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This is a sample of our (approximately) 7 page long Remoteness Of Damage notes, which we sell as part
of the Tort Law Notescollection, a Distinction package written at Oxbridge in 2015 that contains
(approximately) 944 pages of notes across 172 different documents.
That as long as some damage of the relevant kind was reasonably foreseeable o D liable for all damage of
that kind. o Giliker: thus Lords only drew distinction between property damage and other kinds of
damage (i.e. economic loss, personal injury)
Second interpretation (supported by Authority):
As long as some damage foreseeable from D's action o D would be liable for all damage that resulted
from that
The Wagon Mound (1) - D negligently spilt oil into the water from his ship, which spread out among the
harbour. After leaving with no attempt to do anything, some welders on the quay were welding. A spark
ignited some cotton waste that was floating in the water, which in turn ignited the oil and caused
considerable damage to the equipment and wharf. o Viscount Simonds
If it is asked why a man should be responsible for the natural or necessary or probable consequences of
his act (or any other similar description of them)
the answer is that it is not because they are natural or necessary or probable,
but because, since they have this quality, it is judged by the standard of the reasonable man that he ought
to have foreseen them o the test for the liability for fire is foreseeability of injury by fire Principles set out
Need only be foreseeability of the "kind of damage" that eventuates - no need to foresee the exact way the
harm comes about o Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963]:C, 8yo boy, takes paraffin lamp from unattended
open manhole cover and goes down into the area to explore. Owing to complicated scientific reasons, this
And no distinction between burning caused by flame of lamp and burning caused by unforeseeable
explosion. o Would be overly pedantic o And unjust to say can only have damages if spilled lamp and
burnt child
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They both saw each other over 200 yds and neither took evasive action. The fault was ruled to be 25% P's
and 75% D's. Shortly after the accident P was shot in the leg and it had to be amputated immediately. HL
held that the subsequent shooting was irrelevant to the amount of damages that D had to pay, and that D
would have to pay the value of 25% of the damage to the leg overall (i.e. NO reduction despite the fact
that D did not cause the leg to be shot and amputated). The shooting and car accident were to be treated as
concurrent causes of the disability and each was liable for the full damage to the leg i.e. that D should
have to pay the full amount for the long term damage he would have caused (had there been no shooting)
despite the fact that P would have been shot anyway (and P's actions made irrelevant). Lord Pearson: we
should take a "unitary and comprehensive" view of the original injury, assessing it as a "devaluation" in
the leg, for which the responsible party should pay (though only for the proportion of the devaluation for
which he was responsible). The only thing that could change the amount to be paid is a reduction in the
extent of the devaluation e.g. an unexpected recovery OR a shortening of P's life expectancy i.e. the
period over which the plaintiff will suffer from the devaluation. If another tort occurs then the new
tortfeasor will be liable for the further devaluation. The life-shortening point is supported by the fact that
if an injury costs P 20 years working income by destroying
his capacity to work, and then after only 1 year P dies of an unrelated event, it would be unfair to make D
pay for 20 years since this would no longer be compensation. Lord Reid: There were 2 concurrent causes
of P's disability and both tortfeasors should have to pay for the suffering they cause. This seems logical:
The "but for" test would support Lord Reid's conclusion since even "but for the shooting" P would still be
disabled. The correct approach is that adopted: to say that each party has to pay for the "devaluation" that
they cause, making a qualification for cases where the extent of the devaluation has been reduced by
something, for example a wonder-cure: this qualification is made by Lord Pearson. The shooting does not
absolve P of responsibility for disabling D, since even without the shooting D would still have been
disabled: it merely aggravated the situation. Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794: In 1973 P,
who was expected to work until 1985 suffered an injury due to his employer's, D's, negligence which
would reduce his capacity to work by 50% for the rest of his working life. Independently of this, in 1975,
he contracted a disease that totally incapacitated him. Does D have to pay him 50%
for 3 years or 50% for 12? HL say for 3 years, since "the myelopathy (totally incapacitating disease)
could not be disregarded since the court must provide just and sufficient but not excessive compensation".
