Volk und Vaterland:

German Irredentism & Aggression 1933-1939

By:

Michael Raven

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty

of the Department of History and Geography
Georgia College & State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Bachelor of Arts
Milledgeville, Georgia
December 2016

Introduction
In the 1930s, the German people were still recovering from the devastating effects of
losing World War I (WWI). Although the democratic Weimar Republic had been established
shortly following the armistice, this progressive government did not last long in the face of
economic hardship caused by both the Treaty of Versailles and the Great Depression. In 1933,
Adolf Hitler managed to secure his elevation to Chancellor of Germany, which in turn led to the
rapid establishment of the single party, autocratic Nazi state. One of the key tenets of Nazi
ideology was its support for pan-Germanism, an idea dating back to the German Unification
under Bismarck (Usher 1915, 3). Essentially, pan-Germanism advocated the consolidation of all
Germans and German-speaking peoples into a single state: Grodeutschland. This developed
further into the Heim ins Reich ideal, literally meaning Home in the Reich (Low 1980). This
irredentist strategy advocated the return of ethnic Germans to the Reich, potentially as whole
regions re-integrating themselves. The policies of the Nazi government reflected an overall PanGermanic and anti-Versailles sentiment, which thrived on appeasement and eventually led to the
beginning of World War II (WWII), when Germany invaded Poland after being denied the Baltic
port of Danzig. Although the German territorial claims were intended to expand the Reich
through aggression, each of them did have some historical geographic context that the Nazi
regime used to justify and assist their machinations. This thesis will examine the basis for Nazi
claims up to, and including, the invasion of Poland, as well as the process of attainment and their
overall significance in the geopolitical situation of the country at that time.

Setting
Germany was governed by a fascist dictatorship between 1933 and 1945, led by Adolf Hitler. Its
borders were substantially different compared to the present-day country (see Fig.1). Germany
directly bordered Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Switzerland, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland. Notably, the Polish frontier included the exclave of East
Prussia, which was severed from the rest of Germany after WWI, due to stipulations in the
Treaty of Versailles granting Poland access to the Baltic Sea.

Figure 1: Nazi Germany and its surroundings 1933-1939. Humboldt State University.

Germany is physically diverse, with relatively flat land in the northern part of the country,
and rugged uplands in the south, stretching into the Alps. Notable rivers include the Rhine,
Weser, Elbe, Oder, and Danube. In the 1930s, there was significant mining of coal, iron, nickel,
and copper, but deposits of rarer minerals were limited or nonexistent. Germanys climate is
relatively temperate; its seasons are not extreme, and rainfall is generally consistent year-round.
Austria also had a fascist government in the 1930s, though it was not nearly as autocratic
as Germany. German was the primary language of Austria, and most Austrians considered
themselves to be ethnically German. Most of the country is situated in the Alps, and therefore

