Professional Documents
Culture Documents
First, she claims to have noticed the color of Tugades pants who was
seated --- in the front of the jeep. It is quite improbable that Castrence,
being seated inside the bus, could see the color of the pants of Tugade
who was seated on the front seat of the jeep. Second, while she
noticed the passengers in the front of the jeep --- indeed she even
noticed the color of the pants one of them was wearing --- she could
not tell whether or not there were passengers at the back. Third, it is
also improbable that the driver and the passengers of the jeep simply
continued with their journey, oblivious to the wiggling and zigzagging
of their vehicle.
Moreover, even disregarding the incredibility of Castrences testimony,
still the version that the accident was due to a mechanical defect that
allowed the wheels to be detached cannot be given credence. If the
cause of the accident was that both wheels on the right side were
detached, then the jeep would not have turned turtle to its left, but to
its right. If there had been no wheels to support its right side, the jeep
should have turned turtle to its right, but it turned to its left instead.
The court a quo reasons that it is not credible that if the rover jeep
was hit on its left rear, it will turn turtle on its left side. The natural
effect or tendency is for the jeep to be pushed or even thrown towards
its right side. (Decision, p. 3) The court a quo, however, seems to have
disregarded the testimony of Honorato Areola that the jeep first
swerved to the right, then to the left. (TSN, October 15, 1984, p. 48) To
be noted also is that a jeep is inherently maneuverable, and may
easily swerve from side to side when hit from its left rear
portion. Moreover, after the accident, both the jeep and the bus were
at the left side of the highway. If the bus were not attempting to
overtake the jeep, why then was it at the left side of the highway?
As may be seen from the foregoing, the court a quo failed to take into
account the discrepancies and inconsistencies of Castrences testimony
vis--vis established facts and other evidence on record.
Moreover, the court a quo misappreciated the testimony of Areola that
the jeep was being checked up at the Panelco motor pool, and
interpreted such testimony to mean that the jeep was being fixed or
repaired due to a mechanical defect. First, the mere fact that the jeep
was at the motor pool does not mean that it was there due to a
mechanical defect.As testified by Areola, it was being subjected to a
check-up (TSN, October 9, 1984, pp. 41-42), which may have been
simply routinary. Second, even assuming that the jeep had a
mechanical defect, its presence at the motor pool may also mean that
such defect had been repaired and that the jeep was quite old does
not necessarily mean that it had a mechanical defect. That two wheels
were detached from the jeep and that its spindle was broken can be
just as reasonably explained by the fact that the jeep turned turtle
after being sideswiped by an overtaking bus.
On the contrary, Celeste and Nacar, witnesses for the plaintiffs
Tugade, consistently testified that their ride was normal and smooth.
In light of the foregoing, the conclusion must be that the accident was
caused by the negligence of Quiambao in driving Bus No. 244, as
testified to by Areola, Nacar and Celeste, for which he must be held
civilly liable.[10]xxx
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari [11] of the
decision of the Court of Appeals and the resolution dated June 27,
1995 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals:
I
COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AND VIOLATED THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE BY REJECTING THE TESTIMONY OF A DISINTERESTED
WITNESS AND ADMITTED THE BIASED TESTIMONIES OF THE
EMPLOYEES-WITNESSES FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT PANELCO.
II
COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY SUBSTITUTING ITS FINDINGS OF
FACTS TO THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH WAS IN A BETTER
POSITION TO EVALUATE AT FIRST HAND THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
THE PARTIES, PARTICULARLY THE SITUATION, DEMEANOR AND
SINCERITY OF THE WITNESSES.
III
MISINTERPRETED, IF NOT DELIBERATELY DISREGARDED, THE
BREAKING OF THE SPINDLE AND THE DETACHMENTS OF THE FRONT
RIGHT AND REAR WHEELS OF THE ROVER JEEP OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT PANELCO WHICH ARE CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF THE ROAD
UNWORTHINESS OF THE ROVER JEEP THAT TURNED TURTLE CAUSING
THE DEATH OF THE LATE HENRY TUGADE.
IV
ERRED IN ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND IS NOT
THEREFORE LIABLE FOR THE UNTIMELY DEATH OF HENRY TUGADE.
V
ERRED IN NOT APPLYING PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE AND PROVISIONS
OF LAWS IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT. [12]
Petitioners stress that they only questioned before the Court of
Appeals the amount of damages, loss of earning capacity and
attorneys fees awarded by the trial court in its decision, but the
appellate court disregarded the factual findings and conclusions of the
trial court and substituted its own findings of fact. Petitioners claim
that this violates the doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal as it is in
a better position to decide the question on credibility having seen and
heard the witnesses themselves. Petitioners further claim that: the
Court of Appeals erroneously disregarded the testimony of Rosie
Castrence which the trial court found to be a disinterested party,
based on minor and trivial inconsistencies; [13] the appellate court
overlooked or failed to consider the breaking of the spindles and the
detachment of the front and rear wheels of the rover jeep owned by
In this case, the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are conflicting. Thus, it behooves this Court to review the
findings of facts of the lower courts.
