ESTRADA VS.

ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651

August 4, 2003

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant,

vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

Facts
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding
judge of Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City a sworn letter complaint requesting for
an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said
court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to
twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner and is
a resident not of Las Pias City but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge
against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it
might appear that the court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she
was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that
they have a nineteen-year old son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living
together, she and her executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness. Escritor contended that the act of signing a Declaration Pledging
Faithfulness is sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise be classified as
adulterous and bigamous. And by virtue of such act, they are, for all purposes, regarded
as husband and wife by the religious denomination of which they are devout adherents.

At the time Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living
with another woman. Quilapio was likewise married at that time, but had been
separated in fact from his wife. Escritor again testified that her congregation allows her
conjugal arrangement with Quilapio and it does not consider it immoral. She offered to
supply the investigating judge some clippings which explain the basis of her
congregations belief and practice regarding her conjugal arrangement. The execution
of the declaration finds scriptural basis in Matthew 5:32 that when the spouse commits
adultery, the offended spouse can remarry.

Issue
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of
"gross and immoral conduct."
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to determine the sub-issue of whether or not
respondents right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are
held administratively liable.

Held
------------------------------------DISCUSSION-----------------------------------The two main standards used by the Court in deciding religion clauses cases are:
1. Strict Neutrality (Separation) strict or tame protects the principle of churchstate separation with a rigid reading of the principle.
Strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, it is strict in holding that religion
may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental
action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or
obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action.
NOTE: secular morality

2. Benevolent neutrality protects religious realities, tradition and established

practice with a flexible reading of the principle.
NOTE: religious morality
The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed in the law and
religious morality, is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.
The court states that our constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest.
Compelling State Interest serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the
same time affording the protection to the paramount interest of the state.

Compelling State Interest Test

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondents right to religious
freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between:
A. keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family
and
B. giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family
puts a burden on her free exercise of religion.
The second step is to ascertain respondents sincerity in her religious belief.
Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely
using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She
did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral
standards are strict and defined, much less only after an administrative case for
immorality was filed against her. The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation
after ten years of living together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she
entered the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the
Jehovahs Witnesses practice of securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural
basis for such a practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration is not whimsically
issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct but to make the "union" of their
members under respondents circumstances "honorable before God and men."

Since the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality, and
should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom.
To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing
the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable
as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given
the opportunity
(a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondents claimed religious belief and
practice;
(b) to present evidence on the states "compelling interest" to override respondents
religious belief and practice; and
(c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive
to respondents religious freedom.
The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court
Administrators receipt of this Decision.
It is held that there is nothing in the OCAs memorandum to the Court that demonstrates
how this (refer to letter B in the abovementioned) interest is so compelling that it should
override respondents plea of religious freedom nor is it shown that the (refer to letter C
in the abovementioned) means employed by the government in pursuing its interest is
the least restrictive to respondents religious exercise.
Therefore respondent Soledad Escritor is not liable for grossly and immoral conduct
because she made out an exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to
religion.