Bangayan v.

Bangayan
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while
Alegre was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with
Sally Go. Sallys father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced
Benjamin to sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case
against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged
marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally
presented a marriage license allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD:
No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally
was not authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view
of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never
complied with the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous
marriage to speak of.
Romulo v. People
G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the
church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a
marriage license.
With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an
Aglipayan Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a
ceremony on the same day where the couple took each other as husband and wife in

front of the guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of
marriage license.
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an
illegal
marriage
ceremony.
The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and
was not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.
The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.
RULING: Yes.
Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
1.
authority of the solemnizing officer; and
2.

His performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to
solemnize
a
marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount
to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article
6 of the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
1.
for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer;
and
2.
Declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement
is likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved
that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act not
specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for
not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as
penalty.

Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013

Syed, a Pakistani citizen, and Gloria, a Filipino citizen, met in Taiwan in 1991. He arrived
in the Philippines and on January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-laws residence, in Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with
two men. He was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony where he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he only found out
that it was a marriage contract when Gloria told him. He further testified that he did not
go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in
that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
to check on their marriage license. The Municipal Civil Registrar issued a certification
stating that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted was the number of another marriage license issued to another couple. He
also alleged that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002. On the
other hand, Gloria presented her own side. Rev. Mario Dauz, a minister of the Gospel
and a Brgy. Captain stated that he is authorized to solemnize marriage and that he was
doing it since 1982 and he is familiar with the requirements. There were two witnesses;
one of them was Atty Sanchez who handed him the marriage license on the day of the
wedding. Gloria testified that a certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will
get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application
for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer. Gloria also alleged that she has a daughter with Syed. She filed
a bigamy case because Syed married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura. RTCs
ruling: no marriage license, neither of the parties was a resident of Carmona, Cavite.
Void ab initio. CAs ruling: granted Glorias appeal. Marriage is valid and subsisting.
Issue: W/N the marriage was valid.
HELD: cited Arts 3, 4, 35(3) of FC. RTC was right. Ruling on Republic vs CA not
applicable. Their marriage licensed is registered to another couple. Hence, they were
married without securing a marriage license. Void ab initio.
Sy v. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000
FACTS: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 in
Quezon City. They had two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left the conjugal
dwelling. Since then, they lived separately with the children in the custody of their
mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the
RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga which was later amended to a petition for separation of
property. In 1988, she filed a case of attempted parricide against Fernando. However,
the case was lowered to slight physical injuries. Petitioner filed for a declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. It was denied. On
appeal, she raised the issue of their marriage being void ab initio for the lack of
marriage license. Their marriage license was obtained on September 17, 1972 while
their marriage was celebrated on November 15, 1973. Hence, the marriage license was
expired already.

Issue: W/N the marriage is valid

Held: No. Evidence shows that there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet,
neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. Marriage is void ab
initio for lack of marriage license. Issue on psychological incapacity is hereby mooted.
Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They
had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted
by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they
had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.
They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that
they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights.
It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
Republic vs. Dayot GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24,
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived
together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose
filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage

where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was
secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is
void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any
time.
Estrellita Juliano-Llave vs Republic of the Philippines
In May 1993, Mamintal A.J. Tamano (a former senator) married Estrellita Juliano-Llave
under a civil ceremony. In June 1993, both got married again to each other but this time
under Muslim rites. Unfortunately, in less than a year, Tamano died.
In November 1994, mother and son Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano and Adib Ahmad Tamano
filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Tamano
for being bigamous. It appears that Zorayda and Tamano were already married in 1958
under
civil
rites
and
Muslim
rites.
In her defense, Estrellita averred that Tamano was already divorced when he married
Estrellita in 1993. This was evidenced by Tamanos declared status of divorced at the
time of their marriage in 1993.
After a long and tedious process, the marriage between Estrellita and Tamano was
finally declared void for being bigamous by the RTC and later the Court of Appeals.
Estrellita now questions the said ruling on the ground that:
a. Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to question the marriage between Estrellita
and Tamano because they were not parties to the marriage contract; that under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an action to file the declaration of nullity of marriage
is only limited to the husband or the wife;

