1

G.R. No. 147703

April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE BUS RABBIT vs. PEOPLE

indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the

further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment

meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the
finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the
guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary
civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and
executory.

b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum

of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
ofP237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned
income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the
further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages
and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]

The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27,
20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390.
Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in
the first Resolution as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss
is GRANTED and the appeal is orderedDISMISSED."4
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang]
was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries
and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6)
years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum
of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum
of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income
for one year at P2,500.00 a month,P50,000.00 as

c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum

of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
ofP22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum
of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of
income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the
further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as
hospital expenses, doctors fees ofP170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover
future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical
expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, andP25,000.00
as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as
medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of income,
and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as
medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her
loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in
the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as
hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors

2
fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral
damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for
medical expenses, P87.00 for medicines,P1,710.00 as
actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for
hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual
damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as
moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner
of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount ofP250,000.00 as
actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle;
to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as
actual damages;
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the
insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become
final and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is
worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial
court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf
of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of
appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the
trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On
December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9,
1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be
excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the
OSGs authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases
on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of

May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor

filed the instant motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution
also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in
the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers
subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the
accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment.
Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been
dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of
civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the
accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of
Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply
to the instant case."8
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item
A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.

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Main Issue:

prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country

during the pendency of the appeal."12

Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its
appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had
jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of
that of the accused-employee.

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
relief.13
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:

We are not persuaded.

Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal
case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not
thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution
cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a
more severe penalty.10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also
appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the
accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended
parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as
is prejudicial to them.11

"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his

arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in
absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with
the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. 15 While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have
waived the appeal.16
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in
Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we
quote:

Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency
if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from

"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be

modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation."

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In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused
to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory.17

Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution.

Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt

Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, as follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging
therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or
the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within
the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers
employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers,
according to Article 103 which reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main
issue raised by petitioner.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
"x x x

xxx

x x x"

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment
of conviction meted out to the employee.19
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct
and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are
not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the
right to bring such action.

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3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
more than once for the same act or omission.24
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not
those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In
fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in
the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject
to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein. 25
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code,
which states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the
criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof.
Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to
its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party
to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman,
its employee.

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy

Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee
absolved of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a
whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief29 filed with
the CA and from its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial
courts finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence." 31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called
upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused
decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts
have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower
court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the
accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty
higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may
be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right
against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become
subject to modification without his consent.

In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing

with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none
can be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds
employer did not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite
any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an
appeal in such circumstances is not possible.

We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused

effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though,
that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double
jeopardy.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly

declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect,
they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the
extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former
cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.

Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing

criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping
bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having
been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to
have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and
executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:

Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process

"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived

even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of

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them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused.
He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either
expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the
case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be
deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment
rendered against him. x x x."37
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the
court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate
court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who
refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and
executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the
criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has
waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case
against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues.
Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court inMiranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply
to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the
employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their
employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein
petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in
these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary
liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accusedemployee is subsidiary.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of
the latters insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the
judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case
would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered
by a competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the
final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent
would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the
judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.49
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must
be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the
employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in
some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution
against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil
action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced; 51 and in a
hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as
part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.

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Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its
accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its
nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase
its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accusedemployees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of
the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself;
and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case
to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of
the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then
the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary
civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we
reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In
other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in
the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability,
but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence. 52
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory
origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by

the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal

requirements must be strictly complied with.55
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal
as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be
discarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In
these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations,
such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to
facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.59
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it
participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said
that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right
to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. 60 In fact, it can be said
that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived
petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently
proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has
been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the
admissions of petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular
trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being
then operated by petitioners driver,Napoleon Roman, figured in an
accident in San Juan, La Union x x x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute
that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was
in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 158177
January 28, 2008
LO BUN TIONG vs. CHING TENG
The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng
(petitioners) charge Vicente Balboa (respondent) with forum shopping.
On February 24, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila (Branch 34), Civil Case No. 97-82225 for Collection of
Sum of Money against petitioners. The amount sought covers three postdated checks issued by petitioner Caroline Siok Ching Teng (Caroline),
as follows: Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57546 dated December 30, 1996
for P2,000,000.00; Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57547 dated January 15,
1997 forP1,200,000.00; and Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57548 dated
January 31, 1997 for P1,975,250.00 - or a total ofP5,175,250.00.1
On July 21, 1997, separate criminal complaints for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. No. 22) were filed against Caroline before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 10), covering the said
three checks. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 277576
to 78.2
On August 11, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 9782225 finding petitioners liable, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter:
1. To play the plaintiff the sum of P5,175,250.00 plus 6% interest
per annum until full payment;