Lord Wilberforce: there are no overall rules that can govern this type of case that are universally fair and
the best the courts can do is to assess just compensation on a case by case without
rationalisation/exposition of universal guidelines/principles. Bad for legal certainty + inconsistency
potential. The "vicissitudes" argument was adopted by several judges: that the contingencies/vicissitudes
of life can change a person's fortunes and it would be wrong to ignore them when arriving at a fair
settlement: the courts "should not speculate when they know" (Lord E-D). Problem is that this fails to
reconcile Jobling with Willoughby. The House of Lords criticised the ruling in Willoughby on the grounds
that it did not comply with the vicissitudes principle- Lord Reid. The problem with the vicissitudes
argument is that it prioritises "potential causes" over "actual causes". In this case half the disability was
caused by the negligence and the rest completed by the disease. If the disease had struck first then it
would have been the cause, but as it happens the negligence happened first and caused half the disability.
The fact that another "concurrent cause" (to use the Willoughby language) operates to complete the
disability does not change what the original cause was or the fact that it is still operating: The vicissitudes
argument assumes that there is only ever one cause, which is incorrect. Lord Keith said that he would
reconcile Willoughby with the present case by saying that Willoughby was restricted to cases where there
were two tortious acts, unlike the present case. Lords Bridge and E-D imply a desire to overrule
Willoughby. Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074: Ds messed up the blood pressure
levels when P was a baby with the result that they treated him incorrectly and he
that D did not cause the leg to be shot and amputated). The shooting and car accident were to be treated as
concurrent causes of the disability and each was liable for the full damage to the leg i.e. that D should
have to pay the full amount for the long term damage he would have caused (had there been no shooting)
despite the fact that P would have been shot anyway (and P's actions made irrelevant). Lord Pearson: we
should take a "unitary and comprehensive" view of the original injury, assessing it as a "devaluation" in
the leg, for which the responsible party should pay (though only for the proportion of the devaluation for
which he was responsible). The only thing that could change the amount to be paid is a reduction in the
extent of the devaluation e.g. an unexpected recovery OR a shortening of P's life expectancy i.e. the
period over which the plaintiff will suffer from the devaluation. If another tort occurs then the new
tortfeasor will be liable for the further devaluation. The life-shortening point is supported by the fact that
if an injury costs P 20 years working income by destroying
his capacity to work, and then after only 1 year P dies of an unrelated event, it would be unfair to make D
pay for 20 years since this would no longer be compensation. Lord Reid: There were 2 concurrent causes
of P's disability and both tortfeasors should have to pay for the suffering they cause. This seems logical:
The "but for" test would support Lord Reid's conclusion since even "but for the shooting" P would still be
disabled. The correct approach is that adopted: to say that each party has to pay for the "devaluation" that
they cause, making a qualification for cases where the extent of the devaluation has been reduced by
something, for example a wonder-cure: this qualification is made by Lord Pearson. The shooting does not
absolve P of responsibility for disabling D, since even without the shooting D would still have been
disabled: it merely aggravated the situation. Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794: In 1973 P,
who was expected to work until 1985 suffered an injury due to his employer's, D's, negligence which
would reduce his capacity to work by 50% for the rest of his working life. Independently of this, in 1975,
he contracted a disease that totally incapacitated him. Does D have to pay him 50%
for 3 years or 50% for 12? HL say for 3 years, since "the myelopathy (totally incapacitating disease)
could not be disregarded since the court must provide just and sufficient but not excessive compensation".
Lord Wilberforce: there are no overall rules that can govern this type of case that are universally fair and
the best the courts can do is to assess just compensation on a case by case without
rationalisation/exposition of universal guidelines/principles. Bad for legal certainty + inconsistency
potential. The "vicissitudes" argument was adopted by several judges: that the contingencies/vicissitudes
of life can change a person's fortunes and it would be wrong to ignore them when arriving at a fair
settlement: the courts "should not speculate when they know" (Lord E-D). Problem is that this fails to
reconcile Jobling with Willoughby. The House of Lords criticised the ruling in Willoughby on the grounds
that it did not comply with the vicissitudes principle- Lord Reid. The problem with the vicissitudes
argument is that it prioritises "potential causes" over "actual causes". In this case half the disability was
caused by the negligence and the rest completed by the disease. If the disease had struck first then it
would have been the cause, but as it happens the negligence happened first and caused half the disability.
The fact that another "concurrent cause" (to use the Willoughby language) operates to complete the
disability does not change what the original cause was or the fact that it is still operating: The vicissitudes
argument assumes that there is only ever one cause, which is incorrect. Lord Keith said that he would
reconcile Willoughby with the present case by saying that Willoughby was restricted to cases where there
were two tortious acts, unlike the present case. Lords Bridge and E-D imply a desire to overrule
Willoughby. Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074: Ds messed up the blood pressure
levels when P was a baby with the result that they treated him incorrectly and he
****************************End Of Sample*****************************
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needed a respray, the need for it did not flow from D's negligence and therefore he would not be liable.
