An Overview of Electronic Warfare in Radar

Systems
Faran Awais Butt

Madiha Jalil

School of Engineering
University of Management and Technology,
Lahore, Pakistan
faranawais@gmail.com

School of Engineering
University of Management and Technology,
Lahore, Pakistan
ms09141@gmail.com

Abstract-Electronic

counter

measures

and

electronic

counter-counter measures are the two maj or types of electronic

warfare that are always seem to be in competition with each
other. Aircrafts without electronic counter measures are usually
in a high risk against the enemy's air defence. Similarly Radars
without electronic

counter

counter-measures

are

considered

worthless and incapable of deploying in the sensitive zones. In

this paper a brief comparison of electronic counter and counter
counter measures is presented highlighting a race against each
other for superiority.

Keywords-Electronic warfare, electronic counter measures,

electronic counter-counter measures, digital radio frequency
memory.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Electronic warfare is the set of measures that are adopted to

detect and electronically attack the enemy's electronic system,
hence using the science to deny the enemy forces to use its
electromagnetic spectrum. Ever since World War II,
sophistication in the radars and electronic warfare has grown
with a rapid pace. Militaries around the world have started to
attain serious attention to the sophistication of their weaponry
and their control. There has been a rapid increase in
performance of both radar and electronic warfare since World
War II [12].
EW is commonly divided into three categories namely
electronic support measures that is responsible for identifying
the enemy's capabilities and deployment. The other category
is electronic attack which is responsible for attacking the
electronic equipment of the enemy and finally the electronic
protection that is used to countermeasure the enemy's
electronic attack. Broadly speaking electronic warfare is
divided into two parts namely ECM (electronic
countermeasures)
and
ECCM
(electronic
counter
countermeasures). Electronic countermeasures are taken to
lessen the abilities of the Radars to detect the target threat; As
a consequence radars are equipped with electronic counter
countermeasures to ensure their proper operation.
ECCM is a part of electronic warfare that includes practices
that are intended to nullify and hence counter the effects of the
ECM. Electronics played the most important role in the
development of the technology all across the globe. It is the

ISBN: 978-1-4673-5613-82013 IEEE

electronics that comes to rescue against any threat that may

prevail because of electronics.
Radar jamming was started by the Royal Air force during
World War II with the code name 'window', it is usually
known as chaff these days. This was the time when they also
started jamming German's radio communication.
Radar cross section is the parameter of the target which
describes the strength of electromagnetic wave reflected from
the target threat,in other words detectability of the target is
dependent on this characteristic of the target.
RCS in terms of electric field is given by [9].
(J'

lim

H=

4JZ'r2 tl
IE,12

Where Es is the magnitude of the scattered electric field and E,

is the magnitude of the incident electric field. ECM designers
would want to lessen this parameter where as the ECCM
designers wish for greater value of the radar cross section.

II.

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

Any effort intended to disturb the normal operation of radar

is referred to as ECM. ECM can be broadly classified into
detection and monitoring of target, to get advance knowledge
on the nature of signal's used by the target, to jam it or to
deceive it. A variety of components are required in an
advanced ECM system [1].
Digital radio frequency memory is a technology in which
high speed sampling and digital memory is used to store the
incoming signal. The signal is mixed or corrupted and later on
it is coherently reconstructed and sent to the target threat.
These days Jamming pods of most of the fighter aircrafts are
equipped with the DRFM systems [4][5]. DRFM is the
principal means to implement deception jamming in ECM
systems.
ECM can be characterized into noise jamming and
deception jamming.

213

A.

Noise Jamming

The deliberate radiation, re radiation, or reflection of

electromagnetic energy to disturb the normal operation of
radar is referred to as noise jamming.
Noise jamming can be characterized into spot, sweep and
barrage jamming.

jammer distributes its power among multiple frequencies

simultaneously and hence overcomes the challenges
associated with other types of jamming.

1. Spot Jamming

In spot jamming, all of the power of the jammer is

concentrated at a particular frequency which should ideally be
that of the radar. Fig.l shows a pattern if how jammer targets
one particular frequency.