Thereafter, in a Decision dated December 5, 2001 rendered in Criminal

Case Nos. 277576 to 78, the MTC acquitted Caroline of the offenses
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The MTC, however, found Caroline civilly liable in
favor of respondent for the amounts covered by these checks, to wit:
WHEREFORE, accused Caroline Siok Ching Teng is acquitted of
the charge for violation of BP Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is
ordered civilly liable to the offended party for the amounts of the
checks subject of the three informations herein,
i.e.,P1,200,000.00, P1,975,250.00 and P2,000,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the MTC Decision praying for
the deletion of the award of civil indemnity, but it was denied by the MTC
per Order dated April 12, 2002. Thus, Caroline appealed to the RTC,
which docketed the case as Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46.
In the meantime, petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on
appeal the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 97-82225, docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 61457. In the assailed Decision dated November 20, 2002,
the CA5dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC
Decision in toto. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision
reads:

2. To pay the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as and for

attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding no reversible

error in the appealed Decision dated August 11, 1998 of Branch
34 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 9782225, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and
said Decision is affirmed in toto.

3. To pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but this was

denied per Resolution dated April 21, 2003.7

9
On May 8, 2003, the RTC as an appellate court, rendered its Decision in
Criminal Case No. 02-204544-46, modifying the MTC Decision by
deleting the award of civil damages.8
Now before the Court for resolution is the Amended Petition filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the CA Decision dated
November 20, 2002 and Resolution dated April 21, 2003, on the lone
ground that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
RECOVER TWICE FOR THE SAME OBLIGATION ON
ACCOUNT OF THE SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
DELIBERATE FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO INFORM THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE CIVIL OBLIGATION
BEING SUED UPON IS THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL
COMPLAINTS WITH THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, AND
FOR WHICH THE CIVIL OBLIGATION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY
ADJUDGED.9
Petitioners contend that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution should
be reconsidered and the RTC Decision dated August 11, 1998 dismissed
as respondent's act of filing Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases
Nos. 277576 to 78 constitutes forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other
court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a
party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in
one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion
in another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action
for certiorari.10
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity
of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest
in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as
the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other

action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will
constitute litis pendentia.11
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corp.,12 the Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of
action between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a result
of the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the
prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of
the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the claim. The Court
stated:
x x x The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender to deter him and others from committing the same or
similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate
him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose,
meanwhile, of the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the accused. Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No.
00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that sought
in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the recovery of the amount
of the checks, which, according to petitioner, represents the
amount to be paid by respondent for its purchases. x x x
This was reiterated in Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corp. v.
Demetria,13 where the civil case for the recovery of the amount covered
by the bouncing checks was also ordered dismissed.
In Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 5797 effective September 16, 1997, which provides:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil
action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be
allowed or recognized.
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:

10
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks
to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on
the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but
any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions.
The foregoing, however, are not applicable to the present case. It is worth
noting that Civil Case No. 97-82225 was filed on February 24, 1997, and
Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78 on July 21, 1997, prior to the adoption
of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. Thus, at
the time of filing of Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos.
277576 to 78, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and

Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal
proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or
(2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action
was filed prior to the criminal complaint.14 Since respondent instituted the
civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case No. 97-82225 may
proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is
no forum shopping to speak of.
Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of
civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil
case is filed ahead of the criminal case. Thus, in the Hyatt case, the
Court noted,viz.:
x x x This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure ] was enacted to help declog court dockets which are
filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as
collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal
cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect
of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes,
upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The
inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for
collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to
expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a
single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the
policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing
of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a
separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in
court. The only instance when separate proceedings are
allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal
case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the
civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a

11
separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of
the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would
further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of
suits must be avoided. Where petitioners' rights may be fully
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the RTC, in its Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46,
already deleted the award of civil damages. Records do not disclose that
appeal had been taken therefrom. There is, therefore, no double recovery
of the amounts covered by the checks or unjust enrichment on the part of
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated November 20, 2002 and Resolution dated April 21, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148072
July 10, 2007
MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1)
Resolution1 dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 63293 entitled, "Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in
her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of
Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo," which
dismissed petitioner Francisco Magestrados Petition for Certiorari for
being the wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution2 dated 3 May 2001 of the
same Court denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint3 for perjury
against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.

