SPECPRO| RULE 74| 1

G.R. No. 45904

September 30, 1938

excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and
approved.

Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia.

UTULO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano
B.
Gardiner
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.

for

PABLO

G.

appellant.

IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial
administrator of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property
(special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving
spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The
said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio
Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced
heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the
pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died
in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs
being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same
court the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife
(special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs
were he himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only
property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the
intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named
administrator of the property of said deceased. The oppositor objected to
the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the property of her
daughter and the appointment of the applicant as administrator. She
alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there was
no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should
the court grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed
the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the
applicant. After the required publications, trial was had and the court, on
August 28, 1936, finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor

The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial

court, but these assigned errors raise only two questions for resolution,
namely: whether upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the
property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent
appointment of an administrator, and whether the appellant has a better
right to the said office than the appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision
enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living property in the
Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however,
is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the
same Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the heirs
are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may
agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand
pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the required
publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all
the known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the
inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a
person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317).
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions of
articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 2

to all the property left by the deceased from the time of his death. In the
case of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights
to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of
the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if
the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the
estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said
property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they
may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can
do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be
divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually
agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the
estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an
administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among
the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no
debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with
the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging
absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the
estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are coowners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for
the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the
present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of
the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in
the present actions. If there are any heirs of the estate who have
not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition
for partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs. Bondad, supra,
and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated.
And in the case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified the
same doctrine in the following language:
Upon the second question Did the court a quo commit an error in
refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino
Fule? it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to

the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed
against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule
were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657,
659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and
personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted
immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546;
Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin vs.Nacianceno, 19
Phil.,
238;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio,
19
Phil.,
434;
Nable
Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes
immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what
reason can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator
to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of
their possession to which they are immediately entitled? In the case
of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano
Arellano, discussing this question, said: Under the provisions of the
Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other
words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the
estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said
property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they
may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can
do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be
divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually
agree in the division. (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No.
190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is
no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and
expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate
among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 3

against
the
estate.
(Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra; Baldemor vs.Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation
to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any
other coowners or owners in common, and they may recover their
individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided
property.
(Succession
of
Story,
3
La.
Ann.,
502;
Mcintyre vs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss.,
57.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also
exist in the divisions of personal as well as the real property. If they
cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such
personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is
maintenable where the estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of
age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no
necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible
of being held in common which may not be divided by the
coowners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate;
of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of noncontiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands
of the coowners as well as of the whole. (Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N.
H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698; Pipes vs.Buckner, 51 Miss., 848;
Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a
doctrine so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had
followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files would not have
been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are now.
There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect
that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may
have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia
Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of the
representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that
he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be
a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living . In

order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of

the property it is not necessary that the administration of the property of
his deceased wife be instituted an administration which will take up time
and occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.
2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the
parties has preferential right to the office of administrator.
The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to
the applicant-appellee. So ordered.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 4

The record in this case presents two questions:

First. Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within
the time required by law? And,
Second. Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint and
administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased?
FACTS
Saturnino Fule died on the 4th day of April, 1923, intestate. On the 2d day
of July, 1923, Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased, and prayed
specially for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as such administrator.
The petitioner further prayed that during the pendency of the petition for
the appointment of an administrator, the said Cornelio Alcantara be then
and there appointed as special administrator for said estate. The petitioner
alleged that at the time of the death of Saturnino Fule, he was the owner of
real and personal property located in the municipality of San Pablo,
Province of Laguna, of the value of P50,000 with a rental value of about
P8,000 and that, in addition to said real and personal property, he also left
about P30,000 in cash. The lower court on the day of the presentation of
the petition appointed Cornelio Alcantara as special administrator and
required him to give a bond of P8,000. On the 26th day of July, 1923, the
special administrator presented in court an inventory of the alleged
property of the deceased.

G.R. No. 21859

September 30, 1924

Intestate
estate
of
Saturnino
Fule,
deceased.
FULE, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANASTASIO FULE, ET AL., opponents-appellees.

CIRIACO

Palma,
Leuterio
&
Ramon Diokno for appellees.

appellant.

JOHNSON, J.:

Yamzon

for

On the 31st day of July, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney Mr.
Ramon Diokno, appeared and presented a motion alleging that they were
children of Saturnino Fule and that they were all of age; that they opposed
the appointment of an administrator upon the ground that the deceased
had left no debts and that his property had already been partitioned among
his children during his lifetime in conformity with article 1056 of the Civil
Code; that the special administrator had taken possession of property of
large value belonging to them, and had thereby deprived them of their
means of livelihood, and prayed that they order appointing a special
administrator be denied. To said property, personal and real, which the
special administrator had taken possession of, belonging to the oppositors.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 5

On the 4th day of August, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney,
presented a further opposition to the appointment of an administrator for
said estate, alleging again that the heirs of Saturnino Fule were all of age;
that the deceased had left no debts; that the property had been divided
among his heirs during his lifetime; that the special administrator had been
appointed without any notification whatever, neither personal not by
publication, to the heirs of the deceased, and that there was no necessity
for the appointment of a special administrator during the pendency of the
question, nor for the appointment of an administrator.
On the 14th day of August, 1923, the petitioner answered the motion of the
oppositors and opposed their petition for the revocation of the appointment
of a special administrator. He alleged that the oppositors had been
requested to make a partition of the property of the deceased; that no
partition of the property of the deceased had been made during the lifetime
of the deceased; that the property described in Exhibit A attached to the
motion of the oppositors was the exclusive and absolute property of the
petitioner, who had for more than forty years been in the quiet, public, and
exclusive possession of the same, as owner; and prayed that the motion of
the oppositors is denied.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, judge, on the
15th day of August, 1923, revoked the appointment of the special
administrator and ordered him to render an account. On the same day
(August 15, 1923) Judge Paredes denied the appointment of an
administrator, and suggested to the petitioner that within thirty days from
that date he should amend his petition and present an ordinary action for
the partition of the property of the estate of the deceased, and in case he
should fail to do so it would be understood that the petition for the
appointment of an administrator is denied.
On the 5th day of September, 1923, the petitioner excepted to the orders of
the court of the 15th day of August, 1923, and on the same day presented
a motion for reconsideration, or new trial, and prayed that the court declare
without effect the orders of the 15th day of August and proceed to the
appointment of an ordinary administrator who should present to the court a
project of partition of the property involved, for approval. On the 11th day
of September, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney, opposed the
motion for reconsideration or new trial upon the ground that the judgment
of the court of the 15th day of August had become final and nonappealable.

