Santiago v Bautista

Section 1, Art VIII |

Judicial Power

Marcos v.
Manglapus
Section 1, Art VIII |
Judicial Power

Facts: Apellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade 6. As

school year
1964-65 was about to end, the Committee on the Rating of Students
for Honor was constituted for the purpose of selecting honor students.
Socorro Medina, Patricia Lingat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. were
selected to be the first, second and third honor awardees, respectively
Before graduation, Santiago, represented by his mother, (with his
father as council), contested the rankings and instituted the civil case
at hand.
Petitioners alleged, among others, that:
Patricia Lingat has never been a close rival of Santiago, except in
Grade 5
Medina received summer tutorials from a teacher who consequently
became their English teacher, thus unjustly benefiting Medina
Committee was illegally constituted since the said it was composed
of all grade 6 teachers in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers
of the Bureau of Public Schools, which provides that the committee
must be composed of Grade 5 and 6 teachers.
Petitioners prayed for mental and moral damages, to set aside such
list of honor students, and to enjoin respondents from formally
publishing and proclaiming such list. Petition was denied by the lower
court and the graduation continued as scheduled. Appellant assails
the decision of the lower court stating that his petition states no cause
of action.
Facts: Solicitor General proposes that the case (the barring
of Aquino of
Marcoses return from Hawaii) is a political question which is
beyond the
Courts jurisdiction. Court disagrees as the Constitution limits
the invocation
of the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry

Issue: Whether or not the Committee

exercised judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.

Issue: Whether or not there exist

factual bases for the President to
conclude that it was in the
national interest to bar the return
of the
Marcoses.

Held: No, the committee exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial

functions.
Ratio:
Before a tribunal, board o officer, may exercise judicial or quasijudicial
acts, there must be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
made.
No rule or law on record that provides that when teachers sit down
to assess the individual merits of their pupils, such function involves
the determination of what the law is and that they are automatically
vested with judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Whats worse is that
appellant failed to appraise the court regarding pertinent provisions
of the Service Manual.
Felipe v Leuterio, et al: Issue was whether or not courts have the
authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an
oratorical contest. Court held that judiciary has no power to reverse
the award of the board of judges of that contest. This is so for it is
unwritten law that boards decision is final and unappealable. No
rights may be asserted by contestants because theirs is merely a
privilege to compete and such privilege did not ripen into a
demandable right unless they are proclaimed as winners.
Error v Wrong: Judge reasoned that Imperial suffered some wrong
in the hands of the judges. There is no wrong but an error. Wrong
is the deprivation of or violation of a right.
Ratio:
Extent of Review: Judicial Power includes the duty to
determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch
or instrumentality of government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1)
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry. But there
remain
issues which are beyond the courts jurisdiction. For example:
o Presidents recognition of foreign government, presidential
pardon
o Amending the constitution under the guise of resolving a

dispute, such power is reserved to the people

Framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but did
not
intend for the courts to settle all actual controversies.
When political questions are involved, the Court only decides if
there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose actions are being
questioned. If there is no grave abuse, the Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the official concerned
Lansang v Garcia: Executives power to suspend the privilege
of
the writ of habeas corpus. Under the principle of separation of
powers, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere, but this is
not absolute. Executive is supreme if and when he acts within the
sphere allocated to him by the Basic Law. The authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
judiciary.
System of Checks and Balances - the Court will merely
check,
not supplant, the Executive, to ascertain whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise
the power of the Executive or determine the wisdom of the act.
Echegegaray vs.
Secretary of Justice

United States v.
Nixon
Section 1 | Judicial
Power

Facts: This is a review of the denial of the motion to quash

third party
subpoena duces tecum issued by US District Court pursuant
to Fed. Rule
Crim Procedure 17 (c ). Subpoena is directed to US Pres to
produce certain

Issue: WON District court erred

in authorizing the issuance of
subpoena.
the District court.

Ratio: In Marbury v. Madison, it has been held that it is

emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.
Claim of absolute privilege Court: There is no absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of

tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations

with his aides
and advisers. District court rejected US Presidents claims of
executive
privilege, lack of jurisdiction and failure to satisfy
requirements of Rule 17(
c). Hence this appeal.
Presidents counsel: a.) Constitution provides an absolute
privilege of
confidentiality for all presidential communications; b.) there
is a valid need
for protection of communications between high government
officials and
those who advise and assist them in the performance of their
manifold
duties; c.) claim of absolute privilege rests on doctrine of
separation of
powers

immunity
from judicial process absent any claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic
or sensitive national security secrets.
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place
in the
way of the primary constitutional duty of the judicial branch to do
justice in
criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of
courts under
Art III.
Framers of Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system
but
separation of powers were not intended to operate with absolute
independence. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers
into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.
Legitimate needs of judicial process may outweigh
presidential
privilege.
President and his aides must be free to explore alternatives in
shaping
policies and making decisions; however, such privilege must be
considered
in light of commitment under the rule of law. There is a need to
employ
adversary system of criminal justice in which parties contest all
issues
before a court of law.
Thus, when the ground for executive privilege as to subpoenaed
materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in

Infotech
Foundation, et al. v
Comelec
Section 1, Art VIII |
Judicial Power

Noblejas vs.
Teehankee

Facts:
For the automation of the counting and canvassing for the
2004
elections, Comelec Awarded the contract to Mega Pacfic
Consortium, an
entity that had not participated in the bidding.
Comelec awarded undertaking with inexplicable haste,
without
adequately checking and observing mandatory financial,
technical and legal
requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec
committed grave abuse of
discretion in
awarding the Mega Pacific Esolution incorporated the contract
for
automation of the counting and
canvassing for 2004 elections.

confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of

due
process of law in the fair administration of justice. The generalized
assertion
must yield demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal
trial.
Ratio:
There is grave abuse of discretion;
1. When an act is done contrary to the constitution, the law or
jurisprudence; or
2. When it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of
malice, ill will or personal bias.
NOTE: Moot Cases.
One that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical
use or value. However, courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and
academic, if:
First if there is a grave violation of the constitution.
Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved.
Third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Director of Prison
vs. Ang Cho Kio

In Re: Laureta

Francisco vs. House

of Representatives

Quizon vs. Comelec

Mattel. Inc. vs.

Francisco

Begica vs.
Honorable
Executive Secretary

David vs. Arroyo

Malaga v.
Penachos, Jr.
Section 2, Art. VIII |
Creation of Courts

Facts:
What is involved in the present controversy is the
noncompliance
with the procedural rules on bidding which required stict
observance. The
purpose of the rules implementing PD 1594 is to secure
competitive bidding
and to prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of
these
contracts to the detriment of the public.

Issue:
The extent and applicability of PD
1818, which prohibits any court
from issuing injunctions in cases
involving infrastructure projects
of the
government.

RADIOWEALTH, INC.
v. AGREGADO
Section 3 | Fiscal
Autonomy

FACTS:
Clerk of the SC certified the purchase and installation of a
Webster
Tetetalk, Model 206 MA, and Webster Telephone speakers,
totaling
P585
Dacanay, Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee
disapproved
the purchase and installation, for being contrary to the
following

ISSUE:
WON the courts independence is
limited to the exercise of judicial
functions,
and does not include the
purchase of property

Ratio:
In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, this court interpreted a
similar prohibition contained in PD 605, the law after PD 1818 was
patterned. The court observed that to allow the courts to judge
these
matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative
machinery.
Justice Teodoro Padilla, made it clear the on issues definitely
outside
of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not
be
prevented by PD 605 from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit
administrative acts.
RATIO:
Maxim of distribution of powers: The SC is independent of
executive or
legislative control.
Tarlac v. Gale
POWER: The judiciary has power to preserve their integrity,
maintain
their dignity, and to insure effectiveness in the administration of
justice.
PROVINCIAL OFFICERS: May not deprive the court of anything

o EO 302, series of 1940, paragraph 4 (**which I cannot

find,
sorry)
o Policy of discontinuing open market purchases adopted by
the
Cabinet in the preceding year
o Violated the requirements of EO 298, series of 1940
Petitioner Radiowealth Inc requested with the Auditor
General that the
payment be approved; that the treasury warrant was in the
process of
issuance; that the auditor for the SC refused to countersign it

which is
vital to their function nor exercise discretion to escape an
obligation to
the court which the law lays upon them (Power to interfere is the
power
to control. Power to control is the power to abrogate).
DUTY OF PROV OFFICERS:
o Furnish court room, furniture, fixtures, supplies, equipment
which
must be of such character as to permit the court to exercise its
functions in a reasonably effective manner (Act No 83, Sec 10);
o Provide construction or purchase or renting offices (Act No 83,
Sec 13)
o IN CASE OF CONFLICT: Yield to the court
FINAL AUTHORITY OF THE COURT: Certain discretion lies with the
officials but is subject to the paramount and final authority of the
court in determining what is necessary for the proper
administration of
justice
o The court has power to purchase things (purchase, legal charge
on the province)
1. directly or
2. by proper proceedings to compel officials to perform their
duty imposed by law
With regard to acquisition of fixtures: Subject to its dependence
upon
Congress for appropriation, but supreme and independent of the
executive.
o The court could not maintain its independence and dignity as the
Constitution intends if the executive personally or through a
subordinate could determine for the court what it should have or
use in
the discharge of its functions.

BENGZON v.
DRILON
Section 3 | Fiscal
Autonomy

FACTS:
Petitioners, retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Court of
Appeals, are receiving monthly pensions under RA 910 as
amended by
RA 1797.
(Apparently through misinformation) then Pres. Aquino
vetoed a
provision in the GAA for FY 1992 relating to the adjusted
pensions of
the retired justices, which had long been in effect and upheld
by the
Supreme Court
Office of the Solicitor General claims that removal of
special privileges
granted by law to former Justices
o Is to eliminate grant of distinct privileges or preferential
treatments
o That paying off public funds to individuals already leading
private
lives & have ceased performing public service constitute
robbery

ISSUE:
WON the Presidential veto of
certain provisions in the GAA of
FY 1992
relating to the payment of the
adjusted pensions of retired
justices of the
SC & the CA is constitutional

RATIO:
FISCAL AUTONOMY: Guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and
utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require;
power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation
not
exceeding the highest rates provided by law in the course of
discharge of
their functions; freedom from outside control
Veto power trenched upon the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary since it is tantamount to:
o Dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized
o Withholding the Chief Justices freedom to adjust funds
appropriated for expenditures of the judiciary, including the
use of savings to cover deficits and shortages
The imposition of restrictions & constraints of the independent
constitutional offices allocation and utilization of appropriated
funds
is anathema to fiscal autonomy, and violative not only of the
Constitutional mandate, but especially of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the constitutional system is
based.
The judiciary knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal
restraints
Gonzales v. Macaraig & Art VI, Sec 25(5): Upheld the authority of
the Chief Justice, among others key officials, to augment any item
or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency &
efficiency.
DE LA LLANA V. ALBA (Significance of judicial independence): It is
an added
guarantee that justices & judges can administer justice undeterred
by any
fear of reprisal or untoward consequence; that their judgments are
to be
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of