Jammer

Fig.3. Barrage Jamming when a range of frequencies are targeted

simultaneously

B. Deception Jamming

Fig.l. Spot Jamming when the ECM system targets one frequency

In deception jamming the ECM systems deliberately

deceives the radar and sends out false signals. Hence the radar
misinterprets the information received by it and is mislead by
the false target information [3].
Deception jamming can be broadly classified into range
deception and velocity deception.
1.

2. Sweep Jamming

In sweep jamming, the jammer sweeps its frequency

from one to other and hence does not share its power among
multiple frequencies. Fig.2 shows how a jammer targets a
particular frequency and then shifts its power to other
frequencies hence covering a wide range of frequencies.

Range Deception

In range deception jamming the jammer first locks on

the target, after that it uses pulses that are generated in the
jammer and uses time delays to confuse the radar about the
original location of the radar. FigA shows an animation of
plan position indicator of the radar where fake multiple targets
can be seen at different ranges and velocity.
2.

Velocity Deception

In velocity deception, the jamming alters the

frequency or phase of the signal that it sends back and hence
the radar is not able to identify the true location of the target.

(
1

Fig.2 Sweep Jamming where one frequency is targeted at a time

3. Barrage Jamming

In barrage jamming, the jammer targets multiple

frequencies at the same time and hence overcomes the
drawbacks associated with the spot jamming. Fig.3 shows that

ISBN: 978-1-4673-5613-82013 IEEE

Fig.4. Deception Jamming where Multiple false targets appearing on the

PPI of the radar

214

Jamming of the radar affects the signal to noise ratio in the

receiver. Signal to noise plus jamming ratio can be written as

S
J+ N

( (ERP)Ar +kT )
l 4n:R2B,

'

::
' ' .....;. :...: :.: :
..
..
.,...l.
' ' ''oi'....
';'o L_=::::'j
1
3

(2)

IOo

where
ERP

.
.
Effective Radzated Power

10
10
Jammer peak power Watts

PC
.f

":lO r--'1'1'1'1

IT" mli

.f

__

LJ

::10

-,--,-TTTlTfr----r-n,-mr-,--,--,
-,
-rrrm---"
- '
, l-r
" I rn
I'
IT
l

I I I IIIII

I I I IIIII

I I I IIIII

I I I IIIII

I I IIIII

I I I IIIII

I I I IIIII

I I IIIII

I I I IIIII

I I I IIIII

I I IIIII

I I I IIIII

j
j

I I I IIIII

j
j

1 111111
1 111111

I I I IIII

_L .l
Llll
J iI __
I_LUUIJ
l
__U.l Il.JLl _ -.J-.lUUIL _L l.I I I IIIII
I I I IIIII

Fig.5 shows a simulation elaborating a comparison of

Signal to noise plus jamming ratio for radar operating at 5.6
GHz. The one in black in without the jamming power and the
red one shows the SNJR in presence of jammer operating at
500KW of power. Clearly the detection becomes too
cumbersome in presence of ECM effects.

10

I I I IIIII

10

j
j
j
j

I I IIIII
I I IIIII
I I IIIII

:.11

I I I IIIII
I I I IIIII
I

I I I IIII

10
10
Radar peak power KW

I I I IIII

10

10

Fig.6 Comparison of Jammer and Radar's Peak Power

Vs. Cross Over Range

III. ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES

100

-Pj O
-Pj SOO kW
'
,

r::c

-.:>

50

<=

O
-+--:>

en50

100
0

10

15

20
25
30
35
Detection range in Km
Fig.S S/(J+N) vs. Detection Range

40

45

50

As the jammer becomes closer to the radar the SNR

becomes closer to unity, this range is known as the cross over
range. The range where SNR is considerably greater than
unity is called as the detection range.
Fig 6 shows a comparison of jammer and radar's peak
power versus the cross over range for radar operating at 6
GHz. Clearly the jammer needs to come closer to the radar in
order to be more effective. Modern ECCM systems gain
advantage from this and exploit the vulnerabilities associated
with the jamming ECM systems.
Cross over range is expressed as

(3)