On the 17th day of September, 1923, the court a quo, considering said
motion for reconsideration or new trial and the opposition thereto, annulled
and set aside that part of the order of the court of the 15th day of August,
which granted to the petitioner the right to amend his petition, and fixed
the 4th day of October, 1923, for a continuation of the proof upon the
question of the appointment of an administrator. On the 26th day of
October, 1923, and after hearing the respective parties, the Honorable
Isidro Paredes, denied the petition for the appointment of an administrator
upon the principal ground that all of the property of Saturnino Fule had
been in the possession of his heirs for many years before his death; and
that at the time of his death there were no debts and no property to be
administered. From that judgment the petitioner appealed.
In this court the oppositors renewed their motion to dismiss the appeal for
the reason that it had not been presented within the period of twenty days
as provided in section 783 of Act No. 190. Said section provides that: "Any
person legally interested in any other order, decree, or judgment (other
than those mentioned in sections 781 and 782) of a court of first instance
in the exercise of its jurisdiction in special proceedings in the settlement of
the estates of deceased persons or the administration of guardians and
trustees, may appeal to the Supreme Court from such order, decree, or
judgment, when such order, decree, or judgment constitutes a final
determination of the rights of the parties so appealing, and the appeal shall
be effected in the manner provided in the two preceding sections: . . ."
(within twenty days).
The appellees argue that the appeal was not perfected within twenty days
from the 15th day of August, 1923. They evidently overlooked the fact that
the decree was not a final decree for the reason that it gave the petitioner
thirty days within which to decide whether he would amend his petition
present an ordinary action. Inasmuch, therefore, as the petitioner had
thirty days within which to decide just what course he would pursue, said
decision could not become until after the expiration of thirty days or until
the petitioner had decide just what course he desired to take. That order of
the court conceding him thirty days to decide the option therein given,
continued in force until the 17th day of September, when the court decided
the motion for reconsideration and granted to the petitioner a part of his
prayer. From that date the cause proceeded to a final hearing and judgment
on the 26th day of October, 1923, and the appeal from the final judgment
of that date was perfected within the time provided for in the abovementioned provision of Act No. 190.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 6

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment of the 15th day of August,
1923, was not final; that the final judgment rendered in the cause was on
the 26th day of October, 1923; that the appeal from the final judgment was
perfected within time, and therefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal for
failure to perfect the same within the statutory period is hereby denied.
Upon the second question Did the court a quo commit an error in
refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule? it
may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present
action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and
(b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and
661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased
person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To
Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,
321; Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil.,
434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 17 Phil., 73; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes
immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason
can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer
the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to
which they are immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34
Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this question, said: "
'Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death;
in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the
administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer
it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves
and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided
by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the
division.' " (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)

When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no
reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an
administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are
adults and when there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the
property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners in
common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any
other coowners of undivided property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann.,
502; McIntyre vs. Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux., vs. Ford, 29 Miss.,
57.)
And even when there are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of
age, may pay the debts and divide the property among themselves
according to their respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in case of a will,
without probating the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each
party with a complete equitable title to their particular share of the estate.
(Carter vs. Owens, 41 Ala., 217.) The right of the heirs in cases like the one
we are discussing, also exists in the division of personal as well as the real
property. If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of
such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is
maintainable where the estate is not in debt, the heirs are all of age, and
there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof.
(Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex., Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceived of any one class or item of property susceptible of
being held in common which may not be divided by the coowners. It may
be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well
as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or
of part only of the lands of the co-owners as well as of the whole.
(Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 553; 31 L. R. A., 698; Pipes vs. Buckner, 51
Miss., 848; Tewsbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from
is hereby affirmed, without any findings as to costs, and without prejudice
to the right of the petitioner to commence a new action for a partition of
any property left by Saturnino Fule which had not already been partitioned
among his heirs. So ordered.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 7

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA
BRINGAS
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
NAGAC, respondents.

PEREIRA, petitioner,
and

RITA

PEREIRA

Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.

Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the
surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the
deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions
which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed
away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived
by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria
Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private
respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4
for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 8

estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition,

private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas
Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left
no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left
several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS),
as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter
lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the
spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as
an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the
estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the
petition of private respondent 2alleging that there exists no estate of the
deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that
if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said
estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed
private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate
of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of
Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and
personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within
three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment
of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15,
1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the
following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased
Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or
not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no
debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be
appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving
spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the
deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly,
the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively
to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted
letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive
beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the
name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used
to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and,
finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially
settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only
surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to
decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to
appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in
the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not
belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as
aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a
trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or nonexclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which
the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best
position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as
to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights
of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving
whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within
the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is
only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. 7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the
administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be
unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below
discussed.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 9

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in
case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to
name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in
Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful
age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing
to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator.

estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the

intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge
has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and
therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as

administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking
such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of
property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that
estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal
to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased
an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the
do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It intestate proceedings of the latter. 15
should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the
estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are
not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The
or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at
proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11
once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not
bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always
long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the
Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of
the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are
no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
In one case,

13

We said:

Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any
dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of
partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this
case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary

conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as

administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the
deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the
hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are
of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a
judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate
of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial
especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled,
to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most
instances of a similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the
properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple
partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are
protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of
administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 10

deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an

administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of
who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the
sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as
administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration
proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to
commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de
Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31979 August 6, 1980

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 11

FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, MISAEL G. PIZARRO, AURELIO PIZARRO,

JR., LUZMINDA G. PIZARRO, DELIA-THELMA G. PIZARRO, ROGELIO
G. PIZARRO, VIRGILIO G. PIZARRO, ROSALINDA G. PIZARRO, JOSE
ELVIN G. PIZARRO and MARIA EVELYN G. PIZARRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE MANASES G.
REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF DAVAO, HONORABLE VICENTE P. BULLECER, JUDGE OF BRANCH
IV OF THE COURT OF INSTANCE OF DAVAO, ALFONSO L.
ANGLIONGTO JR., FELICITAS YAP ANGLIONGTO, GAUDENCIO A.
CORIAS, REGALADO C. SALAVADOR, ALICIA P. LADISLA and LYDIA
P. GUDANI,respondents.