b. The proceedings in the RTC and the CA are void because under Article 48 of the
Family Code as well as A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Solicitor General or the public
prosecutor are required to appear or participate in the proceedings in order to
determine collusion between the parties this was not the case here, according to
Estrellita;
c. The Muslim Code or PD 1083 was enacted in 1977 and that the marriage between
Zorayda and Tamano happened in 1958; that Muslim Code provides for Muslim Divorce;
that under said law, if Muslim divorce need not be registered.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrellitas arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. Zorayda and Adib have the legal personality to question the marriage between
Estrellita and Tamano. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the
wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out
the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
2. The participation of the Sol-Gen or the public prosecutor can be dispensed with. First
of, the public prosecutor was actually ordered by the RTC at the onset of the case to
make a report on whether or not there was a collusion between the parties. And as the
records of the case would show, the prosecutor did submit a report finding no collusion.
Second, the rationale behind the requirement for the Sol-Gen or public prosecutor to
participate is to make sure that theres no collusion between the parties. In this case,
the lack of collusion between the parties (between Estrellita and Zorayda) is apparent
because of the vehement opposition of Estrellita to the petition filed by Zorayda.
3. The Muslim Code did not automatically cover all Muslim marriages already existing at
the time of its enactment. Further, the Muslim Code finds no application to marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim rites. Further still, the Muslim Code did not
provide for retroactive application. It cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Tamano and Zorayda.
Thus, the law applicable on the marriage between Tamano and Zorayda is the Civil Code
and nowhere in the Civil Code is divorce allowed. The declaration of Tamano that he was
divorced is therefore without effect as to the validity of his earlier marriage with
Zorayda. Hence, the ruling of the RTC and the CA is correct the marriage between
Tamano and Estrellita in 1993 is void for being bigamous.
Morigo vs. People GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for
a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they
became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work
and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In
1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was

then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil
case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty
claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he
contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with
Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead
they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitionerdoes not need to file
declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)
Facts: The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated
July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L.
Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5
children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking
him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand
had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she
attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husbands last name
as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her
psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the
recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her
newhusbands
last
name
as
evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job,
and thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws.
The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the
CA.
Issue: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological
incapacity?
Held: The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological
incapacity. Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by

themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Republic vs. Orbecido GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a
daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS & OSG GR 186571
Facts
Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization
He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City
Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he returned to the Philippines he
found out that his wife was having an affair with another man
He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the same was granted
After two years from the effectivity of the divorce decree, Corpuz found a new
Filipina to love
Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the divorce decree
on his and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate
Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce before the RTC
RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy under Art. 26(2) of the Family Code

Issue: W/N Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
Ruling:
The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26(2) of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is to avoid the absurd situation whre the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree
Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provide that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family Code provides the direct exception to the rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse
An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by
the decree) whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law
Remedy Available to Alien Spouse
The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip the alien spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence,
serves as a presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse, pursuant to Sec.
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgment (Please see pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Sec.
48, Rule 39 and Sec. 24 Rule 132)
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could
not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one
another. In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier
marriage being dissolved.
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish
contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple was able to obtain a
judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial

Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). In this

case, petitioner prayed that:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and
venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC),
specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed that
the case should not be dismissed as the above rule applied only to cases of annulment
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and not in a petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment. Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for
comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to
cases of bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned; Rule
108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor
General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Nial v. Bayadog which declared that [t]he
validity
of
a
void
marriage
may
be
collaterally
attacked.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that
the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.
Recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of
the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.
James Capili vs People of the Philippines
In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months later
in December 1999, he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second marriage
between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina was
granted and Capilis marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting
marriage between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the
bigamy case. He alleged that since the second marriage was already declared void ab
initio that marriage never took place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a
prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy
was already consummated. It is already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see
Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed by
Karla Medina had no bearing to the determination of Capilis guilt or innocence in the
bigamy case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. He who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first
marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a second marriage without having such first
marriage be judicially declared as void. The parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists.

CARINO VS CARINO
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao Cario. He had 2 children with her.
In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cario. In 1988,
prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of
Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went
on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while
Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of
sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that
her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n
SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due
to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also
claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive
legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a
valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for
the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for
their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and
salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC).
Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is
likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there
were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license;
in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which
provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have

been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by
each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
SUAZO v. SUAZO G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.
Without any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelitos parents while
Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and were most of the time drunk.
Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after
their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity.
Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness
corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony
concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not
personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the
ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity,
i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar
to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a
person lives for the next drink and the next drinks but the CA reversed it and held that
the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically
identified.
The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social
personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate
medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner,
anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due
simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of
rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article
36 of the Family Code.
HELD: The Court finds the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible
error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns
marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence. Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an
indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted.

The psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party,
could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively
formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition,
this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologists report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave
and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. As testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a
job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral
element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the
spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or
illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Halili v. Halili G.R. No. 165424 June 6, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent
Chona Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rights
thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband
and wife. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point
petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. It was
only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the
basis of his psychological incapacity.
RULINGS: In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court
reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity on a
case-to-case basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. In Te, this Court defined

dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive

behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance
from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where
to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that
was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has
been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that
effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus
the Court declared the marriage null and void.
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
In 1994, Valerio Tyrone Kalaw filed a petition to have his marriage with Ma. Elena Fernandez be
annulled on the ground that Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC, after hearing the
expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition, but on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the said decision. Tyrone appealed to the Supreme Court. In September 2011, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822) should be reversed.
HELD: Yes.
Trial courts findings of facts should be given due weight
The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by the RTC when the SC reviewed the case in
September 2011. The SC ruled that the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the
evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded
due importance and respect. Therefore, it was not proper for the SC to brush aside the opinions
tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their
conclusions were solely based on the Tyrones version of the events. The conclusions reached by
the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and
should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the Tyrones factual
premises.
Respondent could also establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse

The plaintiff in an annulment case under Article 36 carries the burden to prove the nullity of the
marriage, however, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could also establish the psychological
incapacity of the plaintiff spouse if the respondent raised the matter in her/his answer. The courts are
justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of
whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other
as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist
in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established,
the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
Elenas excessive mahjong sessions is indicative of her psychological incapacity
In the September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the children of Tyrone and Elena testified that
although their parents have differences, both took good care of them. However, upon closer look at
the testimonies of the children, it was shown that Elena was too addicted to mahjong that she would
even bring her children to her mahjong sessions which were so frequent and would last from early in
the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that the Elena brought her children with her to her mahjong
sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to
expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on
every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their
needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This revealed her
wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental development.
Republic vs. De Gracia
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in Zamboanga Del Norte. On
December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into their courtship
in light of her accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their conjugal abode and
sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain Engineer Terez. After
cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a second marriage with another man. Dr. Zalsos stated that
both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated finding that both parties suffered from
utter emotional immaturity.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological
incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos testimony which does not explain in reasonable

detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within
the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The petition is, therefore, granted and the
decision of CA reversed and set aside.
Republic v. Cantor
G.R. No. 184621; December 10, 2013
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a violent
quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent
search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her petition.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in pursuant with Article 41 of the Family
Code?
HELD: Whether or not one has a well-founded belief that his or her spouse is dead depends on the
unique circumstance of each case and that there is no set standard or procedure in determining the
same. Maria Fes alleged well-founded belief arose when: 1) Jerrys relatives and friends could not
give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did not find Jerrys name in the patients
directory whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively look for her
husband in hospitals and it may be sensed that her search was not intentional or planned. Her
search for Jerry was far from diligent. Were it not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the declaration of
presumptive death should have been recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis.
SANTOS vs. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got
married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The
couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987
and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things
aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a
training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all
his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He
argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are
circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
__________
Notes:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

ALMELOR VERSUS RTC/LEONIDA ALMELOR

FACTS:
1. On 29 January 1989, Manuel and Leonida Almelor got married. They are both medical
practitioners an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.
2. After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC to annul their marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
3. Leonlda stated that they first met at SLH as med student clerks and they became
sweethearts and after three years, they got married. At first, Manuel was kind and gentle but
in private life, Leonilda described him as harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous,
easily angered. These are the cause of their frequent fights as couple.
4. Respondent also alleged her husband that the latter has deep affection for his mother and
added her woes for his husbands concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions
were proven by incidents where in she caught her husband kissing a male friend. At that

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

point, she took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children.
Leonida also presented a psychologist who proved that Mauel has psychological incapacity.
On his part, Petitioner invokes that although he and Leonida had petty arguments, he
maintained that their marriage is harmonious. He countered that the true cause of
respondents hostility against him was their professional rivalry.
He also bellied all the allegations against him.
The RTC, in its disposition, granted the petition for annulment, however, not on the ground of
Art 36 but on Art 45 of the FC.
The CA likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In this present case, Manuel argued that erred in its decision annulling the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
1. Concealment of homosexuality, not homosexuality per se, is the proper ground to annul
marriage.
2. Citing RP v. Molina, the Court said indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities,
irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings,
infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect or failure in the performance of some
marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.
3. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage.
4. Even assuming that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a
ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear a marriage may be annulled
when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of
homosexuality.
5. Homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves
as a valid ground to annul a marriage.
6. It is something the respondent failed to prove.

