G.R. No.

157451 December 16, 2005

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of
showing why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any
reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the
will.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision 2 and the March 7,
2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and
allowing probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering
the issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case
be remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the
United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home
to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon
St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca
Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the
United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a
ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a
little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a
cause written down as COR PULMONALE.

"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting
of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983.
The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the
attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator
and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was
signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left
hand margin. It provides in the body that:
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE
LORD AMEN:
I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and
a resident of 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of
sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and
testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the
Catholic Church in accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable
monument to be erected and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my
memory in the minds of my family and friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one
half (1/2) portion of the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [coowner]:
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati,
Metro Manila, described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of
Pasig, Metro-Manila registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca
Valmonte), having share and share alike;
b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and
mixed materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon
Street, Makati, Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482,
Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and
myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-owners thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my
savings account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all
others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife,
Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and
testament, and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in
Quezon City, Philippines.
"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the
USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the
testator; or to give them proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and
formalities were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution
he being in an advance sate of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the
petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of
understanding and integrity.
"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary
public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental
witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the
opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.
"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents
house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get
his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were
times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it
was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The
will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their
wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the
existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found
it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator
bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the said will. To
her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the testator is worth
more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered

mental infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two
to three kilometers from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if
she could not accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly
pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was
hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death.
"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will,
testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the
three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to
prepare his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and
dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on June
15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public
kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned
on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed
by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator
and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each
and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood.
He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator
and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had
he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He
reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because
he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his
observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his
signature on the will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public,
and testified that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza
Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the
house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his
instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that
they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come
back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary public; that the
testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the will
was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of
them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife, Josefina was not with
them.
"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside
from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled
to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at
the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and
was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido
lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and they took
care of him. During that time, the testators physical and mental condition showed

deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary
Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.

Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the subject will."8

"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced,
reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:

In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido
Valmonte.

1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and
attestation of the will; and

This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was
then in an advanced state of senility

Main Issue:

"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate."5

Probate of a Will

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for
Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however,
the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters
resolved by this Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the
appellate court differ from those of the trial court.9

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to
probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing
witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that
the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added
that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" 6 did not make
him a person of unsound mind.
Hence, this Petition.7

The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that
every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures
and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. 10 Verily, Article 839 of the
Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the
time of its execution;

"I.
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;

"II.

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary or of some other person;

Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by
fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should
be his last will and testament.

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

"III.

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto."

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by
imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testators state of mind at the time.
Existence of Fraud in the
Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of
the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the
existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife
and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting
witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the
varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young
life [to] almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age
x x x and who happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado," 11 thus casting doubt on
the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly
"defies human reason, logic and common experience"12 for an old man with a severe
psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense,
by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is
misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes,
or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not
have made."13
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence
of fraud at the time of its execution.14 The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of
fraud.15 Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner,
no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

testator and of one another.19 Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must
acknowledge the will before a notary public.20 In any event, we agree with the CA that
"the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental
witnesses."21
The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25,
1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are
reproduced respectively as follows:
"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator
and his witnesses were supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.
xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per
acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual date when the document
was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their
respective signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will.16 That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently
established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years
his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were
the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight
years."17
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not
even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion."18 More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body
of the document as well as the attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own
handwriting August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)
Eugenio Gomez:

Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in
the acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and
tell us this discrepancy in the date?

A Our purpose is just to sign the will.

A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses;
that was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June
but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.

A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)"22

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your
companions?

Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the

commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent
stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the
three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due
execution.23 Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any
showing of ill motives.24
Capacity to Make a Will

A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out
first time. We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the
last will and testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in the
testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15th of June.
When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to
sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that was
the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what
transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the
following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at
the time of its execution.
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to
know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of
the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate
court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately
the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their
locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some
relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud
in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,25 which held
thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental
aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not
render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him
to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken
or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be
insane or of unsound mind."26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States
and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old.
But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in
English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983but
acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of
this will was opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the
notary public who notarized the testators will, after the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will,
the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to
give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned
on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so
they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983.
The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned
he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983
because he did not like the document to appear dirty.

Petitioners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was
already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting
witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the
attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or
trickery.
HELD:

Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247 | Escosia

FACTS:

1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify

accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his
shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife
as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will
did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of

fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes

irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense,
by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such
character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the
nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it
may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the
deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain
will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving
the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden
to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
because the law does not even require that a notarial
will be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental
witnesses.

