Ethic Theory Moral Prac

DOI 10.1007/s10677-016-9696-7

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

Somogy Varga 1

Accepted: 31 January 2016

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract While dignity plays an increasingly important role in contemporary moral and
political debates, there is profound dispute over its definition, meaning, and normative function.
Instead of concluding that dignitys elusiveness renders it useless, or that it signals its fundamental character, this paper focuses on illuminating one particular strand of meritocratic dignity.
It introduces a number of examples and conceptual distinctions and argues that there is a specific
strand of expressive meritocratic dignity that is not connected to holding a special office or
rank, but that is ascribed to individuals who are able to engage in autonomous self-expression.
Keywords Dignity . Identifications . Personal autonomy
The recognition of practical necessity must involve an understanding at once of ones
own powers and incapacities []; and the recognition of a limit which is neither simply
external to the self, nor yet a product of the will, is what can lend a special authority or
dignity to such decisions (Williams 1981, 130131)
Dignity occupies a significant place in contemporary moral practice and plays a vital part in
modern human rights discourse as well as in the legal constitution of many states.1 Today,
many important United Nations conventions and declarations rely on the concept as the
justification for human rights,2 and its role in the normative regulation of political life is hard

1
In a legal context, the concept of human dignity first appears in Constitution of the Weimar Republic, which
links rights and the regulation of the economic sphere to a dignified existence for all people (McCrudden 2008;
Habermas 2010; Peukert 1992).

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966, notes that the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world and adds that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.

for the special issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice on Frontiers of Dignity: its Nature and Scope (guest
editor: Corrado Del B, University of Milan, Italy).

* Somogy Varga
svarga@memphis.edu; http://memphis.academia.edu/SomogyVarga

Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 327 Clement Hall, Memphis, TN 38152, USA

S. Varga

to underestimate.3 However, despite such a crucial role in political and moral contexts,
there is profound disagreement over the nature and normative function of dignity (Bird
2013). Numerous critics express reservations regarding its vague meaning. Already
shortly after the Second World War, when the link between human dignity and the
possession of human rights was slowly being forged, Morris (1946, 57) argued that only
a few terms put an end to analysis as readily as the dignity of man. It sounds
wholesome and real, and its utterance easily quiets our critical faculties. Morris called
for a thorough and critical examination, and since then, the task of giving an account of
the content of dignity and how it fits into our current vocabulary has only become more
pressing. At the same time, the task has also become more difficult, partly because current
moral and political discourse contains references to human dignity on different levels. For
instance, dignity is both claimed to be the ground of human rights and to describe what
human rights are meant to protect (Waldron 2007, 203204). This creates considerable
ambiguities, which may at least partly be why many contemporary critics express
themselves in a more uncompromising manner than Morris did. They claim that dignity
is little more than a rhetorical decoration devoid of specific content, an elusive concept
that cannot live up to the weighty moral demands assigned to it (Pinker 2010), and that
the concept of dignity can be removed from moral discourse without a loss of content
(Macklin 2003).
Although the importance of giving the concept a clear and unambiguous definition is
commonly recognized, most authors agree that such an undertaking is bound to fail. But the
recognition of such failure leads authors to very different conclusions: for some, dignitys
messiness is an indication of its fundamental character (Malpas and Lickiss 2007, 2), while
others oppose such an interpretation and take the messiness to indicate that the concept has no
definitive meaning (Debes 2009). But perhaps it is better to think about the concept alongside
Wittgensteins reflections in Philosophical Investigations (67) on the parallel between the
way we develop certain concepts and spinning a thread, twisting fiber on fiber (see also
Hursthouse 2007). Thinking of dignity in this manner, as a thread that does not necessarily
have one particular fiber running through its entire length, opens up the possibility of a
different enterprise that aims at a more contextual understanding of the concept. Such an
approach encourages identifying some of the fibers of dignity as the remains of influential
strands of moral reflection that have entered our moral vocabulary at different times. So instead
of aiming at giving the concept a clear and unambiguous definition, the goal would be to
clarify what dignity can mean in different contexts, which may be achieved through isolating
some of the fibers or strands that run through it. Given the prominent place dignity occupies
in contemporary moral discourse, trying to entangle the different fibers or strands that run
through it seems a worthwhile undertaking.
In this paper, I will follow such an overall approach, but focus the investigation on one
particular strand of dignity, which is meritocratic (merit-based) and tied to the ability of
individuals to engage in autonomous self-expression. In other words, the main aim is to
capture a particular strand of meritocratic dignity that is not connected to holding a special
office or rank, but that is regularly attributed to individuals who are able to act on motives that
speak for them under adverse circumstances, and who thereby assert themselves in the world
3

For instance, one of President Obamas executive orders from 2011 advises agencies to take into account
human dignity when analysing the costs and benefits of regulations (Bayefsky 2014).

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

in a way that affirms who they are. In order to situate this particular strand and to provide a
more detailed account, I start out with a brief presentation of two accounts of non-meritocratic
dignity, which are substantially different but need not be understood as mutually exclusive.
While they can both be described as non-meritocratic because they ascribe unearned worth to
human beings, the next step begins to close in on a particular strand of dignity that is
meritocratic and, instead of being associated with rank, is connected to a certain way of
presenting oneself in social life. I differentiate between several types of meritocratic dignity
and argue that there is a particular expressive meritocratic dignity that we ascribe to individuals
who engage in autonomous self-expression by resolutely pursuing the motives that they
wholeheartedly identify with. More precisely, I show that this particular strand of meritocratic
dignity is attributed to individuals who pursue their core identifications in a manner that
displays not only autonomous self-expression, but also sensitivity to the values involved in the
identification. I close by offering some considerations on the relationship between nonmeritocratic dignity and the particular meritocratic dignity on which this paper focuses.