After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended

pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor
Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Pertinent
portions of the information are hereby quoted as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath upon
a material matter before a competent officer authorized to receive and
administer oath and which the law so require, to wit: the said accused
subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda
B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No.
CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging that he lost Owners
Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in
support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of
Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to
Branch 99 of the said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado
signed and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No.
CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City;
the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said
affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter being that the
property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was
mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the
amount of P758,134.42 and as a consequence of which said title to the
property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said
loan, thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo. 4
The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 90721 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado."
On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion5 for suspension of proceedings
based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case
No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title

12
and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must
be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the
issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues
raised in the criminal action.
On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order 6 denying petitioners
motion for suspension of proceedings, thus:
Acting on the "Motion for Suspension of Proceedings" filed by the [herein
petitioner Magestrado], thru counsel, and the "Comment and Opposition
thereto, the Court after an evaluation of the same, finds the aforesaid
motion without merit, hence, is hereby DENIED, it appearing that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on
July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.
On 17 August 1999, a motion7 for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
but was denied by the MeTC in an Order8dated 19 October 1999.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that MeTC Judge
Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 90721.

upon petitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to support his

petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163.
Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the criminal case
which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the
affidavit of loss was executed in support of the petition for issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was
raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC. x x x.10
Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration11 but this was denied
by RTC- Branch 83 in an Order12 dated 21 December 2000.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari13 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge
Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case
No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43
of petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
90721, as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.
On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed14 the Petition in CAG.R. SP No. 63293 on the ground that petitioners remedy should have
been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for
Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of Appeals ruled that:
Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and
appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively.

On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the

prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning thus:
Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases
abovementioned, in relation to the criminal action for PERJURY, this
Court opines and so holds that there is no prejudicial question involved
as to warrant the suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome
of the civil cases. The civil cases are principally for determination whether
or not a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether or not he executed
the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT
No. N-173163, whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes

The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant

petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the same rules. Thus, the said rule provides:
Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the
parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a nonextendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by

13
the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached
to the record x x x.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is hereby DISMISSED.15
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration 16 in a
Resolution17 dated 3 May 2001.
Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated
March 14, 2000 denying petitioners Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and her subsequent Order dated
December 21, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration
thereafter filed can only be reviewed by the Court of Appeals thru
appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in
denying the Petition for Certiorari and petitioners subsequent
motion for reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial question
pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing
jurisprudence.
After consideration of the procedural and substantive issues raised by
petitioner, we find the instant petition to be without merit.
The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper remedy which
petitioner should have availed himself of before the Court of Appeals: an
ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that he
correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal of his Petition
for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 through a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Private respondent and public
respondent People of the Philippines insist that an ordinary appeal was
the proper remedy.

We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err
in dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41,
Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section
10, invoked by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March
2001).
The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only
because RTC-Branch 83 did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358
but also because RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal was a final order
from which petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section
2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a
pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court.
In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower
court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case
completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the
latter.18 RTC-Branch 83s Order dated 14 March 2001 dismissing
petitioners Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 finally
disposes of the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more with
the case.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by the Revised Rules of Court to
be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order
is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

14
Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was
available. It was adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of
law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of
judgment which the trial court might have committed. But petitioners
instead filed a special civil action for certiorari.
We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court lies only when "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."19 Certiorari cannot be allowed
when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability
of that remedy,20 certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal.21
As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly
emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the
period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that
the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final
and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to
appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege
to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. While
every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the
failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction over the appeal.22
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.23 A party cannot substitute the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of
appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are
antithetical to the availability of the special civil action for certiorari.24 As
this Court held in Fajardo v. Bautista25 :
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order,
and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is

not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where

it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and
will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order
complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.
Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed
remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioners own
neglect or error in the choice of remedies.
On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the
RTC-Branch 83 denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had
until 18 January 2001 within which to file an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 February
2001 with the Court of Appeals cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy
of appeal. As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-Branch 83s
dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long become final and
executory.
For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright
the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner before it.
Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant
Petition on the merits.
In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several substantive issues.
Petitioner harps on the need for the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending before MeTC-Branch 43
based on a prejudicial question still to be resolved in Civil Case No. Q98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349
(for collection of a sum of money) which are pending before other trial
courts.
1avvphi1

