Strncturcs oj t/Je P11l1/ic Perccption oj Politics ;....

193

CHAPTER.9

-..""""

' -

High ExpectationsDeep Disappointment

Structures 0 r th p hl. p
.
. :J
e u te erceptton of Poli tics
tn the Weimar Repuhlic
THOMAS MERGEL

he legitimacy and srabil. 0 f

"re I"
..
ity
po ltlcal
sysrern dcpcnds not only on irs
a capac1t1es but also 11 h
.
. . t e expcctatlons placed upon it. 1 TI1e higher
the expectati
h e
ons, t e rewer poi 1t 1
.
h
ment is a const
h
ica opnons t e sysrcm has, sincc disappointant t reat If rh ,
1.
.
1
1
.
US and G
B . .

ere are po 1t1ca a teman ves ( which, unlike in the

11 t
e
.
reat ntam was e
after rhe S
d H, '
g nera Y t le case ror contmcntal Europc until long
econ vvorld War)
J' b
result of
.
. ' ' po mea sta I 1ty can oftcn be vicwcd as less thc
11 11 0 f h 1
.
a systems effect1ven,
placed upon it Th.
. css t
t e owcr expectanons that !uve bccn
Republic h. is rnay, lI1 fact, help cxplain thc stability of France's TI1ird
' w Ic 11 0 11g puzzle l l 11

.
of its str
.
e JOt contcmporancs and h1stonans on account
ucrura inadcquacies 1t
i ..
k
widesp d
.
'
' s opaque e cns1011-ma mg proccsscs, and its
.
. ,H
rea 11epot1sm a11d
of the w,
R
'
con upnon.- owcvcr, as far as I can tell thc failurc
cimar cpublic is . Id
1 J . 1
'
,
citizens' e
.
se om 11 yzcu 111 t 1csc terms. Instcad of probing
xpectanons of the 11
.
l k
el
.
.
ing stru

cw systcm, a iac war -lookmg modcl combmctures, o11g-term

.
el 1
..
.
dom
d
menta mes, an s 1ort-term cns1s cxpcncnccs has
.
mate cxplanarions of w,.
. e . y, . .
orhe
.
cimar s ra1 u1 c. et s11111 1ar facrors wcrc prcscnr 111
r coumnes as wcll wirl
1 d'
.
.
.
iour ca mg 11cccssanly to rhc rap1d collapsc of thcir
olir'
P
ica sysrems. Explan .
1
1 .
.
of th Id
anons t iat cmp 1as1zc thc ant1dc111ocraric scnrimcnr
e o e ircs and the expe . , . 0 f . .
1 .. r
.
rhe O
"
ncnces
cns1s rcsu nng rrom war, mflation, and
epress1on could ali b
i F'
reie
f d
e PP Ico to ~rancc afrcr 1870. TI1erc, too, rhc Righr's
J ctIOn
emocracy and h
1
.
.
t e ncco ro ovcrcomc a losr war wcrc a constanr
robl
3A
P
cm. nyone mq

.
bil"t l
d
mnng In to t 1e rcasons for rhc Wc1111ar Rcpublic's insra1 y a so 11ee s ro k
1 . ..
I h e .
now w iat 1ts cmzc11s cxpcctcd of ir in rhc firsr place.
a
.
b
.
n r ee ro owmg I 'rgue
t1iat t11e msta
1 1ry of rhe Wc1111ar
Republic stcmmcd
1arge 1y rrom rhe facr t
..
.
' t 1ar c1t1zens expectarions of both the poli rica! sysrcm and

its politicians wcre unrcalistic1Ily high and wcre thus cssentially doomed. to
be disappointed. Structural problcms, such as the systematic overreach of the
modcrn state, do nor sufficc to explain rhese expcctations:1 Instead, rhese high
expecrations of polirics-of ali kinds, not only of democratic politics-can also
be analyzed historically. In our case, long-rerm facrors, such as rhe tradition of
the authoritarian srarc or rhc welfarc srate, musr be viewed in conjunction with
shorr-rerm facrors, for example, rhe war-induced growrh of stare action, and
the war cxperience irself-in whichever myrhological or ideological guise it may
ha ve appeared. TI1e resulring ideology of rhe Volksgemeinschajt or "people's community; which was to be creared in polirical rerms, expecred polirics ro achieve
the formation of "community; an expecrarion thar, however, exceeded irs strucrural capabiliries. Tims cirizens' high expecrations arose as polirics became invesred with a compensarory funcrion foi: rhe counrry's failed social inregrarion.
In rhe following I intend ro examine the strucrure of these expectarions.
My comments are based on my book, Parlamentarische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik, which examines the rension between instirutional communicarion in rhe Reichsrag and public perceptions thereof. 5 By "the public" I am
referring mainly to the press and. rhe lirerary community. My analysis, based
on someten rhousand arrides from across rhe entire press specrrum, questions
Jrgen Habcrmas's notion of a (bourgeois) public sphere. His norion assumes a
hornogeneity rhar was barely rhinkable even in the nineteenth century. 6 Ar first
glance, rhc public sphere of rhe Wcimar Republic was rnuch more fragrnented
rhan its ninercenrh-ccnrury counrcrparr, with its disparare publics divided along
rhe lincs of rhe various social and moral rnilieux. If rhis were rhe lasr word on
rhe marrcr, rhen the norion of one public sphere would be out of rhe question. Howcver, rhe application of a discourse-orienred rheorerical concept of
the public sphere makes clear that the Weimar Republic also experienced overlapping discourses, which can bcst be analyzed rhrough rhe inrersecring webs
of cornmunication linking diverse media sites. Ir is possible ro situare these
discourses empirically in rhc reception and discussion of sratemenrs frorn the
opposirional prcss, which was an essential acriviry of all gazettes. Alrhough rhe
primary function of rhcse discussions was to dcmcan others, rhey ultimarely
helpcd draw arrcntion to kcy conceprs, to the rules of speech, and to rhc dcfinirion of problems. rl1c central point here is not whether thcse differenr newspapers agrccd, but rarhcr rhc fact that a shared semanrics developed, identifying
issucs and agendas that could rhcn be discussed publicly. One example is rhe
slogan "partyism" (Parteiismus), which rhcjungdcutscher Orden inrroduced in
1927 and which rhen quickly becamc a descriptive rerm for the entire polirical
sysrem. Rcgardless of wherher thc norion was shared or not, it was used by the
media across rhe poltica! specrrum. 7 Somc of rhese discourses ran rhrough al!
camps. "D1ey did nor lead to a conscnsus rcgarding rhc facrs, bur rhey helpcd ro
develop common rhemes, coined rurns of phrasc, and rhus facilitated a shared

194 ": TIJ0111as Mergcl

percep.tion of polirical reality. Such discourscs pcrmit us ro draw conclusions

re~ard 111 g collecrivc mentaliries. ~TI1e Social Democrats and German Nationalis.rs may well havc offcrcd different answcrs to rhc qucstion of wherher the
Reichsrag adequately represenred rhe people however, a wide range of opinion
makers shared the conviction tfJat thc Reichsrag's proper designation was to
Its
, cnnrety

( an d tnus
'
representanve
rnncnon
c.