The trial court gave weight to the testimony of Rosie Castrence, a
passenger of Dagupan bus who testified that the Panelco rover jeep
turned turtle without being hit by the bus from behind; while the Court
of Appeals pointed out inconsistencies in her testimony and gave
weight to the version of the employees of Panelco that the jeep turned
turtlebecause it was hit by the bus from behind.
The trial court reasoned that Castrence, a fish vendor who
happened to be a passenger at the time of the accident, was credible
and unbiased being a disinterested witness, unlike the other witnesses
who are employees of Panelco. It also explained that she was in a
good position to observe in detail what actually happened at the scene
of the accident as she was seated at the right front seat of the bus. [20]
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals considered her testimony
not worthy of belief because of inconsistencies especially vis-a-vis the
testimonies of the employees of Panelco, namely: Areola, Nacar and
Celeste,[21] to which the appellate court gave greater weight and on
which basis it concluded that the accident was caused by the
negligence of Quiambao in driving Bus No. 244 for which he must be
held civilly liable.[22]
In ascertaining the facts of the case, it would have greatly aided
the courts if photographs of the vehicles were presented during the
trial. However, none was presented.Hence, we are constrained to rely
mainly on the testimonies of the witnesses.
After reviewing the entire records of the case, we find compelling
reasons to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals, and affirm the
appreciation of facts of the trial court.
It is basic that findings of facts of trial courts are accorded by
appellate courts with great, if not conclusive effect. This is because of
the unique advantage enjoyed by trial courts of observing at close
range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of witnesses as they
give their testimonies.[23] Trial courts have the unique advantage of
being able to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witness deportment on the stand while testifying --- the brazen
face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a
lesson, the itching over-eagerness of the swift witness, as well as the
honest face of the truthful one. [24] Indeed, assignment of values to
declarations on the witness stand is best done by the trial judge who,
unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh firsthand the testimony of a
witness.[25]
While there may be inaccuracies in Castrences testimony as
pointed out by the appellate court---the mention of a blown out tire,
the seating arrangement of the passengers of the rover jeep, the color
of the shirt of the deceased, and the location of all the passengers of
the jeep after it turned turtle---we deem such discrepancies negligible
considering the totality of her testimony. Records show that she was
called to the witness stand six years after the accident happened. It is
therefore understandable that she would miss recalling some details.
As we held in the recent case of People vs. Delim:
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of [witnesses] do not render
them incredible or their testimonies barren of probative weight. It
must be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a
photograph and a persons sense of observation is impaired by many
factors A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an errorfree testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of
human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes
on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the
witnesses credibility nor the veracity of his testimonyInconsistencies
on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.[26]
In her testimony, Rosie Castrence said that she saw the jeep turn
turtle in front of their bus.
Q Mrs. Witness, you testified that the PANELCO jeep turned
turtle infront of the Dagupan Bus, how close was the
Dagupan Bus to the PANELCO jeep when you saw it turn
turtle?
A About five (5) meters infront the Dagupan Bus when it turn
(sic) turtle, sir.
Q In other words, the jeep turned turtle even without being
bumped by the Dagupan Bus?
A Yes, sir.[27]
She also testified that before the jeep turned turtle she saw that it
was wiggling.
A When we were still at Barangay Tiep I have seen already
that jeep.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did you observe if any about the jeep that you were
following?
A The jeep was already wiggling and was zigzagging along
the way.[28]
We find this testimony not only credible but also consistent with
the physical evidence as well as the testimonies of Panelcos own
employees.
Engr. Florencio Celeste, who was seated beside Henry Tugade,
testified that after the jeep turned turtle he saw that the right wheels
were detached and that the spindle was broken.
Q If it turned turtle, did you observe the jeep suffered (sic)
any mechanical defect or parts were broken?
A After the jeep turned turtle, I noticed that the right front
wheel and rear wheel of the jeep were detached, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
of the vessel was caused by force majeure, and that the defendants
liability had been extinguished by the total loss of the vessel.
The evidence on record as to the circumstances of the last voyage
of the MV Pioneer Cebu came mainly, if not exclusively, from the
defendant. The MV Pioneer Cebu was owned and operated by the
defendant and used in the transportation of goods and passengers in
the interisland shipping. Scheduled to leave the Port of Manila at 9:00
p.m. on May 14, 1966, it actually left port at 5:00 a.m. the following
day, May 15, 1966. It had a passenger capacity of three hundred
twenty-two (322) including the crew. It undertook the said voyage on a
special permit issued by the Collector of Customs inasmuch as, upon
inspection, it was found to be without an emergency electrical power
system. The special permit authorized the vessel to carry only two
hundred sixty (260) passengers due to the said deficiency and for lack
of safety devices for 322 passengers (Exh. 2). A headcount was made
of the passengers on board, resulting on the tallying of 168 adults and
20 minors, although the passengers manifest only listed 106
passengers. It has been admitted, however, that the headcount is not
reliable inasmuch as it was only done by one man on board the vessel.
