A A Skin Not A Sweater - David Marsh y Paul Furlong

Contents
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes x

Preface to the Second Edition xi
Notes on Contributors xiii
Introduction 1
Gerry Stoker and David Marsh
The discipline of political science: a celebration of diversity 3
What is politics? What is it that political scientists study? 8
What is a scientific approach to politics? 11
Connecting to the world of politics 12
Is there a standard method for undertaking political science? 15
Conclusion 16
1 A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in

Political Science 17
David Marsh and Paul Furlong
Ontology and epistemology 18
Different approaches to ontology and epistemology 22
Ontology and epistemology in political science: two cases 32
Conclusion 40
Further reading 41
PART I APPROACHES
2 Behavouralism 45
David Sanders
The rise of the behavioural movement and its core
characteristics 46
Criticisms of the behavioural approach 51
The strengths of the behavioural approach: an example 55
Conclusion: the behavioural legacy in the twenty-first century 62
Further reading 63
v
vi Contents
3 Rational Choice 65
Hugh Ward
The development of rational choice theory 65

The key commitments and assumptions of the
mainstream variant 68
Criticisms of rational choice theory 71
Developments: where is rational choice going? 84
Conclusions 88
Further reading 89
4 Institutionalism 90
Vivien Lowndes
Introduction 90
The `traditional' institutional approach 92
The rise of the `new institutionalism' 94
What's new about new institutionalism? The core features
of the approach 97
New institutionalist dilemmas 101
Conclusion 107
Further reading 108
5 Feminism 109
Vicky Randall
Debates within feminism 110

Feminism and political science 113
Critical responses to feminist political science 127
Conclusion: the way forward 129
Further reading 130
6 Interpretive Theory 131

Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes
The importance of interpretation 132

Varieties of interpretation 134
An anti-foundational approach to interpretation 139
Criticisms of interpretive theory 149
Conclusion 151
Further reading 152
Contents vii
7 Marxism 153
David Marsh
The development of Marxism 153
What has Marxism to offer? 163
Conclusion 170
Further reading 171
8 Normative Theory 172

Steve Buckler
Logical positivism and the death of political philosophy 172
Interpretive theory 176
Critical theory and dialectics 181
Deontological theory and value pluralism 185
Conclusion 192
Further reading 193
PART II METHODS
9 Qualitative Methods 197

Fiona Devine
The role of qualitative methods in political science 197
The epistemological underpinnings of qualitative methods 200
Criticisms of qualitative research 204
Illustration of qualitative research 207
Conclusion 215
Further reading 215
10 Quantitative Methods 216

Peter John
The collection and management of data 218
The power of description 220
Tables and inferential statistics 222
Multivariate analysis 225
Beyond ordinary least squares 225
Conclusion 229
Further reading 230
11 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 231

Melvyn Read and David Marsh
Quantitative and qualitative methods: a false dichotomy? 231
Combining research methods 231
Problems of combination 240
viii Contents
Two case studies 242

Conclusion 247
Further reading 248
12 Comparative Methods 249

Jonathan Hopkin
Introduction 249
Theory and the comparative method 249
Basic forms of comparative explanation 252
Large Ns: quantitative comparative strategies 255
Limitations of the quantitative comparative approach 258
Small Ns: qualitative comparative strategies 260
Quantity or quality? Quantitative versus qualitative
comparative research 261
Conclusion: challenges to the comparative method 265
Further reading 267
PART III ISSUES
13 Structure and Agency 271

Stuart McAnulla
Introduction: structure and agency a problem for all? 271
Structure and agency: what's really in it for us? 272
The postmodern onslaught 281
The morphogenetic approach 285
Conclusion 290
Further reading 291
14 Institutions and Ideas 292

Mark Blyth
Introduction 292
Don't worry about the philosophy . . . 294
Why institutions? Producing a `conventional' wisdom in
political science 296
Changing the conventional wisdom: reinventing institutions 298
Historical and rational institutionalism 300
Explaining change and stability: the turn to ideas 301
Rationalism and ideas 303
Historical institutionalism and ideas 305
Conclusion: rival ontologies and progress in political science 307
Further reading 310
Contents ix
Conclusion 311
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker
The importance of ontological and epistemological issues 311
The growth of diversity in the formal study of politics 313
Beware gatekeeping 315
A plea for dialogue 316
Bibliography 318
Author Index 350
Subject Index 355
Chapter 1
A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology

and Epistemology in Political
Science
DAVID MARSH AND PAUL FURLONG
This chapter introduces the reader to the key issues that underpin what we
do as social or political scientists. Each social scientist's orientation to their
subject is shaped by their ontological and epistemological position. Most
often those positions are implicit rather than explicit, but, regardless of
whether they are acknowledged, they shape the approach to theory and the
methods which the social scientist utilises. At first these issues seem
difficult but our major point is that they are not issues that can be avoided
(for a similar view see Blyth, Chapter 14). They are like a skin not a
sweater: they cannot be put on and taken off whenever the researcher sees
fit. In our view, all students of political science should recognise and
acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological positions and be
able to defend these positions against critiques from other positions. This
means they need to understand the alternative positions on these
fundamental questions. As such, this chapter has two key aims. First, we
will introduce these ontological and epistemological questions in as
accessible a way as possible in order to allow the reader who is new to
these issues to reflect on their own position. Second, this introduction is
crucial to the readers of this book because the authors of the subsequent
chapters address these issues and they inform the subject matter of their
chapters. As such, this basic introduction is also essential for readers who
want fully to appreciate the substantive content of this book.
The chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section
describes what we mean by these two terms òntology' and èpistemology'
and considers briefly why these questions are important. The second
section then outlines the different positions on ontology and epistemology
and the arguments which have been put forward for and against these
positions. Finally, we shall illustrate how these different positions shape
the approaches that researchers take to their research by focusing on
research in two broad areas: globalisation and multilevel governance.
17
18 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science
Ontology and epistemology
Ontological and epistemological positions are related, but need to be

separated. To put it crudely, one's ontological position affects, but far
from determines, one's epistemological position.
Ontology
Ontological questions are prior because they deal with the very nature of
`being'; literally, an ontology is a theory of `being' (the word derives from
the Greek for èxistence'). This sounds difficult, but really it is not. The
key question is whether there is a `real' world òut there' that is
independent of our knowledge of it. For example, are there essential
differences between genders, classes or races that exist in all contexts and
at all times?
A simple illustration easily makes the point. Over the last ten years John
Gray's book Men are from Mars and Women are from Venus (1992) has
sold seven million copies in the USA and millions more in forty countries
worldwide. He argues that men and women are very different and that
men and women can only understand and deal with one another better if
they recognise this fact of life. This book takes a clear ontological position;
there are fundamental differences between men and women that are
features of their very existence. These differences persist over time and
are common across cultures. This is an essentialist or a foundationalist
ontological position. So, its proponents argue that there are essential
differences of `being' that provide the foundations upon which social life
is built.
Of course, this is a contentious position; one which is strongly attacked
by many, if not most, feminists. They believe that the differences between
men and women are socially constructed. As such, they are not essential
differences but are particular to a given culture and time. They are the
product of patriarchy, in which male dominance shapes the culture and
values of society, affects patterns of socialisation and perpetuates gender
inequality. This argument reflects a different ontological position that is
anti-foundationalist and emphasises the social construction of social
phenomena.
Epistemology
If an ontological position reflects the researcher's view about the nature of
the world, their epistemological position reflects their view of what we can
David Marsh and Paul Furlong 19
know about the world and how we can know it; literally an epistemology
is a theory of knowledge. Again, this sounds difficult, but the basic
concerns are not too difficult. There are two key questions. Can an
observer identify `real' or òbjective' relations between social phenomena?
If so, how? The first question itself subsumes two issues. Initially, it takes
us back to ontology; if one is an anti-foundationalist, then one argues that
there is not a `real' world, which exists independently of the meaning
which actors attach to their action, to discover. At the same time, such an
anti-foundationalist would also suggest that no observer can be òbjective'
because they live in the social world and are affected by the social
constructions of `reality'. This is sometimes called the double hermeneutic;
the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their
interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level).
The second question raises another important, and clearly related, issue.
To the extent that we can establish `real' relationships between social
phenomena, can we do this simply through direct observation, or are there
some relationships which èxist' but are not directly observable? The
answers one gives to these questions shapes one's epistemological position.
Of course, there are different ways of classifying epistemological
positions and there is no agreement as to the best way. Probably the most
common classification distinguishes between scientific (sometimes positi-
vist) and hermeneutic (or interpretist) positions. We shall begin with a
brief review of that distinction, before proposing an alternative, which
distinguishes between positivist, realist and interpretist positions.
Scientific versus hermeneutic approaches

Social science was influenced by the ideas of science as the nomenclature
clearly indicates. In particular, the empiricist tradition played a crucial role
in the development of social science. David Hume argued that knowledge
starts from our senses. On the basis of such direct experience we could
develop generalisations about the relationships between physical phenom-
ena. The aim was to develop causal statements which specified that, under
a given set of conditions, there would be regular and predictable outcomes
(on this see Hollis and Smith 1990: ch. 3). The adherents of the scientific
tradition saw social science as analogous to science. In ontological terms
they were foundationalists; they thought there was a real world òut there'
which was external to agents. Their focus was upon identifying the causes
of social behaviour. The emphasis was upon explanation and many felt
that the use of rigorous `scientific' methods would allow social scientists to
develop laws, similar in status to scientific laws, which would hold across
time and space.
In methodological terms, the scientific tradition was greatly influenced

by logical positivism that posited a very straightforward characterisation
of the form of scientific investigation. As Hollis and Smith put it (1990: 50):
To detect the regularities in nature, propose a generalisation, deduce
what it implies for the next case and observe whether the prediction
succeeds. If it does, no consequent action is needed; if it does not, then
either discard the generalisation or amend it and [test the] fresh
[predictions].
In contrast, there is an alternative hermeneutic (the word derives from
the Greek for `to interpret') or interpretist tradition. The adherents of this
position are anti-foundationalists, believing that the world is socially
constructed. They focus upon the meaning of behaviour. The emphasis
is upon understanding, rather than explanation. As such, in the interpretist
tradition it is not possible to establish causal relationships between
phenomena that hold across time and space.
Positivist, realist and interpretist positions

We prefer this classification because the scientific tradition identified by
Hollis and Smith conflates two distinct positions, positivism and realism.
Positivists adhere to a foundationalist ontology and are concerned to
establish causal relationships between social phenomema, thus developing
explanatory, and indeed predictive, models. The realist is also founda-
tionalist in ontological terms. However, realists, unlike positivists, do not
privilege direct observation. The realist believes that there are deep
structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be
directly observed, but which are crucial for any explanation of behaviour.
So, as an example, a realist might argue that patriarchy as a structure
cannot be directly observed, although we can see many of the
consequences of it; we return to this example later.
The distinction between positivist, realist and interpretist approaches is
examined in much more depth in the next section. However, the key point
here is that any classification that we adopt would annoy some social
scientists. We use this particular distinction because we are realists and, as
such, do not like the conflation between positivism and realism involved in
the first distinction. However, many other authors would question our
distinction. In particular, many, like Bevir and Rhodes (see below) would
want to make further distinctions within the tradition of interpretive
theory. The point is that any way of classifying epistemological positions
can be contested; we choose one, but are aware of the criticism of it. In
addition, we shall deal with many of those criticisms when we look at the
variants within the three positions we identify.
Why are such distinctions important?
In our view, ontological and epistemological concerns cannot, and should

not, be ignored or downgraded. Three points are important here:
1. First, these concerns should not be put in what the Australians, with
typical directness, call the `too hard basket'. Certainly, the issues
involved are not easy, but neither are they difficult, if they are
explained simply and with appropriate examples.
2. Second, ontological and epistemological positions should not be
treated like a sweater that can be `put on' when we are addressing
such philosophical issues and `taken off' when we are doing research.
In our view, the dominance of a fairly crude positivist epistemology
throughout much of the postwar period encouraged many social
scientists to dismiss ontological questions and regard epistemological
issues as more or less resolved, with only the details left to be decided
by those interested in such matters. Such social scientists have tended
to acknowledge the importance of epistemology without considering it
necessary to deal with it in detail; positivism has been regarded as a
comforting sweater that can be put on where necessary. In contrast, we
would argue that epistemology, to say nothing of ontology, is far from
being a closed debate.
3. Third, researchers cannot adopt one position at one time for one
project and another on another occasion for a different project. These
positions are not interchangeable because they reflect fundamental
different approaches to what social science is and how we do it. This is
the key point. As we pointed out in the introduction, a researcher's
epistemological position is reflected in what is studied, how it is
studied and the status the researcher gives to their findings. So, a
positivist looks for causal relationships, tends to prefer quantitative
analysis (for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between
ontology, epistemology and methodology, see Chapter 11) and wants
to produce òbjective' and generalisable findings. A researcher from
within the interpretist tradition is concerned with understanding, not
explanation, focuses on the meaning that actions have for agents, tends
to use qualitative evidence and offers their results as one interpretation
of the relationship between the social phenomena studied. Realism is
less easy to classify in this way. The realists are looking for causal
relationships, but think that many important relationships between
social phenomena cannot be observed. This means they may use
quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data will only be
appropriate for those relationships that are directly observable. In
contrast, the unobservable relationships can only be established
indirectly; we can observe other relationships which, our theory tells

us, are the result of those unobservable prelationships. We return to
these issues in the next section.
Different approaches to ontology and epistemology
Here we outline the positivist, the interpretist and the realist positions in
more detail. We shall focus on: the major criticisms of the positions; the
variations within these positions; and the way the positions have changed
over time. At the outset, however, it is important to emphasise that the
distinctions between the positions, and more specifically that between
interpretism and realism, are not clear-cut.
Positivism
The core of positivism is fairly straightforward, although of course there
are variants within it:
. Positivism is based upon a foundationalist ontology. So, to the

