POLITICAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW

Recent Jurisprudence (2010-March 2015)1

By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
POWERS & STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

STATE POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES

The intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from legalizing abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life
of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers
was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. x x x
The RH Law mandates protection be given from the moment of fertilization
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it
finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the
policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the
uterus for implantation.
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. xxx
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be
clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word" or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

1 This is a working draft of excerpts of recent selected jurisprudence, with the underlined capsules or sub-headings provided by
the author. This work is subject to revision without prior notice. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution
to the author is permitted.

2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of
Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland,
April 2014); Philippine Youth delegate to Japan and Southeast Asia; Litigation lawyer, formerly with the Ponce Enrile
Reyes & Manlastas Law Offices (Pecabar); Professor of Constitutional Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila,
College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), College of Law, Manila. Former professor of
Constitutional Law, New Ear University, Quezon City; Bar Review Lecturer, Recoletos Review Center, Manila

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The RH Law does not legalize abortion as it affords protection for the fertilized
ovum
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, x x x, refers to that which
induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to
mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not
declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum
which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it
becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After
all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the
fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position
that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the
uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of
life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that
is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8,

2014) (Emphases supplied)

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Legal requisites for judicial review
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of these
requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No.

208566, November 19, 2013)

Actual case: A constitutional requirement for judicial review

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently
states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No.

208566, November 19, 2013)

Meaning of actual case: conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal

claims, susceptible of judicial resolution; not a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must
be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
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and jurisprudence." (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013; Araullo v. Aquino,

G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

Moot and Academic Principle: Exceptions

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.

(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

[T]he moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No.

208566, November 19, 2013; Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Actual case: The question must be ripe for adjudication

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for
adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through
advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."

(Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

Meaning of actual case: Conflict of legal rights or claims susceptible of judicial

resolution; not moot or academic; not a request for an advisory opinion
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or
based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme

Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements v. Abolition of Judiciary

Development Fund and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015) (Emphasis
supplied)
Actual case: the petitions against the RH Law present an actual controversy
ripe for adjudication because 1) its implementing rules have already taken effect and
that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, and 2)
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual
case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the
questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has
been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that
judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
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An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate

or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.
xxx
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the
matter NOW. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Actual case: Why a petition assailing a proposed bill does not present an
actual case
A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. The Court has no
power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the
nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. Under the
Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass.
The petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this
courts determination. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and

Fiscal Autonomy Movements v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund and Reduction of Fiscal
Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015) (Emphases supplied)

Actual case: Possibility of abuse in the implementation of a law is not

sufficient for an actual controversy; allegations of abuse must be anchored on real
events
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations
of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Southern

Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)

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Locus standi: Taxpayers have standing to question the validity of the Pork
Barrel System as they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional use of public
funds
As taxpayers, petitioners possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the
existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R.

No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

Locus standi: To have standing to question the legality of the composition of

the Judicial and Bar Council, the petitioner need not be a nominee to a judicial post
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
"personal stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only
official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the
JBC composition for being unconstitutional. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all
over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. Hence,
a citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the
same time, armed with issues of transcendental importance to society. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just
for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders. (Chavez v Judicial and Bar Council, G.R.

No. 202242, July 17, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

Locus standi: If the petition is anchored on a public right, such as the peoples
right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in
interest
If the petition is anchored on the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public
which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the result. It is
sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful execution of the
laws. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment [IDEAL] v. Power Sector Liabilities and

Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)

Political questions: The Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of the Reproductive Health Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of
powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and
of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive
or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
caution.
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political
instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to
respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a
very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and
the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment
to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

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In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may
be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject
to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and
goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the
legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but,
rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and
rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review. This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution x x x
As far back as Tanada v. Angara, the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on
applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, Aldaba v. COMELEC, Magallona v. Ermita, and countless
others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Political questions: The conduct of the foreign relations is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative departments
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such
category involves questions of foreign relations.
The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution
to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the
authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts
but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided
that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts
to question. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010)
Doctrine of operative fact: Actions
unconstitutionality are legally recognized

prior

to

the

declaration

of

Under the doctrine of operative fact, in the interest of fair play, the actions previous to
the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. Thus, acts of the Judicial and Bar Council, before its composition was declared
unconstitutional, are valid. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior
to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences
that cannot always be erased. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but
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sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect. It is resorted to only as a matter of equity
and fair play. The Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that
resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature
but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified.
The adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were
executive acts. In that context, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can
no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete
findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil,
administrative and other liabilities. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

(Emphases supplied)

LEGISLATIVE & EXECUTIVE POWERS

Why PDAF/Pork Barrel System is void
The PDAF/Pork Barrel System violates the principle of separation of powers
Congress cannot participate or interfere in the implementation of the budget, which is an
executive function. Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which
go into the implementation of the national budget. Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress
law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing
the national budget begins. Congress post-enactment role should be limited to oversight. (Belgica v.

Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System violates the principle of non-delegation of

legislative power
An individual legislator cannot be given the authority to dictate (a) how much fund would go
to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that he himself also determines, as these two (2) acts comprise
the exercise of the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. Insofar as it confers postenactment identification authority to individual legislators, said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. (Belgica v. Executive

Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System undermines the system of checks and balance by
impairing the Presidents item veto power
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a
proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations,
pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the
bill."
The lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system under PDAF fosters
the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. This setup leaves the actual amounts
and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate
a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto. (Belgica v. Executive

Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System undermines public accountability by impairing

Congress oversight functions (as said legislators would be, in effect, checking on activities in
which they themselves participate), and violating the constitutional prohibitions on
legislators intervention for pecuniary benefit or on matters where he may be called upon to act
under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

208566, November 19, 2013) (Emphases supplied)

The PDAF/Pork Barrel System violates the constitutional principles on local

autonomy as it allows district representatives who are national officers to substitute the
judgement of local officials on use of public funds for local development
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Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and
thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

208566, November 19, 2013)

Requirements for a valid transfer of appropriations

The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon
a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,

2014) (Emphases supplied)

Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid

The transfer of funds under the Development Acceleration Program (DAP) is
invalid for lack of a valid law authorizing the transfer
GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the
DAP. Hence, transfers under the DAP were unconstitutional
The provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution
for not carrying the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra. The
provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect was that
the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment
any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent
did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the afore-quoted
provisions cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to
another branch, or to a constitutional commission. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,

2014) (Emphases supplied)

The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
necessarily savings.
There are savings only when the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were
already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist. The fact alone that the
appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as
unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings
can be generated. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014) (Emphases supplied)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
transferred to augment existing items in the GAA.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an
appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is
determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be
funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in
this Act. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014) (Emphases supplied)
Only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by
legally accumulated savings. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)

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The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid for because some of the transfers of
appropriation were not made to their respective offices.
Funds appropriated for one office were used to augment items in other offices. the
phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with
respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of
Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the
Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons. Funds appropriated
for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of
augmentation of a deficient item or items. Cross-border transfers, whether as
augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5). (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R.

No. 209287, July 1, 2014) (Emphases supplied)

DAP in Summary: Violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987

Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers
The following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National
Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances [are] unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings
prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,

2014)

The President has the power to conduct investigations and create an ad hoc
investigating body pursuant to his duty to faithfully execute the law
The power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The
former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission finds justification under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in
ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief
Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority. As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus,
the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7,

2010)

THE JUDICIARY
Why Congress cannot grant exemptions from payment of legal fees
Payment of legal fees is part of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court,
which is no longer shared with Congress

9|Page

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress by granting exemption from legal fees to government owned or controlled
corporations or local governments. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the
Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less
with the Executive. (Re: in the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of all Court

and Sheriff's Fees of Cooperative etc., A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012)

Congress grant of exemptions from payment of legal fees will impair the
Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and erode its independence
Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to governmentowned or controlled corporations and local government units is also constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. Fiscal autonomy
recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal
fees. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Courts financial resources
but also comprise an essential element of the Courts fiscal independence. (Re: in the Matter of

Clarification of Exemption from Payment of all Court and Sheriff's Fees of Cooperative etc., A.M.
No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012)

The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure; the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by the
Supreme Court with Congress, more so with the Executive
Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a
power sharing scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules.
Thus, both the 193513 and the 197314 Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the "power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law." However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the
concurrent power to "repeal, alter or supplement" such rules.
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.
This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice17 that this Courts power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress":
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article VIII18 x x x
.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in
the original; boldfacing supplied)
Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put
to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter,
Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all
kinds."19 Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive
power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as "one of the safeguards of this
Courts institutional independence":
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified
by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
10 | P a g e

promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain.

(Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes, G.R. No. 165922)

Judicial and Bar Council

There should be only one (1) representative from Congress in the Judicial and Bar
Council: The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to have each ex-officio member
as representing one co-equal branch of government. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R.

