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maintaining that the case should have been dismissed for failure
to comply with the protest mechanism.
10. The CA then denied the petition and upholding the jurisdiction of
the RTC. An MR was filed by the petitioner but to no avail the CA
disposed of the case ratiocinating that the respondent Lanting did
comply with the requirements of the law:
a. That the letter addressed to the LRA requesting the
award be made to the respondent was sufficient protest
b. That although no protest fee was paid by the respondent,
the LRA in fact, entertained the protest informing the
respondent Lanting tthat the contract was indeed
awarded to another bidder. Hence, there was waiver of
the defect of non-payment of protest fees.
Hence, the present action by the petitioner for Review n Certiorari
arguing that:
1. that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over respondents
Petition for Annulment; and
2. that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it
issued the assailed orders on
the basis of quantum meruit.
Issue: Was the RTC correct in taking cognizance of the case?
Ruling: No. Since the protest mechanism required by law was not
complied with and the administrative remedies not having been
exhausted, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Further, since the court not having jurisdiction over the complaint, the
discussion on the unpaid compensation is unnecessary.
Ratio:
Section 58 of the Government Procurement Act specifically states that:
Resort to Regular Courts: Certiorari. Court action may be
resorted to only after the protests contemplated in this Article
shall have been completed. Cases that are filed in violation of
the process specified in this Article shall be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court shall have
jurisdiction over final decisions of the procuring entity. Court
action shall be governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
This provision is without prejudice to any law conferring on
the Supreme Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary
OF
In the present case, FUCC adduced no special and important reason why
direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. Thus, we reaffirm the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its
jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari.
Similarly, the RTC is the proper venue to hear FUCCs prayer for permanent
injunction. Unquestionably, RA No. 8975 enjoins all courts, except the
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit
or compel the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national
government. The proscription, however, covers only temporary restraining
orders or writs but not decisions on the merits granting permanent
injunction. Therefore, while courts below are prohibited by RA No. 8795
from issuing TROs or preliminary restraining orders pending the
adjudication of the case, said statute, however, does not explicitly proscribe
the issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a court of law arising
from an adjudication of a case on the merits.
Clearly, except for the prayer for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary
injunction, the issues raised by FUCC and the relief it sought are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. It is a procedural faux pas for FUCC to invoke the
original jurisdiction of this Court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari and
permanent injunction.
In any event, the invitation to bid contains a reservation for PPMC to reject
any bid. It has been held that where the right to reject is so reserved, the
lowest bid, or any bid for that matter, may be rejected on a mere
technicality. The discretion to accept or reject bid and award contracts is
vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function. This
discretion is of such wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith
or direct the committee on bids to do a particular act or to enjoin such act
within its prerogatives unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a
fraudulent award; or an unfairness or injustice is shown; or when in the
exercise of its authority, it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. Thus,
where PPMC as advertiser, availing itself of that right, opts to reject any or
all bids, the losing bidder has no cause to complain or right to dispute that
choice, unless fraudulent acts, injustice, unfairness or grave abuse of
discretion is shown.
FUCC alleges that SBAC and PPMC, along with the SCCI and five (5) other
bidders, colluded to rig the results of the re-bidding so that SCCI would
emerge as the so-called lowest bidder. The record, however, is bereft of
any proof to substantiate the allegation. Neither is there any evidence
offered to establish unfairness, injustice, caprice or arbitrariness on the part
SESSION 3 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-5
of the SBAC or the PPMC in awarding the contract to SCCI, the lowest
bidder. The presumption of regularity of the bidding must thus be upheld.
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is vested in the
Government agencies entrusted with that function. The discretion given to
the authorities on this matter is of such wide latitude that the Courts will not
interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a
fraudulent award
It is only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion that the Courts
will set aside the award of a contract made by a government entity.
Accordingly, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, FUCC
has no valid ground to demand annulment of the contract between PPMC
and SCCI.
Case 4: Nava vs. Palattao
Doctrine: The law on public bidding is not an empty formality. It aims to
secure the lowest possible price and obtain the best bargain for the
government.