ISBN: 978-1-4673-5613-82013 IEEE

ECCM refers to the intended efforts which nullifies the

effects of the ECM and makes the radar capable enough to
detect the target threat which is implying the ECM effects.
With the advancements in the ECM systems, there was a need
to counter and hence nullify the effects of ECM and hence to
make the radar capable of doing the work it is made for i.e.
detection and localization of target. In the future, a major part
of the increased processing power of new or upgraded systems
will be devoted to ECCM and target recognition [6].
Since there are different methods of deploying an ECM
system, there is a need of an ECCM application of identifying
the type of ECM that the target threats use. And then
accordingly use the appropriate counter to the type of ECM.
Following are some of the techniques that can be used in
ECCM systems. Fig.7 shows the relative amplitude of target
echo (shown in black) and the jamming amplitude (shown in
red) versus the normalized cross over range for a radar
operating at 6 GHz. The bandwidth of radar is chosen to be
700 KHz and bandwidth of jammer is chosen to be 60 MHz.
These days signal processing is regarded as the hottest topic
for ECCM designers.

A.

Pulse Compression

The radar return at the receiver gets processed to add a delay

as a function of frequency, and it appears stronger. This leads
to stronger signal strength above the noise jamming. Also the
noise signal will typically have a different chirp.
High resolution while maintammg adequate average
transmitted power can be achieved using pulse compression
[10].

215

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c
= __

(4)

2B

where!!.R = ra n g e re solution
B

= ba ndw idth

= pul s e w idth

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40

--- 4---- --- 4----

(1)-20
u
c:
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I I I I III

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:
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---'----r---'---I

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10

Fig.S. RCS vs. Frequency for a sphere

---I

10'

Fig.7 Comparison of Jarnmer and Radars Signal Amplitude

Vs. Nonnalized Cross Over Range

B. Frequency Hopping

[n frequency agility, the frequency of the transmitted signal is

switched rapidly and hence receiving the same frequency
within the receiving time window, it gets very difficult for the
jammer to jam a particular frequency in a certain time interval.
Also the next frequency cannot be predicted by the jammer in
such quick succession.
Frequency hopping is quite useful specially against the
barrage jamming since it forces the jammer to spread its
power among multiple frequencies.
The radar cross section of larger objects [ike aircrafts varies
greatly with the change in frequency. At some frequencies, the
RCS is small and at others it is high. [f radar is operating at a
single frequency it might result in a lost detection as a result
of a smaller target echo. By using multiple frequencies, the
RCS though can vary but the detection probability would
considerably increase.
Fig 8 shows a simulation of radar cross section vs. frequency
acting on a sphere. Even in the sphere we can see that RCS
does not remain constant for wide range of frequencies. [n
realistic objects a larger dip in radar cross section is
experienced at some particular frequencies. Frequency agi[ity
can potentially disturb the coherence between consecutive
echoes, so designers have to take this thing into account as the
corresponding ECM systems are also getting very smarter.

ISBN: 978-1-4673-5613-82013 IEEE

C. Side lobe Blanking

The detection range can be degraded because of jamming

entering in the sidelobes of the antenna. The energies outside
the main beam can be detected by the radar warning receivers
as the multi-static radars with multiple receivers are gaining
popularity. That is why, [ower side[obes are very important
but at the same time this can worsen the problem in case the
jammer tries to jam on the main beam of the radar.
Radars have a directional antenna aimed at certain azimuth
and elevation angle. If the jammer signal aims the target from
some other direction and is strong enough, the radar receiver
can detect it from a relatively low gain side lobe. The radar
however can process it if they were coming from the main
lobe. To overcome this, an Omni directional antenna can be
used which compares the signal strength from the main lobe
and side lobe and hence the receiver can then filter out signals
from unwanted direction. These days many countries are
working on new radar technologies to counter the ECM
effects, among which are modern phased array antenna
technologies [9].
Side lobe blanking devices reduce the number of false alarms
due to the interference which is coming through the side lobes
[2].
Fig 8 and Fig 9 are showing the plots of normalized antenna
pattern with respect to the azimuth angles. [n the simulation,
the jammer height is chosen to be 500m at [OOkm range for
radar working at 6 GHz. The relative sidelobe level in the fig
8 is 0 dB where as in the fig 9, the sidelobe level is -45 dB.
The ECCM designers would ideally want the sidelobe levels
to be as small as possible. The sidelobe blanking system gives
the ECCM designers advantage of exploiting these
vulnerabilities.