No. 202242, July 17, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies
and instrumentalities, including local governments
[R]espondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a
local government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No.
1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities.
Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the
Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing
procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the
Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten
years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating
to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons
respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable
capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and
claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all
government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and
as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the
government, those funded by donations through the government, those required
to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put
up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit.
Rule II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters falling under COAs exclusive
jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule
VIII, Section 1 further provides:
Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have
original jurisdiction over:
a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in
the hiring of legal retainers by government agency; c) write off of unliquidated
cash advances and dormant accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one
million pesos (P 1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from accountability for loses
due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Five
Million pesos (P 5,000,000.00).
In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, we ruled that it is the COA
and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners money
claim against respondent local government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by
the parties failure to argue the issue nor active participation in the proceedings. Thus:
This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for
although petitioners collection suit for P487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the
11 | P a g e

circumstances surrounding petitioners claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COAs
jurisdiction.
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of money
against a local government unit. This brought the case within the COAs domain to pass upon
money claims against the government or any subdivision thereof under Section 26 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:
The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and comprehend
all matters relating to x x x the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any
sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities. x x x. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp.,

G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

COAs authority over money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those

determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers
within reach of accounting officers
The scope of the COAs authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed,
however, by an unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean only
liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers,
invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. Petitioners claim
was for a fixed amount and although respondent took issue with the accuracy of petitioners
summation of its accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily determinable from the
receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the COAs jurisdiction
under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King

Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

STATE POWERS: EMINENT DOMAIN

Requirements for issuance of writ of possession in expropriation
On the matter of issuance of writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio case as
reiterated in Sumulong vs. Guerrero states:
"[I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation
proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a Complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional determination of just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on
the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement
under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with."
Here, it is even pointless to take up the matter of said requisites for the issuance of writ
of possession considering that, as stated, NO complaint was ever filed in Court AT THE TIME of
the seizure of defendants properties. (National Housing Authority v. Baello, G.R. No. 200858,

August 7, 2013) (Emphases supplied)

Agrarian Reform

Indirect ownership of land through stock distribution: Valid under the

Constitution
The wording of the Constitutional provision is unequivocalthe farmers and regular
farmworkers have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The
basic law allows two (2) modes of land distributiondirect and indirect ownership.
Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely
accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative
to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers.
By using the word "collectively," the Constitution allows for indirect ownership
of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer.
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Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29 allows
workers cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second paragraph of
Sec. 31 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers becoming
stockholders or members.
With the view We take of this case, the stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31 of
RA 6657 hews with the agrarian reform policy, as instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of
Article XIII of the Constitution. (Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform

Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011) (Emphases supplied)

Just compensation

Reckoning point for determining value is at the time of taking

Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta.

Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)

Determination of just compensation is a judicial function

While a court should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in
arriving at its just compensation valuation, it is not strictly bound thereto. The determination of
just compensation is a judicial function. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta.

Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)

Interest must be paid in case of delay

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property. However, compensation, to be "just," must also be made without delay. The
owners loss is not only his property but also its income-generating potential. Thus, if property is
taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited with the court. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209,

October 3, 2012)

The Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is
delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an
effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of
12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the
landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in line with the
amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799,58 series of 2013.59. (Department of

Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES
DUE PROCESS
The immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property
without due notice and hearing is violative of due process
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The callous disregard of the Rules and the Constitutional mandate that private property
shall not be taken without just compensation and unless it is for public use, is UNSURPRISING,
considering the catenna (sic) of repressive acts and wanton assaults committed by the Marcos
Regime against human rights and the Constitutional rights of the people which have become a
legendary part of history and mankind.
True it is, that the plaintiff may have a laudable purpose in the expropriation of the land
in question x x x But the reprehensible and scary manner of the taking of defendants property in
1976, which, in a manner of speaking, was seizure by the barrel of the gun, is more aptly
described by the defendants in the following scenario of 1976, to wit:

1.01. Sometime in the mid-seventies, a truckload of fully-armed

military personnel entered the Baello property in Caloocan City [then
covered by OCT No. (804) 55839] (sic) and, at gunpoint, forcibly ejected
the familys caretaker. The soldiers, thereafter, demolished a two-storey
residence and destroyed all fishpond improvements found inside the
property.
1.02. From this period up till the end of the Marcos misrule, no decree,
no court order, no ordinance was shown or made known to the
defendants to justify the invasion, assault, and occupation of their
property. Worse, defendants were not even granted the courtesy of a
letter or memorandum that would explain the governments intention
on the subject property.
1.03. The militarys action, coming as it does at the height of martial law,
elicited the expected response from the defendants. Prudence dictated silence.
From government news reports, defendants gathered that their land was seized
to complement the erstwhile First Ladys Dagat-Dagatan project. Being a pet
program of the dictators wife, defendants realized that a legal battle
was both dangerous and pointless.
1.04. Defendants property thus came under the control and possession of
the plaintiff. The NHA went on to award portions of the subject property to
dubious beneficiaries who quickly fenced their designated lots and/or erected
permanent structures therein. During all this time, no formal communication from
the NHA was received by the defendants. The plaintiff acted as if the registered
owners or their heirs did not exist at all.
1.05. The celebrated departure of the conjugal dictators in February 1986
kindled hopes that justice may at least come to the Baellos. Verbal inquiries were
made on how just compensation can be obtained from the NHA considering its
confiscation of the subject property. The representations proved fruitless.
Evidently, plaintiffs seizure of defendants property is an audacious infringement of their
rights to DUE PROCESS.
The immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without due
notice and hearing is violative of due process. (National Housing Authority v. Baello, G.R. No.

200858, August 7, 2013) (Emphases supplied)

Chance to be heard through motion for reconsideration is sufficient

compliance with due process
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits
is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be
heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a
party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration. In the
present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a
motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any,
was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23,

2014)

In an NBI investigation, the suspect need not be given notice and hearing

14 | P a g e

There is no denial of due process if a suspect is deprived of participation in an

NBI investigation. The NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of
granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. Moreover, findings of
the NBI are merely recommendatory, subject to the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justices
actions for purposes of finding probable cause. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014)

(Emphasis supplied)

Ex-parte issuance of protection order before notice and hearing is valid because
time is of the essence to prevent further violence
The ex-parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order under RA 9262, before notice and
hearing, does not violate due process, as time is of the essence if further violence is to be prevented.
The court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the
life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy. The victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. Nevertheless, the TPO is issued ex parte, the
court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. (Garcia v. Drilon,

G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)

The right to due process protects citizens against arbitrary government action, but
not from acts committed by private individuals or entities; it cannot be invoked in private
controversies involving private parties
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of
party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due
process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO of the party should have first summoned
them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al.,
proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and are, therefore,
covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies
created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are
performed. The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers
thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.
The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due
process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its
citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary
government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. The
right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental
rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. (Atienza v.

Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010)

Void for vagueness doctrine: Vagueness as a violation of due process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health
service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private
health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals
operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning
methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health
15 | P a g e

information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section
23(a)(2). x x x
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be
taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is,
every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health
service provider," xxx
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of
"private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that
they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated
to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures.
Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods,
necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures. (Imbong v. Ochoa,

G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

EQUAL PROTECTION
Favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse is not a violation of the
equal protection clause
R.A. 9262 does not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under
the law. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Search warrants: Requirements for validity

[A]ccused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her house are
inadmissible as evidence because the Search Warrant issued for her house was invalid for failing
to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements. Accused-appellant specifically
pointed out the following defects which made said Search Warrant void: (1) the informants, Lading and Tudlong, made misrepresentation of facts in the Application for Search Warrant filed
16 | P a g e

with the MTCC; (2) Judge Cortes of the MTCC failed to consider the informants admission that
they themselves were selling marijuana; and (3) the Search Warrant failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched because the house was a two-storey building composed of
several rooms.
The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and
protected by no less than the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III which
provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure laid
down the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the
following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)
Search warrants: Meaning of probable cause
In People v. Aruta, the Court defined probable cause as follows:
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. (People v. Tuan, G.R.

No. 176066, August 11, 2010)

Search warrant warrants: Must be based on substantial evidence that the

items are seizable
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the
items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the
items will be found in the place to be searched.
A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
17 | P a g e

substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. (People v. Tuan,

G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)

Search warrants: A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the

officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community
Equally without merit is accused-appellants assertion that the Search Warrant did not
describe with particularity the place to be searched.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar,
the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific
enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellants
residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms. (People v.

Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)

Search warrants: The search must be at the place described in the warrant
The items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other
than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of
petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. (Castillo v.

People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012) (Emphasis supplied)

Search incident to a lawful arrest: First, there must be a valid arrest

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the
process cannot be reversed.
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the
conduct of the search. The arrest of Sanchez was made only after the discovery by SPO1
Amposta of the shabu inside the match box. Evidently, what happened in this case was that a
search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on the evidence
produced by the search. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Stop-and-frisk search: Requirements
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a
"limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover

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weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment x x x x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stopand-frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Stop-and-frisk search: Police must have genuine reason that the person has
concealed weapons
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless
there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the
purpose of protecting the public. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014) (Emphases

supplied)

A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons concealed about him. It
should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest
for this principle to apply.
Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without
more, were innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind
of an experienced and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu in his possession, or
that he was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer. (Sanchez v. People, G.R.

No. 204589, November 19, 2014) (Emphases supplied)

Roadside questioning of a motorist pursuant to a routine traffic stop is not

necessarily an arrest that justifies a search
Roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not
fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest.
However, when there is intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of
liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the
motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. There being no valid arrest, the
warrantless search that results from this will be illegal. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788,

February 29, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

Plain view doctrine: Requirements: 1) prior justification for an intrusion; 2)

discovery is inadvertent; and 3) object is immediately apparent
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the
subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As
already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently
discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly
19 | P a g e

inside a match box being then held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to
the police officers. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
The constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position
to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant
when they went to the house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the
petitioners house, the lumbers were lying under the latters house and at the shoreline about
two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that the said lumber is
plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioners house falls
within the purview of the plain view doctrine. (Crescencio v People, G.R. No. 205015, November

19, 2014)

Silence is not necessarily consent to a search

Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. The prosecution
and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which
is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
presumed. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014) (Emphases supplied)
Informants tip that a pot session is going on inside a house is not sufficient
justification for police officers to enter such house to effect an arrest and seizure
without a warrant
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject
items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and
his Joint Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused
Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in
said house.
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases that tipped information is
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in the
case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit,
basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest.
None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest
and seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case of People v. Bolasa is informative on this
matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman
were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the
house of the suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their informer. When
they reached the house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and woman
repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers,
confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of
the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had
no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed,
were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to
believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who
have escaped from a penal establishment.