positivist, like the realist, but unlike those from the interpretist position,
the world exists independently of our knowledge of it.
. To the positivist, natural science and social science are broadly
analogous. We can establish regular relationships between social
phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested
by direct observation. In this view, and in clear contrast to the realist,
there are no deep structures that cannot be observed. Traditionally,
positivism contended that there is no appearance/reality dichotomy and
that the world is real and not socially constructed. So, direct
observation can serve as an independent test of the validity of a theory.
Crucially, an observer can be objective in the way they undertake such
observations. Researchers from the interpretist tradition rarely accept
any notion of objectivity. Realists accept that all observation is
mediated by theory (to the realist, theory plays the crucial role in
allowing the researcher to distinguish between those social phenomena
which are directly observable and those which are not).
. To positivists the aim of social science is to make causal statements; in
their view it is possible to, and we should attempt to, establish causal
relationships between social phenomena. They share this aim with
realists, while interpretists deny the possibility of such statements.
. Positivists also argue that it is possible to separate empirical questions
that is, questions about what is from normative questions that is,
questions about what should be. Traditionally, positivists thought that
the goal of social science was to pursue empirical questions, while

philosophy, metaphysics or religion pursued the normative questions.
Because we can separate empirical and normative questions, it is
possible for social science to be objective and value-free. Realists and,
especially, those from within the interpretist tradition would reject that
proposition.
Many social scientists are positivists, although much of the positivism is
implicit rather than explicit. The behavioural revolution in the social
sciences in the 1960s, dealt with by David Sanders in Chapter 2, was an
attempt to introduce scientific method into the study of society. It was an
explicit reaction to political theory, which it saw as concerned with
normative questions, and institutionalism, which it saw as lacking theore-
tical and methodological rigour. In contrast, it was based upon a
foundationalist ontology and, most often, a quantitative methodology
(but see below and Chapter 10). The view was that a social `science'
was possible if we followed the scientific method; deriving hypotheses
from theory and then testing them in an attempt to falsify them. We
needed òbjective' measures of our social phenomena, our variables; as
such, we would focus upon `hard' data from government statistics,
election results and so on rather than soft data from interviews or
participant observation. So, for example, if a positivist was studying
political participation, they would be interested in measuring the level of
voting, party or pressure group membership, direct action or whatever,
and relating it to demographic variables such as class, gender, race and
education. The aim would be to establish the precise nature of the
relationship between these variables and participation in order to produce
causal models. We shall return to this example later. The key point here is
that, as always, the ontological and epistemological position adopted had
clear methodological implications.
The criticism of positivism takes two broad forms. The first line of
criticism broadly argues that, in following the methods of science,
positivists misinterpret how science really proceeds. Two lines of argument
have been particularly important here. First, there is the pragmatist
position of Quine (1961) who develops two crucial critiques of positivism
(for a fuller exposition see Hollis and Smith 1990: 557; they deal with a
third, less important, criticism):
(i) Quine argues that any knowledge we derive from the five senses is
mediated by the concepts we use to analyse it, so there is no way of
classifying, or even describing, experience without interpreting it.
(ii) This means that theory and experiment are not simply separable,
rather theory affects both the facts we focus on and how we interpret
them. This, in turn, may affect the conclusions we draw if the facts
appear to falsify the theory. As such, if we observe `facts' which are

inconsistent with the theory, we might decide that the facts are wrong
rather than that the theory is wrong. Of course, this undermines the
notion that observation alone can serve to falsify a theory.
Second, there is Kuhn's view (1970) that, at any given time, science tends
to be dominated by a particular paradigm that is unquestioned and which
affects the questions scientists ask and how they interpret what they
observe (for a fuller discussion, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 5761).
Consequently, scientific investigation is not òpen', as positivism implies,
rather certain conclusions are almost unthinkable. There is a `paradigm
shift' when a lot of empirical observation leads certain, brave, scientists to
question the dominant paradigm, but until that time, and for the most
part, scientists discard observations which do not fit (obviously this fits
well with the second of Quine's criticisms above) and embrace the results
which confirm the paradigm.
The second main line of criticism of positivism is more particular to
social science. It argues that there are obvious differences between social
and physical or natural phenomena that make social `science' impossible.
Three differences are particularly important. First, social structures, unlike
natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they shape.
So, for example, marriage is a social institution or structure, but it is also a
lived experience, particularly, although not exclusively, for those who are
married. This lived experience affects agents' understanding of the
institution and also helps change it. Second, and related, social structures,
unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of agents' views of
what they are doing in the activity. People are reflexive; they reflect on
what they are doing and often change their actions in the light of that
reflection. This leads us to the third difference. Social structures, unlike
natural structures, change as a result of the actions of agents; in most
senses the social world varies across time and space. Some positivist social
scientists minimise these differences, but, to the extent they are accepted,
they point towards a more interpretist epistemological position.
Many positivists avoid these critiques which are put in the `too hard
basket'. However, the more sophisticated positivists are aware of these
criticisms and the position has changed significantly as a result. Fortu-
nately, this volume boasts two sophisticated behaviouralists who are
positivists, Sanders and John. It is particularly worth examining David
Sanders' view in a little more detail because it represents an excellent
example of the modern, more sophisticated, positivist position. Sanders
(Chapter 2) accepts he has been strongly influenced by the positivist
position, but acknowledges the `ferocious philosophical criticism' to which
it was subjected. He argues that `post-behaviouralists', who might also be
called `post-positivists': acknowledge the interdependence of theory and

observation; recognise that normative questions are important and not
always easy to separate from empirical questions; and accept that other
traditions have a key role to play in political and social analysis. As such,
this post-positivism has moved a significant way from more traditional
positivism, largely as a result of the type of criticisms outlined here.
However, the ontological and epistemological problems have not gone
away, rather they have been elided. Two quotes from Sanders illustrate the
point. First, he argues (see Chapter 2: 51):
Modern behaviouralists `post-behaviouralists' simply prefer to
subject their own theoretical claims to empirical tests. They also suspect
that scholars working in non-empirical traditions are never able to
provide a satisfactory answer to the crucial question: `How would you
know if you were wrong?'
Later he continues (Chapter 2: 54):
For modern behaviouralists, the ultimate test of a good theory is still
whether or not it is consistent with observation with the available
empirical evidence. Modern behaviouralists are perfectly prepared to
accept that different theoretical positions are likely to produce different
observations. They insist however, that, whatever òbservations' are
implied by a particular theoretical perspective, those observations must
be used in order to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that
is being posited.
This is a sophisticated statement of a positivist epistemological position,
but it is still essentially positivist. The aim is to use observation (of
whatever type) to test hypothesised relationships between the social
phenomena studied. Research from within other traditions must still be
judged against the positivists' criteria: òbservation must be used in order
to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that is being posited'.
Yet, that is not a standard most researchers from within an interpretist
tradition could accept (even Bevir and Rhodes 1999 could only do so with
major qualifications), because they do not believe that direct observation
can be objective and used as a test of `reality'. Most realists would also
have a problem with Sanders' position because they would see many of the
key relationships as unobservable.
One other aspect of Sanders' position is important here. He accepts that
interpretation and meaning are important, which might suggest that the
differences between positivist and interpretist traditions are beginning to
dissolve. So, Sanders argues (Chapter 2: 53), in criticising prior studies of
voting behaviour: `There are other areas relating to the way in which
individuals reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, upon themselves where
behavioural research has simply not dared to tread.' He recognises that

such factors might, or might not, be important, but emphasises that they
would be difficult to study empirically. However, the crucial point is that
Sanders wants to treat interpretation and meaning as intervening variables.
In this view, how a voter understands the parties and their own position
may affect their voting behaviour. At best, this acknowledges only one
aspect of the double hermeneutic; the interpretist tradition would argue
that we also need to acknowledge the subjectivity of the observer.
So, positivism has changed in response to criticism. Post-positivism is
much less assertive that there is only one way of doing social science.
However, it still emphasises explanation, rather than understanding, and
the primacy of direct observation. In our terms, it is still foundationalist
and firmly located in the scientific tradition.
The interpretist position

The interpretist tradition is the obvious òther' of positivism. However, it
is a much broader church than positivism and much of this subsection will
deal with its variants. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin with an outline of
the core of the position.
. In the interpretist tradition researchers reject the notion that the world
exists independently of our knowledge of it. Rather, they contend that
the world is socially or discursively constructed. This view is
diametrically opposed to positivism, but shares certain features with
some modern variants of realism. In ontological terms, then, this
position is anti-foundationalist.
. This means that for researchers working within this tradition social
phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them;
rather it is this interpretation/understanding of social phenomena which
affects outcomes. As such, it is the interpretations/meanings of social
phenomena that are crucial; interpretations/meanings which can only be
established and understood within discourses or traditions. Conse-
quently, we should focus on identifying those discourses or traditions
and establishing the interpretations and meanings they attach to social
phenomena.
. However, we must also acknowledge that òbjective' analysis is
impossible. Social `scientists' (of course interpretists would not use this
term) are not privileged, but themselves operate within discourses or
traditions. Consequently, knowledge is theoretically or discursively
laden. As such, this position acknowledges the double hermeneutic.
This position has clear methodological implications. It argues that there
is no objective truth, that the world is socially constructed and that the role
of social `scientists' [sic] is to study those social constructions. Quantitative

methods can be blunt instruments and may produce misleading data. In
contrast, we need to utilise qualitative methods interviews, focus groups,
vignettes and so on to help us establish how people understand their
world. So, for example, someone operating from within this tradition
studying political participation would start by trying to establish how
people understand `the political' and `political' participation
The major criticism of the interpretist tradition comes, unsurprisingly,
from positivists, though some realists would agree with elements of that
critique. To positivists, the interpretist tradition merely offers opinions or
subjective judgements about the world. As such, there is no basis on which
to judge the validity of their knowledge claims. One person's view of the
world, and of the relationship between social phenomena within it, is as
good as another's view. To many positivists, this means that such research
is akin to history, or even fiction, whereas they aspire to a science of
society. It is difficult for someone in the interpretist tradition to answer
this accusation, because it is based on a totally different ontological view
and reflects a different epistemology and, thus, a different view of what
social science is about. However, as we shall see, most researchers do
believe that it is possible to generalise, if only in a limited sense. Perhaps
more interestingly, Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) attempt to defend
their approach against this positivist critique by establishing a basis on
which they can make knowledge claims; on which they can claim that one
interpretation, or narrative, is superior to another. We shall return to their
argument below.
Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming: ch. 2) distinguish between the herme-
neutic and postmodern, or post-structuralist, strands in the interpretist
position. In essence, the hermeneutic tradition is idealist; it argues that we
need to understand the meanings people attach to social behaviour. So,
hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of texts and actions.
This involves the use of ethnographic techniques (participant observation,
transcribing texts, keeping diaries and so on) to produce what Geertz
(1973) calls `thick description'. As Bevir and Rhodes put it, quoting Geertz,
the aim is to establish òur own constructions of other people's construc-
tions of what they and their compatriots are up to'. However, ethnogra-
phers do generalise. They develop a narrative about the past based upon
the meanings which the actions had for social actors. Then, on the basis of
this `thick description', they offer an interpretation of what this tells us
about the society. The point is that these interpretations are always partial,
in both senses of the world, and provisional; they are not `true'.
More recently, as Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) emphasise, post-
structuralism and postmodernism have provided a powerful challenge to
foundationalism in both philosophy and social science. Yet, as Bevir and
Rhodes also point out, this variant of the interpretist tradition is itself so
diverse that it is difficult, if not impossible, to characterise. They overcome
this problem by focusing on the work of Michel Foucault, who is perhaps
the best-known writer in this broad tradition. He, like most post-
structuralists and postmodernists, is a strong opponent of foundationalism
and the modernisation project associated with the Enlightenment. This
project argues that: the basis of human knowledge is direct experience; as
such, it is possible to develop an òbjective' view of the `real' world (thus, it
denies both elements of the double hermeneutic); language is transparent
or neutral; and that human history is inevitably progressive, with present
knowledge building on past knowledge to improve our information about
the world and our ability to control it.
In contrast, Foucault argues that experience is acquired within a prior
discourse. As such, language is crucial because institutions and actions
only acquire a meaning through language. Thus, as Bevir and Rhodes
(forthcoming) argue, for Foucault: `to understand an object or action,
political scientists have to interpret it in the wider discourse of which it is
part'. This means that, as Bevir and Rhodes stress, it is the social discourse,
rather than the beliefs of individuals, which are crucial to Foucault's
version of the interpretist position. The identification of that discourse,
and the role it plays in structuring meanings, is thus the key concern of
those adopting this approach (for an example of this broad approach in
use see Howarth (1995).
Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) develop their own take on the inter-
pretist tradition. It is particularly interesting because it directly addresses
the key issue raised in the positivist critique of this tradition. They argue
that social science is about the development of narratives, not theories. As
such, they stress the importance of understanding and the impossibility of
absolute knowledge claims, but they want to explain and they defend a
limited notion of objectivity.
Broadly, Bevir and Rhodes are within the hermeneutic, rather than the
postmodern, or post-structuralist, stream of the interpretist tradition. As
such, they follow Geertz and others in arguing that it is possible to produce
explanations within the interpretist tradition. However, their understand-
ing of explanation is very different from that of a positivist. In their view,
the researcher can produce an explanation of an event or of the relation-
ships between social phenomena. But, this explanation is built upon their
interpretation of the meanings the actors involved gave to their actions.
What is produced is a narrative which is particular, to that time and space,
and partial, being based on a subjective interpretation of the views of, most
likely, only some of the actors involved. Consequently, any such narrative
must be provisional; there are no absolute truth claims.
However, Bevir and Rhodes do wish to make some, more limited,

