Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Child Abuse in an Information6 dated August 29, 2001

which reads:
The
undersigned,
Second
Assistant
Provincial
Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of
Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child
Abuse, committed as follows:

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179090

June 5, 2009

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the

municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abuse physically one [VVV],7 a sixteen (16) year old
minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs,
and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's
development which acts are not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by
Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party in the
amount to be proved during the trial.

LEONILO SANCHEZ alias NILO, Appellant,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS,
Appellees.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2
dated February 20, 2007 which affirmed the Decision3
dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagbilaran City, Bohol, convicting appellant Leonilo
Sanchez alias Nilo (appellant) of the crime of Other Acts
of Child Abuse punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
76104 in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603,5
with a modification of the penalty imposed.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section

10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep.
Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on
the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying
versions emerged.

The Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of

HUMAN RIGHTS

Version of the Prosecution

Nicolas Patayon refused to oblige because he did not

want to interfere in the problem concerning the
fishpond. On her way back to their house, VVV saw
appellant coming from his shop with a gallon of
gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant warned VVV
to better pack up her familys things because he would
burn their house.12

Private complainant VVV was born on March 24, 1984 in

Mentalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu to FFF and MMM.8
On September 24, 1997, VVV's father, FFF, started
leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by Escolastico
Ronquillo (Escolastico), located at Lajog, Clarin, Bohol.
FFF and his family occupied the house beside the
fishpond which was left by the former tenant.9

Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB,

get a piece of wood from the back of their house to
defend themselves and their house from appellant.
However, appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece
of wood from the latter and started beating him with
it.13 At the sight, VVV approached appellant and
pushed him. Irked by what she did, appellant turned to
her and struck her with the piece of wood three (3)
times, twice on the left thigh and once below her right
buttocks. As a result, the wood broke into several
pieces. VVV picked up some of the broken pieces and
threw them back at appellant. MMM restrained BBB,
telling him not to fight back. After which, appellant left,
bringing with him the gallon of gasoline.14

On September 2, 2000 at around 7:00 in the morning,

while VVV was cutting grass in their yard, appellant
arrived looking for FFF who was then at another
fishpond owned by Nilda Parilla located in Boacao,
Clarin, Bohol. VVV knew appellant because he is the
husband of Bienvenida Ronquillo (Bienvenida), one of
the heirs of Escolastico.10 She noticed that appellant
had a sanggot (sickle) tucked in his waist.
Appellant then went to VVVs house and inquired from
VVVs younger brother, BBB, the whereabouts of the
latters father. BBB did not answer but his mother,
MMM, told appellant that FFF was not around. Right
then and there, appellant told them to leave the place
and started destroying the house with the use of his
sickle. As a result, appellant destroyed the roof, the wall
and the windows of the house.11 MMM got angry and
told appellant that he could not just drive them away
since the contract for the use of the fishpond was not
yet terminated. VVV was then sent by MMM to fetch a
barangay tanod. She did as ordered but barangay tanod

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FFF arrived at about 10:00 in the morning of that day.

When he learned about what had happened, FFF
brought his daughter to the Clarin Health Center for
medical attention and treatment.15 Dr. Vicente Manalo
(Dr. Manalo) attended to VVV and issued her a medical
certificate16 dated September 2, 2000, stating that VVV
sustained the following:
CONTUSION WITH HEMATOMA PROXIMAL

LATERAL PORTION OF THIGH, RIGHT

detailed accounting because he and his wife were not

satisfied with the harvest in August of 2000. MMM,
however, retorted, saying that they would no longer
make any accounting, as Benny Ronquillo, brother of
appellants wife, would finance the next cropping.
Displeased with MMM's statement, appellant got angry
and demanded that they leave the fishpond. FFF's
family resented this demand and a commotion ensued.
BBB got a piece of wood and struck appellant but the
latter was able to parry the blow. Appellant got hold of
the piece of wood which actually broke. Intending not to
hurt anybody, appellant threw the same behind him.
Suddenly from behind, VVV appeared, got hold of the
said piece of wood and hit appellant once at the back of
his shoulder. Appellant testified that the blow was not
strong enough to injure him.20

TIME TO HEAL: 3-4 DAYS, BARRING COMPLICATIONS

From the health center, FFF and VVV went to the Clarin
Police
Station
where
they
had
the
incident
blottered.17Thereafter, FFF requested Eliezer Inferido to
take pictures of the injuries sustained by VVV.18
Version of the Defense
Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and
operated the fishpond from 1982 to 1987. Sometime in
1997, FFF occupied the fishpond and the nipa hut
beside the same, by virtue of a Memorandum of
Agreement19 (MOA) entered into by FFF with the Heirs
of Escolastico, as represented by Segundino Ronquillo.
After the MOA expired in 1998, appellant and his wife,
Bienvenida, decided to discontinue the lease because
they did not understand the management and
accounting of FFF. They made several demands on him
to return possession of the fishpond but FFF refused,
asking for a written termination of the contract from all
the heirs of Escolastico. To solve the problem, appellant
and Bienvenida engaged the services of FFF as
caretaker of the fishpond, providing him with
fingerlings, fertilizers and all necessary expenses.

Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal

case was filed by VVV against him for allegedly beating
her. Appellant denied that he beat VVV, saying that the
instant case was fabricated and was being used as a
means to extort money from him.21 Moreover,
appellant asseverated that Ronald Lauren22 (Ronald)
witnessed the incident.
Ronald testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a
piece of wood but appellant was able to parry the blow;
that appellant threw away the piece of wood; that when
appellant threw the piece of wood, there was no one
there at the time; and that appellant left the place
immediately.23

This notwithstanding, FFF still failed to make an

accounting. Thus, on September 2, 2000, at around
7:00 in the morning, after pasturing his cattle, appellant
dropped by the house of FFF to ask him to make a

HUMAN RIGHTS

The RTC's Ruling

On July 30, 2003, the RTC found that at the arraignment,

appellant, through former counsel Atty. Theodore
Cabahug (Atty. Cabahug), admitted that he hit VVV,
although unintentionally. Thus, appellant had the
burden of proving that, at the time VVV was hit,
appellant was performing a lawful act. The RTC ruled
that the evidence did not favor appellant because his
demand for FFF's family to vacate the fishpond, coupled
with threats and punctuated with actual use of force,
exceeded the limits allowed by law. The RTC also held
that the injuries sustained by VVV were distinguishable,
indicating that the blow was forceful, and that the force
used was strong. Thus, the RTC disposed in this wise:

subsidiary penalty in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.24
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25
contending that appellant never admitted that he hit
VVV. The RTC, however, denied the motion in its
Order26 dated August 8, 2003 for being pro forma.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA.27
The CA's Ruling
On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of
the proceedings taken during appellant's arraignment
before the RTC belied appellant's contention that his
defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a
manifestation of appellant's counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in
open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative
defense because the act of hitting VVV was
unintentional. Furthermore, the defense of absolute
denial interposed by appellant cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical statements of VVV and her
witnesses, giving full credence to the factual findings of
the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed
against appellant was not defective inasmuch as the
allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA held
that the prosecution had fully established the elements
of the offense charged, i.e., Other Acts of Child Abuse
under R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. However, the CA
opined that the RTC erred in applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law because R.A. No. 7610 is a special law.
Lastly, the CA deleted the award of civil indemnity and

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds

LEONILO SANCHEZ y Aranas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating paragraph (a), Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 7610, and applying in his favor the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court imposes on him
the indeterminate sentence of an imprisonment of Six
(6) years ofprision [correccional] as minimum to seven
(7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as
maximum, with costs against him. The Court orders him
to pay [VVV] the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) for civil indemnity and the sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for damages; the
awards for civil indemnity and damages are without
subsidiary penalties in case of insolvency.
IN ACCORDANCE with letter (f) of Section 31 of Republic
Act No. 7610, the Court exercising its discretion also
imposes on Leonilo Sanchez y Aranas the penalty of a
fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) without

HUMAN RIGHTS

damages for utter lack of basis. The fallo of the CA

decision reads:

GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT[;]

2. IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION [OVER] THE CASE DESPITE A
DEFECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE
ACTS COMPLAINED OF IS (sic) NOT COVERED BY THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED[; AND]

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed

Judgment dated July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City in Criminal Case No.
11110
finding
accused-appellant
guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under
Republic Act No. 7610 and Presidential Decree No. 603
is hereby UPHELD with MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum of prision
mayor. The fine imposed is retained.

3. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED

OF THE CRIME CHARGED (VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(a)
OF R.A. NO. 7610) NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE ACT
COMPLAINED OF IS OBVIOUSLY COVERED BY THE
REVISED PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815) AS SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURY.31

The Order dated August 8, 2003 denying appellant's

motion for reconsideration is hereby AFFIRMED.

Appellant posits that his conviction is not supported by

proof beyond reasonable doubt; that the RTC erred
when it shifted the burden of proof to appellant; that the
RTC and CA erred in ruling that appellant interposed an
affirmative defense when, all throughout his testimony
before the RTC, he denied having inflicted any injury on
VVV; and that appellant and his counsel did not sign any
written stipulation for appellant to be bound thereby,
hence, the burden of proof still rests in the prosecution.
Moreover, appellant claims that VVV and her family had
ill motive to implicate him because of the pressure he
exerted against them to give up the fishpond. Appellant
pointed out that VVV, in her testimony, made material
inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the
back of their house. Appellant also claims that he had
no motive or intention of harming anyone, otherwise, he
would have done so earlier that day; that if BBB was
also beaten, he should have submitted himself for

The award of civil indemnity and damages in the

assailed Decision is deleted.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.28
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 which the
CA denied in its Resolution30 dated July 11, 2007.
Hence, this Petition claiming that the CA erred:
1. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVE HIS

HUMAN RIGHTS

medical treatment and examination; and that the

Information charging appellant was substantially and
jurisdictionally defective as the acts complained of were
covered by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant submits that, if duly proven, the acts
complained of are clearly constitutive of Slight Physical
Injuries punishable under Article 26632 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Rules of Court; that the Transcript of Stenographic Notes

(TSN) taken during appellant's arraignment on
November 6, 2001 clearly shows that appellant, through
Atty. Cabahug, raised an affirmative defense, hence,
appellant cannot now change his theory; that the
prosecution established the fact that appellant
committed the acts complained of by virtue of the
direct, positive and categorical testimonies of VVV,
corroborated by MMM and duly supported by the
medical examination conducted by Dr. Manalo and the
entry in the police blotter; that VVV's and MMM's
statements are consistent with their allegations in their
respective complaint-affidavits; and that appellant
failed to present any reason or ground to set aside the
decisions of the RTC and the CA. Furthermore, the OSG
argues that there is no ambiguity in the Information as
the allegations are clear and explicit to constitute the
essential elements of the offense of child abuse, to wit:
(a) minority of the victim; (b) acts complained of are
prejudicial to the development of the child-victim; and
(c) the said acts are covered by the pertinent provisions
of R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. The OSG submits that
appellant cannot now feign ignorance of the offense
under which he was specifically charged, and to which
he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when
arraigned.34

Appellant, likewise, posits that the instant case is not

one for child abuse, since VVV was neither punished in a
cruel and unusual manner nor deliberately subjected to
excessive indignities or humiliation. The act was not
cruel since the injury was merely slight per medical
findings; the location of the injury was on the thigh
which is not unusual; and VVV was not beaten in front of
many people as to humiliate her. Lastly, no evidence
was submitted by the prosecution, such as a testimony
of a child psychologist, or even of VVV's teacher who
could have observed changes in the victim's behavior,
as to prove that the injury was prejudicial to the victim's
development. Appellant alleges that the charge was
obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight
physical injuries, in order to subject him to a much
heavier penalty. Appellant prays for acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and, in the alternative, if found guilty,
he should be convicted only of the crime of slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code.33

However, the OSG opines that the CA erred in modifying

the indeterminate sentence imposed by the RTC. The
offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse as defined and
punished under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, a special
law, carries the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period which is a penalty defined in the Revised Penal

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) asseverates that the instant Petition is fatally
defective because it raises purely factual issues
contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 45 of the

HUMAN RIGHTS

Code. The OSG states that the RTC correctly applied the
first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, sentencing appellant to an indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as
maximum, the minimum term thereof being within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree to the
prescribed penalty, as there were no attendant
mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances. Thus, the
OSG prays that the instant petition be denied and the
assailed CA Decision be modified as aforementioned but
affirmed in all other respects.35

injured child resulting in serious impairment of his

growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.36
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 5937 of P.D.
No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section
10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

Our Ruling
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child
abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether
habitual or not, which includes any of the following:

In this connection, our ruling in Araneta v. People38 is

instructive:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,

sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes

not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts,
i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the childs development. The Rules and
Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and
separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation
just to show that these three acts are different from one

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades

or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an

HUMAN RIGHTS

another and from the act prejudicial to the childs

development. Contrary to petitioners assertion, an
accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under
Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he
commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution
need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty
and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of
the child because an act prejudicial to the development
of the child is different from the former acts.

child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No.

7610, as mandated by the Constitution.40 As defined in
the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the
child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of
appellant falls squarely within this definition. We,
therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
In the same manner, we reject appellant's claim that
the Information filed against him was defective. In Resty
Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa,41 we held that
what controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited
therein. Without doubt, the averments in the
Information clearly make out the offense of child abuse
under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. The following were
alleged: (1) the minority of VVV; (2) the acts
constituting physical abuse, committed by appellant
against VVV; and (3) said acts are clearly punishable
under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to P.D. No. 603. Indeed,
as argued by the OSG, the commission of the offense is
clearly recited in the Information, and appellant cannot
now feign ignorance of this.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the

word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation
and independence of one thing from other things
enumerated.lavvphi1 It should, as a rule, be construed
in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use
of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before
the phrase "be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the childs development" supposes that
there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of
child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child
exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the childs development. The
fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner
suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other
acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the
questioned
provision
does
not
warrant
such
construal.39

Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial.

Notably, the RTC found VVV and MMM to be credible
witnesses, whose testimonies deserve full credence. It
bears stressing that full weight and respect are usually
accorded by the appellate court to the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, since the trial
judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses.42 Equally noteworthy is the fact that the
CA did not disturb the RTC's appreciation of the
witnesses credibility. Thus, we apply the cardinal rule

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not

be considered as child abuse but merely as slight
physical injuries defined and punishable under Article
266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently
forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a

HUMAN RIGHTS

that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of

the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions
anchored on such findings, are accorded respect, if not
conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA.
The exception is when it is established that the trial
court
ignored,
overlooked,
misconstrued,
or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if
considered, will change the outcome of the case. We
have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and
we find no reason to deviate from the findings of both
courts and their uniform conclusion that appellant is
indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Other Acts of Child Abuse.43

v. Simon.45
We agree with the OSG.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

However, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the CA

deserves review. The imposable penalty under Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 is prision
mayor in its minimum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC imposed upon
appellant the penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and four
(4) months of prision mayor, as maximum. The CA
modified this by imposing upon appellant the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day,
as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, of prision
mayor, postulating that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special
law, the RTC should have imposed on appellant an
indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same."44 On the other hand, the OSG
contends that the RTC appropriately applied the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, citing our ruling in People

HUMAN RIGHTS

To repeat, the penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is

prision mayor in its minimum period. This penalty is
derived from, and defined in, the Revised Penal Code.
Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the
Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees
or determining the proper period should be applied.
Thus, where the special law adopted penalties from the
Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
will apply just as it would in felonies.46 In People v.
Simon,47 the Court applied the first clause of Section 1

of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to cases of illegal

drugs. In Cadua v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court applied
the same principle to cases involving illegal possession
of firearms. In those instances, the offenses were also
penalized under special laws. Finally, in Dulla v. Court of
Appeals,49 a case involving sexual abuse of a child as
penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
the Court likewise applied the same first clause of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. This case should be no
exception.

Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or

the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that
provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against
the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law
has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means
by which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and
penalized.51
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 27817 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellant Leonilo Sanchez is hereby sentenced to four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Costs against appellant.

