Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI.

JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO vs. LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538
September 21, 1951
FACTS:
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of
Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was
survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces
and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were
the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator.
The testator executed 2 wills, one in 1918 and another in 1939. The latter will contained a
revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. Only a carbon copy of the second
will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to
probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due
execution.
As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time.
Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus
effectively nullified the 1918 will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocatory clause in the 1939
will which was disallowed for probate.
HELD:
Yes. The court rules that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of
dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or
executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have
the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the
mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect.
The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate.
And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasions and
instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of
dying testate.