knowledge claims. They argue (forthcoming): Àlthough we do not have
access to pure facts that we can use to declare particular interpretations to
be true or false, we can still hang on to the idea of objectivity.' They
suggest that a field of study ìs a co-operative intellectual practice, with a
tradition of historically produced norms, rules, conventions and standards
of excellence that remain subject to critical debate, and with a narrative
content that gives meaning to it' (original emphasis).
They continue:
[Practice, tradition and narrative provide] for a negotiated and dynamic
set of standards through which rational debate and argumentation
between proponents of rival perspectives or approaches is possible
[where] these standards are historically embedded within social
practices, traditions and narratives which provide èmbedded reasons'
. . . for judging an argument true or false or an action right or wrong.
Such criteria are not universal or objective; rather, they are `shared criteria
for assessing . . . knowledge claims'. To Bevir and Rhodes, postmodernism
errs in failing to acknowledge `significant, grounded rationality' that is to
be found in these practices and traditions.
In Bevir and Rhodes' view, such knowledge claims are not self-
referential because they can be `reconfirmed' at three distinct points:
The first is when we translate our concepts for fieldwork: that is, are
they meaningful to practitioners and users and if not, why not? The
second is when we reconstruct narratives from the conversations: that is,
is the story logical and consistent with the data? And the third is when
we redefine and translate our concepts because of the academic
community's judgement on the narratives: that is, does the story meet
the agreed knowledge criteria?
Overall, they argue:
To overcome this difficulty, we should conceive of objective knowledge,
less as what our community happens to agree on, and more as a
normative standard embedded in a practice of criticising and comparing
rival accounts of àgreed facts'. The anti-foundational nature of this
practice lies in its appeal, not to given facts, but to those agreed in a
particular community or conversation. In addition, and of key
importance, the normative, critical bite of our approach lies in
conducting the comparison by the rules of intellectual honesty. These
rules originate in anti-foundationalism and not in a straightforward
acceptance of the norms of the relevant community or conversation.
As we can see then, there are a number of variants within the interpretist
tradition. However, they are all anti-foundationalist and critical of
positivism. These approaches have become much more common in
political science since the 1970s for a number of reasons. First, increasingly
philosophical critiques have led to the questioning of positivism. Second,
the postmodern turn in social science has had an affect on political science,
although much less so than in sociology. Third, normative political theory
has changed fundamentally. Historically, it was foundationalist; the aim
was to establish some absolute notion of the good or of justice. As Buckler
argues in Chapter 8, that is no longer the case. Some normative political
theorists have been influenced by postmodernism, again variously defined,
and more by the work of Quine and others. Now, most political theorists
are anti-foundationalists or, at the very least, have a very limited
conception of any universal foundations. Fourth, as Randall shows in
Chapter 5, much, but by no means all, feminist thought has been strongly
influenced by postmodernism; it is anti-foundationalist and operates
within the interpretist tradition. As such, we can see the influence of this
interpretist tradition very broadly across political science.
Realism
Realism shares an ontological position with positivism, but, in epistemo-
logical terms, modern realism has more in common with relativism. The
core views of classical realism are again fairly clear and owe much to
Marx's work:
. To realists, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In
ontological terms they, like positivists, are foundationalists.
. Again like positivists, realists contend that social phenomena/structures
do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements.
. However, unlike positivists, realists contend that not all social
phenomena, and the relationships between them, are directly
observable. There are deep structures that cannot be observed and
what can be observed may offer a false picture of those phenomena/
structures and their effects (for an excellent exposition of this position
see Smith, in Hollis and Smith 1990: 2058). But, as Smith puts it,
although we cannot observe those structures, `positing their existence
gives us the best explanation of social action. To use a phrase familiar
to the philosophy of science, we are involved in `ìnference to the best
explanation'' (Hollis and Smith 1990: 207). As such, to a realist there is
often a dichotomy between reality and appearance. This is a very
important issue because it has clear methodological implications. It
means that realists do not accept that what appears to be so, or, perhaps
more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so. As an

example, classical Marxism, and Marxism is the archetypal classical
realism, argued that there was a difference between `real' interests,
which reflect material reality, and perceived interests, which might be
manipulated by the powerful forces in society. Given this view, we
cannot just ask people what their interests are, because we would
merely be identifying their manipulated interests, not their `real'
interests.
The criticisms of classical realism were of two sorts, which reflect

different epistemological positions. The positivists denied the existence of
unobservable structures. More importantly, they argued that positing them
makes the knowledge claims of realism untestable and, thus, unfalsifiable.
As such, realist claims that rely on the effect of unobservable structures
have the same status to positivists as the claims of scholars from within the
interpretist tradition. In contrast, authors from the interpretist tradition
criticise the foundational claims of realism. In their view, there are no
structures that are independent of social action and no òbjective' basis on
which to observe the actions or infer the deep structures. So, the realist
claim that structures cause social action are rejected on ontological and
epistemological grounds.
In our view, contemporary realism has been significantly influenced by
the interpretist critique. In particular, this modern critical realism ac-
knowledges two points. First, while social phenomena exist independently
of our interpretation of them, our interpretation/understanding of them
affects outcomes. So, structures do not determine; rather they constrain
and facilitate. Social science involves the study of reflexive agents who
interpret and change structures. Second, our knowledge of the world is
fallible; it is theory-laden. We need to identify and understand both the
external `reality' and the social construction of that `reality' if we are to
explain the relationships between social phenomena.
Realism also has clear methodological implications. It suggests that
there is a real world òut there', but emphasises that outcomes are shaped
by the way in which that world is socially constructed. As such, it would
acknowledge the utility of both quantitative and qualitative data. So, for
example, realists might use quantitative methods to identify the extent to
which financial markets are `globalised'. However, they would also want
to analyse qualitatively how globalisation is perceived, or discursively
constructed, by governments, because the realist argument would be that
both the `reality' and the discursive construction affect what government
does in response to global pressures. We shall return to this example later.
Modern realism then attempts to acknowledge much of the interpretist
critique, while retaining a commitment to causal explanation. The key
problem here of course is that it is not easy, indeed many would see it as
impossible, to combine scientific and interpretist positions because they
have such fundamentally different ontological and epistemological under-
pinnings, one focusing on explanation and the other on understanding (on
this point, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 212).
One of the main criticisms of realists has been that they often treat
concepts as if they related to some fixed, or at least more or less given,
èssences' or cores. It should be noted first that this is not a necessary tenet
for realists; it reflects rather the philosophical traditions from which they
derive. Nevertheless, the question of what a concept is for is an important
one, and it affects ontology directly. If a concept cannot be tied firmly to
an underlying reality, as traditional philosophy seems to imply, the concept
of `being' itself may be detached from the real world of experience. This is
one of the reasons why modern philosophy has considerable difficulty even
recognising that there may be a subject of ontology. It should also be noted
that this is one of those issues on which positivists and interpretists can
find themselves temporarily in agreement, even though, as we have seen,
they have fundamentally different views about knowledge and being. Any
apparent agreement between them, however, has limited scope, as they
have different origins and are heading for different destinations. Having
considered how these categories relate to some important issues in the
social sciences, we can now move on to apply the arguments to particular
cases so as to illustrate their use and their limits.
Ontology and epistemology in political science:

two cases
The aim in this section is to examine how a researcher's ontological and
epistemological position affects the way they approach empirical questions
in political science. We shall focus on two areas: globalisation and
multilevel governance. These areas have been chosen because they reflect a
broad spread of the concerns, but, in our view, similar arguments could be
made in relation to other substantive areas.
Case 1: Globalisation
The literature on globalisation mushroomed in the 1990s. It has been
common to distinguish between processes or aspects of globalisation: so
many authors have distinguished between economic, political and cultural
processes, while acknowledging that they are interrelated. In this vein,
many have argued that economic globalisation has grown apace and that
this process has significantly restricted the autonomy of the nation state.
Indeed, Ohmae (1990) goes as far as to argue that only two economic
forces, global financial markets and transnational corporations, will play
any role in the politics of the future. In his view, the future role of states
will be analogous to the current role of local councils. At the same time,
other authors have focused on cultural globalisation, suggesting that world
culture is becoming increasingly homogeneous: in the view of most,
reflecting a growing US hegemony. Certainly, there is little doubt that the
issue of globalisation in a crucial one for those interested in questions of
contemporary political economy and governance.
Political scientists have probably been most concerned with economic
globalisation and the way in which it restricts the autonomy of the state,
and have utilised a foundationalist ontology and a positivist epistemology,
although, as we shall see below, some more recent work is realist. In
contrast, sociologists, particularly those who focus on cultural studies,
concentrate upon cultural globalisation, operating from an anti-founda-
tionalist and interpretist position.
The main debate about economic globalisation has concerned the extent
to which it has increased. There are two main positions. Some authors, like
Ohmae (1990), who are christened hyperglobalists by Held et al. (1999)
and seen as first-wave theorists by Hay and Marsh (2000), argue that there
has been a massive increase in various indicators of economic globalisa-
tion: direct foreign investment; international bank lending; transnational
production; international trade and so on. In contrast, authors such as
Hirst and Thompson (1999), christened sceptics by Held et al. (1999) and
seen by Hay and Marsh (2000) as second-wave theorists, argue that the
process is more limited. More specifically, they suggest that: globalisation
is not a new phenomenon; regionalisation, rather than globalisation, is a
better description of the changes that have occurred; and the only area in
which there has been significant globalisation is in relation to financial
markets. We are not concerned here with the detail of this argument. Our
point is that both sets of authors agree about what constitutes evidence of
globalisation and how we can go about studying that evidence. Globalisa-
tion is an economic process that can be measured quantitatively, indeed
there is large agreement as to the appropriate measures, and which, to the
extent that it exists, has an effect on patterns of governance.
More recently, other authors have been, in most cases implicitly rather
than explicitly, critical of this ontological and epistemological approach.
The point is easily made if we return to two ways of classifying the
literature on globalisation to which we have already referred. Held et al.
(1999) contrast hyperglobalist and sceptical approaches to globalisation
with a third approach to which they adhere: the transformationalist thesis.
In contrast, Hay and Marsh (2000) identify a third wave of the globalisa-
tion literature that builds upon a critique of the first two waves. These two
`third ways' share something in common, but do differ significantly in a

manner that reflects ontological and epistemological debates.
The transformationalists differ significantly from the sceptics in that
they share:
a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalisation is a

central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic
changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order . . . In this
respect, globalisation is conceived as a powerful transformative force
which is responsible for a massive shake out of societies, economies,
institutions of governance and world order. (Held et al. 1999: 7)
Held et al. also emphasise the major way in which the transformationalist
account parts company with both the other two positions (1999: 7):
The transformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of

globalisation . . . Rather [they] emphasise globalisation as a long-term
historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is
significantly shaped by conjunctural factors.
So, they argue that: there are `real' social, political and economic changes
occurring in the world; globalisation is a cause of these changes, a
transformative force; but there is no inevitable process of globalisation
which, as social scientists, we can identify. This last point is especially
important here. The putative development of globalisation is dependent on
the actions of agents, whether individuals, companies, institutions or
states; as such it is a socially constructed process. It seems clear then that
the transformative position is a realist one.
This position has methodological consequences. It points strongly to
comparative analysis, because the emphasis is upon how different coun-
tries, and indeed different companies and markets, are affected by, and
respond to, this process of globalisation in different ways. If globalisation
is not an inevitable or universal process, then we need to focus on how it is
differently experienced in different contexts.
This point is even clearer if we turn to what Hay and Marsh call the
third-wave literature on globalisation. Hay and Marsh (2000: 6) follow
Held et al. in arguing that we: `shouldn't make essentialising and reifying
assumptions about the effects, consequences, or even the very existence, of
globalisation'. Rather, globalisation is a series of contradictory and
contingent processes. More specifically, they suggest that, for many
authors, especially the hyperglobalists, globalisation is a process without
a subject. In contrast, they argue that it is agents who construct globalisa-
tion and, as such, the researcher should identify the actors involved and
how they perceive and discursively construct globalising tendencies.
However, Hay and Marsh go further to contend that these discursive

constructions have significant effects on outcomes. So, they suggest that it
is the discursive construction of globalisation that affects government
economic policies, rather than the `real' processes of globalisation. As
such, and taking the UK as an example, their argument would run along
the following lines:
. While there has been a significant increase in regionalism in patterns of
trading and a globalisation of financial markets, there is limited
evidence that Britain is locked into a globalised political economy which
determines the economic policy which the British Government can
adopt.
. However, British governments, and especially the Blair Government,
have argued that it is constrained in that way. It suggests that the extent
of globalisation is such that the pursuit of neo-liberal policies is
inevitable: there is no alternative.
. As such, it is not the `reality' of globalisation that is shaping British
economic policy, but the dominant discursive construction of that
reality.
We are not concerned here about the validity or otherwise of this
argument. The crucial point for us is that this view clearly marks a break
with the positivism that underpins most work on globalisation. To Hay
and Marsh, there may be `real' processes at work, but the way they affect
outcomes is mediated by the discursive construction(s) of these processes.
This argument has both realist and interpretist elements. There is an
appeal to a real world, but the emphasis is on the discursive construction
of that world. This position illustrates how realist and interpretist
positions interface. In our view, this position is a realist one if it recognises
that there is an interactive or dialectical relationship between the `real'
world and the discourses. A realist would acknowledge not only that
discourses have real effects, in this case that the dominant discourse of
globalisation shapes economic policy, but also that the `real' processes of
globalisation constrain the resonance of different discourses. So, if the
dominant discourse is at odds with the `reality', alternative discourses can
appeal to that `reality deficit'. However, if it is merely the discourses that
have the causal power, then, in our view, it is an interpretist position.
There are other approaches to globalisation which are clearly located in
an interpretist tradition. As we emphasised above, most of these ap-
proaches stress cultural globalisation. Of course, as Held et al. point out
(1999: 328), the concept of culture has a long and complex history but
`normally refers to the social construction, articulation and reception of
meaning'. This definition immediately suggests an anti-foundationalist
ontology and, most often, an interpretist epistemology.
It is possible to approach the issue of cultural globalisation utilising a

positivist epistemology. So, one could focus empirically on the extent to
which certain cultural icons, such as Coca-Cola, McDonald's or Madonna,
have become universal, or whether colonialism was associated with a
similar global culture. However, the focus of a cultural studies approach to
globalisation is much more likely to be on difference. Two points are
important here. First, the argument would be that there are various
discourses about globalisation, none of which is `true', although at any
time one discourse may be dominant. Second, while one discourse may
dominate, it can be, and will always be, resisted: different agents citizens
and researchers will offer different narrations of globalisation and its
effects. In this way, this alternative `cultural studies' approach reflects an
anti-foundationalist and an interpretist position.
Case 2: Multilevel governance
Multilevel governance and intergovernmentalism: realism