represent the peoplc 111

t h ar 1ts

t~ok priority over the governing function). In particular, discourscs on rhe notlons of Fh~e~ and Volksgemeinschaft manifesred such "secret agreements" in
reg~rd to polincal expectations. Here rhe longing for uniry and rhe desire for
clanry w
d
r h
.
ere mosr v1v1 , even 1 t ey meant d1fferent rhings to different people.
A.lrhough .Volksg~met~schajt could mean a number of rhings, one could still
discuss th1s utop1a w1th a person from an enrirely different ideological background.8 Tuus rhe following considerations do not assume rhe existence of harmony, bur rarher ~he notion of a concert of conrradictory opinions-a nerwork
rhat nevertheless 111cluded crossroads of shared interest.
Ibe Promise of the Weimar Republic
The Weimar Republic was a polirical experimenr whose exisrence was due less
to the strength of rhe republican idea rhan to rhe weakness of rhe regirne ir suc~eeded. The revolurion of 1918-19 was an upheaval merely in polirical rerms;
It chang~d the parameters of rhe political system, bur not, as in Russia one
y~ar ear~1er, those of the social arder. TI1e regime change was largely driven by
d1sappo111rment wirh the old system and nor so much by hope for rhe new. As
~arkus Llanque s~ows, e~en rho~e inrellectuals who opred for a sysrem change
nly bec~me acqua111red w1r.h rhe 1.deas of democracy during rhe war. 9 TI1e high
;~pectat1~ns f~r rhe ~epublic, wh1cl.1 eventu.ally followcd, can be cxplaincd by
e r.rom1se ~Ith ~h1ch rhe. republic carne 1nto being. In his speech upon thc
opcmng of t~1e We1mar Nanonal Assembly on 6 February 1919, Friedrich Ebe.rr closed w1th a quotation from Fiebre: "We wanr to crea te a Reich of jusnce : ~~ h~nesty, founded upon the cqualiry of evcryrhing thar bears a human
face. p11s la?guage.:nrailed high expectarions nor only in rhc polirical system
of the peoples state (Volbstaat) but in politics as a whole which reAectcd
rh: continuity of thc Gcrman sratisr rradirion. Despite the almndant scholarsh1p on. bourgeois sociery in the past twenty ycars, which has f1nnly rejccted
the nonon of a German deficit of Brgcrlicl>kcit, 11 ir is still evident rhar German bourgeois society gave primacy to state institutions and srate organization
rarher t~~n to the structures .and initiativcs of civil sociery. 'Tiie expectation
that palmes could salve confli.cts and cr:are social harmony was profoundly
srreng~hene~ by ~!1e w~r expenence. Dunng the war, political control attained
new d1mens1ons. Sooal Democrats were nor the only ones who bclieved thar

Strnctures

oJ t/Jc P11l1/ic Perceptio11 oJ Politics

;..., 195

rhc statist-corporarist organization of rhe wartime cconomy-which went far

beyond anyrhing seen in Francc-and some fonn of socialism were rhe organizational principie of rhe future. Even Walrer Rarhcnau and Max Weber viewed
socialism, or ar leasr rhe variery embodied in a corporarisr sysrem of overall
regularion, as inevitable if nor wholly dcsirable. 13
Of course, rhe signihcance of rhe war experience for such a system of control
was by no means resrricted to Germany. One can hnd similar parrerns in Great
Britain following rhe Sccond World War. In Germany afrer 1918, as in Grear
Britain afrer 1945, rhese ideas combined wirh sweeping conceprs of social harmony. As in rhe "years of consensus" in Great Britain, which sought ro overcome (or sublimare) rhe traumatic years of interwar class struggle by referring
ro the shared war experience, 14 in Germany as well the politically induced organization of society appeared to assuage rhe fricrions of rhe German Empire by
rransferring the idea of rhe warrime Volksgemeinschaft into peacerime. Thus rhe
republican arder of rhe "people's srare" was loaded wirh social expectarions. 15
Tuese were only superficially concerned wirh whar we would describe today as
rhe welfare srate. Tue empire had also been acquainted wirh rhe safety nets of
rhe wclfare srate. No, what was ar srake here was a longing for socieral unity;
rhe funcrion of polirics was to become a model for rhis uniry.
Ir was preciscly rhe experiences of loss, deprivation, and defear rhat supercharged polirics wirh expectation. TI1e Germans were a defeared, impoverished
narion caughr in a rradition of inner polirical boundaries. TI1is fragmentarion
had osrensibly been overcome rhrough the war experience, an event rhat was
promprly rransformed into a myrh because rhe desire for uniry was so great:
TI1is nation exposed irsclf to comperirive democracy, which promised in rurn a
Reich of beaury and digniry anda new realm of polirical moraliry. The fact rhat
rnost parties bore rhe word Volk in rhcir names was evidence of the promise to
unite sociery rhrough polirics.
Expectarions of rhe problem-solving capacities of polirics were high afrer
rhe war in any case, and rhose placed 011 the republic were even higher. After al!,
rhe republic linked polirical problem solving and polirical represcnrarion. TI1c
Rcichsrag represenred rhc pcople and governed ir ar the same rime. Tiiis resulrcd
in conrradictory cxpectations. How was parliament, as a representarive body of
rhe people rhat was expccted to rcsernblc rhe actual people, supposed to govern
thc counrryr Govcrning, after al!, always rneans making unpopular decisions.
How could a party dernocracy, which was rooted in confcr, realize the desire for unityr How could a poltica! sysrern that had to be a "rnachine" andan
"opcrarion" (Be tri ch) in order ro function, fulf111 the longing for directness and
"life?" My argumenr is thar afrer 1918 ar least a portian of the disappointrnent
over polirics was dueto utopian expectations-utopian because they were contradictory and impossible to fulfl. TI1is was nor clear to most contemporaries
to be sure, some perceptive observers, such as Max Weber, were keenly aware of

196 ,...; Thomas Mergcl

the conrradictory narure of sorne of rhese expecrarions. His energetic plea f~r
an illusion-free realism grew from such observations. 16 He could only maintam
this perspective because rhere were certain rhings rhat he simply did not e_xpect from polirics. Far example, he rejected rhe notion rhat politics could exist
wirhour parties, "machines;' and "operation:' But few of bis contemporaries followed his lead. "D1eir conrradictions were reflected in rhe discursive strucrures
in which mutually exclusive notions were rhe rule rather than rhe exception.