For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his

complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage)
and that of private respondent in her complaint in Civil Case No. Q-9834349 (for collection of a sum of money).
Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of Mortgage,
Delivery of Title and Damages filed on 8 May 1988 by petitioner against
private respondent with RTC-Branch 77. Petitioner alleges that he

15
purchased a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N173163 thru private respondent, a real estate broker. In the process of
negotiation, petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of Sale prepared by
private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he noticed that the
Deed was already signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-infact of vendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo Galvez. Petitioner
demanded from private respondent a special power of attorney and
authority to sell, but the latter failed to present one. Petitioner averred
that private respondent refused to deliver the certificate of title of the land
despite execution and signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the
consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to engage the services of
one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed, for P100,000.00 to facilitate the
filing of cases against private respondent; to deliver to petitioner the
certificate of title of the land; and/or to cancel the certificate of title in
possession of private respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing
upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner. In fact,
petitioner was even charged with perjury before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.s wrongdoing. Petitioner
further alleged that he discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate
Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of private respondent.
Petitioner categorically denied signing the mortgage document and it was
private respondent who falsified the same in order to justify her unlawful
withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed
for:
1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 2,
1997 as null and void;
2. As well as to order [herein private respondent] to DELIVER the
Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N173163 to [herein petitioner];
3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sums
of
a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;
b) P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
c) P50,000.00 as Attorneys fees and

d) Cost of suit.
4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable
under the premises.
Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,26 on the other hand, is a complaint for a sum
of money with a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment filed by
private respondent against petitioner on 14 May 1988 before RTC-Branch
84. Private respondent alleges that petitioner obtained a loan from her in
the amount of P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before 30 August
1997. As security for payment of the loan, petitioner executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered under TCT No.
N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said
obligation, to which respondent agreed. But private respondent
discovered sometime in February 1998 that petitioner executed an
affidavit of loss alleging that he lost the owners duplicate copy of TCT
No. N-173163, and succeeded in annotating said affidavit on the original
copy of TCT No. N-173163 on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. Private respondent further alleges that she also discovered that
petitioner filed a petition for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of
TCT No. N-173163 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as
LRC Case No. Q-10052. Private respondent demanded that petitioner
pay his obligation, but the latter refused to do so. Resultantly, private
respondent prayed for the following:
A. That upon filing of this Complaint as well as the Affidavit of
attachment and a preliminary hearing thereon, as well as bond
filed, a writ of preliminary attachment is (sic) by the Honorable
Court ordering the Sheriff to levy [herein petitioner] property
sufficient to answer [herein private respondents] claim in this
action;
B. That after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in
[private respondents] favor as against [petitioner], ordering the
latter to pay the former the sum of P758,134.42 plus interest
thereon at 5% per month from September 1997 up to the date of
actual payment; actual damages in the sums of P70,000.00 each
under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint; P200,000.00 as
moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; twenty
(20%) of the principal claim as attorneys fees plus P2,500.00 per

16
appearance honorarium; and P60,000.00 as litigation expense
before this Honorable Court.
[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice and equity.
As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury
pending final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No.
Q-98-34308, we take into consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend
shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view
of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.27
A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused.28

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it

must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as
to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question
must be lodged in another tribunal.29
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not
involve a prejudicial question.30 Neither is there a prejudicial question if
the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.31
However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of
sound discretion, and upon proper application for a stay of that action,
hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case
pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are
the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the
second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in
the first action are settled, the second action should be stayed. 32
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets,
considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if
proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion
between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the

