Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A
ABANDONMENT
For abandonment to occur, the tenant must have unequivocally and absolutely
relinquished his occupation and cultivation of the lots. This is not so in this case.
Petitioner continued to occupy Lot No. 2679 for residential and small backyard farming
purposes, despite the fact that the eruption of Mr. Pinatubo made it impossible for him to
continue with its cultivation. Moreover, under Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of
1983, the alleged abandonment of the land by the tenant does not automatically terminate
the tenancy relationship as there must be a proper court declaration of such fact. In this
case, such court declaration of abandonment is wanting.
GRACIANO PALELE
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS
SOBREVIAS
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. No. 138289
AND
TOMAS
ABANDONMENT; Requisites:
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to
desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or
carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent
of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been
abandoned.
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versus-
ACQUISITION; Mode of
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land:
compulsory and voluntary.
STA.
ROSA
REALTY
CORPORATION
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526
DEVELOPMENT
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his
administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the
offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the LBP pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowners accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution
of the deed of transfer, the LBP pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner
rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner,
the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just
compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the
DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just
compensation.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526
In the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals we observed that an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applied only when the
plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the
defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in
actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for
the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid
of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 3, 1997
G.R. No. 108547
ACTION; Nature of
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of
the action.
RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE
-versusMARCELO ANDRES AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS
Promulgated: November 20, 2001
G.R. No. 122276
ACTION; Party not impleaded not bound by the decision rendered therein
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 485 (1990), a person who
was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein,
for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then
of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or
whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to pay for it.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
-versusIAC & BENEDICTO HORCA, SR.
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
PHILIPPINES
and
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: October 6, 1995
G.R. Nos. 118712 & 118745
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only
respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken that administrative actions
are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law
for each agency. In this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and
central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy
between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded
Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in
sustaining DARAB's unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in
lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA and RESTITUTO
RIVERA
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 6, 2002
G.R. No. 132048
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud,
collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of a
department head, in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of
substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative decisions are
entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with.
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
-versusADJUTO ABILLE
Promulgated: February 26, 2001
G.R. No. 130196
Note: The doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court.
HILDA RALLA ALMINE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 80719
AGENT; Personality
Erilla as an agent of the landowner(s) was not an independent personality who could
provide insulation for the landowners from their obligations to private respondents as
tenants or agricultural lessees. To hold that the landowner(s) did not give their consent
because private respondents had been hired or give their consent because private
respondents had been hired not give their consent because private respondents had been
hired or retained by the overseer, would be to provide the landowner(s) with too easy an
escape from the thrust of agrarian reform laws by the simple expedient of hiring an
employee or overseer to stand between the landowner(s) and the tenants or agricultural
lessees. To sustain this particular argument of petitioners would be to erode the force and
effect of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, well nigh to the vanishing point.
SPS. AMADEO AND AURORA CUAO
-versusCA, RENATO CRISTOBAL, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159
(d)
Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
RODRIGO ALMUETE AND ANA ALMUETE
-versusMARCELO ANDRES AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS
Promulgated: November 20, 2001
G.R. No. 122276
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS
Represented by his widow ARSENIA GARCIA VDA.
DE SANTOS
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 7, 2000
G.R. No. 109992
The resolution by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the parties
since it is in a better nay presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction
over this case. At any rate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of
private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismondo vs. Court of
Appeals (SCRA), the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage to the parties since it
is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency
presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings
therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be
adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.
-versusCA AND CELESTINO VILLALON
Promulgated: November 20, 1995
G.R. No. 109093
that this factual issue was never determined below. Thus, we cannot conclude that
respondent's parcels of land are residential.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
-versusAPEX INVESTMENT and FINANCING CORP.
Promulgated: April 10, 2003
G.R. No. 149422
As a preliminary point, we note that the landholding in dispute is a mango
plantation. We consider that and there appears no dispute on this point this
plantation is covered by the provisions of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, Section
166 (1) of which defines agricultural land as "land devoted to any growth,
including but no limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle lands and
abandoned lands as defined in pars. 18 and 19 of this Section, respectively". It is
worth noting also that R.A. No. 1199, the earlier statute known as "The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines", effective 30 August 1954, although
it did not expressly define agricultural land, did not limit its scope to rice land, to
the contrary, Chapter III, Section 41 of the Statute, among other provisions,
expressly recognized share tenancy in respect of crops other than rice.
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA Y CUAO
-versusRENATO CRISTOBAL, VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159
"Sec. 5.
Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold
Relations. The agricultural leasehold relation shall be
established by operation of law in accordance with Section four of
this Code and, in other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly
or impliedly."
In other words, in the case at bar, from the moment Benigno, as legal possessor (and,
therefore, an agricultural lessor) granted the cultivation and use of the landholding to
Bernas in exchange or consideration for a sharing in the harvest, an agricultural leasehold
relationship emerged between them "by operation of law.
GRACIANO BERNAS
AND
ERLINDA
APPEALS
AND
We believe and so hold that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land
reform area and subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on and after 21
October 1971 by the private respondent tenant-farmers constituted amortization payments
on the cost of the land that they were required to apply under Presidential Decree No. 27.
These payments, therefore, legally pertain to petitioners, the former landowners as part of
the compensation for the dominion over land of which they were deprived by operation
of P.D. No. 27. Those payments cannot be characterized as rentals like those which had
been paid to Helen Schon as usufructuary prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27 and
prior to the effectivity of Operation Land Transfer.
RAMON R. LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
G.R. No. 51333
Pending full payment of the cost of the land to the old landowner by the
Land Bank of the Philippines, the leasehold system was "provisionally
maintained" by the "lease rentals" paid by the tenant-farmers prior to such full
payment by the Land Bank to the old landowner, would be credited no longer as
rentals but un-amortized portion being payable by the Land Bank. In respect of
lands brought within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the leasehold
system was legally and effectively terminated immediately on 21 October 1972
(notwithstanding the curious statement in Department Circular No. 8 that it was
subjected to the terms and effects of Operation Land Transfer that the leasehold
system did continue to govern the relationship between the "landowner and his
tenant-tillers".
RAMON R. LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
G.R. No. 51333
APPEAL
The failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not
permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to
determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of
Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act as Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the
Court of Tax Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity
in its phraseology. Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a
petition for review is prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the
category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts
do not properly belong. Although Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 [13] (precursor to
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included the decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for review, its non-inclusion later
on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified as a quasi-judicial
agency.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusARLENE DE LEON AND BERNARDO DE LEON
Promulgated: September 10, 2002
G.R. No. 143275
"SEC. 7.
Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a
motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases."
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457
judgment something upon which the parties were not heard is not merely irregular, but
extrajudicial and invalid. The rule is based on the fundamental tenets of fair play and, in
the present case, the Court is properly compelled not to go beyond the issue litigated in
the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals of whether or not the petitioner, Graciano
Bernas, is an agricultural leasehold lessee by virtue of his installation as such by Benigno
Bito-on, the legal possessor of the landholdings at the time Bernas was so installed and,
consequently entitled to security of tenure on the land. Should grounds for the
dispossession of Bernas, as an agricultural leasehold lessee, subsequently arise, then and
only then can be the private respondent (landowner) initiate a separate action to
dispossess the lessee, and in that separate action, she must allege and prove compliance
with Section 36 (1) of the Code which consist of, among others, a one year advance
notice to the agricultural leasehold lessee (the land involved being less than 5 hectares)
and readiness to pay him the damages required also by the Code.