rugged and mountainous, except the Danube River valley, which runs east-west through the
northwest portion of the country and through the capital of Vienna.
Switzerland was also home to a substantial population of German speakers, though the
Swiss German dialect is significantly different from the standard German spoken elsewhere. The
Swiss government, however, was a democratic confederation, and mostly unaffected by fascism.
The country was wealthy through trade, and continued to pursue the same neutral foreign policy
that it had for many years prior. Like Austria, significant portions of Switzerland are in the Alps,
though the northern half of the country is somewhat less rugged. A portion of Switzerlands
border with Germany runs though Lake Constance, one of the largest bodies of fresh water in
Europe.
Czechoslovakia was a multinational state, and home to a significant German-speaking
population, though most of the population was either Czech or Slovak, which the government
considered to be a combined Czechoslovak ethnicity. Though Germans composed the largest
minority, there was also a minor population of Ruthenians, Hungarians, and ethnic Jews.
Czechoslovakias government was a constitutional republic, and its economy was relatively welldeveloped and industrialized. Czechoslovakia had a generally hilly topography, with flatter areas
in the center near Prague, and more mountainous areas along its borders, especially in the eastern
Carpathian areas. Notably, the Sudeten mountains ran along the northern border, and lent their
name to the Sudetenland, which was home to a large proportion of ethnic Germans.
Lithuania had a small German minority in the 1930s, but its significance to German
foreign policy mainly derived from possession of the Memel (Klaipda) region, which had
belonged to the German East Prussia until recent years. This area was the countrys main access
to the sea. Its historical capital was Vilnius, though skirmishes with the neighboring Poles during
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the interwar period left that area under de facto Polish control, and the countrys capital was
temporarily moved to Kaunas. The countrys government was autocratic, though not necessarily
fascist. Topographically, the country is flat, with some hilly areas in the central and eastern
portions of the country. Its most significant river is the Memel (Neman), which ran through the
disputed border region with Germany.
Poland also did not have a substantial German minority in the 1930s, except in the Free
City of Danzig. Polands borders were crafted in the Treaty of Versailles, including most of what
was formerly German West Prussia. This area of land was known as the Polish Corridor, and was
intended to provide Poland with access to the Baltic Sea. Included in this territory was the
majority-German city of Danzig, which was technically semi-autonomous. The city was
practically administered as part of Poland, however. Poland mostly lies within the North
European Plain, though some regions in the south are more mountainous. Significant rivers in
Poland include the Vistula, Warta, and Bug. Though the Oder river is part of modern Polands
territory, this was not the case in the 1930s.
German Foreign Policy in the 1930s
All Possible Worlds provides a significant description of the history of some ideas which
eventually motivated the Nazi government. Friedrich Ratzel, for instance, felt strong national
pride after the 1871 German unification, and this led him to study German minorities in several
countries, including Hungary, Italy, and the United States of America. Ratzel is notable for
describing a state as an organism attached to the land, that must grow and survive or stand still
and die. In a sense, this Organic State Theory was a collectivist idea that the state is a living
organism, with people in it that could be considered cells functioning together. Borders were
perceived to be temporary reflections of a regions identity, subject to change as the state
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necessarily expands and evolves. This eventually led to the concept of Lebensraum (living
space), which later geographers made use ofas a pseudoscientific support for the national
policy of the 1930s (Martin and James 1993, 161-170). Hitler was a prominent supporter of the
Lebensraum theory. Glassner (1995, 31) notes that the Germans deliberately made distorted
maps for propaganda purposes, whether to create the illusion that Germany was in a stronger
position than it appeared, or to suggest that certain areas should rightfully be part of the state.
Ironically, it was a Swede who was the most notable proponent of German expansion.
Rudolf Kjelln seized upon Ratzels ideas and expanded upon them, eventually publishing Staten
som Lifsform (The State as a Lifeform.) Kjelln strongly advocated Germanys leadership of
Europe, as he believed that civilization was threatened by inferior foreign expansion. He is
credited with popularizing the idea of geopolitik (geopolitics), a system of using geographic
knowledge to promote a states policy (Martin and James 1993, 281). This idea rapidly spread
into German geography. One notable geographer of the Nazi years is Karl Haushofer, who ran
his own publication, Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, which published pro-Nazi geographic content.
His impact on Nazi policies, however, seems to have been limited (Martin and James 1993, 185).
Hitlers Aggression
The Nazi Partys perception of what an ideal Reich should look like was heavily steeped
in mythos and legend. Hitler himself was unsurprisingly fond of the nineteenth century German
composer Richard Wagner, who was notoriously nationalistic and reactionary. Even before the
Nazi Partys rise to power, hints of pan-Germanism could be interpreted in some aspects of
German society. For instance, the Deutschlandlied, which had been used as Germanys anthem
since 1922, describes a Germany From the Meuse to the Memel, from the Adige to the
[Fehmarn] Belt; some of the areas described in this anthem had historical German links, but had
7

not been politically or even ethnically German for hundreds of years. WWI began for largely
nationalistic reasons, and in the chaos of defeat, one can understand how the unbridled patriotism
of the Nazi Party might have offered a compelling change of pace to the average German of
1933. Clearly, the Nazis did not invent the idea of pan-Germanism, instead they merely took it,
expanded it, and twisted it to suit their own foreign policy goals.
The existence of German-speaking populations in countries outside the Reich (see Fig. 2)
can be contributed to two primary reasons. First and most significantly for the politics of the
Nazi Party, Germany lost several territories in the Versailles peace settlement, including but not
limited to: Danzig, Memel, Eupen-Malmedy, part of Upper Silesia, northern Schleswig, and the
Saar region (see Fig. 3).

Figure 2: Linguistic Divisions of Europe in 1914. Boston College.

Figure 3: German territorial losses following Versailles. Boston College.