The Ideal of Representation and the Selection of Leaders

TI1 e notion rhat the Reichstag could be a copy or a mirror of rhe people was
scarcely a new idea. As early as 1867, Bismarck had promised that the Reichstag would be a "phorograph" of the German nation. 17 But this expecration assumed a new quality during the Weimar Republic, for rhe proportional voting
system placed new demands on rhe perfecrion of rhis picture. When contemporaries sought to assess the parliamenr's capaciry for accurate representation
of the people, they were merely raking rhe constiturion seriously. Furthennore,
the norion that fair represenration would allow every social group ro be represenred proportionally in the parliamenr meant thar the limits of represenrarion
(rhe n~tion, for example, rhat a mnimum percenrage of votes was necessary f~r
enrry mro parliamenr, exemplified by rhe federal republic's "5 percent hurdle )
failed to convince a majoriry, even rhough ir certainly was a matter of discussion
and debate. In the republican understanding of Weimar, fairness demanded
the represenration of minorities, no matter how smallY
Thus represenration had two sides: an objective side, and, increasingly, a
more subjective one. On the one hand, "represenration" meant a reflection of
the people's social structure, conceived as an ensemble of social groups. In the
everyday terminology of journalists, rhis concept suggesred rhat social groups
replaced individual citizens as rhe deputies' electors. So, for example, the newspaper of heavy indusrry, Der Tag, depicted rhe deputies as the extended arm
of their professional interests. In rhe newspaper's diction, then, it was not rhe
electorate who voted but rather rhe professions: "TI1 e Chambers of Crafrs ha ve
dispatched a secretary. "l1e commercial community is represented by ten merchams."19 Consequenrly, rhis corporatist notion of social structure was reflected
in an election advertisement that was not aimed ar the entire people but instead
at its social subgroups. 2
However, rhe confrontation among organized inrerests thar took place during the l 920s and thar favored groups wirh marker power made clear that man y
parts do not make a whole. The social groups did not blend harmoniously into
one nation. As a consequence, a new "subjective" concept of representation began to prevail, from which rhe Nazis drew vast profit: rhat of direct and palpable
experience. This was nota new idea. Ever since rhe cultural and class srruggles

Strnct11rcs of t/Je J>11l1lic J>erception

of Poli tics

;..... 197

of rhe nineteenth century, affiliation with rhe distinct "life-worlds" of various

social groups had molded rhe polirical landscape and led to the development
of a particularistic polirics of idenriry.21 TI1e category of affiliation based on
experience gained a new immediacy in the late l 920s against the background of
rhe war experience. "Having been there" seemed to instill political actors wirh
a higher competence of judgmenr. Tims ir became important to ask whether a
person had rcally taken part in rhe war (and not merely in the warrime bure~u
cracies), or whether one rcally srill worked in a factory (rarher than as a umon
functionary ). 22 Even one's age, gender, or status as a homeowner could solidify
inro political arguments, for only such factors qualified a person to represent
orhers aurhenrically and to defend their inrerests. Here we see a desire to share
"real lifc" wirh rhe people, which implied rhat only those who lived like rhe
people were able ro grasp its problems and find solurions for them.
This collision of rhe category of experience with professional poli tics harmed
rhe functionaries. Alrhough rhe Weimar Republic was characterized by a high
levcl of lobbying and its functionaries had substancial influence-up to 40 percenr of Reichstag deputies were salaried lobbyists, nor counting the honorary
ones 23 -even rheir own organizarions viewed them wirh misrrust since they
represen red inrerests which rhey themselves "objecrively" did not sha:e. For e~
ample, rhe agrarian lobbyist Albrechr Philipp from Saxony, a profess1onal ?ohrician since 1912 anda parliamentary represenrative for rhe German Nat10nal
People's Party, encountered increasing difficulries wirh rhe grass-roots members of bis party after 1928. He failed to win rheir nomination again in 193~,
not because he represented bis constituency's interesrs poorly but rarher-so lt
was said "from below" -because be was nota farmer himself, bur a high-school
teacher. His supporters' argumenr rhat as a "professional parliamentarian" he
had valuable experiences of a differenr kind could not prevail against the argument bascd on his lifc-world identiry. 21 Even in the communist milieu, where
rhe professionalizarion of poliricians was actively promoted, functionaries, and
parricularly depuries, werc conrinuously suspected of being bourgeois; in rhis
case, rhe poli tics of idcntiry also mcanr control ovcr lifesrylcs. Tims in 1924 rhe
communist deputy Wcrner Scl10lem fclt obligcd to purchase a coat that was
nor "rhe larcsr in fashion" but was insrcad more modest, "as bcfs an attorney
of rhe pcoplc:' 25 Parricularly in rhe shadow of the new and disrressing expericnce of mobiliry, which characterized rhe Weimar era, social mobiliry aroused
suspicion of alienation. Profcssional poliricians were viewed as social climbers,
who had abandoned thosc vcry life worlds that had originally commissioned
rhesc poliricians to represenr them.
And yer, rhis discourse about rhe parliament as a "photograph" of rhe people,
which rhoughr in terms of similarities, was inconsistenr with rhe simultaneous
notion rhar rhe bcst of rhe nation should come together in rhe parliament. Heinrich Triepel, a professor of consritutional law from Berlin, noted in 1923 that
rhe parliamenrary arena had become a "world of mediocriry;' which hindered

l 98 ": Thomas Mcrgrl

.. l

va uablc pcrsons" fro

, . . 76 S h
f l
.
m enrcnng ir.- uc complaints about rhe qualiry o rie
l
par iamenr were esse t.1 ll
1.
1

.
n Y not 11ng ot 1er rhan complaints about the vcry I ea
..
1
o f represenranon "O 0 f " 1
Vc . h ~ .
ne us so meanr one like everybody else," or, as r 1e
ossisc e Zeitiing st t d 'f 1

e I" t 1e parb1amcnt was supposed to be a "photograp h"

0 f t h e people then 't
1 was ne1t 1er cttcr nor worsc rhan rhc German people in
. '
"7?
genera l, w1thout party d

.
, 1, .
an e ass istmcnons. - Tiiis contradiction was persuas1ve Il1 vve1mar
poli . . 1 1
f
.
.
h h
ncs. t Je ca o representatton stood in a constant rens1on
w1t t e se h f, b
.
<
a:c ~r t Je csr man, w1th rhe search for rhe Fhrer.
In h erenr Il1 th1s cont

.
.
R
was a 1snncnon between regularity and irregulanty. epresentati ra1 icnon
d d

f
.
.
.
!'
h. h
on Inc u e nonons o regulanry, m1rror image, and funcnona ity, w 1c . crysralliz ed Il1
t l1e nonon

" 111e
o f t lJe parl1ament
as a "machme.
constanr cnrical talk of rh "

f 1
.
"
.
78 f
"
bl .
e opcrat10n o tne parhament (Parlamcntsbctncb )- o
assem y 11!1e 0 l. "(P
29
. .
P lt!cs
o ltt ~ am laiifcnden Bandc ), or of rhe "master machinIst in the parliame
" (M h

ntary party
ase zncnmeister
in dcr Fraktion) 30 presente d
t h e concepr of a st d d
lf
.
. d
.
an ar ize , even se -regulating mechanism. Tiiis antl1!1 ustnal semantic co n t a1I1e
d w1t
h"Il11tse
lf t h e longing for rhe immediate and t h e
personal. eIt was not that
th
R

h
r

'
e e1c stag
I not runcnon, bur rather that it was accused o f 11

uncnomng too well. In older political rhetoric, the "machine" described

t h e smoorh
running of th e mee h amsms
.
.
.
o f t 1Je state as opposed to the livmg,
bl"
h
f
1
.
.
.
orgamcally
conceived
. . . .
pu 1c sp ere o t Je nmeteenth ccntury. 31 The 'machmc..
meanr m1I11rn1z111g
the Il1
f! uence o f t h e 111
1v1 ua 1 and reducing the indiv1 ua l
.
personality
to
a
mere
e

rl1etonc produccd an amtu

de
.
..
og Il1 t e rnac 1111e. 12 n11s
t h.ar v1ewed
pohncal
pare"
.
.
b
.
.
1es notas anrago111st1c groups ut rathcr as self-scrvmg
o l1garch1es cngaged in h orsc tra mg t l1at coopera te d w1th
onc anothcr behmd
t lJC
scenes. From this poinr f .
i
[> . l
:l .
.
.

o v1cw, tnc 'c1c 1stag pn ce 1tsclf on a represcntanvc

d Il1to

capac1ty that had dct enorate

ru e y me 10crc party functionarics.
The
search for the Fh rer stooc
.
l Il1
a tense re lanons

i1p
to rh1s
mac lJmc.
ll
.
Th IS caregory brought rogcrh
.