When the vessel left Manila, its officers were already aware of the
typhoon Klaring building up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no
typhoon signals on the route from Manila to Cebu, and the vessel
having been cleared by the Customs authorities, the MV Pioneer
Cebu left on its voyage to Cebu despite the typhoon. When it reached
Romblon Island, it was decided not to seek shelter thereat, inasmuch
as the weather condition was still good. After passing Romblon and
while near Jintotolo island, the barometer still indicated the existence
of good weather condition continued until the vessel approached
Tanguingui island. Upon passing the latter island,
556
556
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals
however, the weather suddenly changed and heavy rains fell. Fearing
that due to zero visibility, the vessel might hit Chocolate island group,
the captain ordered a reversal of the course so that the vessel could
weather out the typhoon by facing the winds and the waves in the
open. Unfortunately, at about noontime on May 16, 1966, the vessel
struck a reef near Malapascua island, sustained leaks and eventually
sunk, bringing with her Captain Floro Yap who was in command of the
vessel.
Due to the loss of their children, petitioners sued for damages before
the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 67139).
Respondent defended on the plea of force ma-jeure, and the extinction
of its liability by the actual total loss of the vessel.
After proper proceedings, the trial Court awarded damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to
pay:
Jr., De
la
It should be noted that the City Court of Cebu found that the petitioner
had a lacerated wound on his right palm aside from injuries on his left
arm, right thigh and on his back, and that on his way back to Danao
City, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. These are
findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu which we find no reason to
disturb. More so when we consider the fact that the Court of First
Instance of Cebu impliedly concurred in these matters when it
confined itself to the question of whether or not the tire blow out was
a fortuitous event.
are as follows:
and including June 30, 1968 to give effect to the agreement but to be
deemed automatically reinstated beginning July 1, 1968 (Angela
Estate, Inc. and Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, ibid.).
The temporary lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction assured the
milling of the 1967-1968 crop but not the produce of the succeeding
crop years which situation was duly communicated by the President
and General Manager of the BMMC to the President of Bacolod-Murcia
Sugar Farmers Corporation (BMSFC) on January 2, 1968. 3
On October 30, 1968, Alonso Gatuslao, one of private respondents
herein, and his wife, Maria H. Gatuslao, filed Civil Case No. 8719 in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, against petitioner herein,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. (BMMC), for breach of contract,
praying among others, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering defendant to immediately send
transportation facilities and haul the already cut sugarcane to the mill
site and principally praying after hearing, that judgment be rendered
declaring the rescission of the milling contract executed by plaintiffs
and defendant in 1957 for seventeen (17) years or up to crop year
1973-74, invoking as ground the alleged failure and/or inability of
defendant to comply with its specific obligation of providing the
necessary transportation facilities to haul the sugarcane of Gatuslao
from plaintiffs plantation specifically for the crop year 1967-1968.
Plaintiffs further prayed for the recovery of actual and compensatory
damages as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. 4
In answer, defendant BMMC claimed that despite its inability to use its
railways system for its locomotives and cane cars to haul the
sugarcanes of all its adhered planters including plaintiffs for the 196869 crop year allegedly due to force majeure, in order to comply with
its obligation, defendant hired at tremendous expense, private trucks
as prime movers for its trailers to be used for hauling of the canes,
especially for those who applied for and requested transportation
facilities. Plaintiffs, being one of said planters, instead of loading their
cut canes for the 1968-69 crop on the cargo trucks of defendant,
loaded their cut canes on trucks provided by the Bacolod-Murcia
Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (B-M ACMA) which
transported plaintiffs' canes of the 1968-69 sugarcanes crop.
Defendant prayed in its counterclaim for the dismissal of Civil Case No.
8719 for the recovery of actual damages, moral and exemplary
damages and for attorney's fees. 5
On November 21, 1968, BMMC filed in the same court Civil Case No.
8745 against Alonso Gatuslao, the Agro-Industrial Development of
Silay-Saravia (AIDSISA) and the Bacolod-Murcia Agricultural
after the aforesaid crop year. Adequate measures should have been
adopted by BMMC to forestall such paralyzation but the records show
none. All its efforts were geared toward the outcome of the court
litigation but provided no solutions to the transport problem early
enough in case of an adverse decision.
The last three issues being inter-related will be treated as one. Private
respondent Gatuslao filed an action for rescission while BMMC filed in
the same court an action against Gatuslao, the Agro Industrial
Development Silay Saravia (AIDSISA) and the Bacolod-Murcia
Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Associations, Inc. (B-M ACMA) for
specific performance under the milling contract.
There is no question that the contract in question involves reciprocal
obligations; as such party is a debtor and creditor of the other, such
that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the
other. They are to be performed simultaneously so that the
performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of
the other (Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 643 [1987]).
Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the power to rescind obligations
is implied in reciprocal ones in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him. In fact, it is well established
that the party who deems the contract violated may consider it
revoked or rescinded pursuant to their agreement and act accordingly,
even without previous court action (U.P. v. de los Angeles, 35 SCRA
102 [1970]; Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 43
SCRA 94 [1972]).
It is the general rule, however, that rescission of a contract will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial
and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties
in making the agreement. The question of whether a breach of a
contract is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances
(Universal Food Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., 33 SCRA 1
[1970]).
The issue therefore, hinges on who is guilty of the breach of the milling
contract.
Both parties are agreed that time is of the essence in the sugar
industry; so that the sugarcanes have to be milled at the right time,
not too early or too late, if the quantity and quality of the juice are to
be assured. As found by the trial court, upon the execution of the
amended milling contract on May 24, 1957 for a period of 17 crop
years, BMMC undertook expressly among its principal prestations not
only to mill Gatuslao's canes but to haul them by railway from the
loading stations to the mill. Atty. Solidum, Chief Legal Counsel and in
disturb the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
the occupancy of the Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in Cubi
Point, was to expire in 1991. Under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, foreign military bases, troops or facilities, which include
those located at the US Naval Facility in Cubi Point, shall not be
allowed in the Philippines unless a new treaty is duly concurred in by
the Senate and ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in
a national referendum when the Congress so requires, and such new
treaty is recognized as such by the US Government.
Subsequently, Philcomsat installed and established the earth station
at Cubi Point and the USDCA made use of the same.
On 16 September 1991, the Senate passed and adopted Senate
Resolution No. 141, expressing its decision not to concur in the
ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security and
its Supplementary Agreements that was supposed to extend the term
of the use by the US of Subic Naval Base, among others. 5 The last two
paragraphs of the Resolution state:
FINDING that the Treaty constitutes a defective framework for
the continuing relationship between the two countries in the
spirit of friendship, cooperation and sovereign equality: Now,
therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate, as it is hereby
resolved, To express its decision not to concur in the
ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security and its Supplementary Agreements, at the same time
reaffirming its desire to continue friendly relations with the
government and people of the United States of America. 6
On 31 December 1991, the Philippine Government sent a Note
Verbale to the US Government through the US Embassy, notifying it of
the Philippines termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
The Note Verbalestated that since the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement, as amended, shall terminate on 31 December 1992, the
withdrawal of all US military forces from Subic Naval Base should be
completed by said date.
In a letter dated 06 August 1992, Globe notified Philcomsat of its
intention to discontinue the use of the earth station effective 08
November 1992 in view of the withdrawal of US military personnel
from Subic Naval Base after the termination of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement. Globe invoked as basis for the letter of termination
Section 8 (Default) of the Agreement, which provides:
Neither party shall be held liable or deemed to be in default
for any failure to perform its obligation under this Agreement if
such failure results directly or indirectly from force majeure or
fortuitous event. Either party is thus precluded from
performing its obligation until such force majeure or fortuitous
event shall terminate. For the purpose of this paragraph, force
issued by Cdr. Corliss of the US Navy, the date when they actually
ceased using the earth station subject of the Agreement was not
established during the trial.34 However, the trial court found that the
US military forces and personnel completely withdrew from Cubi Point
only on 31 December 1992.35 Thus, until that date, the USDCA had
control over the earth station and had the option of using the same.
Furthermore, Philcomsat could not have removed or rendered
ineffective said communication facility until after 31 December 1992
because Cubi Point was accessible only to US naval personnel up to
that time. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err when it affirmed the
trial courts ruling that Globe is liable for payment of rentals until
December 1992.
Neither did the appellate court commit any error in holding that
Philcomsat is not entitled to attorneys fees and exemplary damages.
The award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, and
must be supported by factual, legal and equitable justifications. 36 In
previously decided cases, the Court awarded attorneys fees where a
party acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
other partys claims and compelled the former to litigate to protect his
rights;37 when the action filed is clearly unfounded,38 or where moral or
exemplary damages are awarded.39 However, in cases where both
parties have legitimate claims against each other and no party
actually prevailed, such as in the present case where the claims of
both parties were sustained in part, an award of attorneys fees would
not be warranted.40
Exemplary damages may be awarded in cases involving contracts or
quasi-contracts, if the erring party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.41 In the present case, it
was not shown that Globe acted wantonly or oppressively in not
heeding Philcomsats demands for payment of rentals. It was
established during the trial of the case before the trial court that Globe
had valid grounds for refusing to comply with its contractual
obligations after 1992.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63619 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno*, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its
satisfaction.
The other expenses being claimed by petitioner, such as
transportation expenses and those incurred in hiring a personal
assistant while recuperating were however not duly supported by
receipts.21 In the absence thereof, no actual damages may be
awarded. Nonetheless, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the
Civil Code may be recovered where it has been shown that the
claimant suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot
be proved with certainty. Hence, the amount of P20,000.00 as
temperate damages is awarded to petitioner.