On January 11, 1967, the Administrator, through Atty. Regalado C.

Salvador, filed a Motion for Authority to Sell the properties located at Agdao
and Jose Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, to settle the debts of the estate
initially estimated at P257,361.23, including inheritance and estate taxes.
The heirs, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, opposed the Motion stating
that the claims against the estate had not yet been properly determined
and that the sale of the Agdao lot with an area of 13,014 sq. ms. would be
more than sufficient to cover the supposed obligations of the estate, which
they claimed were exaggerated.

The Court, in its Order dated February 7, 1967, authorized the sale "in the
interest of the parties" and since majority of the heirs were in favor of the
sale "to avoid unnecessary additional burden of about P2,000.00 every
month. 1 On February 8, 1967, the Administrator moved for the approval of
the conditional sale of the Agdao property to Alfonso L. Angliongto for a
total consideration of P146,820.00 payable in six installments including the
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
down payment. 2 The document of sale stipulated that the vendor was to
A review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 42507-R, cause the ejectment of all occupants in the property on or before July 31,
entitled Filomena Pizarro, et al. vs. Hon. Manases G. Reyes, et al., 1967, otherwise, the vendee was to have the right to rescind the sale and
dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus with Prohibition and demand reimbursement of the price already paid. The heirs filed a Motion,
Preliminary Injunction which sought to nullify the Order of the Court of First also dated February 8, 1967, to set aside or hold in abeyance the Order
Instance of Davao, Branch III, dated April 10, 1968, dismissing Civil Case authorizing the sale on the ground that they were negotiating for the sale of
said lot to Mr. Benjamin Gonzales, whose theatre was being constructed on
No. 5762.
a 1,187 square meter portion thereof. 3
The controversy stemmed from the following facts:
Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of the late Aurelio
Pizarro, Sr., while the other petitioners, Misael, Aurelio, Jr., Luzminda, DeliaThelma, Rogelio, Virgilio, Rosalinda, Jose Elvin and Maria Evelyn, all
surnamed Pizarro, as well as respondents Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P.
Gudani, are their children. Upon the death of Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special
Proceedings No. 1421 entitled "In the Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners through Atty. Regalado C.
Salvador on September 21, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch I, presided by Judge Vicente P. Bullecer. Listed among the properties
of the estate were parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gill, and Claro
M. Recto Streets, Davao City. On December 23, 1965, the Court, upon
agreement of the parties, appointed Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of Court of
said Court, as Administrator of the estate.

The Court, in its Order dated February 9, 1967, denied the "Motion to Set
Aside" stating that the grounds relied upon by the heirs were "nothing but
speculations and had no legal basis." 4 The heirs moved for reconsideration
alleging that they were being deprived of the right to a more beneficial
sale. 5 On February 11, 1967, a hearing was held on the Motion for approval
of the sale of the Agdao lot to Alfonso Angliongto. 6 The heirs maintained
their objection on the grounds that 1) the sale would be improvident and
greatly prejudicial; 2) there has been no determination of the debts or
obligations of the estate as yet; and 3) the terms of the sale were very
prejudicial to them. The Court denied reconsideration on February 20,
1967, 7 and approved the sale on the same date stating that "the sale
sought to be approved was more beneficial."
On February 22, 1967, the Administrator presented another Motion for
Authority to Sell the Claro M. Recto lot stating that the proceeds from the
sale of the Agdao lot were not sufficient to settle the obligations of the

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 12

estate and that the sale of the property on J. Palma Gil Street was
unanimously opposed by the heirs. Authority was granted by the Court o
March 6, 1967. 8
Prior to this, the heirs, in a Motion dated February 27, 1967 prayed that
Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias be asked to resign or be removed for
having abused his powers and duties is such and that, Letters of
Administration be granted instead to Filomena Pizarro. 9 They also
terminated the services of Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, who had acted
likewise as counsel for the Administrator.
On March 11, 1967, the Administrator moved that he be allowed to resign.
On June 22, 1967, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani,
filed a "Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional Contract of Sale"
of the Agdao lot in favor of Alfonso L. Angliongto reiterating that it was
unnecessary and prejudicial to their interests, that the sale of the lot in
Claro M. Recto Street for P370.000.00 was more than sufficient to settle the
obligations of the estate, that it was impossible to eject all nineteen
tenants, not later than July 31, 1967, and that the vendee had failed to pay
the last four installments due despite repeated demands. 10 Angliongto's
counsel countered that the condition of the sale requiring the prior
ejectment of squatters had not been complied with so that the vendee
would hold in abeyance payment of the balance of the purchase price until
all the squatters were ejected. 11 The Court denied rescission of the sale in
its Order, dated July 3, 1967, stating that the relief prayed for is not within
its power to grant, and that the heirs "should file the necessary action
before a competent Court not before this Court, and much less by mere
motion." 12 The heirs moved to reconsider the said Order. In the meantime,
Judge Bullecer was transferred to the Court of First Instance at Mati, Davao
Oriental.
On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve Final
Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses Angliongtos stating that the latter had
paid the full balance of P58,728.00. On the same date, the Court approved
the same. 13 It appears that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19342 was
issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10, 1967. 14
On July 13, 1967, Gaudencio Corias ceased to be Administrator.

15

Without waiting for the resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order denying rescission of the sale, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and
Lydia P. Gudani, filed on October 5, 1967, a verified Complaint for
"Cancellation of Authority to Sell and Rescission and Annulment of Deed of
Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" (Civil Case No. 5762,
hereinafter called the Rescission Case) in the Court of First Instance of
Davao (raffled to Branch III), against the Angliongto spouses, Administrator
Gaudencio A. Corias, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, Atty. Regalado C. Salvador,
Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, 16 the latter two having refused to join
as plaintiffs. Petitioners contended inter alia that despite all their efforts to
block the sale "the Administrator taking advantage of the name and
influence of the presiding Judge" succeeded in inducing Angliongto to
purchase the lot at a price allegedly much higher than the reported P12.00
per square meter; that the sale contained an impossible condition which
was the ejectment of the tenants before a certain date; that there was
connivance between the Administrator and the vendee with the knowledge
of the Judge and Atty. Regalado Salvador; and that they had suffered actual
and moral damages by reason of the sale. They also prayed that since the
vendees had entered the lot and destroyed improvements thereon, that
they be enjoined from doing so. Attached to the Complaint was a
letter 17 addressed to the surviving spouse, Filomena G. Pizarro, from Atty.
Raul Tolentino to the effect that the sum of P58,728.00 issued by Alfonso
Angliongto in favor of the estate and which was deposited by virtue of a
Court Order had been dishonored by the Bank because of a stop-payment
order of Angliongto.
All the defendants except Judge Bullecer and Atty. Corias who filed a Motion
to Dismiss, presented their respective Answers. Eventually, however, they
all adopted the same Motion predicated mainly on plaintiffs' lack of legal
capacity to sue and lack of cause of action. 18 In addition, the Angliongtos
pleaded res judicata, the sale having been approved by the Court as far
back as February 20, 1967 and the final deed on July 6, 1967, and the
corresponding title issued in the name of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10,
1967. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition 19 as well as a supplemental
Opposition. 20
On October 17, 1967, Judge Alfredo I. Gonzales, as Executive Judge, issued
an Order enjoining the Angliongtos, their agents, laborers, representatives,
from further cutting and destroying coconuts, other fruits and
improvements on the property pending the final termination of the action or