.
.

e
. .
.
cr vanous qucsts, rangmg rrom a vague e csire 1or
d ens1ve elites who e Id
d
r
. .
ou stan out rrom an amorphous mass, al! rhc way to a
mess1a111c. search for a "sav1or
o f G crmany .. w l10 would lcad rhe narion out of 1ts
.
d egradanon ro new gl
.
.
h d
.
ory. H N evcrr l1c less, t lJcsc d.1verse conccpttons
of a hihrcr
. one th1I1g in common. In rhe words of Art!Jur Mocller van den 13ruck: "He
IS a man who cmnot
b e o f a party."15 f'or van d en Bruc k thc rcrm party malll-.
'
fested
nor
only
rhe
d"
o f r1JC G ermans llllt a sor lJc1r
narrow-mmdcdncss,

.
1sun1ty
the1r adherence to rhc mac h me,

d
l

l
.
.
.
.
.
1
an t Jc1r e ocrnna1rc atnruucs-111
short, the1r
v1ew,

abo lr
convenrional Germann
, css. I n l11s
t lJe f'"
u l1rcr was a nonconform1sr,
from
the
blue
and
rlJe
ve
f

1
TI

.
.
. . ry esscnce o 1rrat1011a 1ry. 11s e 1scoursc o 1rrcgu larity an~ unpred1ctab1hty was in no way rcsrricted to thc political Right, bur
was widely sharcd by al! sides. Max Wcbcr's norion of charisma includcd rhcsc
disparate ideas. In facr, Weber condenscd thc ongoing discussion and thcn
36
sharpened it. Whcrher Lefr or Right, al! sidcs in Wcimar politics contended
with the phenomenon of a charismaric lcadcr who could overcomc thc political

Structurcs oj thc Pul>lic Pcrccptio11 oj Politics ;.... 199

paralysis of thc republic. Yet, the appearance of rhe Fhrer was not amenable
to planning he would simply emergc.

37

nJis preccpt mcant a heighrcncd susccpribiliry to rebellious individualism

and also poinrs to rhose important rhematics that rendercd Hirler's conringent,
narcissistic leadership image acceptable. Srared differenrly: rhe emphasis on
charisma and incalculabiliry as esscntial aspects of leadership was a widespread
conremporary inclination thar helped make Hitler visible in the fi.rst place. Precisely rhose were viewed as Fhrer who acted in an unforcseen way, who could
nor be disciplined, and who acred "irrationally: Unril Hitler carne along, this
attribure was rarely applied to the Right. Since rhe Fhrer had to be in tune
wirh the people, ir was instead applied to politicians who remained close to rhe
"masses," such as Gustav Noske, Car! Severing, Josef Wirth, and even Arthur
Mahraun, the leader of rhe Jungdeutscher Orden ( which represenred the fronr
generation), who were ali accorded this rirle. If Alfred Hugenberg was also addressed as Fhrer afrer 1930, rhis merely represented rhe attempt of bis enrourage to talk charismatic abilities into being. Bur since Hugenberg was neither a
powcrful speaker nor had rhe masses behind him, this rirle remained resrricted
to his own small circle of admirers.
1l1e difference berween represenrarion, which may have created identity but
which also concealed within itself thc soullessness of rhe poltica! machine,
and the search for a Fhrer who bore personal and existenrial qualities wirhin
himself, is one of the characteristics of public poltica! discourse in rhe Weimar Republic. Anyone who sought to represenr the people was faced wirh an
impossiblc choice: did he wanr to be like everyone else-part of rhe "photograph" -or did he wanr to be a Fhrer:'

Politics as Morality
Car! Schmitr's approach rhat polirics is a profoundly amoral business has informed modern-day conccptions of polirics in rhe Weimar Republic. He believcd that effectivc policies were nor cultivated by seeking the common good,
bur rathcr by allowing conflicts ro sharpen inro polar oppositions, parallel to
rhe divisions bctween encmies in military conflicts. 38 In politics, good and bad
were only conceivablc as secondary encodings of distincrions rhat were essentially poltica! in narurc. nJe inrensity of polirical conflicr during rhe Weimar
Rcpublic would seem to conli.rm this vicwpoinr.
Srill, I believe that Schmirr's view rcpresenrs a minoriry position. Rarher,
the f!ood of publications on rhe relationship of politics and moraliry would
suggest rhat politics was largely conceived in rerms of moraliry already during
the war years. In rhis sense politics fi.gured as a virtuous activity, rhe main task
of which was not to administer realiry but to realize visions. "Il1ose who con-

200 .-: TI

'""IS Mcrgcl

ducred po l'mes,
then, wcre st
d
l
.
. e t rbafl
the peopl h
l
ipposc to )C v1rruous, more virruous in rae
l
e t emse ves D
h
f
idea
d . unng t e mterwar pcriod, this conception o an
politics ga l
mee ere cncc m rh f
f
h
J1aracteriz. ed rh
. d
.
e ace 0 t ie sharncful social rnorality t ate ' a
e peno of mfl
111

h uation
fi
anon, particular thc black marketeers and t e iJ1 3,
pro teers whose ap
,
.
19?0s. J
Politics
b
pearance was nonceablc in the literature of the - d
was to e free of e
d d l

boe
as well in the N
, gm~m an
ea rnaking. Such moral cla1ms ec
the R . h 1 d ew Year s greetmgs, which thc Reichstag received in 1924 frorn
"the eic
s an
d bund ~and t J1e D cutsc he A gcmcinc Zeitw1g. Its aurhors ca ll ed for
wi an resolur o h
nd
lfl I n t at can move mountains, the firmness, decency, ad
above ali th
ing tr
h .e se essness that fundamentally rejects the usual ministerial 'fee ,
S ohug s and ~ther benefits. Clean hands and pure hearts!"IO
uc expecranon. f d
11 d
Wh re
was rh k' d f
.s un arnenta Y emanded too much of poli tics.
e
. wit
. 11) H ow were poliricians in a parliamenta
.
r}'
sysr Is m o punty t 0 b egm
em
supposed
to
d

.
.

