FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.147978.January23,2002]

THELMA A. JADERMANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C.

CAMAISAandEDILBERTOCAMAISA,respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN,J.:

The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a
conjugalpropertywithoutthewifeswrittenconsent.
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. JaderManalo
allegedly came across an advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma
Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the
newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their tendoor
apartmentinMakati,aswellasthatinTaytay,Rizal.
AsnarratedbypetitionerinhercomplaintfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourtof Makati,
Metro Manila, she was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the
purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by respondent
[1]
spouses. Petitionermadeavisualinspectionofthesaidlotswiththerealestatebrokerand
was shown the tax declarations, real property tax payment receipts, location plans, and
[2]
vicinity maps relating to the properties. Thereafter, petitioner met with the vendors who
turned out to be respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to
respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent
[3]
NormaCamaisainthepresenceoftherealestatebroker. Aftersomebargaining,petitioner
andEdilbertoagreeduponthepurchasepriceofP1,500,000.00fortheTaytaypropertyand
[4]

P2,100,000.00fortheMakatiproperty tobepaidoninstallmentbasiswithdownpayments
ofP100,000.00andP200,000.00,respectively,onApril15,1992.Thebalancethereofwas
[5]

tobepaidasfollows :
TaytayPropertyMakatiProperty
6thmonthP200,000.00P300,000.00
12thmonth700,000.001,600,000.00
18thmonth500,000.00
[6]

ThisagreementwashandwrittenbypetitionerandsignedbyEdilberto. Whenpetitioner
pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wifes
[7]

conformityandconsenttothesale. TheformaltypewrittenContractstoSellwerethereafter
preparedbypetitioner.Thefollowingday,petitioner,therealestatebrokerandEdilbertomet
[8]
inthelattersofficefortheformalsigningofthetypewrittenContractstoSell. AfterEdilberto
signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB Check No.
62807datedApril15,1992forP200,000.00 and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated April
15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the presence of the real estate broker and an employee in

[9]

Edilbertosoffice. ThecontractsweregiventoEdilbertofortheformalaffixingofhiswifes
signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a
[10]
meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. To accommodate her queries,
petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate
[11]
brokeratCafeRizalinMakati. Duringthemeeting,handwrittennotationsweremadeon
thecontractstosell,sotheyarrangedtoincorporatethenotationsandtomeetagainforthe
[12]
formalsigningofthecontracts.
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at
Edilbertos office for the formal affixing of Normas signature, she was surprised when
respondentspousesinformedherthattheywerebackingoutoftheagreementbecausethey
[13]
neededspotcashforthefullamountoftheconsideration. Petitionerremindedrespondent
spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Normas refusal to
sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts
prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against
respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on April 29,
1992,tocompelrespondentNormaCamaisatosignthecontractstosell.
[14]

AMotiontoDismiss wasfiledbyrespondentswhichwasdeniedbythetrialcourtinits
[15]
ResolutionofJuly21,1992.
RespondentsthenfiledtheirAnswerwithCompulsoryCounterclaim,allegingthatitwas
anagreementbetweenhereinpetitionerandrespondentEdilbertoCamaisathatthesaleof
the subject properties was still subject to the approval and conformity of his wife Norma
[16]

Camaisa.

Thereafter,whenNormarefusedtogiveherconsenttothesale,herrefusalwas
[17]

duly communicated by Edilberto to petitioner. The checks issued by petitioner were

[18]
returned to her by Edilberto and she accepted the same without any objection.
Respondentfurtherclaimedthattheacceptanceofthechecksreturnedtopetitionersignified
[19]

her assent to the cancellation of the sale of the subject properties. Respondent Norma
deniedthatsheeverparticipatedinthenegotiationsforthesaleofthesubjectpropertiesand
[20]

thatshegaveherconsentandconformitytothesame.