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 13

until a contrary order is issued by the Court, upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P25,000.00. 21
On April 10, 1968, the trial Court (respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes
presiding) dismissed the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) on the
ground that it could not review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the
Court besides the fact that a Motion for Reconsideration was still pending
resolution before the Probate Court. 22Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration
of the dismissal Order was denied on October 10, 1968.
While the Rescission Case was pending, the Angliongtos filed Civil Case No.
5849 for Damages (the Angliongtos Case) against the heirs.
On November 25, 1968, petitioners elevated their cause to the Court of
Appeals on "Certiorari and mandamus with Prohibition and Injunction,"
charging that respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case and prayed that he be required
to take cognizance thereof and that the Angliongtos be enjoined from
exercising rights of ownership over the property.
On February 11, 1970, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition opining
that the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, did not abuse its
discretion in approving the sale in the Intestate Case (Sp. Proc. No. 1421),
and even granting that it did, the proper remedy was appeal not Certiorari;
that the Court of First Instance, Branch III, neither abused its discretion in
dismissing the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) as that case sought to
review the actuations of a coordinate Branch which is beyond its judicial
competence; and that since said dismissal was final, the proper remedy was
appeal. It also observed that copies of the Orders sought to be reviewed
were not certified true copies and, therefore, violative of Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
The present Petition before us seeks a reversal of the aforestated findings
of the Appellate Court anchored on the principal contentions that the sale of
the Agdao property should be rescinded for failure of the vendees to pay
the purchase price, and that actually no review of the actuations of a coequal Branch of the Court is being sought. We gave due course to the
Petition on June 8, 1970.

In a Manifestation filed by petitioners on March 29, 1976, 23 they disclosed

that the Angliongtos had mortgaged the Agdao property to the
Development Bank of the Philippines in Davao City, in violation of the
injunctive Order of the lower Court, and after redeeming the same caused
the property to be subdivided into three lots and titled in their names.
Subsequently, they allegedly sold the biggest portion containing 11,500 sq.
ms. to Yu Cho Khai and Cristina Sy Yu for P250,000.00 on October 25,
1975. Title to said portion has been allegedly transferred in favor of said
vendees.
The primary point, tendered for resolution is the correctness of the ruling of
the Court of Appeals upholding the opinion of the trial Court that the latter
was devoid of authority to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of
the Court. Secondarily, the propriety of the extra-ordinary remedy of
certiorari despite the existence of the remedy of appeal is also in issue.
Certiorari should lie.
While an Order of dismissal is, indeed, final and appealable as it puts an
end to litigation and leaves nothing more to be done on the merits in the
lower Court, 24 so that certiorari is ordinarily unavailable, that general rule
allows of exceptions, namely, when appeal is inadequate and ineffectual or
when the broader interest of justice so requires. 25 In this case, appeal
would not have afforded the heirs an effective and speedy recourse. It
would have entailed a protracted litigation and in the interim, the heirs
stood to suffer as a consequence of the approval of the sale. The prompt
stoppage of that sale was vital to them. Thusly, appeal not being speedy
enough to bring about the desired objective and to be of any utility to the
heirs, their availment of certiorari must be held to have been proper.
We come now to the question of correctness of the Order of dismissal of the
trial Court which the Appellate Tribunal had upheld. As a strict legal
proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had to be reviewed. There is
no judicial interference to speak of by one Court in the actuations of
another co-equal Court. The Order authorizing the sale was issued on
February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court gave its stamp of
approval to the final sale. Title was issued in favor of the vendees on July
10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore, that sale had been
consummated; the Order approving the sale, final.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 14

But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to
rescind the sale mainly for failure of the vendees to pay the full
consideration thereof, 26 which is a valid ground for rescission. That cause
of action was within the judicial competence and authority of the trial Court
(Branch III) as a Court of First Instance with exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil cases the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. It was beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court
(Branch IV) whose main province was the settlement of the estate. As a
matter of fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court
itself had stated that petitioners' cause of action was not within its authority
to resolve but should be filed with the competent Court. The cause of action
in one is different from that obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial
Court, therefore, to have taken cognizance of and to have heard the
Rescission Case on the merits and it was reversible error for the Court of
Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.

Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,

represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision 1 dated July 18, 2003
of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution 2 dated November 13, 2003
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
65630.3
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with
nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria,
Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died
leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered
by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731,
000732, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.

In so far as the non-presentation of a certified true copy of the Order of

April 10, 1968, sought to be reviewed, its concerned, there seems to have
been substantial compliance with section 1, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court
since the copy of the Order submitted is a duplicate copy of the original and
bears the seal of the Trial Court. Lawyers should bear in mind, however,
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria)
that a faithful compliance with the Rules is still the better practice.
represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding
incumbent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, is (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo
hereby ordered to take cognizance of and hear and decide Civil Case No. Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Glorias
5762 as expeditiously as possible.
brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161220

July 30, 2008

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO

substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and
Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C.
BENATIRO
and
ROSIE
M.
BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian,

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their
respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties
had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date
issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo
Cuyos and including the undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona
Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos
Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a nominal bond
of P1,000.00.6

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 15

Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that
when the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent
Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together with their respective
counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Franciscos counsel, manifested that
the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that
both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo
(Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement
of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the
court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty.
Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30 days from
December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that
he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause
their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to
arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria,
Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return of the service,
these three heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses;
that since some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu,
they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.