GRACIANO BERNAS
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 5, 1993
G.R. No. 85041
B
BACK RENTALS; Payment
The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leasehold rental is an issue which
is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is clearly beyond the legal competence of
the Regional Trial Court to resolve. Consequently, there is exists an agrarian dispute in
the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable y the DARAB. The failure of
petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondents
is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve.
LOPE MACHETE, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS AND
VILLALON
Promulgated: November 20, 1995
G.R. No. 109093
CELESTINO
BENEFICIARIES; Determination of
At this juncture, petitioner ought to be reminded only that the identification and selection
of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
LOLIHALA SABERON LERCANA
-versusPORFERIO JALANDONI, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 1, 2002
G.R. No. 132286
BENEFICIARIES; Qualification
SEC. 22.
Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the
absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of
priority:
(a)
(b)
regular farmworkers;
(c)
seasonal farmworkers;
(d)
other farmworkers;
(e)
(f)
(g)
AND
TOMAS
BENEFICIARY; Woman
Neither is their argument that Plaintiff-Appellee, being a woman, is not capable of
discharging the demands of farming, valid. This Board finds said argument anachronistic
with the changing times of great awareness of the potentials of women. Women today are
found manning our commerce and industry, and agriculture is no exception.
DIONISIA L. REYES
-versusRICARDO L. REYES, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 2002
G.R. No. 140164
C
CARETAKER; Construed
It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be considered the
cultivator of the land.
WENCESLAO HERNANDEZ
-versusHON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET
AL.
Promulgated: September 21, 1990
G.R. No. 74323
CARP; Limitations
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law itself provides for recognition, subject to
limitations, of existing contracts, like lease, even when the lands covered by lease, were
subjected to CARP and were transferred to owner-beneficiaries.
DAVAO ABACA PLANTATION COMPANY, INC.
-versusDOLE PHILIPPINES, INC.
Promulgated: December 1, 2000
G.R. No. 134431
CARP; Objective
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of
poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the
natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who
seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life.
The objective of the State is no less certain: "landless farmers and farmworkers will
receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move on the nation
toward sound rural development and industrialization.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET
AL.
-versusTROPICAL HOMES, INC.
Promulgated: July 31, 2001
G.R. Nos. 136827 & 136799
P.
We cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding
of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in
favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers
that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This
Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions
that are not supported by substantial evidence.
BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versusPATRICIA ARANETA
Promulgated: February 22, 2000
G.R. No. 135829
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In this proceeding only questions of law may be raised.
Petitioner's claim for damages is a factual issue which may not be entertained. The
findings of facts of the appellate court to the effect that there is no proof of actual
damages are conclusive and binding on this Court.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 21, 1990
G.R. No. 86500
CERTIORARI; Requisites
At the outset, it should be stated that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative
in accordance with centuries of both civil and common law traditions and that the grave
abuse of discretion must be shown.
CIVIL LIABILITY
Civil liability is the liability that may arise from (1) crime, (2) breach of contract or (3)
tortious act. The first is governed by the Revised Penal Code; the second and the third, by
the Civil Code.
LEONARDA L. MONSANTO
-versusJESUS and TERESITA ZERNA and CA
Promulgated: December 7, 2001
G.R. No. 142501
CLASSIFICATION; Defined
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each others
in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid,
it must conform to the following requirements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
COMMISSION; Creation of
The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is therefore
material in the disposition of this case, for which purpose the Court of Appeals
constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not
object to the creation of a team of commissioners when it very well knew that the survey
and ocular inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the
subject parcels of land. it is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The
team of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed persons who were
mutually acceptable to the parties. Thus, in the absence of any irregularity in the survey
and inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the
commissioners deserves full faith and credit and we find no reversible error in the
reliance by the appellate court upon said report.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. rep. by the DAR
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREEN CITY
ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Promulgated: October 5, 2000
G.R. No. 139592
or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned the measures before us.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the CARP. It states that the
program
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution.
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language
of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails.
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or
of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention
as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent
of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the
adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what
was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the
deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when
they ratified it.
LUZ FARMS
-versusHON. SECRETARY
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889
CO-OWNER; Effect of sale of the entire property without consent of other coowners
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting her alleged right over the
portion subject matter in the instant case on the ground that their right has been lost by
laches. In Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
"As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale (Punzalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil.
320 (1923). This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the
sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee
gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the things
owned in common. (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909). . . . For Article
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a
co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership.
COVERAGE; Notice of
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power
of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL retention limits to the landowners, there
is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with
the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of
lands they own in excess of the maximum are allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation on the use of
the land. what is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526
D
DAMAGES, Actual, burden of proof
The argument of petitioner that assuming there is no evidence of actual damages, the
Court of Appeals should have asked petitioner to present the evidences in this aspect as it
authorized to receive evidence in accordance with Section 18, P.D. No. 945 and Section
9, B.P. Blg. 129, is untenable. The burden of proof of the damages suffered is on the party
claiming the same. It is the duty of proof of the damages suffered is on present evidence
to support his claim for actual damages. If he failed to do so he has only himself to blame
if no award for actual damages is handed down.
LEONARDO SALAS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 21, 1990
G.R. No. 86500
DAR; Authority of
It is evident from the foregoing that the DAR, like most administrative agencies, is
granted with a fusion of governmental powers, in this case, a commingling of the quasijudicial and the executive. The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subject of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws have impelled this constantly growing tendency toward such delegation.
In delegating these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a duplication of
functions between agencies. Duplication results in confusion between the various
agencies upon whom these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies are
supposed to serve. It divides the agencies resources and prevents them from devoting
their energy to similarly important tasks. The intention to avoid this very situation is
evident in the various laws distinct delineation of the functions of the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional Office. Accordingly, the Court must
reject the theory of concurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter. We hold that
the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974
PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657,
shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are
qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative Order provides
the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said registration.
II.
OBJECTIVES.
A.
General
1.
Develop a data bank of potential and qualified beneficiaries of
the CARP for the effective implementation of the program.
B.
Specific
1.
Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the
CARP. (Underscoring ours.)
DARAB
Apart from granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the
Adjudication Board of the DAR), the law strives to make resolution of controversies
therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by providing not only that the Board "shall not
be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence", but also that, as explicitly stated
by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act:
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow
farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however,
that when there are two or more representatives for any individual or group, the
representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or
group before any DAR proceedings".
DARAB; Creation of
SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. There is hereby created an Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Board shall be
composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as may be designated
by the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and three (3) others to be
appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Secretary as members. A
Secretariat shall be constituted to support the Board. The Board shall assume the powers
and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive
Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. These powers and functions may be delegated to
the regional office of the Department in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Board.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974
DARAB; Jurisdiction
. . . the DAR's exclusive original jurisdiction [as set forth in Section 50 of the CARL] is
exercised through hierarchically arranged agencies, namely, the DARAB, RARAD and
PARAD. The latter who exercise "delegated authority" while the first exercises appellate
jurisdiction over resolutions, orders, decision and other dispositions of the RARAD and
the PARAD.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 12, 2001
G.R. No. 101974
Rule II, Section I of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1.
Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations. (italics supplied)
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of
the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over
the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's
petition for injunction in the first place.
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS
Represented by his widow ARSENIA GARCIA VDA.
DE SANTOS
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 7, 2000
G.R. No. 109992
Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without tenancy
relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian issue.
Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
LAGUNA
ESTATES
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 5, 2000
G.R. No. 119357
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determined and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform . . ..
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY
-versusDARAB, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 22, 1992
G.R. No. 100091
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned, . . .
IGNACIO GONZALES, ET AL.
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 18, 2001
G.R. No. 110335
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank deposited by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of
the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . ".
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an
expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the
coverage of the term "deposit". Accordingly we must adhered to the well-settled rule that
when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to any rule which
allow the opening of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16 (e) of R.A. No.
6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 5, 1996
G.R. No. 118712
DAR, represented by the
AGRARIAN REFORM
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
SECRETARY
OF
DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.
The remedy is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever
agency, local or national, is in a position to pay for it.
TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest on his landholding during the last
five preceding calendar years.
ERNESTO BUNYE
-versusLOURDES AQUINO, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 9, 2000
G.R. No. 138979
ERNESTO BUNYE
-versusLOURDES AQUINO, CITA AQUINO and
ROBERTO AQUINO
Promulgated: October 9, 2000
G.R. No. 138979
DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE
As to whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations may issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the execution of the writ of possession issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the answer is in the negative.
The doctrine is undisputed that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgment or orders of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by injunction (Investor's Finance Corp. vs. Ebarle, 163
SCRA 61 (1988). In fact, the doctrine is applied by analogy even to a body statutorily at
par with the Regional Trial Court.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293
DOCTRINE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY
A sound cannon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and
never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by
the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication.
BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. L-36378
DONATION
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
DUE PROCESS
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a consideration of the action or ruling
complained of (emphasis supplied).
LUCIA MAPA VS. DE DELA CRUZ, ET AL.
-versusADJUTO ABILLE
Promulgated: February 26, 2001
G.R. No. 130196
E
ECONOMIC FAMILY SIZE FARM; Explained
R.A. No. 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm
land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will
produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm
family's needs for food, clothing, shelter and education with possible allowance for
payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly
fluctuations in income.
The private respondent only occupied a minuscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, bananas and
corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size
farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can
not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm
family's basic needs.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
EJECTMENT; Jurisdiction
Where the answer files asserts agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties,
which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold, and even of this assertion per
se does not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, in
view of the defense asserted, the MCTC should hear and receive the evidence for the
precise purpose of determining whether or not it possesses jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, while it may said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary
Procedure in Civil Case No. 262 since Bayog's complaint for ejectment therein
suppressed the fact of an agrarian relationship between him and Magdato, it should not
have refrained from taking cognizance of Madato's answer. Although filed late, the
answer asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the
agricultural tenancy relationship between Bayog and Magdato, which is clearly
evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold issued in Magdato's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per
se did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case,
nevertheless, in view of Magdato's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received
the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over
the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed Magdato were an
agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the
ejectment case.
ALEXANDER BAYOG AND JORGE PESAYCO, JR.
-versusHON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique
and ALBERTO MAGDATO
Promulgated: July 5, 1996
G.R. No. 118691
EMANCIPATION PATENT
Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner from retaining
the area covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides:
Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform
beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. This includes cases of lands which are found to be exempted/excluded from
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of the landowner's retained area.
(emphasis supplied)
EMINENT DOMAIN
To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowner, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property
in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain
for which payment of just compensation is imperative, the taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power
but of the power of eminent domain.
EMINENT DOMAIN; Defined
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under term
also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the
price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will
come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interests on the time-honored justification, as in the cause of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.
EMINENT DOMAIN; Limitations
But for all its primary and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute
(as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction
that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in
the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2)
just compensation.
EMINENT DOMAIN; Police power, property condemned under police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose is not compensable.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the
same subject. In the case of City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, for example, where a law
required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange
for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercise was
eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public
use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or absence materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public
morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
EMINENT DOMAIN; Requisites
As held in Republic of the Philippines vs. Castellvi there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur:
1.
2.
3.
4.
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5.
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
EMINENT DOMAIN; When it can be exercised
Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms
also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the
price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will
come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
demands of the public interest on the time honored justification, as in the case of the
police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILS., INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
G.R. No. 78742
EQUITY
The application of the trial court of its equity jurisdiction is misplaced. As often held by
this Court, equity is available only in the absence of law not as its replacement. All
abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, (judicial rules of
procedure) which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions (Aguila vs. CFI of
Batangas, L-48335, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 352; Zabat vs. CA, L-36958, July 10,
1986). Moreover, a court acting without the jurisdiction cannot justify its assumption
thereof by invoking its equity jurisdiction.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 26, 1991
G.R. No. 93401
ESTOPPEL
Thus, it was held that an estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though
without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in
fact it was relied upon and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the
perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293
It has been consistently held by the court that while lack of jurisdiction
may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings
before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack
of jurisdiction.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO DINGLASAN, ET AL.
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the first place,
they never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of the
proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the DARAB, or the Court of Appeals.
Notwithstanding the presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case
to contest the adjudicator's exercise of jurisdiction. Not once did they register a hint of
protest. Neither can they claim that they were prevented from contesting its jurisdiction
during the eight years this case was under litigation.
JOSE OCA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS
Promulgated: March 7, 2002
G.R. No. 144817
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the
prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender
possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer
should oust him. There is no need for an express order to his effect to decision that in
such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the
improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of
time. Precisely, the law requires in cases where there are improvements on the land that a
special order be issued by the court, directing the removal of such improvements. It is
apparent petitioners confuse the order of demolition with the decision ordering the
eviction of the defendant.
SPS. FELIPE BUAG AND IRMA BUAG
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 25, 1999
G.R. No. 107364
It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution
of a judgment (or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5) years
from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only
by an ordinary action. Actions upon a judgment or a final order of the court must
be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues (Article
1144 (3) or within ten years counted from the time the judgment becomes final.
The agrarian court erred in not dismissing outright the motion for execution filed by
private respondents. Said Court, acting on the motion for execution had no jurisdiction to
entertain propositions outside of the scope of the agreement sought to be executed.
Further, the agreement sought to be enforced was approved by the Court on December
22, 1972, eleven (11) years and eight (8) months from the time the motion for execution
was filed on August 22, 1984. It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, execution of judgment (or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5)
years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced only by an
ordinary action. Actions upon a judgment of a final order of the court must be brought
within ten (10) years from the time the right if action accrues [(Article 1144 (3)] or within
ten (10) years counted from the time the judgment became final (see PNB v. Deloso, L28301, March 30, 170; Rosensons, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Jose Jimenez, et al., L-41225,
November 11, 1975). Furthermore, it is indubitable that the agreement sought to be
executed had already been executed by the parties. The obligations of spouses De Vera,
the original lessees, and of Roman Soriano, under the sub-lease agreement had already
been complied with. Possession and rentals under the contracts were already delivered. In
fact, at the time the motion for execution was files the sub-lease contract had already
expired. Hence, there was nothing more to execute.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, BRAULIO ABALOS and
AQUILINA ABALOS
Promulgated: June 26, 1991
G.R. No. 93401
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 229; RTC divested of their general jurisdiction to try
agrarian reform matters
However, with the enactment of E.O. No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987,
fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the Official Gazette 14/ the regional
trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The
said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.