In the absence of any modifying circumstances, and

because it is favorable to appellant, we find the penalty
of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, proper.lawphi1

SO ORDERED.
As a final word, we reiterate our view in Araneta,50 to
wit:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the

implementation of a national comprehensive program
for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the
population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the
Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of
the children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." This piece
of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws
treating crimes committed against children, namely, the

HUMAN RIGHTS

Sanchez vs. People

G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009

10

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of

Child Abuse in an Information[6] dated August 29, 2001
which reads:

Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the

case at hand.
HELD:

The
undersigned,
Second
Assistant
Provincial
Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of
Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child
Abuse, committed as follows:

In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D.

No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section
10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the

municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a sixteen (16) year old
minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs,
and which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's
development which acts are not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by
Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party in the
amount to be proved during the trial.

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or

Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development.
(a)
Any person who shall commit any other acts of
child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes

not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts,
i.e., (a) child abuse,
(b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the childs development. The Rules and
Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and
separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation

The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him

were minor in nature that it is not prejudicial to the
child-victims development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is
not applicable and he should be charged under the
Revised Penal Code for slight physical injuries.

HUMAN RIGHTS

11

just to show that these three acts are different from one
another and from the act prejudicial to the childs
development. Contrary to petitioners assertion, an
accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under
Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he
commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution
need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty
and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of
the child because an act prejudicial to the development
of the child is different from the former acts.

child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No.

7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As defined in
the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the
child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of
appellant falls squarely within this definition.
We,
therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section
10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep.
Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the

word or is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation
and independence of one thing from other things
enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or
in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the
phrase be responsible for other conditions prejudicial
to the childs development supposes that there are
four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child
abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation;
and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial
to the childs development. The fourth penalized act
cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a
qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an
analysis of the entire context of the questioned
provision does not warrant such construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not
be considered as child abuse but merely as slight
physical injuries defined and punishable under Article
266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently
forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a

HUMAN RIGHTS

12

JULIUS AMANQUITON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of
Barangay Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. As a
purokleader and barangay tanod, he was responsible for
the maintenance of cleanliness, peace and order of the
community.
At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner heard an
explosion. He, together with two auxiliary tanod,
Dominador Amante1 and a certain Cabisudo, proceeded
to Sambong Street where the explosion took place.
Thereafter, they saw complainant Leoselie John Baaga
being chased by a certain Gil Gepulane. Upon learning
that Baaga was the one who threw the pillbox 2 that
caused the explosion, petitioner and his companions
also went after him.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

On reaching Baagas house, petitioner, Cabisudo and

Amante knocked on the door. When no one answered,
they decided to hide some distance away. After five
minutes, Baaga came out of the house. At this
juncture, petitioner and his companions immediately
apprehended him. Baaga's aunt, Marilyn Alimpuyo,
followed them to the barangay hall.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186080

HUMAN RIGHTS

August 14, 2009

13

Baaga was later brought to the police station. On the

way to the police station, Gepulane suddenly appeared
from nowhere and boxed Baaga in the face. This
caused petitioner to order Gepulanes apprehension
along with Baaga. An incident report was made. 3

Dossen Banaga (sgd.)

Thereafter, an Information for violation of Section 10
(a), Article VI, RA5 71606 in relation to Section 5 (j) of
R.A. 8369 was filed against petitioner, Amante and
Gepulane. The Information read:

During the investigation, petitioner learned Baaga had

been previously mauled by a group made up of a
certain Raul, Boyet and Cris but failed to identify two
others. The mauling was the result of gang trouble in a
certain residental compound in Taguig City. Baagas
mauling was recorded in a barangay blotter which read:

The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

accuses Julius Amanquiton, Dominador Amante and Gil
Gepulane of the crime of Violations of Section 10 (a)
Article VI, Republic Act No. 7610 in relation to Section 5
(j) of R.A. No. 8369 committed as follows:
That on the 30th day of October, 2001, in the
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused in conspiracy with one another,
armed with nightstick, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence, a form of physical abuse, upon the
person of Leoselie John A. [Baaga], seventeen (17)
years old, a minor, by then and there manhandling him
and hitting him with their nightsticks, thus, constituting
other acts of child abuse, which is inimical or prejudicial
to childs development, in violation of the abovementioned law.

10-30-201
Time: 10-15 p.m.
RECORD purposes
Dumating dito sa Barangay Head Quarters si Dossen 4
Baaga is Alimpuyo 16 years old student nakatira sa 10
B Kalachuchi St. M.B.T. M.M.
Upang ireklamo yong sumapak sa akin sina Raul[,]
Boyet [at] Cris at yong dalawang sumapak ay hindi ko
kilala. Nang yari ito kaninang 10:p.m. araw ng [M]artes
taong kasalukuyan at yong labi ko pumutok at yong
kabilang mata ko ay namaga sa bandang kanan. Ang
iyong kaliwang mukha at pati yong likod ko ay may
tama sa sapak.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner and Amante both pleaded
not guilty. Gepulane remains at-large.

Patunay dito ang aking lagda.

HUMAN RIGHTS

14

During the trial, the prosecution presented the following

witnesses: Dr. Paulito Cruz, medico-legal officer of the
Taguig-Pateros District Hospital who attended to Baaga
on October 30, 2001, Baaga himself, Alimpuyo and
Rachelle Baaga (complainants mother).

1. Actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00;

2. Moral Damages in the amount of P 30,000.00; and
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P 20,000.00.
The case against the accused Gil Gepulane is hereby
sent to the ARCHIVES to be revived upon the arrest of
the accused. Let [a] warrant of arrest be issued against
him.

The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner,

Amante and Briccio Cuyos, then deputy chief
barangaytanod of the same barangay. Cuyos testified
that the blotter notation entered by Gepulane and
Baaga was signed in his presence and that they read
the contents thereof before affixing their signatures.

SO ORDERED.
Amanquitons motion for reconsideration was denied. 8

On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.7The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
read:

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due

course. On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered a
decision9which affirmed the conviction but increased the
penalty. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA
decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds

the accused JULIUS AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR
AMANTE "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Article VI Sec. 10 (a) of Republic Act 7610 in relation
to Section 3 (j) of Republic Act 8369, hereby sentences
accused JULIUS AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE
a straight penalty of thirty (30) days of Arresto
Menor.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Decision

appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional maximum up to eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum as maximum. In addition to the
damages already awarded, a fine of thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) is hereby solidarily imposed the
proceeds of which shall be administered as a cash fund
by the DSWD.

Both accused Julius Amanquiton and Dominador Amante

are hereby directed to pay Leoselie John A. Banaga the
following:

HUMAN RIGHTS

15

IT IS SO ORDERED.

for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to

meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction where
there is reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires only moral certainty
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. 10

Hence, this petition. Petitioner principally argues that
the facts of the case as established did not constitute a
violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7160 and
definitely did not prove the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt.

The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioners guilt

beyond reasonable doubt (of the crime of child abuse)
solely on the supposed positive identification by the
complainant and his witness (Alimpuyo) of petitioner
and his co-accused as the perpetrators of the crime.

The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. 11 An accused is entitled to
an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt.12 It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to
present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion, with moral certainty.13

We note Baagas statement that, when he was

apprehended by petitioner and Amante, there were
many people around.15 Yet, the prosecution presented
only Baaga and his aunt, Alimpuyo, as witnesses to the
mauling incident itself. Where were the other people
who could have testified, in an unbiased manner, on the
alleged mauling of Baaga by petitioner and Amante, as
supposedly witnessed by Alimpuyo? 16 The testimonies
of the two other prosecution witnesses, Dr. Paulito Cruz
and Rachelle Baaga, did not fortify Baagas claim that
petitioner mauled him, for the following reasons: Dr.
Cruz merely attended to Baagas injuries, while
Rachelle testified that she saw Baaga only after the
injuries have been inflicted on him.