Similarly, Austria-Hungary was dissolved, leaving significant German-speaking

minorities spread across Central Europe. Second, there were many pre-existing German
minorities spread across Europe, often dating to a time even before the German Unification, such
as the Volga and Black Sea Germans in the Soviet Union, the Bessarabia Germans in Romania,
the significant German minority in Yugoslavia, etc. Though these people may have been living in
these countries for several decades, they still spoke German and often lived in isolated German
communities. Nazi administration chose to classify them as Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans), no
matter where their current residency might be. This tied heavily into the Nazi Partys obsession
with race, and of the perceived superiority of the German Volk (Troll 1949, 103). These German
populations served as the primary justification for the Nazi governments territorial claims laid
against other nations during the interwar period.
The territorial claims also owe their existence to a certain sense of revanchism in the Nazi
administration, owing to the significant territorial losses inflicted during the WWI peace process.
Even if many areas lost by Germany did not actually have German majorities, the amount of land
lost was still quite significant overall, with thousands of square miles ceded to Germanys
neighbors. Importantly, the Treaty of Versailles created the Danzig Corridor out of German
territory, separating Eastern Prussia from the rest of the country (see Fig 4).

10

Figure 4: The Polish Corridor. Boston College.

This was to become a major source of contention later. An interesting and unusual aspect
of the Danzig Corridor was the establishment of Danzig as a free city. Although it was situated
within now-Polish territory, the city and some of its surrounding land were intended to be
something of a semi-independent city-state, under League of Nations protection. In practice,
however, Danzig was a semi-autonomous province of Poland. This quite agitated the ethnic
German majority in the city, who were separated from their home country (Levine 1970, 102).
Once in power, the first of Adolf Hitlers territorial moves was to initiate the Anschluss
(joining) with Austria. Most Austrians at the time considered themselves to be ethnically
German, as did the Nazi government, which set the stage for a marriage of the two states. In fact,
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the major political parties of the time used the term pan-German regarding the national identity
of Austrians (Thorpe 2010, 317). Although the Treaty of Versailles explicitly stipulated that
Germany must respect the sovereignty of an Austrian independent state, the League of Nations
lacked the will to enforce this, and in any case, they had little chance to intervene once the events
had begun. In 1936, Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian chancellor, signed a treaty along with
Adolf Hitler, in which Nazi Germany ostensibly pledged to respect Austrian independence,
though Austria acknowledged that it was a German state. This treaty, however, also had secret
protocols, which allowed members of the Nazi Party to begin infiltrating the Austrian
government. In the period after the Austro-German agreement was signed, Hitler gradually began
to undermine Austrian sovereignty. Nazi officials began to terrorize the country and destabilize
the government, with the eventual goal of enabling German forces to enter the country and
permit an annexation (Shirer 1960, 323-325).
One of the factors working toward Hitlers advantage was the previously-mentioned lack
of Austrian national identity. Although the Austrian people certainly identified as citizens of their
state, the predominant sense was that of pan-Germanism, so that Austrians considered
themselves ethnically the same as their German neighbors. Additionally, the Austrian
government was already somewhat fascist in nature (Thorpe 2010, 321). Though it did not
express the same type of single-leader autocracy as Germany or Italy, there were several
organizations and programs in the country, which bore a similarity to their northern neighbors.
The ruling party of Austria between 1934 and the 1938 Anschluss was the Fatherland Front,
which promoted a unique variety of fascism that was heavily influenced by Catholicism, and
strongly believed in Austrian independence. The Fatherland Front established the Sturmkorps in
1938, which was modelled on the Nazi German Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron). In fact,
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though Chancellor Schuschnigg did not have the same breadth of powers as Hitler, the
Sturmkorps seems to have regarded him as something of a Fuhrer figure, as evidenced by a
propaganda photograph which showed them standing under his portrait, with the slogan His
Will is our Command, His Goal is our Victory. The Fatherland Front also had the Mothers
Defense Action program, which idealized motherhood, and provided benefits to new mothers,
especially those with multiple children. Additionally, a state youth group was created, which bore
more than a passing similarity to the Hitler Youth (Thorpe 2010, 323). Overall, though the
Austrian government ostensibly did not support a union with Germany, since Austria was
predominantly Catholic and Germany was mostly Protestant, it is apparent that the political
systems of the two countries were quite compatible. This similarity of government, combined
with the shared ethnicity of the two countries, permitted a relatively easy path to integration
between the two countries, once some difficulties were overcome.
The end of sovereign Austria did not take long, once Nazi officials penetrated its
government. In February 1938, Hitler invited Schuschnigg to his mountain retreat at
Berchtesgaden, where he forced the Austrian chancellor to appoint the Nazi sympathizing Arthur
Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Public Security. This effectively gave the Nazi Party complete
control of Austrias police force. Schuschnigg attempted an emergency referendum, to affirm his
peoples support of Austrian independence, but the Nazis could not allow this. Two days before
the referendum was scheduled, Hitler demanded that Schuschnigg cede power to the Austrian
branch of the Nazi Party. Despite the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty guaranteeing Austrian
independence, neither France nor Britain were willing to use force to intercede and stop Nazi
Germany, and the German Wehrmacht began to flow freely across the border. Austrias status as
a sovereign state effectively ended on 12 March 1938, and remained so for more than 17 years.
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The most prominent anti-Nazi figures in Austrian politics were sent to various concentration
camps to remain until liberated at the end of the war, if they were fortunate enough to survive
(Shirer 1960, 350-353).
The next significant target that found itself in Nazi sights was Czechoslovakia. For
hundreds of years, ethnic Germans had been living in Bohemia, generally interspersed in various
pockets among Czechs, though some areas had more significant German populations. In fact, this
area had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the peace settlement at the end of WWI,
during which Czechoslovakia was created, among other new states. In this ethnically diverse
country, the area with the most significant German population was the Sudetenland, along the
German border. Given the relatively recent and somewhat synthetic establishment of
Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state, and Hitlers explicit desire to bring ethnic Germans back
into the Reich, it is no surprise that he chose to target the Sudetenland. The events that followed
created an international fiasco that did significant damage to the reputation of the League of
Nations, and eventually left Germany completely controlling former Czechoslovakia (Shirer
1960, 357-361).
Hitlers aggression against Czechoslovakia was based on the claim that Sudeten Germans
were being subjected to a campaign of state oppression. This was a characteristic Nazi falsehood;
instead, there was a large fascist Sudeten German Party (SdP), which had taken control of many
local offices by 1938, and was known to agitate for separation of the Sudetenland from
Czechoslovakia. The leader of the SdP, Konrad Heinlein, issued a series of demands, including
Sudeten autonomy, on Hitlers orders. These demands were calculated to be unacceptable to the
Czechoslovak government, and their denial would provide the pretext for a German invasion.
Germanys clear intent to invade Czechoslovakia prompted the Western powers to attempt to
14