Fortich v Corona
Section 4, Art VIII |
The Supreme Court

Facts:
The respondents in this case filed for motions for
reconsideration which were
handled by a Supreme Court division. The division voted 2-2
on separate
motions resulting to a tie. The Supreme Court then issued a
resolution
affirming its earlier decision. The respondents argued that
the Resolution

Issue:
Whether or not it should be heard
en banc

their
conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy
motives;
transcending that of a purely personal right.
POSITION PAPER: The DBM not only allocates less that 1% for the
judiciary
but also examines with a fine-toothed comb how the funds are
spent.
The DBM submits its own version of the proposals without
informing the
agency of major alterations
The DBM prunes budget proposals to below subsistence levels,
compelling the Chief Justice, Chairmen of the Commissions, &
Ombudsman to make pilgrimages to the DBM for additional funds
RIGHT OF RETIRED JUSTICES TO A PUBLIC PENSION: is a vested
right
pursuant to RA 1797, founded on services rendered to the state.
When a judge has complied with statutory prerequisites for
retirement
with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and
may
not thereafter be revoked or impaired.
Retirement laws serve to entice competent people to enter the
government service and to permit them to retire with relative
security
ARGUMENTS OF OSG ARE IMPOLITE & OFFENSIVE: The OSG must
show
continuing esteem and good manner to the retired Justices.
Ratio:
It involves the statutory construction principle reddendo
singula
singulis
Only cases which failed to satisfy the required minimum
number of
votes shall be referred to Court en banc.
In this issue, what we have is only a matter which is to be

released by the Supreme Court did not really resolved the

motions since the
required number (three) to carry a decision was not met and
further argued
that it should be handled then by SC en banc (allegedly
pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution).

resolved to which the requirement for minimum number of votes

does not apply.
The votes resulting to a tie does not mean that the matter was
not
resolved. The resulting tie implies that the motions were not
considered, thus affirming the earlier decision.

Peple vs. Dy,

People vs. Ebio

Section 4 | The
Supreme Court

Facts:
Appellant Gerry Ebio was convicted by this court of
qualified rape
and sentenced suffer the death penalty. The Public Attorneys
Office
moved for reconsideration on the ground that the court
lacked a
quorum when the case was deliberated. This is because the
decision
was signed by only 7 justices.
The court granted the Motion for Reconsideration
The courts decision was concurred in by a majority of the
members
of the court who actually took part in the deliberations. It
was
unanimously signed by the 7 justices who were present in the
deliberations

Issue: Whether or not the seven

constitute a quorum of the 14member
court

Ratio:
A quorum is that number that makes a lawful body and gives
it
power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid corporate
act
As a general rule, a majority of the members of a court is a
quorum
for the transaction of business and the decision of cases.
Based on paragraph 3 of Section 4, when the court meets by
division, there should at least be 3 members present for the
division
to conduct its business
However, paragraph 2 of Section 4 does not state the number of
justices required to be present to constitute a quorum when the
court meets en banc
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on
what
constitutes a quorum when the court is composed of only 14
members
In case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where death
penalty is
imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused

Firestone vs. Court

of Appeals

Marbury vs.
Madison
Section 5 | Judicial
Review

Facts:
At the December term 1801, William Marbury, Dennis
Ramsay,
Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel
severally
moved the court for a rule to James Madison, secretary of
state of the
United States, to show cause why a mandamus should
not issue
commanding him to cause to be delivered to them
respectively their several commissions as justices of
the peace in the district of
Columbia.
The applicants have requested Mr. Madison to deliver them
their
said commissions but the Secretary of State did not comply.
The court, through Chief Justice Marshall, reviewed the case
considering the following questions: (1) Has the applicant a
right to the
commission he demands? (2) If he has a right, and that right
has been
violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? (3)
If they do
afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this
court?
The answers that were given are as follows: (1) Mr.
Marbury, then,
since his commission was signed by the president and sealed
by the
secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating
the office gave

Issue:
W/N an act repugnant to the
constitution (in this case, issuing
a mandamus
in an original jurisdiction) can
become part of the law of the
land

Ratio:
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises
and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and
does not
create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be
directed to
courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a
paper, is in
effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and
therefore
seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act
establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs
of
mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the
constitution; and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a
jurisdiction, so
conferred, can be exercised.
Connection to Art. VII:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say
what the law is So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if
both the
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the
law: the
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This
is of the very essence of judicial duty.

the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the

executive, the
appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer
legal rights which
are protected by the laws of his country. To withhold the
commission,
therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by
law, but violative
of a vested legal right. (2) ...having this legal title to the
office, he has a
consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver
which is a plain
violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford
him a remedy.
(3) To enable this court to issue a mandamus, it must
be shown to
be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be
necessary to enable
them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

The judicial power of the United States is extended to all

cases arising under the constitution.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is
first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but
those only
which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to
all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void, and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.
Note:
The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court
awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison
to deliver
the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and
thus
significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other
hand, if the
Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had
acted out of
fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the
supremacy of
the law.
In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the
commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the
Judiciary Act of
1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of
mandamus
exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the
Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to
chastise

the Jeffersonians and yet not create a situation in which a court

order
would be flouted.