NINA M. QUISMONDO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 95664
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 407; Said law cannot have retroactive effect
The CARL (R.A. No. 6657) was not intended to take away property without due process
of law. Nor is it intended to impair the obligation of contracts. In the same manner must
E. O. No. 407 be regarded. It was enacted two (2) months after private respondents had
legally fulfilled the condition in the contract of conditional sale by the payment of all
installments on their due dates. These laws cannot have retroactive effect unless there is
an express provision in them to that effect.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, NORMY D. CARPIO and
CARMEN ORQUISA
Promulgated: September 20, 1996
G.R. No. 118180
EXPROPRIATION
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on
this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdiction.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon
its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge,
the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation
may be employed in raising the amount.
EXPROPRIATION
UNDER
THE
LAND
REFORM
PROGRAM
DISTINGUISHED FROM ORDINARY EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING
Even if Section 17 of the CARL were applied, the market value paid by the government
in expropriating other lands in Agusan del Norte cannot be the basis for fixing the
compensation to be paid in this case since the lands are not agricultural lands. What is
more, those lands were taken by the government under ordinary expropriation
proceedings, whereas the taking of agricultural lands under the government's land reform
program is based on the combined exercise of the State's power of eminent domain and
police power. The 1973 Constitution enjoined the State to "regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and (to) equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits" (1973 Const. Art. II, Sec. 6), even as it mandated the
State "to formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil". (Id., Art. XIV, Sec. 12) Similar provisions are found
in the present Constitution, (Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. 2 and Sec. 4). Thus, to the extent that
agrarian laws limit the size of the lands which landowners may retain, they partake of the
exercise of police power. On the other hand, to the extent that they require the payment of
just compensation, they reflect the nature of the taking as an exercise of the State's power
of eminent domain.
FELIPE GALEON
-versusHON. EDELWINA PASTORAL & DAR
Promulgated: April 8, 1991
CA-G.R. No. 23168
Upon the repurchase by the vendor a retro, petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he
stepped into the shoes of the previous landholder, vendee a retro, who has instituted
respondents Sevilla as tenant-tillers thereof, for the axiom in land tenure states that
generally once a tenant, always a tenant.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
F
FINDING OF FACTS; Conclusive upon the court, exception
In Talavera v. Court of Appeals, (182 SCRA 778), we held that a factual conclusion made
by the trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum
evidence demanded by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the
appellate tribunals except for compelling reasons. In the case at bar, however, we find
with the respondent court that there was such a compelling reason. A careful examination
of the record reveals that, indeed, the trial court misappreciated the facts when it ruled
that the petitioner was a tenant of the private respondent.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
2)
3)
4)
palpable errors are committed, or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifested.
RELUCIO III
-versusMACARAIG
173 SCRA 635
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
A mortgage who has foreclosed upon the mortgaged real property of a delinquent debtor
and has purchased the same at the foreclosure sale, can be granted a writ of possession
over the property despite the fact that the premises are in the possession of a lessee
thereof and whose lease has not yet been terminated, unless the lease has been previously
registered in the Registry of Property or with prior knowledge of the mortgagee.
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusHON. FILOMENO GAPULTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41835
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293
The mortgagor shall have the right, within the year after the sale of real estate
as a result of the foreclosure of a mortgage, to redeem the property by paying
the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution, with interest thereon at
the rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs and other judicial
expenses incurred by the Bank by reason of the execution and sale and for the
custody of said property." (Republic Act No. 1300).
prior mortgage. His lien on the land is transferred to the surplus fund. And a senior
mortgagee, realizing more than the among of his debt on a foreclosure sale is regarded as
a trustee for the benefit of junior encumbrances.
CESAR SULIT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: February 17, 1997
G.R. No. 119247
I
IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of a court to modify its judgment and its
jurisdiction to enforce its judgment. The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or
alter its judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of
immutability of final judgment.
NATALIA REALTY, INC.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
J
JUDGMENT; Conclusiveness
Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the
owner of other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.
As held in Legarda vs. Savellano:
. . . It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the
solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed
organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final
and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set
the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more
than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of public policy;
and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the
organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies.
RAMON D. OCHO
-versusBERNARDINO CALOS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 22, 2000
G.R. No. 137908
It is settled that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution of a judgment
(or a final order) may be made by motion within five (5) years from the date is becomes
final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment or a final order of the court must be ordinary action. Actions,
upon a judgment or a final order of the court must be brought within ten (10) years from
the time the right of action accrues (Article 1144 (3) or within ten years counted from the
time the judgment became final.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: June 26, 1991
G.R. No. 93401
be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits
its head."
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457
of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987
Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in many instances
(Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208, 1987).
LUZ FARMS
-versusHONORABLE SECRETARY
Promulgated: December 4, 1990
G.R. No. 86889
JURISDICTION
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or
agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or
diminished by, their act or omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard the
rule, this matter being legislative in character.
An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance, as the
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the action. This kind
of defense can be invoked even for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such
us understandable as this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily determined.
JOSE OCA, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS
Promulgated: March 7, 2002
G.R. No. 144817
venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95 provides that actions involving
title to property shall be tried in the province where the property is located, in this case, Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the
time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.
ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late
NORBERTO B. MENDOZA
-versusHON. ANGELITO C. TEH, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 14, 1997
G.R. No. 122646
JURISDICTION; DAR
Having found therefore, that the instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the
said previous case for cancellation of CLTs which was decided in favor of herein
respondent, we believe and so hold that the DAR continues to have jurisdiction over the
same. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matter involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program.
CIPRIANO CENTENO, ET AL.
-versus-
IGNACIA CENTENO
Promulgated: October 13, 2000
G.R. No. 140825
JURISDICTION; DARAB
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would
be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the case at bar, the element that the parties must be "the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee", on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is
absent. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both
parties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No. 5198, by virtue of a
Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private respondents assert
ownership over Lot Nos. 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an Emancipation
Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do the records show any juridical tie or
tenurial relationship between the parties' predecessors-in-interest.
RODOLFO ARZAGA AND FRANCIS ARZAGA
-versusSALVACION
COPIAS
and
PRUDENCIO
CALANDRIA
Promulgated: March 28, 2003
G.R. No. 152404
Petitioners, in raising the issue, is in effect questioning the factual
findings of the DARAB, contrary to the doctrine that findings of facts by
administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the
courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under
their jurisdiction. It must be stressed at this point that the DARAB has the
jurisdiction on all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of agrarian
laws, including PD 27.
SPS. BENNY CALVO AND JOVITA S. CALVO
-versusSPS. BERNARDITO and ANGELINA VERGARA,
ET AL.
Section 1.
Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No.
6657, Executive Order No. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the
following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
f)
Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT),
Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Paten (EP) and
the administrative correction thereof; (underlining added)
It is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals from decisions or orders of
DAR officials other than the Secretary. It is also irrefutable that the issuance of subject
CLOAs constituted a decision of the Secretary, who issued and signed the same.
Consequently, the propriety of the recourse by private respondents to the respondent
court on a petition for certiorari, to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in
question, is beyond cavil. Under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, decisions and awards of
the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari.
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: March 25, 1999
G.R. No. 103953
JURISDICTION; Determination
What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1)
Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of
Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of
private respondent dated April 22, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby
both parties may present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal
trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant
relationship between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents
attached by private respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court but not
presented to the municipal trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence.