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA
MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO
CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZSALONGA respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will
and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria,
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the
petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however,
dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and
Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her
own legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia
died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the
same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding
the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a
petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of
kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been
adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these
respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as
heirs.
Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the
estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December
22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for
Partition filed by the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November
5, 1959 is hereby granted."

In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it
of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On
motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to
bear out the genuineness of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied
with the results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary
questioned-document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said
documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer
the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners
likewise located former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the
questioned adoption, and obtained written depositions from two of them denying any
knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings.
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the
petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter
of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the
late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the
respondent Benita Cruz-Meez who entered an appearance separately from that of
her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court,
by way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be
permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides
subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court
issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the
properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will.
The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby
an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda
from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and
October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners'
intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary
dispositions.
The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk
of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria,
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and
nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On
the other side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita CruzMeez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will
of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of

legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its
extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.
The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie
which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with
the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that
the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of
the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious, the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs
but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds
support in article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided
he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to
the legitime of said heirs.
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are
not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a
free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to
properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate
succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires
relevance.
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate
should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution
of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of
whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists
proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of such cause.
Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the
attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will
of the deceased which recite:
III

Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay

ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente
adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na
pawang may apelyidong Cruz.
Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang
aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:
A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina
Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may
apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at
walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang
mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng
aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro
Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang
Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng
testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay na lupa at
palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa
aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati () ng
ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking
namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria.
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that
the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath
one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's
legitime. The petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to
be spurious, she would not have instituted the respondents at all the basis of the
institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of
the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the
opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion
or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and
niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in
her will?
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must
appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution
if he had known the falsity of the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling
reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that
under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the
testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if
she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law,
independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her

supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on
legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory
scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of
what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails,
however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal
manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the
basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law
commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these
respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever
false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will,
that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause
for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the
institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as
her legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at
best
is
vague
and
uncertain.
The
phrases, "mga
sapilitang
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on
succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and
the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the
decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known
that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the
free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent
Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz,
shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what
she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively
small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the
petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner
Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the
inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to
the bulk of the testate by intestacy a result which would subvert the clear wishes of
the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit
injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any
of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole

estate,2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we
could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. 3 A probate
court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was
possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full
expression to her will.4

considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be
assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject
of a collateral attack.5

HELD:

To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of
December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent
orders complained of served merely to clarify the first an act which the court could
legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes
and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justices. 6 That the court a
quo has limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as
articulated by the Rules of Court.7
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
Austria v. Reyes
31 SCRA 754 | Vargas
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate,
ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently
allowed with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whom were
Basilias legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin of
Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and
without any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should
have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with petitioners being the
compulsory heirs.
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was
deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire
estate to the respondents as the latter's legitime, with the inference that respondents
would not have instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious adoption
been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), the impelling
reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that
under the law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies
whereby, the statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be

ISSUE:
W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.

No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the
Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of
heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and
third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent's will does not
state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs.
Absent such we look at other considerations. The decedents disposition of the free
portion of her estate, which largely favored the respondents, compared with the
relatively small devise of land which the decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a
perceptible inclination on her part to give the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding the respondents from the
inheritance, considering that petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the
bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the
decedent.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate, as was done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the
testator should be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final
judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving
full expression to her will must be in order.

AUSTRIA V. REYES, 31 SCRA 754 (1970)

DOCTRINE: The statement of a false cause in the institution of heirs shall be
disregarded, unless it is proved that the testator would not have made such institution
had he been properly appraised of the truth. Aside from the fact that the false cause must
be stated in the will, the opponents of the will are likewise mandated to prove by
substantial evidence that the testator would not have made such a disposition had he
known the true state of affairs. Therefore, inferences and conjectures are not sufficient to
invalidate a provision which is challenged as one made on the basis of a false cause.