17
trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is
submitted to its sound discretion.33
Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the courts discretionary
authority is not subject to reversal on review unless it constitutes an
abuse of discretion. As the United States Supreme Court aptly declared
in Landis v. North American Co., "the burden of making out the justice
and wisdom from the departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on the
petitioner, less an unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the outcome
of a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that only in
rare circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside,
while a litigant in another, settling the rule of law that will define the rights
of both is, after all, the parties before the court are entitled to a just,
speedy and plain determination of their case undetermined by the
pendency of the proceedings in another case. After all, procedure was
created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice."34
As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be
suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the
facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related
with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the
issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the
criminal case.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q98-34308 pending before RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-9834349, pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the
determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private
respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage
involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand,
Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the
determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an
affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed
independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil
cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the
criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his

execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on

whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of
loss of TCT No. N-173163.
MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil
Case No. Q-98-34308 for cancellation of mortgage before the RTCBranch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for collection of a sum of
money before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a prejudicial question in the
determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Case
No. 90721. RTC-Branch 83, likewise, did not err in ruling that MeTCBranch 43 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion for suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
90721.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5
March 2001 and 3 May 2001of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the
merits of Criminal Case No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings therein,
without prejudice to the right of the accused to due process. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 188197
August 3, 2010
FLORES vs. GONZALES
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision2 dated March 6, 2008 and the
Resolution3 dated May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R.
CEB SP No. 02726.
The antecedent facts and proceedings follow:
On June 24, 2004, petitioner Leonardo U. Flores (Flores) filed a
complaint-affidavit4 against private respondent Eugene Lim (Lim) for
estafa before the City Prosecutor of Cebu City, docketed as I.S. No. 045228-F.

18
Briefly, the complaint alleged that, during the pre-incorporation stage of
Enviroboard Manufacturing, Inc. (EMI) in October 1996, Lim tricked
Flores and the other EMIs incorporators (Flores, et al.) to purchase two
compact processing equipments, CP15 and CP14, from Compak System
Limited, Inc. (Compak) in Great Britain for the manufacture of "Fiber
Boards." Unknown to Flores, Lim was connected with Bendez
International Corporation (Bendez), the exclusive distributor of Compak.
Flores executed an agreement to purchase only a CP15. After the
execution of the sales contract and due to some delay in the delivery of
the CP15, Lim, through insidious words and deliberate bad faith, was
able to convince Flores, et al. to purchase instead an unused but later
model of the compact processing equipment, CP14, for 1,466,000.00
or P60,106,000.00, with the assurance that Lim could effect the
cancellation of the purchase for the CP15. Flores, et al. agreed and
purchased the CP14, using their funds allotted for the CP15. Later,
however, Lim told them that the purchase of the CP15 could not be
cancelled. Out of fear of lawsuits and acting upon the advice of Lim,
Flores, et al. raised the necessary funds through bank loans to pay for
the CP15. Then in 2001, Flores, et al. discovered the distributorship
agreement between Bendez and Compak. Upon further investigation,
they learned that the purchase price of the CP14 was only 908,140.00
or P38,174,618.16 (at the conversion of P41.80) per the Letter of Credit
(LC) No. 263-C-6-000735, Proforma Invoice No. CP627A dated June 18,
19966 and the Ocean Bill of Lading7 relative to these documents.
Lim filed his counter-affidavit8 denying all the accusations against him.
Among others, he insisted that the CP14 was actually priced
at P60,106,000.00, and LC No. 263-C-6-00073 represented only part of
the payment for the purchase price. To support his refutations, he
submitted a Contract Payment Receipt9 dated August 20, 1996 showing
that the full price of a CP14, in reference to Proforma Invoice No.
CP627B dated March 4, 1996, was actually 1,466,000.00
or P60,106,000.00. He also submitted documents showing that a CP10,
an older model of the CP14 was already priced at 1,031,585.00. 10
After further exchange of pleadings and the case was submitted for
resolution, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution 11 dated
January 16, 2005 dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause.
The motion for reconsideration12 filed by Flores was denied in a
Resolution13 dated June 2, 2005.

On July 12, 2005, Flores filed a petition for review14 with the Secretary of
Justice questioning the January 16, 2005 and the June 2, 2005
Resolutions. Lim opposed this petition.15
In a Resolution16 dated March 2, 2006, the Secretary of Justice dismissed
the petition on the ground that there was no showing of any reversible
error on the part of the handling prosecutors, and for Flores failure to
append several documents to his petition.
Flores moved for a reconsideration of this Resolution.17 Lim opposed,18 to
which Flores replied.19
In his Resolution20 dated May 31, 2006, the Secretary of Justice
reconsidered, disposing thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Cebu City is hereby
directed to file an information for other deceits defined and penalized
under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Cebu City, and to report the action taken thereon within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.21
Pursuant to the said directive, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City an Information 22 against
Lim for the crime of Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 135467-R and was
raffled to Branch 4.
Lim thus filed a motion for reconsideration23 of the May 31, 2006
Resolution. Flores opposed.24 Lim replied.25Flores filed a rejoinder.26
On March 22, 2007, the Secretary of Justice reconsidered anew and
issued another Resolution,27 disposing as follows
WHEREFORE, finding respondents motion for reconsideration to be
meritorious, the Resolution dated May 31, 2006 is REVERSED. The
instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED WITH FINALITY.

19
Consequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor is hereby directed to
withdraw the information, if any had been filed in Court, and report the
action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
Accordingly, on May 3, 2007, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the
MTCC a Motion to Withdraw Information.29
Seeking to nullify the March 22, 2007 Resolution, Flores filed a petition
for certiorari30 with the Court of Appeals on May 22, 2007.
Meanwhile, on June 20, 2007, the MTCC issued its Resolution31 denying
the Motion to Withdraw Information. Ratiocinating on the denial of the
motion, it declared
The Court notes the flip-flopping of the Public Prosecutors, notably the
Secretary of Justice in the instant case. On January 16, 2005, the
Investigating Prosecutor dismissed the case for lack of probable cause.
After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the private complainant
appealed to the Secretary of Justice who, however, dismissed the same
on a technicality. Private complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the Secretary of Justice granted on Mary 31, 2006. In that
Resolution, the City Prosecutor of Cebu was directed to file within ten
(10) days from receipt, an Information charging Accused with the crime of
"Other Deceits" under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Now the
same Secretary of Justice has reversed himself again and, through his
subordinates, is asking the Court to withdraw the Information.
The Court has conformably to the doctrine laid down in Crespo and other
cases made its own independent assessment of the evidence thus far
submitted and is convinced that there exists probable cause to hold
accused to trial where the parties can better ventilate their respective
claims and defense[s].32 (Emphasis supplied.)
On June 29, 2007, Flores filed a Manifestation33 with the Court of
Appeals, attaching the June 20, 2007 Resolution of the MTCC.
Meanwhile, Lim, on July 20, 2007, moved to reconsider the June 20,
2007 MTCC Resolution.34

On August 20, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with
the Court of Appeals its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment.35 The OSGs position was that the Secretary of Justice acted
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and directing
the withdrawal of the Information. Lim filed his Comment 36 on September
28, 2007. Flores filed his Reply37 to Lims Comment on November 8,
2007.
In the meantime, on November 26, 2007, the MTCC issued an
Order38 holding in abeyance the proceedings pending before it, including
the resolution of Lims motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
Motion to Withdraw Information. It held
In a manner of speaking, the subject incident is straddling on two horses.
The ardent desire of the private complainant to prosecute the accused is
evident when he filed the petition before the Hon. Court of Appeals to
question the Resolution of the Hon. Secretary of Justice. There is nothing
wrong to be zealous in prosecuting an accused except that his chosen
approach coupled with the fact that this court chose to disregard the
subject Resolution and insists on its jurisdiction over the case result in a
procedural disorder or confusion. This is taking into account the
unquestionable primacy of the Hon. Court of Appeals over this court by
virtue of which any action or resolution by this court on the issue can be
negated or voided by the former. By reason of such primacy, this court
ought to defer to the Hon. Court of Appeals and observe judicial courtesy
to a superior court.
The outcome of the pending case before the Hon. Court of Appeals
questioning the resolution and order of the Hon. Secretary of Justice will
eventually determine the merit of the resolution of this court in denying
the motion to withdraw filed by the prosecution acting on the order of the
Hon. Secretary of Justice.
Hypothetically, if the Hon. Court of Appeals will sustain the Hon.
Secretary of Justice, how can this court take a posture different from that
of a superior court and insist[s] on hearing this case. Conversely, if the
Hon. Court of Appeals will sustain the private complainant, it will, in effect,
sustain the resolution of this court denying the motion to withdraw
Information, and render the motion for reconsideration of the public