back him down through appeasement. Most notably, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
made several trips to Germany to speak with Hitler and attempt to secure a non-violent
resolution to the situation. Each time Chamberlain would concede to Hitlers demands, the bar
would be set higher, as Hitler wanted to justify a complete annexation of the Sudetenland, rather
than gain a few concessions. However, this cycle eventually escalated to such a point that the
Nazis were willing to cooperate, resulting in the Munich Conference in September 1938 (Shirer
1960, 397-401). At this conference, representatives of Germany, Italy, France, and Britain met to
discuss a resolution to the Sudeten Crisis. Notably, the Czech government was excluded from the
proceedings; their fate would be decided behind closed doors. The Soviet Union was also not
invited, despite having previously made their interest in supporting Czechoslovakia clear. This
interest was largely theoretical, however, as the Soviets had no feasible means to intervene, since
any military forces would have to travel through Poland or Romania. At the time, Polish-Russian
relations were at a low point due to a recent war, and Romania was pursuing a pro-German
strategy, which put military access out of the question (Keegan 1990, 40). The Western powers
were in a better position to intervene, but they had absolutely no intention of going to war over
the Sudeten Crisis, and were willing to accept almost any demands to prevent a conflict. On 29
September 1938, the Munich Agreement was reached, allowing Germany to completely occupy
the Sudetenland, and stripping Czechoslovakia of significant resources, as well as a large area of
defensible territory. The well-equipped Czech Army was ready to fight in resistance against the
agreement, and would perhaps have stood a fair chance against what limited German forces were
mobilized at the time. The mountainous border regions were moderately fortified, though the
extended German border resulting from the Anschluss created a disadvantage. President Edvard
Bene, however, decided that a war would be unsuccessful without the support of the Western
15