Facts: The complaint involving the herein accused was initiated by the
COA, Region XI, Davao City, which resulted from an audit conducted by
a team which was created by the COA Regional Office per COA Regional
Assignment Order No. 91-74. The objective of the team was to conduct
an audit of the 9.36 million allotment which was released in 1990 by the
DECS, Region XI to its Division Offices.
In the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265.00 was shown to have been
released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to the
newly nationalized high schools located within the region. Through the
initiative of accused Venancio Nava, a meeting was called among his 7
schools division superintendents whom he persuaded to use the money
or allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices
(SLTD). In other words, instead of referring the allotment to the 155
heads of the nationalized high schools for the improvement of their
facilities, accused Nava succeeded in persuading his 7 schools division
superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of science
education facilities for the calendar year 1990. In the purchase of the
school materials, the law provides that the same shall be done through a
public bidding pursuant to Circular No. 85-55, series of 1985. But in the
instant case, evidence shows that accused Nava persuaded his 7 schools
division superintendents to ignore the circular as allegedly time was of the
essence in making the purchases and if not done before the calendar
year 1990, the funds allotted will revert back to the general fund.
FACTS:
1. Romulo Macalintal (Macalintal), a member of the Philippine Bar
and a taxpayer, seeks to have some provisions of RA 9189 (The
Overseas
Absentee
Voting
Act
of
2003)
declared
unconstitutional.
2. He claims that his actual and material legal interest in the subject
matter is grounded on the fact that he wants public funds to be
properly and lawfully used and appropriated.
a. Sec. 29 of RA 9189 provides that a supplemental budget
on the GAA of the year of its enactment into law shall
provide for the necessary amount to carry out its
provisions.
3. The provisions subject to this petition are the following:
a. Sec. 5(d)
i. It allows the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines.
ii. This provision allegedly violates the 1-year
residency requirement at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election as required
by Sec. 1 of Art. V of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision does not allow provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote, hence, the
questioned
provision
circumvents
the
constitutional requirement on the right of suffrage
by providing a condition which, in effect, amends
or alters the constitutional requirement on
residency to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.
b. Sec. 18.5
i. It pertains to the on-site counting and
canvassing. It empowers the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates despite the fact
that the scheduled election has not taken place
in a particular country or countries, if the holding
of elections therein has been rendered
impossible by events, factors and circumstances
peculiar to such country or countries, in which
events, factors and circumstances are beyond
the control or influence of the COMELEC.
ii. This provision allegedly violates the constitutional
mandate under Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution
SESSION 3 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-7
Doctrine:
Facts: Petitioner G & S Transport Corporation (G & S), with the name
and style Avis Rent-A-Car was the exclusive operator of coupon taxi
services at the NAIA under a 5-year contract of concession with
respondent Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). The concession
contract expired on 31 January 1994 but was renewed by the parties on a
monthly basis until such time when a new concessionaire (shall have
been) chosen. Under the arrangement, G & S was able to operate the
coupon taxi service uninterruptedly beyond the period of 5 years originally
awarded by MIAA.
On 12 July 1994 MIAA initiated proceedings for public bidding to choose
two (2) concessionaires of the coupon taxi services at the NAIA. 5 firms
pre-qualified to join the bidding including petitioner G & S and
respondents 2000 Transport Corporation (2000 TRANSPORT) and
Nissan Car Lease Philippines, Inc. (NISSAN), after complying with the
terms of reference, the instructions to bidders and the invitation to bid.3
On 23 September 1994 MIAA announced the ranking of the bidders on
the basis of the fares per kilometer they each tendered.
The highest ranking bidder which offered the lowest rate per kilometer
was Philippine International Transport Service Cooperative but was
however disqualified as the bond it submitted was not a cash bond as
required by the bidding rules. Consequently, on 5 December 1994 MIAA
selected 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN as the winning bidders and
issued in their favor the respective notice of awards of the coupon taxi
service concession. On 10 January 1995 petitioner G & S filed a
complaint for injunction and mandamus with preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order against MIAA and its General Manager
Guillermo G. Cunanan, 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN. The complaint
sought to disqualify 2000 TRANSPORT from the award of the concession
SESSION 3 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS10