Tongson Torts Reviewer

A.
Preliminary Considerations
1. Tort Defined
Tort is a private or civil wrong violating the right for which the law provides a remedy
in the form of damages
Elements:
1. Basic duty (Art. 12, NCC)
2. Act or omission violating a right or duty
3. Damage or injury
2. Quasi-delict defined
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of (Title XVII, Chapter 2 of NCC)
Elements:
1. Act or omission committed through negligence or fault
2. Damage or injury caused by such act or omission
3. There is no pre-existing contractual obligation
Essential averments for a quasi-delictual action (Garcia vs. Florido)
1. Act or omission by defendant
2. Presence of fault or negligence, or lack of due care
3. Damages sustained by petitioner
4. Direct causal connection between the damage and fault or negligence
5. Absence of pre-existing contractual obligation
CASES:
Barredo vs. Garcia
Facts
There was an accident between a taxicab
and carretela; a boy riding the carretela
died as a result. His parents filed a
complaint for damages against the owner
of the taxicab.
Issue/Holding
W/N the parents may recover damages
from the owner? YES.
An action can be brought directly against
a person responsible for another, without
including the author of the act; the action
for responsibility of the employer, is in itself
principal action.
Thus, the owner has either subsidiary
liability under the RPC, or principal liability
under the Civil Code. The latter is more
expeditious remedy.
Doctrine
Culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code, with
substantivity of its own, and individuality
that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or a crime. (See: Art. 2177)
Differences between culpa aquiliana and
crimes under the RPC include:
(1) Crimes affect public interest;
quasi-delicts are only of private
concerns;
(2) RPC punishes criminal acts; Civil
Code repairs damages; and,
(3) Crimes are only punishable when
there is a law providing for
punishment for it; quasi-delicts
include all negligent or imprudent
acts or omissions.
However, not all crimes produce civil
liability.
Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER |
Garcia vs. Florido
Garcia rented a public utility car owned

by one of the respondents, and driven by
their driver. It collided with a passenger
bus while it was traversing a highway
which caused injuries to the passengers of
the car.
They filed a complaint for damages
against owners and drivers of the public
utility vehicle and the passenger bus.
Elcano vs. Hill
Reginald Hill, a married minor, who is still

living and dependent to his father, killed
Agapito Elcano. There was a criminal
complaint filed against Reginald, and a
complaint for damages against his father.
He was acquitted of the criminal case,
there being no intention on his part to kill,
being that it was only a mistake.
A motion to dismiss the civil complaint
against the father was filed on the grounds
that: (1) res judicata applies; and (2)
marriage of Reginald has relieved his
father as guardian.
Cinco vs. Canonoy
There was a vehicular accident involving

the petitioners car and a passenger jeep.
He filed a civil complaint for damages
against the driver and the owners of the
W/N civil action may be filed during the

pendency of a criminal action? YES
By the institution of the present civil action
for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case, and
have opted instead to recover them in the
present civil case.
W/N the present civil action was barred by

the acquittal of Reginald? NO.
The acquittal or Reginald has not
extinguished his civil liability. The offended
party may avail of either civil indemnity
through civil liability that comes with the
criminal action or an indemnity in a
separate civil action.
W/N the principle of quasi-delict is
applicable in this case? YES.
Art. 2180 applies because Reginald is still
dependent and subservient to his father.
Emancipation by marriage does not carry
with it the do any act that can give rise to
judicial litigation. Killing gives rise to judicial
action under Art. 399.
W/N there can be an independent civil
action to recover damages during the
pendency of the criminal action? YES.
The same negligent act causing damages

may produce a civil liability arising from
crime or create an action for quasi-delict
or culpa extra-contractual.
Generally, a civil action is deemed
instituted with a criminal action, except
when: (WEF)
1. Waived
2. Expressly reserved right to institute
separate civil action
3. A civil action filed prior to the
criminal action
Filing of separate civil action shall, in
effect, deem the petitioners to have
abandoned their right to press for
recovery for damages in the criminal case
Culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law.
Acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.
It must be borne in mind that, according
to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
and solidary liability of presuncion with
their offending child under Article 2180 is
that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing
damage to third persons.
The jural concept of a quasi-delict is that
of an independent source of obligation
"not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony.
jeep. Subsequently, a criminal complaint

was filed against the driver. A motion to
suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit, invoking
Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of
Court was filed.
Rule 111, Sec. 3(b), ROC was misapplied

providing that civil action shall be
suspended until final determination of the
criminal action. Such refers to civil actions
arising from criminal offenses and not
those arising from quasi-delicts.
Rule 111, Sec. 2, ROC applies instead
which recognizes the separate and
independent civil action for quasi-delicts.
Mandoza vs. Arrieta
There was a 3-way vehicular collision in

which a Mercedes Benz, a passenger
jeep, and a gravel and sand truck were
involved.
Criminal actions were filed against drivers
of the jeep and the truck. For which the
jeepney driver was acquitted and the
truck driver was found guilty (to pay
indemnity to jeepney driver only).
Subsequently, the owner of the MB filed a
civil case against the owners of the
jeepney and the truck.
In this case, the petitioners cause of

action was based on quasi-delict.
W/N the case should prosper despite the
prior judgment in the criminal cases?
A separate civil action based on quasidelict will proceed separately and

independently from the criminal action.
Quasi-delicts apply not only to damages
to persons, but also damages to property.
The word "damage" is used in two
concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done.
WRT the truck driver, YES.

In said criminal case truck driver Montoya
was not prosecuted for damage to
petitioner's car but for damage to the
jeep. Neither was truck owner Timbol a
party in said case.
WRT the jeepney driver, NO.
The basis of the acquittal of
jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal
case is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action
must be held to have been extinguished in
consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court.
W/N petitioner's failure to make a
reservation to file an independent civil
action bars the institution of such separate
civil action? NO.
Garcia vs. Florida doctrine!
3. Culpa aquiliana distinguished from crime

Rule:
Art. 2177. Responsibility from fault or negligence under 2176 is separate and distinct from civil liability arising from negligence under RPC. However, same plaintiff cannot recover
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Distinction: Barredo vs. Garcia doctrine
Dulay vs. CA
Facts
There was an altercation between
Torzuela and Atty. Dulay which happened
in Big Bang sa Alabang. Torzuela was a
security guard on duty at the carnival. He
shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
Atty. Dulays heirs filed complaint for
damages against Torzuela and Safeguard
Investigation and Security Company
and/or Superguard Security Corp, alleged
employer or Torzuela.
Superguard, on their part, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of
his duties, and that since the alleged act
of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability
therefor is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code. The complaint was
based on 2176 which only applies to
quasi-delicts.
Padilla vs. CA
Safeguard, on the other hand, filed motion

for exclusion claiming that Torzuela was
not their employee.
The mayor and some policemen,
petitioners, were charged with grave
coercion following an incident wherein
they violently forced Vergara and his
family (market stall vendors) to close their
stall in the public market.
They were acquitted from grave coercion
Issue/Holding
W/N respondent companies may be held
liable as employers of Torzuela? YES
Elcano vs. Hill: Article 2176, where it refers
to "fault or negligence," covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character; whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores
W/N the petitioners can still be made to

pay civil liability despite the acquittal from
criminal offense? NO.
Doctrine
There is no justification for limiting the
scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to
acts or omissions resulting from negligence
The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such
employee.
Burden of proof: upon the employer to
prove that there was no negligence on
their part in hiring and supervising the
employee.
Civil liability ex delictu (founded on Art.

100, RPC) is only extinguished with the
acquittal if:
1. When it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil might
arise did not exist
Only preponderance of evidence is
but was still made liable to pay for

damages
People vs. Ligon
needed to prove that the plaintiffs are

entitled to civil indemnity.
The acquittal of the defendant in the
criminal case would not constitute an
obstacle to the filing of a civil case based
on the same acts which led to the criminal
prosecution. To hold otherwise would only
clog court dockets and would be a
needless waste of resources for all
involved.
It does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil
liability. While the guilt of the accused in a
criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in
a civil action for damages. The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of
the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.
Ligon pretended to buy a cigarette from a

cigarette vendor while driving the car
owned by the father of his companion,
Gabat while the traffic light was red.
When it turned green, he (the asshole)
sped dragging with him the cigarette
vendor all the way from Lerma St. to Taft!
Bystanders helped the cigarette vendor
and took him to PGH where he
subsequently died a few days later.
Maniago vs. CA
Criminal charge was filed against Ligon for

homicide through reckless imprudence.
Another charge for robbery with homicide
was filed.
Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle
buses which were used in transporting
employees of the Texas Instruments,
(Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its
plant site at the Export Processing
Authority in Loakan, Baguio City.
One of his buses figured in a vehicular
accident with a passenger jeepney
owned by private respondent Alfredo
Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City.
As a result of the accident, a criminal case
for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and multiple physical
injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against
W/N despite the absence of a reservation

of the right to bring a separate civil action,
an action for damages may still be
brought? NO.
Private respondent admits that he did not
reserve the right to institute the present
civil action against Andayas employer.
He contends, however, that the rights
provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code are substantive rights and, as such,
their enforcement cannot be conditioned
on a reservation to bring the action to
enforce them separately. But the Court
The right of the injured party to sue

separately for the recovery of the civil
liability whether arising from crimes (ex
delicto) or from quasi delict under Art.
2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved
otherwise they will be deemed instituted
with the criminal action.
Any award made against the employer,
whether based on his subsidiary civil
liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable
from the accused.
petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the
proceedings in the civil case against him,
citing the pendency of the criminal case
against his driver. TC&CA denied.
Manliclic vs. Calaunan
A Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by PRBLI,

and an owner-type jeep owned by
Calaunan were both bound for Manila.
They collided along NLEX. The bus hit the
left rear portion of the jeep which caused
it to fall down a ditch with water.
Criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with
physical injuries were filed against the
driver of the bus, Manliclic. Civil complaint
was also filed.
Criminal case:
said that the requirement that before a

separate civil action may be brought it
must be reserved does not impair, diminish
or defeat substantive rights, but only
regulates their exercise in the general
interest of orderly procedure. The
requirement is merely procedural in
nature. For that matter the Revised Penal
Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any
person criminally liable is also civilly liable,
gives the offended party the right to bring
a separate civil action.
The cause of action was based on a
quasi-delict. Manliclics acquittal in the
criminal case is irrelevant.
Rule 111, Sec. 2 (b) Extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist.
Above only applies to civil liability arising
from delicts.
Since whatever is recoverable against the

employer is ultimately recoverable by him
from the employee, the policy against
double recovery requires that only one
action be maintained for the same act or
omission whether the action is brought
against the employee or against his
employer.
Rules on extinction of civil liability based

on delict upon acquittal of the accused in
the criminal case:
1. if an accused is acquitted based
on reasonable doubt on his guilt:
his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
2. if an accused is acquitted on the
basis that he was not the author of
the act or omission complained of
(or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not
exist): said acquittal closes the
door to civil liability based on the
crime or ex delicto.
Rules on extinction of civil liability based
on quasi-delict upon acquittal of the
accused in the criminal case:
1. same will not be extinguished by
an acquittal, whether it be on
ground of reasonable doubt or
that accused was not the author
of the act or omission complained
of
2. The responsibility arising from fault
or negligence in a quasi-delict is
ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT
from the civil liability arising from

negligence under the Penal
Code. An acquittal or conviction in
the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
4. Culpa Aquiliana distinguished from culpa contractual; presence of contractual relations

Culpa contractual
Presence of negligence
Incidental, incident to the performance of an obligation already
existing because of a contract (Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf)
Relationship
There is a preexisting obligation (contract, express or implied)
(Rakes)
Proof needed
Preponderance of evidence
What must be proven
Existence if contract and the breach thereof (Cangco v. Manila
Railroad Co.)
Burden of proof
Presumption: if there is a contract and it was not carried out, it is
presumed that the debtor is at fault.
Culpa Aquiliana
Direct, substantive, and independent (Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf)
The vinculum juris (Cangco vs.
No pre-existing obligation (except of course the duty to be careful
in all human actuations). (Rakes Case)
Preponderance of evidence (Barredo vs. Garcia)
Lack of diligence (Cangco)
Victim; because the obligation arises from the alleged negligence
on the part of the defendant. (Cangco)
Debtor has the burden of proof to prove that there was no

negligence in carrying out the terms in the contract. (Cangco)
Defense
Defense of good father of a family in the selection and supervision

of employees is not a proper complete defense in culpa
contractual (though this may MITIGATE damages).
Defense of good father, etc, is a proper and complete defense

(insofar as employers or guardians are concerned) in culpa
acquiliana. (Cangco and De Guia Cases)
Rebuttal of the breach. (Cangco)
Liability
Rationale: unfair; they may no longer be compelled to contractual

obligation if diligence is a defense.
Direct liability as contracting party
Direct liability as employer/guardian

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
Facts
Manila Railroad supplies train passes to
their employees which entitle them to free
rides of the train.
Cangco, one of their employees use the
train everyday to and fro work. He got into
an accident one night when there were
sacks of watermelon on the platform
which caused him to fall from it and be
dragged under the train. Because of that,
his arm was amputated.
Issue/Holding
W/N the respondent railroad company
should be liable for quasi-delict? NO
There is a contract of carriage existing in
this case. It is deemed to exist between a
carrier and passenger.
W/N the defendant should be absolved in
view of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff? NO.
Negligence need not be proven in culpa
contractual. Existence and breach of the
contract is sufficient. Negligence in this
case does not absolve the defendant but
merely mitigates his liability
Del Prado vs. Manila Electric
Plaintiff in this case, tried to catch a car

owned and operated by Manila Electric
across the street. However, the driver of
the car, merely slowed down but did not
stop. Before the plaintiff fully got on board,
the driver sped up which caused him to
fall down and his leg be crushed by the
car. It was later amputated.
W/N the defendant may be held liable for

breach of contract? YES.
The nature of relationship between a
carrier and its passengers is that of a
contract; failure on the part of the carrier
to exercise due care is a breach of duty.
In this case, it was the duty of the driver to
do no act that would increase the peril
that the plaintiff was in while attempting to
board the car.
W/N the liability should be mitigated in
Doctrine
The mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him
from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation
exists, the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes a breach of the contract
would have constituted the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex
contractu, but only to extra-contractual
obligations.
Distinction:
Ex contractu
Quasi delict
Contract and
Plaintiff has the
breach thereof are
burden to prove
sufficient proof to
existence of
establish prima
negligence, if he
facie case of
fails to do so, his
negligence
action fails.
The duty to exercise due care extends to
persons boarding the car and alighting
therefrom.
Distinction:
Ex contractu
The due diligence is
not a valid defense.
Quasi-delict
the employer may
exculpate himself
by proving that he
has exercised due
diligence to
prevent the
damage
view of the contributory negligence of the

plaintiff? YES.
Proximate cause of the injury was the
premature acceleration, and not the act
of the plaintiff. Last clear chance rule
applies.
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
Rakes was a newbie worker of the

defendant company. They were
transporting rails using two rail cars
immediately following another. While
walking beside the cars, the rails slipped
off, catching his leg. It was later
amputated.
W/N the accident happended through

the negligence of the defendant?
Vasquez vs. De Borja
There was a civil complaint for damages

for the breach of contract against
Vasquez and Busuego.
W/N De Borja correctly brought action

against Vasquez? NO.
The contract was to deliver 4000 cavans of

rice to De Borja. A part of it was refused to
be delivered.
Vasquez, merely the acting manager of
Natividad-Vasquez Sabani Development
Co. Inc., with whome De Borja entered
into a contract with, denied being
involved personally in the contract.
The court is given

discretion in
mitigating the
liability according
to circumstances
Court has no
discretion to
mitigate liability
(same end was
reached by SC in
this case the court is
given discretion in
mitigating the
liability according
to circumstances)
Last clear chance rule: the contributory

negligence of the injured party will not
defeat his action if it be shown that the
defendant, might, through the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party.
The responsibility of an employer to his
employee arises out of the contractual
relations between them
Negligence of the injured person
contributing to his injury but not being one
of the determining causes of the principal
accident, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but only in reduction of his
damages. Each party is chargeable with
damages in proportion to his fault.
Since the cause of action is based on
breach of contract, it must be brought
against the party in breach.
Preponderance of evidence shows that

the contract was celebrated by Vasquez
as acting president and manager of the
company, it is, however, insufficient and
invalid to show that he is liable on a
contract duly and lawfully entered by him
on its behalf.
Since it was the corp.'s contract, its nonfulfillment, whether due to negligence or
fault or to any other cause, made the
corporation and not its agent liable.

Air France vs. Carrascoso
Singson vs. BPI
Radio Communications of the Philippines,

Inc. vs. CA
Calalas vs. Sunga
Huang vs. Phil. Hoteliers
Carrascoso travelled to Rome for a pilgrim.

He bought a first class ticket
Person is entitled to recover damages

from the air-carrier, upon the ground of
tort on the latters part, for, although the
relation between a passenger and a
carrier is contractual both in origin and
nature the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort.
Existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a
tort by the one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor
Telegraph corporation, as employer is
liable directly for the acts of its employees;
Action based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, not on subsidiary liability of
corporation under Article 1161, New Civil
Code
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is
the basis of the action, whereas in breach
of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the breach thereof.
In case of death or injuries to passengers,
Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts.
1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier
the burden of proof.
In quasi-delict, negligence is direct,
substantive and independent, while in
breach of contract, negligence is merely
incidental to the performance of the
contractual obligation; there is a preexisting contract or obligation. In quasidelict, the defense of good father of a
family is a complete and proper defense
Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER | 10
insofar as parents, guardians and

employers are concerned, while in breach
of contract, such is not a complete and
proper defense in the selection and
supervision of employees. In quasi-delict,
there is no presumption of negligence and
it is incumbent upon the injured party to
prove the negligence of the defendant,
otherwise, the formers complaint will be
dismissed, while in breach of contract,
negligence is presumed so long as it can
be proved that there was breach of the
contract and the burden is on the
defendant to prove that there was no
negligence in the carrying out of the terms
of the contract; the rule of respondeat
superior is followed.
In an action based on quasi-delict, it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the
presence of the following requisites before
the defendant can be held liable, to wit:
(a) Damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) Fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond;
and
(c) The connection of cause and
effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the
plaintiff
Res ipsa loquitur
A Latin phrase which literally means the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself;
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
where,
(1) The accident was of such
character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have
happened except for the
defendants negligence;
(2) The accident must have been

caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the
person charged with the
negligence complained of; and
(3) The accident must not have been
due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the
person injured.
5. Interference with contracts
Gilchrist vs. Cuddy
Facts
Cuddy rented Gilchrist his film, Zigomar, for
a price but a few days before Gilchrist
could show Zigomar, Cuddy retracted
because he already rented it to another
person, Espejo, for a higher price upon
their urging.
They knew that a contract between
Cuddy and Gilchrist had been but did not
know of the identity of Gilchrist.
Nevertheless, they offered a higher price
to get the film.
Issue/Holding
W/N the appellants are also liable for
interfering with the contract despite not
knowing the identity of one of the
contracting parties? YES.
Contract has been made. There is in the
record not only the positive and detailed
testimony of Gilchrist to this effect, but
there is also a letter of apology from
Cuddy to Gilchrist in which the former
enters into a lengthy explanation of his
reasons for leasing the film to another
party.
Even though Espejo had the right to
compete for the leasing of the film, that
did not give them the right to intentionally
induce Cuddy to take away the
appellees contractual rights.
So Ping Bun vs. CA
There were lease contracts between

DCCSI and Tek Hua Corp. signed through
the efforts of So Pek Giok as the managing
director of Tek Hua Corp. for DCCSIs
warehouse spaces. Years passed, Tek Hua
Corp. dissolved and was reformed as Tek
W/N So Ping Bun was guilty of violation of

tortuous interference of contract? YES.
Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to
execute a contract in its favor depriving
THE of its property rights and as a result
Doctrine
If the disturbance or loss come as a result
of competition, or in the exercise (of the
right to competition), it is loss without injury
(damnum absque injuria), unless some
superior right by contract or otherwise is
interfered with.
Liability from interfering with a contract
arises from malice.
Sufficient justification for interference with
plaintiff's right must be an equal or superior
right in themselves, and that no one can
legally excuse himself to a man, of whose
contract he has procured the breach, on
the ground that he acted on a wrong
understanding of his own rights, or without
malice, or bona fide, or in the best
interests of himself, or even that he acted
as an altruist, seeking only good of
another and careless of his own
advantage."
Requisites for liability for a nontrespassory
invasion of anothers interest in the private
use and enjoyment of asset:
1. The other has property rights and
privileges with respect to the use or
enjoyment interfered with,
Hua Enterprises.
When So Pek Giok died, his grandson, So
Ping Bun occupied the warehouse for his
own textile business.
Subsequently, DCCSI sent THE a new lease
contract with reservation that nonaccomplishment shall be deemed as noninterest to renew. THE did not respond but
the contract remained unrescinded.
They asked So Ping Bun later to vacate but
So Ping Bun refused and even signed a
new contract with DCCSI.
Injunction.
Lagon vs. CA
Lagon purchased two lots from the

intestate estate of Bai Tonina Sepi. Lapuz
filed a complaint for damages against
Lapuz for inducing the heirs of CTS to sell to
him despite his leasehold rights over the
property.
petitioner deprived respondent

corporation of the latters property right.
Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the
appellate court, the three elements of
tortous interference are present in the
instant case.
W/N So Ping Bun should be liable for
damages? NO.
The business desire is there to make some
gain to the detriment of the contracting
parties. Lack of malice, however,
precludes damages. But it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering
into contracts and causing breach of
existing ones.
W/N Lagon committed tortuous

interference of contract? NO.
Based on the facts surrounding the case,
Lagon conducted his own sufficient
investigation on the property he bought
which roused no suspicions on his part.
Moreover, he did not induce the heirs of
BTS to sell to him.
2. The invasion is substantial,

3. The defendants conduct is a legal
cause of the invasion, and
4. The invasion is either intentional
and unreasonable or unintentional
and actionable under general
negligence rules.
Elements of tortous interference:
1. Existence of a valid contract;
2. Knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of
contract; and
3. Interference of the third person is
without legal justification or excuse.
Unlawful interference of a person to the
enjoyment of another of his own property
may give rise to a tort.
Actual knowledge of the existence of
contract is not necessary. What is needed
is awareness of facts that would lead to
disclosure of contractual relations if
followed by reasonable inquiry.
Damnum absque injuria when there is a
legal invasion of a legal right, lack of
malice precludes claim for damages.
B. Negligence
1. Concept
Both a name of tort cause of action and a term given to conduct which falls
below the standard which the law requires.
Elements of Negligent Cause of Action
1. Duty by the defendant to act or refrain from acting
2. A breach of that duty by failure to conform his conduct to the required
standard
3. A sufficient causal connection between negligent conduct and the plaintiffs
injury
4. Actual harm, measurable and compensable in money damages
Test for Negligence
The test for negligence should be objective.
Whether the defendants conduct was that of a hypothetical, reasonably
prudent person placed in the same or similar circumstances (Kionka v.
Blackletter)
Gan vs. CA
Professional Services vs. Agana (2007)
Facts
Hedy Gan was driving her car along
Tondo, Manila, when a car from the other
lane driving the opposite direction
overtook the car in front of it. In her effort
to avoid the car, she swerved her car to
the right hitting and pinning an old man
about to cross the street against a jeep. A
truck was also damaged.
She was charged with homicide through
reckless imprudence in the TC for which
she was convicted. It was, however,
modified in the CA to homicide through
simple imprudence.
Dr. Ampil, at Medical City General
Hospital, conducted surgery on Natividad
Agana due to cancer of the sigmoid.
During surgery, it was found out that the
cancer had spread through her ovaries so
parts of it needed to be removed. He
asked for the help of Dr. Fuentes to
Standard of Care
Art. 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
(1104a)
The defendant is held to the standard of reasonable or normal person. As opposed to
when the defendant chooses to engage in an activity requiring learned skills or
certain knowledge, his conduct is measured to the hypothetical person who is
reasonably skilled and knowledgeable in that activity.
The reasonable standard is sometimes called the ordinary care or due care under
the circumstances. The law does not require a person to be perfect but only to
behave as a reasonably prudent person would behave.
Issue/Holding
W/N she was imprudent in the said act
causing the death of the old man? NO.
The Court applied the emergency rule.
Hedy Gan was in danger, herself, so she
could not have time for rational thinking to
hit on the brakes instead of swerving. It
was also not through her own negligence,
but from the negligence of the car which
overtook the car in front of it.
W/N Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence and

malpractice? YES
Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the
duty to remove all foreign objects, such as
gauzes, from Natividads body before
closure of the incision. When he failed to
Doctrine
Emergency Rule: "Under that rule, one
who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in
which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence."
Elements of medical malpractice:

1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate causation
res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks
conduct a hysterectomy on her.

When he was done operating, he left the
room. Dr. Agana closed up the wound
despite announcement of the nurses that
several sponges and gauzes were missing.
She went back to Dr. Ampil because of
pains but the doctor dismissed this saying
that such was a normal consequence to
the surgery. Her daughter later found a
gauze protruding from her vagina which
cause it to be infected.
The spouses then filed a case before the
RTC against the petitioner, owner of
MCGH, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes for
medical malpractice. They also filed for
medical malpractice against the doctors
before the PRC.
do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad

about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties.
Such breach caused injury to Natividad,
necessitating her further examination by
American doctors and another surgery.
That Dr. Ampils negligence is the
proximate cause of Natividads injury
could be traced from his act of closing the
incision despite the information given by
the attending nurses that two pieces of
gauze were still missing.
W/N Dr. Fuentes is also liable? NO.
Res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Dr.
Fuentes was not the lead surgeon in this
case and merely rendered assistance to
Dr. Ampil who examined his work. He also
left the room immediately upon finishing
wherein Dr. Ampil resumed with the
operation.
W/N PSI is liable for the negligence of Dr.
Ampil? YES.
PSI failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the accreditation and
supervision of the latter.
Cantre vs. Go
Nora Go gave birth at Jesus Delgado

Memorial Hospital. During the delivery, she
suffered in profuse bleeding which caused
her BP to drop very low. The attending
doctor ordered a droplight to be placed
to warm her and the baby.
PSIs liability is traceable to its failure to

conduct an investigation of the matter
reported in the nota bene of the count
nurse. Such failure established PSIs part in
the dark conspiracy of silence and
concealment about the gauzes.
W/N the petitioner is liable for the injury
suffered by respondent Nora Go? YES.
for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the

occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima
facie case, and present a question of fact
for defendant to meet with an
explanation.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive
law, hence, does not per se create or
constitute an independent or separate
ground of liability, being a mere
evidentiary rule.
Requisites of res ipsa loquitur
1. The occurrence of an injury;
2. The thing which caused the injury
was under the control and
management of the defendant;
(most important)
3. The occurrence was such that in
the ordinary course of things,
would not have happened if those
who had control or management
used proper care; and
4. The absence of explanation by the
defendant.
Captain of the ship rule: the operating
surgeon is the person in complete charge
of the surgery room and all personnel
connected with the operation.
The gaping wound on the arm of

respondent Nora Go was not an ordinary
occurrence in the delivery of a baby.
After the delivery, her husband noticed a

gaping wound on her arm. This wound
greatly affected her life even after months
from the delivery.
Mercury Drug vs. Baking
They filed a complaint for damages

against the hospital, the attending doctor,
Cantre, and Dr. Abad.
Baking was prescribed by his doctor with a
drug named Diamicron to lower his blood
sugar. He went to Mercury Drug to buy the
said medicine. The pharmacist misread
the prescription and gave him Dormicum
instead, which is a very potent sleeping
pill.
Unaware, he took one pill for three
consecutive days. On the third day he
took the medicine, he got into a vehicular
accident. He fell asleep while driving. He
could not remember anything about the
accident not felt anything. Suspecting that
it was the drug prescribed to him that
caused his mental state at the time of the
accident, he went back to his doctor
where he found out that he had been
taking a different drug.
He filed complaint against Mercury Drug.
Whether the injury was caused by the

droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of
no moment. Both instruments are deemed
within petitioners exclusive control, as the
senior consultant in charge, under the
"captain of the ship" doctrine. There was
also no contributory negligence on the
part of Nora because she was
unconscious at that time.
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if
so, whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of respondent's
accident? YES.
The employee was negligent in selling to
respondent Dormicum instead of the
prescribed Diamicron. The accident was
also not caused by the respondents
negligence in driving his car. The vehicular
accident could not have occurred had
petitioner's employee been careful in
reading Dr. Sy's prescription.
The care required must be commensurate

with the danger involved, and the skill
employed must correspond with the
superior knowledge of the business which
the law demands.
Drugstores are imbued with public interest.
They shall exercise the highest form of
diligence in the exercise of the duties.
Health and safety of people are at stake
for their negligence.
Petitioner is liable for the damages caused

by the negligent employee. When an
injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there has been
negligence on the part of the employer,
either in the selection of his employee or in
the supervision over him, after such
selection. The presumption, however,
may be rebutted by a clear showing on
the part of the employer that he has
exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee.
Petitioner's failed to prove that it exercised
the due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its
employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.
2. Persons liable
i.
Tortfeasor, for his own acts
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
(1904)
Parents
Art. 211, FC. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are
obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)
Art. 231, FC. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also
suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.
ii.
Persons liable for the acts of others
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted
from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the
court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other
measures as may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in
a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the
cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)
Art. 236, FC. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the
person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all
acts of civil life. (412a)
Father and mother have the joint exercise of parental authority over the child
so the father is no longer primarily liable. They could be jointly sued.
However, the liability only attaches when the child lives with his parents
whether he is in their domicile or lives in some other place temporarily.
o If so, the liability of the parents depend on the reason for separation.
o If unjustifiable, parents have the liability
o If for just cause, not anymore.
For illegitimate children, only the father is liable for negligence.
Libi vs. IAC
Facts
Wendell Libi and Julie Ann Gotiong were
sweethearts who broke up because of
Wendells sadistic and irresponsible
behavior. Wendell tried to reconcile and
even resorted to threats. They were later
found dead on the Gotiongs house with a
gun issued to Wendells father. There were
no eyewitnesses.
Gotiongs claim that Wendell killed Julie
Ann and then committed suicide, while
Libis said that it could be third parties who
had a grudge against Wendell as an
informer of PC Officers,
Gotiongs filed complaint for damages
against the Libis.
Issue/Holding
W/N the parents of Wendell Libi are liable
under 2180? YES.
Based on the facts surrounding the case,
the parents of Wendell were both
negligent in supervising their minor child.
They did not safely lock the gun as
Wendell even knew that the key to the
lock was in his mothers bag.
Negligence was also given away by the
fact that they did not even know that he
was an informer to PC officers and that he
had the gun for a long time already to
keep up with the role of being an agent.
The diligence of a good father of a family
required by law in a parent and child
relationship consists, to a large extent, of
the instruction and supervision of the child.
Exconde vs. Capuno
Dante Capuno was a boyscout who

attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose
Rizal. Upon the instruction of the school
supervisor, they boarded a jeep.
He took the wheel of the jeep while the
supposed driver sat on his left side. They
have not gone far yet when the jeep
turned turtle causing the death of two of
its passengers.
He was charged of homicide through
reckless imprudence for which he was
found guilty of. The mother of one of the
deceased filed a separate claim for
damages against his father, who did not
even know that Dante attended the
W/N Delfin could be held civilly liable,

jointly and severally with Dante? YES.
Doctrine
The parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their
minor children under their legal authority
or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted
with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages.
That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the RPC with
respect to damages ex delicto caused by
the minor, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the
enforcement of such liability shall be
effected against the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother.
However, under the Family Code, this civil
liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental
authority over the minor offender.
2180 applies only to establishments of arts
and trades.
Civil liability of the parents is a
consequence of the parental authority
they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the duty of supporting
them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means, while, on the
other hand, gives them the right to
correct and punish them in moderation.
Fuellas vs. Cadano
parade.
Rico took the pencil of another classmate
and placed it surreptitiously inside the
pocket of Pepito. When the classmate
looked for it, Pepito returned it. That
angered Rico so he held the neck of
Pepito and pushed him to the floor. They
were separated by their teacher and were
told to go home. So they left. Rico, still
angry, approached Pepito just when he
just gone down from the schoolhouse. A
classmate saw them so he told them to
shake hands. Pepito extended his hand
but Rico held Pepito by the neck and by
his leg, threw him out of balance. He then
rode Pepito on his left side. Pepito cried
out that his arm was broken and thats
when Rico left.
Criminal case was filed against Rico as
well as a civil case for damages against his
father.
Cuadra vs. Monfort
Cuadra and Monfort were classmates and

friends who were assigned to weed the
school grounds. Monfort playfully threw a
headband which she found at Cuadra
which hit her eye. Cuadra rubbed her eye
and put powder on it to lessen the pain. It
subsequently became blind.
Civil suit for damages was filed against the
father of Monfort.
W/N Agapito should be held liable under

2180 for the deliberate criminal intent of his
son? YES.
This is not respondeat superior, but pater
familias which bases the liability of the
father ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his minor son, and that
if an injury is caused by the fault or
negligence of his minor son, the law
presumes that there was negligence on
the part of his father.
W/N Art. 101, RPC should apply instead?
NO.
2180 governs. To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which
arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations
which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the
father or mother may stand subsidiarily
liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.
W/N the parent could be held liable for
the act of his child under certain
circumstances? YES.
There is nothing from which it may be
inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance
of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such
damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school,
where it was his duty to send her and
where she was, as he had the right to
Burden of proof rests on the defendant to

prove that there was no negligence.
Degree of diligence of a good father of a
family
The basis of this vicarious, although
primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault
or negligence, which is presumed from
that which accompanied the causative
act or omission. The presumption is merely
prima facie and may therefore be
rebutted. This is the clear and logical
inference that may be drawn from the last
Rodriguez-Luna vs. IAC
Deceased in this case was driving a gokart in Greenhills when a Toyota car driven
by Luis dela Rosa, unlicensed 13 year old,
intruded into the track causing an
accident.
Heirs of Luna instituted a suit for damages
against Luis and his father.
expect her to be, under the care and

supervision of the teacher. And as far as
the act which caused the injury was
concerned, it was an innocent prank not
unusual among children at play and
which no parent, however careful, would
have any special reason to anticipate
much less guard against. Nor did it reveal
any mischievous propensity, or indeed any
trait in the child's character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and
for which the blame could be attributed to
her parents.
Elcano vs. Hill doctrine not applicable
based on equity. Luis does not have
property in the Philippines of elsewhere to
pay for damages.
paragraph of Article 2180, which states

"that the responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage."
As for the ruling of the CA that Luna was

engaged in racing as a sport, so he it
cannot be expected for him to have a
long lifespan, thus lowering the award for
damages, SC said go-kart racing is not a
dangerous sport.
Guardians
Employers
a. Employer-employee relationship must be established
a.1. Doctrine of apparent authority
a.2. Registered vs. Actual owner of vehicle
b. Acting within the scope of assigned tasks
Facts
Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co.
Moises Cuison was on his way to school
when large pieces of lumber fell from a
truck owned by Ora and rented by Norton
and Harrison Co. The accident caused
Moises instant death.
Ora was not only the owner of the truck,
he was also employed by Norton as a
foreman, directing the transportation and
Issue/Holding
Based on testimonial evidence, Ora is both
an employee and a contractor at the
same time.
Doctrine
Under the civil law an employer is only
liable for the negligence of his employees
in the discharge of their respective duties.
He is a contractor in the sense that he had

a verbal agreement with Norton for the
transportation of lumber from Nortons
lumber yard to the place of its destination.
The chauffer and the two helpers were
The basis of civil law liability is not

respondeat superior but the relationship of
pater familias. This theory bases the
liability of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
China Airlines vs. CA
loading of lumber on the truck.
also his direct employees.
Moises father instituted a civil complaint

for damages against the respondents.
While he is a contractor, he cannot be

considered as an independent contractor,
since he is, at the same time, at the
employ of Norton. He is a foreman who is
tasked by Norton to transport the lumber.
Norton retained the power of directing
and controlling the work.
Jose Pagsibigan was the VP of Rentokil. He

bought a ticket for Manila-Taipei-HK-Mnl
flight of China Airlines from Transaire Travel
Agency. He was issued a ticket where it
was indicated that his departure time
would be at 5:20PM.
When he arrived on the day of his flight in
the airport an hour before his plane
supposedly takes off, he was informed that
his plane had left at 10:20AM that same
day.
Universal Aquarius Inc. vs. QC Human

Resources Management Corp.
He filed complaint for damages against

the airlines allegedly for the business
damages he incurred from not being able
to take his supposed flight.
Defendants employees had been
temporarily supplied to plaintiff Universal.
These employees then staged a strike,
picketing, barricading, obstructing the
plants exit and entry points, intercepting
trucks, and disrupting Universals business.
Universal and plaintiff Tan, proprietor of the
adjoining chemical depot, both sought
damages against defendant.
Here, there was negligence while Ora was

performing his duty. Thus, it follows that
Norton, being the employer, is liable.
Pagsibigan pursued two causes of action:
Breach of contract of transportation by
CAL and the recovery for tort from PAL
and Espiritu.
CAL was absolved from civil liability for tort
for not being the employer of either PAL or
Espiritu. For 2180 to apply, ER-EE
relationship must be existent.
However, 2177 proscribes double

recovery. To avoid inequitable effects
under such confluence of remedies, the
true nature of the action instituted by
respondent Pagsibigan was determined
(for tort)
For 2180 to apply, ER-EE relationship must
be existent.
PAL, on the other hand, was liable for not

being able to rebut the disputable
presumption of negligence in hiring and
supervising Espiritu.
Espiritu was negligent. Despite lack of
malice, he was still held civilly liable.
The Court found that defendant was liable
to Universal for damages, based on
breach of contract. It was evident that
plaintiff Universal had a valid contract that
employed defendants workers, and that
there had been breach in defendant
providing workers that were unfit and
maladjusted.
Defendant however was not liable to Tan
under Art. 2180, because an employer
only incurs liability for his employees
tortious conduct if the employee performs
An employer's liability for acts of its

employees attaches only when the
tortious conduct of the employee relates
to, or is in the course of, his employment.
The question then is whether, at the time of
the damage or injury, the employee is
engaged in the affairs or concerns of the
employer or, independently, in that of his
own.
The employer may not be held liable to
third parties for acts carried out by the
employees on their own, beyond the
these acts or omissions within the scope of

his employment. The Court ruled that
defendants employees were acting on
their own, beyond the scope of their
employment, when they staged the strike.
Thus, though there is liability to Universal for
breach of contract, no liability can be
imputed to defendant based on quasidelict.
Ortaliz vs. Echarri
Mendoza vs. Soriano
Sonny Soriano jaywalked along

Commonwealth Avenue. A Tamara FX,
drive by Macasasa, hit him. Macasasa
merely left the scene.
A criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide against Macasasa,
AND a civil case for damages against
Flordeliza Mendoza, registered owner of
the FX were filed.
Mendoza, as owner and employer, is

directly and separately civilly liable for her
failure to exercise due diligence in
supervising Macasasa. The Court
emphasized that this damage suit is for the
quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and
employer, and not for
the delict of Macasasa, as driver and
employee.
The driver in this case had two traffic
violations: overspeeding and not helping
the victim.
Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. CA
An MMTC bus and a PUJ ridden by Nenita

Custodio collided at an intersection in
Bicutan. Both vehicles were driving at a
fast clip and did not slow down while
approaching the intersection. Because of
the impact, Nenita Custodio was thrown
out of the vehicle and suffered serious
physical injuries.
A complaint for damages was filed by
private respondent, who being then a
minor was assisted by her parents, against
all of the defendants following their refusal
to pay the expenses incurred by the
former as a result of the collision.
Petitioner's attempt to prove its

diligentissimi patris familias in the selection
and supervision of employees through oral
evidence must fail as it was unable to
buttress the same with any other
evidence, object or documentary, which
might obviate the apparent biased nature
of the testimony.
scope of employment.
Employers need not be engaged in any

business or industry to be liable for the
damages caused by employees who act
within the scope of their assigned tasks.
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person
driving a motor vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating traffic regulations
When the plaintiff's own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded.
Art. 2180 is applicable only where there is
an employer-employee relationship.
Whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, the employer under Article 2180 is
liable for torts committed by his employees
within the scope of their assigned tasks.
The diligence of a good father of a family
required to be observed by employers to
prevent damages under Article 2180 refers
to due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees in order to
protect the public.
Due diligence in the supervision of
employees includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the

guidance of employees and the issuance
of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through
his or its employees, and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon
employees in case of breach or as may
be warranted to ensure the performance
of acts indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer. Actual
implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the
employer x x x .
Belizar vs. Brazas
Petitioner filed a complaint against

defendants in their capacity as employees
of the Bureau of Public Highways. Belizar
was operating the Samar Express Transit
when one of his auto-trucks fell into Taft
River, Taft, Samar while being transported
and was submerged in water for over 30
hours. Allegedly, this was because of the
defendants gross negligence in not
providing the ferry boat with safety
devices. The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that there was no
cause of action and that they are not the
real parties in interest.
W/N the liability of the employer

extinguishes the liability of the employee?
NO.
In the present case, although the duties
and positions of the defendants are
indicated, it does not necessarily mean
that they are being sued in their official
capacities, especially as the present
action is not one against the Government.
In order that the defense of due diligence

in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and
plausible, it is not enough to emptily
invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. "It is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that in recruiting and
employing the erring driver, the
recruitment procedures and company
policies on efficiency and safety were
followed."
Petitioner Belizar was suing the defendants
personally for their negligent acts under
quasi-delict. Article 2180 provides for the
liability of an employer for the tortious acts
of his employees. However, employees
can also be personally liable if there are
no persons having direct supervision over
them, or if it is proved that there is
negligence on their part. The injured party
can bring an action directly against the
author of the negligent act or omission,
although he may sue as joint defendants
such author and the person responsible for
him.
YHT Realty Corp vs. CA
McLoughlin was a philanthropist who

frequented the Philippines for business. He
used to stay at Sheraton Hotel, but upon
the urging of his new found friend, Tan, he
transferred to Tropicana Copacabana
Apartment Hotel.
Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel
has a security deposit box which can only
be opened by the renter with a key given
to him after a staff opens another lock.
He went to Hongkong for a short trip
where he found some missing money from
the envelope he took from the security
deposit box. He ignored it thinking it was
only a lapse in accounting.
When he came back the following year,
he still rented a SDB. When he opened it,
he noticed that some of his money was
gone again. Tan admitted it was her who
stole from the SDB by stealing his key.
He filed complaint for damages.
SC pointed out that they were not

impressed with the argument of the
petitioners that the findings of the TC and
CA of gross negligence on their part was
not supported by evidence. It was clear
from the foregoing that the opening of the
safety deposit box requires 2 keys one,
the registered guests, and two, the hotel
managements. If the guest wants to open
his safety deposit box, he would have to
ask for assistance from the management.
This proves to say that without the
acquiescence of the employees of
Tropicana, the safety deposit box wouldnt
have been opened by Tan, and
McLoughlins money wouldnt have been
lost.
Not only that, the employees even
admitted that they assisted Tan to open
McLoughlins safety deposit box three
times! Three times and they did not even
notify McLoughlin of what transpired. They
claim that based on the acts of
McLoughlin, being intimate with Tan, they
were made to believe that she was his
wife. However, the Court said that without
the express showing by McLoughlin that
she was his wife. This will not exculpate
them from the liability that arose from the
employees negligence. In fact, Tans acts
should have raised their suspicion and
should have prompted them to conduct
an investigation as to the relationship
between her and McLoughlin considering
that she opened the safety deposit box
during the times he was asleep.
The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from

responsibility by posting notices to the
effect that he is not liable for the articles
brought by the guest. Any stipulation
between the hotel-keeper and the guest
whereby the responsibility of the former as
set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is
suppressed or diminished shall be void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New
Civil Code as an expression of public
policy precisely to apply to situations such
as that presented in this case. The hotel
business like the common carriers business
is imbued with public interest. Catering to
the public, hotelkeepers are bound to
provide not only lodging for hotel guests
and security to their persons and
belongings. The twin duty constitutes the
essence of the business. The law in turn
does not allow such duty to the public to
be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called undertakings that
ordinarily appear in prepared forms
imposed by hotel keepers on guests for
their signature.
Art. 1170 of the NCC provides that those

who, in the performance of their
obligation, is guilty of negligence, shall be
liable for damages. Art. 2180 (4), on the
other hand, provides for the liability of
Pilipinas Petroleum Corp. vs. CA
Camacho owns a gas station in Baguio.

They requested a hydro-pressure test to be
conducted to determine whether there
were leakages on the underground tanks.
They sent Feliciano to do the job. When
they opened the gas station the following
day, customers came back complaining
that the gas they bought were
contaminated with water. Camacho filed
complaint for damages against Petron.
FGU Insurance Corp. vs. CA
Two vehicles figured in a traffic accident in

EDSA, Mandaluyong. The first car, owned
by Lydia F. Soriano, was being driven at
the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin
Jacildone, while the second car, owned
by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc.
(FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen
(a Danish tourist), as lessee, was at the
center lane, left of the other vehicle.
As a consequence, petitioner FGU
Insurance Corporation, in view of its
insurance contract with Soriano, paid the
latter P25,382.20
By way of subrogation, FGU sued DahlJensen, FILCAR and Fortune Insurance
owners and managers of establishments

for damages caused by their employees
in service of the branches in which they
are employed or on the occasion of their
function. Given the fact that the loss of
McLoughlins money was attributable to
the negligence of the employees of
Tropicana, in allowing Tan to open the
safety deposit box, YHT, as the owner and
operator of Tropicana and the assisting
employees should be held solidarily liable
under Art. 2193.
Shell is not liable for damages since
Feliciano was not their employee. He was
hired by Shell as an independent
contractor who is responsible for his own
acts and omissions.
W/N an action based on quasidelict could prosper against a rent-a-car

company and its insurer for fault or
negligence of the car lessee in driving the
rented vehicle? NO
FILCAR was not negligent in this case. The
lessee was the sole negligent agent
having swerved the car to the left even
though he was at the center lane. FILCAR
being engaged in a rent-a-car business
was only the owner of the car leased to
Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was
no vinculum juris between them as
employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible
Well-settled rule that an employeremployee relationship must exist before

an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee. Also settled is
that the existence of an employeremployee relationship is determined by
these factors:
1. the manner of selection and
engagement of the putative
employee
2. the mode of payment of wages
the presence or absence of a power to
control the putative employees conduct
(most important element)
2184 "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have by the
use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortuneIf the owner was not in the
motor vehicle, the provisions of article
2180 are applicable."
^does not apply to the case because
there was no master-driver relationship.
NPC vs. CA
Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana (2008,

2010)
Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR

for quasi-delict
There were four dump trucks owned by
NAPOCOR that were headed to Iligan
City. On the way there, one of it collided
with a Tamaraw FX causing death of 3
people and injuries to 17 others.
for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the

former not being an employer of the latter.
PHESCO was only engaged in labor-only
contracting and as such, it is considered
merely an agent of the NAPOCOR. Thus,
the employer-employee relationship was
between NAPOCOR and Ilumba.
Heirs of the victims filed complaint against

NPC and PHESCO, allegedly the owner f
the trucks.
NPCs liability is direct, primary and solidary

with PHESCO and the driver. NPC,
however, would still have recourse against
PHESCO and the driver.
1. PSI contends that there was no EREE-R because Dr. Ampil was merely
a consultant.
Ramos vs. CA: "for purposes of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee
relationship exists between hospitals and
their consultants."
2008 case: PSI assails the decision holding

it jointly and severally liable with Dr. Ampil
for damages suffered by Natividad when
Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes neglected to
remove from her body two gauzes used in
her surgery.
2007 ruling:
1. there is an employer-employee
relationship between Medical City
and Dr. Ampil. The Court relied on
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, holding
that for the purpose of
apportioning responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in
effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting
physicians;
2. PSIs act of publicly displaying in
the lobby of the Medical City the
names and specializations of its
accredited physicians, including
Dr. Ampil, estopped it from denying
the existence of an employeremployee relationship between
them under the doctrine of
ostensible agency or agency by
estoppel
3. PSIs failure to supervise Dr. Ampil
and its resident physicians and
Doctrine of apparent authority, the

question is whether the principal has by his
voluntary act placed the agent in such a
situation that a person of ordinary
prudence, conversant with business
usages and the nature of the particular
business, is justified in presuming that such
agent has authority to perform the
particular act in question.
2. Ostensible agency or agency by

estoppel does not apply.
By accrediting Dr. Ampil and advertising
his qualifications, PSI created the public
impression that he was its agent.
3. Doctrine of corporate negligence
was misplaced.
PSI was bound by its duty to provide
comprehensive medical services to
Natividad Agana, to exercise reasonable
care to protect her from harm, to oversee
or supervise all persons who practiced
medicine within its walls, and to take
active steps in fixing any form of
negligence committed within its premises
PSI committed a serious breach of its
corporate duty when it failed to conduct
an immediate investigation into the
reported missing gauzes.
Casumpang vs. Cortejo
nurses and to take an active step

in order to remedy their
negligence rendered it directly
liable under the doctrine of
corporate negligence.
2010 Case: second motion for
reconsideration averring that:
1. The declaration in the 31 January
2007 Decision vis-a-vis the 11
February 2009 Resolution that the
ruling in Ramos vs. Court of
Appeals that "an employeremployee relations exists between
hospital and their consultants" stays
should be set aside for being
inconsistent with or contrary to the
import of the resolution granting
the hospital's motion for
reconsideration in Ramos vs. Court
of Appeals which is applicable to
PSI since the Aganas failed to
prove an employer-employee
relationship between PSI and Dr.
Ampil and PSI proved that it has no
control over Dr. Ampil.
2. Respondents Aganas did not select
Medical City Hospital (PSI) to
provide medical care because of
any apparent authority of Dr.
Miguel Ampil as its agent since the
latter was chosen primarily and
specifically based on his
qualifications and being friend and
neighbor.
3. PSI cannot be liable under doctrine
of corporate negligence since the
proximate cause of Mrs. Agana's
injury was the negligence of Dr.
Ampil, which is an element of the
principle of corporate negligence.
Cortejo brought her 11 year old son,
Edmer, to San Juan De Dios Hospital.
W/N a hospital may be held liable for the

negligence of physicians-consultants
allowed to practice in its premises? YES
Not under respondeat superior. The control
test is applicable. Control as a
determinative factor in testing the
employer-employee relationship between
doctor and hospital is a requisite fact to be
established by preponderance of
evidence. Here, there was insufficient
evidence that PSI exercised the power of
control or wielded such power over the
means and the details of the specific
process by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills
in the treatment of Natividad.
PSI, however, is liable under ostensible
agency by virtually reinforcing the public
impression that Dr. Ampil was a physician
of its hospital, rather than one
independently practicing in it; that the
medications and treatments he prescribed
were necessary and desirable; and that
the hospital staff was prepared to carry
them out.
PSI is also liable, pro hac vice (for or on
this occasion only), under the principle of
corporate negligence for its failure to
perform its duties as a hospital
Whether Dr. Casumpang was negligent

and whether SJDH was solidarily liable. YES
A hospital can be held vicariously liable for

the negligent acts of a physician (or an
Edmer was diagnosed by a Dr Livelo with

bronchopneumonia. Edmer's blood was
also taken for testing, typing, and for
purposes of administering antibiotics.
Afterwards, Dr. Livelo gave Edmer an
antibiotic medication to lessen his fever
and to loosen his phlegm. Mrs. Cortejo did
not know any doctor at SJDH. She used
her Fortune Care card and was referred to
an accredited Fortune Care coordinator,
who was then out of town. She was
thereafter assigned to Dr. Noel
Casumpang, a pediatrician also
accredited with Fortune Care. Using only a
stethoscope, Dr. Casumpang confirmed
the diagnosis. Cortejo then reported to Dr.
Casumpang that Edmer were
experiencing fever, throat irritation, as well
as chest and stomach pains. However, Dr.
Casumpang merely inquired if Edmer has
asthma and reaffirmed Cortejo that her
son has bronchopneumonia. Bothered
with the actions of the doctor, Cortejo
sought another doctor's opinion. She went
to Dr. Sanga-Miranda. Dr Sanga's
diagnosis and tests revealed that Edmer
has stage 4 dengue fever. Edmer was
transferred to Makati medical center
where he died.
Mendoza vs. Sps. Gomez
A truck, owned by the Sps. Gomez, and a

bus, owned by Lim and being
driven by Mendoza, figured in an
accident. The bus was going the opposite
direction of the truck when it intruded the
Dr. Casumpang selectively appreciated

Edmers symptoms. He casually ignored
the pieces of information that pointed
towards dengue and clung to his
diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, even
despite Mrs. Cortejos expressed doubts.
He also began testing procedures and the
proper medical management too late.
Due to Dr. Casumpangs failure to timely
diagnose Edmer with dengue, the latter
was not given immediate proper
treatment. Even after he had discovered
the real illness, he still failed to promptly
perform the standard medical procedure.
Dr. Sanga was not negligent. She
extended diligent care to Edmer. When
she suspected Edmer could be suffering
from dengue fever, she wasted no time in
conducting the necessary procedures,
which led to the dengue finding.
The doctors were mere independent
contractors of SJDH, as there is no
evidence showing that SJDH exercised
any degree of control over the means,
methods of procedure and manner by
which the doctors conducted and
performed their medical profession.
SJDH impliedly clothed Dr. Casumpang
with apparent authority leading Cortejo to
believe that he is an employee or agent of
the hospital. It cannot now disclaim liability
since there is no showing that the spouses
Cortejo knew, or should have known, that
Dr. Casumpang is only an independent
contractor of the hospital. In this case,
estoppel has already set in.
In Filcar Transport Services vs. Espinas, the
Court said that the registered owner is
deemed the employer of the negligent
driver, and is thus vicariously liable under
Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180.
independent contractor) providing care

at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove
these two factors: first, the hospitals
manifestations; and second, the patients
reliance.
Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA
De Leon Brokerage Co. Inc. vs. CA
lane occupied by the truck, causing the

collision. Several people were injured and
the truck was damaged. The Sps. Gomez
filed for damages against Mendoza and
Lim. It was being argued that while the bus
was registered under the name of Lim, the
true owner of the bus was a certain SP01
Enriquez.
A jeep owned by petitioner school struck
and injured an 82-year-old retired
schoolteacher, Potenciano Kapunan, Sr.
The authorized driver was Allan Masa, but
Daniel Funtecha, an employee of the
school who only had a students permit,
was allowed to drive it then. Kapunan
commenced a civil action for damages
against Filamer, Funtecha, and Agustin
Masa, president and director of Filamer.
Petitioners cargo truck, driven recklessly

by Augusto Luna, collided with a jeepney
in which respondent Angeline Steen was a
passenger. She filed to recover damages
from both Luna and petitioner.
Additionally, in Erezo v. Jepte, the Court

explained that the main aim of motor
vehicle registration is to identify the owner
so that if any accident happens, or that
any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicles on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a
definite individual, the registered owner.
In the 1990 decision, the Court relied on
the IRR of the Labor Code, which stated
that working students do not have an
employer-employee relationship with the
school. It thus held that Funtecha was not
in such a relationship with the school.
Kapunans heirs appeal, and the Court
reversed itself in this 1992 decision, where it
held that the reliance on an implementing
ruleone which is merely a guide to the
enforcement of the substantive lawis
mistaken. Such implementing rule is not
the decisive law in a civil suit for damages.
The Civil Code continues to govern,
especially since this is not a labor dispute,
but one for damages based on quasidelict. The employer-employee
relationship exists then, because Funtecha
was acting for the schools benefit. The
employer is expected to impose upon its
employees the necessary discipline called
for in the performance of all acts
indispensable to the business and
beneficial to the employer.
Petitioner contends that Luna had been
instructed to go to Pampanga and from
there, proceed to Nueva Ecija. However,
after unloading his cargo in Pampanga,
Luna immediately returned to Manila.
According to petitioner, this means that
Luna was no longer in the performance of
his duties at the time of the collision. But
there was no determinative proof that the
deviation was so complete as to
Conviction in the LCP does not preclude

filing of damages under the NCC.
constitute a cessation or suspension of his

service. Absent such proof, petitioner
would still be held solidarily liable with
Luna.
State
Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands
Fontanilla vs. Maliaman
Rosete vs. Auditor General

Republic vs. Palacio
Facts
Petitioner was riding a motorcycle that
collided with a General Hospital
ambulance, whose driver acted
negligently by not following protocols as
prescribed by ordinance and the Motor
Vehicle Act, and by not sounding his horn.
The collision left Merritt severely injured.
The Legislature then passed Act 2457 (An
Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit
against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the AttorneyGeneral of said Islands to appear in said
suit), allowing Merritt to file a suit against
the state. The defendant argues that even
if the chauffeur was negligent, the state
could not be held liable for the damages
caused.
Issue/Holding
Legislative enactments permitting
individuals to sue the State by virtue of tort
(or contract) constitutes the States
consent to be sued. Through such an
enactment, the State only waives its
immunity from suit. The State, however,
can be made liable for injuries arising from
the negligence of its agents or servants,
only by force of some positive statute
assuming such liability. Art. 2180(6)
expressly provides for the states liability
when it acts through a special agent (as
defined above). Further, the Court stated
that negligence cannot be presumed on
the States part.
Doctrine
Definition of special agent
One who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official, so that in representation of
the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him.
Why the State cannot be sued
1. Neither fault nor negligence can be
presumed on the part of the State in the
organization of branches of public service
and in the appointment of its agents. On
the contrary, all foresight humanly possible
must be presupposed, in order that each
branch of service may serve its public
purpose.
2. Suing the State will divert its focus from
the delivery of necessary public services
The fact that the State consents to be
sued is not an admission of its liability.
A government instrumentality performing
proprietary functions has a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the
government. Therefore, it may be sued.
Though the States liability may have been
ascertained, the State is still at liberty to
determine whether to pay the judgment
or not. Execution cannot issue on
judgment against the State. The
Legislature must first recognize such
judgment as final, and, because no
disbursement is possible without
appropriation, the Legislature must

determine how to satisfy the claim.
Consent to suit may be implied, as when
the State files a complaint, making it
subject to counterclaim, or when it enters
into contracts. Local government units, as
agencies of the State when engaged in
governmental functions, should enjoy
immunity from suit, but their charters
provide they can be sued.
Municipality of San Fernando La Union vs.

Firme
The municipality may not be held liable for

the torts committed by a regular
employee discharging governmental
functions.
The mere fact that a public officer is the
head of an agency does not necessarily
mean that he is the party ultimately liable.
He cannot be held personally liable simply
because he was the final approving
authority.
Albert vs. Gangan
Teachers and Heads of Establishments of Arts and Trades

Facts
Mercado vs. CA
There was a quarrel between the sons of
Ciriaco Mercado and Quisimbing which
resulted to the slashing of the face of the
son of Quisimbing by the son Mercado.
Quisimbing filed complaint for damages
against Mercado for the acts of his son.
Issue/Holding
W/N the teacher or head of school should
be responsible instead of Ciriaco? NO.
The students go to school and come
home to the parents. Therefore, the claim
of Ciriaco to hold the school responsible
was held to be without merit.
W/N the defendant-officials should be

held solidarily liable with Daffon? YES.
The last phrase presupposes a situation

wherein the pupil lives with the teacher or
the head of establishment of arts and
trades insofar as the control, direction, and
influence supersedes that of the parents
and so the responsibility passes on from
the parents to the teacher.
2180 applies to non-academic schools
only.
But with the exception of Antiono Brillantes
Nevertheless, liability of teachers and
Mercado contended that since the

incident happened in school during
recess, and without fault on his part, the
teacher or head of establishment should
be responsible.
Palisoc vs. Brillantes
Dominador Palisoc and Daffon were

working on a machine during recess at
their school, Manila Technical Institute.
They got into a fistfight where Daffon gave
Doctrine
Last paragraph of Art. 2180 states that
the teacher of heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be responsible for
damages caused by their pupils, students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody
successive blows to Dominadors stomach;

Dominador just kept on retreating.
Dominador stumbled upon an engine
block and then fainted. He never woke
up.
Dominadors parents sued Antonio
Brillantes, member of the Board of
Directors of MTI; Teodioso Valenton,
President of MTI; Santiago Quibulue,
instructor of their class; and, Virgilio Daffon
himself who was a person of age when the
incident occurred, for damages.
Amadora vs. CA
Alfredo Amadora was a graduating

student of Colegio de San JoseRecolectos who was only in school to
submit a prerequisite for graduation to his
Physics teacher. He was shot by Daffon, a
classmate, at the auditorium of the school.
The gun was confiscated from Gumban
by the dean of the boys, but was later
returned to him prior to the shooting.
Gumban was one of the companions of
Daffon when he shot Alfredo.
Alfredos parents filed complaint for
damages against the school, its rector, the
HS principal, dean of the boys, physics
teacher, Daffon and two other students
through their parents, but the case against
the students were later dropped.
who was only a member of the board of

directors.
Last paragraph of 2180, as applied in
Exconde vs. Capuno, provides that the
institution contemplated are only
institutions of arts and trades and not
academic educational institutions.
The school involved was not an academic
one as it was a technical, vocational, and
industrial school.
W/N the defendants could be made liable

even though the school was an academic
institution? YES.
There is no distinction between academic
and non-academic institutions insofar as
torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from teachers of both over the
students under their control and
supervision as the injury was caused by the
student, and not by the school itself as a
result of its operations or equipment.
The disparity was only caused by practice
historically which no longer applies to
current practices in view of the expanding
scope of establishments of arts and trades.
heads of establishments of arts and trades

extend not only to minor students, but to
students of age as well.
(Teachers and heads of establishments of
arts and trades) protective custody is
substituted for that of the parents, hence it
becomes their obligation to supervise the
activities of their students during the whole
time of their attendance in school,
including recess time, as well as to protect
their students from dangers and hazards
that would reasonably be anticipated
including injuries that may be inflicted by
other students willfully or negligently on
their fellow students.
Overturned Exconde, Mercado and
Palisoc in stating that 2180 applies even to
academic institutions.
The student is in custody of the school as
long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended. As long
as it can be shown that the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of legitimate student right, and
even the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student
continues.
W/N the responsibility of the teacher or

heads of establishments is co-extensive
with the period for which the student is
actually undergoing studies during the
school term? NO
Custody does not connote immediate
Ylarde vs. Aquino
Principal of the school, Soriano, was

digging holes to bury boulder remains of a
building that was destroyed during the
WWII. His colleague, Aquino, a teacher of
the school decided to help him by some
of his male students aged 10-11 years old
to help him dig beside a boulder.
Having dug enough, he left the boys to
look for a person he can borrow a rope
from. The 3 of the boys, including Ylarde,
jumped into the hole to play. One of them
jumped on the boulder which caused it to
slide and catch Ylarde. They were still able
to extract him from the hole but he still
subsequently died.
Salvosa vs. IAC
PSBA vs. CA
Ylardes parents filed complaint for