As regards the award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast rule
in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages
since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances.22 The testimony of petitioner about his physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shock
resulting from the shooting incident23 justify the award of moral
damages. However, moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to
enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable
the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will
serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at
the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial
courts must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they
should exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid
suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the
part of the trial court.24 We deem it just and reasonable under the
circumstances to award petitioner moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00.
Likewise, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of
P50,000.00 as part of damages is reasonable in view of Article 2208 of
the Civil Code.25 However, the award of exemplary damages is deleted
considering the absence of proof that respondents acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
We note that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily liable
with respondent FEU. In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,26 we
held that:
[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate
and distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that,
save for certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered
into contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held
personally liable for the liabilities of the latter. Personal liability
xxxx
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents
cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was
employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more
than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services
entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be
construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the
employers of Rosete.28
entered
into
the
said
office
with
guns
drawn. Suspects(sic) (1) went straight inside and poked
his gun toward Romeo Sicam and thereby tied him with
an electric wire while suspects (sic) (2) poked his gun
toward Divina Mata and Isabelita Rodriguez and ordered
them to lay (sic) face flat on the floor. Suspects asked
forcibly the case and assorted pawned jewelries items
mentioned above.
Suspects after taking the money and jewelries fled on
board a Marson Toyota unidentified plate number.[3]
Petitioner Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter dated October 19,
1987 informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery
incident in the pawnshop. On November 2, 1987, respondent Lulu then
wrote a letter[4] to petitioner Sicam expressing disbelief stating that
when the robbery happened, all jewelry pawned were deposited with
Far East Bank near the pawnshop since it had been the practice that
before they could withdraw, advance notice must be given to the
pawnshop so it could withdraw the jewelry from the bank. Respondent
Lulu then requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry
for withdrawal on November 6, 1987 butpetitioner Sicam failed to
return the jewelry.
On September 28, 1988, respondent Lulu joined by her husband,
Cesar Jorge, filed a complaint against petitioner Sicam with the
Regional Trial Court of Makatiseeking indemnification for the loss of
pawned jewelry and payment of actual, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 88-2035.
Petitioner Sicam filed his Answer contending that he is not the real
party-in-interest as the pawnshop was incorporated on April 20, 1987
and known as Agencia de R.C.Sicam, Inc; that petitioner corporation
had exercised due care and diligence in the safekeeping of the articles
pledged with it and could not be made liable for an event that is
fortuitous.
Respondents subsequently filed
include petitioner corporation.
an
Amended
Complaint
to
After
trial
on
the
merits,
the
RTC
rendered
its
Decision[6] dated January 12, 1993, dismissing respondents complaint
as well as petitioners counterclaim. The RTC held that
petitioner Sicam could not be made personally liable for a claim
arising out of a corporate transaction; that in the Amended Complaint
of respondents, they asserted that plaintiff pawned assorted jewelries
in defendants' pawnshop; and that as a consequence of the separate
juridical personality of a corporation, the corporate debt or credit is
not the debt or credit of a stockholder.
The RTC further ruled that petitioner corporation could not be held
liable for the loss of the pawned jewelry since it had not been rebutted
by respondents that the loss of the pledged pieces of jewelry in the
possession of the corporation was occasioned by armed robbery; that
robbery is a fortuitous event which exempts the victim from liability for
the loss, citing the case of Austria v. Court of Appeals;[7] and that the
parties transaction was that of a pledgor and pledgee and under
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code, the pawnshop as a pledgee is not
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen.
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. In a Decision
dated March 31, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is
GRANTED, and the Decision dated January 12, 1993,of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, ordering the appellees to
pay appellants the actual value of the lost jewelry
amounting
to P272,000.00,
and
attorney'
fees
of P27,200.00.[8]
In finding petitioner Sicam liable together with petitioner corporation,
the CA applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity
reasoning that respondents were misled into thinking that they were
dealing with the pawnshop owned by petitioner Sicam as all the
pawnshop
tickets
issued
to
them
bear
the
words Agencia deR.C. Sicam; and that there was no indication on the
pawnshop tickets that it was the petitioner corporation that owned the
pawnshop which explained why respondents had to amend their
complaint impleading petitioner corporation.
The CA further held that the corresponding diligence required of a
pawnshop is that it should take steps to secure and protect the
pledged items and should take steps to insure itself against the loss
of articles which are entrusted to its custody as it derives earnings
from the pawnshop trade which petitioners failed to do; that Austria is
not applicable to this case since the robbery incident happened in
1961 when the criminality had not as yet reached the levels attained
in the present day; that they are at least guilty of contributory
negligence and should be held liable for the loss of jewelries; and that
robberies and hold-ups are foreseeable risks in that those engaged in
the pawnshop business are expected to foresee.