JAIME P. CORPIN
-versusAMOR S. VIVAR and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
Promulgated: June 19, 2000
G.R. No. 137350
R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, ?11,
the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for
determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate
jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative
law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine
in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), but such determination is subject
to challenge in the courts.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 18, 2000
G.R. No. 132767
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: September 26, 1989
G.R. No. 80719
JURISDICTION; RTC
The jurisdiction of the RTC is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question
is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the
administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the
DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on
the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 18, 2000
G. R. No. 132767
JUST COMPENSATION
Now, in the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42
insofar as they sanction executive determination of just compensation in expropriation
cases, it is imperative that any right to the immediate possession of the subject property,
accruing to respondent VISCA, must be firmly grounded on a valid compliance with
Section 2 of Rule 67, i.e., there must be a deposit with the National or Provincial
Treasurer of the value of the subject property as provisionally and promptly ascertained
and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.
JAIME T. PANES, ET AL
-versusVISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: November 27, 1996
G.R. No. 56219-20 & 56393-94
(a) For lands above fifty (50)Twenty-five percent (25%) cash the hectares,
insofar as the excess balance to be paid in government hectarage is
concerned financial instruments negotiable at anytime
(b) For lands above twenty -Thirty-percent (30%) cash, the four (24)
hectares and upbalance to be paid in government to fifty (50) hectares
financial instruments negotiable at anytime."
We disagree. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997
judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of
Garnishment ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the
manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay
in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final
judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not
compatible with such judgment.
Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the
final judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken
in conjunction with R.A. No. 6657. Since respondent bask had already given petitioner
the entire adjudged amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be
deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39.
EDGARDO SANTOS, represented by his attorney-infact ROMEO L. SANTOS
-versusLAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS DIAZ,
ROBERTO ONG and AUGUSTO AQUINO
Promulgated: September 7, 2000
G.R. No. 137431
L
LACHES; Defined
Laches has been defined as the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. Laches thus amounts to an implied waiver arising
from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them.
MARILOU RIVERA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: May 22, 1995
G.R. No. 107903
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which be exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is
an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendants
title, but only with whether or not be reason of plaintiff's long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because
to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. Laches is not
concerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals
with the fact of delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.
FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, ET AL.
-versus-
successfully challenged in that case. (LOI 474 was published though, in the Official
Gazette dated November 29, 1979.)
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
LAWS; Prospective
We categorically rule that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D. No. 27 cannot be applied
retroactively under the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect unless
otherwise provided therein.
ROSALINA BONIFACIO, ET AL.
-versusHON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 6, 1989
G.R. No. 79416
retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect (Castro v. Castro, 128 SCRA
519 (1984), Diga v. Adriano, 133 SCRA 421 (1984); Gallardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA
500 (1988); Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 (1989).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: August 9, 1991
G.R. No. L-35495
LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP
The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere congruence of facts but, being
a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be
primordial.
ANGEL CHICO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 2000
G.R. No. 134735
LEASEHOLD RIGHTS
As correctly observed by the Regional Adjudicator, to give petitioners the right to
exercise that choice would merely result in the unnecessary displacement of respondent
who, after years of labor, now has an undeniable stake on the land. given the practical
circumstances as well as the legal and equitable considerations in this case, we are in
agreement with the Court of Appeals, the DARAB, and the Regional Adjudicator that
respondent's leasehold rights deserve to be protected and maintained.
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, ET AL.
-versusSIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 137509
(2)
(3)
there is consent;
(4)
(5)
(6)
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no
tenancy relationship between the party.
REYNALDO BAJASA and ERLINDA BEJASA
-versus-
Taada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 444 (1984)) Assn. Of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc.
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 369 (1989).
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA
-versusHON. CONRADO ESTRELLA
Promulgated: September 13, 1991
G.R. No. 60269
M
MANDAMUS; When available
Under the facts, SHARP is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. For, it is essential for the
writ to issue that the plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. The legal right of the
plaintiff to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The
corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act must also be clear and
specific.
Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty
that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of
public funds is concerned. It is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to
control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body
discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or to
approve or disapprove a specific application (B.F. Homes, Inc. v. National Water
Resources Council, L-78529, Sept. 17, 1987; 154 SCRA 88). Mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes
upon him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act (Mata v. San Diego, L-30447 March 21, 1975; 63 SCRA 170).
It is settled that mandamus is not available to control discretion. The writ may issue to
compel the exercise of discretion but not the discretion itself. Mandamus itself can
require action only but not specific action where the act sought to be performed involves
the exercise of discretion.
SHARP INTERNATIONAL MARKETING
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 04, 1991
G.R. No. 93661
(b)
Petition for Review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c)
Appeal by Certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
-versusARLENE DE LEON AND BERNARDO DE LEON
Promulgated: September 10, 2002
G.R. No. 143275
FINANCE
N
NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL; Effect
The contention of petitioners (Salen) that the respondent court erred in proceeding with
the hearing of June 26, 1978 despite their absence therein due to the failure of their
counsel to inform them is untenable because normally notice to counsel is notice to
parties, and the client is bound by the negligence of his own attorney who failed to notify
him of the decision rendered in the case (Valerio v. Sec. of Agriculture & Nat. Resources,
G.R. No. L-18587, April 23, 1963, 7 SCRA 719). The client cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently (Vivero v. Santos,
52 O.G. 1424, 98 Phil. 500), although he may have the right of action against the attorney
if prejudiced by the latter's negligence.
DOMINGO SALEN AND ROSA SALEN
-versusHONORABLE PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not receive the Notice
of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latter's old address. Petitioner explained
that its personnel could not effect personal service of those notices upon respondent
because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investment and Financing Corporation
to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, that personal service could not be made,
however, there is no showing that petitioner caused the service of the notices via
registered mail as required by Section 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657. On this point, petitioner
claimed that the notices were sent "not only by registered mail but also by personal
delivery" and that there was actual receipt by respondent as shown by the signature
appearing at the bottom left-hand corner of petitioner's copies of the notices. But
petitioner could not identify the name of respondent's representative who allegedly
received the notices. In fact, petitioner admitted that the signature thereon is illegible. It is
thus safe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings. Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due process. It is
elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should be informed of
the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
-versusAPEX INVESTMENT and FINANCING CORP.
Promulgated: April 10, 2003
G.R. No. 149422
him of the decision rendered in the case (Valerio v. Santos, 52 O.G. 1424, 98 Phil. 500),
although he may have the right of action against the attorney if prejudiced by the latter's
negligence. (Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279).
DOMINGO SALEN, ET AL.
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
NOTICES; Required
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice
of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526
O
OCCUPATION BY TOLERANCE; Effect
More than one has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The situation is not much different
from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of
the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is
merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals,
where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant its undertaking to buy
the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite
demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, ** (its) continuing
possession** became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the **
(plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
P
P.D. NO. 27 CONSTITUTIONALITY
P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been
repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the
aforecited case of De Chavez v. Zobel, [24] P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and
upheld as part and parcel of the law of the land, viz.:
"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is
emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of
the land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of
petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an
express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear;
obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate
of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because
any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration
to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and
the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small
landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new
Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could
indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in
the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no
justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm
or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not
thwarting fundamental policy goals."
ROLANDO SIGRE
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES
Promulgated: August 8, 2002
G.R. Nos. 109568 and 113454
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police
power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put
otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular
class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have
been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve
the Constitutional goal.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN
THE PHILS., INC.
-versusSECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION;
Injunction
Requisites,
Purpose
and
Objective
of
BY
Injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control
of one party and place it into that of another whose titles has not clearly been established
by law.