Angara v. Electoral
Commission
Section 5 | Judicial
Review

FACTS:
National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8 ) of December 3,
1935,
confirmed the election of herein petitioner to the said body.
On the other
hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9,
1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests
against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of
the National Assembly which
confirmed the
election of petitioner has the
effect of cutting off the power of
the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests
against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the
National Assembly

Tolentino v.
Secretary of
Finance
Section 5 | Judicial
Review

FACTS:
[No facts. I guess same facts apply as in the case in Section
26 of Article VI.
Pero mejo irrelevant yung facts kasi focused lang sa judicial
review yung
nakacite sa case book under this Section]

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has
jurisdiction over the case

RATIO:
Judiciary asserts the solemn and sacred obligation to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantee to them
Judicial supremacy: power of judicial review under the
Constitution
Judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation
of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries
Upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly
o Generally, in this case, the court reiterates its power and
obligation to interpret the Constitution because the nature of
this controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution
RATIO:
Power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty
imposed
on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in
the
performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers
set by the principle of separation of powers
Angara c. Electoral Commission: (Conception of judicial power)

TAN v. MACAPAGAL
Section 5, Art VIII |
Judicial Review

FACTS:
A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A.
Tan,
Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of
Roxas City,
Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as taxpayers,
but purportedly
suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people
They filed a five-page pleading it is understandable,
therefore, why
the petition could hardly be characterized as possessed of
merit. The Court
issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on the last day
of that month a
printed thirty-two-page motion for reconsideration. It is
evident that
petitioners took some pains this time, although the main
reliance seems to
be on a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence.
Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with the controlling

ISSUE:
Assailing the validity of the
Laurel-Leido Resolution, dealing
with the
range of the authority of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, would
have
this Court declare that it is
"without power, under Section 1,
Article XV of
the Constitution and Republic Act
6132,
to consider, discuss and adopt
proposals which
seek to revise the present
Constitution through the
adoption of a form of government
other than the form
now outlined in the present
Constitution [the Convention

the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and
to establish for the parties in actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them
o This conception does not add anything to invoke this duty
to justify the Courts intervention in what is essentially a
case that at best is not ripe for adjudication: This duty must
still be performed in the context of a concrete case or
controversy, as VIII, Section 5, paragraph 2 clearly defines
our justification in terms of cases
Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and
controversy requirement can in the long run only result in
undermining our authority as a court of law
o Judgment according to what may appear to be the opinion
of the day
RATIO:
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other
departments
being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The
judiciary as
Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct nor restrain
executive [or legislative]
action ... ."
The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its
advice as to what to do or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be
postponed in
the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then
been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into
the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was
done but
only "when ... properly challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding."

PACU V. SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION
Section 5 | Judicial
Review

doctrine had
the good sense to wait before filing his suit until after the
enactment of the
statute for the submission to the electorate of certain
proposed
amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the
matter was ripe
for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep
its hands off.

being] merely empowered to

propose improvements to
the present Constitution without
altering the general plan
laid down therein."

FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made
a
petition that Act No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act
making the
Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges
obligatory for the
Secretary of Public Instruction and was amended by Act No.
3075 and
Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on
the grounds
that
1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as
well as
teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of Law;
2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and
duty to
rear their children for civic efficiency and
3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education
unlimited
powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
constitute towards
unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the
Secretary
of Education before opening a school is not originally included

ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act no. 3075 and
Commonwealth Act no. 180 may
be declared void and
unconstitutional?

RATIO:
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a
legislative
enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallability
of the
human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he
can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath
decline the
responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p.
332.)
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important
rights
have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider
an
attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.)
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed
on only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a
justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties
concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the
interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for
their

in the original
Act 2706. The defendant Legal Representative submitted a
memorandum
contending that:
1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting
unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question;
2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the
said
act 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the court
dismissed the
petition for prohibition.

Lina vs. Purisima

Araullo vs. Aquino

Belgica vs.
Honorable
Executive Secretary

protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being

insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L.
Ed. 754.)
Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual
cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is
incidental
to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the
Constitution
and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution
are
raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in
the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between
litigants.
(Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)

Joya v. PCGG
Section 5 | Locus
standi

Facts:
35 Petitioners, who were Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists,
seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction
sale scheduled on
Jan. 11, 1991 by Christies of New York of the Old Masters
Paintings and
18th and 19th century silverware seized from the Marcoses
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists
deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the
countrys
artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain the
respondents in
acting against the latters public duty to conserve the artistic
creations
mandated by Art. XIV, Sec. 14-18 of the Constitution and
R.A. 4846.

Issue: WON this petition

complies with the legal requisites
for this Court to
exercise its power of judicial
review this case.