the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000.00) each.
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted
from their respective share of P4,000.00.9
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of
the heirs, informed all those present in the conference of her desire to buy
the properties of the estate, to which everybody present agreed, and
considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the
submission of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that
she be given enough time to make some consultations on what was already
agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976
that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the
information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed
upon, provided she be given the sum of P5,570.00 as her share of the
estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order
to defray their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioners Report, the CFI issued the assailed
Order10 dated December 16, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the
time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering the
properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as having
been properly and duly accounted for.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the
administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also
one of the heirs as having been properly and duly accounted for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an
accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been
withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to
first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 subject to the condition that should
any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the properties of the estate,

WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to
be in order, the same being not contrary to law, said compromise
agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby
approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed
of sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos
Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum of P36,000.00. The said sum
of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and
administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the
remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the
heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum
of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs
present during the conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos
(Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 16

the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was

already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the
early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale13 over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the
late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum
of P36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique
Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents),
allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729,
000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late
mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos.,
namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 2014134, were issued in Columbas name; and that later on, Original
Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in
favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently
transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M.
Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and
Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued;
that they subsequently discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25,
1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the
Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction.14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at
the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.15

that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their
share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an
affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no
meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the
estate of their parents and that they never received any payment from the
supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in
close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by
the Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the
probate court; that since the report was a falsity, any order proceeding
therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor
of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which
issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the
consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the
remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the
administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not
yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the
appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received
their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners
in manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of
their right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing
that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered
the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was
preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate
proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this
was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for
annulment within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have
been in possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the
same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate
proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed
order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having
received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents
were estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it
had already attained the status of finality.

On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation 16 of the
other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, 17 and
Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated
December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated the dispositive portion of which reads:
December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no effect, the same being
based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular;

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 17

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by the Court of First Instance of
Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title
issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent transfer
of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is
hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued. 18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established
was the veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioners Report, which was
used by the trial court as its basis for issuing the assailed Order. The CA
held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the concerned
parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario
since in their separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the
decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened
among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of
Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an
official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference
was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioners Report never
mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in the alleged
conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the names
of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more
important, than the names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also
failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the
attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as
regards the agreed mechanisms for the estates settlement; (3) there was
lack or absence of physical evidence attached to the report indicating that
the respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled
conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the
respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did
not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report
was given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco
Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs
of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyers authority to compromise cannot be
simply presumed, since what was required was the special authority to
compromise on behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement entered

into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and

has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being a void compromise
agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein
petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the
properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise
agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void
and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum
of P36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the sale, except for
the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he received his share of
the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he received; that
even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance
with the trial courts order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale
covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro
after the payment to the administratrix of the sum of P36,000.00; that said
sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and
administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the
remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the
heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even
furnished the trial court nor was said money placed under custodia legis as
agreed upon; that the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the
Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated
and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of
Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the
parcels of land, which included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax Declarations
and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted
with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise
agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners
through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership over the
properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of
the respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant in
this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the
opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by
petitioners to assert their claim.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 18

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was
a proper remedy where the aggrieved party had other appropriate
remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed
to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it
annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an
official act which enjoys a strong presumption of regularity - based merely
on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case,
extrinsic fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower
court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation
that they were in possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed
by the heirs of Lope Cuyos 21 and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares22 on
February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits,
the affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending
the case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate
properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had
already received their share of the purchase price. Another heir, respondent
Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an Affidavit 23 dated December
13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she
had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In
addition, Numeriano had issued a certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which
was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already
received P4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be the reason why
he refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of
Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in
annulling the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved the
Commissioners Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement
entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.

The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character 25 and

will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by
final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for
recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court
of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment
of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial
of due process as additional .ground therefor.26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the
fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when
there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him
by the prevailing party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to
the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December
16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the
heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for
lack of due process.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 19

Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the

agreement of the heirs and to prepare the project of partition for
submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty.
Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his
Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance
of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place,
where the subject properties were located for settlement, by sending them
subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference
scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the
nine heirs, only six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly
found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only
those heirs who failed to attend the conference, namely: respondents
Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return
of service, could not be located in their respective given addresses.

It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to
arrive at a compromise agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus,
it was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and
be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests.
Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed
among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that
the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the
heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in
the Report.

However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the
alleged subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in
the scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in
the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had
executed an affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that
she was not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of
any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on December
17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance31 regarding this case, it was
only for the reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by
their late sister Columba, and that she had already received her
corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the
affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a
meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement 32 that
there was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneos holding of a
conference with the heirs was doubtful.

While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by

an officer in connection with the performance of an official act in the line of
his duty was legally done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence
to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as
absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of
the signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence
of evidence showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to be
competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.

Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened
for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties,
since they were not even required to sign anything to show their
attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report,
which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the
signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity
thereto.

Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and
a disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules
on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.

Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the

conference was not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of
the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification 33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the
Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to
show that copies of the Commissioners Report were sent to all the heirs,
except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as
enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the
accompanying registry receipts. 34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed
constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and
partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein,
when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published,
we held:

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 20

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte

proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do
not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will
not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent
out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is
agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition), and not after such an agreement has already been
executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication
of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to
the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this
connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never
signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following
Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the
partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as
they are concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether
the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was
arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified
of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were
called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved
the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing
conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement
therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus,
effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's
action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find
that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all the parties in the
intestate estate proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by

respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty.

Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case
amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in
the Order dated January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his
interest in the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who
retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal
representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and
creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the
assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's
Report, the parties lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on
December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification 37 dated August 7, 2003 of
the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered
notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of
notices of orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon
receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the respondents could have
taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for reconsideration, a
motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time,
but they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioners Report was
received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and
Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be
seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was
Glorias counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration,
while Atty. Yray was Franciscos lawyer when he filed his opposition to the
petition for letters of administration and his Motion to Order administrarix
Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the
other heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice
of the judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in
February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering
the parcels of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona
Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in
Columbas name, and Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently
issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or
other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due
process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
or of any obligation.38

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 21

In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void

judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the
petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned
decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to
have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void
decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative
judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System
vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of
the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create
rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to
those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment
are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there
were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same
position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final
and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a
lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally
or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by
laches.41Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving
it must be declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from
assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on
ground of laches and estoppel.

Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for

annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four
years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is
barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.42
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate
fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or
the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would
result.44
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in
February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001.
Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the paramount
consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an
action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. 45
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal
and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of
law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in
favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles
pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab
initio. No reversible error was thus committed by the CA in annulling the
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18,
2003 and Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of
Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No.
24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 22

No costs.

2. A parcel of land (Lot 1896), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan, with
the area of 2,123 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot 1898-C; on the
SE by Lot 1897; on the SW by New Provincial Road; and on the NW by Lot
1893, covered by OCT No. (24101) RO-1570, under ARP/TD No. 01087 &
01088 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of P6,910.00;
and

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168692

December 13, 2010

FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted by LUCRESIA TAYCO and NOEL

TAYCO, Petitioners,
vs.
Heirs Of Concepcion Tayco-Flores, namely: LUCELI F. DIAZ, RONELE
F. BESA, MONELE FLORES, PERLA FLORES, RUPERTO FLORES,
WENCESLAO
FLORES,
PURISIMA
FLORES,
and
FELIPE
FLORES,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals'
Decision2 dated November 17, 2004 and the reinstatement of the Regional
Trial Court's Decision3 dated October 2, 2001.
The records contain the following facts:
Upon the death of the spouses Fortunato Tayco and Diega Regalado, their
children, petitioner Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and
Consolacion Tayco inherited the following parcels of land:
1. A parcel of land (Lot 1902pt.), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan
with the area of 9,938 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lots 1848 &
1905; on the SE by Lots 1903 & 1904; on the NW by Lots 1895, 1887,
1890 and 1808, covered by OCT No. (24360) RO-1569 under ARP/TD No.
01025 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of P15,210.00;

3. A parcel of land (Lot 2960), situated at Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, with the
area of 4,012 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot 2957-J; on the SE
by Lot 2961-H; on the SW by Lot 2660; and on the NW by Lot 2656,
covered by OCT No. (23813) RO-1563, under ARP/TD No. 01782 in the
name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of P4,820.00.4
Sometime in September of 1972, petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister
Consolacion Tayco executed a document called Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation
of Sale of Shares,5 transferring their shares on the abovementioned
properties to their sister Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was
notarized and, on March 16, 1991, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and
Consolacion Tayco executed the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in
Three (3) Parcels of Land.6
Consolacion Tayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-Flores
died on January 14, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed a case
for nullity of documents and partition with damages with the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan claiming that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares and the
Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land are null and
void; thus, he is still entitled to his original shares in the parcels of land.
According to him, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was executed at that
time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in need of money and wanted
the properties to be mortgaged in a bank. He claimed that the mortgage did
not push through and that he requested his sister to cancel the said Deed,
to which the latter ensured that the same document had no effect.
However, he further claimed that without his knowledge and consent, her
sisters Concepcion and Consolacion executed another document entitled
Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in order to
have the tax declarations and certificates of title covering those three
parcels of land transferred in the name of Concepcion. He also alleged that
he came to know of the said facts only when he had the property surveyed

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 23

for the purpose of partition and some of the heirs of Concepcion objected to
the said survey.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Francisco Tayco, the dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in
favor of the plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring the document entitled, Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares (Annex
A, Complaint), and the document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of
Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land (Annex B, Complaint), as null and void;
b) Declaring the three (3) parcels of land subject of the above documents
to be co-owned by the plaintiff ( share) and defendants ( share);
c) Ordering the parties to submit to the court a Project of Partition
indicating the specific portion allotted to them within 30 days from receipt
of this decision; in case of disagreement, the Court shall order the sale of
all the three (3) parcels with the proceeds to be divided equally between
plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other;

The respondent-heirs appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of

Appeals, and on November 17, 2004, the latter reversed the former's
ruling, disposing it in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us REVERSING the assailed decision of the lower court and a
new one entered declaring defendants-appellants absolute owners of Lot
Nos. 1902, 1896 and 2620. The complaint of plaintiff-appellee is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.8
In reversing the trial court's findings, the CA reasoned out that the
genuineness and due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement was not
disputed and was duly signed by the parties and notarized. It added that
the recital of the provisions of the said document is clear that it is an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of deceased Diega Regalado and that
petitioner and his sister Consolacion confirmed the sale of their shares to
Concepcion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 but was denied10 by the same
court. Thus, the present petition.
The petitioner raised this lone issue:

d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00

representing litigation expenses, and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
cost.
e) The claim for moral and exemplary damages are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.7
In ruling that the assailed documents were null and void, the RTC
ratiocinated that the extrajudicial settlement is a simulated document to
make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the owner of the
properties, so that it would be easy for her to use the same as a collateral
for a prospective loan and as evidence disclosed that the intended loan with
any financial institution did not materialize, hence, the document had no
more effect. Consequently, according to the trial court, since the first
document was simulated and had no force and effect, the second document
had no more purpose and basis.

CAN THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE

DECEASED DIEGA REGALADO WITH CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF SHARES
DIVEST CO-HEIR AND CO-OWNER FRANCISCO TAYCO OF HIS SHARES IN
THE THREE (3) PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION? 11
Under question is the validity of the document that contains the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, Diega Regalado. The
trial court ruled that it is null and void based on its assessment of the facts,
while the CA adjudged it valid based on its examination of the said
document. Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari
before the Supreme Court, it is clearly enunciated that only questions of
law may be set forth. 12 Questions of fact may not be raised unless the case
falls under any of the following exceptions:13
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 24

or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
This case clearly falls under one of the exceptions and after a careful review
of the facts of the case, this Court finds the petition meritorious.

ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in
the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision
among (his) co-heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced
by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property
regardless of the form it takes. x x x15
The trial court, after a keen determination of the facts involved in the case,
clearly articulated its findings as to the inconclusiveness of the required
publication and the notarization of the document purportedly containing the
extrajudicial settlement in question, thus:

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action for partition. x x
x.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall
be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof.
xxxx
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of
making it a public document 14 that can bind third parties. However, this
formal requirement appears to be superseded by the substantive provision
of the Civil Code that states:

At the outset, the document, Exhibit A, was executed at Lezo, Aklan which
is about ten kilometers from Kalibo where all the parties are residents.
Defendant had to hire a tricycle from Kalibo to bring the parties to Lezo.
Assuming that a certain Engr. Reynaldo Lopez was helping the defendants
at that time in this transaction, he is also a resident of Kalibo, Aklan which
is the center of Aklan where almost all the lawyers have their offices. Engr.
Lopez has also his office here. Why would he still recommend the execution
of this document particularly in Lezo and before that particular alleged
Notary Public? This sounds incredible.
Defendants alleged that the document was published in a newspaper of
general circulation of Aklan but no affidavit of such publication was
presented. Only an alleged receipt from Engr. Lopez was presented (Exh. 2)
but does not prove its purpose.16
The above findings of fact of the trial court must be accorded respect. It is
a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and
valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court
to analyze and weigh evidence by the parties all over again. 17

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 25

Anent the true intent of the signatories of the questioned document

appearing to be an extrajudicial settlement of an estate, the trial court
found the following facts:
Plaintiff alleged that Exhibit A was executed just to accommodate his sister
Concepcion Tayco to be able to offer as collateral the property in order to
raise money for the marriage of her son Ruperto Flores. But the property
was never encumbered because it was then Martial Law (TSN, 10/14/98,
pp. 3-4; 5/6/99, pp. 5-6). This testimony of the plaintiff was never rebutted
or denied by the defendant, Ruperto Flores, who himself testified for the
defendants. In fact, he even admitted that he got married after the
execution of Exhibit A (TSN, 2/16/01, pp. 15-16). This allegation by the
plaintiff, therefore, must stand.
Defendants argue that if their intention was to mortgage the property in
raising money, there was no need for the execution of Exhibit A but only a
Special Power of Attorney would suffice. This would be the quickest way if
the bank would be amenable, but the latter would be more protected if the
title of the property are already transferred in the name of the mortgagor.
For them, it has only to rely on the certificate of tile if it decides to deal with
it.18
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine
that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered
into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was
doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise
investment.19 However, in the construction or interpretation of an
instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be
pursued.20 If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control.21 If the contract appears to be contrary to the evident
intentions of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.22 The
denomination given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the
nature of the contents. 23 In this particular case, the trial court, based on its
appreciation of the pieces of evidence presented, rightfully concluded that
the intent of the signatories was contrary to the questioned document's
content and denomination.1avvphi1
Furthermore, the trial court, before stating its final conclusion as to the
nullity of the document in question, correctly discussed the lack of
consideration in so far as that part of the document which embodies the

confirmation of the sale of shares of siblings Francisco and Consolacion to

Concepcion. Thus:
The consideration of P50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq. meters real
property in Kalibo, Aklan even way back in 1972 is definitely way below the
market value. Even if we take into consideration the filial love between
siblings (Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 233), still, the difference between the
market value then and the purchase price is very great. Even for a market
value of P1,000.00, a consideration of P50.00 only plus filial love would still
be greatly disproportionate. Certainly, the 1/3 share of plaintiff
exceeds P1,000.00. The filial love between siblings may affect the
discrepancy only if the difference between the market value over
the selling price is slight. (ibid.). It would appear, therefore, that Exhibit
A is merely a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion TaycoFlores is the owner of the properties so that it will be easy for her to use
the same as collateral for a prospective loan. Should the encumbrance not
materialize or if it did after the obligation thereunder has been paid, the
document shall become null and void and without effect. As the evidence
disclosed that the intended loan with any financial institution did not
materialize, hence, immediately thereafter, the document had no more
effect.24
As to the other questioned document or the Confirmation of Quitclaim of
Shares in Three Parcels of Land, the nullity of the first document renders it
void because its effectivity is anchored on the validity of the first document.
The Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three Parcels of Land came into
fruition merely to confirm the existence of the first document. It was
executed on March 16, 1991, when petitioner Francisco Tayco was still
alive. Nevertheless, the said document was signed only by Consolacion and
Concepcion, which prompted the trial court to make the following
observations:
As to Exhibit B, it is surprising why only the two sisters participated in its
execution while the plaintiff who is still very much alive and also a resident
of New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan was excluded. This document is a
confirmation of the execution of Exhibit A where the plaintiff is a party. The
plaintiff would have also been made a party to this document so that he
could have confirmed the sale of his share had it been so. Could it be,
therefore, that defendants did not want the plaintiff to know this document
so that they can obtain the transfer of the titles and the tax declarations in
their names without his knowledge? Unfortunately, however, plaintiff

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 26

accidentally discovered the transfer when he tried to survey the property

for ultimate partition.25
To reiterate, in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, this
Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it
does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented
by the contending parties during the trial of the case. 26 The CA, therefore,
erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court without providing
any substantial evidence to support its own findings.

G.R. No. 171717

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated November 17, 2004
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of
Kalibo,
Aklan,
Branch
9,
dated
October
2,
2001,
is UPHELD and REINSTATED.

RAMON
B.
BRITO,
SR., Petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO D. DIANALA, VIOLETA DIANALA SALES, JOVITA DIANALA
DEQUINTO, ROSITA DIANALA, CONCHITA DIANALA and JOEL
DEQUINTO, Respondents.

SO ORDERED.

DECISION

December 15, 2010

PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and
set aside the Decision1 dated January 12, 2005 and Resolution 2 dated
February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70009.
The assailed Decision set aside the Joint Orders 3 dated June 29, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, Cadiz City,
while the questioned Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba,
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The said tract of land is a portion of Lot No.
1536-B, formerly known as Lot No. 591-B, originally owned by a certain
Esteban Dichimo and his wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of whom are already
deceased.
On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her husband,
Ramon Brito, Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo,
Edito Dichimo, Maria Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her husband,
Angelino Mission, Leonora Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 27

Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Fausto

Dolleno, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros
Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 12887.
Petitioner's wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged
that they are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria,
Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one
Eusebio Dichimo; that Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban
and Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon their death
Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that,
in turn, Vicente and Eusebio, and their respective spouses, also died
intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the
inheritance of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention
claiming that prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a
certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and Francisca bore five children,
all of whom are already deceased; that herein respondents are the heirs of
Esteban and Francisca's children; that they are in open, actual, public and
uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30
years; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of
petitioner and his co-heirs; that, in fact, petitioner and his co-heirs have
already disposed of their shares in the said property a long time ago.
On November 26, 1986, the trial court issued an Order dismissing without
prejudice respondents' Answer-in-Intervention for their failure to secure the
services of a counsel despite ample opportunity given them.
Civil Case No. 12887 then went to trial.
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a
Compromise Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose
Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely: Margarita,
Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the said
agreement that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot to
the mother of Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 45 rendered a decision approving the said
Compromise Agreement.