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Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no
valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they
saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the
search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a
customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a
surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause
for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a
valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise
illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accusedappellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010) (Emphases

supplied)

Evidence cannot be considered inadvertently discovered for purposes of

seizure of evidence in plain view, if the police officers intentionally entered the house
with no prior surveillance or investigation
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of
plain view are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers
intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they
discovered the accused with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in
Bolasa was held to be insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless
search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a
moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one
under exigent and emergency circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the
identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have
been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as
a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search
and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010) (Emphases supplied)
Airport security searches: Valid even without a warrant, because of their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel
In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger
during a routine frisk at the airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless
search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Searches pursuant to
airport security procedures are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
21 | P a g e

safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.

(Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013) (Emphases supplied)
Airport security searches: Not limited to a stop-and-frisk

We further held that the scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure
is not confined only to search for weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine. The
more extensive search conducted on accused Canton was necessitated by the discovery of
packages on her body, her apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused the suspicion
of the frisker that she was hiding something illegal.
The search of the contents of petitioners short pants pockets being a valid search
pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him
was therefore admissible in evidence. (Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013)

(Emphases supplied)

The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to
search for weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine. The more extensive search
conducted on accused Canton was necessitated by the discovery of packages on her body, her
apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused the suspicion of the frisker that she was
hiding something illegal. (Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013) (Emphases

supplied)

Government search of the office computer of a government employee: Valid if

there are reasonable grounds to suspect that it will turn up evidence of work-related
misconduct
Warrantless search by a government agency of the office computer of its employee in
connection with an investigation on a work-related misconduct is valid when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of
work-related misconduct.
The search is a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of
an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency
work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence
questioned search are deemed admissible. (Pollo v. Constantino-David,

October 18, 2011) (Emphases supplied)

the government as
by going after the
derived from the

G.R. No. 181881,

In flagrante delicto arrest requirements: 1) the person to be arrested must

execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and 2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful
arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the
instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest
was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or
was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante
delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Both elements were missing when
Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. (People v. Edano, G.R. No.

188133, July 7, 2014) (Emphases supplied)

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Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: Reliable information

alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)
Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is
known an arrest in flagrante delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that
could be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he
(appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime.
In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each
other when he approached them.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant
and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal
knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones
consciousness of guilt.
In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly
committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. (People v. Edano, G.R. No.

188133, July 7, 2014) (Emphases supplied)

Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: the mere act of leaving a
residence of a known drug peddler is not sufficient for an arrest
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to
Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police
operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that
proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b)
of Section 5 have been complied with in this warrantless arrest. When the police officers chased
the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu
from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he
boarded the tricycle. In other words, there was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez
that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in the
criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. Verily, probable cause in this case was more
imagined than real. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

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Hot pursuit arrest: Police presence at the scene while the crime was
being committed not required
For a valid hot pursuit arrest, personal knowledge of a crime just committed does not
require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough
that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less
than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as
those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in
the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)

FREE SPEECH
Prohibition on the sending of internet spam is a violation of freedom of
expression
Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 penalizes the
transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam," wherein the
communications seek to advertise, sell or offer for sale products or services.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate
category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The
State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of

Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)

The government can penalize internet libel, but the law penalizing
aiding and abetting the commission of internet libel is void for being vague and
overbroad
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation
to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a new crime
since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. The above
prohibition merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing
libel.
Under the doctrine of overbreadth, a governmental purpose, such as to regulate the use
of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of
mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of
protected freedoms.
In this case, the terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages.
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Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, penal laws should provide reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.
A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad
or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.
In this case, the term aiding or abetting is vague and does not give netizens "fair
notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its vagueness
raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the
freedom of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
Why Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized tarpaulins posted on
private property by non-candidates is void
Comelec cannot prohibit or regulate the posting on private property of
tarpaulins by non-candidates pursuant to their advocacy on a social issue; such
tarpaulins are not campaign materials or election propaganda subject to Comelec
regulation
Oversized tarpaulins not paid for by any candidate, political party, or party-list group, but
posted by non-candidates on private property pursuant to its advocacy on a social issue are not
campaign materials or election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must
be protected by this court. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

205728, January 21, 2015) (Emphases supplied)

Prohibition on the posting of tarpaulins on private property by non-candidates

is a content-based regulation that is presumed invalid unless the prohibition passes
the clear and present danger test
A content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured
against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if
justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high." "Only when the challenged act
has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality."
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin
as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to
minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech." In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on
the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. (The Diocese of

Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by noncandidates, in which the speech advocates a social issue, is unconstitutional

25 | P a g e

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole,
principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which
will not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it
reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as
members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is
declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the
endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity
of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the
basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on
private property. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January

21, 2015)

Comelec prohibition on tarpaulins posted by non-candidates on private

property is a deprivation of property without due process
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private
property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property
or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers
should be posted is "so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property."
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this
right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government
must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
Respondents have not demonstrated that the present state interest they seek to promote
justifies the intrusion into petitioners property rights. Election laws and regulations must be
reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individuals right to exercise property rights.
Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated.
The act of respondents in seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in
their own private property is an impermissible encroachments on the right to property. (The

Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Comelec cannot regulate or limit the speech of the electorate in the electoral
process
COMELECs general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce
spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the
speech of the electorate as it strives to participate in the electoral exercise.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie
of expression protected by our fundamental law.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the
electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by
26 | P a g e

candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates
the conditions for their election.
It is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. (The Diocese of

Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Why Comelecs aggregate-based regulation of air-time of candidates and

political parties is void: It unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of the
press as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which adopts the "aggregate-based" limits broadcast and
radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for
political campaigns or advertisements unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of
speech and of the press.
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental
Law. Accordingly, the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling
state interest.
Given the reduction of a candidate's airtime minutes in the New Rules, petitioner GMA
estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for his political
advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days, he will only have
27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates to 1 advertisement
spot on a 30-second spot basis in television.
The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357,

September 2, 2014) (Emphases supplied)

Why the Comelec rule on mandatory right to reply is valid

The Constitution itself mandates the right to reply
Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, as revised by Resolution No. 9631, provides:
SECTION 14. Right to Reply. - All registered political parties, party-list groups or
coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have the right to reply to charges published or aired
against them. The reply shall be given publicity by the newspaper, television, and/or radio
station which first printed or aired the charges with the same prominence or in the same page or
section or in the same time slot as the first statement. x x x
The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly,
honest, fair and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a
right to reply. Given that express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the
Fundamental Law itself has weighed in on the balance to be struck between the freedom of the
press and the right to reply. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357,

September 2, 2014)

Radio and TV broadcasting companies are only given a franchise to use the
airwaves, which franchise is a mere privilege, that may reasonably be burdened with
the performance by the grantee of some form of public service
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.
They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere
privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

205357, September 2, 2014)

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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Under the Establishment Clause, the State is prohibited from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions
[T]he constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,

8 April 2014)

Under the Free Exercise Clause, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering
with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. Explaining the
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious
tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L.
ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits
of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation
whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate
invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) (Imbong

v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

But if the state regulates conduct to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance
But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has
for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its
indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without
imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144;

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449). (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8
April 2014)
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power
to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.

(Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

Freedom to believe is absolute; freedom to act on ones belief is not

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Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination
and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds.
One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards.
But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road
to travel.
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and
can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where
the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R.

No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

A conscientious objector should be exempt from complying with the RH

Law regarding reproductive healthcare; otherwise, there will be a violation of "the
principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the right to free exercise of religion
The Reproductive Health Law mandates that a hospital or a medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government
legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's
espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this
case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular
objective.
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on
one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the
strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private,
should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle
of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers. (Imbong v. Ochoa,

G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all
medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.

(Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

Exception: Life threatening cases: The government may compel healthcare

providers to give reproductive health care, because the right to life of the mother
should be given preference
While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive
health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must
be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given
preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of
service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.

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Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the

life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical
practitioner. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

Mandatory family planning seminars: No violation of religious freedom

because attendees are not compelled to accept the information given to them
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 152 as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the
type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R.

No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to be let alone
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones
private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities." It is
the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned." Simply
put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No.

179736, June 26, 2013) (Emphases supplied)

Right to privacy may extend to places where one has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access, such as a business office
An individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not
be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the
right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of
anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

(Emphases supplied)

The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v.
Torres, we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an
individuals "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June

26, 2013) (Emphasis supplied)

Surveillance cameras should not pry into or cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy
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In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for
the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should
not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.
Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business
office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No.
4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners
as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person."
Petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property,
whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of
video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a
significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to
privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified.

(Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013) (Emphases supplied)

To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show

intention to keep certain posts private through the use of privacy tools
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network (OSN)
activity, it is first necessary that said user, manifest the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right
which necessarily accompanies said choice.
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, if he does not employ protective measures or
devices that would control access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
Setting a posts or profile details privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no
longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.

(Vivares v. St. Theresas College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE

If the mayor wants to change the venue of the rally, he must give the
applicant for a permit an opportunity to be heard
The public official concerned shall appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter,
his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R.

No. 175241, February 24, 2010)

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THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Direct evidence of enforced disappearance is not required; Hearsay evidence
may be admitted
Direct evidence of enforced disappearance is not required for the writ of amparo to issue.
Substantial evidence is still required, but flexibility must be observed. Hearsay evidence may be
admitted as the circumstance of the case may require.
The requirement for direct evidence to establish that an enforced disappearance
occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would render it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. In these lights, while the
need for substantial evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where appropriate
for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. (Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No.

182498, February 16, 2010)

Responsibility and/or accountability: The legal basis or bases for impleading

military commanders in amparo cases
The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding
does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground
that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis
of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at
least accountability. (Roxas v. Macapagl Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)
The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding
does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground
that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. Commanders may therefore be impleadednot actually on the basis of
command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these
terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. (Balao v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December

13, 2011) (Emphases supplied)

Writ of amparo: Proceedings do not determine criminal, civil or administrative

liability; principal objective is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination
of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe
writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law. The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been,
in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:
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x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding

that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner;
it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings. (Roxas v. Macapagl Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)

Writ of amparo: Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo

cases in order to identify those accountable individuals who have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue
Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an
amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect
the rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a
preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the President, as commander-in-chief of the
military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the
following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior
and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine. (Emphases supplied) (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,

November 15, 2011)

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Purpose: Protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual or a persons right to control information regarding
oneself
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.
It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
33 | P a g e

privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to

provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. (Vivares v. St. Theresas College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be
granted
It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
reads:

Habeas data The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right

to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a

public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

Writ of habeas data: Application may be be denied if the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest (such as
dismantling of private armies)
The right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may
yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether
the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this
case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the
relevant state interest involved.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of Private Armed Groups
with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against
her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must
be denied. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Rights in custodial interrogation do not apply in administrative investigations
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, is applicable only in custodial
interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain
silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to
be informed of the two other rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that
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petitioner gave an uncounseled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the

branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law
enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and,
(2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant
manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the
taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to
counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those
made in an administrative investigation." (Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June

26, 2013) (Emphases supplied)

The constitutional right to counsel is available only during custodial investigation. If the
investigation is merely administrative conducted by the employer and not a criminal
investigation, the admission made during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify
dismissal. (Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014)
There is no constitutional right to counsel for resource persons in a
congressional inquiry
The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial
investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such
custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as
resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel. (Philcomsat v.

Senate, G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012)

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Paraffin test without a lawyer is valid: The right against self-incrimination
extends only to testimonial compulsion, and not the use of the body of the accused is
examined
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question,
under the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right
is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession
or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not
violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends
only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to
be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently
fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. (People v.

Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014) (Emphasis supplied)

Mandatory drug testing of arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense:

Violation of the right to privacy and right against self-incrimination; drug test
evidence is immaterial in non-drug offenses
The drug test in Section 15 [of R.A. 9165, Dangerous Drugs Act] does not cover persons
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of
R.A. 9165 [Dangerous Drugs Act].
To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime
not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused
appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
Making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other
crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or
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arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to
our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, to wit:
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable
exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been
allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to
the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be material. In the instant case, we fail to see how a
urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion.
In the Gutang et al. case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material."
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug
case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that
point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was
arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample
was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal
drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioners right to privacy and right against selfincrimination.
We cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the
crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No.

200748, July 23, 2014)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first
Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent
court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad
had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ
denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of
impartiality and independence. When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944. We
eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never
had a chance to attach. (Ocampo v. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014)

36 | P a g e

RIGHT TO INFORMATION
The people have the right to access the papers and documents relating to the
company profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder for a government project
The peoples right to information is provided in Section 7, Article III of the Constitution,
which reads:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The peoples constitutional right to information is intertwined with the governments
constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution declares the State policy of full transparency in all transactions
involving public interest.
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority involving the execution of an Amended Joint
Venture Agreement on the disposition of reclaimed lands without public bidding, the Court held:

Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids

or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is
not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the
evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite
proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the
publics right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the
non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority thus laid down the rule that the constitutional

right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a

final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military
and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. In
addition, Congress has prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.
Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution, the other
aspect of the peoples right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain access to
documents and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of
information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter
contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency. Such
relief must be granted to the party requesting access to official records, documents
and papers relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are relevant to a
government contract.
Here, petitioners second letter dated May 14, 2010 specifically requested for detailed
information regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person or
responsible officer, office address and Philippine registration. But before PSALM could respond to
the said letter, petitioners filed the present suit on May 19, 2010. PSALMs letter-reply dated May
21, 2010 advised petitioners that their letter-re quest was referred to the counsel of K-Water.
We find such action insufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement and inconsistent
with the policy under EPIRA to implement the privatization of NPC assets in an "open and
transparent" manner.
Consequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing PSALM to allow
petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal
capacity of the winning bidder. (Initiatives For Dialogue And Empowerment Through Alternative

Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No.
192088, October 9, 2012)
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ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose
disciplinary sanctions, such as dismissal or expulsion of students who violate
disciplinary rules; the power to discipline students in subsumed in the academic
freedom to determine what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who may be
admitted to study
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.
In Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, which enumerated "the four essential freedoms"
of a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2)
what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to
study.
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their
academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." In this regard, the
Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions,
which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary
rules. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught."
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires
rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the
creation of an educational environment conducive to learning.
Moreover, by instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to
discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident
than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom
to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well
as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation
privileges.
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation
for any act done by the student prior thereto. InUniversity of the Phils. Board of Regents v.
Court of Appeals, We upheld the university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred
on a student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation.
Every citizen has a right to select a profession or, course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. The PMA is not different. As
the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor
Code and the Honor System in particular. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military

Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
In the exercise of quasi-legislative power, a government agency cannot
modify, reduce or enlarge the scope of the law

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It is basic that a rule issued by a government agency pursuant to its quasilegislative power cannot modify, reduce or enlarge the scope of the law which it seeks
to implement. The discourse made by the Court in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections is
instructive:
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to
effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character,
but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must
not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The
power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a
legislative enactment.
It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a
mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
held:

Moreover, in Padunan v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, this Court

It must be stated at the outset that it is the law that confers jurisdiction and not the
rules. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of
procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.
(Emphasis supplied.) (Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 176162,

October 9, 2012)

Prior opportunity to be heard: Required before Comelec promulgates rules and

regulations that substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on January 15, 2013 then came up with
a public hearing on January 31, 2013 to explain what it had done, particularly on the aggregatebased air time limits. This circumstance also renders the new regulation, particularly on the
adoption of the aggregate-based airtime limit, questionable. It must not be overlooked that the
new Resolution introduced a radical change in the manner in which the rules on airtime for
political advertisements are to be reckoned. As such there is a need for adequate and effective
means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and implemented. In this regard, it is not
enough that they be published - or explained - after they have been adopted.
Whatever might have been said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals, should also apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to
promulgating rules and regulations which adversely affect, or impose a heavy and
substantial burden on, the citizenry.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs

nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
given the force and effect of law.
For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said
Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective and
ineffectual. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS
Findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or unless the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence; these factual findings carry even more weight
39 | P a g e

when affirmed by the CA, in which case they are accorded not only great respect, but
even finality
At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the findings of fact of administrative bodies
will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
These factual findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case they are
accorded not only great respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon this Court,
unless it is shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended
evidence before the latter to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion, had the
evidence been properly appreciated. This rule is rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a
trier of facts. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those
matters.
This Court will not disturb the factual findings of both the CSC and the CA, absent any
compelling reason to do so. The conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved
after their own thorough investigations and hearings, as well as their consideration of the
evidence presented before them and their findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the CA
must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this Court. (Encinas v. Agustin, G.R.

No. 187317, April 11, 2013)

Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute

It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence. Their factual findings are generally accorded
with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special
knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
This rule was reiterated in Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII, where we held
that: When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it
should be considered as conclusive. This Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the
Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA.
This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite
the respect given to administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review
and re-evaluate the evidence on record and reverse the administrative agency s findings if not
supported by substantial evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by the administrative or
quasi-judicial agencies (like the Office of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not
adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts. (Miro

v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45, November 20, 2013)

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction: When a case requires the expertise,

specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies,
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the
courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is
sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss
the case without prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
40 | P a g e

determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the
court.
As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly
owed by petitioner, a local government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No.
1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development

Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the

Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing
procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the
Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten
years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating
to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons
respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable
capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and
claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all
government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and
as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities subsidized by the
government, those funded by donations through the government, those required
to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has put
up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit.
Rule II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters falling under COAs exclusive
jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule
VIII, Section 1 further provides:
Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original
jurisdiction over:
a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in
the hiring of legal retainers by government agency; c) write off of unliquidated
cash advances and dormant accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one
million pesos (P 1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from accountability for loses
due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Five
Million pesos (P 5,000,000.00).
In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, we ruled that it is the COA
and not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioners money claim against
respondent local government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties failure to
argue the issue nor active participation in the proceedings.
x
Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTCs
jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent
proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may raise the issue of primary
jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue
it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative
bodies and not for the convenience of the parties.
Respondents collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money
claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the
proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and
before the CA. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos.