Ratio:
First requisite of LEGAL STANDING
Petitioner Court
The painting and
silver ware are public
Devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and
in law.
properties collectively
owned by the Filipino
people in general.
By auctioning the
same, petitioners have
been deprived of their
right to public property
in violation of the
Constitution.
The paintings were NOT public property.
They were donated by PRIVATE persons from
different parts of the world to the Metropolitan
Museum. The painting was not a Philippine art.
The antique silverwares was given to the
Marcos couple as gifts for their anniversary,
the confiscation of these should not be
understood to mean that the ownership has
automatically passed on to the government
without complying with the constitutional and
statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation.
This petition can be
allowed as taxpayers
suit.
No. They are not challenging any
expenditure involving public funds but the
disposition of what they allege as public
properties.
The questioned act of the government in
this case does not involve the disbursement of

public funds for administering unconstitutional

acts.
Second requisite of ACTUAL CONTROVERSY
Petitioner Court
This case is an exception to the rule on
moot and academic cases.
That although the sale of the paintings and
silverwares has long been consummated, the
novelty and importance of issues raised
deserve the Courts attention to establish
future guiding principles and doctrines on the
preservation of nations treasures.
The purpose in this
case has become stale
and has long past,
therefore the issues
have become moot and
academic.
Although the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of cases
w/c does not satisfy the requirement of actual case or legal
standing when
paramount public interest is involved, We find that there is no
such
justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation
of the
rule.
NOTE: Petitioners brought up RA 4846 as amended by PD 374. It
declares it
to be the policy of the state to preserve and protect important
cultural
properties and national cultural treasures of the nation. However,
Director of
the Museum issued a certificate that the Italian paintings and
silverwares do
not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among
those listed
in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.

Findings of such Director is controlling because of their

acknowledged expertise in their fields of specialization.
Definitions:
Legal standing personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.
Interest material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a
mere incidental interest. Interest must be personal not one based
on the
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
unrelated party.
Macasiano v.
National Housing
Authority
Section 5 | Locus
standi

Facts:
The petitioner seeks to have Section 28 and 44 of RA 7279
(Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992) declared
unconstitutional. The
provisions in question provide for rules regarding eviction and
demolition
and provides for a moratorium of 3 years.
His locus standi is based on his being a consultant of the
DPWH and
his being a taxpayer.
As a consultant of DPWH, he alleges that said provisions
serves as a
drawback to his task of demolition of illegal structures and
that he was
unable to continue the demolition which he has assiduously
and faithfully
carried out in the past.
As a taxpayer, he alleges that he has direct interest in seeing
to it
that the public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed.

Issue: WON the petition has all

the essential requisites for the
Court to
review the case.

Ratio:
There is no actual controversy. The petitioner did not claim that
the
provisions actually prevented him from performing his duties as a
consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner. He has no
locus standi.
The petitioner is not a proper party. As a consultant of DPWH he
is
not vested with the authority to demolish properties of public
domain, much less on private lands. Nor does the petitioner claim
that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and
use
would be affected by the challenged provisions.
Although he anchors his locus standi on the fact that he is a
taxpayer, it does not mean that the Court should hear the parties
in
each and every instance where such ground is invoked.
The Court has discretion whether or not it should entertain a
taxpayers suit.

Mariano, Jr. v.
Commission on
Elections
Section 5, Art VIII |
Judicial Review: Locus
Standi

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 51, Article
X of RA No.
7854 which provides:
Section 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The present
elective officials
of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials
of the City
of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until
such time
that a new election is held and the duly elected
officials shall
have already qualified and assumed their offices.
Provided, The
new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continue
exercising the
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed
by the
city government of the City of Makati.
Petitioners Arguments:
Said section collides with Section 8, Article X and Section
7, Article
VI of the Constitution which provide that elective local
officials,
including Members of the House of Representatives, have a
term of 3
years and are prohibited from serving for more than 3
consecutive
terms.

Issue: Whether or not the court

can entertain this challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 51.

Ratio:
1. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events.
a. That Mayor Binay will run again in the coming mayoralty
elections
b. That he would be re-elected in said elections
c. That he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
elections.
o These contingencies may or may not happen. Petitioners merely
pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy.
2. ALSO, petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
3. Petitioners hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory
relief
over which the Court has no jurisdiction

o By providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate

existence, Section 51 of RA No 7854 restarts the term of
the
present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards
the terms previously served by them.
o Section 51 favors incumbent Makati mayor Binay who has
already served for 2 consecutive terms.
! Should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as
city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for
the same position in 1998 and seek another 3-year
consecutive term since his previous 3-year consecutive
term as municipal mayor would not be counted.
! Section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the
political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr.
Section 5, Art VIII |
Judicial Review: Locus
Standi

Facts:
Principal plaintiffs, now principal petitioners, are all minors
duly
represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI).
o Petitioners assert that they represent their generation as
well as
generations yet unborn.
Orginal defedndant was the Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.,
then DENR
secretary, substituted by the new Secretary Hon. Angel
Alcala.
This complaint prays for the judgment that all existing
timber license
agreements in the country be cancelled and that defendant
and his agents cease and decist from receiving, accepting,
processing,
renewing, or approving new TLAs, and other reliefs.
The complaint as instituted as a taxpayers class suit
and alleges that

Issue: WON petitioners have

legal standing.

Ratio:
Petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in
so far
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
" Every generation had a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology.
" The minors assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
Note (side issue): Re definiteness of the specific legal right
involved
While a right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under
the Declaration of State Principles and State Policies (Section 16,
Article

the plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of the

Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment
of the
natural resource treasure that is the countrys virgin tropical
rainforests.
The minors also claim that they represent their generation
as well as
generations yet unborn.
Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss based on 2 grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him.
2. The issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question.
Petitioners maintain that:
1. The complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action.
2. The motion is dilatory.
3. The action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendants abuse of discretion.
Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to
dismiss.
Kilosbayan v
Guingona, Jr.

