11/20/2016

G.R.No.122539

TodayisSunday,November20,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
THIRDDIVISION

G.R.No.122539March4,1999
JESUSV.TIOMICO,petitioner,
vs.
THEHON.COURTOFAPPEALS(FORMERFIFTHDIVISION)andPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondent.

PURISIMA,J.:
ThisisapetitionforreviewbycertiorariunderSection2,Rule125,inrelationtoSection1,Rule45oftheRulesof
Court to correct, reverse and annul the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment 2 of the trial
courtconvictingthepetitionerhereinforaviolationoftheTrustReceiptsLaw.

PetitionerJesusV.Tiomico,(Tiomico)openedaLetterofCreditwiththeBankofthePhilippineIslands(BPI)for
$5,600tobeusedfortheimportationoftwo(2)unitsofForklifts,Shovelloaderandatruckmountedwithcrane.
On October 29, 1982, the said machineries were received by the accused, as evidenced by the covering trust
receipt. Upon maturity of the trust receipt, on December 28, 1982, he made a partial payment of US$855.94,
therebyleavinganunpaidobligationofUS$4,770.46.AsofDecember21,1989,TiomicoowedBPIUS$4,770.46,
or P109,386.65, computed at P22.93 per US dollar, the rate of exchange at the time. Failing to pay the said
amountortodeliversubjectmachineriesandequipments,despiteseveraldemands,theInternationalOperations
DepartmentofBPIreferredthemattertotheLegalDepartmentofthebank.Buttheletterofdemandsenttohim
notwithstanding,Tiomicofailedtosatisfyhismonetaryobligationsuedupon.
Consequently, he was accused of a violation of PD 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law, under an
Information3alleging:
That on or about the 29th day of October, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro, Manila,
Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,executed
aTrustReceiptAgreementforandinbehalfofParamountCalibratorsMerchandisingofwhichheis
thesoleproprietorinfavoroftheBankofthePhilippineIslands.Inconsiderationofthereceiptbythe
saidaccusedofthree(3)baresoneunitForkliftModelFD30ToyotaBranch2J70Hpandoneunit
Forklift Model LM301 Toyota Branch 2J 70 Hp and one unit shovel loader Model SOT 130 HP, 6
CylLC#216860,forwhichthereisnowduethesumofUS$5600.00,whereintheaccusedagreedto
sellthesameandwiththeexpressobligationtoremittothecomplainantbanktheproceedsofthe
sale,and/ortoturnoverthesameifnotsold,ondemand,buttheaccusedonceinpossessionofthe
said items, far from complying with his obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, did
thenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslymisappropriate,misapplyandconvertthesameto
his own personal use and benefit despite repeated demands, failed and refused and still fails and
refusesaccountforand/orremittheproceedsofthesalethereof,tothedamageandprejudiceofthe
said complainantbank as represented by Lourdes V. Palomo in the aforementioned amount of US
$5600oritsequivalentinPhilippinecurrency.
Contrarytolaw.
Arraigned thereunder, Tiomico entered a plea of Not Guilty, at which juncture, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
JohnB.Eganamanisfestedthathewasauthorizingtheprivateprosecutor,Atty.JoseB.Soncuya,toprosecute
thecasesubjecttohisdirection,supervisionandcontrol.
OnOctober16,1989,GretelS.Donatowaspresentedtotestifyfortheprosecution.Accordingtoher,sheworked
fortheBankofthePhilippineIslands(BPI)in1981andin1982,shewasassignedasoneoftheLetterofCredit
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processors in the International Operations Department of BPI. Her duty, among others, was to process letter of
creditapplicationswhichincludedthatofTiomico.Thetrustreceiptexecutedbythelatterwasgiventoheraspart
ofthedocumentssupportinghisLetterofCredit.
ThefollowingdocumentspresentedinthecourseofthetestimonyofDonatowereidentifiedbyherasfollows:
(1)Exhibit"A"LetterofCredit
(2)Exhibit"B"ProFormaInvoice
(3)Exhibit"C"LetterofCreditConfirmation
(4)Exhibit"D"TrustReceiptExhibitD1D4signaturesthereon
(5)Exhibit"E"StatementofAccount,theamountofP306,708.17appearingtherein,
asExhibitE1,andthesignaturetheretoofanunidentifiedbankofficer,asExhibitE2
(6) Exhibit "F" Letter of Demand of the bank's legal department a return card, as
ExhibitF1,andthesignatureoftheaddressee'sagent,asExhibitF1A.
CounselforpetitionerobjectedtotheadmissionofExhibits"A","B","C"and"D"onthegroundthatwitnessfailed
to identify the said documents inasmuch as her testimony regarding the signatures appearing therein were
evidently hearsay. But the trial court admitted the said documentary evidence, despite the objections raised
theretobythedefense.Thereafter,theprosecutionrested.
After the People rested its case, petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to the evidence, theorizing that the
evidenceonrecorddoesnotsufficetoprovebeyondreasonabledoubttheaccusationagainsthim.Butinsteadof
granting the said motion of the defense, the trial court ordered a reopening of the case, so as to enable the
prosecutiontoadducemoreevidence.Thedefenseobjectedbuttonoavail.Thetrialcourtproceededwiththe
continuationoftrial"intheinterestofjustice".
OnSeptember5,1990,thelowercourtdeniedthedemurrertoevidence.TheMotionforReconsiderationofthe
defensemetthesamefate.Itwasdenied.ThecasewasthensetforcontinuationoftrialonDecember12,1990.
ReceptionofevidenceforthedefensewassetonJanuary7,1991.ButonJanuary4,1991,threedaysbeforethe
scheduledcontinuationoftrial,thedefensecounselfiledanUrgentMotionforPostponementforthegivenreason
thathehadtoappearbeforeBranch12oftheMetropolitanTrialCourtofManilaonJanuary7,1991.
OnJanuary7,1991,thelowercourtdeniedtheUrgentMotionforPostponementandadjudgedpetitionertohave
waivedtherighttointroduceevidenceonhisbehalf.
OnJanuary30,1991,thetrialcourtpromulgateditsdecisionfindingpetitionerguiltyofaviolationofPD115,and
sentencinghimaccordingly.
Onappeal,theCourtofAppealscameoutwithajudgmentofaffirmance,thedispositiveportionwhich,istothe
followingeffect:
WHEREFORE,theCourtfindsJESUSV.TIOMICOguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofviolationofPD
115andisherebysentencedtosufferanindeterminatepenaltyoften(10)yearsofprisionmayoras
minimum,tofifteen(15)yearsofreclusiontemporalasmaximumtoindemnifyBankofthePhilippine
IslandsthesumofP109,386.65andtopaythecosts.
SOORDERED.4
Undaunted,petitionerfoundhiswaytothisCourtviathePetitionforReviewbyCertiorariatbar,seekingtoannul
thedecision5oftheCourtofAppealsraisingasissues:
(1)WHETHERORNOTPD115ORTRUSTRECEIPTSLAWISUNCONSTITUTIONAL
(2) WHETHER OR NOT A TESTIMONY CAN BE ADMITTED DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF FORMAL OFFER AS REQUIRED BY SECTIONS 34 AND 35, RULE 132, OF THE
REVISEDRULESOFCOURT
(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS WITH REGARD TO THE
LETTEROFCREDITANDOTHERDOCUMENTISHEARSAYAND
(4) WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE MOTION FOR
POSTPONEMENTBYTHEDEFENSECOUNSEL.
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Asregardsthefirstissue,theCourthasrepeatedlyupheldthevalidityoftheTrustReceiptsLawandconsistently
declaredthatthesaidlawdoesnotviolatetheconstitutionalproscriptionagaintsimprisonmentfornonpaymentof
debts. (People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312 People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726 Lee vs. Rodil, 175 SCRA 100).
SuchpronouncementwasthoroughlyexplainedinLeevs.Rodil(supra)thus:
Verily,PD115isadeclarationbythelegislativeauthoritythat,asamatterofpublicpolicy,thefailure
ofapersontoturnovertheproceedsofthesaleofgoodscoveredbyatrustreceiptortoreturnsaid
goodsifnotsoldisapublicnuisancetobeabatedbytheimpositionofpenalsanctions.Asheldin
Lozanovs.Martinez(146SCRA323,338):
. . . certainly, it is within the authority of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain act
deemedperniciousandinimicaltopublicwelfare.Actsmalainsearenottheonlyacts
thatthelawcanpunish.Anactmaynotbeconsideredbysocietyasinherentlywrong,
hence,notmaluminse,butbecauseoftheharmthatitinflictsonthecommunity,itcan
beoutlawedandcriminallypunishedasmalumprohibitum.TheStatecandothisinthe
exerciseofitspolicepower.
Infine,PD115isavalidexerciseofpolicepowerandisnotrepugnanttotheconstitutionalprovision
ofnonimprisonmentfornonpaymentofdebt.
Inasimilarvein,thecaseofPeoplevs.Nitafan(supra)held:
The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the
handlingofmoneyorgoodstotheprejudiceofanotherregardlessofwhetherthelatter
is the owner or not. The law does not seek to enforce payment of a loan. Thus, there
canbenoviolationoftherightagainstimprisonmentfornonpaymentofadebt.
Anentthesecondissue,thepivotalquestionis:Shouldthetestimonyofawitnessbeadmitteddespitethefailure
oftheproponenttoofferitformallyinevidence,asrequiredbySection34ofRule132 6?Weruleonthisissuein
theaffirmative.

Recordsdisclosethattheprivateprosecutorstatedthepurposeofthetestimonyinquestionalthoughhedidnot
formallyofferthesame.Theproceedings7wentonasfollows:
ATTY.SONCUYA:
Thepurposeofthetestimonyofthewitnessistoprovethattheaccusedappliedforaletterofcredit,
fortheopeningofaletterofcreditandfortheimportationofmachineryfromJapanandthatthose
machineryweredeliveredandreceivedbytheaccusedasevidencedbythetrustreceiptandthatthe
accusedfailedtocomplywiththetermsandconditionsofthesaidtrustreceipt,yourHonor.
COURT:
Allright,proceed.
AsaptlystressedbytheSolicitorGeneralinhisComment, 8 "the absence of the words, 'we are formally offering the
testimony for the purpose of . . .'" should be considered merely as an excusable oversight on the part of the private
prosecutor.

ItshouldbeborneinmindthattherationalebehindSection34ofRule132 9istoinformtheCourtofthepurposeof
thetestimony,toenablethejudgetorulewhetherthesaidtestimonyisnecessaryorisirrelevantorimmaterial.

In the case under scrutiny, since the purpose of subject testimony was succinctly stated, the reason behind the
requirementforitsformalofferhasbeensubstantiallycompliedwith.Whatthedefensecounselshouldhavedone
should have been to interpose his objection the moment the private respondent was called to testify, on the
groundthattherewasnoprioroffermadebytheproponent.10
Thetendencyoftherulesonevidence,istowardssubstantialjusticeratherthanstrictadherencetotechnicalities.
To condemn the disputed testimony as inadmissible due to the failure of the private prosecutor to properly
observe the rules on presentation of evidence, would render nugatory, and defeat the proceedings before the
lowercourt.
Onthethirdissuewhetherornotthewitnesscantestifyonsubjectdocumentsintroducedasevidencedespite
heradmissionthatshedidnotseetheaccusedsignthesaidexhibits,welikewiseruleintheaffirmative.
Asaptlyheldbytheappellatecourt:11
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Gretel Donato testified that she was not present when appellant affixed his signature on the
documentsinquestion(p.22ibid).She,however,identifiedthesignaturesthereon(Exhs."A1","A
2", "D1", "D2" and "D3", Letter of Credit Exhibit B Pro Forma Invoice Exhibit C Letter of
CreditConfirmationExhibitDTrustReceiptExhibitD1D4signaturesthereonpp.129and132
of Orig. Rec.) as those of the appellant Jesus V. Tiomico arising from her familiarity therewith
inasmuchasshewastheonewhoprocessedthepaperspertinenttothetransactionsbetweenthe
appellantandthecomplainantbank(TSN,Feb.5,1990,pp46).Hertestimony,therefore,cannotbe
consideredhearsaybecauseitisprincipallybasedonherpersonalknowledgeofbanktransactions
and the documents and records which she processes in the regular course of the bank's business
operations.
Itisnotessentialtothecompetenceofalaywitnesstoexpressopinionsonthegenuinenessofhandwritingsthat
hedidseethepersoninquestion
write. 12 It is enough that the witness has so adopted the same into business transactions as to induce a reasonable
presumption and belief of genuineness of the document. This is due to the fact that in the ordinary course of business,
documents purporting to be written or signed by that person have been habitually submitted to the witness, or where
knowledgeofhandwritingisacquiredbyhiminanofficialcapacity.13

Didthewitnessgainfamiliaritywiththesignatureoftheaccused?Theanswerisyes.Exhibits"A"to"D":Letterof
Credit,ProForma Invoice, Letter of Credit Confirmation and Trust Receipt, respectively, were all familiar to the
witnesssincethesaiddocumentsbearingthesignatureoftheaccusedwereallsubmittedtoherforprocessing.It
is therefore beyond cavil that she acquired sufficient familiarity to make witness competent to testify on the
signatures appearing in subject documents. From the time of the application to its approval and when Tiomico
defaulted, she (witness) was the one who had overseen the transactions and recommended the actions to be
taken thereon. As a matter of fact, she was the one who referred the failure of Tiomico to pay his balance to
Tiomico to pay his balance to the Legal Department of BPI, prompting the said legal department to send him
(Tiomico)ademandletter.
Furthermore, whether there was due execution or authencity of such documents was impliedly admitted by the
accused.Onthispoint,wequotewithapprovaltheconclusionreachedbytheCourtofAppeals,towit:14
On the other hand, appellant impliedly admitted the due execution of the assailed documents
consideringthathedidnotdenythefactthatheopenedaletterofcredit.Neitherdidhedenythat
thesignatureappearingthereonishis.Whatappellantintendedtodisputewasmerelythebalanceof
hispastdueaccountwiththecomplainantbank,thus:
COURT
Denied.
Whatisthedefenseoftheaccused?
Denialthatheopenedtheletterofcredit.
ATTY.EBRO
No,youhonor.
COURT:Whatisthedefense?
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY.EBRO.
Q:NowyouidentifiedsignaturesallegedlyoftheaccusedonExhibitA,whichisthe
application for the letter of credit, I ask you Miss Donato, were you personally present
whenthissignaturewasaffixedtothedocument?
A:(witnessgoingoverExhibitA)Iwastheoneoftheoneswhoprocessedtheletter
ofcredit.
ATTY.EBRO
Mayweaskforanorderdirectingthatthewitnessrespondtomyquestion.
COURT
Justanswerthequestion.
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WITNESS
A:No,sir.
COURT
Doestheaccuseddenythesignature?
ATTY.EBRO
No,yourHonor.Iamjustshowingalsothatshehasbeenexaggerating.
(TSN,Feb.5,1990,pp.1213,p.22)
In light of the foregoing, it stands to reason and conclude that the documents under scrutiny are admissible in
evidence,asheldbythetrialcourt.
Anentthefourthissue,petitionertheorizesthatthedenialofthemotionforpostponementsentinbyhislawyer
violatedhisconstitutionalrighttodueprocess.
It should be stressed that subject Urgent Motion for Postponement was not the first motion for resetting ever
presentedbythecounselforpetitioner.OnDecember12,1990,uponmotionofthelatter,andwithoutobjection
onthepartoftheprosecution,thereceptionofevidenceforthedefensewasresetoncemoretoJanuary7,1991,
at8:30inthemorning.
Themostbasictenetofdueprocessistherighttobeheard.Whereapartyhadbeenaffordedanopportunityto
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. 15 Due
processissatisfiedaslongasthepartyisaccordedanopportunitytobeheard.Ifitisnotavailedof,itisdeemedwaivedor
forfeitedwithoutviolatingtheBillofRights.16

Itisfurthertheorizedbypetitionerthatthelowercourtshouldhaveatleastgrantedhimanothertrialdatesoasto
enable him to present his evidence, so that the denial of his Urgent Motion for Postponement infringed his
constitutionalrighttobeheardbyhimselfandbycounsel.17Thissubmissionisunsustainable.
Whenanaccusedisaccordedachancetopresentevidenceonhisbehalfbutduetohisrepeatedunjustifiable
failuretoappearatthetrialwithoutanyjustification,thelowercourtorder'sthecasesubmittedfordecisiononthe
basisoftheevidenceonrecord,saidjudicialactionisnottaintedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionbecauseinsucha
case,theaccusedisdeemedtohavewaivedtherighttoadduceevidenceonhisbehalf.18
Furthermore,recordsshowthatinthiscasethedefensecounseldidnotevenbothertoappearforthescheduled
reception of evidence for his client on January 7, 1991, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court did not act
upon,muchlessgrant,theUrgentMotionforPostponementwhichhefiledonJanuary4,1991.Lawyersshould
neverpresumethattheirmotionsforpostponementwouldbegranted.19
A motion for continue or postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of
discretionresultinginadenialofsubstantialjustice.20
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is evidence of bad faith, malice or
inexcusablenegligenceonthepartofthemovant.21Theinadvertenceofthedefenseofthedefensecounselinfailing
to take note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court
appearances,constitutesinexcusablenegligence.Itshouldbeborneinmindthataclientisboundbyhiscounsel'sconduct,
negligenceandmistakesinhandlingthecase.22