Thereafter, TCT No. T-12561 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cadiz
City in the name of Margarita, Bienvenido and Francisco.
On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another
Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages, this time against
herein respondents. The case, filed with the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60,
was docketed as Civil Case No. 548-C. Herein respondents, on the other
hand, filed with the same court, on August 18, 1999, a Complaint for
Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner and his co-heirs. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 588-C.
The parties filed their respective Motions to Dismiss. Thereafter, the cases
were consolidated.
On June 29, 2000, the RTC issued Joint Orders, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders the
following:
1. The Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 548-C is hereby GRANTED and Civil
Case No. 548[-C] is hereby ordered DISMISSED for violation of the rule on
forum shopping;
2. The Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 588-C is likewise hereby GRANTED
and the Complaint dated August 13, 1999 is hereby DISMISSED for want of
jurisdiction.
3. All counterclaims in both cases, Civil Case No. 548-C and 588-C are
likewise ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but both were
denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
Herein respondents then appealed the case to the CA praying that the
portion of the RTC Joint Orders dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C be declared
null and void and that the case be decided on the merits.
On January 12, 2005, the CA rendered judgment disposing as follows:

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered by us GRANTING the appeal filed in this case and SETTING
ASIDE, as we hereby set aside, the Joint Order[s] dated June 29, 2000 of
the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60, dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C. Further,
let the entire records of this case be remanded to the court a quo for the
trial and hearing on the merits of Civil Case No. 588-C.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a
Resolution dated February 13, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition with the following assigned errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE RECONVEYANCE
CASE OF THE HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 60, CADIZ CITY.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
AMENDMENT OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 12887 IS NOT
TANTAMOUNT TO ANNULMENT OF THE SAID DECISION. THE HONORABLE
COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE. 6
In his first assigned error, petitioner claims that the CA erred in holding that
respondents are not parties in Civil Case No. 12887 contending that, since
their Answer-in-Intervention was admitted, respondents should be
considered parties in the said case. Petitioner also avers that, being parties
in Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are bound by the judgment rendered
therein.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court.7 In the present case, when respondents filed their Answer-inIntervention they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Respondents,

thus, became parties to the action. Subsequently, however, respondents'

Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed without prejudice. From then on,
they ceased to be parties in the case so much so that they did not have the
opportunity to present evidence to support their claims, much less
participate in the compromise agreement entered into by and between
herein petitioner and his co-heirs on one hand and the defendant in Civil
Case No. 12887 on the other. Stated differently, when their Answer-inIntervention was dismissed, herein respondents lost their standing in court
and, consequently, became strangers to Civil Case No. 12887. It is basic
that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the
court.8 Thus, being strangers to Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are not
bound by the judgment rendered therein.
Neither does the Court concur with petitioner's argument that respondents
are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for reconveyance
only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly
committed by petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an
action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in
four years, which period is reckoned from the discovery of the fraud.
In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that
petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud.
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of
which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property.9 Thus, in Caro v. Court of
Appeals,10 this Court held as follows:
x x x The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L33261, September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396, illuminated what used to be a
gray area on the prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to
real property and, corollarily, its point of reference:
x x x It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the
effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190) governed prescription. It provided:

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 29

SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the
recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods
after the right of action accrues:
xxx

xxx

xxx

3. Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the
right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery of the fraud;
xxx

xxx

xxx

In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.

1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that article

1144 and article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in
the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then
resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action
for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his
legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without
prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of
registration on the original petition or application, x x x.
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil
Code, x x x
xxxx

Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx

xxx

x x x (Italics supplied.)

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must

perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of
this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of
the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is
Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a
reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained
by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the
fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No.
190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30,

The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the
property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section
53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the
Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive
period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten
(10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title.
x x x11
In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by petitioner and his coheirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint for
reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year
prescriptive period has not yet expired.
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioner's contention that
respondents are guilty of laches and are already estopped from questioning
the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 on the ground that they
slept on their rights and allowed the said decision to become final.
In the first place, respondents cannot be faulted for not appealing the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 simply because they are no

SPECPRO| RULE 74| 30

longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to assail the
said judgment.
Secondly, respondents' act of filing their action for reconveyance within the
ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an unreasonable delay in
asserting their right. The Court has ruled that, unless reasons of inequitable
proportions are adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is
sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar
relief.12 Laches is recourse in equity.13 Equity, however, is applied only in the
absence, never in contravention, of statutory law.14
Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession
thereof.15 Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property,
prescription does not commence to run against him. 16 Thus, when an action
for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. 17 The reason for this is
that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule
being, that his undisturbed possession provides him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right
can be claimed only by the one who is in possession. 18
In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession
of the subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his coheirs filed a separate action against respondents for recovery of possession
thereof. Thus, owing to respondents' possession of the disputed property, it
follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As
such, with more reason should respondents not be held guilty of laches as
the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set up to resist the
enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.
In his second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the objective of
respondents in filing Civil Case No. 588-C with the RTC of Cadiz City was to

have the decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 12887
amended, which is tantamount to having the same annulled. Petitioner
avers that the RTC of Cadiz City has no jurisdiction to act on Civil Case No.
588-C, because it cannot annul the decision of the RTC of Bacolod City
which is a co-equal court.
The Court does not agree.
The action filed by respondents with the RTC of Cadiz City is for
reconveyance and damages.1awphi1 They are not seeking the amendment
nor the annulment of the Decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in Civil Case
No. 12887. They are simply after the recovery of what they claim as their
rightful share in the subject lot as heirs of Esteban Dichimo.
As earlier discussed, respondents' Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed by
the RTC of Bacolod City without prejudice. This leaves them with no other
option but to institute a separate action for the protection and enforcement
of their rights and interests. It will be the height of inequity to declare
herein petitioner and his co-heirs as exclusive owners of the disputed lot
without giving respondents the opportunity to prove their claims that they
have legal interest over the subject parcel of land, that it forms part of the
estate of their deceased predecessor and that they are in open, and
uninterrupted possession of the same for more than 30 years. Much more,
it would be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.19
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
January 12, 2005 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70009 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.