The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was

discussed in People v. Berroya:14
[Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a
criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the
subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory
finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command;
with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are
regarded as public officers, as therefore as speaking
semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty
often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged
in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not

HUMAN RIGHTS

We note furthermore that, Baaga failed to controvert

the validity of the barangay blotter he signed regarding

16

the mauling incident which happened prior to his

apprehension by petitioner. Neither did he ever deny
the allegation that he figured in a prior battery by gang
members.

We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in

this case. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in
question or there is doubt on which side the evidence
weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused.18 If inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a
conviction.19

All this raises serious doubt on whether Baagas

injuries were really inflicted by petitioner, et al., to the
exclusion of other people. In fact, petitioner testified
clearly that Gepulane, who had been harboring a
grudge against Baaga, came out of nowhere and
punched Baaga while the latter was being brought to
the police station. Gepulane, not petitioner, could very
well have caused Baaga's injuries.

Time and again, we have held that:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the
implementation of a national comprehensive program
for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the
population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the
Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right
of the children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other
conditions
prejudicial
to
their
development." This piece of legislation supplies the
inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed
against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and
Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a
mechanism for strong deterrence against the
commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has

Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually

caused the bloodied condition of Baagas face because
she had to first put down the baby she was then
carrying when the melee started. 17 More importantly,
Alimpuyo stated that she was told by Baaga that, while
he was allegedly being held by the neck by petitioner,
others were hitting him. Alimpuyo was obviously
testifying not on what she personally saw but on what
Baaga told her.
While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of
the lower courts on the trustworthiness of witnesses,
when there appear in the records facts and
circumstances of real weight which might have been
overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk
from its duty to sift fact from fiction.

HUMAN RIGHTS

17

stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by

which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and
penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is
expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of
child abuse under existing laws but includes also "other
acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to the childs development." 20

parameters are set in the law itself, if only to prevent

baseless accusations against innocent individuals.
Perhaps the time has come for Congress to review this
matter and institute the safeguards necessary for the
attainment of its laudable ends.

However, this noble statute should not be used as a

sharp sword, ready to be brandished against an accused
even if there is a patent lack of proof to convict him of
the crime. The right of an accused to liberty is as
important as a minors right not to be subjected to any
form of abuse. Both are enshrined in the Constitution.
One need not be sacrificed for the other.

We emphasize that the great goal of our criminal law

and procedure is not to send people to the gaol but to
do justice. The prosecutions job is to prove that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction
must be based on the strength of the prosecution and
not on the weakness of the defense. Thus, when the
evidence of the prosecution is not enough to sustain a
conviction, it must be rejected and the accused
absolved and released at once.

We reiterate our ruling in People v. Mamalias:21

There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations

protecting a child from any and all forms of abuse.
While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of
children abound amidst social ills, care has to be
likewise taken that wayward youths should not be
cuddled by a misapplication of the law. Society, through
its laws, should correct the deviant conduct of the youth
rather than take the cudgels for them. Lest we regress
to a culture of juvenile delinquency and errant behavior,
laws for the protection of children against abuse should
be applied only and strictly to actual abusers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

August 28, 2008 decision and January 15, 2009
resolution of Court of Appeals are reversed and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Julius Amanquiton is hereby
ACQUITTED of violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of
RA 7160.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

The objective of this seemingly catch-all provision on

abuses against children will be best achieved if

HUMAN RIGHTS

18

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182941

July 3, 2009

ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

HUMAN RIGHTS

19

DECISION

petitioner was charged with rape under the following

Information:

BRION, J.:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a
minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen
years of age, against the latters will and consent.

Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda

(petitioner) for the review on certiorari 1 of the Decision2
and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals 4 (CA) that
affirmed with modification his conviction for the crime
of qualified rape rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, in its decision of April 5,
2006.

Contrary to law.6

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and
raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that
he was selling cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape.
He also claimed that AAA only invented her story
because she bore him a grudge for the beatings he
gave her. The parties mother (CCC) supported the
petitioners story; she also stated that AAA was a
troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified that the
petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged
incident happened.7

In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with

her friend BBB in the second floor of her familys house
in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife
and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with
them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had
sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to
AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse
with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The
petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they
did.

The defense also presented BBB who denied that the

petitioner raped her; she confirmed the petitioners
claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.

AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena

Gallano (her teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the
parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to
the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to physical
examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen
consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis
of the complaint and the physical findings, the

HUMAN RIGHTS

On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of

qualified rape as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds

20

the accused ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of rape (Violation of R.A.
8353 in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby
sentences the said juvenile in conflict with law to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and
to indemnify the victim the amount of P75,000 as civil
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as
exemplary damages.

As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the

Solicitor General that Robert is not exempt from liability.
First, it was not clearly established and proved by the
defense that Robert was 15 years old or below at the
time of the commission of the crime. It was incumbent
for the defense to present Roberts birth certificate if it
was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Neither is the suspension of sentence available to
Robert as the Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:

SO ORDERED.8
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took
effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:

The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by

attacking AAAs credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1,
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006)9 to exempt him from criminal liability
considering that he was only 15 years old at the time
the crime was committed.

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the

child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of
the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.

The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioners conviction

with modification as to penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in
convicting Robert Sierra, the assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The award of damages are
likewise affirmed.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the

various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as
provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law.

SO ORDERED.10
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from
criminal liability, the CA held:

HUMAN RIGHTS

21

The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as

amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension
of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he
is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement
of
his/her
guilt.
The
other
disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have
not been deleted from Section 38 of Republic Act No.
9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to
maintain the other disqualifications as provided in
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been
convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having
their sentences suspended.11

incumbent for the defense to present the petitioners

birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344
when the burden of proving his age lies with the
prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in
Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton13 thereby denying the
petitioner the benefit of exemption from criminal
liability under R.A. No. 9344.
The threshold issue in this case is the determination of
who bears the burden of proof for purposes of
determining exemption from criminal liability based on
the age of the petitioner at the time the crime was
committed.
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be
on the prosecution as the party who stands to lose the
case if no evidence is presented to show that the
petitioner was not a 15-year old minor entitled to the
exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R.A. No.
9344.14 He additionally claims that Sections 3, 15 7,16 and
6817 of the law also provide a presumption of minority in
favor of a child in conflict with the law, so that any
doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor.

The CA denied the petitioners subsequent motion for

reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
THE ISSUES
The petitioner no longer assails the prosecutions
evidence on his guilt of the crime charged; what he now
assails is the failure of the CA to apply paragraph 1,
Section 612 of R.A. No. 9344 under the following issues:

The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts

and evidence on record specifically: the allegation of
the Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and
CCC that the prosecution never objected to, and the
findings of the RTC established that he was not more
than 15 years old at the time of the commission of the

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the

provisions of R.A. No. 9344 on the petitioners
exemption from criminal liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was

HUMAN RIGHTS

22

charged.19 As against AAAs testimony, the petitioner

could only raise the defenses of denial and alibi
defenses that, in a long line of cases, we have held to
be inherently weak unless supported by clear and
convincing evidence; the petitioner failed to present this
required evidentiary support. 20We have held, too, that
as negative defenses, denial and alibi cannot prevail
over the credible and positive testimony of the
complainant.21 We sustain the lower courts on the issue
of credibility, as we see no compelling reason to doubt
the validity of their conclusions in this regard.

crime.
The Peoples Comment, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the burden
belongs to the petitioner who should have presented his
birth certificate or other documentary evidence proving
that his age was 15 years or below. The OSG also
stressed that while petitioner is presumed to be a
minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence
suspended following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon.
Gubaton.18

While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground i.e.,

exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344
that implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in
no way swayed the conclusion we made above, as the
defense is entitled to present all alternative defenses
available to it, even inconsistent ones. We note, too,
that the defenses claim of exemption from liability was
made for the first time in its appeal to the CA. While this
may initially imply an essential change of theory that is
usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness, 22
no essential change is really involved as the claim for
exemption from liability is not incompatible with the
evidence submitted below and with the lower courts
conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the crime
charged. An exempting circumstance, by its nature,
admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the
accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words,
the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held
criminally liable therefor because of an exemption
granted by law. In admitting this type of defense on
appeal, we are not unmindful, too, that the appeal of a

THE COURTS RULING

We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the prosecutions evidence
and the findings of the lower courts on the petitioners
guilt, since the petition opens the whole case for review
and the issues before us are predicated on the
petitioners guilt of the crime charged. A determination
of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of R.A. No.
9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal,
not on the civil, liability.
We see no compelling reason, after examination of the
CA decision and the records of the case, to deviate from
the lower courts findings of guilt. The records show that
the prosecution established all the elements of the
crime charged through the credible testimony of AAA
and the other corroborating evidence; sexual
intercourse did indeed take place as the information

HUMAN RIGHTS

23

criminal case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the
whole case for review, even on questions that the
parties did not raise.23 By mandate of the Constitution,
no less, we are bound to look into every circumstance
and resolve every doubt in favor of the accused. 24 It is
with these considerations in mind and in obedience to
the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344
on how the cases of children in conflict with the law
should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.

