Professional Documents
Culture Documents
UPDATES OF CASES ON
PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS 2010-2016
(JUNE)
Family Code:
Privacy Art. 26
Absence of Essential Elements of
and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension from
employment in 2006. Cadiz was suspended for Unprofessionalism and
Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. Cadiz became
pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the suspension until such
time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law. Cadiz then
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice,
Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with
prayer for Reinstatement.
ISSUE:
W/N the condition requiring Cadiz to first enter into marriage before
she can be admitted back to employment
ART. 4, 35 (3)
Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 18396, January 30, 2013)
FACTS:
Marriage Art. 4
Marriage with Foreigners Art. 26
Void ab initio Marriages Arts. 34, 35,
38, 39 & 40
Psychological Incapacity Art. 36 FC
Absence or Disappearance of Spouse
Arts. 41 & 42
Improvements on Paraphernal Property
Art. 92
Sale of ACP without consent Art. 96
HELD:
Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and discriminatory.
The RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona. CA ruled that there was
a valid marriage license because the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search
for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value.
HELD:
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.
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ART. 26
FACTS:
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HELD:
NO, the divorce is not valid and the trial court should not
have acknowledged the divorce decree.
The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
fact. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Norma A. Del Socorro, for and in behalf of her minor child, Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem v. Ernst Johan Brinkham Van Wilsem
(10 December 2014, G.R. No. 193707)
FACTS:
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HELD:
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Article 34
Art. 35
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HELD:
YES. The existence of the previous marriage between Amelia
and Filipito was sufficiently established by the Certificate of
Marriage. In the absence of any showing that such marriage
had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage
was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
In a void marriage, it is as though no marriage has taken
place. Thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally and
may be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage. There is no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father.
ART. 36
Aurelio v. Aurelio (G.R. No. 175367, June 06, 2011)
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HELD:
Psychological incapacity contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling to constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown tha t the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse
from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Otherwise, the alleged sexual infidelity and abandonment
are merely grounds for legal separation.
ART. 38
Held:
Article 147 is applicable, not Article 129. The marriage
between Nonato and Barrido was declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36. Article 147 states
that if the marriage is void, wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares, and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. This particular kind
of co-ownership applies when the following elements are
present: must be capacitated to marry each other; live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void.
ART. 39
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ART. 40
FACTS:
Edgardo and Edna Azote married on 1992, and their union
produced six children. Edgardo, a member of the Social
Security System (SSS) submitted to the SSS two E-4 forms in
1994 and 2001designating Edna and their six children as
beneficiaries. Edgardo passed away in January 2005.
ISSUES:
W/N the SSS can determine the validity of Ednas marriage
to Edgardo considering Rosemarie or Elmer did not appear
or contest Ednas claim.
W/N Edna is entitled to Edgardos SSS death benefits as his
legitimate wife.
HELD:
ART. 41
Republic v. Narceda
(G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)
HELD:
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. Hearing of a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding. Article 247 of the Family
Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in
summary court proceedings shall be immediately
final and executory. Thus, by the express provision
of law, the judgment of the RTC is not appealable.
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ART. 42
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City
declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively
dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage.
Celerina and Ricardo were married in 1980. According to
Ricardo, when the family business did not prosper, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work abroad as a domestic
helper. She left the Philippines and was never heard from
again. He also exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He claimed
that it was almost 12 years from the date of his RTC petition
since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
HELD:
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial
Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner.
An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent. The
choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them
certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions. The Family Code
provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the
present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage. In turn, the Family Code
provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
ART. 92
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ART. 117
ART. 116
Dela Pena v. Avila
ISSUE: W/N Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the
purchase of the real properties subject to the dissolution
proceedings?
HELD:
NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by
virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates
no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. (Distinguish
from Borromeo v. Descallar (2009) relationship under Art. 148)
FACTS:
Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, was
married on March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of
Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the
basis of the formers psychological incapacity. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership and prayed for the distribution of several
properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage.
Beumer testified that while the four other lots were registered
in the name of his wife, these properties were acquired with
the money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit.
ART. 121
Aguete v. Philippine National Bank
(G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011)
Art. 122
Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012)
FACTS:
Prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia,
and others of murder before RTC Surigao. The RTC acquitted
Efren but found Melecia and another person guilty and
sentenced them to the death. The RTC ordered those found
guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and
severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on
March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names
of Efren and Melecia.
Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012)
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ART. 129
ART. 124
Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions
also state that the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power
of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of
the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
ART. 130
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Art. 147
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ART. 148
HELD:
The divorce did not dissolve the marriage between JLL and Eugenia.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of JLL and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until JLLs death.
