RIGHT TO SPEEDY, PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL

HOW SHOULD THE TRIAL BE CONDUCTED?

> The trial should be speedy, public and impartial

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL?

> The right means that the trial should be conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and
regulations and it should be free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays

WHEN SHOULD THE ARRAIGNMENT AND PRE-TRIAL BE HELD?

> According to the Speedy Trial Act of 1988, and Circular 38-98, if the accused pleads not guilty, arraignment and pretrial should be held within 30 days from the time the court acquires jurisdiction
over the accused

WITHIN HOW MANY DAYS SHOULD THE TRIAL BE COMPLETED?

> In no case shall the entire period exceed 180 days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by
the Court Administrator

WHAT FACTORS MAY BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN DEPRIVED
OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE? (ACCORDING TO CORPUZ V.
SANDIGANBAYAN)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Length of delay
Reason for the delay
The defendants assertion of his right
Prejudice to the defendant

WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE ACCUSED WHOSE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL HAS BEEN
VIOLATED?
1.
the
2.
3.
4.

Motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of right to speedy trialmust be filed before trial.
same effect as an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy.
File for mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information
If he is restrained of his liberty, file for habeas corpus
Ask for the trial of the case and move to dismiss

This has

WHAT IS THE LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL?

> The limitation is that the State shouldn't be deprived of its day in court
> The right of the State and the prosecution to due process should be respected

THE PROSECUTION AND THE COMPLAINANT FAIL TO ATTEND THE FIRST HEARING. THE COURT
POSTPONES THE HEARING TO ANOTHER DATE. IS THERE A VIOLATION TO THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL?
> No, the right to speedy trial is violated when there are unjustified postponements of the trial and a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the case being tried for no unjustifiable reason
NOTA BENE: Corollary to the right to speedy trial is the right to speedy disposition of cases.

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL?

> It means that anyone interested in observing the manner that a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so

WHY SHOULD A TRIAL BE CONDUCTED IN PUBLIC?

> The trial should be public in order to prevent abuses that may be committed by the court to the prejudice of the
defendant
> Moreover the accused is entitled to the moral support of his friends and relatives
IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICITY?
> Yes, the court may bar the public in certain cases, such as when the evidence to be presented may be offensive
to decency or public morals, or in rape cases, where the purpose of some
persons in attending is merely to ogle at the parties

IS IT ALRIGHT TO HOLD THE TRIAL IN THE CHAMBERS OF THE JUDGE?

> Yes, there is no violation of the right to a public trial since the public isnt excluded from attending the trial

IN SO-CALLED TRIALS BY PUBLICITY, WHEN CAN THE PUBLICITY BE CONSIDERED PREJUDICIAL TO

THE ACCUSED?
> To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegations and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be by the barrage of
publicity

A Dismissal Grounded On The Denial Of The Right Of The Accused To Speedy Trial Has The Effect Of
Acquittal That Would Bar The Further Prosecution Of The Accused For The Same Offense
May 13, 2015May 11, 2015 by The Lawyer's Post

