DANILO E.

PARAS, petitioner,
ELECTIONS, respondent.

vs.

COMMISSION

ON

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay
of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay
election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition
for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing
on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995.[1] At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition,
well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC,
however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the
recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the
holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction,

docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing
a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing,
the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and
required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without COMELEC approval.[2]
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the
third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996;
hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in
behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of
the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining an
opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law
department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a
reply.[3]
Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section
74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner
insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now
barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by
Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every
three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated
Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner
maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no
recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK
election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be
the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for
loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part
of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. [4] The
evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election,
that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the
novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of
removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end
of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to
be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within
the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously
insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted
rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and
the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the
enactment of a statute.[5] An interpretation should, if possible, be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is

defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,

emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.[6]
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a
statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
[7]
Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government
Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict
with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads
to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court
made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its
authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth
but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x[8]
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit
and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal
working of the local government unit necessitating additional
expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election
one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for
the office of the local elective official concerned.The electorate could
choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly

has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall

election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of
the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as
one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of
the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering
that the next regular election involving the barangay office
concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled on May 1997.[9]
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having
become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued
by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election
should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989

ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO

SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE
RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and
WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and
setting aside of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing
the petition for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private respondent,
William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage
and application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free
Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H.
de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title
was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of
Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the
patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the
property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and

Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner

Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the
aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the
Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the
Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On
June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered
by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The
mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after the
petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4,
1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor
of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as
security for a loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by
the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property
was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The private
respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the
said public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was
issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines
Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was
executed in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ
of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the
trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an
order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private
respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however,
attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in the
possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate
and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to
repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August
15, 1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ

of possession was filed by the private respondent with the trial court.
The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private
respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase
the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal
offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ
of possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was
denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case
to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12,
1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22,
1984, denying their motion for reconsider consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate
court gave due course to the petition; required the parties to submit
simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective positions; and
restrained the trial court and the private respondent from executing,
implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of
possession until further orders from the court. 3 However, in a
decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent Court
of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the
appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner,
Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248,
was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of
absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the property
covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to
repurchase the property provided for in Section 119
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could

have already started. Prom this fact alone, the

petition should have been dismissed. However,
granting that the transfer from parent to child for a
nominal sum may not be the "conveyance"
contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue
raised by the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate
court went on to hold that the five-year period of the petitioners to
repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already
prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in
consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged
the property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made
their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had
clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught because on
May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the
same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the
courts below, their right to repurchase within five years under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support
their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of
Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate
court's decision, states that the sale of the contested property by the
patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal
heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the petitioners) no

longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of

Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or
not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer
to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to
repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to
repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists.

Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent

and the appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of
Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader
or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the
land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his
labor in clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering that petitioner
Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and
Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and
her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping
with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between
two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of
the law should prevail.

Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period
of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three
classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase the
applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the
contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent
appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those
classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not
through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitionersspouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of
the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas,
being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such,
and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase.
This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in
speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other
issue here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the petitioners
to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by
the respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present
controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially different from
those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de
retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question
raised there was whether the five-year period provided for in Section
119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if the same is
with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of the
land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of
the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore
understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto
de retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession
over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of
the vendor a retro to repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an
absolute sale with a resolutory condition.

The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position,

on the other hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the
case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles over which were
obtained either through homestead or free patent. These properties
were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of
the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed.
In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to.
repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale
under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of
redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby
formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and
the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private
respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed"
issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to
repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally,
on August 31, 1984 were both made within the prescribed five-year
period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the
private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public
auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to
November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and
taxes on the property that the private respondent might have paid
after purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same rate
as that on the purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the
Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983, October
12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another one ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey

the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of

reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to
him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of
assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per
month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in
the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under
OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his
undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by
way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia
Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an
instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P
440.00. 3
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA
PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious
conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we
apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even
against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is
that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice.

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said

sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing
the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo
Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the
enclosed area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs,
sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his
complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American
citizen . 5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir,
filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption
claimed by her brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that
the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days
from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no
written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the
co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be

plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on
the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including
the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold
her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who
later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the
private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children
went to school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the
sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by
the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and
Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for
Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant
was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by
the petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part or
of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked,
interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the
notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual
notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De
Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the
respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in
Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no
particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the
Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the
property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for
written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the
redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars
thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking
through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice
should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a
similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that
of the adjoining owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623
deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that

notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given
by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the
30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes
dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously
cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice
given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and
interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that
in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not
begun to run, much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.

"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly
may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the
law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we
may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing
so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute
determines its construction, hence, a statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent. For what is
within the spirit is within the letter but although it is
not within the letter thereof, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of the lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to
ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of
the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the
starting time of the 30-day period of redemption.
Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise
date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem
of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a
day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of
redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made

in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977,
thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second
sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a
decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to
be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming
there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there
be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired
long before the complaint was filed in 1977?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates
of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between
those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was
filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that
thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired.
This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen
years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the
properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her
complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished
because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private

respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by
their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof
of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the
letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to
make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied
that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed,
although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that
such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with

laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is
essential that he should have knowledge of the facts
upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced
inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were
readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects
to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the
same as if he had known the facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the
spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion
of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials.
This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere
mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given
this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at
least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It
took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right
of redemption, but then it was already too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating

from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said
court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines
laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this
should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De
Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting
an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That
wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that
it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is
reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.