Facts: Petitioners seek to prohibit and restrain the

implementation of the
Contract of Lease executed by PCSO and Philippine Gaming
Management
Corp (PGMC) in connection with the online lottery system or
lotto.
Kilosbayan is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of
civic-spirited
citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and ay leaders committed to
the cause of
truth, justice and national renewal. They are suing as
members of the Board
of trustees of Kilosbayan, as taxpayers and as concerned
citizens. Senators
Webb and Tanada, Rep. Arroyo are suing as members of
Congress, as

II) and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the
latter.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners

have legal standing to maintain
the
instant suit.

Ratio:
A partys standing is a procedural technicality which the court
may,
in its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues
raised.
Emergency Powers Cases: SC brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
People v Vera: Person who impugns the validity of a statute
must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.

taxpayers and as concerned citizens.

Public respondents allege that petitioners have no standing.

Tatad v Garcia

Facts: In 1989, DOTC planned to construct an LRT line along

EDSA, to be
known as EDSA LRT III. In 1992, an agreement was reached
with EDSA LRT
Corp., a foreign corporation. Petitioners argue that the
agreement is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants EDSA LRT Corp. the
ownership of EDSA
LRT III, a public utility.
Respondent Garcia, Secretary of DOTC and EDSA LRT Corp.
claim that
petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest and they have
no legal
standing to institute the petition.
Petitioners seek to prohibit respondents from further
implementing and
enforcing the Revised and Restated Agreement to Build,
Lease and Transfer
a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA. Sen. Tatad, Osmea

Issue: Whether or not petitioners

have legal standing.

Basco v PAGCor: Objections to taxpayers suits for lack of

sufficient personality standing or interest are, however, in the main
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of
the
cases at barthis Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petitions.
It is within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement
and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the
serious constitutional questions raised.
In line with the liberal policy of this court on locus standi,
ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters,
and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and
prosecute actions before this Coirt to question the constitutionality
or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various
govt
agencies or instrumentalities.
Ratio: Prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits: allow taxpayers to
question
contracts entered into by the National Government o GOCC
allegedly in
contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only
municipal
contracts are involved.
Concurring Opinion: Mendoza, J. Petitioners have no standing
to sue as
legislators, taxpayers or citizens. Concur with decision of majority
to dismiss
petition.
Concur in all except with the decision that petitioners have
standing
to sue.
As members of Congress: because they allege no infringement
of
prerogatives a slegislators

and Biazon are

suing in their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers.

KILOSBAYAN, et. al.

vs. MANUEL L.
MORATO, et. al.
Section 5 | Locus
Standi

FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to declare the Equipment License
Agreement (ELA)
invalid on the ground as the Contract of Lease between Phil
Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and Phil Gaming Management
Corp (PGMC)
nullified in G. R. No.113373. Petitioners contended that the
amended ELA is
inconsistent with and is violative of PCSOs charter.
Petitioners:

ISSUE:
#1: Whether or not petitioners
possess the legal standing to
file the
instant petition.
#2: Whether or not petitioners
are real parties in interest
within the
meaning of Rule 3 Sec 2 of Rules
of Court

As taxpayers: because they allege neither an unconstitutional

exercise of the taxing or spending powers of Congress nor illegal
disbursement of public money.
Bugnay Const an Dev. Corp. v Laron: A party suing as a
taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and
that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the questioned statute or contracts. It is not sufficient that he has
merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
As citizens: only if it is claimed that it is if transcendental
importance
Lotto Case: (Kilosbayan v Guingona) Court took into account the
paramount public interest involved which immeasurably affected
the social, economic and moral well-being of the people and the
effects the online lotto system. Court then invalidated the contract
for the operation of lottery.
For citizens actions to be allowed: Party must show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result
of the allegedly illegal conduct of government.
Holding that a citizen has standing to question a government
contract unduly expands the scope of public actions and sweeps
away the case and controversy requirement embodied in Art. VIII
sec. 5. It would controvert the court into the office of the
Ombudsman for ventilation of generalized grievances.
RATIO:
ISSUE #1: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing
to file the
instant petition.
Respondents Contention: Petitioners, not being parties to the
Contract of
lease which they seek to nullify, have no right to bring the suit as
they have
no personal and substantial interest to be injured by the
enforcement of
contract.

a.) Kilosbayan is an organization composed of civic-spirited

citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and lay leaders commited to
the
cause of truth, justice and national renewal
b.) Kilosbayan trustees are suing as taxpayers and concerned
citizens
c.) Sen Freddie Webb, Sen Wigberto Tanada and Rep Joker
Arroyo,
are members of Congress suing as such and as taxpayers
and
concerned citizens.
On Jan 25, 1995, PCSO signed ELA where PGMC leased
online lottery
equipment and accessories to PCSO with rental equivalent of
4.3% of gross
amount of ticket sale.
On Feb 21, 1995, this suit, GR No. 118910, was filed seeking
to declare the
ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases nullified
in the first
case.
PCSO and PGMC question the petitioners standing:
1. ELA is a diff lease contract with the Contract of Leases
nullified in prior case
2. ELA did not have to be admitted to public bid because of
the exception
in EO No. 301
3. Only Board of Directors of PCSO has the power to
determine whether
ELA is advantageous
4. PCSO lacks fund to purchase own online lottery; thus, has
to enter lease
contract
5. Petitioners are only seeking moral crusade and political
agenda in this
suit