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN ASUNCION
-versusHON. MARGARITO GERVACIO, JR. ET AL.
Promulgated: March 9, 1999
G.R. No. 115741
PUBLICATION; Indispensable
Petitioners insist that the rules are not applicable to them because they do not own more
than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were
intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they
have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Taada vs.
Tuvera.
ASSN. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHONORABLE SECRETARY OF
REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
AGRARIAN
ERFE
-versusFORTUN
36 SCRA 552
Q
QUESTION OF LAW V. QUESTION OF FACT
Two types of questions: there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.
SPS. BENNY CALVO AND JOVITA S. CALVO
-versusSPS. BERNARDITO and ANGELINA VERGARA,
ET AL.
Promulgated: December 19, 2001
R
R.A. NO. 3844; Prescriptive period
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that "an action to enforce any cause of
action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within 3 years after such cause
of action accrued." The law does not specifically require a judicial action, hence, it can be
an administrative action. Ubi les non distinquit nec nos distinquere debemos (Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish).
SPS. ROLANDO DOLORFINO & MONINA FULE
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
G.R. No. 89545
ESPERIDION TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
REDEMPTION OR PRE-EMPTION
In time, both the court of origin and the appellate court could have found for petitioner
were said courts not unduly swayed by the circumstance that petitioner presented as his
own evidence the deed of sale wherein it was stated that the land involved is not tenanted.
Such conclusion having been rejected and the identity of the landholding as well as the
fact of tenancy thereon of petitioner been established matters, there is no further
hindrance to the exercise by petitioner of the right of redemption or pre-emption extended
and granted to him by law.
VICENTE PALO-PALO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 19, 1992
G.R. No. 75584
REFERRAL; Effect
The referral of a case for preliminary determination to the MAR refers to pending
agrarian or civil cases of those pending decision or execution where the issue of actual
tenancy is raised. And even if the said issue was properly raised a case that was
terminated and duly executed cannot be reopened much less referred to such
administrative body as the MAR (now DAR) for a preliminary determination of the
relationship of the parties and a certification if the case is proper for trial in court.
GRACIANO B. VALLES, ET AL.
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
SAMAR, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 28, 1989
G.R. No. 61297
CELESTINO
RETENTION LIMITS
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII,
Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such
limits now in Section of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.
This section declares: Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, nay public or private agricultural land,
the size which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family sized farm, such
as commodity produced, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) the he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by P.D. No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder further, that original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
RETENTION LIMIT; Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 in its entirety deals with
retention limits.
As earlier stated, Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 in its entirety deals with retention limits
allowed by law to small landowners. Since the property here involved is more or less ten
(10) hectares, it is then within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) to determine whether or not the property can be subjected to agrarian reform. But
this necessitates an entirely different proceeding.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, SPS. NORMY D. CARPIO
AND CARMEN ORQUISA, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 20, 1996
G.R. No. 118180
RETENTION; Right to Retain
Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the
condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually
cultivate it upon the effectivity of the law.
"SEC. 6.
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility
as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) the he is at least fifteen (15) years of age;
and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose
lands have been covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep an area originally retained by them
thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still
own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead."
FLORENCIA PARIS
-versusDIONISIO A. ALFECHE, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 2001
G.R. No. 139083
RIGHTS OF A LESSEE
As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed about matters
affecting the land he tills, without need for him to inquire about it.
THE HEIRS OF GUILLERMO A. BATONGBACAL
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 24, 2002
G.R. No. 125063
An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with
consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the
redemption price within the prescribed period. It must be stressed however that in making
a repurchase it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his
desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to
repurchase. And the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase
price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual. As to what constitutes
reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and
respondent Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable
price and consideration.
ANICETO M. QUIO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 26, 1998
G.R. No. 118599
S
SALE; Effect on agricultural relationship
The agricultural relationship is not extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. The purchaser or transferee is simply subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Sec. 10, RA 3844).
SPOUSES ROLANDO DOLORFINO & MONINA
FULE
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 3, 1990
G.R. No. 89545
SALE; PERFECTION
A contract of sale being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.
Delivery of the thing bought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of
the contract, and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract
does not make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most in
default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise his legal remedies.
CLARA M. BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 28, 1996
G.R. No. 109410
SECURITY OF TENURE
Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on
their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the
rights of an agricultural tenant.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 128177
the expiration of the contract, a tenant of the lessor, "was" answered in the affirmative,
not so much because of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court but pursuant to
Section 3 Republic Act No. 2263. The same question was raised in Arevalo v. Benedicto,
a 1974 case (58 SCRA 186, 191) and this Court declared that the question had been
definitely resolved in favor of the tenant in Joya, et al. v. Pareja (106 Phil., 645), wherein
(it was) held that since the return by the lessee of the lease property to the lessor upon the
expiration of the lease involves a transfer of legal possession of the land, the termination,
therefore, of the lessor-lessee relationship did not even vest the tenant of the lessee of the
right to remain and continue on his cultivation of the land.
PACITA A. OLANDAY
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 71217
On both justiciable and equitable grounds, this Court as arbiter of agrarian
justice, has generally upheld the tenants' security of tenure (Primero V. Court of
Agrarian Relations and Sinforoso Quion, 101 Phil 675 (1957); Pineda v. De
Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967); Quilantang v. Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA 294
(1972) or the right of the tenant to the enjoyment and possession of his
farmholding which has been created, conferred, protected and guaranteed by the
police power of the state in compliance with the mandate of the Constitution
expressed in Article II, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution (as well as in the 1973
and 1987 Constitution).
RAYMUNDO ANCHETA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, CALIXTO BLAZA and
CANUTO DAMASO
Promulgated: August 9, 1991
G.R. No. L-35495
The new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Section 7 of R.A.
No. 3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the
agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the leasehold
relationship is established. It also entitles him to security of tenure on his
landholding. He can only be ejected by the court for cause. Time and again, this
Court has guaranteed the continuity and security of tenure of a tenant even in
cases of a mere transfer of legal possession. As elucidated in the case of
Bernanrdo vs. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA 439 (1988), security of tenure is a
legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings tantamount to deprivation of their only means
of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides
that the livelihood relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when the agricultural
leasehold relationships is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of the
Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not
terminate the tenancy relationship. The donation itself is valid.
ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Promulgated: March 31, 1992
G.R. No. 76225
The Court of Appeals opined that the Municipal Trial Court had correctly
dismissed the Oportos complaint against the Claritos on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Invoking COCOMA vs. CA, decided in 1988 by this Court, the
Appellate Tribunal ruled that under the circumstances in the case at bar . . . there
exists a tenancy relationship between the parties notwithstanding the label of
joint venture used in the written agreement. It set out its reasons as follows:
"The records of this case show sufficient evidence to support such a
conclusion. It is undisputed that the land involved in this case is a fishpond
which is considered under the law as an agricultural land (Section 166 (1), R.A.
No. 3844, as amended. Moreover, as to the fish and other fishpond products
raised, produced and harvested in the premises, the contract states that these
shall be divided in equal proportion between the contracting parties . . ..
Furthermore, having granted to the petitioners (Claritos) the use or cultivation
of their fishpond for a consideration in shares of the harvests thereof the
petitioners are considered in law as landholders (Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
1199). Lastly, since petitioners be themselves and with the aid of their
immediate family household occupied the land of the private respondents
(Oportos), converted developed the same into a fishpond, cultivated the same
by raising and maintaining the fish and other fishpond products therein, all
these with the owners consent, and the net produce or harvest from said
fishpond is, by agreement, shared equally between the parties, the petitioners
(Claritos) are undoubtedly de jure tenants on the land subject of the dispute
and therefore they are entitled to security of tenure (Section 5 (a) of R.A. No.