versus positivism
The term `multilevel governance' covers a variety of familiar phenomena
that are normally located in the areas of regional policy and European
integration. Though `multilevel governance' (MLG) is rapidly acquiring
the status of a fashionable mainstream concept, it is not as established as
`globalisation' in the vocabulary of politicians and commentators. Here
again, the contemporary debates in large part reflect different ontological
and epistemological positions. In this case study, we concentrate not on the
different uses of the term, although these can be significant, but rather on
the contrast between MLG and its main opponent, which is liberal
intergovernmentalism.
A useful definition of MLG is provided by Hunt (1999): `[According to
multilevel governance theories] the policy process involves the interaction
between a constellation of public and private actors located at the supra-
national, national and sub-national level.' This interaction is usually
understood as non-hierarchical and as lacking a central, predominant
authority, and similar usages can be found in Marks et al. (1996) and
Armstrong and Bulmer (1998). These theorists argue against the view of
the EU as an international organisation whose decision-making is based
predominantly on national interests determined by member states, a view
known as intergovernmentalism.
The intergovernmentalist perspective is closely associated with interna-
tional lawyers, but an influential political analysis is provided by Andrew
Moravscik (1993), who argues that the European policy process can be
understood as a nested game played out both in the domestic politics of

member states and in the international arena of the EU's institutions.
While the MLG theorists derive their frameworks from institutionalist
perspectives (see Chapter 4), arguing that ìnstitutions matter' in shaping
interaction, analysts such as Moravscik generally utilise rational choice
perspectives (see Chapter 3 below). Both approaches would claim to be
empirically grounded, but the nature of the empirical grounding differs.
Most MLG theorists are realists in epistemological terms, emphasising
how the continuity of rules, norms and operating procedures, and some-
times of `deep, non-observable structures', can, and does, determine the
outcomes of decision-making in the long term. As such, their logic is
inductive rather than deductive. Overall, MLG is not so much concerned
with the debate between neo-federalists and intergovernmentalists as with
the consequences of different possible forms of integration for normative
issues such as democratic participation, effective government and distri-
butive justice.
In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists seek to identify the preferences
and the parameters of the individual actors (usually member states) and
show how, after the event, the outcomes can be understood as the result of
rational calculated behaviour. Their logic is therefore deductive: they
argue from the general to the particular. Liberal intergovernmentalism is
foundationalist in ontological terms and operates with a positivist episte-
mology. In its treatment of European integration it is clearly unsympa-
thetic to neo-federalism and to supranationalism.
The normative underpinnings of multilevel governance and

intergovermentalism
MLG theorists argue that, rather than conceptualising regional policy as a
national issue in which the lead role is taken by the national state
institutions, it should be identified as an arena in which the European
Union plays an integral role in policy-making, together with the separate
regional authorities and the central national institutions. In this sense,
theories of multilevel governance make a distinction between `government'
and `governance'. `Government', it is argued, is too narrowly concerned
with the formal structures of state authority, and with the associated
processes and issues, whereas `governance' is concerned with much wider
notions of politics, encompassing the production, accumulation and
regulation of collective goods at all levels including the international.
Power relations in multilevel governance are structured by reciprocal
interdependence on each other's resources, rather than on conflict over
either scarcity or fundamental values. Typically, these theories argue that
relations of decision-making between the various levels should be seen as
loosely interconnected rather than as tightly nested; that is, characterised

by multilateral links, and non-hierarchical in form, rather than by a
hierarchical chain of bilateral links in which the national state authority
has a predominant role, as is the case with intergovernmental approaches.
There is thus a strong normative element in multilevel governance. From
describing the increased evidence of the multiplicity of decision-making
forms and levels in European integration, proponents move to arguments
about the value of multilevel governance in enhancing democratic legiti-
macy and effective decision-making under conditions of globalised poli-
tical economy. In comparison with state-centred accounts, multilevel
governance is said to be `closer to the people', and therefore more
acceptable, and more flexible and adaptable, so better able to respond
to the rapidly changing economic climate (Marks et al. 1996).
The arguments against multilevel governance, if it is regarded as a policy
prescription as well as empirical analysis, concentrate on two main issues
(Moravscik 1993; Scharpf 1988). The first is what is known as the `joint
decision trap'. This focuses upon the danger of deadlock in decision-
making where there are many participants, interdependent arenas and a
variety of possible combinations of policy-making processes. Though
multilevel governance may offer the prospect of policy-making close to
the people and greater legitimacy, it risks sacrificing efficiency in decision-
making if there is no authoritative procedure for resolving disagreements
among equal participants. A second criticism denies even that multilevel
governance provides greater legitimacy and argues that, when the smaller
units and more local levels of decision-making are included, the greater
complexity of procedures results in opacity of decision-making and,
therefore, in less accountability. In practice, multilevel governance can
mean obscure elite-led agreements and public incomprehension. Neo-
liberal arguments try to resolve these problems by emphasising how the
member states in the EU remain both the focus of popular legitimacy,
albeit with some rebalancing towards regional authorities, and the main
guarantors of effective governmental decision-making.
In response to this, Marks et al. (1996) have three main criticisms of the
intergovernmental approach. Underlying these disagreements is a funda-
mental dispute about the nature of social reality. First, positivist explana-
tions of societal phenomena neglect the structural constraints within which
individuals operate. These are varied in kind, but the most important are
generally the impact of differential allocation of resources, the culturally-
given nature of the value framework within which individuals choose and
the unpredictability of external factors, such as the international economic
and security climate.
Second, the realist perspective emphasises how the institutional frame-
works have a primary effect in shaping decision-making through their
formal rules, their informal procedures, their value structures and their
effect on office-holding and internal role-oriented behaviour. In one sense,
the institutions are no more than the sum of countless individual choices,
but merely to state this does not get us very far. Realists seek to find ways
of characterising different institutional frameworks so as to move beyond
this and to introduce other levels of analysis and explanation which
recognise the weight of the long-term structural and institutional context.
Third, it is argued that intergovernmentalists are insufficiently critical
about what time-frames are relevant and why. The term `path dependency'
used in this context (Pierson 1996) does not just refer to the given nature of
resource allocations at `point zero' which the researcher takes as the start.
It also directs our attention to the impact of decisions prior to point zero,
and of the ways in which the institutional frameworks lock actors into
particular sets of choices. This implicitly asks positivists to justify why they
adopt diachronic modes of explanation, which imply social understanding
as a set of discrete operations in fixed points in time, as opposed to
synchronic explanations, which emphasise a more continuous and context-
led understanding of the social nature of time.
Despite these epistemological and methodological differences, writers
such as Moravscik and Scharpf (Scharpf 1988, 1997) appear to be able to
integrate some of the concerns of multilevel governance into their own
perspective, so that, despite the methodological differences between the
positivists and realists, we can identify these as distinct strands in the study
of the European policy process, marked by an attentiveness to similar
policy problems and with some of the same language.
The constructivist approach

This is not true of the social constructivist approach (see, for example,
Jrgensen 1998; Weldes 1996; Wendt 1994). This rejects the language of
causality, with which positivists and realists are content in their different
ways, and in contrast, is based upon an interpretist epistemological
position. Constructivists argue that, if there is a problem of increasing
complexity of decision-making associated with the decline of the nation
state, this complexity must be understood as an intentional social construct
on the part of decision-makers, part of a set of political projects associated
with responses to perceptions of external and internal constraints. The
questions which arise are concerned with political decision-making as a
series of attempts to resolve conflicts over meaning and identity,
understood in the broadest sense. Constructivists take issue with the
positivist understanding of the nature of political choice. They argue
against the acceptance of individual preference as a given and instead
interrogate specifically why and how preferences come to be formed and
how these preferences and choices relate to the strategic aims of powerful
interests in society. Multilevel governance then would not be seen as a set
of objectively perceived phenomena, but as a normative framework which
is itself part of the political conflict between the interests associated with
neo-liberal economic restructuring and those seeking a more social
democratic accommodation with technological change.
This locates the arguments about multilevel governance within the
discussion about the nature of globalisation, which we dealt with above,
and in which one of the main disputes is about the underlying realities of
technological economic and social change and their relationship with the
discursively constructed political uses made of them within specific
political projects.
Conclusion
The point here is not to attempt to resolve these disputes. Rather, what we
have sought to do is to show how the different approaches in different
issues relate to epistemological and methodological assumptions, and to
one another. The terms introduced here can be used as signposts,
suggesting how we can come to terms with the deeper implications of the
theories and groups of concerns which are the focus of the individual
chapters which follow. One of the temptations in so doing is to attempt to
find a synthesis of all the available positions, in the hope that, at some level
of analysis, agreement is possible over fundamental issues. Unfortunately,
experience and logic combine to warn against this temptation. These
debates have been part of the intellectual and moral climate of Western
thought for centuries and continue because they reflect disagreements not
just about logic or technicalities but also about the proper scope of human
action in society. In other words, they are questions which relate to deep-
rooted moral positions that may be internally coherent, but are
incompatible with one another, except in so far as they all include some
appeal to intellectual and ethical tolerance of diversity. In the face of these
difficulties, another strategy, alluring at least to risk-averse researchers, is
to avoid the issue. Far from being safe, this position is actually rather
unsafe, since it does not enable one to distinguish between good and bad
research and between good and bad arguments. The least one can say
about these issues is that they are of sufficient importance to warrant a
genuine commitment to coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with
the issues requires one to think through the different arguments separately,
to compare them and to evaluate them. As we argued at the beginning of
this chapter, this means identifying, as far as possible, what are the
epistemological and ontological underpinnings and what these imply in
terms of argumentation, practical research method, explanatory logic and

research construction. The purpose of this chapter has been to encourage
this and to attempt to provide an introduction to some of the main ideas
and methods involved.
Further reading
. The best introductions to the philosophy of science and social science

are Chalmers (1985, 1990) and Winch (1958).
. For an accessible overview of ontology and epistemology, see Hay
(2002).
. On the positivist approach, see Kuhn (1970), Hempel (1965, 1966) or
Halfpenny (1982).
. On the interpretive approach, see Bevir and Rhodes (1999).
. On realism, see Sayer (1992).
Author Index
Acker, J. 125, 318 Budge, I. and Laver, M. 45, 321

Adorno, T. 55, 318 Butler, D. and Stokes, D. 214, 321
Allen, J. 123, 318 Butler, J. 112, 321
Allison. G.T. 45, 74, 318
Almond, G. 3, 4, 318 Carnap, R. 64, 322
Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S. 297, Carr, E.H. 53, 322
318 Castles, F. 2578, 322
Althusser, L. 275 Chalmers, A. 63, 322
Archer, M.S. 279, 28590, 291, 318 Chalmers, A.F. 41, 322
Aristotle 172 Champney, L. 230, 248, 322
Armstrong, K. and Bulmer, S. 36, 318 Charlesworth, S.J. 203, 322
Arrow, K. 66, 318 Clegg, S. 101, 322
Ashe, G. et al. 193, 318 Coleridge, S.T. 135, 151
Austen-Smith, D. 85, 318 Collard, D. 79, 322
Avineri, S. and de Shalit, A. 194, 318 Collingwood, R.G. 1356, 152, 322
Ayer, A.J. 46, 64, 1745, 319 Comte, A. 46, 322
Connell, R. 1234, 130, 323
Baldwin, D. 45, 319 Connolly, W. 194, 323
Barnes, S. 266, 319 Coole, D. 111, 323
Barnes, S. and Kaase, M. 45, 319 Corrin, C. 109, 323
Barrett, M. 110, 319 Cowling, M. 151, 323
Barry, B. 71, 89, 319 Cox, R. 72, 258, 323
Bates, R., Greif, A., Levi, M., Rosenthal, Creswell, J. 23941, 323
J. and Weingast, B. 263, 319 Crewe, I. and King, A. 200, 209, 323
Bauman, Z. 152, 319 Crewe, I. and Thomson, K. 209, 323
Beasley, C. 109, 319 Cutright, P. 257, 323
Bellamy, R. and Hollis, M. 194, 319
Bentham, J. 135, 151 Daly, G. 159, 323
Berger, P. and Luckman, T. 1356, 152, Daniels, N. 194, 323
319 Denzin, N. 203, 236, 237, 323
Berlin, I. 1856, 193, 319 Derrida, J. 137, 324
Berman, S. 3057, 310, 319 Dessler, D. 291, 324
Bernstein, R. 152, 320 Devine, F. xiii, 1516, 203, 197, 324
Bevir, M. xiii, 3, 152, 320 Devine, F. and Heath, S. 215, 241, 247,
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 20, 25, 248, 324
279, 41, 152, 320 Dews, P. 193, 324
Blalock, H.M. 64, 320 Di Palma, G. 251, 324
Blyth, M. xiii, 17, 266, 277, 284, 310, Diamond, I. and Hartsock, N. 117, 324
320 Diamond, L. 257, 259, 261, 324
Boix, C. 260, 320 Dobbin, F. 310, 324
Bromley, S. 158, 321 Dogan, M. 260, 324
Bryman, A. 232, 321 Dowding, K. 236
Bryson, V. 130, 321 Downs, A. 656, 67, 73, 74, 79, 85,
Buckler, S. xiii, 8, 13, 30, 313, 314 324
Budge, I. and Fairlie, D. 45, 321 Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. 152, 324
350
Author Index 351
Dunleavy, P. 89, 2457, 3245 Habermas, J. 55, 1825, 193, 328