0
Th e
h
en tire Y w1t 10ut mm1sterial perquisites and pnv1 eges.)
e raer t ar rhe R . h
d .
. l
wa d l
eic stag an Its representatives failed to embody this 1 ea
s
ue
ess
to
the

.
1
.
rh
h
po mes t iey actually conducted rhan to rhe expectatwns
at
t
ey
were
exp
d
e
1611
TI
.
.e_
f,
h
. ecte to ru 1 ie nonon of politics as virrue, as a sacrrnce
or
t
e
commurnrv
.

d
.
h
n 1 .
.
t
.
,, COlllCI e w1t vve1mar society's extraordinary sens1nvity
0 corrupnon In th

e conremporary d1scussions
of polirical corruption it was l'
1
wayscearrhatitwasam
f
,r,.
1
...
p . .
' atter o pr0Jcss101w ized-i.e. "machine"-po l1nC1ans.
o Itlc1ans had a reputanon
ror
e

'
seekmg their own advantage and making unsavory d eab1s.bThe for mer rector o f t h e Berlm
. Handclshochschule, IgnazJastrow,
w
assoc1at1on
w1th
cnmm:i.
ls w lien
h as pro a ly not even aw are 0 f any genu111e
full-tim e P 0 !'ItICi:i.ns

"pro1ess1on:i.I
e

"
Be termed
,r,
:i.nd h:i.bitual p:i.rli:i.mentanans

( eruJs- und Gewoh 11 h, 't

) 111
rhe dcrnocr:i.tic Berlincr 1iigc l,lntt. 11
et spar /amentaner
. .
e
. el cmocranc
. systems, and it was pervas1ve
. in
.
h orrupnon is ha r di Y unusua l lll
tth e model
democraci

f
1
,
n'
Wl

d
F
h ,
es 0 t ie vvest.
11 e corruption scandals almost rove
Third R epu bl'IC mto

k e rene
h
t ie ground, British newspapcr edirors a lso
new w.. ar they we re t lk'mg a b out w h en t h ey spelled Lloyd George as "f loyd
Ge
42
13. d lKen a h:i.llrnark of the po l'm-
l orge. In the Unitd
e S tates corruption
ea systemsincetheni
t''
l

.
ne cent l century. 4lD cnunc1at1ons
of corrupnon,
t h en,
aR so enrailed
an
t'd
.
l
11
.
.
.
an I emocratic e ement. 1ere is no doubt that the We1111ar
epubhc
was
consid

bl
l
l

b
l ly
l
era Y ess corrupt t 1an t icse democracies, and pro a)
a so
e j era 1 repu bl.1c later was. In any case, ir was not
'b ess corrupt tln'n rl ie, rec
b n es or grafr a

.
' mong po 1t1c1ans
t iat preoccupied the public. Nor was it primanly
concern
d
.
1
d,
.
.
.
.
1
lobb'
e Wlt
epunes w110se campa1gns
werc financed by mdusrnal
'.es, or those who wcre employed by trade unions or who rcceived high
sablaries as me m b ers o f executive
. , l)Oard.s. Instead, the Gerrn:in pubhc
. fretted
out the petty bencfits that werc :iccorded ro poliricians-perquisircs th:it the
p~opl~ had to do without. Whcthcr politicians reccived tailor-madc suits for
t e pnce of used clothing (as in the Sklarck scandal), or enjoyed hors d'ocuvrcs
expense
.
( as m
t ie Barmat scandal), or spent their
and champag
'
ne at pu bl 1c

Structures <{ t/Je Public Pcrccptio11 oj Poli tics ;.... 201

~wlidays in a Swiss hotel (as Matthias Erzberger was falsely accused of domg), the outrage and scandal arose from the difference in life-worlds that these
symbols of rhe good life represenred in rhe hunger-worn, austere society of rhe
l 920s. Corruption figured less asan expression of the functional shortcomings
of the political systcrn rh:in of rhe dissonances berween the representatives and
the represen red. 111us one standard topos in rhe perceprion of politicians was
thcir well-fed appcarance, which cast doubt upon rheir suirability to represent
the people."14 In the same way, critics challenged the rights of deputies to travel
first class on the Reichsbnlm, a class of service used by only 5 percent of al! pas45
sengers; this marked yet another separation from the people.
'This discourse on corruption, which was acrually a politics of identity, is
~ncapsulated in one small example. On 11 February 1923, rhe Hamburg meat
import companies invited female deputies-not their male colleagues-from
both the Prussian and rhe national Iegislarures to the Reichstag to taste-test
frozcn mear. 111e menu was opulent, including steak tartare, cold roast beef,
meat broth, and corned beef, along with compare, salad, and mocha for dessert.
1l1e !ades were expected to decide which dishes had been prepared from frozen mear and which were made from frcsh mear. Of course, this "test" was a
promotional event designed to improve the prospects for lifring restrictions on
the import of frozen mear. TI1e occasion was well chosen, for a debate was scheduled for the following day on rhe SPD's proposal to ease the restrictions on
frozen mear imports. 46 A large majority approved this measure, alrhough ir is unknown whethcr rhe banquet of the previous day actually influenced the deputies'
opinions. But for rhe Communist newspaper Rote Falme, which had reported on
rhis "parliamenrary corruption dinner" in ad vanee, this was not the crucial point.
Rarher, in rhe view of irs editors, rhis episode illustrated "rhc amenities that parliamentarism offers loyal bourgeois and Social Democratic deputies: Naturally
the fcmale Cornmunist deputies w:inted no part of it."17 Tirns it was the good lifc
that corrupted, and politicians could only remain free of rhis corruption if rhey
pracriced duriful :ind ethical asceticism-in a word, politics as sacrifice.
Analysis of rhis enormous cxcess of expectations prompts a revision of the
view of parliament as a relection of the peoplc: deputies were not supposed
to reflect what rhe Volh really wns, but wh:it it coitld potentially bccome. Tims
the parliament w:is nota simple mirror; instead, ir was to be a utopian kind of
concave mirror in which the people could see a vision of itself, notas it actually
was, but as it was supposed to be.

Performance Expectations
'l1e expectations the pcople lcvcled at the parliament also revealed ideological
residues frorn the past, which as a result of the war years and the new functions

202 ": yJomas Mergcl

the Weimar con . .

.
.
.
.
snrur10n ass1gned to rhe Reichsrag rook on utop1an propo1t1ons
1 d ou 61 e 6'111 d
dand
. 6ecame
'
unrea iza 6 le in rheir conrradictions. A spena
existe m the fac h
1
.
1
h
' t t ar t 1e Re1chstag was now expected not on y to represent
t e people 6ur ro

d
'
l
.
ru e lt as well. If questions regarding a g1ven e cgates sooa
1ocanon
and e

.
xpenence soughr ro revea! who rhe delegare was, new questions
wcre now poscd as to w h ar rhe delegare acrually did. If discuss1ons

1ia d a lrea d Y
1
ta k en
place
duri
K

'
1 1ty to
.
.
ng tne a1serre1ch a6out individual depuncs accounta 6
h eir votmg disr
td"d
e
ncts, par 1amenrarians as a group were now as k e d w h at t11ey
1 ror the Vo/k Tu e quesnon
o f h ow to judge a polmc1ans
. perrormance
e
was
1
a .mosr exclusive! Y answere d numerically, revealing rhe d eep traces t h ar t h e
d ISCOUrses of ec
ranonalization