powers, and the Czech government accepted the demands on 30 September. When Prime
Minister Chamberlain returned to Britain after the Agreement, he famously declared, I believe it
is peace in our time (Shirer 420). This was to later prove tragically short-sighted.
Czechoslovakia did not retain its independence for long after the Munich Agreement.
Slovakia had been granted a new level of autonomy in the agreement, and on 14 March 1939, it
proclaimed its establishment as a sovereign state. This was highly encouraged by the Germans,
who the Slovaks saw as a potential protector in the face of Hungarian territorial claims. From the
beginning, the ostensibly independent Slovak government was little more than a collaborationist
German puppet. The day after the Slovak Republic was established, German forces occupied
what was left of the Czech rump state, under the pretext that it was descending into anarchy. A
day later, on 16 March, Hitler announced that the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia had been
established. This new territory was technically considered an autonomous part of the Third
Reich, though in practice it was firmly ruled by Nazi authorities on orders from Berlin (Keegan
1990, 40-41). In the eyes of Hitler, Bohemia and Moravia were part of the German Lebensraum
(Shirer 1960, 449).
A somewhat less notable target of German aggression in the late 1930s was Lithuania. It
had come into possession of the Memel region after a 1923 anti-German revolt by the Lithuanian
residents living there. At the time, Germany was not able to resist, and the League of Nations
took no issue with the self-determination of the people. This eventually led to the formal
international recognition of Memel as a part of Lithuania, through the Klaipda Convention of
1924, which was signed by the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy. In 1939, however, the
days of the relatively pacifist German Weimar government were gone, and Hitlers sights landed
on Memel. This culminated in an ultimatum to the Lithuanian government on 20 March, 1939. In
16

effect, Germany demanded that the Memel region be returned, or it would be taken by force.
Though the Lithuanian government was reluctant to cede the region to Germany, as it was an
important seaport, it was in no position to risk a military altercation with the Wehrmacht. Though
the autocratic and right-leaning government had proposed a buildup of the countrys military
forces, it stood no chance against the German war machine. The most significant natural obstacle
to a German invasion was the Memel river itself, which is not particularly broad or deep. As
mentioned previously, Lithuania is a relatively flat country, therefore its military could count on
no particularly defensible terrain from which to resist an invasion. In addition, the Germans were
interested in the possibility of taking Memel from the sea, as a demonstration of naval might. As
Lithuania had no navy, it would have been powerless to stop this threat (Shirer 1960, 461-462).
Notably, its relationship with Poland was quite contentious; in 1920, a supposedly mutinous
Polish general had taken over portions of Lithuania, including the capital of Vilnius, creating the
internationally-unrecognized Republic of Central Lithuania, forcing Lithuania to establish a
temporary capital in Kaunas. This situation still existed in 1939, which may have prompted the
right-leaning autocratic government of Lithuania to seek accommodation with Germany, in the
hope of resolving the Vilnius issue. Since the Italians and Japanese supported the Germans, and
the French and British continued their appeasement strategy, Lithuania in any case had no choice
but to accept the German ultimatum, and Memel was ceded to Germany on 23 March 1939
(Keegan 1990, 41).
Around the same time as Memel was being annexed, the Germans made their formal
demands for Danzig. The city was important to Germany, as it was historically a part of West
Prussia, and still contained a majority German population. The Polish Corridor also separated
East Prussia from the rest of Germany, creating an exclave. Continuing with Hitlers policy of
17

reclaiming lost lands and abandoning the Versailles Treaty, Danzig was one of the most obvious
remaining examples of the concessions forced on Germany after WWI. The Germans proposed
that Poland cede the city, allow a German highway to pass through the Polish Corridor and into
East Prussia, and effectively become a client state of Germany. This proposal was not accepted,
and on 31 March 1939, the United Kingdom issued a guarantee of Polands independence (Shirer
1960, 460-461). Shortly thereafter, the Poles began work mobilizing their army, and attempting
to gather foreign support. The Soviet Union proposed to assist the Poles, under certain conditions
that included Soviet military access into Poland. Though they desperately needed nearby allies,
tensions still ran high between the Soviets and Poles, therefore this proposal was denied. After
being rejected by Poland, the Soviet Union eventually signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with
Germany, which guaranteed non-aggression between the two states (Keegan 1990, 43).
In the meantime, Poland was desperately attempting to ready its military for war. Though
it nominally possessed one of the largest militaries in Europe, only a portion of the Polish Army
was mobilized due to the French and British desire to seek a peaceful solution to the Danzig
crisis. It faced a numerical disadvantage against the Wehrmacht, and its equipment was generally
quite outdated. The Polish Air Force had very few aircraft with which to resist the German
Luftwaffe, and very few tanks to deter the German panzer divisions. Though Poland had a navy,
it was limited to submarines, destroyers, and other small vessels which stood no chance fighting
the heavier ships of the German Kriegsmarine. Another compromising factor was the sheer
expanse of the frontier with Germany. The western border with Germany was quite long by
itself, and the East Prussian exclave created an additional path that Wehrmacht forces could use
to strike toward Warsaw. The effective German control of former Czechoslovakia extended
Polands hostile borders even further to the south. Most of the terrain in the northern part of the
18