damages against
Jimmy Abon, guard of the Baguio
Colleges Foundation ROTC Armory Unit,
which was under the control of AFP, shot
someone with an unlicensed firearm that
he took from the armory at a time he was
supposedly guarding it.
Parents of the victim filed a complaint for
damages against Abon, ROTC
Commandant, officials of the schools, and
the school itself.
Carlitos Bautista, a student of PSBA, was
stabbed in the second floor of the
premises of PSBA by outsiders of the
school. His heirs filed a suit for damages
against PSBA and its officials for his death
claiming that it was caused by the
and actual physical control but refers

more to the influence exerted on the child
and the discipline exerted on him by virtue
of the influence. Thus, the teacher-incharge shall be held responsible for the
tortious act of the student.
W/N both respondents could be held
liable for damages? NO.
Only Aquino who was the teacher in
charge should be held liable for damages
using 2180. But in this case, the alleged
liability was based on 2176.
Aquino can still be held liable under 2176.
Based on the circumstances surrounding
the case, it can be gleaned that Ylarde
would not have died if not for the unsafe
situation that was created by Aquino.
Contributory negligence was alleged but
the SC ruled that the behavior of Ylarde
was that as would be expected from a 10
year old.
W/N the petitioners can be held solidarily
liable with Jimmy Abon for damages
under 2180? NO.
When Abon shot the victim, he was
supposedly guarding the armory. It was
after the dismissal of students, and not
during recess. And since Abon was
employed by the AFP, and not the BCF, he
could not be considered as under the
custody of BCF.
W/N petitioners may be held liable under
2180? NO.
There is a contractual relationship
between the school and its enrolled
student.
2180: So long as the teacher stands in loco

parentis to a certain extent is called upon
to exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of the student so long as the
student is under the custody of the
teacher, meaning as long as they are in
attendance in school, even during recess.
When an academic institution accepts

students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are
bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student
schools negligence and recklessness and

the lack of security measures.
Soliman vs. Tuason
Maximo Soliman was a student of

Republic Central Colleges who was shot
by a security guard of the school
employed by RL Security Agencies without
any provocation on his part.
He filed complaint for damages against
the school, the security agency and
security guard.
A more appropriate remedy would be to

implead PSBA for breach of contractual
obligation to provide their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining it primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge, corollary to its main
obligation to provide education, which
includes security.
with an education that would presumably

suffice to equip him with the necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations
2180 (7) may only be invoked when the
person causing damages is a student of
the school or establishment.
W/N the Colleges could not be held liable

upon any other basis in law for the
damage? NO.
There was no employer-employee
relationship between the school and the
security guard. First paragraph is not
applicable.
As to the seventh paragraph, liability of
teachers and heads of establishments of
arts and trades only extend to acts of their
students and apprentices.
St. Francis High School vs. CA
Ferdinand Castillo joined his schoolmates

to a beach outing supervised by teachers
of the school where he drowned and
died.
His parents filed a complaint for damages
against the school, its officials and
teachers who were present at the outing.
It would have been better if he had

implicated the school for breach of
contractual obligation based on the
implied obligation a school undertakes
when accepting an enrollee.
W/N the petitioners were guilty of
negligence? NO.
It was proven that the school and the
teachers in this case were not negligent.
The teachers were not engaged in their
capacity as teachers. The school could
not be held responsible for the negligent
act. Mere knowledge of the principal does
not mean consent.
St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos
St. Marys was conducting an enrollment

drive where they visit school to encourage
prospective enrollees to enroll in their
school.
On the way to a certain school, the jeep,
that was being driven by a minor student
of the school turned turtle which caused
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
St. Josephs College vs. Miranda
Parents of Sherwin filed complaint for

damages against the school, the minor
driver and his parents, and the owner of
the jeep.
Jayson Miranda and his classmates were
conducting a science experiment.
Miranda looked into the test tube but at
the very moment the substance spurted
out, hitting his eye. This happened while
their teacher was out of the classroom.
His father demanded that the school to
pay for entire medical expenses incurred
from the accident.
The organizer of the event even invited

two PE teachers and scoutmasters who
had knowledge in first aid application and
swimming. They even had lifesavers in
case of emergency. This shows that she
had exercised due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent untoward
incidents to everyone who joined the
picnic.
W/N St. Marys was liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos? NO.
The enrollment drive being conducted by
St. Marys was not the proximate cause of
the death of Sherwin.
It could be the reckless driving of the minor
student or the detachment of the steering
wheel. Nevertheless, either of the two
intervened with the negligence of the
school, thus it could not be said that it was
the proximate cause.
Art. 218, FC. Those engaged in child care

shall be given special parental authority
over the child while under their supervision,
control or custody, whether inside or
outside school premises, as long as the
activity is authorized.
Art. 219, FC. Those with special parental
authority shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the act or
omission of the unemancipated minor.
Parents/guardians are subsidiarily liable
W/N the proximate cause of Jaysons

injury was his own negligence? NO.
The immediate cause of the accident was
not Jaysons negligence when he curiously
looked into the test tube when the
chemicals suddenly exploded which
caused his injury, but the sudden and
unexpected explosion of the chemicals
independent of any intervening cause.
SJC could have prevented the mishap if
they exercised a higher degree of care,
caution and foresight.
The neglect in preventing a foreseeable
injury and damage equates to neglect in
exercising the utmost degree of diligence
required of schools, its administrators, and
teachers, and, ultimately was the
proximate cause of the damage and

injury to Jayson.
iii.
Joint tortfeasors
Worcester vs. Ocampo
iv.
Facts
Dean Worcester filed an action to recover
damages resulting from an alleged
libelous publication against Martin
Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K.
Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, et
al, as the owners, directors, writers, editors
and administrators of the daily newspaper
El Renacimiento (Spanish version) and
Muling Pagsilang (tagalog version).
Worcester alleged that the defendants
have been maliciously persecuting and
attacking him in the newspapers for a long
time and they published an editorial
entitled Birds of Prey with the malicious
intent of injuring Worcester, both as a
private person and as a government
official as the editorial obviously referred
to him.
Issue/Holding
W/N the defendants can be made
solidarily liable for the damages? YES.
Doctrine
Each joint tortfeasor is not only individually
liable for the tort in which he participates,
but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. If
several persons commit a tort, the plaintiff
or person injured, has his election to sue all
or some of the parties jointly, or one of
them separately, because the TORT IS IN
ITS NATURE A SEPARATE ACT OF EACH
INDIVIDUAL.
Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are
each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they
had performed the wrongful act
themselves. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and
severally liable for the tort which they
commit. Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro
rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among
themselves. They cannot insist upon an
apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part.
Particular persons held liable by law

Facts
Possessor or user or animal

Owner of Motor vehicle
Manufacturers/possessors of
foodstuffs
Issue/Holding
Doctrine
Vestil vs. IAC

Chapman vs. Underwood
Caedo vs. Yu Khe Tai
PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. vs.
UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines vs.
CA
Provinces, Cities, municipalities
Proprietor of
building/structure/thing
Head of Family
City of Manila vs. Teotico

Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan
Municpality of San Juan vs. CA
Gotesco vs. Chatto
Dingcong vs. Kaanan

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Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER |

Garcia vs. Florido

Garcia rented a public utility car owned

Elcano vs. Hill

Reginald Hill, a married minor, who is still

Cinco vs. Canonoy

There was a vehicular accident involving

W/N civil action may be filed during the

W/N the present civil action was barred by

The same negligent act causing damages

Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER |

jeep. Subsequently, a criminal complaint

Rule 111, Sec. 3(b), ROC was misapplied

Mandoza vs. Arrieta

There was a 3-way vehicular collision in

In this case, the petitioners cause of

A separate civil action based on quasidelict will proceed separately and

WRT the truck driver, YES.

Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER |

3. Culpa aquiliana distinguished from crime

Safeguard, on the other hand, filed motion

W/N the petitioners can still be made to

Civil liability ex delictu (founded on Art.

Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER |

but was still made liable to pay for

People vs. Ligon

needed to prove that the plaintiffs are

Ligon pretended to buy a cigarette from a

Criminal charge was filed against Ligon for

W/N despite the absence of a reservation

The right of the injured party to sue

Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER |

petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya

Manliclic vs. Calaunan

A Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by PRBLI,

said that the requirement that before a

Since whatever is recoverable against the

Rules on extinction of civil liability based

Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER |

from the civil liability arising from

4. Culpa Aquiliana distinguished from culpa contractual; presence of contractual relations

Debtor has the burden of proof to prove that there was no

Defense of good father of a family in the selection and supervision

Defense of good father, etc, is a proper and complete defense

Rebuttal of the breach. (Cangco)

Rationale: unfair; they may no longer be compelled to contractual

Direct liability as employer/guardian

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad

Del Prado vs. Manila Electric

Plaintiff in this case, tried to catch a car

W/N the defendant may be held liable for

Tongson D2019 | TORTS MIDTERMS REVIEWER |

view of the contributory negligence of the

Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf

Rakes was a newbie worker of the

W/N the accident happended through

Vasquez vs. De Borja

There was a civil complaint for damages

W/N De Borja correctly brought action

The contract was to deliver 4000 cavans of

The court is given

Last clear chance rule: the contributory

Preponderance of evidence shows that