On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for Summary
[21]

Judgment assertingthatthereisnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfactonthebasisof
thepleadingsandadmissionofthepartiesconsideringthatthewifeswrittenconsentwasnot
obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal properties belonging to respondents
hence,thecontractwasnullandvoid.
OnApril14,1993,thetrialcourtrenderedasummaryjudgmentdismissingthecomplaint
onthegroundthatunderArt.124oftheFamilyCode,thecourtcannotintervenetoauthorize
thetransactionintheabsenceoftheconsentofthewifesincesaidwifewhorefusedtogive
consenthadnotbeenshowntobeincapacitated.Thedispositiveportionofthetrialcourts
decisionreads:
WHEREFORE,consideringthesepremises,judgmentisherebyrendered:
1.DismissingthecomplaintandorderingthecancellationoftheNoticeofLisPendensbyreasonof
itsfilingonTCTNos.(464860)S8724and(464861)S8725oftheRegistryofDeedsatMakatiand
onTCTNos.295976and295971oftheRegistryofRizal.
2.OrderingplaintiffThelmaA.JadertopaydefendantspousesNormaandEdilbertoCamaisa,FIFTY

THOUSAND(P50,000.00)asMoralDamagesandFIFTYTHOUSAND(P50,000.00)asAttorneys
Fees.
[22]

Costsagainstplaintiff.

Petitioner,thus,elevatedthecasetotheCourtofAppeals.OnNovember29,2000,the
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial court but deleted the award of
P50,000.00asdamagesandP50,000.00asattorneysfees.
The Court of Appeals explained that the properties subject of the contracts were
conjugalpropertiesandassuch,theconsentofbothspousesisnecessarytogiveeffectto
thesale.Since private respondent Norma Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale
was never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was returned by respondent spouses and
wasacceptedbypetitioner.TheCourtofAppealsalsostressedthattheauthorityofthecourt
toallowsaleorencumbranceofaconjugalpropertywithouttheconsentoftheotherspouse
is applicable only in cases where the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participateintheadministrationoftheconjugalproperty.
Hence,thepresentrecourseassigningthefollowingerrors:
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSGRIEVIOUSLYERREDINRENDERING
SUMMARYJUDGMENTINDISMISSINGTHECOMPLAINTENTIRELYAND
ORDERINGTHECANCELLATIONOFNOTICEOFLISPENDENSONTHETITLESOF
THESUBJECTREALPROPERTIES
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSGRIEVIOUSLYERREDINFAILINGTO
CONSIDERTHATTHESALEOFREALPROPERTIESBYRESPONDENTSTO
PETITIONERHAVEALREADYBEENPERFECTED,FORAFTERTHELATTERPAID
P300,000.00DOWNPAYMENT,RESPONDENTMRS.CAMAISANEVEROBJECTEDTO
STIPULATIONSWITHRESPECTTOPRICE,OBJECTANDTERMSOFPAYMENTIN
THECONTRACTTOSELLALREADYSIGNEDBYTHEPETITIONER,RESPONDENT
MR.CAMAISAANDWITNESSESMARKEDASANNEXGINTHECOMPLAINT
EXCEPT,FORMINORPROVISIONSALREADYIMPLIEDBYLAW,LIKEEJECTMENT
OFTENANTS,SUBDIVISIONOFTITLEANDRESCISSIONINCASEOFNONPAYMENT,
WHICHPETITIONERREADILYAGREEDANDACCEDEDTOTHEIRINCLUSION
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSGRIEVIOUSLYERREDWHENITFAILEDTO
CONSIDERTHATCONTRACTOFSALEISCONSENSUALANDITISPERFECTEDBY
THEMERECONSENTOFTHEPARTIESANDTHEAPPLICABLEPROVISIONSARE
ARTICLES1157,1356,1357,1358,1403,1405AND1475OFTHECIVILCODEOFTHE
[23]

PHILIPPINESANDGOVERNEDBYTHESTATUTEOFFRAUD.

The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
Petitionerallegesthatthetrialcourterredwhenitenteredasummaryjudgmentinfavor
of respondent spouses there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that the
issue of whether the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses was
perfectedisaquestionoffactnecessitatingatrialonthemerits.
The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon
motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or
issues of fact involved, and that therefore the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
[24]
matteroflaw. Aperusalofthepleadingssubmittedbybothpartiesshowthatthereisno