The CA concluded that both petitioners should be jointly and severally
held liable to respondents for the loss of the pawned jewelry.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated August 8, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition for review with the following assignment of
errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND WHEN IT DID, IT
OPENED ITSELF TO REVERSAL, WHEN IT ADOPTED
UNCRITICALLY (IN FACT IT REPRODUCED AS ITS OWN
WITHOUT IN THE MEANTIME ACKNOWLEDGING IT)
WHAT THE RESPONDENTS ARGUED IN THEIR BRIEF,
WHICH ARGUMENT WAS PALPABLY UNSUSTAINABLE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AND WHEN IT DID, IT
OPENED ITSELF TO REVERSAL BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT, WHEN IT AGAIN ADOPTED UNCRITICALLY (BUT
WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING IT) THE SUBMISSIONS OF
THE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR BRIEF WITHOUT ADDING
ANYTHING MORE THERETO DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE SAID ARGUMENT OF THE RESPONDENTS COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED IN VIEW OF UNREBUTTED
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[9]
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners point out that the CAs
finding that petitioner Sicam is personally liable for the loss of the
pawned jewelries is a virtual and uncritical reproduction of the
arguments set out on pp. 5-6 of the Appellants brief. [10]
Petitioners argue that the reproduced arguments of respondents in
their Appellants Brief suffer from infirmities, as follows:
(1) Respondents conclusively asserted in paragraph 2
of their Amended Complaint
that Agencia de
R.C. Sicam, Inc. is the present owner of Agencia de
R.C. Sicam Pawnshop, and therefore, the CA cannot
rule against said conclusive assertion of respondents;
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based as
required by Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. The discretion to
decide a case one way or another is broad enough to justify the
adoption of the arguments put forth by one of the parties, as long as
these are legally tenable and supported by law and the facts on
records.[11]
Our jurisdiction under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the
review of errors of law committed by the appellate court. Generally,
the findings of fact of the appellate court are deemed conclusive and
we are not duty-bound to analyze and calibrate all over again the
evidence adduced by the parties in the court a quo.[12] This rule,
however, is not without exceptions, such as where the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are conflicting or
contradictory[13] as is obtaining in the instant case.
However, after a careful examination of the records, we find no
justification to absolve petitioner Sicam from liability.
The CA correctly pierced the veil of the corporate fiction and adjudged
petitioner Sicam liable together with petitioner corporation. The rule is
that the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced when made as a
shield to perpetrate fraud and/or confuse legitimate issues. [14] The
theory of corporate entity was not meant to promote unfair objectives
or otherwise to shield them.[15]
Notably, the evidence on record shows that at the time respondent
Lulu pawned her jewelry, the pawnshop was owned by
petitioner Sicam himself. As correctly observed by the CA, in all the
pawnshop receipts issued to respondent Lulu in September 1987, all
bear the words Agencia de R. C. Sicam, notwithstanding that the
pawnshop was allegedly incorporated in April 1987. The receipts
issued after such alleged incorporation were still in the name
of Agencia de R. C. Sicam, thus inevitably misleading, or at the very
least, creating the wrong impression to respondents and the public as
well, that the pawnshop was owned solely by petitioner Sicamand not
by a corporation.
Even
petitioners
counsel,
Atty. Marcial T. Balgos,
in
his
letter[16] dated October 15, 1987 addressed to the Central Bank,
expressly referred to petitioner Sicam as the proprietor of the
pawnshop notwithstanding the alleged incorporation in April 1987.
are
liable
for
the
Petitioners insist that they are not liable since robbery is a fortuitous
event and they are not negligent at all.
We are not persuaded.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or
when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee
the same. [22]
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent
of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that
constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person
would as to his own property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2 shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the performance,
that which is expected of a good father of a family
shall be required.
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan[30] that negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do.[31] It is want of care required by the circumstances.
A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise
reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence
in the operation of their pawnshop business. Petitioner Sicam testified,
thus:
Court:
Q. Do you have security guards in your pawnshop?
A. Yes, your honor.
Q. Then how come that the robbers were able to enter
the premises when according to you there was a
security guard?
A. Sir, if these robbers can rob a bank, how much more
a pawnshop.
Q. I am asking you how were the robbers able to enter
despite the fact that there was a security guard?
A. At the time of the incident which happened about
1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and it
happened on a Saturday and everything was quiet
in the area BF Homes Paraaquethey pretended to
pawn an article in the pawnshop, so one of my
We,
however,
do
not
agree
with
the
CA
when
it
found petitioners negligent for not taking steps to insure themselves
against loss of the pawned jewelries.