1 Two Strands of Non-Meritocratic Dignity

To be in a better position to locate the particular strand that constitutes the focal point in this
paper, it is helpful to commence with a brief presentation of two strands of non-meritocratic
dignity. On these accounts, people possess dignity as an unearned worth qua being properly
integrated in socio-political structures, or simply qua being human beings. In both cases,
dignity simply descends on the individual independent of skills, status, rank, possessions, etc.
In order to introduce the first strand, it is helpful to consider the numerous contexts in which
the concept is used to justify the moral condemnation of certain practices (torture, human
trafficking, etc.) as violations of human dignity. Such uses are often in association with the
advocacy of certain rights, which may result in some rhetorical advantage. However, it usually
does little to contribute to a thorough clarification of the meaning of the term dignity and
takes the focus away from the fact that peoples intuitions significantly diverge when it comes
to understanding such violations (Waldron 2012). Of course, such uses do capture important
overlaps. For instance, many agree that assaults on ones bodily integrity, suffering from social
exclusion or extreme poverty may constitute violations of human dignity, which leads to the
conclusion that human dignity requires preventing such conditions.
While it is difficult to disagree with the main idea behind such uses of the concept, on a
second look, things become more complicated. For instance, it is not necessarily always the
case that living in poverty violates the dignity of human beings. This might be the case if
poverty is a direct result of a natural disaster affecting whole countries or continents. However,
one may indeed speak of violations of dignity (at least in this sense) in a case where the effects
of the disaster can be traced back to certain states of affairs that have induced particular
vulnerabilities to disaster in those areas (Forst 2012). When many victims of Hurricane Katrina
claimed that their dignity was violated, their complaint was not merely about having to live in
poverty, but that such poverty was caused, to an important extent, by political decisions over
the span of decades that ignored significant parts of the population, rendering them invisible
in important social and political relations. So in this sense, human dignity is about being
properly integrated into certain social relations and political processes that confer a certain
status on individuals. As Forst (2012, 968969) puts it, to possess non-meritocratic
human dignity means being an equal member in the realm of subjects and authorities of

S. Varga

justification, that does not depend on the active exercise of the capacity of justification, which
would exclude infants or disabled persons. Thinking of dignity in this sense also enlightens
the fact that, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, poverty relief under the label of charity and
particular bureaucratic procedures that addressed the needy in a patronizing manner were
experienced as more undignified than poverty itself.
Some critics may counter such considerations and argue that being rendered invisible in
important social and political relations fails to capture what violations of dignity are about. The
critic might emphasize that, in many cases, the ascription of dignity and indignity is independent from being visible and even from legal and moral norms. Instead, the qualities in
another human being that activate ascriptions of dignity include signs of having a certain
control of the body, but also maturity, composure, and cleanliness (Pinker 2010). Based on
such a view, the critic could argue that what we perceive as undignified when looking at
individuals in profound poverty (for instance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina) is not some
kind of a moral or legal transgression or harm, but merely the fact that they have, to a
significant extent, lost their control of their body, lost their ability to maintain control over
psychological and physiological functions, or simply lack cleanliness and gravitas. To
strengthen her point, the critic might invoke an additional example. The Guardian (August
20 2005) reported that Britains growing obesity problem has led to the use of larger
ambulances capable of carrying morbidly obese patients. Such patients previously had to
travel in the back of a van otherwise used to carry heavy equipment, which was deemed
undignified The conclusion of the article was that heavy duty ambulance saves patient
dignity. Based on such a case, the critic might argue for a simple understanding of dignity
independent from legal and moral norms: obese patients having to travel in the back of a van
triggers the ascription undignified, because it involves a loss of control, loss of gravitas and
composure of the body. Just as for those individuals in profound poverty in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, the loss of dignity in these morbidly obese patients does not involve a
transgression of moral or legal norms.
However, although the critics line of thought point, to a further complication with the
concept of dignity, it does not threaten the idea that non-meritocratic dignity is about being
suitably integrated into certain social relations and political processes. The main problem with
the objection is that the interpretation of the examples is too simplistic and ignores the
complicated socio-political context in which the event takes place. Let us consider again the
case reported in The Guardian. If we take into account the fact that the needs of the growing
obese population are often ignoredperhaps partly because obesity is often tacitly understood
as some kind of a moral failurethen the situation may be understood in a different manner.
On a different and richer interpretation that takes into account the socio-political context in
which the event occurs, the obese patients having to travel in the back of a van can be
understood as undignified because it expresses or demonstrates that the needs of the obese
population are disregarded. Put differently, it articulates that the obese are invisible in certain
structures, are not properly acknowledged by them, and lack the elevated status that is
usually granted to other, non-obese patients.
In order to introduce the second strand of non-meritocratic dignity, it is helpful to call in
mind that the concept is often used in a more foundational manner, as identifying the ground of
a range of first-order moral commitments. On such a view, largely inspired by Kant, dignity
does not so much capture what some rights are about, but rather functions as the ground of
these rights, capturing an idea about the special moral standing of persons. This notion of
dignity is tied to a distinctly moral idea of respect for persons, which stands for an affirmation

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

of the equal, or perhaps rather unique, and supreme moral worth of every human being, an
affirmation designed to play a foundational role in morality and by extension in law as well
(Dan-Cohen 2011, 2). In the Groundwork, Kant unfolds his view on dignity arguing that in the
kingdom of ends, there are entities that have a price (and can hence be replaced by something
else) and entities that have dignity (and hence admitting of no equivalent). The latter have an
intrinsic value, that is dignity. [] Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of
morality, is the only thing which has dignity (Kant 1956, 102). Put in different terms, while
laws determine the conditions under which something can count as a value, the law-making
which determines all value must for this reason have a dignitythat is, an unconditioned and
incomparable worth (Ibid., 103). Dignity is thus the ground of human natures unconditional,
incomparable value that all human beings possess. As carriers of the moral law within
themselves, human beings enjoy the highest elevation: they are somehow lifted beyond the
natural world and their dignity is depicted as sublimity (Erhabenheit). Importantly, in
contrast to things with a derived value determined by market forces of supply and demand
(that ultimately derive from human goals), dignity is incomparable, non-derived, and nonrelational, and it grounds strong moral expectations and denotes in some basic sense the
equality of individuals. At least on one widespread understanding, dignity remains unaffected
in the sense that it is a possession that one cannot lose regardless of whether the moral
expectations that it grounds are actually met.4
There are, however, a number of concerns that such an account raises.5 One crucial worry is
closely tied to the metaphysical picture that underlines Kants account of dignity. Many
philosophers have voiced important concerns about the idea that dignity is an inherent value
in human beings that commands respect. But with this fundamental idea under considerable
attack, one might reach the conclusion that Kants account lacks support. There is, however,
another possibility. Sensen (2011) provides a different interpretation of dignity in Kant,
arguing that Kant, to a certain extent, actually relies on a Stoic conception (Sensen 2011,
143). His point is that contrary to what the most well-known passages suggest, Kant does not
think of dignity as an inner value but merely as the elevation of something over something
else. Quite simply, ontologically, dignity does not refer to a non-relational value property,
but merely to the relational property of being elevated. According to this interpretation, X has
dignity is just another expression for X is elevated over Y. What X is raised above depends
on the context in which Kant uses dignity (Sensen 2009, 310).
But in that case, i.e., if we accept that the second strand of non-meritocratic dignity can be
understood as the relational property of being elevated, then it appears largely compatible with
what I introduced as the first strand of non-meritocratic dignity. While there are of course
4