The Facts
Atty. Segundo (Bonsubre) filed a criminal case for Estafa against Erwin, Erico and Ritchie (Yerro) before
the RTC. During trial, his lawyer, Atty. Norberto Luna manifested that there is an on-going settlement
between the complainant and the accused, and they would file the necessary motion thereto. Thus, the
RTC issued an order on September 12, 2000 giving them 10 days to submit the motion and to furnish
counsel for the accused copy of such motion for their comment, after which the case shall be submitted
for resolution. The prosecution failed to furnish a copy of the Compromise Agreement reached between
the parties or the motion thereto, hence the RTC, by order of September 18, 2001, dismissed the case
for failure to comply with the Courts directive and failure to prosecute, in furtherance of the accuseds
right to speedy trial.
More than 2 years after the order was issued, or on June 15, 2004, Segundos new lawyer, Atty.
Bernardito Malabago, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated September 18, 2001, averring
that he learned of the order only on June 7, 2004 and believed in good faith that the case was archived
mainly due to the Compromise Agreement between the parties. The RTC denied the motions, holding
that the dismissal grounded on failure to prosecute had long become final and executory, and the RTC
has lost jurisdiction over the case. The complainant however is without recourse, as he may still file an
independent civil action to collect the amount under the Compromise Agreement. Segundo thus filed a
notice of appeal which the RTC gave due course with respect to the civil aspect only of the case, but not
to the criminal aspect. In denying the appeal on the criminal aspect, the RTC held that a dismissal of the
case for violation of the accused right to speedy trial is an adjudication on the merits. It directed
Segundo to file the appropriate docket fees.
Dissatisfied, Segundo filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the denial of his appeal on the
criminal aspect. The appellate court dismissed the petition, holding that the lapse of more than 2 years
from the dismissal of the case was enough ground for the RTC to deny due course to the appeal.
Segundo cannot deny knowledge of the dismissal since he should have safeguarded his right being a
lawyer himself, and his inaction was his undoing. His motion for reconsideration denied, Segundo
elevated the case to the Supreme Court. He argues that the finality of the motion for reconsideration
should be counted from its discovery by Atty. Malabago his new counsel; that he was denied due process
when the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute since the accused themselves did not move for its
dismissal and he was very much interested in prosecuting the case.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in denying due course to the notice of appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case.
The Courts ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
Essentially, petitioners course of action is anchored on the propriety of the September 18, 2001
Dismissal Order that was grounded on failure to prosecute in consideration of respondents right to
speedy trial. Petitioner asserts that the same was issued without due process as respondents did not
move for the cases dismissal and that no violation of the right to speedy trial was committed, adding
that the prosecution was very much interested in prosecuting the case but the proceedings were merely
held in abeyance in view of the impending settlement between the parties 1. He also argues that the
above-mentioned Order has not attained finality since, in fact, it was his counsel, Atty. Malabago, who
went to the court and discovered its existence.2 Thus, he posits that the date of discovery of said
counsel should be deemed as the date of receipt.
The submissions have no merit.
At the outset, it must be borne in mind that a dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the
accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal that would bar the further prosecution of the accused
for the same offense. In People v. Judge Hernandez,3 the Court explained the parameters of this rule:
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of
the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. Thus, errors of
judgment are not appealable by the prosecution. Appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal
of the criminal case by the trial court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there was denial
of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. This is so as while it is true that double jeopardy
will attach in case the prosecution appeals a [D]ecision acquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really acquit and
therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment.
In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private respondents for the denial of their
right to speedy trial. In a long line of cases, we have held that a dismissal on the ground of the denial of
the accuseds right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further prosecution of
the accused for the same offense. Thus, we have held that where after such dismissal the prosecution
moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the court re-set the case for trial, the
accused can successfully claim double jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final
and cannot be reconsidered. x x x.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Perforce, the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order grounded on the denial of respondents right to
speedy trial is a final order that is not appealable5 and is immediately executory.6
While the remedy of certiorari may be availed of in order to challenge the judgment or order of acquittal,
petitioner must prove that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely errors of
judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction 7. Under its classic
formulation, grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion
must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be
equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. 8