1961. The incident became the subject of a criminal case filed against
several persons. Austria filed an action against Abadand her husband
(Abads) for recovery of the pendant or its value, but the Abads set up
the defense that the robbery extinguished their obligation. The RTC
ruled in favor of Austria, as the Abads failed to prove robbery; or, if
committed, that Maria Abad was guilty of negligence. The CA,
however, reversed the RTC decision holding that the fact of robbery
was duly established and declared the Abads not responsible for the
loss of the jewelry on account of a fortuitous event. We
held that forthe Abads to be relieved from the civil liability of returning
the pendant under Art. 1174 of the Civil Code, it would only be
sufficient that the unforeseen event, the robbery, took place without
any concurrent fault on the debtors part, and this can be done by
preponderance of evidence; that to be free from liability for reason of
fortuitous event, the debtor must, in addition to the casus itself, be
free of any concurrent or contributory fault or negligence. [38]
We found in Austria that under the circumstances prevailing at the
time the Decision was promulgated in 1971, the City of Manila and its
suburbs had a high incidence of crimes against persons and property
that rendered travel after nightfall a matter to be sedulously avoided
without suitable precaution and protection; that the conduct
of Maria Abad in returning alone to her house in the evening carrying
jewelry of considerable value would have been negligence per se and
would not exempt her from responsibility in the case of robbery.
However we did not hold Abad liable for negligence since, the robbery
happened ten years previously; i.e., 1961, when criminality had not
reached the level of incidence obtaining in 1971.
In contrast, the robbery in this case took place in 1987 when robbery
was already prevalent and petitioners in fact had already foreseen it
as they wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank for
safekeeping. Moreover, unlike in Austria, where no negligence was
committed, we found petitioners negligent in securing their pawnshop
as earlier discussed.
In Hernandez, Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC and special disbursing
officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism
in Cavite. In the morning of July 1, 1983, a Friday, he went
to Manila to encash two checks covering the wages of the employees
and the operating expenses of the project. However for some reason,
the processing of the check was delayed and was completed at
about 3 p.m. Nevertheless, he decided to encash the check because
the project employees would be waiting for their pay the following
day; otherwise, the workers would have to wait until July 5, the earliest
time, when the main office would open. At that time, he had two
choices: (1) return to Ternate, Cavite that same afternoon and arrive
early evening; or (2) take the money with him to his house
in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the
following day. He chose the second option, thinking it was the safer
one. Thus, a little past 3 p.m., he took a passenger jeep bound
forBulacan. While the jeep was on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, the
jeep was held up and the money kept by Hernandez was taken, and
the robbers jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez chased the
robbers and caught up with one robber who was subsequently charged
with robbery and pleaded guilty. The other robber who held the stolen
money escaped. The Commission on Audit found Hernandez negligent
because he had not brought the cash proceeds of the checks to his
office in Ternate,Cavite for safekeeping, which is the normal procedure
in the handling of funds. We held that Hernandez was not negligent in
deciding
to encash the
check
and
bringing
it
home
to Marilao, Bulacan instead of Ternate, Cavite due to the lateness of
the hour for the following reasons: (1) he was moved by unselfish
motive for his co-employees to collect their wages and salaries the
following day, a Saturday, a non-working, because to encash the check
on July 5, the next working day after July 1, would have caused
discomfort to laborers who were dependent on their wages for
sustenance; and (2) that choosing Marilao as a safer destination, being
nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips to the two
places, said decision seemed logical at that time. We further held that
the fact that two robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep
while it was on a busy highway and in the presence of other
passengers could not be said to be a result of his imprudence and
negligence.
Unlike in Hernandez where the robbery happened in a public
utility, the robbery in this case took place in the pawnshop which is
under the control of petitioners. Petitioners had the means to screen
the persons who were allowed entrance to the premises and to protect
itself from unlawful intrusion. Petitioners had failed to exercise
precautionary measures in ensuring that the robbers were prevented
from entering the pawnshop and for keeping the vault open for the
day, which paved the way for the robbers to easily cart away the
pawned articles.
In Cruz,
Dr. Filonila O.
Cruz, Camanava District
Director
of
Technological Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA),
boarded
the
Light
Rail
Transit
(LRT)
from Sen. Puyat Avenue to Monumento when
her
handbag
was
slashed and the contents were stolen by an unidentified person.
Among those stolen were her wallet and the government-issued
cellular phone. She then reported the incident to the police
authorities; however, the thief was not located, and the cellphone was
not recovered. She also reported the loss to the Regional Director of
TESDA, and she requested that she be freed from accountability for
the cellphone. The Resident Auditor denied her request on the ground
that she lacked the diligence required in the custody of government
property and was ordered to pay the purchase value in the total
amount of P4,238.00. The COA found no sufficient justification to grant
the request for relief from accountability. We reversed the ruling and
found that riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced as a negligent
act more so because Cruzs mode of transit was influenced by time and
money considerations; that she boarded the LRT to be able to arrive
in Caloocan in time for her 3 pm meeting; that any prudent and
rational person under similar circumstance can reasonably be
expected to do the same; that possession of a cellphone should not
hinder one from boarding the LRT coach as Cruz did considering that
whether she rode a jeep or bus, the risk of theft would have also been
present; that because of her relatively low position and pay, she was
not expected to have her own vehicle or to ride a taxicab; she did not
have a government assigned vehicle; that placing the cellphone in a
bag away from covetous eyes and holding on to that bag as she did is
ordinarily sufficient care of acellphone while traveling on board the
LRT; that the records did not show any specific act of negligence on
her part and negligence can never be presumed.