Of course, one problematic consequence is that no amount of humiliation or cruelty can blemish the moral
dignity inherent in the individual. But at this point, I focus on other challenges.
5
Some worry about the fact that Kant posits a strong link between the capacity for morality and dignity, while he
simultaneously maintains that the moral nature of human beings comes from our having been created by God as
free beings. However, Kants account of dignity doesnt depend on God as it did in Aquinas (see Rosen 2012,
2425). Kant allows that we can know moral nature independently of our beliefs about God and thus takes steps
toward a secular understanding of dignity. But one could still claim that the notion of dignity carries an internal
tension due to roots in seemingly incompatible theological and philosophical sources. The biblical idea of imago
Dei, which claims that human beings have special moral worth because they were created in the image of God,
appears to be in tension with Kants aim to provide morality with a non-theistic foundation. Nonetheless, the
resemblance thesis can be interpreted in a way that reduces the tension: loosely following Feuerbachs ideas on
religion, one may reverse the creation thesis, claiming that human beings created God by projecting an idealized
vision of themselves. Such a reversed resemblance thesis is then compatible with the Kantian conception of
human dignity.

S. Varga

differences, the two strands of non-meritocratic dignity appear to share a common core. On
both accounts, dignity is conferred on individuals by their being properly integrated into
particular socio-political relations, while violations of dignity, ranging from subtle forms of
social marginalization to corporeal torture, can be comprehended as consisting in being
ignored and rendered invisible in the context of legitimizing social relations, and lastly in
being dominated in the sense of being subject to rule by external forces without suitable
legitimation and justification.

2 Meritocratic Dignity and Self-Possession

The presentation of these two strands of non-meritocratic dignity is admittedly sketchy, but
perhaps just detailed enough to help carve out the strand that this paper aims to further analyse.
Non-meritocratic dignity is in tension with an older, meritocratic conception of dignity that is
non-universal, restricted, and often connected to rank, office, or excellence that confers some
kind of elevation upon the person (see Waldron 2007). This elevation commands immediate respect and can only pertain to some human beings (Iglesias 2001). Such meritocratic
dignity is a scarce resource, typically attributed to persons who are of high standing, most
clearly discernible in archaic societies, and often sustained by family and personal patronage
relations.
While there appears to be an insurmountable tension between such a meritocratic (antiegalitarian) notion of dignity and the one used in human rights discourses,6 some have argued
that human dignity has been democratized and now generalizes to all humanity the high
standing formerly reserved for a privileged few (Waldron 2007, 2012; Kateb 2011). The point
is that even in highly inegalitarian honor-cultures, dignity contained an egalitarian (in a limited,
intra-rank sense) kernel, which modern egalitarian morality has enlarged to encompass the
whole human species (Waldron 2012), so that dignity consists in equal membership in a
species of high stature (Kateb 2011). As Waldron (2012, 229) puts it, the modern notion of
human dignity involves an upwards equalization of rank, so that we now try to accord to every
human being something of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was formerly
accorded to nobility.
While we may accept the thesis of an extension of formerly high-status to every segment of
the population (though see Bird 2013 for a critique), one important point is that there is a form
of meritocratic dignity that is not directly connected to holding a special office or rank. Schaber
(2011) distinguishes between social dignity (related to office, rank, or social functions in
general) and expressive dignity (which refers to a persons behavior).7 The latter is not
bestowed upon individuals through birth or some formal act like an appointment, but is earned
through certain deeds or ways of acting. While the following sections will focus on meritocratic expressive dignity, it is important to note that there is a continuum comprising several
types of conduct that trigger ascriptions of expressive meritocratic dignity.
6

For instance, the latter rejects the view that some humans of high standing like kings, dukes, or bishops are
worthy of special dignity.
The term merit gives rise to ambiguities that may lead to misunderstandings. Dignity as connected to rank or
office is not necessarily meritocratic in the narrow sense, as people can clearly be born with a certain rank. So it
makes sense to further distinguish between meritocratic dignity that is earned and meritocratic dignity that is
bestowed upon one regardless of ones abilities and deeds. However, since the focus of this paper is on
expressive dignity, there is no need to further refine this part of the taxonomy.

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

On one end of this continuum, we may locate a strand of expressive meritocratic dignity
that is related to the way in which one is able to present oneself as self-possessed in social life.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary one of the meanings of dignity is elevation of
aspect, manner, or style; becoming or fit stateliness, gravity, which is linked to presenting
oneself as self-controlled and self-possessed in ones comportment. We may add calmness,
restraint, controlled emotions, self-contained serenity, and note that we sometimes see indignity in agents who lose their temper (Bird 2013). For instance, a hysterical outbreak of anger
or fear involves being overpowered by an emotion in a way that undermines our ability to
convey a composed self-possession to others. But being too noisy, forcedly humorous,
exceedingly unreserved, or acting in ways that displays pomp and grandeur equally undercut
such meritocratic dignity (Kolnai 1976).
On the other end of this continuum, we find a strand of expressive meritocratic dignity (or
dignified character) that we sometimes attribute to individuals whose acts reflect a deeply
moral character (see Beyleveld and Brownsword 2000). The typical examples here involve
individuals who always strive to improve the welfare of others, whose actions exhibit
exceptional moral value, and who might even be ready to face severe dangers and to pay
the ultimate price for their moral or other convictions. For instance, Kateb (2011) describes
how it is common to ascribe to individuals like Socrates a meritocratic strand of dignity,
because he would rather die than inflict injustice on another person or give up his pursuit of
wisdom. As Kateb (2011, 7) notes, [c]ondemned to death on the charges against him, he
chooses to die for the safety of the laws of the city rather than escaping with the help of his
friends. In a similar way, Hursthouse (2007, 61) ascribes a particular form of meritocratic
dignity to Nelson Mandela, which is not at all the sort of thing that anyone had merely in
virtue of being human. Mandela would have it, but Mugabe would not, having lost it
irrevocably, quite some time back. But even in Kant, it is possible to find passages suggesting
this type of meritocratic dignity. Although this is admittedly a minor aspect of Kants use of the
term dignity, in a crucial passage Kant refers to dignity not as the intrinsic quality of human
beings who carry the moral law within themselves, but as the quality of the character of the
person who fulfills all his duties (see Rosen 2012, 2930). Rosen (2012, 38) concludes that
Kants official account of dignity is compatible with (if not quite the same as) Schillers
suggestion that human beings are dignified in character when their actions give expression to
the struggle of duty to overcome the inclinations.
While the available literature has mainly focused on these two ends of this continuum, there
is another possibility that both involves some degree of self-possession and has at least a moral
dimension. This strand of expressive meritocratic dignity is connected to autonomous selfexpression. More precisely, this meritocratic dignity depends on the ability of agents to act on
motives that speak for them and thus expresses an assertion of themselves in the world,
affirming who they are and where they stand.