In this case, no such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the RTC in dismissing the case for
denial of the respondents right to speedy trial. Aside from the lapse of two (2) years and nine (9)
months from the time the case was dismissed to the time petitioner sought for a reconsideration of the
same, it is also not disputed that it was petitioner who caused the inordinate delay. As culled from the
records, it was the private prosecutor who sought for a temporary suspension of the case during the
September 12, 2000 hearing with a manifestation that they would file the necessary motion relative to
the settlement. Despite having executed a Compromise Agreement which this Court notes was not
notarized petitioner and his counsel failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the same or comply with the
directive to submit the necessary motion. Even when the respondents reneged on their obligation under
the Compromise Agreement having failed to pay not only the first two (2) installments, which was
already a ground to revive the criminal case under paragraph 3 (d) thereof 9 but rather all 36 monthly
installments, still, petitioner and his counsel failed to lift a finger to prosecute the case. 10 Such
inordinate and unjustified delay on the part of the prosecution clearly prejudiced the respondents.
Hence, there can be no gainsaying that their right to speedy trial had been violated.
Petitioners contention that the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order should have been reconsidered as
it was issued in violation of his right to due process is untenable. In a plethora of cases, it has been held
that the due process requirement is met simply when there is an opportunity to be heard. 11 In this case,
petitioner cannot claim that he was not given an opportunity to be heard considering that it was the
prosecutions silence and inaction that led to the eventual dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute.
Similarly, petitioners theory anent the belated discovery of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order by
the collaborating counsel, Atty. Malabago, does not deserve any credence, given that he admitted that a
copy of the said Order was cared-off to his first counsel, Atty. Luna, but was not actually received by him
because of his change of address. This, to the Courts mind, constitutes negligence as the said lawyer
should have informed the RTC of any change of address so that court processes could be properly
served at such new address. In this light, and absent any of the limited exceptions to the rule, the
negligence of counsel binds the client12. Also, on another significant point, while counsel is expected to
amply protect the interest of his client, the latter cannot just sit back and await the outcome of the
case.13 As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner should have been vigilant in safeguarding his
rights, considering that he himself is a lawyer. He should have taken the initiative of making the proper
inquiries from his counsel or the trial court as to the status of his case. Failing in which, petitioner only
has himself to blame.
Finally, petitioners asseveration that there was no violation of the respondents right to speedy trial as
both parties mutually agreed to provisionally dismiss the case until full settlement of the obligation
under paragraph 514 of the Compromise Agreement likewise does not persuade.
The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement
thereof,15 is governed by Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived.
Under the afore-cited provision, a case is provisionally dismissed if the following requisites concur:
(a)

The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for its provisional dismissal;
(b
)

The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

(c
)

The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and

(d
)

The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal of the
case.16

In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites were met. While it may appear that the respondents
consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the Compromise Agreement, the prosecution
neither presented the same for the courts approval nor filed the required motion to that effect such that
no order was in fact issued granting the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, petitioners assertion
that the respondents are estopped from invoking their right to speedy trial is without basis.
Accordingly, the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order grounded on the denial of respondents right to
speedy trial being a final order that cannot be subject of reconsideration or an appeal, no error can be
imputed against the CA in upholding the RTC Ruling denying due course to petitioners notice of appeal
relative to the criminal aspect of the case. That being said, the Court reminds petitioner that nothing
precludes him from preserving his interest over the case but only with respect to its civil aspect as aptly
observed by the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2011 and the Resolution dated
August 15, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01102 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 205952, February 11, 2015, ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR., PETITIONER,
VS. ERWIN YERRO, ERICO YERRO AND RITCHIE YERRO, RESPONDENTS.

Rollo, pp. 7-8.

Id. at 9-10.
3
531 Phil. 289 (2006).
4
Id. at 305-306.
5
People v. Asis, G.R. No. 173089, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 250, 256.
6
See Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014.
7
People v. Judge Hernandez, supra note 35, at 317.
8
Julies Franchise Corp. v. Hon. Judge Ruiz, 614 Phil. 108, 116 (2009).
9
Paragraph 3 (d) of the Compromise Agreement states:
3. That the FIRST PARTY in order to buy peace will obligate themselves to perform the following to wit:
xxxx
d) The remaining obligation of P150,000.00 shall be paid according to the terms and conditions of the
promissory note to be executed by the parties therein;
x x x x (CA rollo, p. 17.)
10
See rollo, p. 55.
11
Allied Banking Corp. v. CA, 461 Phil. 517, 539 (2003); Adiong v. CA, 422 Phil. 713, 721 (2001); Caete
Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 374 Phil. 272, 281 (1999).
12
[W]hile it is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client, this rule is not without exception. In
cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel x x x deprives the client of due process of law, or
when the application would result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property, or where the
interest of justice so requires, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers
gross or palpable mistake or negligence. (Multi-Trans Agency Phils. Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp., 608
Phil. 478, 492-493 [2009].)
13
Air Phils. Corp. v. Intl. Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., 481 Phil. 366, 384 (2004).
14
Paragraph 5 of the Compromise Agreement states:
5) That the dismissal of the above entitled case will only be provisional (with the consent of the
accused) until such time that full payment of the total obligation of P362,000.00 be made which the
SECOND PARTY will finally execute an affidavit of desistance for the dismissal of the case. (CA rollo, p.
18)
15
Condrada v. People, 446 Phil. 635, 640 (2003).
16
Los Baos v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229 (2009).
2

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