Please note that the false cause which led the testator to make a particular
testamentary disposition is treated in the same way as a mistake, which in contract law,
vitiates consent.
FACTS: On July 7, Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for
probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the
petitioners, Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo and still
others who, like petitioner are nephew and nieces of Basilia. The opposition was
dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
1. The bulk of the estate of Basilia, was destined under the will to pass on to
respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz,
and Luz Cruz Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by
Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
2. April 23, 1959 two years after the probate was allowed Basilia died. Perfecto
Cruz was appointed as executor without bond in accordance with the provisions
of the decedents will.
3. November 5, 1959 Petitioner filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of
Basilia, and that the five respondents, Perfecto Cruz, et.al, had not fact been
adopted by the decedent in accordance with law. The court then allowed the
said intervention by petitioners which the court delimited to the properties of
the deceased which were not disposed of in the will and disregarded the
matter of the genuineness of adoption.
4. Upon denial of two motions for reconsiderations, the petitioners filed before
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the
lower courts orders restricting their intervention.
ISSUE: WON the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists
proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
HELD: No
Article 850 of the Civil Code provides:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered
as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites:
1. The cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will
2. The cause must be shown to be false
3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause
Even if Basilia have used the terms sapilitang mana and sapilitang tagapagmana there
is no indication that had she known that the respondents were not her adopted
disposition of the free portion was largely at Basilias discretion and she had given a large
part to the respondents while giving a relatively small legacy in favor of the petitioners.
The decedents will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such
institution of heirs. The Court cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or
uncertain implications.

Article 850 of the Civil Code is positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the
testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be
annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator
clearly would not have made the institution of he had known the cause for it to be false.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and
the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of
the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
The legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in
a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack.

G.R. No. 118680

March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all
surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN
TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE,
PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA
M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS,
INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil
Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:

On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez

initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein
petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the
petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in
equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of
petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent
Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the
adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of
Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an
extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of
Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of
Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land
covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided
among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely
by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567
square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively.1 The total
land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents
Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were
able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.2
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were
transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai,3 but not included in the Deed of
Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are
now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among
Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B,
560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to
respondent Victorino Detall4 and was subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine
who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square
meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla 5 and was later transferred to
respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name of respondent
Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and subsequently
registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining

portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent
Immaculate Concepcion College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T10208.6
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of
petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the
properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and
Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was
filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to
include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between
the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."7
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision
of the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the following grounds:8
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from
questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already estopped, it
naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise
estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and
void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the partition would have
been alright had she been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late
considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period provided for in Article
1100 of the Civil Code;9
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994.10
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were
allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals in I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION
ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID TRANSACTION
II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE
ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION

One, the party assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two, the party
assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these
requirements are not present in her case, 12 since she did not participate in the "Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30
(1963), where we held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including
some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent.
She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.13

III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED

OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE
APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WHO WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO.
SP-00208

Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since
they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence required before purchasing the
lots in question.14 In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a coowner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New
Civil Code.15

IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE

NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED
DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO
HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S"
AND "I"

Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed.
She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil
Code.16

V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT

CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF
THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE
OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM
ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN
COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS
APPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF
HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION11
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for
annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already
prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner
is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent
buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not
yet prescribed since the prescriptive period which should be applied is four years
following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec.
4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements.

Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed.
In addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their
shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they
entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally,
respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition
was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In
any case, they assert that the shares of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in
the said partition.17
Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who
have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in
addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 19 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.20
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.
Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De
Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of
fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed
with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the
name of respondents exclusively.21

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or
three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March
11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis
of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of
extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.22
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule
contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of
Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties
to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which
was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling
in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the
settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial
partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial
partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and
consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. 23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel
together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel,
she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate,
following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. 24 The private respondent
Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since
they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that
their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned
at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the
adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a
much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive
parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is
patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent
to defraud Maria Elena.

Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be

precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question
which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule
covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in
the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge
the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.25
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise.
Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died.
Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since
Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and
widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's
estate but only Pilar's estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in
this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this
issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered
under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot
be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for such purpose.26
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other
documentary evidence was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual
damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the
fact and amount of damages.27 The same is true for moral damages. These cannot be
awarded in the absence of any factual basis. 28 The unsubstantiated testimony of
Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and has no probative value. It is settled in
jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her claims for
damages does not mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the
law, nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded
or violated by defendants may be vindicated and recognized.30

In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:

This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person
who has been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the
decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two
years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate under

Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately,
was not adequately and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her
legal participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3)
respondents had transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties, and
(4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in
petitioner's favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical
injury.31 The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate

to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said
damages.32 Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the
special reasons extant in this case.33 Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the technical
injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is

declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to petitioner as

damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.