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www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1206326110
Author contributions: U.S., C.F.C., C.R.F., and T.L. designed research; U.S. and T.L. performed research; U.S., C.F.C., C.R.F., and T.L. contributed new reagents/analytic tools; U.S.
and T.L. analyzed data; and U.S., C.F.C., C.R.F., and T.L. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
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Edited by Jose A. Scheinkman, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved May 17, 2013 (received for review April 17, 2012)
teams were traded. In each group, one interval was unpacked into
two subinterval assets and another interval (unpacked in their
counterpart group) was packed into a single asset. The trading
mechanism and all other methods were very similar to those in
study 1 (SI Appendix), but they were adapted for Web access only
and trading was possible for several weeks.
The PD effects are similar in magnitude to those in the laboratory markets. Individual belief judgments summed across
unpacked intervals are a median of 0.20 higher in NBA and
0.15 higher in World Cup markets than in comparable packed
intervals. There is not much visible convergence over time
(Fig. 2A gives results for the most actively traded NBA team,
the Dallas Mavericks).
Creating an index of the amount of overall PD in these prices
is complicated by the fact that liquidity was low. Because there
was not always a range of bids and asks at which to trade, what
the price is at any moment in time is ambiguous. A conservative approach interpolates hypothetical prices by assuming that
buyers could always buy at the higher of the last price or the next
purchase price (and oppositely for sellers). This approach creates
a continuous ow of virtual prices, to measure how much could
be hypothetically earned by selling assets on two unpacked events
and buying the cheaper packed event (called PD arbitrage) or
executing the opposite trade (reverse PD; which should never be
protable if PD exists). The time-weighted average hypothetical
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Fig. 1. Design and evidence of PD in a laboratory experimental prediction market. (A) Time course of a typical experimental session in study 1 (upper part)
and construction of assets for the two DAX Index (German stock market) partitions (lower part). The digital option will pay a xed amount (1V) only if the
DAX closes within the specied interval 2 wk in the future. (B) The development over time of price differences of the packed and summed unpacked assets,
for the sports assets in study 1. Prices are averaged over all 12 market replications. The difference in the nal prices is signicant (KruskalWallis, P < 0.001).
The slope of the time trend for the difference in prices is 0.0094 (Upper) and 0.0159 (Lower).
Fig. 2. Prices and pseudoarbitrage prot opportunities in NBA and World Cup eld experimental markets. (A) Price chart for packed and unpacked assets in
prediction market trading the number of wins by the Dallas Mavericks, DAL. Numbers at the top of the graph indicate cumulated number of wins. (B) For each
NBA playoff team, average levels of partition dependence (PD) arbitrage are positive and typically larger than reverse PD arbitrage (which is often zero).
(Reverse) PD arbitrage occurs if a hypothetical prot could be made by buying (selling) the packed event in one market and selling (buying) the unpacked
events in the other market. At times where no bids or asks were available, the more conservative from the previous and subsequent price are used, i.e., the
price that makes the occurrence of (reverse) PD arbitrage less likely. Levels are set to 0 if no arbitrage opportunity existed. The numbers displayed in the gure
are the time-weighted averages of the available PD (or reverse PD) arbitrage levels over the complete trading period for each team generated by the low
intervals (I1 and I2) and by the high intervals (I3 and I4).
Fig. 3. Graphical illustration of a mixture model of prediction market prices. The mixture model assumes that the probability distribution observed in the
prediction market (Center) is a linear mixture of a 1/N nave prior distribution with weight (Left) and an unbiased distribution reecting traders best guesses
with weight 1- (Right).
Fig. 4. The relation between perceived probability (estimated from aggregate market betting) and actual probability (sample relative frequencies)
for races with different numbers of horses. 1/N bias predicts the curve from
races with fewer horses will lie above the curve from races with more horses.
The graph was created from a lowess-smoothed version (bandwidth = 0.4) of
their (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010) Fig. 1 for races with exactly 6, 8, 10, or 12
horses, and then converting racetrack odds to implied probabilities. (Sample
sizes are multiples 0.044, 0.192, 0.145, and 0.053 of the full sample; the
minimum is 250,000 horse starts.) Regressing perceived probabilities, for
different numbers of horses and actual probabilities of 0.02, gives a weight
on 1/N of 0.12. Analysis performed by Snowberg and Wolfers, based on data
in their 2010 paper. (Reproduced with permission from Snowberg and
Wolfers.)
Sonnemann et al.
Discussion
A central question that cuts across social sciences is how individual
cognition inuences collective activity. We focus on whether
judged probability of a numerical interval is partition dependent,
increasing when the interval is unpacked into equivalent adjacent
subintervals. Two experiments and two eld datasets measure
how much PD is reected in prediction market prices. All four
types of data show substantial and persistent PD in market prices.
PD is evident in a short (1-h) laboratory experiment, in a weekslong eld experiment on NBA and World Cup (Federation Internationale de Football Association, FIFA) outcomes, in a parimutuel prediction market forecasting economic indicators, and
in a population of US parimutuel horse race markets. The studies
span a wide range of structure, time, and trading domains; they
are not meant to comprise a step-by-step bridge between laboratory and eld (as was seminally done in ref. 38).
Combining these data sources is useful for the following reasons: General explanations based on trading frictions (35, 37)
might apply to parimutuel markets but do not apply to the CDA
laboratory and eld markets; explanations based on information
conveyed by the choice of partitions in horse race and economic
indicator markets are eliminated by laboratory experiments; and
explanations based on low nancial stakes and trader experience
are eliminated by the parimutuel eld markets. Occams razor
therefore favors the only interpretation that applies to all four
datasets, which is that PD in individual judgments also inuences
market prices (cf. refs. 3941).
Our studies also illustrate the complementarity between laboratory and eld methodsan idea that is widely endorsed in
experimental economics (29, 42). In this setting, complementarity means that the weakness of one method makes the compensating strength of a different method especially valuable.
Studies 12 are strong for eliminating perceived information
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. This research was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Grant LA1316/3-1, National Science Foundation (NSF)
Grant SES-00-99209 (to C.R.F.), and The Betty and Gordon Moore Foundation, NSFHuman and Social Dynamics, and Human Frontier Science Program
grants (to C.F.C.).
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