BPI V.

DE COSTER
G.R. No. L-23181, March 16, 1925, 47 Phil 594

Note:
A power of attorney to loan and borrow money and to mortgage the principals
property does NOT carry with it or imply that the agent has a legal right to make
the principal liable for the personal debts of the agent.
FACTS:
Defendant Gabriela Andrea de Coster y Roxas executed a Special Power
of Attorney in favor of her husband. This authority gave Jean M. Poizat
(agenthusband) the power to loan and borrow money in her behalf. The
agent was able to obtain a loan from BPI, secured by a chattel
mortgage on the steamers of his company, Poizat Vegetable Oil Mills and a
real mortgage over a property, which is also subject to another mortgage in favor
of La Orden de Dominicos.
Defendants defaulted on their obligations to BPI and La Orden de Dominicos.
Thus, both creditors prayed for the forclosure of the mortgaged properties.
RTC declared the defendants in default for their failure to appear and
ruled in favor of he plaintiffs. De Coster alleges that she never had any
knowledge of the actual facts until she read about her default in the
newspapers, since she was not in the Philippines when the summons
were served; that her husband fled the country; that the mortgages
executed by her agent husband was without marital consent; and that
he did not have any authority to make her liable as surety on the debt
of a third personit being a personal debt of her husband and his company.
ISSUE:
W/N the principal-wife, Gabriela De Coster y Roxas, is liable for the mortgage
executed by her agent husband, Jean Poizat
HELD:
NO. The note and mortgage show upon their face that at the time they
were executed, the agent-husband was attorney-in-fact for the
defendant wife, and the bank knew or should have known the nature
and extent of his authority and the limitations upon his power. Par. 5 of
the Power of Attorney authorizes the agent husband for and in the name of his
wife to loan or borrow any sums of money or fungible things, etc. This is
taken to mean that he only had the power to loan his wifes money and
to borrow money for or on account of his wife as her agent and
attorney-in-fact. It does not carry with it or imply that he had the legal
right to make his wife liable as a surety for the preexisting debt of a
third person.
It is fundamental rule of construction that where in an instrument powers and
duties are specified and defined, that all of such powers and duties are

limited and confined to those which are specified and defined, and that
all other powers and duties are excluded.
The fact that the agent-husband failed and neglected to perform his
duties and to represent the interests of his principal is NOT a bar to the
principal obtaining legal relief for the negligence of her agent.
It is apparent from the face of the instrument that the whole purpose and intent
of the power of attorney was to empower and authorize the agent-husband to
look after and protect the interests of the wife and for her and in her
name to transact any and all of her business. But nowhere does it
provide or authorize him to make her liable as a surety for the payment
of the preexisting debt of a third person.
Thus, the agent-husband does not have the authority to sign the note
and to execute the mortgage for and on behalf of the wife as her act
and deed, and that as to her the note is void for want of power of her
husband to execute it.