C.
. fn
f;
onomic
and standardization Jert
m po mes.
acr, an almosr T 1 . . .
d.
"61 .
.
Y onsnc v1ew of polirical activiry was 1scerm e m quest1ons a6our h

h
ow many speeches a speaker delivered; about rhe average engt
o f t h ese speeche s,,48 a6 our t h e num6ers of laws passed an d t h e cosr o f t h e
pla~er on which they were prinred. 49 The way such figures were evaluared was
u. timarely
.
. .'ar6ir rary, eror any num6er of laws could just as eas1 y attest to "! eg-
is anve. d1hgence" as ouer
cr
. act1v1ty.
"50 Tu"1s
ev1"d ence of ..superf1uous legis anve
numencal
poinr
f

0
.
view ecame most obv1ous 111 marrers mvo vmg money: h ow
d.1v1d ua asexpens1ve was a pariamenrary enquiry, 51 how expensivc was an m
52
sem ~!~, or even a word uttered in rhe Reichstag? 53 How much did rhe average
po
. d
.
e
W. 1t1c1an cosr
. how ~lle h eror an 111
usrnous
one; h ow mue h ror
a azy one.)54
ould parliamenransm cost less if rhe lazy poliricians could be sorted out in
ord er to achieve a m ore f;avara bl e cost- b ene fi1t rano?
"" n ie newspapers d ecne
d
the
empry
ben
h

f
d

h
e es m t 1e p enary sess1011s, published lists o epunes w 10
6
ad _ ee,n absenr from votes, and calcubred rhe absence rares of rhe individual
parnes. 06
In rhis way, critics asked how "well" parliamentarians worked. Unlike rhe
medirationsonrhe
F
ei
e
f;
commg
u irer, t Je quesnon
1c not rocus
on extraonimary
ac~o.rs, 6ur rarher on matters of function: cfficiency is something differenr than
pol1t1cal genius, and attendance did not correlate with charisma. TI1e inf1ection
of this quesrion of performance with the idioms of economic efllciency h;:id
the effecr of 6ringing rhe processes of poli tics and rhe machi ne back in ro rhe
cei~ter of the debate. For only rhis parliarnentary machine was able to distingms~ 6etwe~n rhe industrious and rhe lazy, between rhe good and the bad
~arliamentanans. Ycr this same machine, which fostered profcssionalizar_ion-rhrough demands for regular arrendan ce, for rhc rationalization of parhamentar~ work, or for a rcasonable relationship of costs to benefits-was ar
rhe sam~ t'.me . symbol of profound political alienation. Here again an interna!
conrrad1ct1011 IS revealed in rhese discourses: although polirics figured as a sorr
of customer service, yer which acrivity is more alienated tl1an rhat of service
provider?

Strnctures of tlJe Puli/ic Perceptio11 of Poli tics ;.... 203

Self-Descriptions
TI1e perspective rhe public took on rhe Reichsrag and irs poliricians during
rhe Weimar Republic represents a bundle of murually conrradictory expecrarions-expectations rhar demanded far too much of polirics. How did poliricians respond to rhese expectations? The facr rhar rhe answers rhey offered
sought ro fulfill rhese expectations made rhe burden of rhese expectations ali
rhe more evidenr. 57 In rhe politicians' self-descriptions, which appeared in rhe
handbooks of rhe German Reichstag, rhey tried to be all rhings to all people:
rhey depicted rhemselves as roored in rhe life-worlds of rheir milieus and also
as effective "Fhrers"; rhey described rhemselves as efficienr representatives of
special inreresr groups and, ar rhe same rime, as attorneys of the common good;
rhey demonstrated rheir inregriry by emphasizing rheir parhs of conrinuous
professional development, rheir significanr achievemenrs, and rheir cosmopolitanisrn. Depuries pointed ro rhe ways in which rhey were anchored in their respective Soci;:il Democratic, Carholic, or narional milieus, proudly menrioning,
for example, rhar rhey had shared prison rime wirh August Bebe!, or listing rhe
many associations in which they wcre members. TI1ey rhus presenred themselves as people whose affiliarions made rhem the ideal administrators of rheir
respective world views. "D1ey poinred ro rheir organizational achievements as
master builders or functionarics, ro rheir warrime milirary achievements, arhl_cric accomplishments, or to rheir success as functionaries or in local polirics;
rhey rold of rheir travels and lisred rhe firms rhey lud founded or managed.
'Il1cse sometimes rather immodesr reporrs had much in common wirh one
another. 'Die frequenrly similar careers rhcy traced were more reminiscent of
rhe "machine" rh;:in of the contingency of rhe Fhrer-rhesc self-descriprions
scarccly presented rhese depuries as "statesmen: TI1e more rhc parliamenr's mediocriry attracred rhe public's critica! eye, rhe more the rnyrhs of social advancement, which rhe parliamentarians soughr to em6r;:icc, jarred people's nerves.
In 1930, for examplc, rhe Demokrntisc/Jc Zcitw1gsdicnst mocked rhe absurdiry
and vaniry of rhe depuries' accounrs in rhe new Rcichsrag handbook, in which
rhey sought to acquaint "rhe world wirh rhe derails of rhcir career parhs and
rhcir effecriveness [as depurics] ." 58 Whilc rhe depuries may ha ve seen rhesc reports as honest accounts of rheir panicular achicvcmcnts, rhey seemcd ridiculous to rheir readers. Sociery called for statesmen and instead was faced with
braggarrs.
Some depurics werc clearly aware of rhe high expecrations to which they
were subjected and soughr to shake off rhis burden. TI1ey told of receiving so
man y lerrers rhat rhey were unable to afford rhe postage to rcply to all of rhem, 59
or of rheir constiruenrs' expecrarion rhat delegares help rhem find jobs. 60 TI1e
Cenrer Parry depury Joos charactcrized rhese exaggerated expectations in un-

204 "": yJo111as Mcrgel

Stn1ct11rcs

ambiguous terms "D

.
l

epunes understand rhe lirnits of rhe effectiveness of lega

measures only too well H
.
.
.. n
sdl
out In the countryside a certam superst1t1
1 preva1 s. People ex owever,

11
e
va
non
and every group imagines rhat it w1 com
peer
sa
firom ab ove
Th
. ..
'
1 l . e impossibil1ty of realizing the exaggerated hopes which peop e pace m our laws l"
,1 1 d
.
l'
.
. .
u timare Y ea s to the collapse of faith and trust in po mes,
ll1 part1es, ll1 the parlia
d fi
.
.
"61
'ment, an
nally 111 the dernocratic republican state.

The Nazi Response

The National Soc 1 1.. '
.