JLLs marriage to Soledad, being bigamous, was void, and the
properties acquired during their marriage are governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that only the property acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required.
Soledad failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to
purchase the condominium unit. Also, it is logical that Soledad, not
being a lawyer, had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase
of books for the law firm.
Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna (23 July 2015, G.R. No.
171914)
FACTS:
Art. 152:
Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan (G.R. No. 178288 Aug. 15, 2012)
FACTS: The court issued a judgment against Sps. Fortaleza which
resulted to the execution of their conjugal house.
ISSUE: W/N he family home can be executed.
HELD: A family home is exempt from execution or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code, provided such claim for
exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so
estops the party from later claiming the exemption.
In this case, reasonable time for purposes of the law on
exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the
one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the
property.
ART. 155 DE MESA v. ACERO (G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012)
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of
exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before August 3, 1988 must
be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code;
Second, family residences constructed after August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences not judicially or extrajudicially constituted
as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by
operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
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HELD:
Respondents family home cannot be sold on execution under
Article 160 of the family Code. The issue of whether the
property in dispute exceeded the statutory limit of Php300,000
has already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its
findings necessarily meant that the property is exempt from
execution.
Art. 172
Facts:
Spouses Aguilar died, intestate and without debts. Their estate
include two parcels of land which is the subject of the controversy.
Petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC a civil case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G.
Siasat, alleging that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of
the Aguilar spouses; that he discovered that the subject titles were
missing, and he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan had
stolen the same.
In her Answer,respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who
was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness
of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife,
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share
of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar,
her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue;
and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for
safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.
HELD:
Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for
proof of filiation and relationship of petitioner to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Filiation may
be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required.
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HELD:
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or good cause for the holding of the test.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
ART. 175
Jesse U. Lucas V. Jesus S. Lucas (G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011)
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ISSUE: W/N Antonio may compel the use of his surname for
his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD: NO. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother (Art 176 of the Family
Code). The exception provided is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on
the mother; hence, Antonios prayer has no legal mooring. Since
parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the
minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.
the instant petition. In Tison v. CA,the Court held that "the civil
status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally." The childs
legitimacy "cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose."The
instant petition sprang out of AAAs application for a PPO before
the RTC. Hence, BBBs claim that CCC is not his biological son is a
collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.
HELD:
The amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.
Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for
his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses, etc.,
should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite. Any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those
incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
FACTS:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for
support pendent lite amounting to P500,000. Respondent on the
other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give
as much as 75,000 as support. The RTC ruled that based on the
evidence presented the proper amount to paid should be
115,000. This was not assailed by any party thus, it became final
and executory. Issues once again arose, when respondent in
complying with its obligation, deducted from the amount of
support in arrears, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner representing the value of two expensive cars bought by
respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel
expenses and purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods.
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Art. 203
RA 7610
Facts:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old. The
two became sweethearts. Sometime in 1998, Caballo persuaded
AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by
several more incidents of sexual congress.
Issue: W/O Caballo is guilty of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
HELD:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12)yeasof age shall bereclusion temporalin its medium period,
xxx
(c) xxx
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the
following:
1.The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2.The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
3.The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age
(Jojit Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011)
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Held:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Consent is not
material in cases under RA 7610.
Moreover, the abuse is punishable whether habitual
or not. In the case, Caballos actuations of assuring AAA
of his love and promise to marry may be classified as
coercion and influence within the purview of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610. These were meant to influence
AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give
into having sex with him, in which he succeeded.
Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron v. People, (G.R No. 195224, June 15, 2016)
Jabalde is guilty of slight physical injuries only and not child abuse
under R.A. 7610. Jabalde was accused of slapping and striking Lin,
but the records do not show that Jabalde intended to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human
being. The laying of hands on Lin was an effect of Jabaldes
emotional outrage after being informed that her daughters head was
punctured which made her think that she was already dead. Dr. Munoz
stated that the abrasions may have been mildly inflicted. This runs
contrary to the accusation that she intended to abuse or maltreat Lin,
because if she did, she could have easily hurt the 7 year old boy with
heavy blows. As a mother, the idea of the death of her child caused
an instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm
and danger in the form of the mild abrasions inflicted on Lin. Having
lost the strength of her mind, she lacked the intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being that is essential in the child of crime abuse.
and CA that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his
hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with
their holding that petitioners acts constituted child abuse
under RA 7610. The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had
been intended to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended
to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent
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THE END
THANK YOU
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