216

,--,----,--.--,
--1-- - - ---1- - - - t- - ---

--- ---1----+----

I
I - ----I1 - - - j-- - T

I -------I1 ----1

______

____ L ____

________

L ____

-;;;10
o

2:0

Study of the two EW schemes show that a lot of work has

been done in ECM and the ECCM. Aircrafts are at high risk in
a hostile environment if they are not equipped with an ECM
system; similarly radar without a proper ECCM is ineffective.
The country having superior ECM system can render the
million dollar radars of the rivalry ineffective; similarly a
superior ECCM system nullifies the effect of a costly ECM
system. The conflicting sides have to strive for superiority in
both ECM and ECCM for a reliable air defense system. A
counter technique is usually followed by a counter-counter to
it and the race continues.

I-lI--lII-I'--"-"------'--"-'------a-'--"-"'--"-"----'--w-'
10 u----'----I
150
100
.
0
50
100
1
Azimuth Angle, deg

Fig.9. Nonnalized antenna pattern for 6 GHz radar having OdB relative
side lobe level

REFERENCES
[I]
[2]

,--,----,--.--,
1
______ ____ .L ____
--1- - - - ---, - - - ___

-;;10

___

____ .L ____ L _

- ---

J ____ l ____
I
I

--1-- - - ---1 - - - - +- - - - - I

[3]

[4]
I
I

________

l ____
I

-- ---1- - - - +- - ---

[5]
[6]

[7]

150

100

0
50
Azimuth Angle, deg

100

Fig.10. Normalized antenna pattern for 6 GHz radar having -45dB as the
relative side lobe level

[8]
[9]
[10]

[II]

D. Polarization

Polarization can be used to filter out the jamming signals. The

jamming signal loses its effectiveness if it does not have the
same polarization as that of the receiver. Besides that, the
radar receiver can make use of antenna diversity. It can use
multiple antennas of different polarization and correlate the
signals in the receiver.
Study of all these methods and technologies for radar ECCM
in recent years show that study in these fields is promising and
great deal of room is available in them for further
improvement [7]. Many researchers believe that the field of
signal processing has the maximum potential in ECCM of
radar systems [8].

[12]

J.D
Mosinski,
"Electronic
Countenneasures",
Tactical
Communications Conference, 1992.
G. Foglia, "ECM counteracting SLB: Analysis and effectiveness
evaluation," Radar Conference, 2008.
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algorithms to discriminate between radar targets and ECM signals,"
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, v.58 n.12, p.5984-5993,
December 2010.
J. Schuerger and D. Gannatyuk, "Deception Jamming Modeling in
Radar Sensor Networks," Military Communications Conference,2008.
1. Moir, A. Seabridge, "Military Avionics Systems", John Wiley And
And Sons 1006.
G.V Morris and T.a.Kastle, 'Trends in Electronic Counter-Counter
Measures," Proceedings
of
IEEE National
Telesystems
Conference,Atlanta,v.1 ,p 265-269,March 1991.
J.M.Guo, J.X.Li and Q. Lv, "Survey on Radar ECCM Methods and
Trends in its Development," International Conference on Radar, 2006.
P K. Kumar and K M N. Prabhu, "Classification of radar returns using
Wigner-Ville distribution," IEEE ICASSP -96, 1996: 3105-3108.
1. C. Wise, "Summary of Recent Australian Radar Developments,"
IEEE A&E Systems Magazine, 2004(12): 8-10.
C. E. Cook and W. M. Siebert, "The early history of
pulse
compression radar,"IEEE Trans. Aerospace and Elec. Systems, v.
24, no. 6, pp. 825-833, Nov. 1988.
B.R. Mahafza and
A. Z. Elsherbeni, " Simulations for
Radar System Design" Chapter 05, July 2003.
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Radar Conf. Rec, May 6-9, 1985,pp 5.2-5.7.

IV. CONCLUSION
The paper provides an over view of the electronic counter
measures and the electronic counter counter-measures. A
better ECCM gives supremacy to the ground based radar
systems, where as an ECM systems exalt the superiority of jet
aircrafts.

ISBN: 978-1-4673-5613-82013 IEEE

217