R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006
and took effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote
and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law
or a child at risk by providing a system that would
ensure that children are dealt with in a manner
appropriate to their well-being through a variety of
disposition measures such as care, guidance and
supervision orders, counseling, probation, foster care,
education and vocational training programs and other
alternatives to institutional care.26 More importantly in
the context of this case, this law modifies as well the
minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor
offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
previously provided i.e., from "under nine years of
age" and "above nine years of age and under fifteen"
(who acted without discernment) to "fifteen years old
or under" and "above fifteen but below 18" (who acted
without discernment) in determining exemption from
criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law
as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did
presumes that the minor offenders completely lack
the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so that
their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they
cannot be held accountable. 27 The current law also drew
its changes from the principle of restorative justice that
it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as
formative years and gives minors of these ages a
chance to right their wrong through diversion and
intervention measures.28

We find a review of the facts of the present case and of

the applicable law on exemption from liability
compelling because of the patent errors the CA
committed in these regards. Specifically, the CAs
findings of fact on the issues of age and minority,
premised on the supposed absence of evidence, are
contradicted by the evidence on record; it also
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.25
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at
the outset that the ages of both the petitioner and the
complaining victim are material and are at issue. The
age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his
entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under
R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is material in
characterizing the crime committed and in considering
the resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does not
remove.

In the present case, the petitioner claims total

exemption from criminal liability because he was not

Minority as an Exempting Circumstance

HUMAN RIGHTS

24

the rape charged.30

more than 15 years old at the time the rape took place.
The CA disbelieved this claim for the petitioners failure
to present his birth certificate as required by Section 64
of R.A. No. 9344.29 The CA also found him disqualified to
avail of a suspension of sentence because the
imposable penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion
perpetua to death.

This conclusion can also be reached by considering that

minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape;
the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these
circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the
prosecution would make minority and age integral
elements of the crime when clearly they are not. 31 If
the prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden
relates to proof of the age of the victim as a
circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape. 32

Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules
on Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or
her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of
proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the
prosecution which has the duty to prove all the
essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution
completes its case as soon as it has presented the
evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required
elements. At this point, the burden of evidence shifts to
the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown
by evidence, or to prove by evidence the circumstances
showing that the accused did not commit the crime
charged or cannot otherwise be held liable therefor. In
the present case, the prosecution completed its
evidence and had done everything that the law requires
it to do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the
defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense,
that the accused, even if guilty, should be exempt from
criminal liability because of his age when he committed
the crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution,
has the burden of showing by evidence that the
petitioner was 15 years old or less when he committed

HUMAN RIGHTS

Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence

to Prove the Accuseds Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial
evidence showing that the petitioner was only 15 years
old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 of
R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in
conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents.
In the absence of these documents, age may be based
on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance
of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in
his/her favor. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing

25

R.A. No. 9344 provides the implementing details of this

provision by enumerating the measures that may be
undertaken by a law enforcement officer to ascertain
the childs age:

(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height,

built) of the child; and

(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the childs age,

such as

xxx

(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.

Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law

(having been passed only in 2006), does not depart
from the jurisprudence existing at that time on the
evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of
the accuseds minority and age.

(a) Childs birth certificate;

(b) Childs baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not
limited to the childs school records, dental records, or
travel papers.

In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino, 33 we accepted

testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of
the accused in the absence of any document or other
satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This
was followed by U.S. v. Roxas34 where the defendants
statement about his age was considered sufficient, even
without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was
a minor of 16 years at the time he committed the
offense charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo, 35 the
Court appreciated the minority and age of the accused
on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense in the absence of
any contradictory evidence or objection on the part of
the prosecution. Then, in People v. Villagracia, 36 we
found the testimony of the accused that he was less
than 15 years old sufficient to establish his minority. We
reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v. Morial 37
and David v. Court of Appeals, 38 and ruled that the
allegations of minority and age by the accused will be

(2) x x x
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or
pending receipt of such documents, the law
enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to
determine age by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that
indicate age (e.g. date of birthday, grade level in
school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that
indicate[s] age of the child (e.g. relatives, neighbors,
teachers, classmates);

HUMAN RIGHTS

26

accepted as facts upon the prosecutions failure to

disprove the claim by contrary evidence.

the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.

Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its
implementing rules, and established jurisprudence in
accord with the latest statutory developments, the CA
therefore cannot but be in error in not appreciating and
giving evidentiary value to the petitioners and CCCs
testimonies relating to the formers age.

In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to

testimonial evidence on the accuseds minority and age
upon the concurrence of the following conditions: (1)
the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as
the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the
accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused
and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused
at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of
any contrary evidence showing that the accuseds
and/or his relatives testimonies are untrue.

Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344

That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No.
9344 took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he
was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will
not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption
that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants. 41 As we
explained in discussing Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No.
934442 in the recent case of Ortega v. People:43

All these conditions are present in this case. First, the

petitioner and CCC both testified regarding his minority
and age when the rape was committed. 39 Second, the
records before us show that these pieces of testimonial
evidence were never objected to by the prosecution.
And lastly, the prosecution did not present any contrary
evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15
years old when the crime was committed.

Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases

of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development
officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with
respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the
CICL, is not the CICLs age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICLs age at the
time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
[Emphasis supplied]

We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of

R.A. No. 9344 provides that any doubt on the age of the
child must be resolved in his favor. 40 Hence, any doubt
in this case regarding the petitioners age at the time he
committed the rape should be resolved in his favor. In
other words, the testimony that the petitioner as 15
years old when the crime took place should be read to
mean that he was not more than 15 years old as this is

HUMAN RIGHTS

27

The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also

justified under Article 22 of the RPC, as amended, which
provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not
found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the records
of this case indicates that the petitioner is a habitual
criminal.

AAAs minority, though alleged in the Information, had

not been sufficiently proven.45 People v. Pruna46 laid
down these guidelines in appreciating the age of the
complainant:
In order to remove any confusion that may be
engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344
provides that the accused shall continue to be civilly
liable despite his exemption from criminal liability;
hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite his
exemption from criminal liability. The extent of his civil
liability depends on the crime he would have been liable
for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal
liability.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended

party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266B of the RPC, as amended, that the petitioner is guilty of
qualified rape because of his relationship with AAA
within the second civil degree of consanguinity and the
latters minority.44 Both courts accordingly imposed the
civil liability corresponding to qualified rape.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is

shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar

authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the
victim would suffice to prove age.

The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as

siblings, does not appear to be a disputed matter. Their
mother, CCC, declared in her testimony that AAA and
the petitioner are her children. The prosecution and the
defense likewise stipulated in the proceedings below
that the relationship exists. We find, however, that

HUMAN RIGHTS

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and

what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;

28

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and

what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;

pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not

qualified rape. The civil liability that can be imposed on
the petitioner follows the characterization of the crime
and the attendant circumstances.

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age

and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
18 years old.

Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of

P50,000.00 but increase the awarded exemplary
damagesP30,000.00, both pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.47 Moral damages are automatically
awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof;
the law assumes that the victim suffered moral injuries
entitling her to this award. 48 Article 2230 of the Civil
Code justifies the award of exemplary damages because
of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
relationship between AAA and petitioner and dwelling. 49
As discussed above, the relationship (between the
parties) is not disputed. We appreciate dwelling as an
aggravating circumstance based on AAAs testimony
that the rape was committed in their house. 50 While
dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not
alleged in the Information, established jurisprudence
holds that it may nevertheless be appreciated as basis
for the award of exemplary damages.51lavvphi1

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic

document, or the testimony of the victims mother or
relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him. [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evidence proving the age
of AAA. They do not likewise show that the petitioner
ever expressly and clearly admitted AAAs age at the
time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna, neither can his
failure to object to AAAs testimony be taken against
him.

We modify the awarded civil indemnity of P75,000.00 to

P50,000.00, the latter being the civil indemnity
appropriate for simple rape 52 on the finding that rape
had been committed.53

Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that

would upgrade the crime to qualified rape i.e.,
relationship within the third degree of consanguinity
and minority of the victim does not exist. The crime
for which the petitioner should have been found
criminally liable should therefore only be simple rape

HUMAN RIGHTS

In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we

see no need to discuss the petitions third assignment
of error.

29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29, 2008
and Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218 are REVERSED
andSET ASIDE.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case

No. 120292-H for rape filed against petitioner Robert
Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is
REFERRED to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer who shall proceed in accordance
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9344. Petitioner is
ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Unless there are other valid causes for petitioners
continued detention, we hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE
RELEASE under the above terms.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of

the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within
five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has
taken.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168546

MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the

Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council.
SO ORDERED.

HUMAN RIGHTS

July 23, 2008

DECISION

30

QUISUMBING, J.:

minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and

confederating together and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully
authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver
and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseurbuyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams
of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found
positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in
violation of the said law.

This petition for review assails the Decision 1 dated April

19, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 14, 2005, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had
respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for
certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration.
Paduas petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004 3 and
July 28, 20044 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for
probation.

Contrary to law.8

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted

by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.9

On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar

Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168,
Pasig City of violating Section 5, 5 Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous
drugs.7 The Information reads:

During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004,

however, Paduas counsel manifested that his client was
willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a
plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to firsttime offenders under Section 7010 of Rep. Act No. 9165.
The prosecutor interposed no objection. 11 Thus, the RTC
on the same date issued an Order12 stating that the
former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered
withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.
Hence, in a Decision13 dated February 6, 2004, the RTC
found Padua guilty of the crime charged:

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public

Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez
a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a.
"Mike", with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II,
Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec.
5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused

Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art.
II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par.
(a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to

On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar
Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a

HUMAN RIGHTS

31

Padua be placed on probation. 18

suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and

one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing

Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the
Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section
2419 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law. The court ruled thus:

No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed

should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art.
39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation

Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared
by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro
Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City
Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.

SO ORDERED.14
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation 15 dated
February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a
first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 16 (P.D. No.
968), otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976"
and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged
that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the said laws.

In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde

recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be
placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on
Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as
the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal
with the suspension of sentence and commitment of
youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find
application in this case, the matter before the Court
being an application for probation by minor Michael
Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.

The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed

the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a PostSentence Investigation and submit a report and
recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the
order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit
his comment on the said petition within five days from
receipt of the order.

On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of

R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for Treatment
and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to
76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to
violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in
Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.

On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer

Josefina
J.
Pasana
submitted
a
Post-Sentence
Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that

HUMAN RIGHTS

32

More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165,

particularly Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or
Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in
Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so
holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was
charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II,
R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section
in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder
quoted:

DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition
where he raises the following issues:
I.

"Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug

Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the
penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended." (underlining supplied)

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR
PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A
MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES
IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for

Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as
it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE
RELEASED
UNDER
RECOGNIZANCE]
HAS
BEEN
VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER
PURPOSES.22

20

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but

the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in
a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing

public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment 23 as its
Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered

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33

I.

"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with

absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of
jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of
discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 28

The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis
in applying Section 24, Article II of R.A. 9165 instead of
Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.
II.
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as
the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has no
application to the instant case.24
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err
in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari assailing the
trial courts order denying his petition for probation? (2)
Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344, 25 the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and
(3) Does Section 3226 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise
known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law" have application in this case?

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas

petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted
without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion
because it merely applied the law and adhered to
principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas
petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of
Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling
dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act
No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking
cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:

As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals

did not err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27

HUMAN RIGHTS

SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug

Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for
drug trafficking or pushing under this Act,
regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court,
cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended. (Emphasis supplied.)

34

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.

Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing,
regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968.
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that
when the words and phrases of the statute are clear
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says.29 If a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plainmeaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention.30 Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure. 31

the legislators to exempt from the application of Section

24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and
first time offenders, the law could have easily declared
so.35
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug
traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug
users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or
dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months
rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for
the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165,
while a person charged and convicted of selling
dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue
that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the "Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can
he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC
otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law" has application in this case. Section 68 36
of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not
probation.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out

that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep.
Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher
punishment for those persons convicted of drug
trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic
and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections
1132 and 1533 of the Act. The law considers the users
and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug
traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug
traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically
disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful
drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given
the chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals
also correctly stated that had it been the intention of

HUMAN RIGHTS

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 37

of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively
applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act
No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of
age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall

35

place the child in conflict with the law under suspended

sentence. Section 4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however,
provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of 21
years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age
or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child 39
for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the
application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and
academic as far as his case is concerned.

entered his plea of guilty to avail the benefits of firs time offenders.
Subsequently, he applied for probation but was denied. In his petition
for certiorari, the court said that probation and suspension of sentence
are different and provisions in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be invoked
to avail probation. It is specifically stated that in drug trafficking,
application for probation should be denied. As a side issue, the court
discussed the availment of suspension of sentence under RA 9344.
ISSUE
Whether suspension of sentence under RA 9344 can still be
invoked given the fact that the accused is now 21 years old.
HELD

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated
June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

NO. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of

Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively
applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act
No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of
age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however,
provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of 21
years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age
or over and thus, could no longer be considered a
child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the
application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and
academic as far as his case is concerned.

SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

Michael Padua vs People of the Philippines

GR 168546 (July 23, 2008)
Facts:
Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling
illegal drugs. Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-

HUMAN RIGHTS

36

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated August 16,
2011, which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 of
Branch 94, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
dated December 11, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-0091967 to Q-00-91971 finding accused-appellant Milan
Roxas y Aguiluz guilty of five counts of rape against
AAA,3 a minor who was 9 years old at the time of the
first rape and 10 years old at the time of the succeeding
four rapes.
Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant
Roxas, charging him as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967: That on or about the 9th
day of August 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused with force and intimidation did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age
by then and there blindfolding her, then removed her
shorts and underwear then accused inserted his penis
inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge
of her against her will and without her consent. 4

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200793

June 4, 2014

2. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ, Accused-Appellant.

HUMAN RIGHTS

That on or about the 28th day of July 1998 in Quezon

37

City, Philippines, the above-named accused with force

and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at
knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a
minor 10 years of age by then and there blindfolding
her and removing her shorts and underwear and
inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had
carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent.5

down on a bed inside his grandparents room then

blindfolded her, then removed her shorts and
underwear, then accused inserted his penis inside her
vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her
against her will and without her consent. 7
5. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971:
That on or about the 11th day of May 1998 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused with force
and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at
knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a
minor 10 years of age by then and there removing her
shorts and underwear and inserting his penis inside her
vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her
against her will and without her consent. 8 Accusedappellant Roxas entered a plea of Not Guilty to all the
crimes charged.9

3. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969:

That on or about the 16th day of September 1997 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
with force and intimidation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault
at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a
minor 9 years of age by then and there laying her on
the chairs inside the bathroom, then blindfolded her and
then removed her shorts and underwear then accused
inserted his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had
carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent.6

The prosecutions factual account based on the

testimony of AAA was concisely stated by the Office of
the Solicitor General in its Appellees Brief, as follows:

4. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970:

On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of

age, was at her grandmother [CCC]s house located on
[XXX], Quezon City. In the morning of said date, she was
at the dirty kitchen with her aunt [ZZZ] who was then
washing clothes. Her aunt asked her if she had already
taken a bath, she replied in the negative.