genuinecontroversyastothefactsinvolvedtherein.
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels of land
between petitioner and respondent spouses that petitioner and respondent Edilberto
Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and the terms of payment, and a
downpaymentwaspaidbypetitionertothelatterandthatrespondentNormarefusedtosign
thecontractstosell.Theissuethusposedforresolutioninthetrialcourtwaswhetherornot
the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses were already perfected
suchthatthelattercouldnolongerbackoutoftheagreement.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the
dispositionisvoid.Thus,Article124oftheFamilyCodeprovides:
Art.124.Theadministrationandenjoymentoftheconjugalpartnershippropertyshallbelongtoboth
spousesjointly.Incaseofdisagreement,thehusbandsdecisionshallprevail,subjecttorecoursetothe
courtbythewifeforaproperremedy,whichmustbeavailedofwithinfiveyearsfromthedateofthe
contractimplementingsuchdecision.
Intheeventthatonespouseisincapacitatedorotherwiseunabletoparticipateintheadministrationof
theconjugalproperties,theotherspousemayassumesolepowersofadministration.Thesepowersdo
notincludethepowersofdispositionorencumbrancewhichmusthavetheauthorityofthecourtor
thewrittenconsentoftheotherspouse.Intheabsenceofsuchauthorityorconsentthedispositionor
encumbranceshallbevoid.However,thetransactionshallbeconstruedasacontinuingofferonthe
partoftheconsentingspouseandthethirdperson,andmaybeperfectedasabindingcontractupon
theacceptancebytheotherspouseorauthorizationbythecourtbeforetheofferiswithdrawnby
eitherorbothofferors.(Underscoringours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal hence, for the
contractstoselltobeeffective,theconsentofbothhusbandandwifemustconcur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale.
EvengrantingthatrespondentNormaactivelyparticipatedinnegotiatingforthesaleofthe
subjectproperties,whichshedenied,herwrittenconsenttothesaleisrequiredbylawforits
validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to
sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
[25]
conjugalproperties.However,beingmerelyawareofatransactionisnotconsent.
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her
signaturestothecontractstosell,courtauthorizationunderArticle124oftheFamilyCodeis
warranted.
The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the
writtenconsentoftheotherspousecannotbeobtainedorisbeingwithheld,themattermay
be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the
circumstances.However,itshouldbestressedthatcourtauthorizationunderArt.124isonly
[26]
resortedtoincaseswherethespousewhodoesnotgiveconsentisincapacitated. Inthis
case,petitionerfailedtoallegeandprovethatrespondentNormawasincapacitatedtogive
herconsenttothecontracts.Intheabsenceofsuchshowingofthewifesincapacity,court
authorizationcannotbesought.
Undertheforegoingfacts,themotionforsummaryjudgmentwasproperconsideringthat
therewasnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfact.Theonlyissuetoberesolvedbythetrial
court was whether the contract to sell involving conjugal properties was valid without the
writtenconsentofthewife.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyDENIEDandthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals

datedNovember29,2000inCAG.R.CVNo.43421AFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Puno,Pardo,andYnaresSantiago,JJ.,concur.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

ParagraphIVofComplaintRollo,p.61.
ParagraphVofComplaintid.
ParagraphVIofComplaintid.
ParagraphVIIofComplaintid.,at62.
Id.
ThehandwrittenagreementwasattachedasAnnexEtotheComplaintRollo,pp.8083.
Supra,Note4.
ParagraphIXofComplaintRollo,p.63.
PhotocopiesofthesecheckswereattachedasAnnexHtotheComplaintRollo,.pp.9092.

[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
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[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]

ParagraphXIofComplaintRollo,pp.6364.
ParagraphXIIofComplaintid.
ParagraphXIIIofComplaintid.
ParagraphXIXid.,pp.6465.
Rollo,pp.107110.
Id.,at143.
ParagraphXIofAnswerwithCumpolsaryCounterclaim,id.,p.95.
ParagraphXIII,id.
id.
id.
Paragraphs2and3oftheAnswerwithCompulsaryCounterclaimid.at9394.
Rollo,p.186.
AnnexQ,p.3Rollo,pp.224225.
Rollo,p.23.
271SCRA36(1997).
Tinitiganvs.Tinitigan,100SCRA619(1980).
CommentariesandJurisprudenceontheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,ArturoTolentino,Vol.I,p.461citing
thecaseofNicolasvs.CourtofAppeals,154SCRA635[1987]whichheldthat:

...theveryconspicuousabsenceofthewifesconformetosuchdispositionoftheganancialproperty,therebeing
no showing that Lourdes Manuel, whom respondent Madlangsakay married in 1927, is legally incapacitated

renderstheallegedsalevoidabinitiobecauseitisincontraventionofthemandatoryrequirementinArticle166
oftheCivilCode.Thisdoctrineistoowellsettledinourjurisprudencetorequirefurtherelucidation.
See also p. 392 of Tolentinos Commentaries relating to an identical provision, Art. 96 of the Civil Code, on
communityproperty.Tolentinowrites:
As a result of this joint ownership, neither spouse may alienate or encumber any common property without the
writtenconsentoftheother,or,iftheotherspouseisincapacitated,theauthorizationofthecourt.