1199).
the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy indeed, is a
blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was
done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or
both, to insure that the Constitution would no be breached.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
-versusHON. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Promulgated: July 14, 1989
SETTLEMENT; Encourage
The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of
disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.
CELESTINA G. DE GUZMAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 7, 1996
G.R. No. 110122
COURT,
COURT,
Share of his labor in the production shall not be less than 30% of the harvest, after
deducting the expenses for harvesting and/or initial processing.
DR. JOSE TONGSON, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: November 06, 1992
G.R. No. 77104
2.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
It must be stated that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law and
construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application
is impossible or inadequate without them (National Federation of Labor vs. Bisma, 127
SCRA 419, 425 (1984). The aforequoted provision of PD 946 is clear and unambiguous.
It provides, as an exception to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the subject matters exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform among which are the classification and identification of landholdings,
the parcellary mapping in question and the issuance, recall or cancellation of CLTs.
Accordingly, it should be taken to mean exactly what is says. It is elementary rule in
statutory construction that when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says (Insular Bank of Asia and American
Employees Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 673 (1984). Where the
provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's
seeking legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition for
subtraction.
FAGEL TABIN AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION
-versusTHE HONORABLE EMILIO A. JACINTO, ET AL
Promulgated: October 28, 1991
G.R. No. 55393
Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more
strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless
the words used so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to
them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will
hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. x x x (Farnel v.
Pingree (1988), 5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer v. City of Ashville (1894), 114 N.C.,
495, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co, (1907), 209 U.S., 306)
Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strength
from later developments.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is
impressed with social function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his
property not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, the Constitution provides
under Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of social justice the State shall regulate
the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. The Constitution also ensures that the
worker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his family
an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better life
(Sections 7 & 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs. Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals,
78 SCRA 194).
PIO BALATBAT
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. L-36378
SUBROGATION
Subrogation of Land Bank to the obligation of farmer-beneficiaries for payment of price
of the land brought under land reform does not mean the Bank has to pay interest on the
acquisition price prior to the payment of said price (partly in cash and bonds) to the
landowner.
Land Bank may deduct from acquisition price the rents paid by tenant-farmer to
landowner from October 21, 1971 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
VDA. DE ORTIZ
-versusLAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
148 SCRA 685
SUCCESSION
The Respondent who is the only heir interested in succeeding his father who died, had the
right to take over as agricultural tenant in petitioner's land.
Nature of work performed by the respondent's father is that of tenant on the land.
ROBLES
-versusBATACAN
154 SCRA 644
SUGARLANDS; Covered
Sugarlands are not mentioned as among the areas neither by the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, and neither they are included in the exempted lands.
Any share tenant in sugarlands may exercise his option to change his relationships with
the landowner into the leasehold system.
Agricultural Land Reform Code should be given liberal interpretation.
DAVID
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
161 SCRA 114
T
TAKING; When it Takes Effect
The seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation, judicially
determined.
The Department of Agrarian Reform, as of August 29, 1991, when it decreed the
coverage of the landholding in question under CARL (R.A. No. 6657) had not paid or
even determined the just compensation for the taking of the landholding.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 19, 2001
G.R. No. 131216
TENANCY
The fact if sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it
is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone
who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing
or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is
only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an
industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel
of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.
Tenancy, however, is not a purely factual relationships dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements,
provided there are complied with and not contrary to law, are even more important.
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 03, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
We are not impressed with the argument that the private respondent could
both have been a mere share tenant and agricultural lessee because he has several
children who are professionals. That will not necessarily make him prosperous
himself nor does it mean he can stop making his own living. A man does not
have to depend upon his children for his livelihood even if they are well off as
long as he retains his strength and his pride to continue charting his own life and
earning his own keep. There are thousands of such proud parents who are able to
provide their children with a good education and a brighter future while
themselves remaining as humble tillers of the soil and beholden to no man for
their sustenance.
On the fixed yearly rentals of P1,000 from the fishpond, we have held that the use of the
land by the tenant for a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both as consideration
is an element of tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act. In the present case, the
consideration was stipulated between the parties pursuant to the aforementioned Section
46 of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended.
Inasmuch as substantial evidence does not only require the presence of a mere scintilla of
evidence (Berenguer, Jr. v. C.A. 164 SCRA 433 (1988) citing and Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), we rule that there is no concrete evidence on
record sufficient to establish that the element of consent is present. But even assuming
arguendo that the element of consent is present, we declared in Delos Reyes v. Expineli
(30 SCRA 574 (1969) that absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be a
tenant even of he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
findings of the respondent court and the trial court are, generally entitled to respect and
non-disturbance except for unusual reasons (Macaraeg vs. CA, G.R. No. 48008, January
20, 1989; Anderson Co., et al. vs. IAC, G.R. No. 65928, January 21, 1988; Tarunez vs.
IAC, 134 SCRA 414 (1985); Gagolar vs. CAR, 18 SCRA 992 (1966); Chavez vs. CAR, 9
SCRA 412 (1963), none of which is present in the case at bar.
TENANCY; Effect of non-payment of rentals
The deliberate refusal of the agricultural lessee to pay the rentals for a period of two (2)
years carried with it the grave penalty of forfeiture of the landholding, it is imperative
under the law that every opportunity must be given the lessee to be heard on his side of
the controversy relating to non-payment of rentals.
MAGNO
-versusBLANCO
174 SCRA 398
person "who by himself, or with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household" cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another. The fact, however,
that a tenant or an agricultural lessee may have been assisted by farm laborers, on an
occasional or temporary basis, hired by the landowners, does not preclude the element of
personal "cultivation" essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship. In De
Guzman v. Santos, the mere fact that the tenant did not do all the farm work himself but
temporarily or on an emergency basis utilized the services of others to assist him, was not
taken to mean that the tenant had thereby breached the requirement imposed by the
statute. We do not consider that the statute prohibits the tenant or agricultural lessee who
generally works the land himself or with the aid of members of his immediate household,
from availing occasionally or temporarily of the help of others in specific jobs.
SPS. AMADEO CUAO AND AURORA Y CUAO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, RENATO CRISTOBAL,
VIRGILIO DIEGO, ET AL.
Promulgated: September 26, 1994
G.R. No. 107159
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents' self-serving
statements regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship.
[43] The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of
the existence of agricultural tenancy. [44] Substantial evidence does not only entail the
presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be
established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the
element of sharing. [45] Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing
of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented as self-serving statements
are deemed inadequate. [46]
In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson,
and subsequently, Valencia and Fr. Flores, partook of a civil law lease. Henson and later
Fr. Flores were not instituted as agricultural lessees but as civil law lessees. As a finding
of fact, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform held that a written civil law lease contract
between Valencia and Fr. Flores was on file which contained in clear and precise terms
the stipulation prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his parcels of land without
the written consent of Valencia. [47] The Secretary even went as far as stating for the
record that such stipulation barring the subletting of the property was violated by Fr.
Flores when he subleased the subject parcels of land to private respondents.
VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
Furthermore, there is an apparent absence of the essential requisites of an
agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties over Lot No. 2025. For this
relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of
harvest or payment of rental.