.
d
.
ists opportumty
sternrned frorn the fact that they had not 1'
mg to o w1rh ali of rh' Wh
h
b

1930 f,
is.
en t ey entered tbe Reichstag in large num ers in
orum was placed at their disposal that would allow rhem to shape this
.
d 1scourse They 111
. l
f
.
.
: .
e cap1ta
out o the high expectations placed on po mes
bY 111tens1fy111g
rhe
.
h
se expectat10ns, t us presenting the failure of tbe current
11. 1. l
po ~ : system in an even more drarnatic fashion. 111is is best illustrated by the
N az1s political lang

d
.
uage-essenna y a language of rnorality-that denounce
t h ose wh o cla1med to h ave eroun d e d a R e1c
. h upon beauty and d1g111ty,
. . eh arg111
. g
h
h
. 11 o f corruption, deceit, an d oppress10n.
.
..t ar t ey had instead
' creare d a f>"\.CIC
You, gentlemen, have had eleven years in which to serve the people; but you
have also had eleven years 111
w111c
h to swmdle

the people, and you ha ve rna d e

good use of rhe latt "r,z Tu
.
.
f
e current m1sery, 1t seemed, was not tbe resu t o
' er.
or
failur
.
h

weakness
.
e, on t e contrary, 1t was deliberare sabotage. W ien t 1e N az1s
turned
their
langu

" t 1ey exp01te

d t 11s
mora 1
. .
'
age agamst
t ie "system parnes,
v1s1on of
t ie not1011
o f a "peop 1es state," n:ime 1'}
. politics 111e h ope cm b o d'ie d 111
td'h e umfication
of
th
f

o f u111ty,
i:i d lJecn

.
e ragmente nanon t 1rougi a polmcs
is~ppomted and now aligned itsclf with the enemies of the system.
1'.1is discourse was intensified by a semantic str:itegy that rhe Nazis applied
cons1stenr!y
1
y aune
d ata cruc1a
11 111gu1st1c

agreemenr o f r1e
.
'and rhar
, was mrcct
Reichstag-the reinterprerarion of rhe word wc. Previously ivc had 11\eanr rhe
~eichstag as a whole and also rhe people, because rhe Reichsrag h:id described
Itself as the mirror of the people. The Nazis now set up rhe dichoto!11)' of 1\'C
~ the party, which was simulrancously rhe p~oplc) vs. yo11 ( the sysrem partics,
l.e., the enemies of the people). 'TI1ey accused the government and the Reichstag of having turned away frorn the people and claimed rhat instead tl.icy were
~he qualified interpreters of the people's soul. "Poli tics," Gregor Str:isser said,
z:neans for ns service for the good of the German people and state, :rnd in our
view the state is something other rhan a stage for the essentially irresponsible
governments of democracy.... We embody righrs, natural rights, and the right
to life of every people's comrade [Volhsgcnossc J. We st:ind for re:ison, and for
th~ soul of. the German people, which you !uve denied for so many ye:irs:' 63 In
th1s rhetonc, the party was the authentic expression of tl1e people and from this
1

<if tlJc P11l1lic Perccption of Poli tics

!'-' 205

perspective even political morality assumed a different face. 111e NSDAP depury Jacob Sprenger, who was accused of illegally raking money for attendance
ar assemblies, casually justified himsclf by saying rhat "rhe difference between
your side and ours is that you waste the money, bur in our case the money exclusivcly benefits rhe parry, the popular movement, and tbus tbe people:'G!
The "system parties" were hard pressed to refute the Nazis' claim that tbey
were identical to tbe Gerrnan people, for their electoral victories seemed to
reflect this increasingly. Indeed, tbe Nazis also matched tbe ( utopian) Volk
in rheir social structure. 111ey were young; they were war veterans; they were
not paid by interest groups; tbey were not professional poliricians. In short,
they formed a "genuine national community" (interestingly enough, the fact
rhat there were no women in rhis "national communiry" was constandy neglecred by all discussants ). 'TI1is description, disseminated effectively by Nazi
propaganda, made a profound impression on the other parries because it was
founded on a shared social idea-that of rhe "photographic" representation of
the people. 111e search for affiliations and experiences, which bad constituted
the Reichstag's digniry as a popular representative body, finally ended in the
admission that the Nazis indeed represented rhe people in a much more direct
way than did the other parties. Furthermore, they had a genuine Fhrer wbo
dissolved rhe conrrast between "machine" and contingency by virrue of being a
simple man of the people who had experienced war and poverty, but who was
also entirely different, as bis language, gestures, and "fanaticism" demonstrated.
Furrhermore, he carne from rhe Austrian irredenta and thus stood for the unity
of ali Germans. In tbis representation, Adolf Hitler fulfilled the expectation
rhat a Fhrer had to emerge from the realm of the improbable, a place far from
power, but close to the experiences of ordinary people.

Conclusion
In the Weimar Republic a structurc of expectations predominated that sysremarically overburdened politics. 111is becomcs clear when we depart from
discourse-analytical leve! to examine rhe case of the Reichsrag elections, in
which-unlike modern-day Bundestag elections-the sitting government did
not benefit from an electoral bonus, but w:is instead penalized. Social Democrat Gustav Radbruch, for example, presumed that wielding government power
would automatically mean a loss of votes. 65 In light of this same experience, the
D D P glorified its "courage to be un popular," making it into a "principie rhat it
[ rhe D D P J has rhe historie task of hclping the republic along to victory, even if
ir must sacrifice irsclf in rhe process."66 11iis not only described a myth of poltica! sacrifice but was also quite close to tbe truth. And yet, rhe disappoinrment
expressed in rhe voters' tendency to grant and then entirely withdraw their trust

206 ,.... TI

Strncturcs <if tl!c P11blic Pcrccption <if Politics !"' 207

!omas Mcrge/

in the poliricians the h d 1

d
1 . r \vas
not

. Y e ecte was largely homemade. This be uvio 1,

priman Yannrepubl

f . blen
solvin
.
ICan; cnncism of rhe poltica! sysren lack o P1
g capac1ty was aimed
h
1
. c. alL et
isted d 1 d
at t e par 1amentary system, since 1t, arrcr' .
an na aroused s h f A
.
. bl is ne
silence of rh
.
uc ar- ung expectations. Parricularly nancea e ...,
ose vo1ccs rhat ,d
.1 d
ysre 1"
of the
.
' aime to return to the resrcd-and fa1 e -s
d
emp1re. Even h
1
del
letter by th
Wit lln t e po It!cal Righr, monarchism was largely a ,d
e second half 0 f h 1920 I
. .
d rnovr
increasin .
h
t e
s. nstead, aurhontanan mo e s
.t
d
d
d
c. I 5ov1e
g y mro r e foreg
Russia d M
. ..
roun an appeare to have been successn1
' an
ussoli 111 I J A
ctJ'
rions pi d
s ta Y t easr they had not disappoinred rhe cxpe.
ace upon th
B
h
1
]a1rJ1S
upon .
em. ot were models that asserred high socia e h
0 It!cs. E ven if the
P
d upan vio
1
d rr e
ro
f
.
Yre ie
ence, they nevertheless hel ou
P specr o effect111g
h.
1
G
r 1 d ro
.
somer mg t iat erman poli tics had parenrly ral e "
ch 1eve: reesrabl h

'
1
d
. IS mg t le umty of the people, serving as both a "phorograp
an as a utop1an mod I
1
.
rer'
oinr ro h
1 . . e ar t le same time. This vision represenred a coun .
P
I
.
h' 1
];i.1nt
t e ana ys1s of rhe d'
of "p
. .. .
isma present, w 1c l culminared in rhe cornP .
h .r.arty1sm, i.e., the disuniry of rhe people. The counrer term Volksgc1netrl'
se Jt, summoned a hun
f; ,

'
et'
eri
b
.
ger. or armony, wh1ch was intensified by thc wM
P ence ecause It supp dl 1 d b
. e
f11e
Vi lks
.
ose y 1a
een sat1sned for a brief period rhen
o gerhnernschajt represenred a utopa, not only of the Righr. Rarhcr. rbere
were ot er realms f
.
.
1. 1
e'
.
f ,
o expenence m w 11c l fragmentaran was to be ovcrcof11 .
th e lil11 ty O th

j
t
th
.
~ young generat10n, t 1e experience of rhe tren ches and nor Jea~
e expenence 111 rhe w k J
TI .