3 Expressive Meritocratic Dignity and Autonomous Self-Expression

To demonstrate this, consider two examples. First, consider the fact that many individuals who
suffer from a drug addiction feel that their condition undermines and violates their autonomy
and dignity. In many cases, the violation of dignity does not stem from the addicts becoming
invisible and, thus, from the lack of recognition of her special needs. Neither does the
violation of dignity in such cases always consist in the addicts loss of control over her self-

S. Varga

representation, nor from the fact that the craving causes conduct that is less than dignified.
Instead, at least in some cases, the unwilling addict may experience a violation of her dignity
because she regards her effective desire resulting in consuming drugs as an alien force that
controls her, as an intrusion rather than an expression of her autonomy and agency. Using
Frankfurt's distinction we may say that she has conflicting first order desires (to consume drugs
vs. not to consume drugs) and a second order volition to the effect that she does not want her
desire not to consume drugs to be effective.8 When she is taking the drugs, she lacks autonomy
because she fails to secure the conformity of her will to her second-order volition. She does not
identify with the first-order desire, does not desire that it be effective in guiding her actions, and
thus lacks a proper second-order endorsement (see Frankfurt 1988a, 2002a, b). Along similar
lines, the willing addict (someone who is content to be using drugs) also lacks autonomy,
because her desire to take the drug will be effective whether or not she wants it to constitute her
will (Frankfurt 1988a, 2425).
In the literature on personal autonomy, identification and autonomous action are often
clarified and explained by a contrast to the case of the addict whose acts of using drugs are
guided by desires she does not reflectively endorse (see Frankfurt 1988b; Frankfurt 1999a, b;
Frankfurt 2004, Frankfurt 2006; Christman 1988, Christman 1989; Wolf 1990, 1993). Accordingly, agents act autonomously when the desire that guides their acts is one that they
endorse, identify with, and want to guide their act. On such account, autonomy is inherently
linked to the pursuit of motives that are profoundly owned by the agent, while it is the
development of a hierarchical structure through identification that renders a given motive
genuinely one's own, providing it with special authority (Henning 2011; Shoemaker 2003;
Dworkin 1989; Arpaly and Schroeder 1999).
Returning to our addict, when she acts from the alien motive that she does not identify with
and that she disowns, she feels that she is violating her authority and dignity by failing to
give her life a direction that is in accordance with motives that genuinely belong to her and that
express who she really is. Although such a sense of violating ones dignity may additionally
involve the loss of her conviction that she possesses equal worth and non-meritocratic dignity,
it would be wrong to grant her the final word on this matter. While we may agree that our
addict lacks expressive meritocratic dignity, such an observation is independent from her nonmeritocratic dignity. Clearly, the addict whose cravings cause her to engage in (meritocratic)
undignified behavior in no way justifies treating her as a being without non-meritocratic
dignity, or regarding her as an object to be used at the discretion of others (Meyer 1989).
But before we move on to the next example, we need to address a possible concern. One
could object that the reason why the addict is perceived as not having expressive meritocratic
dignity is not because she has lost the capacity to autonomously regulate her urges and
cravings, but rather because the particular craving for (and consumption of) the drug undermines her ability to resent herself as self-possessed in social life and promotes types of
uncivilized behavior widely considered undignified (being overly noisy, self-aggrandized,
uncontrolled, etc.). However, this objection fails. It is not difficult to imagine a person who
displays exactly this type of addict behavior, but does so due to a certain neurological disease.
In that case, it would be odd to claim that the behavior of the person suffering from this
condition is undignified. But if this is correct, then this type of addict behavior alone is not
sufficient to prevent someone from being ascribed expressive meritocratic dignity. When we
refrain from ascribing expressive meritocratic dignity to the addict, this is not so much due to
8

Having a first-order desire does not imply whether or not the agent wants them to be effective.

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

the uncivilized behavior that the addiction promotes, but rather to the fact that the addict acts
from the alien motive that she disowns. To bolster this point, imagine somebody who is
equally addicted, but to a chemical compound that makes impossible uncivilized and
improper conduct and causes instead a very civilized, pleasant, restraint, controlled, and
modest behavior. Still, I take it uncontroversial to claim that her behavior would not trigger the
ascription of meritocratic dignity, which means that this type of civilized behavior is not
sufficient for meritocratic dignity. Overall, the important upshot is that having this type of
expressive meritocratic dignity is not about particular, socially sanctioned forms of civilized
behavior, but is inextricably connected to the agents ability to act autonomously guided by
motives that the agent endorses and identifies with. This connection can be further clarified
with a second example that invokes the often-cited words of Martin Luther.
Upon Luthers criticism of certain church practices, he received an invitation from the
imperial herald, guaranteeing him a safety pass from the emperor and allowing him to present
his views unafraid. The role as prosecutor had been given to von der Ecken, who gave Luther
the chance to recant his views and disown his publications in order to have a chance to be
reconciled to the Church. Von der Ecken tried to win from Luther at least a renunciation of the
most critical works, but when pressed to disown them, Luther determinedly refused to recant
anything, saying that Im bound by the scriptural evidence adduced by me and my conscience
is captive to the Word of God. I cannot, I will not recant anything, for it is neither safe nor right
to act against ones conscience. This was supposedly crowned by the epic finale Here I
stand! I can do no other! (Mullett 2014, 126). Attempts to water down Luthers resistance
failed, and upon his departure, the Edict of Worms deemed him a heretic.
Although Luthers words and conduct may be interpreted in various ways (and Ill have much
more to say about this in section 6), it has often been used to highlight a sense of being
incapacitated, which, in contrast to the addict, does not compromises agency, autonomy, or
self-control. The phenomenology of such an experience is multifaceted, characterized by both
feeling incapacitated and constrained, and by achieving unique clarity about something that is
central to oneself, something that speaks for oneself. What may first appear as a sheer incapacity
turns out to demonstrate the capacity of an agent to relate to herself autonomously, with a certain
authority, and to act on motives that genuinely belong to her and express who she really is. It is a
fully voluntary form of necessitation that arises from fundamental identifications that define the
agents identity. Bernard Williams (1981) describes this incapacity as one with which the agent is
identified, while Frankfurt (1999b; 2004) adds that such volitional necessity is able to
effectively constrain the agents conduct precisely because the agent is identified with it.
Crucially for our purposes, while the necessitation experienced by the addict robs her of
meritocratic dignity, autonomous necessitation arising from the agents deepest identifications
appears to bestow expressive meritocratic dignity on the agent. In his enlightening discussion
of the case of Luther, Williams instructively connects such autonomous practical necessity to
dignity:
The recognition of practical necessity must involve an understanding at once of ones
own powers and incapacities, and of what the world permits; and the recognition of a
limit which is neither simply external to the self, nor yet a product of the will, is what can
lend a special authority or dignity to such decisions (Williams 1981, 130131, italics
added).
The important point is that in such cases, we ascribe dignity to individuals who, often in
spite of the consequences, are able to follow the path they have laid down for themselves,

S. Varga

engaging in autonomous self-expression. This indicates that there is a strand of expressive

meritocratic dignity that is tied to the capacity to act on motives that speak for the agent, that
she (in a yet to be explained sense) unequivocally identifies with, and that are fundamental to
her sense of identity.
However, more work is needed to provide a convincing account of this strand of meritocratic dignity. First, we need a more thorough comprehension of the nature of identifications
that are so essential to the agents sense of identity that they effectively speak for her.
Second, we also need to address a possible objection that the ascription of expressive
meritocratic dignity in the sense discussed here requires more than acting in accordance with
ones wholeheartedly endorsed identifications: it requires some kind of yet to be defined moral
dimension. For this reason, the next section will provide a brief account of the identifications
that speak for us, followed by an example taken from the literature on psychopathy, designed
to help understand the moral dimension involved.

4 Dignity, Identifications and Psychopathy

Although many agree with Frankfurts view that what grants some of our motives the authority
to speak for us is our being properly identified with them, the term identification is often
ambiguous in the literature (see Christman 2009; Scanlon 2002; Watson 2002; Seidman 2009).
Given that there are many ways in which we can identify with our motives, we need to
distinguish identifications that speak for us from those that are more like conditional
intentions. Let us assume that I identify with my motivationally efficacious motive to X, a
motive that derives from my being invested in or caring about something that my X-ing would
help promote. What are the conditions under which my identification with the motive to X
counts as one that speaks for me? To answer this question, it is useful to start out with a very
moderate attempt to detect some central qualities of the deep type of identification that
characterizes the motives that speak for us.
In Frankfurts work, wholehearted identifications unify the agent and provide the framework within which his mundane motives become comprehensible for him and within which
his environment is intelligible to him as affording certain actions rather than others. In a
dialogue with Frankfurts notion of wholehearted identifications, it is possible to identify four
characteristics that characterize such identifications (for a detailed account see Varga 2015a).
First, my identification with a motive to X that I have acquired under conditions of manipulation or oppression fails to speak for me, no matter the role it plays in my psychological life.
Although Frankfurts account does not take into account the manner in which identifications
are acquired (see Frankfurt 1988d, 120121), I take it to be rather uncontroversial that if it is
revealed to me that this identification of mine is the result of a subtle form of brainwashing, I
would stop claiming that it speaks for me and expresses who I am (see also Christman 1991;
1993; 2009).
Second, a motive can only count as genuinely my own if I do not currently harbor nontrivial reservations toward it or suspect that further deliberation might require me to disavow it.
Such identification is wholehearted: it is characterized by the absence of reservations in the
agents attitude toward it (Frankfurt 2004, 95). Put simply, the agent thinks that no further
reflection would require her to abandon it or to change her mind (Frankfurt 1988c, 2006).
Third, my identification with the motive to X can only count as genuinely my own if my
failure to X would come at the price of some sense of self-betrayal. Of course, I may act

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

contrary to my wholehearted identifications, but due to their central position in my mental life,
such courses of action come with serious consequences pertaining to my self-conception.9 In
sum, betraying such a wholehearted identification amounts to betraying oneself (Frankfurt
2006, 51).
Fourth, wholehearted identifications entail a special kind of commitment, both to the
content of the desire and to maintaining the desire itself (Frankfurt 2006, 1819; Calhoun
2009; Korsgaard 2006; 2009). In this way, the commitment surpasses the object of desire and
involves being prepared to take steps to preserve and reinvigorate it. For instance, if I
wholeheartedly identify with my desire to X, then I am also prepared to seek new motivations
for sustaining my commitment, which may include taking measures like planning, resolutions
for control, etc. (see Kovach and Fitzpatrick 1999).
These four characteristics help carve out differences between wholehearted identifications
and conditional intentions or provisional plans that are not connected to dignity and that agents
do not typically think of as expressive of their identities. While this is an important first step,
further work is needed in order to pinpoint those identifications that are directly linked to
expressive meritocratic dignity in the sense explained above. This is because not all cases in
which an agent is able to act on motives that she wholeheartedly identifies with trigger the
ascription of dignity.
To see this, imagine a psychopath who displays no empathic concern, focuses on nonmoral, self-directed values like satisfaction and power, and is prone to dehumanize other
human beings and to deny their status as epistemic and moral agents who demand respect and
care (for an overview, see McIlwain 2010; Baron-Cohen 2012; Glenn et al. 2010). Particularly,
consider a successful psychopath, who is not only not imprisoned, but is educated and
successful in his career as a CEO (for such examples, see Cleckley 1976; Mullins-Sweatt et al.
2010; Boddy 2011). Babiak and Hare (2006) provide a particularly useful description of such
an individual. They describe how a successful corporate psychopath, Dave, quickly advances
in the corporate hierarchy, by callously exploiting, misleading, and backstabbing his colleagues. While Dave is obviously intelligent, dedicated, and a talented manipulator, he lacks
respect for moral values and for basic standards of reciprocity.
In a sense, we may say the Dave is wholeheartedly identified with his desire to become the
CEO of the company, and he is clearly able to continuously act in accordance with it even
under adverse circumstances (see Varga 2015a). He is often able to suppress momentary
impulses, anger, frustration, and to stand up for himself, articulating an assertion of himself
in the world that affirms who he is. Nonetheless, it would be odd to say that his way of
pursuing his wholehearted identification bestows some kind of expressive meritocratic dignity
upon him. Instead, it seems rather uncontroversial to assume that people witnessing his
ruthless advancement through the ranks would think of his behavior as undignified, even if
they perceive him as acting in accordance with his wholehearted identification. But if this is
true, then we may also conclude that meritocratic dignity in the sense discussed here requires
more than acting in accordance with ones deepest and wholeheartedly endorsed motives that
define who one is. Rather, it appears that it requires something that Dave is incapable of doing:
it requires pursuing ones wholehearted identification in a way that is consistent with some
relevant moral norms, or at least with some relevant values that do not emanate from ones
identifications.
9

There are many ways in which we can fail our wholehearted identifications through ignorance or incompetence,
and there is a sense in which we can also betray them by certain actions.

S. Varga

5 Expressive Meritocratic Dignity and Core Identifications

While the reflections in the last section reveal that not all wholehearted identifications are
linked to expressive meritocratic dignity in the narrow sense that were interested in, this
section will proceed by isolating a special class of wholehearted identifications. I have
elsewhere referred to such wholehearted identifications as core identifications (see Varga
2015a, b), and showed in more detail how they speak for us because they express both
crucial volitional characteristics and fundamental judgments about identification-independent
values. While the concept of core identifications opens some conceptual space between the
view that our values are produced by identifications (see Frankfurt 2006) and the opposite
view that the weight of an identification derives from the sense of its value (see Scanlon 2002),
in this context, understanding their structure will help us account for the link to meritocratic
dignity.
On Frankfurts understanding of wholehearted identifications, when we make decisions
guided by wholehearted identifications, we usually do so without deliberating on the
identification-independent value of the object of the desire motivating us. The view is that
wholehearted identifications generate values and reasons, but they do not depend upon them
(Frankfurt 2002b). On this account, both ordinary people and Dave the successful psychopath
settle the question what is valuable to identify with? by clarifying what they wholeheartedly
identify with. However, such an account ignores core identificationsa type of wholehearted identifications that are multifactorial and involve a specific assemblage of complementary
beliefs and desires (Varga 2015b). Such core identifications are best understood as volitionaldoxastic complexes in which three interlocking elements are integrated into one structure.
To get a better grip on the nature of core identifications and to shed light on how they are
linked to expressive meritocratic dignity, it is helpful to contrast the case of Dave with the case
of Isabel, who is not a psychopath, but merely a tremendously determined, ambitious, and
effective employee. Let us imagine that both Dave and Isabel wholeheartedly identify with
their desire to become the CEO of a corporation that specializes in manufacturing very
affordable medical equipment, designed to address the needs of deprived inhabitants in Third
World countries. In both cases, this wholehearted identification in itself affords them with
reasons to act, without any deliberation about the moral value of the motive or the value of the
conditions that it promotes. Nevertheless, the differences are significant. This is because Isabel,
unlike Dave, concurrently holds a value judgment, believing that reducing poverty and helping
to alleviate disease-related suffering in the Third World are valuable endeavors. But merely
saying that Isabel values these issues would miss something very important. She also thinks
that fighting poverty and helping to alleviate disease-related suffering in the Third World
would be appropriate objects of desire to any rational individual who possesses a suitable
comprehension of the non-normative aspects of these topics. Furthermore, Isabel is conscious
of the correspondence between her relevant identification and value judgment, that is, she is
convinced that her work as a CEO could help reduce poverty and disease-related suffering in
the Third World.
It is not difficult to see the significant differences between Daves and Isabels volitional
profiles. Isabels wholehearted identification with the desire to become the CEO of the
company is a part of a volitional-doxastic complex that includes (a) the wholehearted identification, (b) holding a positive value judgment about certain values that she thinks are valuable
independently of her identification, and (c) the belief that acting on her wholehearted identification will promote these values. When her core identification is formed, these three

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

interlocking elements become integrated and build a solidly embedded volitional-motivational

complex that is not directly reducible to the sum of (a), (b), and (c). The structure of her core
identification allows Isabel to do something that is impossible for Dave, namely to understand
her identification in light of values (reduced poverty and disease-related suffering) that are
independent from, and do not originate in her identification. Unlike Dave, she can view the
identification as both expressive of something that speaks for her and as valuable independently of her identification for reasons that would be intelligible for other rational inhabitants
of her social world. But most importantly, unlike Dave, if Isabel is able to follow the path she
has laid down for herself (and engage in autonomous self-expression), and if she is able to act
on her core identifications under adverse circumstances (perhaps accompanied by a recognition of the kind of practical necessity that Williams mentioned), then her action would trigger
the ascription of expressive meritocratic dignity.
The concept of core identifications underscores that normative constraints are imposed on
Isabel by her will, while also highlighting the role of value-judgments that limit the range of
identifications that she regards as justifiable.10 Consequently, Isabels core identification
imposes volitional and rational restrictions on her, because her identification is inseparably
connected to the associated positive value judgments. She may of course disregard these
constraints, but that would come at the price of undercutting her expressive meritocratic
dignity. Let me explain.
For example, she may disregard these constraints by preventing a rival colleague from
putting a new product on the market that would both help the company reach new heights and
also reduce poverty and disease-related suffering. At first, one may claim that her action would
still be in accordance with her core identification to become the CEO of the company. But on a
second look, her action preventing someone from engaging in an endeavor that could have
helped reduce pollution constitutes a betrayal of her core identification, because it hinders the
advancing of the identification-independent value (reduced poverty and disease-related suffering) that she takes it to express. It seems uncontroversial to claim that most people would not
judge her behavior as meriting the ascription of expressive meritocratic dignity. Why? While
one may argue that she has not been entirely fair to her colleague, this alone does not seem
weighty enough to trigger the ascription of a type of behavior that is somehow undignified or
inconsistent with expressive meritocratic dignity. Instead, Isabels behavior prevents the
ascription of expressive meritocratic dignity, because she betrays herself by failing to live up
to the core identification that to a significant degree constitutes who she is. Ultimately, she fails
to exhibit the kind of self-control required for autonomous self-expression. In conclusion, then,
we may say that acting on ones core identifications only triggers the ascription of expressive
meritocratic dignity if ones actions convey a proper understanding of the constraints that ones
core identifications come with, which, among other factors, require being considerate about the
values that they involve.
Let us take stock. We have said that there is a strand of meritocratic dignity that is related to
the way in which one presents oneself as somehow self-possessed in social life, but that is both
different from the kind of expressive meritocratic dignity that we associate with the presentation of oneself as self-possessed in social life and that we attribute to individuals whose acts
reflect a deeply moral character. I argued that there is a strand of expressive meritocratic
dignity the attribution of which is triggered when agents engage in autonomous self10

Although her acquisition of the wholehearted identification may not need the value component, with time it is
integrated with the value judgment in a way that the value becomes part of the content of what is identified with.