Dunleavy, P. et al. 45, 325 Hague, R. et al. 267, 329
Durkheim, E. 75 Halford, S. 125, 329
Dworkin, R. 194, 325 Halfpenny, P. 41, 64, 329
Hall, P. and Taylor, R. 95, 96, 1067,
Eckstein, H. 92, 325 108, 329
Eliasoph, N. 198, 215, 325 Hall, P.A. 102, 103, 263, 300, 310, 329
Elster, J. 75, 325 Hammersley, M. 152, 232, 236, 240, 329
Eribon, D. 152, 325 Hanson, R. 64, 329
Esping-Anderson, G. 124, 325 Hargreaves-Heap, S., Hollis, M., Lyons,
Evans, G. and Norris, P. 224, 325 B., Sugden, R. and Weale, A. 71,
329
Finer, H. 92, 93, 326 Harrop, M. and Miller, W.L. 74, 329
Finkel, S.E. and Muller, E.N. 84, 326 Hartsock, N. 11516, 329
Finnemore, M. 310, 326 Hay, C. 89, 41, 156, 272, 276, 2801,
Fischer, E. 171, 326 284, 285, 291, 330
Foucault, M. 28, 119, 123, 1379, 141, Hay, C. and Marsh, D. 33, 345, 330
152, 326 Hay, C. and Wincott, D. 106, 330
Fox, C. and Miller, H. 97, 98, 326 Hayek, F.A. von 70
Franzosi, R. 222, 326 Hayward, J. 3, 330
Frazer, E. 194, 326 Heath, A. 53, 330
Freud, S. 82 Heath, A., Jowell, R. and Curtice, J. 45,
Furlong, P. xiii 53, 330
Helco, H. and Wildavsky, A. 200, 330
Gamble, A. 107, 327 Held, D. 193, 330
Gamble, A., Marsh, D. and Held, D. et al. 334, 35, 330
Tant, T. 171, 327 Hempel, C. 41, 46, 52, 54, 64, 330
Gamson, W.A. 199, 327 Hicks, A. 2645, 330
Garrett, G. 220, 2589, 327 Hindess, B. 89, 330
Garrett, G. and Weingast, B.R. 3034, Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. 33, 330
306, 327 Hix, S. 86, 330
Gauthier, D. 76, 327 Hobbes, T. 67
Geertz, C. 27, 28, 1356, 152, 327 Hollis, M. and Lukes, S. 193, 331
Giddens, A. 98, 105, 273, 27880, 284, Hollis, M. and Nell, E. 72, 331
285, 291, 327 Hollis, M. and Smith, S. 1920, 23, 24,
Gilbert, N. 215, 327 30, 32, 331
Gilligan, C. 121, 327 Honig, B. 194, 331
Gilmour, I. 143, 327 Hopkin, J. xiii, 16, 312
Gintis, H. 80, 327 Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. 182,
Goldstein, G. and Keohane, R. 3034, 331
310, 328 Howarth, D. 28, 2823, 331
Goodin, R. 100, 105, 108, 328 Huff, D. 230, 331
Goodin, R. and Klingemann, H. 2, 3, 5, Hume, D. 19, 1734, 331
10, 11, 90, 91, 101, 107, 108, 328 Hunt, J. 36, 331
Goodin, R. and Pettit, P. 193, 328 Huntington, S.P. 99, 2978, 331
Grafstein, R. 82, 328 Husserl, E. 136, 331
Gramsci, A. 156, 1589, 171, 328
Grant, W. and Marsh, D. 45, 328 Immergut, E. 102, 331
Gray, J. 18, 328
Green, D.P. and Shapiro, I. 71, 79, Jackson, J. 248, 332
823, 84, 328 Jackson, S. 1567, 159, 230, 332
Greenleaf, W.H. 136, 151, 328 Janda, K. 256, 332
Gutmann, A. 194, 328 Janis, I.L. and Mann, L. 80, 332
352 Author Index
Jay, M. 193, 332 Lijphart, A. 258, 260, 335

Jenkins, K. 152, 332 Lipset, S.M. 2501, 2567, 259, 335
Jessop, B. 55, 107, 157, 162, 171, 2801, Locke, J. 67
283, 284, 285, 291, 332 Lovenduski, J. 124, 335
John, P. xiv, 1516, 24, 92, 103, 232, Lowndes, V. xiv, 5, 99, 108, 114, 296,
316 299, 313, 314, 3356
Johnson, N. 92, 93, 332 Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H. 89, 336
Johnston, J. and Dolowitz, D. 156, 158, Lukacs, G.S. von 155
332 Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M.D. 86,
Jones, K. and Jonasdottir, A. 130, 332 336
Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. 84, 332 Lyotard, J.-F. 137, 194, 336
McAdam, D. 198, 336

Kaletsky, A. 165, 332
McAnulla, S. xiv
Kathlene, L. 1257, 333
McCarthy, T. 193, 336
Katz, R. 260, 333
Machiavelli, N. 156
Kautsky, K.J. 155
MacIntyre, A. 180, 336
Kavanagh, D. 1456, 333
MacKay, F. 122, 130, 336
Kenney, S. 128, 333
Mackie, T. and Marsh, D. 267, 336
Kenny, M. 158, 333
Maclean, I. 89, 336
Keohane, R. 45, 87, 315, 333
McLellan, D. 171, 336
King, A. 45, 285, 333
McNamara, K.R. 310, 336
King, G. 64, 227, 228, 333
McNay, L. 152, 336
King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S. 64,
Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. 256,
217, 333
336
King, G., Tomz, M. and Lee, J. 220,
Mansbridge, J.J. 72, 79, 80, 89, 3367
333
March, J. 72, 337
Kingdon, J. 310, 333
March, J. and Olsen, J. 74, 94, 96, 99,
Kiser, L. and Ostrom, E. 101, 334
103, 105, 108, 337
Klein, N. 1667, 171, 334
Margolis, H. 7980, 337
Kolakowski, L. 193, 334
Marks, G., Hooghe, E. and
Kuhn, T. 24, 41, 64, 334
Blank, K. 36, 38, 337
Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P. 194, 334
Marquand, D. 1467, 337
Kymlicka, W. 193, 334
Marsh, D. xii, xiv, 8, 233, 337
Marsh, D. and Furlong, P. 11, 12, 159,
Lacan, J. 137, 334 232, 2401, 250, 285, 295, 311
Lacey, A. 64, 334 Marsh, D. and Read, M. 2435, 337
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. 153, 162, Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 94, 96,
283, 334 97, 102
Lakatos, I. 50, 69, 334 Marsh, D., Richards, D. and
Lane, J.-E. and Ersson, S. 261, 334 Smith, M. 2467, 337
Lane, R. 113, 334 Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. xi, xii, 272
Laslett, P. 172, 334 Marx, K. 30, 53, 1535, 162, 171, 182,
Laver, M. 89, 335 305, 337
Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. 83, 335 Mason, J. 202, 215, 248, 337
Layder, D. 27980, 291, 335 May, E. 244
Leftwich, A. 9, 335 Meehan, J. 193, 338
Lenin, V. 158, 171, 335 Meyer, J. and Rowan, B. 96, 338
Levi, M. 263, 335 Miles, M. and Huberman, A. 236, 338
Levi-Strauss, C. 275 Miliband, R. 158, 171, 338
Lewin, L. 72, 79, 335 Mill, J.S. 135, 2525, 265, 338
Lewis, D.K. 76, 335 Miller, W.L. 230, 248, 338
Lichbach, M.L. 266, 335 Moe, T.M. 72, 338
Author Index 353
Moller Okin, S. 120, 338 Quattrone, G.A. and Tversky, A. 82,

Monroe, K.R. 72, 89, 338 342
Moore, B. 251, 2613, 338 Quine, W. 234, 30, 342
Moore, M. 257, 338
Moravscik, A. 367, 39, 338
Ragin, C. 252, 264, 342
Morgenthau, H. 53, 339
Randall, V. xiv, 5, 9, 10, 14, 30, 31213,
Morrow, J. 89, 339
314, 342
Mouffe, C. 194, 339
Randall, V. and Waylen, G. 130
Mueller, D.C. 89, 339
Rasmusen, E. 89, 342
Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. 194, 339
Rawls, J. 67, 1869, 194, 342
Raz, J. 194, 342
North, D.C. 103, 310, 339
Read, M. xiv
Nozick, R. 194, 339
Read, M. and Marsh, D. 16, 314
Rhodes, R.A.W. xiv, 91, 92, 93, 94, 108,
O'Donnell, G. et al. 251, 340
152, 3423
Oakeshott, M. 1356, 143, 340
Rhodes, R.A.W. and Bevir, M. 1112,
Offe, C. 100, 340
233, 236, 281, 312
Ohmae, K. 33, 340
Rhodes, R.A.W. and Dunleavy, P. 94,
Okin, S. 194, 340
343
Olson, M. 66, 79, 299, 340
Rich, A. 111, 343
Ordeshook, P.C. 77, 89, 340
Riker, W. 778, 343
Ostrom, E. 73, 84, 87, 102, 340
Riker, W. and Ordeshook, P.C. 89, 343
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and
Risse-Kappen, T. 310, 343
Walker, J. 73, 340
Rittberger, V. 96, 102, 343
Outhwaite, W. 193, 340
Robinson, N. 163, 343
Robson, W. 92, 93, 343
Padgett, D. 23940, 340
Rokkan, S. 262, 343
Panebianco, A. 252, 340
Rorty, R. 137, 194, 343
Pareto, V. 53, 340
Rosenau, J. 45, 343
Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N. 45,
Rosenau, P.M. 152, 343
340
Rosenberg, S. 80, 343
Pateman, C. 121, 194, 3401
Roseneil, S. 198, 215, 343
Pattie, C. and Johnston, R. 243, 341
Rothstein, B. 93, 100, 102, 103, 344
Pennings, P., Keman, H, and
Rubin, G. 111, 344
Kleinnijenuis, J. 230, 248, 267, 341
Ruddick, S. 111, 344
Peters, G. 92, 95, 96, 100, 102, 103, 104,
Rudner, R. 63, 344
105, 108, 252, 253, 341
Rueschemeyer, D. et al. 2612, 344
Phillips, A. 120, 129, 130, 194, 341
Pierre, J. 100, 341
Plant, R. 193, 341 Sahlins, M. 79, 344
Plato 2, 172, 174 Sandel, M. 189, 194, 344
Polsby, N. 93, 341 Sanders, D. xv, 14, 23, 246, 45, 201,
Popkin, S. 85, 341 219, 235, 31112, 313, 316, 344
Popper, K. 48, 50, 52, 161, 341 Sapiro, V. 11617, 344
Poulantzas, N. 156, 1612, 171, 341 Sarlvik, B. and Crewe, I. 53, 344
Powell, R. 69, 341 Sartori, G. 254, 344
Pridham, G. 251, 342 Saussure, F. de 2745
Pridham, G. and Lewis, P. 251, 342 Savage, M. and Witz, A. 125, 130, 344
Pringle, R. and Watson, S. 117, 342 Sayer, A. 41, 291, 344
Przeworski, A. 74, 342 Scharpf, W. 39, 3445
Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. 254, 257, Schlick, M. 64, 345
258, 265, 342 Sears, D.O. and Funk, C.L. 79, 345
Putnam, H. 2956, 342 Self, P. 72, 345
354 Author Index
Sened, I. 878, 345 Vanhanen, T. 251, 257, 260, 347

Shepsle, K. and Bonchek, M.S. 87, 89, Verba, S., Schlozman, K. and
345 Brady, H. 222, 347
Sikkink, K. 266, 345
Silverman, D. 152, 215, 248, 345 Walby, S. 121, 348
Simon, H.A. 72, 80, 171, 345 Walt, S.M. 83, 348
Skinner, C. 230, 345 Walzer, M. 194, 348
Skocpol, T. 75, 346 Ward, H. xv, 5, 235, 277, 302, 313, 314
Smelser, N. 261, 346 Waylen, G. 130, 348
Smith, A. 67, 144 Weale, A. 260, 348
Smith, M.J. 278, 314, 346 Weaver, R. and Rockman, B. 102, 348
Smith, S. 30, 315, 346 Weber, M. 53, 149, 155
Soros, G. 1656, 346 Weingast, A. 86, 348
Spencer, H. 151 Weldon, T.D. 175, 177, 179, 348
Squires, J. 127, 129, 130, 346 White, H. 137, 348
Steinmo, S. 102, 263, 346 White, S. 193, 348
Stoker, G. xv, 346 Whiteley, P. and Seyd, P. 46, 5662, 349
Stone, D. 310, 346 Whiteley, P., Seyd, P. and
Strange, S. 171 Richardson, J. 84, 349
Willetts, D. 144, 349
Tanenbaum, E. and Scarbrough, E. 228, Williams, M. and May, T. 202, 203, 349
230, 346 Wilson, G. 45, 349
Tant, T. 159 Wilson, W. 93, 349
Taylor, C. 193, 194, 346 Winch, P. 41, 63, 77, 17780, 193, 349
Taylor, M. 75, 347 Wittgenstein, L. 1768, 349
Thomas, D. 63, 347 Wittman, D. 80, 349
Thompson, J. and Held, D. 193, 347 Wonnacott, T. and Wonnacott, R. 230,
Tronto, J. 1212, 347 349
Tsebelis, G. 263, 347
Tsebelis, G. and Garrett, G. 86, 347 Young, I. 194, 349
Tufte, E. 230, 248, 347
Zey, M. 72, 349
Ullmann-Margalit, E. 76, 347 Ziegler, J. 310, 349
Subject Index
abortion 120, 242, 244, 288 black economy 259