That on or about the 20th day of March 1998 in Quezon

City, Philippines, the above-named accused with force
and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at
knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a
minor 10 years of age by then and there laying her

HUMAN RIGHTS

Her

38

uncle,

accused-appellant,

overheard

their

conversation so he volunteered to give [AAA] a bath.

Subsequently, he brought her upstairs to the bathroom.

Accused-appellant then went to the terrace and

dragged her to the bedroom of her grandparents. She
could not run anymore nor shout for help because aside
from the fact that there was nobody else in the room,
accused-appellant was holding a pointed weapon.

While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told

[AAA] to turn around. After she complied with his
directive, he blindfolded her. [AAA] started to wonder
what the accused-appellant was doing so she told him
that he was supposed to give her a bath. Accusedappellant told her that they would play first for a while.

While [AAA] and accused-appellant were inside the

room, he blindfolded her, removed her shorts and
underwear, and then laid her down the bed. Thereafter,
he moved on top of her and inserted his penis in her
vagina. Again, she did not report the incident because
of accused-appellants threats should she report the
incident to anybody.

He turned her around three (3) times and then,

removed her shorts and underwear. After that, he sat on
a chair, which was inside the bathroom, and raised both
of her legs.

Another incident of rape took place on 11 May

1998while [AAA] was again at her paternal
grandparents house. On the said date, she was alone in
the living room on the second floor of the house when
accused-appellant called her. She did not accede to his
bidding because she was scared of him. Thereafter, he
shouted at her and demanded that she come near him,
so she went to him.

Thereafter, she felt him on top of her. She also felt

accused-appellants penis enter her vagina which she
found painful.
She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but
accused-appellant got angry and poked a sharp
instrument on her neck. [AAA] did not report the
incident because accused-appellant threatened to cut
her tongue and to kill her and her mother.

He brought her inside her grandmothers bedroom and

upon reaching the room, he immediately blindfolded her
and poked a bladed weapon on her neck. He turned her
around three (3) times, removed her shorts and
underwear, laid her down the bed, moved on top of her,
and inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, the
accused-appellant threatened her so she did not report
what had happened.

[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was

at the same house of her paternal grandparents. She
was on the terrace on the second floor of the house
when accused-appellant, who was in her grandparents
bedroom at that time, called her. She hesitated to go
near him because she was afraid that he might rape her
again.

HUMAN RIGHTS

39

[AAA]s ordeal did not stop there. She was raped for the
fourth time on 28 July 1998 at her paternal
grandparents house.1wphi1 She and the accused
were incidentally alone in the living room on the second
floor of the house. He asked her to go with him inside
the bedroom of her grandparents, but she did not get
up from her seat. So accused-appellant pulled her
toward the bedroom. She tried to free herself, but he
poked a pointed instrument at her.

In contrast, the defense presented four witnesses:

AAAs mother (BBB), AAAs two brothers (DDD and
EEE), and Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. The defenses
statement of the antecedent facts as contained in the
Appellants Brief is reproduced here:

Accused-appellant committed the same acts he had

perpetrated on [AAA] during her three [previous] rape
incidents: he removed her shorts and underwear, laid
her on the bed, moved on top of her and thereafter,
inserted his penis in her vagina. She was again
threatened by the accused-appellant not to tell anybody
about the incident or else he would cut her tongue and
kill her and her mother.

[DDD], brother of herein private complainant, testified

that his aunt in the maternal side, [Tita YYY], induced
him by giving toys if he would tell his father that the
accused was raping his sister, [AAA]. Upon prodding of
his maternal aunt, [DDD],who was only eight (8) years
old then, told his father that he saw the accused rape
his sister. His father ran amuck which led to the filing of
the instant case.

The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09

August 1998. At that time, [AAA] was at the terrace on
the second floor of her paternal grandparents house;
and accused-appellant also happened to be there. He
pulled her and brought her inside the room, blindfolded
her, and turned her around three (3) times. He
employed the same method in raping her: he removed
her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed and
moved on top of her. She tried to push him and raise
her shorts and panty, but she did not succeed because
he poked a pointed instrument on her neck. Thereafter,
he inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, she did not
report the incident to anyone because she was scared
of his threats.10 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

On subsequent days, while [DDD]and [AAA] were in a

grocery store buying something, their [Tito XXX], [Tito
WWW] and [Tita YYY] arrived on board an FX vehicle.
[Tita YYY] told [DDD] that they will be going to buy toys.
[DDD] said that he will first ask permission from his
grandfather, but [Tita YYY] said that it would only take a
few minutes and they will bring them home afterwards.
[AAA] was brought to SSDD, a place under the
administration of the DSWD, while [DDD] was brought
to Caloocan. On the following day, he was brought to
Muoz, in a rented house of his [Tita YYY] and her
husband. [DDD] stayed there for almost a year. He was
forbidden to go outside as the door was always locked.
When [his Tita VVV] arrived from Japan they went to

HUMAN RIGHTS

Accused Milan Roxas denied having raped [AAA] on all

the five (5) counts of rape.

40

Tarlac where his paternal grandmother fetched him.

by herein accused. She told a lie and made the false

accusation against the accused, because she does not
want to put the blame on any of her maternal relatives.
[AAA] was greatly indebted to her maternal
grandmother and her maternal uncles and aunts
because they had taken care of her since she was three
(3) years old.

[EEE], brother of herein private complainant, likewise

testified that when [his Tita VVV] arrived, they went to
North Olympus, Quezon City where [his] maternal
relatives reside. On one occasion, he saw his sister,
[AAA] and his maternal uncle [Tito XXX] entered one of
the bedrooms. He tried to open the door to see what the
duo were doing, but it was locked. [EEE] looked for a
wire and was able to open the door. He saw private
complainant on top of his [TitoXXX], both naked. When
the duo saw him, private complainant and his [Tito XXX]
stood up. The latter threatened him not to tell anybody
or he will cut off his tongue.

Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of

Jail Management and Penology testified that based on
her examination of the accused, she concluded that he
is suffering from a mild mental retardation with a
mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old. She
observed that the subject was aware that he was being
accused of rape, but he had consistently denied the
allegations against him.11 (Citations omitted.)

On November 26, 1999, [BBB], mother of the private

complainant testified that her two (2) children, [AAA]
and [DDD], were missing. She looked for them, but to
no avail. So she went to the police station to have it
blottered. Later did she know when she called her sister
who resides in Project 6, Quezon City that [DDD] was
brought to Ilocos and [AAA] at the SSDD in Kamuning by
her 3 brothers and sister. She filed a case of kidnapping
against his brother [Tito WWW]. [Tito WWW], however,
promised to return her children if she will have the said
case dismissed which she did.

The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on

December 11, 2007, finding accused-appellant Roxas
guilty as charged in each of the five Informations filed
against him. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt in all five (5) counts of rape as recited in the
information[s] and sentences accused MILAN ROXAS:

She denied the allegations that[her] brother-in-law,

herein accused, raped her daughter, [AAA]. In fact,
before the filing of the present rape cases there was
one rape case filed on September 22, 1999 which was
dismissed because [AAA] retracted her statements. As
told to [BBB] by her daughter [AAA], she was not raped

HUMAN RIGHTS

1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967 to suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages
in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;

41

2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968 to suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages
in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;

be "flimsy."
Accused-appellant Roxas elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03473. Accused-appellant Roxas submitted
the following Assignment of Errors in the appellate
court:

3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969 to suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages
in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;

4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970 to suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages
in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs; and

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL

WEIGHT
AND
CREDENCE
TO
THE
PRIVATE
COMPLAINANTS TESTIMONY.
II

5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971 to suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages
in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.13

To credit in favor of the herein accused the full period of

his detention in accordance with law. Resultantly, all
pending incidents are deemed moot and academic. 12

On August 16, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered the

assailed Decision, modifying the Judgment of the RTC as
follows:

The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not

exempt from criminal responsibility on the ground that
he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or
insane person, since Dr. Aglipay merely testified that he
was an eighteen-year old with a mental development
comparable to that of children between nine to ten
years old. The RTC found the testimony of AAA credible,
and found the testimonies of the defense witnesses to

HUMAN RIGHTS

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated

11 December 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 94, in the case entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Milan Roxas y Aguiluz", docketed therein
as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971, is
AFFIRMED with modification that accused-appellant is
ordered to pay private complainant on each count civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages

42

in the amount of P75,000.00, and exemplary damages

in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of
rape.14Hence, accused-appellant Roxas interposed this
appeal, where he, in his Supplemental Brief, presented
an Additional Assignment of Error:

to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of

this Act.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION GIVING
CREDENCE
TO
THE
PRIVATE
COMPLAINANTS
TESTIMONY.15

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)

years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.

