos (P1,500,000) for the third and
subsequent offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of
insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of
imprisonment and the amount of fine, the court shall
consider the value of the infringing materials that the
defendant has produced or manufactured and the
damage that the copyright owner has suffered by
reason of infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when
copyright subsists in a work has in his
possession an article which he knows, or ought
to know, to be an infringing copy of the work for
the purpose of:
(a) Selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade
offering or exposing for sale, or hire, the article;
(b) Distributing the article for purpose of trade or
any other purpose to an extent that will
prejudice the rights of the copyright of the
owner in the work; or

(c) Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty

of an offense and shall be liable on conviction to
imprisonment and fine as above mentioned. (emphasis
supplied)

Respondent asserted in his counter-affidavit[16] that he

committed no violation of the provisions of the IPC
because he was only a retailer.[17] Respondent neither
reproduced nor manufactured any of petitioner's
copyrighted item; thus, he did not transgress the
economic rights of petitioner.[18] Moreover, he obtained
his merchandise from authorized manufacturers of
petitioner's products.[19]
On September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that:
Evidence on record would show that respondent
bought his merchandise from legitimate sources, as
shown by official receipts issued by JC Lucas Creative
Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares
Manufacturing Corporation. In fact, in her letter dated
May 23, 2002, Ms. Ma. Angela S. Garcia certified that
JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics,
Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation are
authorized to produce certain Sanrio products. While
it appears that some of the items seized during
the search are not among those products
which [GGI] authorized these establishments to
produce, the fact remains that respondent
bought these from the abovecited legitimate
sources. At this juncture, it bears stressing
that respondent relied on the representations of
these manufacturers and distributors that the
items they sold were genuine. As such, it is not

incumbent upon respondent to verify from these

sources what items [GGI] only authorized them to
produce. Thus, as far as respondent is concerned,
the items in his possession are not infringing
copies of the original [petitioner's] products.
(emphasis supplied)[20]

Thus, in a resolution dated September 25, 2002, it

dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence.
[21]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

[22]
Hence, it filed a petition for review in the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ.[23] In a resolution dated
August 29, 2003,[24] the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor affirmed the TAPP resolution. The petition was
dismissed for lack of reversible error.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA. On May 3, 2005, the appellate court dismissed
the petition on the ground of prescription. It based its
action on Act 3326 which states:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year
for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years; (c) after eight years for those
punished by imprisonment for two years or
more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve
years for any other offense punished by imprisonment

for six years or more, except the crime of treason,

which shall prescribe after twenty years; Provided,
however, That all offenses against any law or part of
law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same may not be known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are
dismissed
for
reasons
not
constituting
jeopardy. (emphasis supplied)

According to the CA, because no complaint was filed in

court within two years after the commission of the
alleged violation, the offense had already prescribed.[25]
On the merits of the case, the CA concluded that the DOJ
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition for review.[26] To be criminally liable for
violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following
requisites must be present:
1.
2.

possession of the infringing copy and

knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an
infringement of the genuine article.

The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to

prove that respondent knew that the merchandise he sold
was counterfeit. Respondent, on the other hand, was able
to show that he obtained these goods from legitimate
sources.[27]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now essentially avers that the CA erred in
concluding that the alleged violations of the IPC had
prescribed. Recent jurisprudence holds that the pendency
of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the
prescriptive period.[28] Moreover, the CA erred in finding
that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint. Respondent is liable for
copyright infringement (even if he obtained his
merchandise from legitimate sources) because he sold
counterfeit goods.[29]
Although we do not agree wholly with the CA, we deny
the petition.
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN
THE
DOJ
TOLLED
THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD

Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive

period for violation of special laws starts on the day such
offense was committed and is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings against respondent (i.e., the
accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit
on April 4, 2002 or one year, ten months and four days
after the NBI searched respondent's premises and seized
Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information
was immediately filed in court, respondent's alleged
violation had not yet prescribed.[30]
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,[31] we
affirmed that the filing of the complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation interrupts the period of
prescription of criminal responsibility.[32] Thus, the
prescriptive period for the prosecution of the alleged
violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely filing
of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.
IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE DOJ
IN
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATIONS WILL NOT BE
DISTURBED

In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor

determines whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty
thereof.[33]Probable cause is defined as such facts and
circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.[34] Because a public prosecutor is the one
conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines the
existence of probable cause.[35]Consequently, the decision
to file a criminal information in court or to dismiss a
complaint depends on his sound discretion.[36]
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide
latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. For this reason, courts generally do not
interfere with the results of such proceedings. A
prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence
that will establish probable cause justifying the filing of a
criminal information against the respondent. [37] By way of
exception, however, judicial review is allowed where
respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion.[38] Otherwise stated,
such review is appropriate only when the prosecutor has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, patent and gross enough to amount to

an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform

a duty enjoined by law.[39]
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no
probable cause existed against respondent for violation of
the IPC. They were in the best position to determine
whether or not there was probable cause. We find that
they arrived at their findings after carefully evaluating the
respective evidence of petitioner and respondent. Their
conclusion was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167571

November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and
RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP
No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's)
petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money
amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993,
Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson),
jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of
the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the
signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for
payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either
for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June
1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and
Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly
included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent
money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like
petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation
of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that
he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had
filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and

pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been
falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several
documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly
the same as the those appearing on the checks. 7 He also showed
a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself
had claimed to be Cawili's business associate. 8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III
Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial
appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case
against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letterresolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible
for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had
deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted
during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer
the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his
motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S.
Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against
Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, 11 ACP Sampaga
held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the
four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were
dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing
of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August
1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as

the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative

proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more
than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as
yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22
imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga
stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the
matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative
should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no
dealings with petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through
Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same,
stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act
No. 3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of
the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running
of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to
file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed
an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, 22 the DOJ,
presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed
and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden
turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive
period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special
act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines
and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the

Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses

penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v.
Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari 25 before the Court of
Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification
of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003
resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. 27Still, the Court
of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent
compliance with the formal requirements would not per
se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court
of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical
grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently
without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not
err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of
Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It
argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not

provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four

(4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the
Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim
that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State,
violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. 30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition
before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules,
the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that
the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points
out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency
in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect
being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended
to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true
and correctthe court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance
with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served, 32 as
in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching
the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to
attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April
2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the
petition before the

Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ

resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy of which
was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals
committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case
involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that
the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information
in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case
is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the
filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the
violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of
Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him
since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his
control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled
An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which
do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent
provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be

not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P.
Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we
cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4
December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses
was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in
the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that
once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is
halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is
illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at
a time when the function of conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the
peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases
of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of
the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of
the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of
the complaint signifies the

institution of the criminal proceedings against the

accused.44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People
v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation
or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial
proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the
filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely
for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should,
and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may
only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be
interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v.
Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code
(R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that
the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings
for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is
instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial

proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of
the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the
exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive or
judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial
and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person
which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be
sufficient to toll prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right
to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner
filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the
four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his
appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of
the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the
prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24
August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he
had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early
as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's
flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed.
Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement
of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses
they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there
is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the
filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of
Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information
against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.