197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

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Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The RTC has jurisdiction over a petition for
prohibition but the National Electrification Administration (NEA) has jurisdiction over
the question of the validity of a board resolution issued by an electric cooperative
It is true that the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by
respondent. However, the basic issue in the present case is not whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent; rather, the issue is who between the RTC
and the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution
issued by SAMELCO II. A careful reading of the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly
show that, pursuant to its power of supervision and control, the NEA is granted the authority to
conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations
with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity
of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed
respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him
to run as such in the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and,
thus, comes within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D.
No. 1645.
In this regard, the Court agrees with petitioners' argument that to sustain the petition for
prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC would constitute an unnecessary intrusion into the
NEA's power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives.
Based on the foregoing discussions, the necessary conclusion that can be arrived at is
that, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, the NEA,
in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the
issue of the validity of the subject resolution. (Samar II Electric Cooperative v. Seludo, G.R. No.

173840, April 25, 2012)

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction and principle of exhaustion of administrative

remedies
[T]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed
within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in
which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The Court, in a long line of cases, has held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail
himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such
remedy must be exhausted first before the courts power of judicial review can be
sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent
any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are
subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
42 | P a g e

(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where
the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.
Respondent, however, failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the aboveenumerated exceptions. While respondent alleged in his Urgent Petition for Prohibition that the
subject resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of his right to due
process, mere allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that
has been specifically granted by law to special government agencies. Moreover, the issues raised
in the petition for prohibition, particularly the issue of whether or not there are valid grounds to
disallow respondent from attending SAMELCO's Board meetings and to disqualify him from
running for re-election as a director of the said Board, are not purely legal questions. Instead,
they involve a determination of factual matters which fall within the competence of the NEA to
ascertain.
Finally, the Court agrees with petitioners' contention that the availability of an
administrative remedy via a complaint filed before the NEA precludes respondent from filing a
petition for prohibition before the court. It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ of
prohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. In order that prohibition will lie, the petitioner must first exhaust all
administrative remedies. Thus, respondent's failure to file a complaint before the NEA
prevents him from filing a petition for prohibition before the RTC. (Samar II Electric Cooperative

v. Seludo, G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012)

Exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there
is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d)
where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the
issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l)
in quo warranto proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the
present case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the
doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void. (Province of Aklan v.

Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)

Requirements for Forum-shopping and res judicata in administrative cases

Petitioner argues that respondents are guilty of forum-shopping for filing two allegedly
identical Complaints in violation of the rules on forum-shopping.76 He explains that dishonesty,
grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the servicecharges included
in the CSCRO Complaintwere charges that were equivalent to the BFP Complaint, the subject
of which was his alleged violation of R.A. 6975 or illegal transfer of personnel.
We do not agree with petitioner. In Yu v. Lim, this Court enumerated the requisites of
forum-shopping as follows:
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the
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concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case.
Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP
Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no
forum-shopping on the part of respondents.
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment." It lays down the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
on the merits, rendered without fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other
actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, on the points
and matters in issue in the first suit.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of
parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the
rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical
or dilatory objections;" or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party
is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point." (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)
The results of a fact-finding investigation is not a judgment on the merits for
purposes of the application of the doctrine of res judicata; a fact-finding
investigation is an exercise of administrative powers, not judicial or quasi-judicial
powers
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition
above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of
a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined
therein with finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as
opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and
evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and
(c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of
quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication
of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. In Bedol v. Commission on
Elections, this Court declared:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
44 | P a g e

facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of
the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties.
Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to
an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is
not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an
absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they
were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of
determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed against
petitioner.
It can be gleaned from the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 itself that the purpose of the
BFP proceedings was to determine whether there was sufficient ground to warrant the filing of
an appropriate administrative offense against petitioner. xxx
The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at
determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to proceed
with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public prosecutors
preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed.
The Ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals91 is analogously applicable to the
case at bar. In that case, we ruled that the preliminary investigation conducted by a public
prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was definitely not a quasi-judicial proceeding:
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other
quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making."
xxxx
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication
nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano, in which this Court clearly
reiterated that a public prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation, is not
exercising a quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor
inspects the records and premises, investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under
the formers jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents. In
contrast, judicial adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon
the rights and obligations of concerned parties, viz.:
This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special
Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not

a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasijudicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of
probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards
determine the rights of parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment
of a court." This is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation
to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal
offense, or when the Secretary of Justice reviews the former's orders or resolutions" on
determination of probable cause.
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In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts

preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers.
Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of persons or entities
coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information
by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and
production of documents. This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication
which signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of concerned parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which
sets a public prosecutor apart from the court.
Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented, further action
should be taken through the filing of a criminal complaint in court. Similarly, in the instant case,
the BFP exercised its investigative or fact-finding function to determine whether, based on the
facts and the evidence presented, further administrative actionin the form of a formal charge
should be taken against petitioner. In neither instance is there in adjudication upon the rights,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.
With the above disquisition, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint cannot
operate as res judicata. Therefore, forum-shopping is unavailing in this case. (Encinas v. PO1

Agustin and PO1 Caubang, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)

THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

DUAL POSITIONS AND DOUBLE COMPENSATION
An ex officio position is not another office for purposes of the prohibition on
dual positions, and does not entitle an official to additional compensation
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 2 which provides: The President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by
the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties
and functions on said officials.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for
his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. (Philippine Economic Zone

Authority (PEZA v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012)

The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission cannot hold any other office or
employment in the Government during his tenure; he cannot sit as a Director or
Trustee of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, as this will allow him to exercise
powers and functions which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC
Chairman

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We proceed to resolve the substantive issue concerning the constitutionality of Duques

ex officio designation as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
The underlying principle for the resolution of the present controversy rests on the correct
application of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which provide:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among
others, imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and
disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is the
disqualification from holding any other office or employment during Duques tenure as
Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this disqualification in relation to
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the Courts pronouncement in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.
Section 7, paragraph (2),A rticle IX-B reads:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e.,
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque
was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B.
He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if
such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Respondents insist that Duques ex officio designation as member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is allowed by the primary functions of his
position as the CSC Chairman. To support this claim, they cite Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with
various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. All of these
powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the
respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore
derived from his position as CSC Chairman. The Court also notes that Duques designation
as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to
receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex
officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IXA of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio
position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service

Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

The Chairman of the CSC cannot sit as a Director or Trustee of GSIS,

PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, as this will impair the independence of the CSC
because their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques designation
as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the
independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
47 | P a g e

exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not
under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a
government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health45 and the
Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office
of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised
through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the
Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their
respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman
cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil

Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

A DOTC undersecretary cannot be designated concurrently as OIC of MARINA

because 1) Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants cannot, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure, and 2) she was not designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as
OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to
which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple
offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Undersecretary Bautistas designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.

On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:

Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to
be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII;
or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII;
and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot
invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another
office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC
of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
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The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other
office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials. (Funa v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No.

184740, February 11, 2010)

MIDNIGHT APPOINTEES AND APPOINTMENT BAN

The prohibition against presidential appointments two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, under Section
15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
The framers did not intend to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.
One of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate
midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the
appointments dealt with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo.
The Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made
in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their
subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the
unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer
be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the
Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the
Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. (De Castro v. Judicial and

Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)

DE FACTO OFFICER
Because Duque as CSC Chairman did not validly hold office as Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he was a de facto officer, but he is
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be
considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A
de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose
term of office has not expired.
That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or
Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, the Court has said:
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto
officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. This doctrine is,
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undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit
by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue
of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

(Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

As a de facto officer, his official actions as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS,

PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority
to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He
may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the
acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far
as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a
Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid,
binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office.
This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the dealings by the
public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. (Funa v. Chairman,

Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)

PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO

The suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office; an
acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee
Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. The
person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled
to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage.
For a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a
clear right to the contested office. His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the
suit for lack of cause of action.
Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he
clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an
acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the
appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an
office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office
for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. (General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560,

March 29, 2011)

NEPOTISM
The prohibition against nepotism applies to appointments made by a group of
individuals acting as a body; a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity of a member of the body that is the appointing authority (such as the Civil
Service Commission) cannot be appointed by such body
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2)
recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of
Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of
Commissioner Mallari.
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By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons
employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.2 In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes
as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.
In her defense, respondent Cortes raises the argument that the appointing authority
referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the
individual Commissioners who compose it.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of
the appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for
appointment a relative. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural
persons.
To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the individual
members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless.
In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the
Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition.
Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character
of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still
exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an
impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En
Banc. (Civil Service Commission v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014)