A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the

day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.

Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of

AAA is replete with inconsistencies and narrations that
are contrary to common experience, human nature and
the natural course of things. 16 Accused-appellant Roxas
likewise points out that under Republic Act No. 9344 or
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, minors
fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from
criminal responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas claims
that since he has a mental age of nine years old, he
should also be "exempt from criminal liability although
his chronological age at the time of the commission of
the crime was already eighteen years old." 17

The exemption from criminal liability herein established

does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility,

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 18 is explicit in
providing that:

In determining age for purposes of exemption from

criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as
determined by the anniversary of ones birth date, and
not the mental age as argued by accused-appellant
Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe
its true intent.19

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A

child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected

On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully

examined AAAs testimony and found ourselves in
agreement with the assessment of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. As observed by the appellate

HUMAN RIGHTS

43

court:

expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and

to decide who among them is telling the truth.23 As the
trial court further observed, the defense witnesses were
not eyewitnesses. A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as
provided in the Rules of Court. 24 AAAs mother and
brothers were not present when the five rapes allegedly
occurred, and therefore any testimony on their part as
to whether or not the complained acts actually
happened is hearsay.

We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical,

straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner,
without any artificialities or pretensions that would
tarnish the veracity of her testimony. She recalled the
tragic experience and positively identified accusedappellant as the one who ravished her on five
occasions. Her testimony was unshaken by a grueling
cross-examination and there is no impression
whatsoever that the same is a mere fabrication. For her
to come out in the open and publicly describe her
harrowing experience at a trial can only be taken as a
badge of her sincerity and the truth of her claims. 20

We shall now discuss the criminal liability of accusedappellant Roxas. As stated above, the trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of rape.

We further underscore that AAA was merely 14 years

old at the time she testified.21 We have repeatedly held
that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full
weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is
a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact
been committed. When the offended party is of tender
age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to
her account of what transpired, considering not only her
relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is
not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.22

The first rape incident was committed in July 1997, and

therefore the law applicable is Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 which
provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and

It is likewise axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating

the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great
respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who
is in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial

HUMAN RIGHTS

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is

44

demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by

reclusion perpetua.

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is

otherwise unconscious;

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use

of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse

of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of

the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age

and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a

deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx

The succeeding counts of rape were committed after

the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8353 on October
22,1997, which transported the rape provision of the
Revised Penal Code to Title 8 under Crimes against
Persons, and amended the same to its present wording:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of

rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim[.]

Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. Rape

is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

While it appears that the circumstance of minority

under Article 335 (old rape provision) and Article 266-B

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

HUMAN RIGHTS

45

was sufficiently proven, the allegation of the

relationship between AAA and accused-appellant Roxas
is considered insufficient under present jurisprudence.
This Court has thus held:

While the informations in this case alleged that

accused-appellant is the uncle of the two victims, they
did not state that he is their relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity. The testimonial
evidence that accused-appellant's wife and Luisa de
Guzman are sisters is immaterial. The circumstance that
accused-appellant is a relative of the victims by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree
must be alleged in the information. In the case at bar,
the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of
private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It was
necessary to specifically allege that such relationship
was within the third civil degree. Hence, accusedappellant can only be convicted of simple rape on two
counts, for which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua in each case.25

However, as regards the allegation in the Information

that appellant is an uncle of the victim, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently
satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that appellant is
a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or
affinity. It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the
victim is his niece. In the same manner, it is irrelevant
that "AAA" testified that appellant is her uncle. We held
in People v. Velasquez:
However, the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty on accused-appellant, applying Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659.1wphi1 We have consistently
held that the circumstances under the amendatory
provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, the
attendance of which could mandate the imposition of
the single indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature
of qualifying circumstances which cannot be proved as
such unless alleged in the information. Even in cases
where such circumstances are proved, the death
penalty cannot be imposed where the information failed
to allege them. To impose the death penalty on the
basis of a qualifying circumstance which has not been
alleged in the information would violate the accused's
constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accusedappellant Roxass "niece" in each Information is
therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship. Instead, the
applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a
deadly weapon, for which the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since there was no other
aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information
and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless
proper even as we overturn the lower courts
appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship.
For

HUMAN RIGHTS

46

consistency

with

prevailing

jurisprudence,

we

reduce the awards of civil indemnity and moral

damages toP50,000.00 each, for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 for each count, on the other hand, is in line
with recent jurisprudence. 26 WHEREFORE, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473
dated August 16, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity and
moral damages awarded to the complainant are
reduced to P50,000.00 each, for each count of rape,
plus legal interest upon the amounts of indemnity and
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

HUMAN RIGHTS

47

Amanquiton vs. People, 596 SCRA 366, August

14, 2009, G.R. No. 186080

child abuse under existing laws but includes also other

acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to the childs development.
However, this noble statute should not be used as a
sharp sword, ready to be brandished against an accused
even if there is a patent lack of proof to convict him of
the crime. The right of an accused to liberty is as
important as a minors right not to be subjected to any
form of abuse. Both are enshrined in the Constitution.
One need not be sacrificed for the other.

While Republic Act No. 7610 is a statute that provides

for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the
commission of child abuse and exploitation, this noble
statute should not be used as a sharp sword, ready to
be brandished against an accused even if there is a
patent lack of proof to convict him of the crime.
the right of an accused to liberty is as important as a
minors right not to be subjected to any form of abuse.
Time and again, we have held that: Republic Act No.
7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation
of a national comprehensive program for the survival of
the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional
mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that
The State shall defend the right of the children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. This piece of legislation supplies
the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes
committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal
Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and
Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a
mechanism for strong deterrence against the
commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has
stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by
which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and
penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is
expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of

HUMAN RIGHTS

While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of

children abound amidst social ills, care has to be
likewise taken that wayward youths should not be
cuddled by a misapplication of the law.
society, through its laws, should correct the deviant
conduct of the youth rather than take the cudgels for
them.There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations
protecting a child from any and all forms of abuse.
While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of
children abound amidst social ills, care has to be
likewise taken that wayward youths should not be
cuddled by a misapplication of the law. Society, through
its laws, should correct the deviant conduct of the youth
rather than take the cudgels for them. Lest we regress
to a culture of juvenile delinquency and errantbehavior,
laws for the protection of children against abuse should
be applied only and strictly to actual abusers. The
objective of this seemingly catch-all provision on abuses
against children will be best achieved if parameters are

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set in the law itself, if only to prevent baseless

accusations against innocent individuals. Perhaps the
time has come for Congress to review this matter and
institute the safeguards necessary for the attainment of
its laudable ends.

by deeds or words which debases, degrades or

demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic
needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4)
Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.

Where the special law adopted penalties from the

Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
will apply just as it would in felonies.
The penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision
mayor in its minimum period. This penalty is derived
from, and defined in, the Revised Penal Code. Although
R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised
Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or
determining the proper period should be applied. Thus,
where the special law adopted penalties from the
Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
will apply just as it would in felonies.

Sanchez vs. People, 588 SCRA 747, June 05, 2009,

G.R. No. 179090.
Definition of Child Abuse.
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child
abuse refers to the maltreatment of a child, whether
habitual or not, which includes any of the following: (1)
Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act

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HUMAN RIGHTS

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