.
.
'
( li,
.
or p ace. 11s assert1on of 1dentity in rhe reilm o F
ti.es 1 ummated

1 bl

a
.. f
a transmona pro em: coming to terrns with the shifr (rof11
po1ltlcs o repre

fi . . .
y
. senrat1on to u11ct10n111g politics. T11e conce.:)t of a democrac

t 1lat cou Id achi . h

k
.
Car! Sch .
cvc r_ is was one mar ce1 by l10mogcncity and hcrc, once ;i.ga1I1
Th mi~t had h1s flnger on the pulse of rhe times.
e ~.azis were also faced with these high expectations ifit, . "scizurc
o f power and f; 1
ll
, er t lCII ,.67
. h '. f . e t compe ed to take meas u res against popular "bellyachng
TI1e1r
e 1e 1nstru

d'

r
.
.
menr aga111st 1sappo111tmenr was moverneiit 1 ,, l. 011 sran
surpnses m b J d

d e
' .~ .
. , 0 ( che
or 1 ornes tic an rore1g11 policy-wirh rhar sne _ I
unexpected th
.b
.
r ua qua 1It}
at was attn ured to a genu111e Fhrer Pr 0 ..
l -1rioI1
and the incl .

g1ess1ve mo 1t IZ
us1on of as many peoplc as possiblc in the N~z . . . ronal
strucru
'd 1
" 1 or g.1111za
1
. .. ;\n
.
re avo1 eu t le Weimar Republic's problern wirh eve. 1.
w1rh J1 lf
11 fi

r yc1.1y po 1IticS
(
a m1 1011
unct1onaries active in rhe NSDAP 1
. . a o
activit w
1
'
a one, even r 11s ;11C ,.
Y as no onger conducted at a remove from rhe .:)e C)r)t 1C. Tl lC .. 1111L. 1inC

1os~ Its
terrors once evcryone had become a part of it.
.
n the early days of rhe federal republic, thc tension b 't
_ rioil
and d'

e Wccn cxpclrJ
.
1sappo1nrmenr was scarccly an issue. No one exr)ccr, J
r
,ol'
ne - f;

..
r
cu n1uc 1 rrolll F
s m act, t 1ere were no poi mes. Instead, polirics devele).: d
. f11c
fi

)C
o ver ti JllC
rsr opm1on surveys 111 rhc l 950s revealcd nor only rhe wid
. d
. ,..,ce
f
h
h
esp1 ca persiste"
o aut ontanan t ought pattcrns but also a high dcgrce of 1 . I . rioI1

.
po 1t1ca a 11cna e
an d cons1'd era bl e reservanons
rowards pol1tics
r,R Funl
.
lermore, the high cxpc

tations of the people werc now rcdirectcd towards the "cconomic miracle: Tliis
undoubrcdly took rhe prcssurc off politics during rhc l 950s in the same way
that rhe painful learning process of the l 960s and rhe development of a civil
society took rhe pressure off of politics during rhe ncxt decade. 69 I suspect rhat
these two significant developments also cushioned the new expansion of rhe
systen functionary duties, as shown by the Grand Coalition, Keynesianism,
and finally the social enginccring promises of the social-liberal coalition after
1969. T11is may explain why Germans in opinion surveys conrinue to display
a high degree of satisfaction with rhe system, despite constant dissatisfacrion
with the achievements of the poltica! parties. Today, it would appear, Germans
are making a distinction between rhe system's srructure and rhosc who work
wirhin ir-a distinction rhat was unrhinkable during rhe Weimar Republic.

Notes
Originally written in German, rhis arride was rranslared by Alan Norhnagle and edired by
Karhleen Canning.
l. My approach here relies looscly on Niklas Luhmann's rheory of social srrucrures as
strucrures of cxpectation. Expecrations are restrictions on rhe free play of possibiliry-rhe higher rhe expecrarions, rhe smaller rhe sysrcn freedom of acrion since rhe
dangcr of disappoinrmcnr riscs. 1hus a systcn performance is acrually a result of expecrarions. Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Syste111e. Gn111drifl einer ,l/ge11111rn Theorie
(Frankfurt, 1987), esp. 139 f., 391-404.
2. Cf.Jcan-Marie Mayeur, La vie po/i1i,11e so11s la TroisiCine fp11bliqt1e, 1870-1940 (Paris,
1984), 399 fE
3. Sec Wolfgang Schivclbusch, Die K1tlt11r der Niederlage: Der 11111crika11isc/Je Siidrn 1865,
Frnnkreich 1871, Drntsclilm1d 1918 (I3erlin, 2001 ).
4. Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Politisclie Tlieorie im Wohlfi1hrtsstilat (Mnchcn, 1981); wirh re
specr to modern democracics, see Willibald Stei11111etz, Das Sagbare 1111d das Maclibare.
Zwn W.mdel politisclier Ha11dlu11gsspielrii111ne, England 1780-1867 (Srurrgart, 1993).
5. 1homas Mergcl, Parlamrntarische ltlt11r in der Weimarcr Republik. Politisclie Kommu
11ilwtio11, symbolische Politi/, 1111<1 O_ij"entlichkeit im Reiclistag, 1919-1933 (Dsseldorf,
2002).
6. In his inrroducrion to rhc 1990 cdition of his book, Habermas admitted as much, alrhough not wirh rcspccr ro thosc public sphcres which I analyze. SeeJrgcn Habermas,
Strnkt1mva11del der _{frntlichkcit (Frankfurr, 1990). For a similar view see Geoff Eley,
"Natons, Publics, and Polirical Cultures. Placing Habermas in the 19rh Century;' in
Crtlt11rd Powcr/ 1-Iistory: A Re<1dcr in Co11te111pon1ry Social 'flieory. ed. Nicholas Dirks
cr al. (Princeron, NJ, 1994), 297-335. Herc Elcy also makes a disrincrion berween
various public sphercs: gcndcr and popular culture, but not Catholicism and the rural
milieu.
7. Cf. Mergcl, Parlmnentorisclie K11lt11r, 399 ff.
8. 'fl10mas Mergel, "Fhrer, Volksgcmcinschaft und Maschine. Polirische Erwarrungsstrukturcn in der Weimarer Republik und dem Nationalsozialismus 1918-1936;' in
Politischc K11lt11rgcscliiclitc der Zwischcnkriegszcit 1918-1939, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig
(Gorringen, 2005), 91-127.