Lord Evershed MR says to allow P to claim for damage that merely "would have" been caused by D in
other circumstances is absurd: suppose A chips my windscreen so I have to get a new one and then you
chip it: surely you shouldn't compensate me because there is no extra damage caused by your action.
Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467 (NB CONFINED TO CASES OF TWO TORTIOUS ACTS BY
JOBLING): P walked into the middle of the road and D, driving, ran into him, causing damage to P's leg.
They both saw each other over 200 yds and neither took evasive action. The fault was ruled to be 25% P's
and 75% D's. Shortly after the accident P was shot in the leg and it had to be amputated immediately. HL
held that the subsequent shooting was irrelevant to the amount of damages that D had to pay, and that D
would have to pay the value of 25% of the damage to the leg overall (i.e. NO reduction despite the fact
that D did not cause the leg to be shot and amputated). The shooting and car accident were to be treated as
concurrent causes of the disability and each was liable for the full damage to the leg i.e. that D should
have to pay the full amount for the long term damage he would have caused (had there been no shooting)
despite the fact that P would have been shot anyway (and P's actions made irrelevant). Lord Pearson: we
should take a "unitary and comprehensive" view of the original injury, assessing it as a "devaluation" in
the leg, for which the responsible party should pay (though only for the proportion of the devaluation for
which he was responsible). The only thing that could change the amount to be paid is a reduction in the
extent of the devaluation e.g. an unexpected recovery OR a shortening of P's life expectancy i.e. the
period over which the plaintiff will suffer from the devaluation. If another tort occurs then the new
tortfeasor will be liable for the further devaluation. The life-shortening point is supported by the fact that
if an injury costs P 20 years working income by destroying
his capacity to work, and then after only 1 year P dies of an unrelated event, it would be unfair to make D
pay for 20 years since this would no longer be compensation. Lord Reid: There were 2 concurrent causes
of P's disability and both tortfeasors should have to pay for the suffering they cause. This seems logical:
The "but for" test would support Lord Reid's conclusion since even "but for the shooting" P would still be
disabled. The correct approach is that adopted: to say that each party has to pay for the "devaluation" that
they cause, making a qualification for cases where the extent of the devaluation has been reduced by
something, for example a wonder-cure: this qualification is made by Lord Pearson. The shooting does not
absolve P of responsibility for disabling D, since even without the shooting D would still have been
disabled: it merely aggravated the situation. Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1982] AC 794: In 1973 P,
who was expected to work until 1985 suffered an injury due to his employer's, D's, negligence which
would reduce his capacity to work by 50% for the rest of his working life. Independently of this, in 1975,
he contracted a disease that totally incapacitated him. Does D have to pay him 50%
for 3 years or 50% for 12? HL say for 3 years, since "the myelopathy (totally incapacitating disease)
could not be disregarded since the court must provide just and sufficient but not excessive compensation".
Lord Wilberforce: there are no overall rules that can govern this type of case that are universally fair and
the best the courts can do is to assess just compensation on a case by case without
rationalisation/exposition of universal guidelines/principles. Bad for legal certainty + inconsistency
potential. The "vicissitudes" argument was adopted by several judges: that the contingencies/vicissitudes
of life can change a person's fortunes and it would be wrong to ignore them when arriving at a fair
settlement: the courts "should not speculate when they know" (Lord E-D). Problem is that this fails to
reconcile Jobling with Willoughby. The House of Lords criticised the ruling in Willoughby on the grounds
that it did not comply with the vicissitudes principle- Lord Reid. The problem with the vicissitudes
argument is that it prioritises "potential causes" over "actual causes". In this case half the disability was
caused by the negligence and the rest completed by the disease. If the disease had struck first then it
would have been the cause, but as it happens the negligence happened first and caused half the disability.
The fact that another "concurrent cause" (to use the Willoughby language) operates to complete the
disability does not change what the original cause was or the fact that it is still operating: The vicissitudes
argument assumes that there is only ever one cause, which is incorrect. Lord Keith said that he would
reconcile Willoughby with the present case by saying that Willoughby was restricted to cases where there
were two tortious acts, unlike the present case. Lords Bridge and E-D imply a desire to overrule
Willoughby. Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074: Ds messed up the blood pressure
levels when P was a baby with the result that they treated him incorrectly and he
****************************End Of Sample*****************************
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