JURISDICTION OF THE CSC IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

The Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it,
regardless of who initiated the complaint; thus even private individuals may file a
complaint against a member of the Civil Service with the CSC.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint
and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted
by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution
defines the scope of the civil service:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341,18 PUP became a chartered state
university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O.
No. 292.19
The parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra and Cezar are government
employees and part of the Civil Service. The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation
of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of E.O. No. 292.
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission
by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and
decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission
with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in
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case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally
to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is
removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
concerned. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O.
No. 292 which states that "a complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private
citizen against a government official or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a
case filed directly before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen.
The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in the subject provision
and the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which requires that when the law is clear
and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that
a simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the intention of the statute and prevailing
jurisprudence.
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen
and one filed by a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to
"hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal"
without any qualification.
In the case of Camacho v. Gloria, the Court stated that "under E.O. No. 292, a complaint
against a state university official may be filed with either the universitys Board of Regents or
directly with the Civil Service Commission." It is important to note that the Court did not
interpret the Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed directly
with it by a member of the civil service.
Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service Commission, the Court
interpreted Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 as allowing the
direct filing with the CSC by a public official of a complaint against a fellow government
employee. In the said case, Quezon City Vice-Mayor Charito Planas directly filed with the CSC a
complaint for usurpation, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross
insubordination, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against the City Legal
Officer of Quezon City. The CSC issued a resolution ruling that the respondent official should not
be allowed to continue holding the position of legal officer. In a petition to the Supreme Court,
the official in question asserted that the City Mayor was the only one who could remove him
from office directly and not the CSC. The Court upheld the decision of the CSC, citing the same
provision of the Administrative Code:
Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is nothing under the law to prevent
her from filing a complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner. Thus, when the CSC
determined that petitioner was no longer entitled to hold the position of City Legal Officer, it was
acting within its authority under the Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints filed
before it.
It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is immaterial to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the
CSC may hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may
deputize any department or agency to conduct an investigation. (Civil Service Commission v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012)

POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN

The Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions
Under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with
sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people
against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was granted the power
to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary
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authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of
Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its
authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.
The conclusion reached by the Court in Ledesma is clear: the Ombudsman has been
statutorily granted the right to impose administrative penalties on erring public
officials. That the Constitution merely indicated a "recommendatory" power in the text of
Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution did not deprive Congress of its plenary legislative
power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated.
The provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority.
These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the
authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance
with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place
under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine
the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the
evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that the Office of the
Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions.
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. (Office of the Ombudsman v.

Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, March 7, 2012)

Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI15 of the
Constitution merely indicates a "recommendatory" function, this does not divest
Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond
those stated in the Constitutional provision. Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)No. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman is legally authorized to
directly impose administrative penalties against errant public servants. Further, the manifest
intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations. (Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No.

173277, February 25, 2015)

The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which

are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies
While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the Local Government Code both provide
for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two laws have
been resolved in cases decided by this Court.
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, we pointed out that "there is nothing in the Local Government
Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of
the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent
x x x as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other."
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public
officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.
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Consequently, as we held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission

of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more
disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to
take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman,
occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. Under RA 7160, the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official,
as follows:
Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang
bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent. (Alejandrino v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact

Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013) (Emphases supplied)

MISCONDUCT
If a nexus between the public officials acts and functions is established, such
act is properly referred to as misconduct; otherwise, the act may be considered
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
Both the Ombudsman and Dr. Apolonio concede that the latter appropriated funds
intended for the workshop to a purpose other than the one stated and approved by the NBDB.
Therefore, the only issue to be determined is whether the purchase of the gift cheques
constitutes a grave misconduct or, as found by the CA, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. As already stated, we find Dr. Apolonio guilty of neither, and instead hold her liable
for simple misconduct.
In Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, the Court defined misconduct as "a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." We further stated that misconduct becomes
grave if it "involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence." Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Therefore, "[a] person charged with grave
misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of
the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave."
In Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, the Court noted that "[d]ismissal and forfeiture
of benefits, however, are not penalties imposed for all infractions, particularly when it is a first
offense." Despite evidence of misconduct in her case, the Court emphasized that "[t]here must
be substantial evidence that grave misconduct or some other grave offense meriting dismissal
under the law was committed."
Further, in Monico K. Imperial, Jr. v. Government Service Insurance System, the Court
considered Imperials act of approving the salary loans of eight employees "who lacked the
necessary contribution requirements" under GSIS Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 153-99 as
simple misconduct. It refused to categorize the act as grave misconduct because no substantial
evidence was adduced to prove the elements of "corruption," "clear intent to violate the law" or
"flagrant disregard of established rule" that must be present to characterize the misconduct as
grave.
As in the cases of Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma and Imperial, Dr. Apolonios use
of the funds to purchase the gift cheques cannot be said to be grave misconduct.
Dr. Apolonios actions were not attended by a willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules.
We cannot likewise agree with the CAs findings that Dr. Apolonios acts constitute merely
as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal
from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the
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performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,

intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Therefore, if a nexus between the public officials acts and functions is
established, such act is properly referred to as misconduct.
In Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that "the offense committed by
the employee in selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his
officemates during office hours was not grave misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service." Further contrast Dr. Apolonios case with Mariano v. Roxas, where "the
Court held that the offense committed by a [CA] employee in forging some receipts to avoid her
private contractual obligations, was not misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service because her acts had no direct relation to or connection with
the performance of her official duties." (Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No.

165132, March 7, 2012)

BACK SALARIES
Two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries during the
suspension pending an appeal: 1) the employee must be found innocent of the
charges and 2) his suspension must be unjustified
The employee is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed until his
reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending
appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not
entitled to any back salaries. (Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9,

2011)

Two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee
must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning
behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive
suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive
suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and
must be compensated. (Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)

ELECTION LAW
JURISDICTION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
For the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, these are the requisites:
(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office of the
Member of the House
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has
the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives. Contrary to petitioners claim,
however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications,
as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said
tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the
House of Representatives.

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Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives
because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. The term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election."
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported
Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the
oath of office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. Members shall take their oath or affirmation
either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1)
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she
made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary
or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied with. (Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 20726, June 25, 2013) (Emphases

supplied)

Party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives;

once the party or organization has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his
oath and assumed office as member of the House, the COMELECs jurisdiction ends
and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of
the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. (Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010)

JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC

General Rule: The Supreme Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order
or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
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COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division
of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision
must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

(Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012)

When the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in an appeal

from an election protest decided by a trial court, the Commission is must decide the
case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration
When the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case,
the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only
upon motion for reconsideration.
The Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and
decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the COMELEC division that has original appellate jurisdiction to resolve an appeal to
an election protest decided by a trial court. Conclusively, the Commission en banc acted without
jurisdiction when it heard and decided Dumpits appeal. (Eriguel v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010)

A decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed

by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated
to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for
reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this
procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be
reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion
for reconsideration is mandatory. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012)

Exception: When the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a petition for
certiorari to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First
Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for
the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and
if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the
COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits. It is
true that there may be an exception to the general rule, as the Court conceded in Kho v.
Commission on Elections. In that case, the protestant assailed the order of the COMELEC First
Division admitting an answer with counter-protest belatedly filed in an election protest by filing a
petition for certiorari directly in this Court on the ground that the order constituted grave abuse
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of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Division. The Court granted the petition and
nullified the assailed order for being issued without jurisdiction, and explained the exception.
Under the exception, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and
consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division
unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can
directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the
matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No.

194139, January 24, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

COMELEC REGULATIONS
Why Comelecs "aggregate-based" rule on airtime limits on candidates and
parties is void
If ever Comelec has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained
with sufficient basis, especially if there is a radical departure from the previous rules
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate
total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively.
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued
Resolutions implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime
limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes "per
station." For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political
parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a "per station" basis, to
a "total aggregate" basis.
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily
authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations - or
reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is
the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned.
The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has
consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it
has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and rational
basis for any changes in those rules by which they are supposed to live by, especially if there is a
radical departure from the previous ones.
The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting "aggregate"
basis in the determination of allowable airtime. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

The law does not state that the maximum allowable airtime for candidates
should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued
Resolutions implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime
limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes "per
station." For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political
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parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a "per station" basis, to
a "total aggregate" basis.
The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime
should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations. Senator
Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed - that it
should be on a "per station" basis. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357,

September 2, 2014)

Comelecs "aggregate-based" rule on airtime limits is unreasonable and

arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people
The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based"
airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time
limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his
advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and
relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of
such candidate to express himself - a form of suppression of his political speech. (GMA Network

v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

Comelecs "aggregate-based" rule on airtime limits violates the peoples right

to suffrage by restricting the right of the people to be adequately informed for the
intelligent exercise of their right to determine their own destiny
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate
total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively.
Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people's right to suffrage.
Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people
to determine their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government.
Thus, the primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be
adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of such birthright.
Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing space - including the means to
disseminate their ideas. This could not be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner
by which the respondent implemented the time limits in regard to political advertisements in the
broadcast media. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2,

2014)

Prior opportunity to be heard: Required before Comelec promulgates rules and

regulations that substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on January 15, 2013 then came up with
a public hearing on January 31, 2013 to explain what it had done, particularly on the aggregatebased air time limits. This circumstance also renders the new regulation, particularly on the
adoption of the aggregate-based airtime limit, questionable. It must not be overlooked that the
new Resolution introduced a radical change in the manner in which the rules on airtime for
political advertisements are to be reckoned. As such there is a need for adequate and effective
means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and implemented. In this regard, it is not
enough that they be published - or explained - after they have been adopted.
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Whatever might have been said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of

Appeals, should also apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to
promulgating rules and regulations which adversely affect, or impose a heavy and
substantial burden on, the citizenry.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
given the force and effect of law.
For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said
Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective and
ineffectual. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES
Effect of a void certificate of candidacy: No valid candidate, no valid votes,
votes for him are stray votes and should not be counted; the qualified person who
obtained the highest number of votes must be proclaimed
A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid votes. Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the
start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after
the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a
valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Thus,
Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010
elections Cardino who received the highest number of votes. (Jalosjos v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

The rule that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer
is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing, but
subsequently cancelled for a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the CoC
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the
first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to
be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect,
after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then
legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the
elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy
void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should
also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. (Jalosjos

v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates disqualification: Not necessary

before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner

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With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as
he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a
void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at
all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate
do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of
eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters are
well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes
in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes
may be deemed elected.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a
prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually
the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of
no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but
also the proclamation.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It
does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office. (Maquiling

v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013) (Emphases supplied)

Votes in favor of a candidate whose certificate of candidacy: Void and should

not be counted; the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
should be proclaimed; the rule on succession will not apply
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections,
reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted.
This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply. (Maquiling v.

Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013) (Emphasis supplied)

A disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a

candidate; a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled
under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidates
bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a
petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are wellperceived.

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Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a
candidates possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her
commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section
68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. In
particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of
terrorism to enhance ones candidacy; (3) spending in ones election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80,26 83,27 85,28
8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC.
Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of,
or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had
already been elected.
One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have
been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the
candidates compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age,
residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned
election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding
under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a persons misrepresentation of any of the material
qualifications required for the elective office aspired for.
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have
been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been
denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate
at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga v.
COMELEC, the Court ruled that while a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.

(Tagolino v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013) (Emphases Supplied)

Effect of cancellation of or denial of due course to a CoC: No valid candidate,

no valid substitution
Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified
by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified.
Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate
substitution proceeds.
The law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a
candidate. The requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater importance if one considers its
nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a persons public declaration to run for office but
evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post.
In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status
of a candidate. In other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal
contemplation.
If a persons CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she
cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is
therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly
substituted.
As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya, a candidate who is disqualified under
Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a
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candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course to
and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate. Stated differently, since there would be no candidate to speak of
under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no
candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain, however, in a disqualification case since
there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her candidacy is discontinued.

(Tagolino v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013) (Emphases Supplied)

An allegedly false nickname in the CoC is not a material

misrepresentation that is a ground to cancel or deny due course to a CoC under
Section 78
Petitioner filed the petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code claiming that
respondent committed material misrepresentation when the latter declared in his COC that his
name/nickname to be printed in the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-MIGZ instead of
his baptismal name, VILLAFUERTE, MIGUEL-MIGZ.
Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC required under
Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC.
The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer
to qualifications for elective office.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under
Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of
surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the public as to one's identity is not within
the scope of the provision.
In Aratea v. Commission on Elections, we proclaimed Estela D. Antipolo, the alleged
second placer, as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, being the one who remained as the sole
qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, since the
COC of Romeo D. Lonzanida, the first placer, was declared void ab initio. We find that violation
of the three-term limit is an eligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office
and the misrepresentation of such is a ground to grant the petition to deny due course or cancel
a COC. We said that:
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he
seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing x x x is eligible for said office." After being elected and serving for three consecutive
terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next
regular election because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective
public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"
means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and
none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.
Thus, Lonzanidas representation that he was eligible for the office that he sought
election constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material
misrepresentation, as "material misrepresentation" under the earlier-quoted Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective office."
Clearly, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his
eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run
for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code. Hence, petitioners allegation
that respondents nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" written in his COC is a material misrepresentation
is devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname written in the COC cannot be considered a material
fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to run for public office.
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Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a

deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. As we said, respondent's nickname is not considered a material
fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ"
in his COC, respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an
effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume. (Villafuerte v. Comelec,

25 February 2014) (Emphases supplied)

Stating under oath in the CoC that one is eligible to run for public office, when
one is not, is a false material misrepresentation
Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is
eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material representation, a
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for
said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is
not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he
intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy
that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false
material representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78.
It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a
voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirming the disapproval of
Hayudinis petition for registration. Hence, the COMELEC was accurate in cancelling Hayudinis
certificate of candidacy. (Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014)

COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel a CoC for material
misrepresentation continues even after election and proclamation, except in the
cases of congressional and senatorial candidates
Hayudini protests that it was a grave error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared
his proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever filed.
What petitioner seems to miss, however, is that the nullification of his proclamation as a winning
candidate is also a legitimate outcome a necessary legal consequence of the cancellation of
his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature
of a disqualification case.
The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes. If the disqualification or CoC
cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day, the proceedings
shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner.
Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner,
but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC
continues. This rule likewise applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has
already taken his oath of office. The only exception to this rule is in the case of
congressional and senatorial candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor
of either the Senate or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have
been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also assumed office. (Hayudini v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014) (Emphases supplied)

Opportunity to be heard is required before cancellation of or denial of due

course to a CoC
In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid
COC and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the Comelec gravely
abused its discretion.

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Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due
course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs.
In Cipriano v. Comelec, we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give
due course to COCs. We emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to give due course to
COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the Comelec may
look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the Comelec. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136,

December 2, 2014)

For cancellation of/denial of due course

misrepresentation, there must be a verified petition

to

CoC

for

material

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed
a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC
may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of
the COMELEC.
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his
certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.
In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid
certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to
or cancel Lunas certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper
proceedings, cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by
Luna invalid. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014)

Cancellation of CoCs: Exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec;

Comelec in Division should first decided the case
The Court reminds the Comelec that, in the exercise of it adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by
Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc.
As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the
Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first decided this case.
In Bautista v. Comelec, et al., where the Comelec Law Department recommended the
cancellation of a candidates COC for lack of qualification, and which recommendation was
affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, the Court held that the Comelec En Banc cannot short cut
the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it
denies due process to the candidate. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

205136, December 2, 2014)

Nuisance candidates: Comelec must give the candidate opportunity to be

heard before cancellation of/denial of due course of CoC
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of
candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may
be "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party," "subject to an opportunity to
be heard."
The determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of ones right to run
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for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that
the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the
opportunity to refute the allegations against him. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February

24, 2015) (Emphases supplied)

CITIZENSHIP
Effect of use of foreign passport after oath of renunciation: Recantation of
oath of renunciation
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify
one to run for an elective position. (Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

(Emphases supplied)

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of

Representatives, may be questioned at any time
Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of
Representatives, may be questioned at any time. Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot
and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The question on Limkaichongs
citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence,
capable of repetition. (Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011)
RESIDENCE
Change of residence requirements: 1) bodily presence in the new locality; 2)
an intention to remain there; 3) an intention to abandon the old domicile; ownership
of a house does not establish domicile
There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice.
First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain
there. Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.
These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as held
in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC and subsequently in Dumpit- Michelena v. Boado:
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue.
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof
that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010
elections.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva,
Duhaylungsod, Estrellada, Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation,
Maghilum and Javier.
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that petitioner
was not and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most, the Affidavits of all the
witnesses only show that petitioner was building and developing a beach resort and a house
in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she wanted to oversee
the construction of the resort and the house.

Fernandez v. COMELEC has established that the ownership of a house or some other
property does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true in this case as
petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the locality and her intent to stay there at
least a year before the elections, to wit:

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To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence

of domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold
public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a voter
only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency requirement as a
voter. This minimum requirement is different from that for acquiring a new domicile of choice
for the purpose of running for public office. (Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 193314, February 26,

2013) (Emphases supplied)

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he
has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such
conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a
house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a
friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make
property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things:
actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. (Jalosjos v. Comelec,

G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a
day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled
with conduct indicative of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that
place but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent
place of abode.
The petitioners, in the present case, largely rely on statements that Osmea was "hardly
seen" in Toledo City, Cebu to support their claim of error of jurisdiction. These affidavits,
however, deserve little consideration and loudly speak of their inherent weakness as evidence.
The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven
(7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
Similarly, the fact that Osmea has no registered property under his name
does not belie his actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not
among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he
should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use
ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.

(Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014) (Emphases supplied)

Subjective standards (such as, a man of stature does not live in a dilapidated
house or a feedmill) cannot be used to determine residence
We cannot accord credence either to the petitioners contention that the dilapidated
house in Ibo, Toledo City, could not serve as Osmeas residence in view of the latters stature.
Moreover, the petitioners speculation involves the use of subjective non-legal standards, which
we previously condemned in the case of Mitra v. Commission on Elections. In Mitra, we
pronounced:
The respondents significantly ask using this case to adopt the same faulty approach of
using subjective norms, as they now argue that given his stature as a member of the prominent
Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room
in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.
We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we
condemned the COMELEC's use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitra's feed mill
dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of
his transfer of residence, specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside
of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory
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moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot
for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is
adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his house. (Jalover v. Osmena,

G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014) (Emphases supplied)

RULES ON RESOLUTION OF QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS

The ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility; the ballot cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed
or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public
officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person
who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the
will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of
the candidate.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. (Maquiling v.

Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

Burden of proof: To successfully challenge a winning candidates

qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
We find it apt to reiterate in this regard the principle enunciated in the case of Frivaldo v.
Comelec, that "[i]n any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices
to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority."
To successfully challenge a winning candidates qualifications, the petitioner
must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby
giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. The reason for such liberality
stems from the recognition that laws governing election contests must be construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
Nonetheless, we wish to remind that COC defects beyond matters of form and that
involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory
requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have
spoken. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one
hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold
that we cannot choose the electorates will.
With the conclusion that Osmea did not commit any material misrepresentation in his
COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will. We cannot
deny, however, that the people of Toledo City have spoken in an election where residency
qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict
on Osmeas qualifications. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014)

(Emphases supplied)

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Rule in case of doubt as to the winning candidates qualification: Courts must

respect the decision of the people and resolve all doubts in favor of the peoples
manifest will
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve
all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

(Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

Rule in case the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak
or inconclusive: The will of the electorate should be respected
We do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own judgment
regarding the qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him, notwithstanding that the issue
of his residency qualification had been raised prior to the elections.
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that "(t)o
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people,
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections, we concluded that "when the evidence
of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is
weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be
thwarted by upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate
should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters."
In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently established his
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law. We
also recognize that "(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the
electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that
must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred." (Sabili v.

Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS
New parameters for party-list elections: Not all party-list groups must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented"
or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
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"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,

indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bonafide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. (Atong Paglaum v

Comelec, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)

REAPPORTIONMENT: CREATION OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT

A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the
immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition
contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." The only issue here is whether the
City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose
of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections.
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in
the "immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population,
and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district
representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or
will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010
elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least
250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following
election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. (Aldaba v.

Comelec, G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010)

THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE

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In case of legislative reapportionment, where the district is practically the

same as the district that previously elected the same candidate: The three-term limit
rule applies
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three consecutive
terms. But then, the Court is now called upon to resolve the following questions. First. What are
the consequences to the provincial board members eligibility to run for the same elective
position if the legislative district, which brought him or her to office to serve the first two
consecutive terms, be reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are
carved out and renamed as another district? Second. Is the provincial board members election
to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed
district, a violation of the three-term limit rule?
In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city. The
then municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him of the three-term limit rule.
The Court declared that there was no interruption of the incumbent mayors continuity of
service.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, the COMELEC declined to apply the threeterm limit rule against the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of
Gainza and Milaor distinctively created a new district, with an altered territory and constituency.
Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation." The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population
and voting power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants
of a city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein.
As a result of the reapportionment made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of
Camarines Sur, minus only the two towns of Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as the Third District.
A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the
lawmakers intended the old Second District to be merely renamed as the current
Third District.
The actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of the current
Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical fact
renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the
old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members
are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third
and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. (Naval v.

Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014) (Emphasis Supplied)

AUTOMATED ELECTIONS
Picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are
likewise "official ballots; the printouts thereof may be used for purposes of revision
of votes in an electoral protest
An automated election system, or AES, is a system using appropriate technology which
has been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of
election result, and other electoral process. There are two types of AES identified under R.A. No.
9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2) direct recording electronic election system. A
paper-based election system, such as the one adopted during the May 10, 2010 elections, is the
type of AES that "use paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses
and transmits electronically the results of the vote count."
The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out
an official paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each
voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machine which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As
established during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in
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encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized
representations of the ballots cast.
We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the picture images of the
ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that faithfully
captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out
by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.

(Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22,
2013)

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
POWER OF LGUS TO ENACT ORDINANCE
A city ordinance is invalid if it is enacted not for the "general welfare"
In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary.
Hence, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already changed, Ordinance No.
8187 was passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the
previous members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding the same
seat, and pending the resolution of these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the
oil depots until the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor
Lim stood his ground and vetoed the last ordinance.
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim),
who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187.
Thus, where the Industrial Zoneunder Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial
Zone (I-1), Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy
Industrial Zone (I-3), where petroleum refineries and oil depots are now among those expressly
allowed. In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was
enacted to alleviate the economic condition of its constituents.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the
operations of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not
substantially differ to this day, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has
thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or political
affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the "general welfare" of
the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense
and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the
members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its
view on the matter, favoring the citys economic related benefits, through the
continued stay of the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of
its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the
facts on the table as to which specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in
this present controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such thing as "the will of
Manila" insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared
as a guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents of
Manila. There, the Court said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise of
police power with the concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject "to safeguard the
rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila;" and a lawful method the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial, which
effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in Pandacan.
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The very nature of the depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly
volatile products, regardless of whether or not the composition may cause explosions, has no
place in a densely populated area.
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that
we saw in and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No.
8187, compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the
continued stay of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052,
to wit: Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning,
ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian
was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation
in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class.
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot
remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any
convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we
hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional. (Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014)

LGU PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL PROJECTS

National government agencies must secure prior public consultation and
approval of local government units for the projects affecting the ecological balance
of local communities
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in
the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and
approval of local government units for the projects described therein.
In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the project
proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which authorized the
reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to undertake reclamation nationwide.
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities, and is covered by the requirements found in Section 26
and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior
approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory
requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required by law
to have been conducted and secured by the respondent Province. (Boracay Foundation v.

Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

The national government is not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and implementation of national social welfare programs
In 2007, the Department of Social Welfare & Development (DSWD) embarked on a
poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries.
Eligible households that are selected from priority target areas consisting of the poorest
provinces classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NCSB) are granted a health
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assistance of P500.00/month, or P6,000.00/year, and an educational assistance of

P300.00/month for 10 months, or a total of P3,000.00/year, for each child but up to a maximum
of three children per family.
Petitioners take exception to the manner by which it is being implemented, that
is, primarily through a national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the
responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare, agriculture and health care
services have been devolved pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Petitioners assert that giving the DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries
and the manner by which services are to be delivered or conditionalities are to be complied with,
instead of allocating the P21 Billion CCTP Budget directly to the LGUs results in the
"recentralization" of basic government functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local
autonomy and the avowed policy of decentralization.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local government unit
as to preclude any and all involvement by the national government in programs
implemented in the local level would amount to a decentralization of power.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments more responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit
of national development and social progress.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself
weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct
hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs
especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

(Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012) (Emphases supplied)

CONVERSION OF LGUS
Why conversion of a component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC)
requires approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite for the entire province:
Conversion will lead to material change in the political and economic rights of
not only of the component city but of the entire province
The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is
precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political
units directly affected."
Similar to the enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions were found to
result in material changes in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected.
Given the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that
the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to
conversions as well. Thus, RA 852813 was declared unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground
that the law downgraded Santiago City in Isabela without submitting it for ratification in a
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plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. (Umali v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

Conversion of the component city will lead to a substantial alteration of

boundaries of the entire province
Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC
is substantial alteration of boundaries.
The phrase "boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one,
referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It
also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political subdivisions,
where the LGUs exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other begins.
The province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by
Cabanatuan Citys gain of independence. With the citys newfound autonomy, it will be free from
the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the
latter.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is
substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said
provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC. (Umali v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)

Conversion will directly affect the economic and political rights of the
residents of the entire province
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what
should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will
be "directly affected" by the change.
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its
share in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of
Cabanatuan Citys conversion, petitioner Umalis contention, that its effect on the province is not
only direct but also adverse, deserves merit.
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. This reduction in
both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a material and substantial change to the provinces
economic rights, warranting its participation in the plebiscite.
A component citys conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from the province
is a threat to the latters economic viability. The ensuing reduction in income upon separation
would clearly leave a crippling effect on the provinces operations as there would be less funding
to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs.
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and those
of its residents will also be affected by Cabanatuans conversion into an HUC. Notably, the
administrative supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked upon
conversion.
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of
Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly stands to be directly
affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the doctrines in
Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to
participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

203974, April 22, 2014)

POWERS OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES

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A mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions after
complying with due process
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se. So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp:
We agree with petitioners contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered
to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears
stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance
per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the
extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or
use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a
thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be
determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this
case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the
exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.1
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders.
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as
the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution
thereon. Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order
the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary
permits.
In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits,
clearances, and exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay West
Coves hotel in Malay, Aklan. To recall, petitioner declared that the application for zoning
compliance was still pending with the office of the mayor even though construction and
operation were already ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer be denied that
petitioner openly violated Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Alas, petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrators ruling. He consciously chose to
violate not only the Ordinance but also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying down the requirement of
building permits.
This twin violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGUs invocation of Sec. 444
(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate
nuisances per se. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can,
after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

(Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014)

INTERNATIONAL LAW
EXCHANGE OF NOTES
Exchange of notes are a form of executive agreement; Senate concurrence is
not required for validity
An exchange of notes is a form of executive agreement and does not need Senate
concurrence to be valid and binding.
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An "exchange of notes" is similar to a private law contract. The agreement consists of the
exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. The terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements"
have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of
executive agreement.
Moreover, Senate concurrence is not required for an exchange of notes to be
binding on the Philippines and the US. International agreements may be in the form of (1)
treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive
agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters
than treaties.
International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties
[while] those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of
executive agreements. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and
executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned.

(Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011)

IMMUNITY OF A FOREIGN STATE FROM SUIT

Philippine courts cannot have jurisdiction over US Navy officers for acts in
committed their official capacity; such suit is barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suits without its consent
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a longstanding rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of
a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not
just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself
in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic
personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he
is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are sovereign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if
the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed
against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued
in the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into
a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from
private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State
immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. In this
case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against
the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

(Emphases supplied) (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)
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IMMUNITY OF WARSHIPS FROM THE JURISDICTION OF COASTAL STATES:

EXCEPTION UNDER UNCLOS
Under UNCLOS, the flag State shall bear international responsibility for any
loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of
their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where
they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through
the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy
the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the
oceans" as codified in UNCLOS.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty
extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.
In the case of warships, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for
compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to
the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this
Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes
A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting
damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may
apply.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute.
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States
while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial
sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable
for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for noncommercial purposes under Article 31. (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014)

(Emphases supplied)

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