Mallilin vs. Jamesolamin, GR No. 192718 February 18, 2015

FACTS:
Robert and Luz were married in 1972. They begot three children. On 16 March 1994, Robert filed a
case for annulment of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Roberts petition was tried by the family court (RTC) of CDO. Robert alleged that at
the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental
incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential
obligations and responsibilities. He alleged that such incapacity became even more apparent during

their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of
independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding
obligation of a parent. (In the meantime, Roberts petition with Metropolitan Tribunal and the National
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church was granted and their marriage declared void) After the
hearing, the family court granted the petition but the Court of Appeals reversed family court and
declared that there is no psychological incapacity.
Main Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that there is no psychological
incapacity to warrant annulment of marriage.
Decision: Court of Appeals is correct.
What is psychological incapacity within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines?
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
What characterizes psychological incapacity to constitute grounds for annulment of marriage?
a) gravity
c) incurability
b) juridical antecedence and
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,

although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The
trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
When can the evidence of psychological incapacity be considered as medically and clinically
indentified?
Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that Luzs disposition of not cleaning the room,
preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different male
visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on
psychological incapacity.The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother,
as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties marriage. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.Indeed, to be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform ones duties is another.
Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Is sexual perversion or promiscuity of an errant spouse alone enough to constitute psychological
incapacity? When can sexual promiscuity be considered psychological incapacity?
No. As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the
psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as
nymphomania or excessive sex hunger. Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing
evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania,

and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity
embodied in Article 36. To stress, Roberts testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of
psychological incapacity. . respondents act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to
establish that the respondents unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which
made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
(Please observed however the tenor of the underscored portion of the decision. Roberts argument
that nymphomania constitutes psychological incapacity might have been considered had it been
backed up with proper evidence.
What is the probative value of the decision of the National Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church?
the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of
Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court stated
that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.
Thus: Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides: The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be
specified. In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value
since it was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence
considered by the same tribunal.
LAVADIA VS HEIRS OF LUNA
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot
seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to
live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property
Settlement whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On
January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the
Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty.
Luna obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the
condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares. When the law
office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names of the owners, with Atty.
Lunas share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty.
Lunas death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law books and furniture were taken over

by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out
to Atty. Dela Cruz.
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the
properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they had no
children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half
bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by
awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding that the
Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife)
is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the divorce
decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending
parties were entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.
The Supreme Court:
The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void:
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies
against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.
No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement:
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the
time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had
not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil
Code clearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning, hence, their
property relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership:
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.
To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in
Saguid v. Court of Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of coownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous
and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an

adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.
Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the properties subject of the
case, the subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
Petition denied.
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014, SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF JUAN
LUCES LUNA, REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO Z. LUNA AND EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,
RESPONDENTS.
QUIAZON VS BELEN
Digest: If a person dies intestate, who are entitled to administer his/her estate? This is the question
answered in this case of Leo. Leo married Amy in their hometown and begot two daughters with her,
Zeny and Lani.
As a businessman, he used to travel to Manila on a business trip. In one of those business trips he
met Malou and fell in love with her. So about ten years after their marriage, Leo left his family and
transferred his residence to a suburban town in Manila where he asked Malou to stay with him.
Malou agreed, so they lived together as husband and wife and eventually begot a daughter, Lisa.
Somehow Leos business flourished and he was able to amass real and personal properties with his
common law wife. But after about 18 years, Leo died without leaving any will. When Malou and Lisa
was gathering and compiling all the papers and documents left behind by Leo for purposes of
settling his estate, they discovered that Leos legal wife Amy was already married to another man
(Lito) when she married Leo as evidenced by a Marriage Certificate issued 50 years ago. So Lisa as
represented by her mother Malou filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for issuance
of Letters of Administration praying that she be appointed as Administration of Leos properties. Lisa
claimed that she is the natural child of Leo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other since Leos supposed marriage to Amy was
bigamous and null and void from the beginning. Thus she also asked that Leos marriage to Amy be
declared void.
Amy and her two daughters, Zeny and Lani opposed this petition. They claimed that they are the
legitimate heirs of Leo and better entitled to administer his estate. They contended that Leos
marriage to Amy can no longer be questioned beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. The
RTC however ruled in favor of Lisa and Malou. It directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Lisa upon posting of the necessary bond. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this
decision. The CA likewise declared Amys marriage to Leo as void from the beginning for being
bigamous since Amy was previously married to a certain Lito when she married Leo. The CA said
that in a void marriage, it was as though no marriage has taken place, thus it cannot be the source of
rights and can beat tacked directly or collaterally by any interested party even beyond the lifetimes of
the husband or wife.

Were the RTC and the CA correct?

Yes. The existence of Amys previous marriage to another man named Lito celebrated some 50
years ago was sufficiently established by the Certificate of Marriage issued by the parish priest in
their hometown. Consequently in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
dissolved at the time Amy married Leo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is void
ab initio. The CA is correct in declaring it void because void marriages can be attacked directly or
collaterally at any time, even beyond the death of any party to such marriage. On the other hand, the
letters of administration in the estate proceedings can be issued in favor of one who would be
benefitted in the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate. In this case, Lisa
has overwhelmingly established that she is the natural child of Leo and Malou as she was conceived
and born at the time her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. So she is a compulsory
heir of Leo who, under the law is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.
She is therefore an interested party to whom letters of administration can be issued