Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges
the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila
presented by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked
opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said
vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower
court of the said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.
Held:
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the
Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said
that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it causes such drugs
to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked
and the Court ordered further proceedings.

Villareal v. People
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012
Facts:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity. The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation
rites. After the second day of initiation rites has ended, accused non-resident or
alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal demanded that the
rites be reopened. Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling"
and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny Villa received several paddle blows,
one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. When they were
already sleeping, the neophytes were roused by Lennys shivering and mumblings.
He was brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
On 10 January 2002, the Court of Appeals decided that the accusedappellants Dizon and Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused Dizon filed

a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the Court of Appeals

Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R.
No. 15520. Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process
when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence;
and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him
the same ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence
constitutes denial of due process.
Ruling:
Yes, the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes
denial of due process.
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since
counsel for another accused Antonio General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was
not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court preassigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the
five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his preassigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the
present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally
made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In
fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of
another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to
the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a
waiver.

Valenzuela vs. People

G.R. No. 160188
June 21, 2007
Facts:
While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a
supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded
with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon,
was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged
with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started
loading the cartons inside. As the taxi was about to leave, the security guard asked
Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on

foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted
both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela
appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of
frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, thus the Petition for Review was
filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage.
Held:
No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is
consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be
present: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs
to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
The Court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property
by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable
to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of
execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts.
Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or
consummated.

People vs Villalba and Villalba

G.R. No. 207629 / 349 SCRA 532
October 22, 2014
FACTS:
Maximillian and Frederick, followed by wife, Josephine, Homer, and Marilou,
chanced upon accused-appellants Arnel, his girlfriend. And two other companions,
somewhere along Capitol Drive, near the vicinity of Faisano Mall in Butuan City, at
around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006. These two groups did not know each
other prior to April 29, 2006. Maximillian addressed an insulting remark towards
Jenny causing tension between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel. A scruffle
ensued between the two men and accused-appellant Arnel eventually stabbed

Maximillian on the chest with a sharp instrument, causing a puncture wound that
penetrated Maximillians heart and ultimately caused Maximillians death.
Prosecution witness Josephine and Frederick had positively identified both
accused-appellants at the police station soon after accused-appellants arrest. The
same prosecution witnesses, together with Homer, would again positively identify
both accused-appellants in open court during trial. Hence, accused-appellants
Randys presence at the time and place of Maximillians stabbing was duly
established. Accussed-appellant Randy was not able to attribute any ill motive on
the part of the three prosecution witnesses that could have impelled them to testify
against him. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution
were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on
the witness stand, under the solemnity of an oath, deserve full faith and credence.
It necessarily prevails over alibi and denial, especially when neither alibi nor denial
is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, nonetheless, accused-appellant
Randys presence at the time and place of Maximillians stabbing does not
necessarily mean that the former should bear criminal liability for the latters death.
The Information charged accused-appellants with Maximillians murder, alleging
that accused-appellants, acting in conspiracy with each other, stabbed Maximillian
with an icepick.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant Arnel conspired with Accused-appellants
Randy to commit the stabbing.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must
be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof
of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred
from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the offense.
There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to
kill Maximillian. There is no strong evidence of the weapon accused-appellants Arnel
used in stabbing Maximillian. None of the witnesses even knew that Maximillian was
stabbed. Accused-appellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted that
he used only a barbecue stick which he found in the area. This is consistent with the
puncture wound of Maximillian. This event shows that he acted instantaneously and
spontaneously in stabbing Maximillian, thus further negating the possibility that he
conspired with accused-appellant Randy to commit the stabbing.
FACTS:
The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness involving different victims. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals found Cruz guilty of both crimes charged, hence, this appeal.
Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic
wares and glass wares in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set up their tents
to have a place to sleep. Petitioners wife and their driver went back to Manila to get

more goods. While sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on top of her mashing her
breast and touching her private part. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she will
be killed. AAA fought back and Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires.
AA left the tent to seek for help. When she returned to their tent, she saw Norberto
touching the private parts of BBB. This prompted Norberto to leave the tent.
Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly do
the acts imputed out in the open as there were many people preparing for the
simbang gabi. He further assails the credibility AAA for the crime of rape, alleging
that the complaints were filed only for the purpose of extorting money from him.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?
HELD:
NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal
knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as the act of a man
having sexual bodily connections with a woman, in other words, rape is
consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the
external genitalia of the female. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that
the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape.
Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of
an attempted stage. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender
does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the
slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its
attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by
the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is
to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his
clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or susceptible of double
interpretation, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the
intention to cause rape as the particular injury.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without
such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. Petitioners
embracing and touching the victims vagina and breasts did not directly manifest
his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the
position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about
his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. The

intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from
his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts leading to rape.

People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Casas y Vintulan

G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Casas was charged with the crime of Murder and Attempted
Homicide under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC and the
CA convicted him of the crimes charged.
Records show that accused Casas went to a certain taho factory looking for a
certain Jesus. Failing to find Jesus, he brandished a knife and stuck it into a pail used
for making taho. As a result, Eligio, an employee of the factory confronted Casas
and told him to get rid of the knife. Thereafter, Eligio and Casas had a fistfight.
Consequently, Casas was able to regain the knife and stabbed Eligio twice while the
latter was fleeing. While Casas was in pursuit of Eligio, he ran into Joel who tried to
help Eligio with the use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped and lay prostrate
on the floor. There and then, Casas stabbed him twice who eventually died.
Accused-appellant interpose self-defense to justify his actions of stabbing both Joel
and Eligio alleging that Joel challenged him to a fight and that he stabbed Eligio to
protect himself.
ISSUE:

Is the conviction of Casas for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide proper?
HELD:
YES and NO. The Court affirmed the accused-appellants conviction of Attempted
Homicide but found the charge of Murder improper. The accused should only be
guilty of the crime of Homicide on killing of Joel.
The Court first rules on the existence of criminal liability. There can be no selfdefense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense. It was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he was the
one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay
prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. The initial fistfight between Eligio
and Casas does not indicate that unlawful aggression was employed by the former
against the latter considering that Eligio had already yielded from the brawl and, in
fact, proceeded to flee. The moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful
aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist. The core element of
unlawful aggression was not proven, thus, Casas claim of self-defense falters and
his criminal liability stands.
The Court, however, disagrees that Casas should be convicted of the crime of
Murder with respect to the death of Joel due to the prosecutions failure to prove the
existence of treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and
unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest provocation on the latters
part. The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of
the attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger
he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, then
the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated. In this case, Joel
was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas was
armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene,
and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious that
Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Hence, there can be no treachery. As such,
accused-appellant is guilty only of the crimes of Homice and Attempted Homicide.