aesthetics 46, 51 Blair, A.C.L. 35, 198, 209, 211
Africa 292, 297 Boolean algebra 2645
agencies 246 bounded rationality 723, 82, 84
agents 298, 300, 301, 305, 306, 309 brand names 36, 166
Agreement on Investment 167 Brazil 164
altruism 73, 7980, 83, 84 Britain see United Kingdom
disguised forms of self-interest 80 British Broadcasting Corporation
reciprocal 80 (BBC) 147
American Political Science Review 249 British Election Surveys (BES) 2078,
Analytical Narratives (Bates et al. 214, 224
1998) 263, 319 budgets 98, 100, 299
anthropology 135, 136, 139, 142, 197, Bush, George W. 271
275
anti-foundationalism 5, 7, 8, 9, 1112, cabinet 100, 145
15, 1819, 20, 26, 2930, 33, 35, 36, capital 90, 160, 162, 166
13948, 155, 193, 232, 233, 236, 314 financial 166
appearance and reality 154 industrial and banking 161
Ashdown, J.J.D. (Lord Ashdown) 210, capital punishment 244
211 capitalism 789, 110, 115, 1223, 142,
assertion 294 147, 153, 154, 157, 161, 166, 167,
attitudes 45, 207 181, 182, 256, 298, 3056
Australia 124, 168 advanced 55
authority 175, 179, 184 Asian 164
casino 165, 171
banking 33, 158, 164, 238, 300 contemporary 163
behaviouralism 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, contradictions 155, 171
1314, 15, 23, 24, 256, 4564, 65, exploitative 171
901, 94, 107, 132, 137, 176, 235, global 8
236, 263, 313 internationalisation 157
philosophical origins 64 US-style 164
theoretical concepts and empirical case studies 3240, 75, 81, 106, 130,
indicators 60 20715, 2427, 263
see also post-behaviouralism cathexis 124
beliefs 95, 131, 1323, 1345, 139, 140, causality 212, 23, 30, 31, 47, 63, 78,
141, 14950, 154, 179, 180, 188, 200, 107, 154, 160, 1789, 182, 184, 223,
306 2245, 232, 253, 257, 258, 263, 264,
tripartite distinction 303 273, 274, 2767, 305, 306, 312
Berlin Wall 273 see also explanation
bias 117, 201, 204, 2056, 219, 307 central conflation 279
selection bias 265 central government 99, 200, 246
binary opposition 282 change 293, 3013, 3049
biological chief officers (local government) 125
determinism 111, 127 children 111, 115, 117, 120, 130, 168,
reductionism 111 212
355
356 Subject Index
China 262 consensus 97, 99, 143, 145, 185, 186,

church 121, 134, 139 189, 1912
citizens 36, 76, 85 end of 1458
civic groups 198, 215 Conservative Party 589, 60, 61, 77,
civil association 143 143, 144, 200, 20814, 244, 28990
civil servants 238, 299 consistency 141, 142
civil service/bureaucracy 67, 86, 93, 94, constitutions 4, 5, 901, 93, 102, 183,
1245, 133, 145, 147, 218, 2457, 296, 308
262, 277, 298, 299 constraints 233, 235, 238, 243, 2756,
civil society 101, 119 279, 280, 291, 300, 301
class 7, 11, 74, 78, 102, 112, 116, 117, constructivism 3940, 310
118, 123, 124, 133, 138, 150, 154, content analysis 218, 219, 235, 237, 238
155, 1567, 161, 167, 178, 181, 184, context 218, 221
20910, 213, 219, 251, 284, 294 contract 134, 186
climate change 286 conventional wisdom 2969, 310
Cold War 296 conventions 789
aftermath 164 `core executive' studies 94
collective action 66, 73, 76, 78, 79, 80, critical realism 7, 285
82, 84, 87, 96, 1045, 299, 3023, critical theory 180, 1815, 192, 193
304, 3089 Cuban Missile Crisis 74
collective benefits 57, 58, 59, 60 cultural
collective values 163 conditioning 288, 289
collectivism 136, 144 elaboration 288, 289
Colne Valley 213 reproduction 288, 289
Colombia 260 culture 18, 103, 111, 115, 116, 121, 125,
common sense 90, 92, 136, 2212, 273, 147, 160, 166, 180, 190, 192, 1978,
274 256, 266, 282, 28790, 291, 312
`common-pool resource' (CPR) currency/foreign exchange 165, 259,
problems 301 264
communism 95, 150, 153, 163, 262, customs 103, 104
298
Communist Manifesto (Marx and data 29, 52, 58, 81, 84, 88, 149, 202, 204,
Engels 1848) 171, 337 205, 207, 217, 221, 2245, 230, 232,
Communist Party of Italy (PCI) 158 2345, 23940, 241, 242, 245, 2589,
communitarianism 18890, 192, 194 260
comparative methods/analysis 16, 34, binary 2645
401, 101, 102, 104, 108, 142, 151, collection 1516, 21820
24967, 297, 312 field notes 198
case studies 75 quantitative and qualitative 212, 31
`method of agreement' 253, 255 `soft' 247
`method of concomitant decision-making 801, 82, 96, 98, 100,
variables' 2534 103, 116, 273
`method of difference' 2523 deconstruction 150, 203
`most similar' and `most deductive approach 37, 62, 95, 232, 234
different' 2545 democracy 13, 37, 45, 66, 76, 85, 87, 92,
qualitative comparative 95, 118, 123, 146, 179, 183, 256, 262
strategies 2601 Democracy and Participation
quantitative comparative programme 215
strategies 25560 democratisation 2501, 2568, 25960,
quantitative versus qualitative 2615 262
`conceptions of the good' 188, 190, 191 Denmark 1312
`conceptions of the right' 188, 190 deontological theory 1845, 193
conceptualisation 25960 and value pluralism 18592
Subject Index 357
description: power of 2202 elections 216, 224

Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane electoral systems 100, 216, 258
and Verba 1994) 217, 333 electorates 93
determinism 106, 121, 123, 154, 1556, eleventh of September (2001) 165, 290
157, 159, 161, 162, 167, 170, 263, elites/elitism 45, 77, 110, 112, 169, 183,
267, 2723 197
development 292, 2978 emancipatory knowledge
developmental state 1478 (Habermas) 1834
devolution 945 empirical
Devon West and Torridge 212 institutionalists 967
dialectics 155, 1815, 27881, 285, 288, questions 25
290, 291 theory 47
strategicrelational approach 2801 empiricism 6, 11, 13, 20, 223, 25, 457,
structuration theory 49, 50, 51, 524, 56, 58, 616, 71, 79,
(Giddens) 27880 81, 834, 86, 88, 95, 109, 157, 173,
dialogue 31617 1756, 1779, 184, 185, 197, 202,
dictatorship 250, 256, 257, 262, 297 203, 205, 232, 234, 250, 2525, 257,
difference 1901 259, 262, 265, 272, 291, 293, 295, 310
disability 168 employment 191, 279, 281, 286
discourses 26, 28, 35, 36, 51, 77, 131, white-collar 158
1389, 140, 141, 159, 161, 164, 165, enabling 233, 279, 301
170, 233, 235, 2825, 312 enterprise association 143
discursive environment 66, 87, 271, 272
conditions 192 epiphenomena 276, 288
construction 159, 1601 epistemes (Foucault) 138, 140
selectivity 284 epistemology xi, 1, 4, 11, 12, 1741,
division of labour 124 48, 71, 108, 109, 131, 154, 1723,
domestic 125 197, 2004, 215, 231, 232, 233, 234,
sexual 115 235, 237, 239, 2401, 242, 245, 247,
division of powers 102 265, 2823, 292, 293, 2945, 300,
divorce 242 307, 308
dogmatism 294, 295 approaches 2232
domestic violence 120 case studies 3240
dominant ideology thesis 288 conclusion 31117
double hermeneutic 19, 26, 28 definition 1819
feminist critique 11418
economic importance 212
crisis 155 Marx 15960
depression/recession 273, 3012, scientific versus hermeneutic
3056 approaches 1920
development 2501, 256, 25960, à skin, not a sweater' 17, 21, 311
262, 263 equality 98, 186, 190, 191
liberalisation 279 essentialism 18, 111, 112, 115, 127, 140,
structure 251 148, 154
economics 65, 299, 314, 317 strategic 130
economism 154, 1556, 157, 159, 161, ethic of care 1212, 130
162, 170, 171 ethic of justice 121
economy 209, 211, 213, 218, 229, 238, ethical principles 184
256, 271, 272, 305 ethical solidarity 188
education 167, 168, 169, 210, 211, 212, ethics 46
213, 223, 224, 237, 238, 255, 257, ethnocentricity 312
260, 286, 298 ethnography 27, 117, 137, 152, 197, 206
fee-paying 168 four main characteristics 136
358 Subject Index
ethnology 1357, 150 femocrats 124

Europe 158, 256, 265, 300, 313, 314 `file drawer problem' 227, 228
East and Central 95 financial crisis (global 1997) 164
Eastern 163 financial markets 31, 33, 35, 300
European Commission 86 financial sector 158
European Community 3034 Financial Times 167
European Court of Justice 279 focal points 304, 306
Cassis de Dijon ruling (1979) 304 focus groups 15, 27, 197, 1989
European Parliament 86 foundationalism 11, 18, 20, 23, 28,
European Single Market 3034 301, 33, 37, 137, 154, 187, 188,
European Union (EU) 367, 378, 45, 18990, 202, 232, 236, 315
867, 164, 211, 213, 258, 279 see also positivism
evolution 73, 80 France 93, 102, 168, 262, 263, 265, 313
expected utility 81, 84 free markets 144, 146, 1478, 164, 165,
experience 111, 115, 121, 1389, 140, 254
198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 207, 2834 market forces 163
explanation 47, 50, 545, 556, 75, 84, free trade 2534
87, 88, 120, 1312, 136, 148, 149, free will 2723
151, 180, 201, 232, 234, 252, 2545, freedom/liberty 143, 175, 186, 187, 190
264, 272, 282, 284, 290, 296, 304 Freedom House 257
see also causality Freedom Summer project 198
functional analysis 76
fairness 1867, 191 functional responses 87
false consciousness 77, 180 functionalism 92, 161, 300, 3089
falsifiability 6, 4850, 63, 71, 83, 103, funding 226, 234, 2356, 242, 265
150, 161, 174, 204, 217, 265, 295,
312, 316 game theory 66, 71, 74, 80, 83, 85, 88,
see also testing 89, 263, 299
family 79, 119, 120, 154, 213, 288 evolutionary 73
fascism 150, 262, 305 strategy equilibrium 689, 70, 85
feminism 1, 5, 7, 9, 1011, 12, 15, 18, games 1767, 178
30, 10930, 1567, 158, 185, 191, gatekeeping 31516
194, 273, 278, 314 Gates, B. 166
general: gendering the state 1227; `gender' 111
internal debates 109, 11013; gender 18, 74, 111, 112, 116, 117, 123,
methodology and 1245, 155, 1567, 158, 161, 167,
epistemology 11418; `not bold 168, 16970, 178, 191, 233, 314
enough' 1289; race 112; `gender regime' (Connell) 1234
reconceptualising general trends (academic Holy
politics 11822 Grail) 249
types: black 112, 115; cultural 117, generalisability 207, 241, 248, 255, 263,
121; liberal 110, 112, 116, 117, 312, 317
118, 120, 123, 312; generalisation 263
Marxist 11012, 114, 115, geographic location 74
11819, 1223, 1567, 312; Germany 93, 1312, 168, 181, 262, 265,
materialist 159; 313
postmodern 116, 124; Social Democratic Party
post-structuralist 117, 130; (SPD) 3056, 307
Radical 11012, 115, 11723, glass ceiling 275, 283
312; second-wave 111, 11415, globalisation 31, 326, 40, 1578, 160,
120; socialist 110, 118, 123, 157; 235, 238, 258, 271, 286
standpoint 114, 115, 116, 117, cultural 33, 356
313 economic 323
Subject Index 359
first-wave theorists 33 House of Commons 169, 2425