Petitioners Contention: The ruling in the previous case sustains

their
standing to challenge the validity of the first contract is now law
of the
case and thus, question of standing can no longer be reopened.
Court: Neither the doctrine of stare decisis, law of the case or
conclusiveness of judgment poses barrier to determination of
petitioners
right to maintain the suit.
a.) Stare decisis: Concern for stability in the decisional law, in this
case, does not call for adherence to what has been recently
been laid down as a rule.
a. Valmonte v. PCSO: Court denied the standing to a party,
in questioning validity of a form of lottery, claimed the
right to sue as a taxpayer, citizen and member of the
bar.
b. Philconsa v. Enriquez: If complaint is not grounded on
the impairment of powers of Congress, legislators do not
have standing to question the validity of any law or
official action.
b.) The voting on standing in previous case was narrow 7-6. There
are also changes in members of Court with retirement of
Justices Cruz and Bidin and appointment of Justice Francisco.
c.) Doctrine of the law of the case is not applicable as the latter
case is a sequel to GR 113375 and not its continuation. Since
present case is not same as the former, the ruling there cannot
be regarded as the law of this case. The doctrine applies only
when a case is before a court a second time after ruling by an
appellate court.
a. law of the case means whatever is once irrevocably
established as controlling legal rule of decision between
same parties continues to be the law of these case, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be facts of the case before the court.
b. It differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of the
first judgment is not dependent upon its finality.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not petitioners are real parties in interest

within the
meaning of Rule 3 Sec 2 of Rules of Court.
Rule 3 Sec 2 of Rules of Court: Every action may be prosecuted
and
defended in the name of the real party in interest
Baker v. Carr: Standing is whether such parties have alleged
such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional
questions
Salonga v. Warner Barnes: real party in interest is whether he is
the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party
entitled to
the avails of the suit
Petitioners do not have substantial interest in the ELA as
would
entitled them to bring this suit.
present substantial interest is the interest of a party in the
subject matter
of the action as will entitle him, under substantive law, to recover
if the
evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and
the
defendant will be protected in a payment by him
*Regalado J, dissenting: The right of petitioners to file and
maintain this action whether the
objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or right of
action has
already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case.
There would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities
or
excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal

capacity of
standing to sue. Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will
not leave
without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of
government
contracts.
The case should be decided on the merits and substantive
considerations
and not technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry into the
validity of the
supposed amended lease contract. The people are entitled to the
benefit of
duly clarified and translucent transaction.
The argument that previous judgment must be revisited in lieu of
change of
membership is magistrate shopping or court packing and does
not sit
well with the public as a judicious policy.
Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action of two lotto
cases:
a.) Subject matter, identity of parties: The removal and
replacement of some objectionable terms of contract, which
continue to operate under the same basis for the same purpose
and same parties does not suffice to extinguish the identity of
subject matter in both cases. New contract is the same as the
original with just some variants in the terms of the latter to
eliminate those which were objected to.
b.) Cause of action: Under Sec 49(c) Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, there is still a collateral estoppel or conclusiveness of
judgment. Thus, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the prior
judgment shall be conclusive between the parties conclusive
between the parties in the case now before us and that
definitely includes that petitioners have the locus standi or the
right to sue respondents on the contacts concerned.
The court has clearly indicated that it sets aside objections
grounded on
judge-made constitutional theories only under cogent reasons of

TELEBAP vs.
COMELEC
Section 5 | Locus
Standi

Facts: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of

the Phil
(TELEBAP), an organization of lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting
companies suing as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters,
and GMA
Network Inc., which operates radio and television
broadcasting stations
throughout the Philippines under franchise granted by
Congress, together
filed a petition to challenge the validity of Sec 92 of BP 881.
Section 92 of BP Blg 881 requires radio and tv broadcast
companies to
provide free time to COMELEC for the use of candidates for
campaign and
other political purposes.
Petitioner: The requirement that radio and tv time be given
free (1) takes
properties without due process of law; (2) it violates eminent
domain clause
which provides just compensation; (3) it denies broadcast
media the equal
protection of the laws; and (4) that it violates the terms of
franchise of
petitioner GMA Network Inc. (5) it is in excess of the power
given to
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media
communication or
information during the election ban

Issue: WON petitioners have

legal standing to bring the
constitutional
challenge

substantial
justice and paramount public interest; thus the stance of majority
that
taking cognizance of this case and resolving it on merits will invite
others to
unduly overburden the Court with avoidable opportunities is
unimpressive.
Ratio:
Legal Standing of TELEBAP suing as
a.) citizen: No, a citizen will only be allowed to raise constitutional
question if he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as the result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government.
In
the instant case, petitioners have not shown that they have
suffered
harm as a result of BP Blg 881.
b.) Registered voters: No, case does not concern their right of
suffrage.
c.) Taxpayers: No, it does not involve the exercise by Congress of
its
taxing or spending power. He has not shown sufficient interest in
preventing illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation or that
he will sustain direct injury as a result.
d.) Corporate entity: No, standing jus tertii will only be recognized
if he
has substantial relation to the third party, third party cannot assert
constitutional right, or right of third party be diluted unless the
party
in court is allowed to espouse third partys constitutional claim.
None of which is present.
e.) Lawyers in broadcast industry: No, it does not entitle them to
bring
the suit in their names as representatives of affected companies.