S. Varga

expression, demonstrating their ability to act on motives that they wholeheartedly identify
with. However, after some reflections on the case of our psychopath, Dave, it also became
apparent that the ascription of expressive meritocratic dignity is not triggered in all cases in
which agents act on their wholehearted identifications. Using the example of Daves competitor, Isabel, we were able to narrow down the scope of the investigation to core identifications and reflected on a way in which Isabels pursuit of her motive could block the ascription
of expressive meritocratic dignity.
But we may add that such ascription could be blocked in another way, which is connected
with the fact that this kind of expressive meritocratic dignity is not something that can be
obtained directly. Rather, it can only be acquired indirectly, through the pursuit of projects or
commitments that the agent identifies with and that reflect values that the agent endorses. We
would refrain from the attribution of expressive meritocratic dignity to Isabel if her behavior
displayed a prevailing concern about her own meritocratic dignity. Instead, she would strike us
as self-absorbed to the point of falseness or hypocrisy.

6 Luther Again
In section 2, I have utilized Williamss analysis of Luthers case to link meritocratic dignity to
the sense of practical necessity that arises from wholehearted identifications. In that context,
the primary goal was to underscore the link, and I have therefore refrained from describing the
case in all its complexity. However, it is now time to pay attention to its multifaceted and
controversial nature, not so much to do justice to historical details, but to elucidate some issues
that have hitherto not received sufficient attention. For instance, while many philosophers
assume that there is some autonomous self-expression at stake in the Luther case, and while
Williams thinks that it is a paradigmatic example of autonomous necessitation that warrants the
ascription of (meritocratic) dignity, it remains unclear whether this ascription is triggered by
Luthers synchronic ability to stay on his path, or whether it also necessitates attributing to
him a more stable, diachronic disposition or volitional profile.
Keeping in mind the nature of the link between expressive meritocratic dignity and
autonomous self-expression explored in the previous sections, we are now in a position to
take a closer look at why it appears natural to attribute expressive meritocratic dignity to
Luther. My answer is that the Here I stand situation is (mostly) implicitly comprehended on
the background of a larger story about Luther. Call in mind that Here I stand is often
understood as the initial slogan of modernity, as expressing a deep commitment to equal
rights, freedom of thought and expression, and a quasi-democratic outlook anticipating central
ideas that have played an important role in Enlightenment thought and the American and
French Revolutions (Mullett 2004, 262). Part of this underlying story is also that Luther spoke
out against the tyranny of the Lords, and that certain passages in his work such as suggest
almost revolutionary views11 that inspired the intellectual emancipation of common men and
women and the German Peasants Revolt (15241526) against brutal socio-economic conditions.12 In light of this larger story, Luthers case triggers the ascription of meritocratic dignity,
Consider for instance, I believe that in this community of Christendom, all things are common, and all the
goods of one belong to the other and that no one owns anything entirely of his own. (quoted in Mullett 2004,
165)
12
Although his work cant be seen as a call to peasant mobilization, it might have appealed to a wing of the
revolt under Thomas Mntzers leadership (who was a former disciple of Luther).
11

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

because we are inclined to comprehend his wholehearted commitments as a part of a

volitional-doxastic complex that also includes positive value judgments about certain values
(emancipation, equal rights, freedom of expression) and the belief that acting on his wholehearted commitments will promote these values.
Placing the Here I stand situation in such a larger story also helps to understand that
expressive meritocratic dignity requires more than just a synchronic, momentary ability to
stay on ones path. Instead, as it was with Isabels case, it requires a more stable, diachronic
disposition. Then, the Here I stand situation is not merely comprehended as some kind of a
momentary and transient success in following the path he had laid down for himself in spite of
the consequences, but as something like a milestone, or the culmination of a continuous effort
to autonomous self-expression.
Having expounded one reason why it appears natural to attribute expressive meritocratic
dignity to Luther, I should immediately pause to emphasize that the progressive and almost
faultless image that most likely frames the common understanding of the Here I stand
situation is historically inaccurate. A closer look at the historical sources indicates a much
more complex and controversial doxastic and volitional profile. Luther was hostile to Jews,
peasants, lawyers, and Italians, supported authoritarian governance, and regarded massive
social inequalities as necessary. Also, he rejected the peasants understanding of Christian
freedom as incompatible with serfdom, and maintained instead that the peasants should accept
their fate and end their struggle for basic rights (see Mullett 2014, Ch 9). Luthers Against the
Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants expressed a profound condemnation of the
insurgents use of the gospel to advance a more egalitarian social cause and to demand secular
liberty. He depicted peasants as demons, and called on their eradication in no uncertain terms:
let everyone who can, smite, slay, and stab, secretly or openly, remembering that nothing can
be more poisonous, hurtful or devilish than a rebel. It is just as when one must kill a mad dog
(quoted in Mullett 2004, 169). Around 100,000 insurgents and suspected rebels were killed,
but in his Table talk of January 1533 Luther resolutely and remorselessly accepted his role:
I, Martin Luther, slew all the peasants in the uprising, for I ordered that they be put to death;
all their blood is on my neck (quoted in Lull and Nelson 2015, 242).
Luthers story is now so complex that it can be interpreted in an excessive number of ways.
Let me therefore briefly focus on two interpretations that have the most direct ramifications for
the account of expressive meritocratic dignity proposed in this paper.
The first possibility is to interpret Luthers psychological profile not only as complex, but as
profoundly ambivalent, involving commitment to irreconcilable beliefs and incompatible
values and desires. Harboring such profoundly competing and unresolved attitudes (for
instance egalitarian vs. anti-egalitarian, authoritarian vs. democratic) is usually what it takes
to undermine the possibility of wholeheartedness, and it very likely gives rise to a profound
sense of internal disunity. Frankfurt argues that if an agent has such unresolved conflicts then
he is in danger of having no second-order volition (Frankfurt 1988a, 21). Although this view
may be too strong, Frankfurts point about ambivalence as the opposite of wholeheartedness
(Frankfurt 1999c, 99100) rings true. But in that case, the upshot is that Luther has not really
determined what it is that genuinely speaks for him and thus fails to have diachronically
stable, wholeheartedly endorsed commitments that the Here I stand situation supposedly
expresses. Consistent with the criteria set out previously in the paper, this would also mean that
the attribution of expressive meritocratic dignity is blocked.
The second (and historically more correct) interpretation is that Luthers psychological
profile did not suffer from ambivalence, partly because he never actually held those