FELIX PASCUAL
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VICTOR
SOLIS
Promulgated: December 3, 2001
G.R. No. 138781
Tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing,
expressly or impliedly, in accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199. Although
petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with
respondent, in our view petitioners consented to the tenancy albeit impliedly by
allowing respondent to cultivate the landholding in question and by receiving
from him the landowner's share of the harvest over a considerable length of time.
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, ET AL.
-versusSIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: August 15, 2001
G.R. No. 137509
GREGORIO CASTILLO
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: January 27, 1992
G.R. No. 98028
the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
NICOLAS CARAAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 124516
APPEALS
AND
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of
sharing the harvests.
POLICARPIO
NISNISAN
NISNISAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 12, 1998
G.R. No. 126425
AND
ERLINDA
PRUDENTIAL BANK
-versusLEOPOLDO M. SERRANO, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 19, 1990
G.R. No. L-49293
NICOLAS G. SINTOS
-versusHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: July 14, 1995
G.R. No. 96489
REMIGIO ISIDRO
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(SEVENTH
DIVISION)
AND
NATIVIDAD
GUTIERREZ
Promulgated: December 15, 1993
G.R. No. 105586
JULIO BARANDA
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
The determination by the DAR concerning the tenancy relationship between the parties is
only preliminary. After making its determination, the DAR can issue the appropriate
certification for court action. There is nothing in the decree which vested in the Secretary
the final authority to rule on the existence or non-existence of a tenancy relationship
whenever a case is referred to it by the courts pursuant to P.D. No. 316. The DAR's
preliminary determination, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, does not even
foreclose a further examination by the courts nor is the latter bound by the former's initial
appreciation of the relationship between the parties as provided in P.D. No. 1038.
Moreover, with the express repeal of PDs 316 and 1038 by Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657,
the preference to the DAR become unnecessary, as the trial court may now process to
hear the case. The reference requirement under the decree is merely a procedural matter,
the repeal of which did not cause any prejudice to petitioner. Besides, there is nothing in
the decree which says that if the DAR determine the existence of a tenancy relationship,
an ejectment case cannot prosper.
NICOLAS CARAAN
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 124516
(2)
(3)
there is consent;
(4)
(5)
(6)
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.
THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 30, 2002
G.R. No. 138016
The requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent
by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvest. All these requisites are
necessary to create tenancy relationship and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as distinguished from
a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a
de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
ANASTACIO VICTORIO
-versusTHE HON. COURT OF
DOMINADOR FERNANDEZ
Promulgated: March 28, 2001
G.R. No. 110012
APPEALS
AND
BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versusPATRICIA ARANETA
Promulgated: February 22, 2000
G.R. No. 135829
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to
wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.
there is consideration; have not been met by the private
respondent.
In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. (189 SCRA 194, 181 SCRA
247).
BONIFACIO L. HILARIO AND EDUARDO M.
BUENCAMINO HILARIO, PETITIONERS
-versusHONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
AND
SALVADOR
BALTAZAR,
RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 70736
RAFAEL GELOS
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
LOURDES PEA QUA assisted by her husband
JAMES CUA
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), ET AL.
Promulgated: June 11, 1991
G.R. No. 95318
JULIO BARANDA, ET AL.
-versusHON. ALFONSO BAGUIO, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 76415
YOLANDA CABALLES
-versusDAR, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
However, we agree with the petitioners that with the landowners' admission that
petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element of "sharing harvest" is
assumed as a factual element in that admission.
THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: January 30, 2002
G.R. No. 138016
Private respondent are entitled to security of tenure as they are legitimate tenants of the
lands.
Alleged agreements executed by the respondent purportedly relinquishing possession of
their landholdings are not enforceable, as it would violate the Code of Agrarian Reform
on security of tenure of tenants.
Private respondent having been already listed as farmer beneficiaries of the Land Transfer
Program, strengthens the security of tenure of tenants.
DON PEPE HENSON
-versusPANGILINAN
161 SCRA 687
TENANT; Defined
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who,
himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the
land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landowner under the share tenancy system, or in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the above
definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy
relationship had ever existed between the parties.
GERARDO RUPA, SR.
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
MAGIN SALIPOT
Promulgated: January 25, 2000
G.R. No. 80129
JOSE MATIENZO
-versusMARTIN SERVIDAD
Promulgated: September 10, 1981
G.R. No. L-28135
greater degree of security of tenure for tenants, further promoting the constitutional
objective of social justice and protection to labor (Pintacasi vs. CAR, L-23704, July 29,
1972), specifically Section 49 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended, the right of the tenant is not
severed by said repurchase. The intent or purpose of the law is the preservation of the
tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant to insure the well-being of the
tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land. Upon the repurchase
by the vendor a retro, petitioners Salen, of the landholding, he stepped into the shoes of
the previous of the landholder, vendee a retro, who has instituted respondents Sevilla as
tenant tillers thereof, for the axiom in land tenure states that generally once a tenant,
always a tenant.
DOMINGO SALEN
-versusHON. PEDRO M. DINGLASAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 28, 1991
G.R. No. 59082
U
USUFRUCT; Extinguished
As to the question of what rights, if any were retained by Helen Schon as a usufructuary,
after the effectivity of P.D. No. 27. We believe that the usufruct which had theretofore
existed as jus in re aliena in favor of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by P.D.
No. 27. To hold, as private respondent Helen Schon apparently urges, that her usufruct
was not extinguished but rather remained impressed upon the land passing on to the new
owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose of the land reform statute. P.D. No. 27
was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of the soil" by giving to
tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the assumption
that they would work harder to improve their lot in life if they became landowners rather
than mere tillers of somebody else's land. To hold Helen Schon as entitled to continue
enjoying, usufructuary, the natural or civil fruits of lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be set at
naught the major purpose projected by P.D. No. 27 and maintained by Executive Order
No. 228.
RAMONA LOCSIN
-versusHON. JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA and
CARLOS PANALIGAN, ET AL.
Promulgated: February 19, 1991
G.R. No. 51333 & 52289
V
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; Mode of Extinguishment
To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private
person. It was the government, through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the
private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws.
Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of Government (now the Department
of Interior and Local Government) regulates them through the Bureau of Cooperative
Development (Section 8, PD 175).
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versusSps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297
W
WAIVER OF RIGHTS; Null and Void
Private respondents contend that petitioner was no longer entitled to recognition as a
farmer-beneficiary because of the series of mortgages he had taken out over the land. they
also cite his "Waiver of Rights" and abandonment of the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the
government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a
reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land,
thus negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the
soil.
GAVINO CORPUZ
-versusSps. GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA GROSPE
Promulgated: June 08, 2000
G.R. No. 135297
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional
Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if
the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves
the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the
Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
G.R. No. 131457
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition on the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly
put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance
of the assailed resolution.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, ET AL.
-versusHON. RENATO C. CORONA, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 24, 1998
Z
ZONING ORDINANCE; Defined
"A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection of needs.
STA. ROSA REALTY DEV'T. CORP.
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: October 12, 2001
G.R. No. 112526
HELP CENTER
How to Use the ERC Legal Information Archive
CONTACT INFORMATION
Department of Agrarian Reform
Elliptical Road, Diliman
Quezon City, Philippines
Copyright Information
All material contained in this site is copyrighted by the Department of Agrarian Reform unless otherwise specified. For
the purposes of this demo, information are intended to show a representative example of a live site. All images and
materials are the copyright of their respective owners.