20
prosecution moot and academic. In such a case, the prosecution of the
accused will have to proceed.
If the court will proceed with this case but the Hon. Secretary of Justice
will be eventually upheld by the Hon. Court of Appeals, all the
proceeding[s] already had in this court would become useless and
wasted, including the time and efforts of all parties concerned.
Furthermore, to continue with the proceedings in this case while a case
that matters is pending in the Hon. Court of Appeals will constitute
discourtesy and disrespect to a superior court. That there is no injunction
or restraint on this court to proceed with this case is not an issue since in
the first place it was the private complainant and not the public
prosecutor or the accused who initiated the petition for certiorari in the
Hon. Court of Appeals. In fact, judicial courtesy and respect dictate that
the private complainant ought to initiate the suspension of the
proceedings of the case in this court while the petition is pending, or if he
wants the proceedings herein to continue, then he should have initiated
the withdrawal or termination of the case he filed in the Hon. Court of
Appeals.39
On March 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated the questioned
Decision finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary
of Justice in issuing his March 22, 2007 Resolution.
Flores filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 8, 2008 Decision.
The Court of Appeals denied it in its Resolution dated May 28, 2009.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUNE 20, 2007 RESOLUTION OF
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, DENYING RESPONDENT
LIMS MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION AND FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE, RENDERED THE DISPOSITION OF THE
PETITION BEFORE [THE] COURT OF APPEALS ACADEMIC?
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
COULD RULE IN A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE
VALIDITY, WEIGHT, ADMISSIBILITY, AND MERITS OF
PARTIES DEFENSES, EVIDENCE, AND ACCUSATION?

In gist, Flores asserts in his petition that the June 20, 2007 Resolution of
the MTCC denying the Motion to Withdraw filed by the prosecution and
finding probable cause to hold Lim for trial for the crime of Other Deceits
under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code rendered his petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot and academic. He says that
this is pursuant to the ruling in the landmark case of Crespo v.
Mogul40 that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case resulting either in the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the court, who is the best and
sole judge on what action to take in the case before it.
Flores further argues that the Secretary of Justice overstepped his
jurisdiction in the determination of probable cause when he ruled during
the preliminary investigation on the validity, weight, admissibility and
merits of the parties evidence. According to him, these matters are better
ventilated before the court during the trial proper.
Our Ruling
With respect to the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. Indeed, as
Crespo declared
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from

21
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.41
In this case, on a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice found
probable cause for Other Deceits against Lim; thus, the proper
Information was filed in Court pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of
Justice. Upon filing of the Information, the MTCC acquired jurisdiction
over the case.
Lim filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice. There was nothing procedurally infirm in this
course of action inasmuch as there is nothing in Crespo that bars the
Secretary of Justice from reviewing resolutions of his subordinates in an
appeal or petition for review in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice
was merely advised in Crespo that, as far as practicable, he should not
take cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or information is
already filed in court.42
This is also true with respect to a motion for reconsideration before the
Secretary of Justice. Review, whether on appeal or on motion for
reconsideration, as an act of supervision and control by the Secretary of
Justice over the prosecutors, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency may be corrected by higher administrative
authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative
remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.43 In any case,
the grant of a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw the information,
which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses the
finding of probable cause, is subject to the discretion of the court.44
In this case, the Secretary of Justice, reversed himself in his March 22,
2007 Resolution, and directed the withdrawal of the Information against
Lim. In compliance with this directive, the prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Information on May 3, 2007. Flores, on the other hand, filed on
May 22, 2007 a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to assail
the March 22, 2007 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Then, on June
20, 2007, the MTCC denied the Motion to Withdraw Information on the
ground that, based on its own assessment, there exists probable cause

to hold Lim for trial for the crime of Other Deceits. In view of the June 20,
2007 MTCC Resolution, Flores manifested before the Court of Appeals
this disposition, attaching a copy of the said Resolution to his pleading.
Meanwhile, Lim filed a motion for reconsideration with the MTCC.
Cognizant of the pending petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
and Lims motion for reconsideration of the June 20, 2007 Resolution, the
MTCC suspended the proceedings before it, and deferred the
arraignment of Lim until the resolution of Flores certiorari petition of the
Court of Appeals.
We wish to point out that, notwithstanding the pendency of the
Information before the MTCC, especially considering the reversal by the
Secretary of Justice of his May 31, 2006 Resolution, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, anchored on the alleged
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on
the part of Secretary of Justice, was an available remedy to Flores as an
aggrieved party.45
1avvphi1