markets 165 filibustering 2434
political economy 38 Second Reading debates 243, 244
protesters 1667 Third Reading debates 244
sceptics 334 House of Lords 243, 290
second-wave theorists 33 households 220
third-wave theorists 334 housework 259
governance 334, 37, 92, 100, 170 human agency 77, 105, 1067, 138,
Governing the Economy (Hall 13940, 141, 1545, 160, 1612, 170,
1986) 263, 329 187
government 37, 92, 136, 144 Mrs Thatcher 146
advisers 238 see also structure and agency
coalitions 83 human condition 182, 188, 189, 192,
structures 90 291
governments 9, 10, 31, 35, 243, 299, Human Development Index
300 (UNDP) 257
marginal seats 224 human/civil rights 1334, 198, 257, 303,
Great Depression 296, 308 313
Green Party 208 Hungary 158
Greenham 198, 215 hyperglobalists 33, 34
gross domestic product (GDP) 257, 259, hypothesis 22
261
groups 272, 276, 278, 2867, 288 ideal speech situation (Habermas) 183
guillotine (House of Commons) 243 ideal types 149
idealism 27, 135, 145, 155
ideas 2, 9, 131, 135, 151, 155, 162, 234,
habit 1034 266, 2834, 285, 28790, 291,
Hansard 243 292310
health 102, 168, 210, 211, 213, 238 explaining stability and change 3013
hedge funds 165 historical institutionalism 3057
Hegelianism 139 rationalism 3034
hermeneutics 1920, 27, 28, 51, 132, role in explaining political
1357, 139, 150, 152, 293 phenomena xi
heuristics 69, 72, 73, 81, 235 see also institutions and ideas
Himmler, H. 131 Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
historical institutionalism 92, 94, 96, Institutions and Political Change
101, 104, 105, 106, 261, 263, 265, (Goldstein and Keohane
293, 299, 3001, 3023, 304, 309, 1993) 3034, 310, 328
310, 313 identity 56, 61, 77, 78, 83, 95, 100, 112,
ideas 3057 124, 127, 18990, 192, 194, 281
historical materialism 294 ideology 56, 578, 60, 61, 768, 85, 120,
historicism 92 122, 123, 133, 136, 143, 150, 161,
history 86, 116, 121, 124, 129, 132, 135, 165, 180, 181, 182, 262, 275, 288,
138, 145, 151, 181, 273, 313, 317 299, 306
end of 164 end of 164
historical stories 148 idiographic studies 249, 252, 263
Marxist theory 155 incentives 95, 100
History of the Human Sciences income 168, 169
(journal) 193 independent definition 489
Hitler, A. 131, 305, 306 India 137, 262
holism 261 indicators 5961
holistic approach 199, 202 individual benefits 57, 58, 60, 61
homosexuality 113, 242, 244, 28990 individual costs 57, 58, 60, 61
360 Subject Index
individualism 144, 163, 3089 interest groups 10, 45, 86, 244, 273
methodological 75 pressure groups 102, 289
possessive 147 interest rates 1323
reductionist 147 interests 31, 534, 94, 95, 100, 117, 121,
individuals 10, 66, 70, 76, 78, 80, 84, 90, 188, 281, 286
91, 94, 95, 96, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, intergovernmental relationships 100
106, 188, 189, 191, 255, 256, 258, intergovernmentalism 369, 86
272, 274, 2768, 281, 283, 2867, international institutionalism 96
288, 294, 302, 306, 307, 309 International Monetary Fund
Indonesia 164 (IMF) 165
inductive reasoning 37, 83, 232, 234 international relations (IR) 53, 66, 81,
inductivism 52, 54 85, 87, 96, 102, 291, 303, 310, 314
industrialisation 257, 262, 300 gatekeeping 315
inequality 157, 161, 162, 163 International Studies Association
inflation 67, 133, 146, 149, 238, 252, (USA) 315
281 internet 167, 227
information 845, 856, 95, 299, 301 interpretation 256
false disclosure 85 see also hermeneutics
private 85 interpretive theory 1, 5, 1112, 1920,
instinct 2778 20, 215, 2630, 313, 356, 39, 41,
Institute for Social Research (Frankfurt 71, 114, 13152, 160, 17680, 193,
1923) 181, 193 201, 241, 2956, 31217
institutional theory 314 intersubjectivity 701
institutionalism 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, interviews 15, 23, 27, 197200, 201,
23, 37, 90108, 2967, 313 2056, 207, 20815, 233, 234, 235,
descriptiveinductive method 95, 102 237, 2389, 240, 243, 246, 247, 275,
examples 93 281, 283
historicalcomparative method 923 irrationalism 141
old 296, 308, 317 IR see international relations
see also new institutionalism Islam 68
institutions 2, 8, 9, 16, 389, 84, 868, Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 256
989, 1001, 1012, 1036, 108, 110,
129, 132, 145, 14950, 154, 170, 258, Japan 164, 168, 255, 258, 262
263, 272, 276, 286 Jews 1312
formal and informal joint decision trap 38
conceptions 989 journals 84, 217, 220, 2268, 230
genesis and transformation 1046 judiciary 93
holistic and disaggregated justice 13
conceptions 1001 juvenile delinquency 113
and ideas 292310
international 271
not independent, but embedded 101 Kennedy, J.F. 74
static and dynamic conceptions 99 Keynesianism 102, 147
see also institutionalism; new kin altruism 80
institutionalism Kinnock, N. 209
instrumentalism 123 kinship 275
intellectual imperialism 293 knowledge 167, 170, 296
intellectuals 156 see also epistemology
intentionalism 106, 2768, 279, 285,
2878, 2901 labour 90, 161, 166, 181, 184, 300
ìnter-coder reliability scores' 219 Labour Government (1977) 243
interaction: institutions and Labour Party 589, 60, 61, 132, 169,
individuals 102 200, 20814, 244, 254
Subject Index 361
language 28, 138, 1769, 183, 184, 256, Marxism xi, 1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 31, 66,
265, 275, 282 139, 15371, 181, 184, 273, 275,
games 177, 178, 179 2945, 305, 307
gendered 234, 235 classical 1536
racially inspired 235 contemporary 15963
terminology 64 economic, social and political
Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer change 1579
1936/1971) 174 `flexibility' 163
Latin America 114, 164, 2567, 297 importance 16370
law/legislation 87, 92, 102, 132, 154, ìrresolvable dualism' 155
236, 296, 308, 313, 317 surviving collapse of communism 163
law-courts 94, 169 theoretical critiques 1567
laws (scientific) 6, 12, 232, 2512 utility 167
lawyers 36, 92, 94 see also feminism; neo-liberalism
leadership 45, 209, 211, 213, 275 masculinity 130
legal systems 90 material reality 14950
legislative coalitions 66 materialism 1545, 1556, 157, 159,
legislatures/parliaments 93, 94, 145, 1612, 170
147, 169, 224, 246, 305 mathematics 173
lesbianism 111 mean values 221
Liberal Democrat Party 208, 21014 meaning 62, 77, 116, 131, 1345, 136,
liberal democratic reformism 93 138, 151, 170, 175, 176, 177, 180,
liberal universalism 150 184, 199, 207, 232, 316
liberalcommunitarian debate 194 see also understanding
liberalism 67, 77, 1445, 153, 186, media 14, 86
1912, 194 newspapers 222, 292, 293
libertarianism 189, 194 media information 199
life expectancy 257 median (middle observation) 221
life histories 235 Members of Parliament 218, 2425, 289
life-chances 9 Men are from Mars and Women are from
life-saving 2778 Venus (Gray 1992) 18, 328
lifestyle 286 mentalities 141
linguistics 275 meta-narrative (world-view) 155
literacy 257 meta-theoretical concepts 287
Liverpool 210 metaphysics 23, 46, 1746, 179, 181,
local government 125, 147, 200 184, 193
Local Government Act (1988), methodological individualism 88
Section 28 28990 methodology 1516, 301, 34, 83, 90,
logical empiricism see logical 92, 235, 2401, 247, 293, 2945
positivism conclusion 311, 312, 314
logical positivism 46, 1726, 177, 179, economics 65
185, 192, 193, 314 feminist critique 11418
lone parents 168 see also comparative methods;
Long-Term Capital Management Fund qualitative methods; quantitative
(LTCMF) 165 methods
micro-practices (Foucault) 119, 139, 141
microeconomics 67
Madeira 255 Microsoft 166
Major, J. 209, 213 middle class/bourgeoisie 133, 210, 214,
majority, size of 233 262
manufacturing 158, 259 miners 210
March of Dimes (USA) 302 ministers 238, 243
marriage 24, 134, 138 misogyny 11314
362 Subject Index
Mississippi 198 neo-Marxism 901, 288

mode (most frequent value) 221 neo-realism 315
models 11, 12, 6970, 73, 75, 78, 7980, nested games 37
82, 83, 84, 85, 102, 105, 178, 217, Netherlands 168, 313
299 network institutionalism 96, 97, 99
bootstrapping 229 New Conservatism 144
bureau-shaping (Dunleavy) 2456 new information 81
general incentives 567 new institutionalism 86, 90108, 299,
linear additive 58 308, 313
logocentric 185, 191 approach 947
male breadwinner 124 contribution to `multi-theoretic
masculine behavioural 118 research' 108
non-parametric 217 core features 97101
regression 225, 228 dilemmas 1017
socialeconomic status (SES) 222, èpistemic gain' 108
224 òrganising perspective' rather than a
spatial 83 `theory' 107
Westminster 147 points of departure 97
modernisation 262, 298 varieties 95, 96, 102
modernism 202 see also institutionalism
monetarism 102, 146 New Labour government (1997) 118
money 167, 170 new public management 934
monists 295 New Right 70, 146, 163
Monte Carlo simulation 229 New York: Waldorf Hotel 280
moral arguments 51 New Zealand 168
moral nihilism 192 News International Group 165
morphogenesis 28590 Next Steps agencies 99, 246
morphostasis 287 nihilistic irrationalism 139
multiculturalism 1912, 194 nobility 262
multilevel governance (MLG) 369, nomothetic studies 249, 263
3940 non-governmental organisations
multinational corporations 33, 45, (NGOs) 1667
1667, 171 non-positivism 232, 233, 235, 239,
multiple regression 223 2401, 242, 245, 31617
multivariate analysis 216, 224, 2258 normative institutionalism 956, 98, 99,
Murdoch, R. 165 100, 101, 103, 105
Mussolini, B. 158 compatibility with rational choice
approach 1067
narratives 28, 29, 134, 142, 1438, 199, normative theory/approach 1, 67, 8,
312 1315, 223, 25, 30, 379, 40, 51, 67,
Nash equilibria 73 723, 79, 80, 82, 83, 92, 95, 121, 123,
nation states 323, 368, 39, 45, 55, 96, 132, 17294, 313, 314
266, 3034 norms 10, 756, 95, 96, 103, 105, 182,
nationalisation 210 183, 184, 190, 192, 266
natural law 179, 188 conventional forms of behaviour 75
natural liberty (Adam Smith) 144 non-instrumental 193
natural selection 73 Northampton North 21011, 212
natural structures 24 Northern Ireland 292
Nazis/Nazism 1312, 305 Norway 168
neo-functionalism 86
neo-institutionalism 74 objectivity 22, 26, 28, 29, 116, 139, 142,
neo-liberalism 35, 38, 40, 67, 70, 1647, 149, 159, 174, 175, 184, 185, 201,
235, 315 2056, 236
Subject Index 363
observation 22, 234, 256, 30, 45, pension systems 299

467, 52, 534, 545, 59, 197, 200, personal economic expectations 238
237 phenomenology 132, 135
occupation 178 philosophy 23, 30, 32, 82, 132, 151,
One Nation Toryism 143, 144 1748, 272, 282, 314, 317
ontology xi, 1, 4, 89, 11, 1741, 70, 71, permanent task 186
103, 107, 111, 154, 197, 232, 234, philosophy of history 152
2401, 247, 265, 266, 287, 2926, philosophy of science 41, 63
300, 301, 302, 304, 306 pluralism 66, 153, 162, 167, 190, 194,
approaches 2232 277, 278, 293, 31415, 316
case studies 3240 policy-making 14, 100, 102, 128, 160,
conclusion 31117 2456
definition 18 path-dependent 101
facilitates adjudication between policy networks 94, 99
competing theories 307 polio 302
importance 212 `political', the 109, 118, 130, 296
positivist, realist and interpretist political
positions 20 activism 46, 5662
progress in political science 30710 business cycle 67
scientific versus hermeneutic context 56, 58, 60, 61
approaches 1920 correctness 204
à skin, not a sweater' 17, 21, 311 `dispossessed' 203
social 106 efficacy 57
open government 200 participation 23, 237, 316
operationalisation 59, 61, 62, 201 parties see political parties
opinion 856, 135, 199 philosophy see political philosophy
opinion polls 198, 199, 213, 238 science see political science
oppression 111, 116, 189, 190, 191 Political Man (Lipset 1959) 2501,
ordinary least squares (OLS) 217, 2258 2567, 259, 335
disadvantages 2289 political parties 45, 53, 73, 77, 83, 85,
multivariate regression analysis 244 93, 156, 205, 20815, 218, 219, 220,
r-squares 225, 228 233, 254, 256, 2578, 300, 301, 305
Organisation for Economic Co-operation discipline 2423
and Development (OECD) 167, emotional attachment 57
261 governing 238
organisations 978, 101, 117 manifestos 216
outcomes 35, 37, 57, 68, 69, 74, 87, 111, membership 200
160, 162, 167, 170, 203, 257, 262, officials 200
263, 266, 272, 286, 293, 298, 304 voting behaviour in House of
Oxbridge 168 Commons 2445
Oxford West and Abingdon 211 political philosophy 67, 1315, 179,
180, 186, 188, 193
parliamentary procedures 296 `death' 1726
parliamentary systems 102 political science xi, 116, 197, 251
participant observation 23, 27, 1978, approaches 1, 67
201, 206, 235, 237, 239 basic questions 3
path dependency 39 boundaries of discipline 119, 122,
patriarchy 18, 20, 110, 115, 118, 1201, 125, 128, 129
1223, 273, 275, 283 conclusion 31117
male domination 115 dialogue 4, 12, 14, 31617
male power (entrenched) 112 diversity (broad church) 38, 311,
pauperisation 294 31315
peasant communities 75, 262 internationalisation 2
364 Subject Index
political science (cont.) private property 878, 154