S. Varga

commitments to rights, freedom of thought and expression, and a quasi-democratic outlook

that people often attribute to him. Instead, he exhibited a diachronically stable profile: his
wholehearted commitments were a part of a volitional-doxastic complex that also included
judgments about the value of authoritarian governance, the preservation of social inequalities
and serfdom, etc., and the belief that acting on his wholehearted commitments would promote
at least some of these values. Moreover, when considering the passage from the Table talk, it
indeed appears that Luther stayed on his path and acted on motives that spoke for him.
However, while one may discuss whether this can be taken to involve some degree of
autonomous self-expression, his commitments that led him to instigate brutal violence and
to support authoritarian oppression entail serious enough moral transgressions to block the
ascription of meritocratic dignity. This confirms the view proposed earlier in this paper,
according to which meritocratic dignity requires not merely acting in accordance with ones
deepest and wholeheartedly endorsed motives, but also pursuing them in a way that is
consistent with at least some basic moral norms.

7 Dignity: Non-Meritocratic and Meritocratic

While this paper has made steps toward clarifying a particular, meritocratic strand of dignity
that is connected to core identifications, it has also left open a number of questions. One
particularly intriguing question concerns the relation between the non-meritocratic dignity
discussed in the first part of the paper and the specific form of expressive meritocratic dignity
to which the majority of this paper was dedicated. While I cannot provide a detailed
investigation at this point, it appears defensible to maintain that non-meritocratic dignity is
at least in one way prior to expressive meritocratic dignity. If it is true that being visible for
the purpose of legitimizing social relations actively confers non-meritocratic dignity upon
individuals, then it is not difficult to see that such a process helps individuals to achieve a
psychological sense of being dignified, resulting in an awareness of their own worth. Such a
minimal sense of self-worth is, however, necessary for individuals in order to be able to
comprehend their desires and motives as worthy of pursuit. Without this basic sense of selfworth, individuals may assume behavior patterns characterized by adaptability, self-adjustment, self-negation, and servility, which all undercut expressive meritocratic dignity. But in
that case, non-meritocratic dignity can be seen as a necessary condition for the kind of
autonomous self-expression that may eventually trigger the ascription of expressive meritocratic dignity.
The relation between the non-meritocratic dignity and expressive meritocratic dignity can
be further enlightened by underscoring how they exhibit different emotional signatures and
prompt different responses. It is true that both meritocratic and non-meritocratic dignity
command a paradigmatically reverential manner of response, or, as Kolnai (1976, 252) puts
is, an upward looking type of attitude that involves an experience of elevation or height.
But on a closer look, it quickly becomes transparent that reactive attitudes in experiences of
meritocratic and non-meritocratic dignity significantly differ. Encountering individuals who
possess non-meritocratic dignity amounts to encountering individuals who are suitable objects
of respect, who should be granted protection from degradation and contempt, and who should
be allowed to pursue the identifications that are fundamental to who they are. In contrast,
when we encounter individuals who possess expressive meritocratic dignity, we do
not merely experience them as worthy of respect, but also as suitable objects of admiration.

Autonomous Self-Expression and Meritocratic Dignity

We admire the ability of agents to act on motives that speak for them, even if we might think
that they would have sufficient reasons to act otherwise and even if the admirability fails to
neatly map onto moral rightness. Admiration as a characteristic response that we yield to
expressive meritocratic dignity when we recognize its presence often includes a distinctive
emotion that psychologists call an other-praising emotion (Algoe and Haidt 2009; see
Zagzebski 2015). Other-praising emotions refer to distinct positive emotions that arise from
witnessing others exemplary actions, which also include elevation and gratitude. But besides
exhibiting different phenomenal characters and emotional signatures, our experiences of
detecting meritocratic and non-meritocratic dignity are also different in that they provide us
with different types of reasons to act. An individual with non-meritocratic dignity is owed
respect, and detecting non-meritocratic dignity in this individual provides mandatory reasons
for respecting her. However, detecting expressive meritocratic dignity in an individual is less
obligatory, and it only provides sufficient reasons for admiring her.

8 Concluding Remarks
While dignity has developed into a crucial concept in a number of areas, many find it worrying
that we lack a clear and unambiguous definition. This leads most authors to conclude either
that dignitys elusiveness signals its fundamental character or that it lacks definitive meaning.
In this paper, I chose an approach that refrains from making final claims about the concept of
dignity, but focuses instead on clarifying what it means in particular contexts. Invoking
Wittgensteins reflections on how certain concepts are developed and extended like spinning
a thread, I have attempted to isolate one strand that is connected to the way in which we
attribute dignity to individuals who are able to articulate their autonomy by acting on motives
that speak for them. In order to situate this particular strand, I have started out by presenting
two strands of dignity. The first is connected to the sense in which an individuals or a
groups human dignity can be violated when they are rendered invisible in important social
and political relations. The second is tied to a distinctly moral ideal of respect for persons,
which expresses an affirmation of the equal and ultimate moral worth of every human being.
While these two notions of dignity are clearly and substantially different, it was shown that
they need not be mutually exclusive, provided that Kantian dignity is understood in a relational
manner. However, while these two strands of dignity are non-meritocratic, representing some
kind of unearned worth qua being human beings, I started to close in on a specific meritocratic
conception of dignity, which is different from the Roman dignitas. While the latter captures
an elevation due to rank or office and is typically attributed to persons who are of high
standing, I argued that there is a particular strand of dignity that is meritocratic, without being
direly connected to holding a special office or rank. Instead, it is associated with the way one
relates to oneself in social life that, among other factors, involves autonomous self-expression.
After clarifying that what bestows some of our motives with the authority to speak for us
is our being properly identified with them, I proceeded by distinguishing identifications that
speak for us from conditional intentions or provisional plans that agents do not typically
think of as expressive of their identities and that are not connected to expressive meritocratic
dignity. Having identified four characteristics of wholehearted identifications, I argued that
only certain wholehearted identifications are linked to dignity. Introducing the case of Dave
helped substantiate that only some cases of acting on wholehearted identifications trigger the
ascription of dignity. Instead, I argued that we ascribe a particular type of expressive

S. Varga

meritocratic dignity to individuals who manage to stay on their paths by acting in accordance
with what I referred to as core identifications. In the last step of the argument, I further
clarified this particular strand of expressive meritocratic dignity by showing that we only
ascribe dignity in this narrow sense to individuals who pursue their core identifications in a
manner that displays not only proper self-expression, but also sensitivity to the values involved
in the identification.

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