Asgleanablefromtherecords:
...AttachedtothemotionistheOrderofsaidcourtdatedNovember19,1990.Obviously,whenthe
case was called on December 12, 1990, the counsel for the accused had already known of the
scheduled hearing before the Metropolitan Trial Court, yet he agreed to the hearing on January 7,
1991.Counsel'sconductisnotconsistentwiththethrustoftheJudiciarytoexpeditethetermination
ofcasesundertheMandatoryContinuousTrial...23
Alawyerasanofficerofthecourtispartofthejudicialmachineryintheadministrationofjustice.Assuch,hehas
aresponsibilitytoassistintheproperandsoundadministrationofjustice.Likethecourtitself,heisaninstrument
toadvanceitsendsandthespeedy,efficient,impartial,correctandinexpensiveadjudicationofcases.Alawyer
shouldnotonlyhelptoattaintheseobjectives.Heshouldalsoavoidimproperpracticesthatimpede,obstructor
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preventtheirrealization,chargedasheiswiththeprimarytaskofassistingthecourtinthespeedyandefficient
administrationofjustice.24
Petitioner invites attention to the Affidavit of Desistance by the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). This issue
raisedbythepetitionercannotbeentertainedasitwasonlyraisedforthefirsttimeonappeal.25
Considering that the assailed decision is firmly anchored on prevailing law and established jurisprudence, the
Courtcannothelpbutdenythepetition.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIEDandthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,datedMay31,1995,affirmingthe
judgmentofconvictionrenderedonJanuary28,1991bythecourtoforiginAFFIRMED.Nopronouncementasto
costs.
SOORDERED.
RomeroandGonzagaReyes,JJ.,concur.
Vitug,J.,abroadonofficialbusiness.
Panganiban,J.,isonleave.
Footnotes
1CAG.R.No.11977,promulgatedonMay31,1995bytheFifthDivisionofCourtofAppeals,withJustice
MartinJr.,ponenteandJusticesMorales,andRamirez,members.
2 Criminal Case # 33723, dated Jan. 28, 1991, Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati, MM penned by Judge
BuenaventuraJ.Guerrero(nowJusticeoftheCourtofAppeals).
3Rollo,p.128.
4RTCDecision,p4,Rollo,p.134.
5promulgatedonMay31,1995bytheFifthDivisionofCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.No.11977.
6Sec.34orRule132oftheRevisedRulesofCourtstatesthat:"OFFEROFEVIDENCETheCourtshall
considernoevidencewhichhasnotbeenformallyoffered.Thepurposeforwhichtheevidenceisoffered
mustbespecified."
7t.s.n.,p.2,February5,1990.
8Rollo,p.178.
9 Catuira vs. Court of Appeals 236 SCRA 398, p. 402, citing the Minutes of the Revision of Rules of
Committee,8October1986,p.5.
10Ibid,p.400.
11CAdecision,p.8Rollo,p.140.
12Francisco,RevisedRulesofCourt:Evidence,p440,1973ed.
1320AmJur,703.
14CADecision,p.12Rollo,p.143.
15Loongvs.COMELEC,257SCRA1
16ComendadorvsDeVilla,GRNo.93177,August2,1991,200SCRA82,89.
17Petition,p.50Rollo,p.59.
18Siguianvs.People,GRNo.8219,March13,1989,citingPeoplevs.Angco,103Phil33(1958).
19VideogramRegulatoryBoardvs.CourtofAppeals,265SCRA50.
20PepsiColaProductsPhils.,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.122629,promulgatedDecember2,1998,
citing the cases Belstar Transportation Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, 181 SCRA 209, 213 (1990), Alcarez vs. Racino, 125 SCRA 328, 334
(1983),Sumadchatvs.CA111SCRA488.

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21ChingHengSovs.TanBoonKong,53Phil437.
22Suerezvs.CourtofAppeals,220SCRA,274.
23RTCOrderdatedJanuary7,1991,p.1,Rollo,p.126.
24Agpalo,TheCodeProfessionalResponsibilityforLawyers,FirstEd.,p.127,citedinpage1314ofCA
Decision,Rollo,pp.145146.
25C.AlcantaraSonsIncvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,229SCRA109.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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