mainstream critique of rational choice private sector (economy) 120, 164
theory 824 privatisation 945, 146, 209
meta-theoretical challenges 2, 9 probability 2256, 228
methods 2, 1516 production 33, 157, 184
scientific approach 1112 means/mode of 138, 154, 155
subject matter 811 professions 118, 125
theory and practice 1215 prospect theory 81
see also politics protectionism 2523
Political Science Association protest movements 167, 273
(USA 1903) 2 riots 45
Political Studies Association psychology 65, 7982, 121, 228, 271
(UK 1950) 2 public
politics 215 administration 90, 93
avoidance 198, 215 choice theory 667, 277
connecting to the world of 1215 corporations 93
feminist perspective 11822 opinion 10
practice of 67 policy 257, 258, 299, 310
see also political science private partnerships 210
positivism 1113, 1920, 20, 21, 226, private spheres (of life) 5, 7, 110,
28, 303, 367, 38, 39, 41, 468, 51, 118, 11920, 121, 122, 128, 129,
52, 64, 114, 11618, 1357, 15960, 157, 191: `personal is political' 9,
161, 173, 182, 2002, 216, 2325, 1011, 119
23942, 245, 247, 248, 250, 265, 266, sector 120, 146, 158, 164
295 spending 218, 238, 245, 247
conclusion 31117
criticism of interpretist position 27
criticisms 234 qualitative methods xi, 2, 15, 212, 27,
reformulation in light of interpretist 31, 48, 589, 64, 197215, 21617,
critiques 245 218, 2212, 223, 227, 229, 251, 263,
post-behaviouralism 245, 51, 54, 2645, 267, 294, 314
623 case study 20715
post-positivism 246 comparative strategies 2601
post-structuralism 278, 117, 132, 135, criticisms 2047, 21415
1379, 13941, 150, 151 generalisability 207
feminist 112, 115, 116 interpretation 2067
postmodernism 278, 29, 30, 116, 124, objectivity and bias 2056
132, 135, 1379, 13941, 150, 151, representativeness and reliability 205
152, 153, 155, 18992, 194, 2024, quantitative methods xi, 2, 15, 212, 23,
236, 2901, 314 27, 31, 48, 64, 116, 128, 173, 2001,
`structureagency' debate 2815 202, 204, 205, 207, 215, 21630, 251,
poverty 164, 168, 169 263, 2645, 267, 312, 314
power 9, 10, 37, 91, 95, 97, 1001, 102, comparative strategies 25560
104, 106, 110, 113, 119, 1234, 129, quantitative and qualitative methods
130, 145, 146, 147, 157, 167, 170, (combined) 23148
200, 203, 234, 278, 288 false dichotomy? 2315
systemic 90 modes 23940
prediction 201 move towards methodological
Preface to the Critique of Political pluralism 2356
Economy (Marx 1859) 154 triangulation 237, 2389
preferences 1345, 234, 306 why and how 23740
presidential systems 102 questionnaires 198, 201, 220, 233, 234,
privacy 120 238, 317
Subject Index 365
race 112, 117, 124, 133, 155, 161, 167, replicability/replication 56, 2278, 230,
1689, 16970, 190 248, 250, 251, 265, 266, 317
ethnic categories 256 research
racism 221, 282 `good' and `bad' 2034, 2478
randomness 225, 229 see also qualitative methods;
rational choice institutionalism 956, quantitative methods
97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 1045, 3001 research design 311, 312
compatibility with normative researchers 17, 1819, 21, 36, 40, 56
approach 1067 crisis of legitimation 2034
rational choice theory 1, 45, 6, 9, 10, crisis of representation 2023
12, 14, 15, 37, 567, 61, 6589, 901, resources 9, 38, 39, 2789
94, 95, 132, 137, 224, 234, 235, 263, retroduction 62
266, 277, 293, 294, 2989, 3001, revolution 133, 181, 264, 298, 305
3023, 304, 306, 307, 3089, 31314, rights 121, 183, 184
317 risk 68, 81, 141
cooptation of ideas 310 Robertson, P. 290
feminist critique 116 Rotherham 203
information 846 Rowntree Inquiry into Income and
institutional 868 Wealth 168
psychologists' critique 7982 rules 10, 75, 789, 86, 88, 92, 95, 96,
Rawls 1868 978, 100, 121, 146, 178, 275, 2789,
sociological critique 749, 88 280, 297
rational institutionalism 3001 informal conventions 98, 99, 103,
rationalism 136, 263, 301, 3034 104
rationality 139, 1401, 185 standard operating procedures 1034
Reaganomics 67 ruling class 154, 155, 181, 288
real world 5, 11, 18, 19, 28, 35, 62, 63, rural areas 262
149, 154, 156, 15960, 163, 177, 203, Russia 164, 255, 260
236, 283, 297, 299, 305, 308
realism 1112, 20, 223, 25, 26, 302,
33, 34, 35, 367, 389, 41, 154, sampling 205, 207, 215, 21920, 233,
15960, 233, 247, 292, 313, 314, 239, 242, 246, 258, 317
31617 Scandinavia 252, 313
critical 160 Scargill, A. 210
criticism of interpretist position 27 sceptics 103
modern critical realism 31 science 11, 22, 24, 41, 132, 134, 159,
reductionism 701, 88, 93, 94, 103, 185, 173, 176, 177, 178, 200, 201, 224,
285, 2878 2323, 250, 265, 312
economic 149, 150 scientific
Referendum Party 212 approaches 1920
reflexivity 24, 31, 105, 160, 170, 206, claims 67
232, 2801 realism 295
regime theory 91 Scotland 122, 290
regional policy 36 Seattle 167
regionalisation 33 Second International 155, 156
regionalism 35 Second World War 296
regression analysis 235 aftermath 300
relations of production 275 Selections from the Prison Notebooks
relativism 30, 54, 1412, 160, 180, 185, (Gramsci 1971) 1589, 171, 328
193, 204, 233, 241, 248, 265, 282, 296 selectivity
epistemological 62 strategic (Jessop) 162
religion 23, 74, 177, 190, 244, 252, 284, structural (Poulantzas) 1612
292 self-esteem 141
366 Subject Index
self-interest 68, 77, 78, 7980, 83, 87, Social Democratic Moment (Berman
90, 102, 116, 143, 188, 189, 191, 277, 1998) 3057, 310, 320
299, 3001, 3023, 304, 305, 307 Social Democratic Party (SDP, UK) 200,
senior managers (local government) 125 211
sense experience 173, 174, 177 Social Origins of Dictatorship and
service sector 259 Democracy (Moore 1966) 251,
sex 112, 126 2612, 338
sex categories 124 socialisation 18, 11617, 213, 308
sexgender system (Rubin) 110, 111 socialism 155, 213
sexual conduct 138 Socialist tradition 1468
sexuality 11112, 121, 190 society 163, 178
signalling 85 Society for the Protection of the Unborn
significance tests 2256, 227, 228 Child (SPUC) 244
Single European Act (1986) 279 socio-cultural interaction 288, 289
slavery 296 sociological institutionalism 95, 96,
small business 300 107
snowball sampling 205 sociology 30, 33, 65, 70, 86, 88, 116,
social 117, 129, 135, 153, 197, 198, 200,
aggregates 45 215, 263, 291, 313, 314, 317
atoms 701, 78 àrbitrary boundary' with political
capital 101, 114, 222 science 119, 122
change 158 critique of rational choice
choice theory 66, 79, 86, 87 theory 749
consciousness 154 sociology of knowledge 152
construction 18, 20, 22, 267, 31, 34, sociology of organisations 125
35, 39, 124, 127, 266, 314 soft science 136
constructionism 111, 112 software 166, 217, 220, 222, 223, 226,
constructivism 233 230, 234, 235
context 189 AMOS 224
contract 175, 179 LISREL 224
contract theory 88 SPSS 228
democracy 40, 258, 305 STATA 223, 229
forces 162 South Africa 95
and human sciences 2, 5, 20, 223, South Korea 164
24, 41, 137, 193, 197, 201, 202, Soviet Union 158, 163
2323, 236, 240, 247, 248, 249, Spain 259
271, 274, 277, 278, 282, 295, 312, stability 293, 3013, 304, 306, 3089
314, 317 Stalin, J. 158
interaction 286, 287 state xi, 94, 111, 113, 120, 121, 130, 139,
justice 1858, 191 141, 142, 143, 147, 154, 164, 175,
life 178, 179, 182 179, 280, 305
mobility 168 British 276
movements 84 feminist critique 1227
obligations 189 power 251
reality 183, 274, 275, 283 redistributive 187
revolution 75 `relative autonomy' 157, 161, 162
status 288 theory 1567, 2989, 300, 308:
stratification 262 Marxist 1612
structure 24, 301, 38, 745, 83, 88, State and Capitalist Society (Miliband
140, 158, 180, 184, 25960, 284: 1969) 158
see also structure and agency State and Revolution (Lenin 1917) 158,
theory 180 171, 335
welfare 76 statistical techniques 15, 48, 52, 61, 204
Subject Index 367
statistics 23, 134, 201, 208, 217, 218, thick description (Geertz) 27, 1367
219, 2212, 227, 229, 230, 232, 234, Third World/developing countries 130,
235, 236, 238, 23940, 242, 2445, 250
256, 258, 260, 264, 265 time 18, 87, 138
inferential 2225 time and space 20, 24, 28, 101, 155
structural equation models (SEM) 224 Times, The 165
strategic relational approach 2801, 291 Toryism 143, 144
structural trade 33, 160, 303
conditioning 286, 287 trade unions 125, 210, 211, 252, 299, 306
elaboration 286, 287 tradition 103, 136, 1401, 1438
forces 53 Liberal 1445
functionalism 2978 Socialist 1468
reproduction 286 Tory 143
structuralism 91, 92, 107, 132, 154, Whig 1456
1556, 157, 159, 161, 162, 170, 266, transformationalism 334
2746, 285, 2878, 2901 transitivity 68, 82
as a `movement' 2745 transparency 227, 230, 301
as tendency 276 Treaty of Rome 304
structuration 88, 27880, 291 triangulation 237, 2389
structure and agency 27191
structured inequality 157, 16771, 233 uncertainty 73, 81, 82, 84, 85, 102, 105
UK 1679 underclass 168
USA 16970 understanding 312, 31617
structures 93, 95, 1067, 160, 170, 273 see also meaning
corporatist 161 unemployment 149, 150, 229, 238, 256,
subjectivity 27, 13940, 201, 204, 232, 259, 274, 281
236 United Kingdom (UK) 3, 35, 5662, 87,
superstructure (Marxist) 154, 155 934, 99, 102, 111, 118, 125, 129,
surveys 201, 220, 235, 237, 240, 258 136, 1428, 160, 163, 200, 219, 254,
Sweden 102, 1312, 260, 263, 265 255, 262, 263, 265, 289, 300, 313, 314
Swedish Social Democrats (SAP) 305, civil service (changing
307 structure) 2457
Switzerland 102 economic decline 276
economy 1578, 300, 301
tautology 49, 50, 51, 83, 103, 104 Ministry of Defence 98
tax and benefit systems 100 Parliamentary Select Committees 104
tax burden 102 political participation 234
taxation 88, 21112, 213, 218 prime ministership 145, 233
Taxation and Democracy (Steinmo private members' bills 2425
1993) 263, 346 structured inequality 1679, 170
technical rationality 182 United States of America (US/USA) 65,
testing 478, 58, 62, 63, 102, 174, 217, 67, 83, 89, 93, 102, 111, 129, 164,
222, 223, 249, 2502, 263 168, 217, 242, 254, 258, 260, 262,
see also falsifiability 263, 265, 290, 302, 313, 314
Thailand 164, 255 Congress 71, 867, 169, 233, 289
Thatcher, M. 168, 209, 210, 252, 301 hegemony 33
Thatcherism 67, 77, 132, 1428, 312 international relations 315
theology 46, 188 Presidency 233, 271
theory 22, 234, 25, 31, 478, 50, 52, ReaganBush Snr
545, 56, 59, 60, 61, 623, 92, 134, administrations 277
136, 160, 201, 226, 232, 249, 2502, state legislative committees 1257
262, 265, 266, 272, 306, 307, 31112, structured inequality 16970
315 Supreme Court 170
368 Subject Index
universal claims 313 war 264, 3012

universal moral vision 184, 187, 188, wealth 167, 257, 259, 280
189, 193 UK 1678
universalism 127 USA 169
universities xi, 147, 168, 281 and voluntary activity 2224, 225
urban areas 262 wealth inequality 294
urbanisation 257 wealth redistribution 189
utilitarianism 67 web sites 167
utility maximisation 95, 96, 98, 99 Weberianism 156, 162, 170
welfare 210, 21112, 259
value judgement 173, 174, 175, 185 welfare state 93, 119, 121, 124, 161, 168,
value pluralism 18592 169, 252, 2645
values 67, 10, 12, 1314, 18, 23, 37, public patriarchy 124
389, 45, 54, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, well-being 9, 67, 79, 132, 238
99100, 102, 104, 105, 116, 122, 198, Whig tradition 1456, 147
200, 207, 216, 266, 288 Wirral West 209
variables 61, 2378, 244, 250, 251, `woman' 111, 112, 130
2534, 2557, 260, 261, 264, 267 women 5, 18, 158 1689, 191, 275,
independent and dependent 2223 2834
Verstehen 149 `stereotypical and sexist
veto points 102 understandings' 14
Vienna Circle (1920s) 46 see also feminism
vignettes 27, 235, 239 women's culture 121
Vocabulary of Politics (Weldon women's experience 111, 115, 121, 122,
1953) 175, 348 126
voluntary activity 102, 2224, 225 women's initiatives 125
voting 45, 4950, 53, 589, 60, 65, 66, workers' councils 156
74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 86, 116, 1323, workforce 168
1789, 197, 198, 199, 205, 20715, working class/proletariat 133, 1689,
218, 219, 223, 229, 235, 255, 256 181, 210, 213, 214, 254
general election (1992) 59, 21014 World Bank 165
general election (1997) 20815 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 167
general elections 61 world-views 180, 181, 182, 191, 201,
sample (1997) 208 297, 303
tactical 21213
see also electoral systems youth 209, 213, 214, 234, 238

A A Skin Not A Sweater - David Marsh y Paul Furlong

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A A Skin Not A Sweater - David Marsh y Paul Furlong

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Contents

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes x

1 A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in

The development of rational choice theory 65

Debates within feminism 110

6 Interpretive Theory 131

The importance of interpretation 132

8 Normative Theory 172

9 Qualitative Methods 197

10 Quantitative Methods 216

11 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 231

Two case studies 242

12 Comparative Methods 249

PART III ISSUES

13 Structure and Agency 271

14 Institutions and Ideas 292

A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology

Ontology and epistemology

Ontological and epistemological positions are related, but need to be

Scientific versus hermeneutic approaches

In methodological terms, the scientific tradition was greatly influenced

Positivist, realist and interpretist positions

Why are such distinctions important?

In our view, ontological and epistemological concerns cannot, and should

indirectly; we can observe other relationships which, our theory tells

Different approaches to ontology and epistemology

. Positivism is based upon a foundationalist ontology. So, to the

the goal of social science was to pursue empirical questions, while

appear to falsify the theory. As such, if we observe `facts' which are

called `post-positivists': acknowledge the interdependence of theory and

behavioural research has simply not dared to tread.' He recognises that

The interpretist position

of social `scientists' [sic] is to study those social constructions. Quantitative

However, Bevir and Rhodes do wish to make some, more limited,

more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so. As an

The criticisms of classical realism were of two sorts, which reflect

Ontology and epistemology in political science:

`third ways' share something in common, but do differ significantly in a

a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalisation is a

The transformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of

However, Hay and Marsh go further to contend that these discursive

It is possible to approach the issue of cultural globalisation utilising a

Case 2: Multilevel governance

Multilevel governance and intergovernmentalism: realism

understood as a nested game played out both in the domestic politics of

The normative underpinnings of multilevel governance and

loosely interconnected rather than as tightly nested; that is, characterised

The constructivist approach

terms of argumentation, practical research method, explanatory logic and

. The best introductions to the philosophy of science and social science

Acker, J. 125, 318 Budge, I. and Laver, M. 45, 321

Dunleavy, P. 89, 2457, 3245 Habermas, J. 55, 1825, 193, 328

Jay, M. 193, 332 Lijphart, A. 258, 260, 335

McAdam, D. 198, 336

Moller Okin, S. 120, 338 Quattrone, G.A. and Tversky, A. 82,

Sened, I. 878, 345 Vanhanen, T. 251, 257, 260, 347

abortion 120, 242, 244, 288 black economy 259

China 262 consensus 97, 99, 143, 145, 185, 186,

description: power of 2202 elections 216, 224

ethnology 1357, 150 femocrats 124

first-wave theorists 33 House of Commons 169, 2425

Mississippi 198 neo-Marxism 901, 288