country was flat and open, which made ideal ground for German mobile warfare. Despite the
severe disadvantages, the Poles prepared to resist the anticipated German invasion, hoping that
they would be able to hold out long enough for British and French reinforcement to arrive (Shirer
1960, 491-496).
The test of Polands forces was not long in coming. On 31 August 1939, German SS
commandos dressed in Polish uniforms crossed the border into Poland and seized a radio tower
in Gleiwitz. They used the transmitter to broadcast an anti-German propaganda message, and left
several bodies in an attempt to create the ruse that anti-German forces within Poland were
responsible for the attack. This provocation was used to justify the wider German invasion the
next day, on 1 September 1939 (Polak-Springer 2013). The Polish Air Force was destroyed
within the first two weeks, and the Army was in almost continuous retreat. The initial defensive
plan was to allow the German forces to advance, then cut them off from behind, but the rapid
pace of the invasion and lack of reserve forces prevented this from being feasible. Polish units
continued to either retreat or be destroyed, though there were still hopes that France or Britain
would come to their aid. Both countries had declared war on Germany in response to the
invasion, but neither had made any significant moves. The disposition of forces on the GermanFrench border was such that the French would likely have been able to successfully attack into
Germany, but their reluctance to leave the defensive positions along the Maginot Line precluded
this possibility. All hopes were dashed on 17 September, when the Soviet Red Army began to
invade from the east. Though it was not publicly known at the time, the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact had included secret protocols which provided for the division of Polish territory between
Germany and the Soviet Union. This proved to be catastrophic for the Poles, who withdrew from

19

the advancing Red Army with only limited skirmishes. The last remaining Polish forces
surrendered on 6 October, and the country effectively ceased to exist (Shirer 1960, 625-632).
The defeat in Poland resulted in calamity for the Polish people. As Hitler considered
Poland rightfully part of Germanys Lebensraum, he issued orders which effectively called for
the extermination of Poles. Though the worst days of Nazi genocide were yet to come, German
forces indiscriminately murdered thousands of Polish civilians during their advance, and SS
groups specifically targeted prominent members of Polish society for execution. Over the course
of WWII, several million Poles were killed as a part of the overall plan to cleanse Poland for
future German settlement (Shirer 1960, 1071).
Conclusion
The Nazi partys perception of the ideal German Reich was heavily steeped in mythos
and pseudoscientific explanations of race. However, its ability to enforce its will in the 1930s
was quite real. Hitler and his associates had an uncanny ability to sense weakness in their
opponents, and ruthlessly exploited it in order to achieve their goals. This exploitation, however,
was always preceded by some form of justification. Despite his unabashedly aggressive nature,
Hitler always sought to justify himself by one means or another. His grievances were never
justified to the extent that his hyperbolic manner of speaking indicated, but pre-1939 aggression
did generally have its origin in concessions forced upon Germany and its allies at the end of
WWI. Hitlers mystifying oratory skills allowed him to capitalize on the anti-Versailles
undercurrent of many Germans, and though there was some reluctance at first, his generals were
won over to his side by the ease with which he bloodlessly expanded the borders of the Reich in
the early years. It is unclear whether France and the United Kingdom were mollified by his

20

explanations for his conduct or simply unwilling to risk a war under any pretext, but the practical
result was that the Nazis were able to capitalize on all their demands and more.
Though the territorial changes that occurred during this time were mostly reversed after
the end of the war, the effects of German aggression still linger on the landscape. Most affected
were the German people themselves. Many areas that once contained large German-speaking
populations are now home to almost none. East Prussia, Danzig, and other ethnically German
areas which fell into the Soviet sphere of influence were forcibly cleansed of German population
and culture. There is a certain irony to be found in the results of the Third Reichs actions.
Though it briefly expanded to an enormous size which included many ethnic German
populations that were formerly outside its borders, the end result was that these communities
found themselves unwelcome after the war, and Germanys territory was reduced to a state
smaller than before the war.

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Figure 5: Changes in Eastern Europe after WWII. Humboldt State University

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