In the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals is not being asked to
cause the dismissal of the case in the trial court, but only to resolve the
issue of whether the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of
discretion in either affirming or reversing the finding of probable cause
against the accused. But still the rule standsthe decision whether to
dismiss the case or not rests on the sound discretion of the trial court
where the Information was filed.46 As jurisdiction was already acquired by
the MTCC, this jurisdiction is not lost despite a resolution by the
Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case,
notwithstanding the deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the
accused and further proceedings, and not even if the Secretary of Justice
is affirmed by the higher courts.47
Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the
appellate courts, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or
assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial courts
duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.48 Thus, the trial
court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case
based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence

22
appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which
the court may order the latter to produce before it; or any evidence
already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion
is filed by the public prosecutor.49 The trial court should make its
assessment separately and independently of the evaluation of the
prosecution or of the Secretary of Justice. This assessment should be
embodied in the written order disposing of the motion to dismiss or the
motion to withdraw the information.50
This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to
Withdraw Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it correctly did
so. In view of the above disquisitions, and while the disposition of the
issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of
discretion in not finding probable cause against Lim may be persuasive,
the MTCC is not bound to dismiss the case or to withdraw the
Information. For these reasons, the petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals has effectively become moot and academic upon the issuance
by the MTCC of its June 20, 2007 Resolution. The March 6, 2008
Decision and the May 28, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
affirming the Secretary of Justice will really make no difference anymore.
As held in Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn, 51 pursuant to our
ruling in Crespo and in the subsequent related cases, this Court held
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction in his
determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the
writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice
exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion is not enough, it must amount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over
the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without authority.

There is no escaping the fact that resolving the issue of whether the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction would necessarily entail a review of his
finding of lack of probable cause against the respondents AUDI AG
officers.
If we should sustain the DOJ Secretary in maintaining that no probable
cause exists to hold respondents AUDI AG officers liable to stand trial for
the crime they were charged with, our ruling would actually serve no
practical or useful purpose, since the RTC had already made such a
judicial determination, on the basis of which it dismissed Criminal Case
No. 4824-A. Lest it be forgotten, the fact that the Information against
respondents AUDI AG officers had already been filed in court, its
disposition, i.e., its dismissal or the conviction of the accused, rests on
the sound discretion of the Court. And although the fiscal retains direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. Thus, the court may deny or grant the motion to withdraw
an Information, not out of subservience to the (Special) Prosecutor, but in
faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative. For these very
same reasons, we must now refrain from resolving the issues raised by
petitioners PPC and APC, considering that the information against
respondents AUDI AG officers had already been filed before the RTC; the
RTC acquired exclusive jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 4824-A; and
it has already rendered judgment dismissing the charges against
respondents AUDI AG officers.
This is not to say that we are already affirming the 2 July 2008 Order of
the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 4824-A. To the contrary, we are
much aware that petitioners PPC and APCs Motion for Reconsideration
of the said order of dismissal is still pending resolution by the trial court.
By refusing to go into the merits of the instant Petition, we are only
respecting the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC over Criminal Case No.
4824-A and avoiding any pronouncement on our part which would
preempt its independent assessment of the case. Irrefragably, a
determination by us that probable cause against respondents AUDI AG
officers does or does not exist would strongly influence, if not directly
affect, the resolution by the RTC of the matter still pending before it. In

23
any case, the party that would feel aggrieved by the final judgment or
order of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 4824-A has the option of
elevating the same to the higher courts. And if only for the orderly
administration of justice, the proceeding in Criminal Case No. 4824-A,
that is, the resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners PPC and APC, should be allowed to continue and take its
course.
Under the circumstances, the denial of the present Petition is clearly
warranted for being moot. Where a declaration on an issue would have
no practical use or value, this Court will refrain from expressing its
opinion in a case where no practical relief may be granted in view of a
supervening event. Thus, it is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment thereon

cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot
be enforced.52
Anent the second issue, suffice it to state that these matters are best
addressed to the MTCC, where they will be thoroughly ventilated and
threshed out in the resolution of Lims motion for reconsideration of the
MTCC June 20, 2007 Resolution, and eventually, if the trial court denies
the motion, during the trial on the merits before it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02726 is declared MOOT
AND ACADEMIC. Consequently, the assailed Decision dated March 6,
2008 and the Resolution dated May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
the said case are SET ASIDE. No costs.SO ORDERED.