Unlike in the Cruz case, the robbery in this case happened in
petitioners' pawnshop and they were negligent in not exercising the
precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop.
WHEREFORE, except for the insurance aspect, the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2003 and its Resolution
dated August 8, 2003, areAFFIRMED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
private respondent to the effect that the incident was not due to its
fault. A police report of an alleged crime, to which only private
respondent is privy, does not suffice to establish the carnapping.
Same; Same; Same; Pursuant to Articles 1174 and 1262 of the
New Civil Code, liability attaches even if the loss was due to a
fortuitous event if the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk.It must likewise be emphasized that pursuant to
Articles 1174 and 1262 of the New Civil Code, liability attaches even if
the loss was due to a fortuitous event if the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk. Carnapping is a normal business risk
for those engaged in the repair of motor vehicles. For just as the
owner is exposed to that risk so is the repair shop since the car was
entrusted to it. That is why, repair shops are required to first register
with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and to secure an
insurance policy for the shop covering the property entrusted by its
customer for repair, service or maintenance as a pre-requisite for
such registration/accreditation. Violation of this statutory duty
constitutes negligence per se.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lorenzo G. Parungao for petitioner.
Samson S. Alcantara for private respondent.
MARTINEZ, J.:
On July 18, 1990, petitioner entrusted his Nissan pick-up car 1988
model1 to private respondentwhich is engaged in
________________
1
Registered in the name of petitioner with Plate No. PJK-666.
113
VOL. 291, JUNE 22, 1998
113
Co vs. Court of Appeals
the sale, distribution and repair of motor vehiclesfor the following
job repair services and supply of parts:
Bleed injection pump and all nozzles;
Adjust valve tappet;
Change oil and filter;
Open up and service four wheel brakes, clean and
adjust;
Lubricate accelerator linkages;
Replace aircon belt; and
Replace battery2
Private respondent undertook to return the vehicle on July 21, 1990
fully serviced and supplied in accordance with the job contract. After
petitioner paid in full the repair bill in the amount of P1,397.00, 3private
respondent issued to him a gate pass for the release of the vehicle on
said date. But came July 21, 1990, the latter could not release the
vehicle as its battery was weak and was not yet replaced. Left with no
option, petitioner himself bought a new battery nearby and delivered
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126389. July 10, 1998]
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO,
EMERITA
DIMAANO,
REMEDIOS
DIMAANO,
CONSOLACION
DIMAANO
and
MILAGROS
DIMAANO, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the Decision[1] promulgated on July 31, 1996, and
Resolution[2] dated September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals [3] in
CA-G.R. No. 41422, entitled Juanita de Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et
al. vs. Southeastern College, Inc., which reduced the moral damages
awarded below from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00.[4] The Resolution
under attack denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road,
Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along
the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the
morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very
strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of
private respondents house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular
inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of
engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L.
Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latters Report [5] dated October 18,
1989 stated, as follows:
5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the
formation of the buildings in the area and the general direction of the
wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of
4-storey building. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerly
direction, the general formation of the buildings becomes a big funnellike structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving the
heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the
roofing, those located on both ends of the building, which remained
intact after the storm.
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging
of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said
trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded on
the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not
bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which
were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not
anchored at all to the roof beams.
that
the
well as that credited to the principal for each payment, while the
disputed receipts contain no such specification.
These differences between the defendants disputed receipts and
those admitted by plaintiff, when coupled with the fact that appellant
Medinas answer expressly admitted the balance due as well as his
failure to meet the monthly installments from September, 1956 to
January, 1957; his lack of corroboration; and the further circumstance
that the admissions in his answer were never withdrawn, nor was the
answer containing them ever amended, irresistibly show that the trial
courts re553
VOL. 2, MAY 31, 1961
553
Gesolgon vs. Lacson
jection of the genuineness and validity of the disputed receipts
constituted no error. The authenticity of the signatures appended to
them does not prove that they were issued in 1956 or 1957, as
claimed by the appellant, nor that they should be credited to the note
Exh. A. It is not at all improbable that these mutilated receipts were
among those issued to the appellant prior to the consolidation of his
accounts and the execution of the promissory note.
Appellant avers that the genuine receipts dated January, 1957
raise the presumption that prior installments were paid. This might be
true if such receipts recited that they were issued for the installments
corresponding to the month of January, 1957; but nowhere does that
fact appear. And even if such recital had been made, the resulting
presumption would only be prima facie, and the evidence before us is
clear that the payments made do not correspond to the installments
falling due on the dates of the genuine receipts.
We find no error in the judgment appealed from, and therefore the
same is hereby affirmed. Costs in both instances against appellant
Mariano Medina.
Padilla, Bautista
Angelo, Labrador,Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, De
Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
Judgment affirmed.
_______________