Gonzales v. Narvasa
Section 5 | Judicial
review: locus standi

Facts:
Petition for prohibition and mandamus, petitioner Ramon
A.
Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer assails
the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants.
Petitioner also asks the court to enjoin the Exec.Sec.
Ronaldo
Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations, to
enjoin
COA from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the
presidential assistants and consultants. Petitioner prays for
an order
compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner
information on
certain matters.
o Petitioner disputes die constitutionality of the PCCR on two
grounds;
! Contends the PCCR is a public office which only the
legislature can create by law
! That by creating such a body the President is
intervening in a process from which he is totally
excluded by the constitution.
o Respondents allege the case has become moot and
academic.
NOTE: Upon submission of recommendations the president
dissolved
the PCCR.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner has
legal standing to invoke judicial
power insofar as the PCCR is
concerned

Ratio:
Action is considered moot when it no longer presents a
justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or
dead.
o Upon submission of recommendations the president
dissolved the PCCR. It likewise spent the funds allotted to it,
thus ceased to exist, having lost its raison detre.
There is legal standing when a party can establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly
illegal conduct of the government. Petitioner has sustained no
direct, or even any indirect, injury.
A taxpayer is deemed to have standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed
in
alleged contravention of the law or the constitution.
o In the case, it is apparent that there is no exercise by
congress of its taxing or spending power. Under sec.7 of EO
43, the 3mil is appropriated for its operational expenses to
be sourced from the funds of the Office of the president.

Del Mar, et al. v.

PAGCOR
Section 5| Judicial
review: locus standing

Facts:
Petitioner Raoul del Mar initially filed a petition for
prohibition to
prevent respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating
the
jai-alai, by itself or in agreement with Belle corporation.
o On the ground that the controverted act is patently illegal
and devoid of any basis either from the constitution or
PAGCORs own Charter.
However, respondent PAGCOR entered into an agreement
with
private respondents BELLE and FILGAME. In the agreement it
was
agreed that BELLE will make available to PAGCOR required
infrastructure facilities, as well as provide the necessary
funding for
the jai-alai operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR,
while
PAGCOR handles the actual management and operation of
jai-alai.
A supplemental petition was filed questioning the validity
od said
agreement, on the ground that PAGCOR is without
jurisdiction,
legislative franchise, authority or power to enter into such
Agreement for the opening, establishment, operation, control
and
management of jai-alai.
o Respondents allege that petitioners have no legal standing
to file a taxpayers suit because the operation of jai-alai
does not involve the disbursement of public funds.
o Petitioners complain that the operation of jai-alai
constitutes
an infringement of the legislatures exclusive power to grant
franchise. To the extent the powers of congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioners suing
as taxpayers and in their capacity
members of the House of
Representatives possess legal
standing to sue.

Ratio:
A member of the House of Representatives has standing to
maintain
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the constitution
in his
office.!

MACALINTAL v.
COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner, filing as a taxpayer and as a lawyer, seeks to
declare some
provisions of the Oversees Absentee Voting Act of 2003
(RA 9189) as
suffering from constitutional infirmity

ISSUE:
WON the Court should uphold
Macalintals right to file the
present petition

WHITE LIGHT CORP

v. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:
The Malate Tourist and Development Corporation filed a
complaint for
declaratory relief (prelim injunction &/or TRO) against Mayor
Lims City
Ordinance prohibiting short-time admission, wash-up rate
schemes in
hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses, and
similar
establishments.
White Light Corp, as well as Titanium Corp, Sta Mesa
Tourist &
Development Corpioration filed a motion to intervene

ISSUE:
WON these establishments have
requisite standing to plead for
protection of
their clients equal protection
rights
Petitioners
1. The ordinance unlawfully
interferes with their business
2. The equal protection rights of
their clients are interfered with.
Court
General rules on standing,
extancy of direct and personal

RATIO:
TAXPAYERS STANDING: RA 9189 appropriates funds to carry out
its
provisions. Taxpayers thus have the right to restrain public officials
from wasting public funds through enforcing unconstitutional
statute.
TECHNICALITIES: Technicalities of procedure may be set aside in
cases
where
1. petitioners have presented an issue of transcendental
significance
and
2. because it is the courts duty to determine whether other govt
branches have acted within the limits of the Constitution
" 15 YEARS SINCE THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
requiring Congress to provide for a system of absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad
PREMATURITY OF QUESTION OF PRORPRIETY: There are no
ongoing
proceedings (judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial)
o In legislative acts which are claimed to contravene the
Constitution, the judiciary not only has the right but also the
duty to settle the dispute

interest admit of
several exceptions:
1. Over-breadth doctrine (HELD
APPLICABLE)
Assuming arguendo that
petitioners have no relationship
with their patrons, challengers
are in effect permitted to
raise the rights of 3rd parties
where a statute needlessly
restrains constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
o The ordinance is a sweeping
intrusion into the
right to liberty of their
clients.
2. Taxpayers suit
3. Third party standing (HELD
APPLICABLE)
a. Litigant suffered injury-in-fact,
giving him sufficiently
concrete interest in the issues
outcome business of
petitioners are likewise
injured by the ordinance
b. Litigant must have a close
relation to the 3rd party
petitioners rely on their
customers patronage for
their viability which is
threatened by the ordinance
c. There must exist some
hindrance to the 3rd partys ability
to
protect his own interests relative
silence in
constitutional litigation of

such special interest may

be construed as hindrance of
customers to bring suit
4. Transcendental importance