Reyes vs.

Sisters of Mercy Hospital

G.R No. 130547 (October 3, 2000)
A. Legal Issue. Whether or not Sisters of Mercy
Hospital is liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.
B.

Facts
Petitioner, Leah Alesna Reyes, is the
wife of the deceased patient, Jorge Reyes. Five
days before the latters death, Jorge has been
suffering from recurring fever with chills. The
doctors confirmed through the Widal test that
Jorge has typhoid fever. However, he did not
respond to the treatment and died. The cause
of his death was Ventricular Arrythemia
Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant case
for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, which dismissed the case and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The contention was that Jorge did not
die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death was
due to the wrongful administration of
chloromycetin. They contended that had
respondent doctors exercised due care and
diligence, they would not have recommended
and rushed the performance of the Widal Test,
hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from
typhoid fever, and administered chloromycetin
without first conducting sufficient tests on the
patients compatibility with said drug.
C. RulingSisters of Mercy Hospital is not liable for
the death of Jorge Reyes.

D.

E.

Reasoning of the Court

There is no showing that the attending
physician in this case deviated from the usual
course of treatment with respect to typhoid
fever.
Jorge
was
given
antibiotic
choloromycetin and some dose of triglobe
after compatibility test was made by the
doctor and found that no adverse reactions
manifested
which
would
necessitate
replacement of the medicines. Indeed, the
standard contemplated is not what is actually
the average merit among all known
practitioners from the best to the worst and
from the most to the least experienced, but
the reasonable average merit among the
ordinarily good physicians. Here, the doctors
did not depart from the reasonable standard
recommended by the experts as they in fact
observed the due care required under the
circumstances.
Policy
In Medical Negligence cases, it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that
the usual procedure in treating the illness is

not followed by the doctor. Failure to prove

this, the doctor is not liable. Physicians are not
insurers of the success of every procedure
undertaken and if the procedure was shown to
be properly done but did not work, they cannot
be faulted for such result.
WILDVALLEY

In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a

rule that ships passing through it must be
piloted by pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in
1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of
Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the
services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited
pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the
Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas
ran aground in the Orinoco River while being
piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded
ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel
was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd.
(WSC). The blockade caused $400k worth of
losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make
its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in
the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable
for the losses it incurred under the laws of
Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la
Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona
de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These two laws
provide that the master and owner of the ship
is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the
ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent
when he failed to check on certain vibrations
that the ship was experiencing while
traversing the river.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President

Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan
laws.

HELD:
No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not
duly proven as fact before the court. Only
mere photocopies of the laws were presented
as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public

document to be admissible, the following

requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer
having legal custody of the records or by his
deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a
certificate by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consular
or consular agent or foreign service officer,
and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral
testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as
are printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted
in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives
rise to processual presumption where the
foreign law is deemed to be the same as
Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor
Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the
negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had
shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to
pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was
a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good
standing when he was engaged.

Facts:

Manuel Lim v CA

Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim are the

officers of the Rigi Bilt Industries, Inc. (RIGI).
RIGI had been transacting business with Linton
Commercial Company, Inc. The Lims ordered
100 pieces of mild steel plates from Linton and
were delivered to the Lims place of business
which was in Caloocan. To pay Linton, the Lims
issued a postdated check for P51,800.00. On a
different date, the Lims also ordered another
65 pcs of mild steel plates and were delivered
in the place of business. They again issued
another postdated check. On that same day,
they also ordered purlins worth P241,800
which were delivered to them on various
dates. The Lims issued 7 checks for this.

When the 7 checks were presented to

the drawee bank (Solidbank), it was
dishonored because payment for the checks
had been stopped and/or insufficiency of
funds. So the Lims were charged with 7 counts
of violation of Bouncing Checks Law.
The Malabon trial court held that the
Lims were guilty of estafa and violation of BP
22. They went to CA on appeal.
The CA acquitted the Lims of estafa, on
the ground that the checks were not made in
payment of an obligation contracted at the
time of their issuance. However, the CA
affirmed the finding that they were guilty of
violation for BP 22. Motion for Reconsideration
to SC.
Issue:

Whether or not the issue was within the

jurisdiction of the Malabon Trial Court
Held:

Yes. The venue of jurisdiction lies either

in the RTC Caloocan or Malabon Trial Court.
BP 22 is a continuing crime. A person
charged with a transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was partly committed. In determining
the proper venue, the ff. must be considered.
1) 7 checks were issued to Linton in its place
of business in Navotas. 2) The checks were
delivered Linton in the same place. 3) The
checks were dishonored in Caloocan 4) The
Lims had knowledge of their insufficiency of
funds.
Under sec 191 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law:
ISSUE = 1ST delivery of the instrument
complete in form to a person who takes it as a
holder
HOLDER = payee or indorsee of a bill/note who
is in possession of it or the bearer
The place where the bills were written,
signed or dated does not necessarily fix or
determine the place where they were
executed. It is the delivery that is important. It
is the final act essential to its consummation of
an
obligation.
An
undelivered
bill
is
unoperative. The issuance and delivery of the
check must be to a person who takes it as a
holder.
Although Linton sent a collector who
received the checks fr. The Lims at their place
of business, the checks were actually issued
and delivered to Linton in Navotas. The
collector is not a holder or an agent, he was
just an employee.

*SC affirms conviction of the Lims for

violation of BP 22 and the decision of CA
PLDT v CA
GR No. 57079 September 29, 1989
Facts:

Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep

when they ran over an earth mound and fell in
an open trench on the road resulting to slight
injuries to the husband and serious injuries to
the wife. The windshield of the jeep was also
shattered due to the accident. Spouses
Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because
of lack of warning signs placed near the
manhole dug resulting on the earth mound on
the road causing injuries to the wife. PLDT
contends the injuries were the result of the
negligence of the independent contractor the
company hired (Barte) and should be the one
held liable and not the company. RTC ruled in
favour of the spouses while the CA under
Justice Agrava as ponente reversed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue: W/N PLDT can be held liable for the
injuries caused to spouses Esteban
Held:

PLDT and Barte contends that the

independent contractor placed signs on the
road and that it was the fault of Mr. Esteban
because he did not diligently drive the
jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly swerved from
the outer lane thereby hitting the earth
mound. SC finds no error in the findings of the
respondent court in its original decision that
the accident which befell private respondents
was due to the lack of diligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner
PLDT. The findings clearly show that the
negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was
not only contributory to his injuries and those
of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes
their right to recover damages. The presence
of warning signs could not have completely
prevented the accident; the only purpose of
said signs was to inform and warn the public of
the presence of excavations on the site. The
private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the
lack of knowledge of these excavations which
caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the
excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound.

Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and

Light Co.
Facts:

Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old

at the time he received the injuries that gave
rise to this complaint. On September 30, 1905,
plaintiff and Manuel Claparols, about 12 years
of age, went to the power plant owned by the
defendant to visit one Murphy, an employee.
Not being able to find Murphy on inquiry, the
boys for curiosity wandered around the
premises and reached the place where the
company dumped in the cinders and ashes
from its furnaces. There they found some 2030 fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
The caps are intended for explosion of
dynamites, and have in themselves explosive
power. The boys picked up the caps and
carried them home. Along the way they met
Jessie Adrian, a 9-year old girl. The 3 went to
Manuels house and performed a little
experiment. They opened the caps and found
yellowish substance. They lighted a match and
applied it on the contents. The girl became
frightened and ran away. The substance
exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessies neck,
burns on Manuel, and loss of Davids eyesight.
Plaintiff sued the company for damages.
Issue:
Whether the company could be faulted
for the allowing the children to be exposed to
the harmful substances
Held:

Fulminating caps or detonators for the

discharge by electricity of blasting charges by
dynamite are not articles in common use by
the average citizen, and under all the
circumstances, and in the absence of all
evidence to the contrary, we think that the
discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at
the place where they were found by the
plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies
the inference that the defendant company was
either the owner of the caps in question or had
the caps under its possession and control. We
think also that the evidence tends to disclose
that these caps or detonators were willfully
and knowingly thrown by the company or its
employees at the spot where they were found,
with the expectation that they would be buried
out of the sight by the ashes which it was
engaged in dumping in that neighborhood,
they being old and perhaps defective; and,
however this may be, we are satisfied that the
evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that
the company or some of its employees either
willfully or through an oversight left them

exposed at a point on its premises which the

general public, including children at play,
where not prohibited from visiting, and over
which the company knew or ought to have
known that young boys were likely to roam
about in pastime or in play.
It is clear that the accident could not
have happened and not the fulminating caps
been left exposed at the point where they
were found, or if their owner had exercised due
care in keeping them in an appropriate place;
but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not
have been injured had he not, for his own
pleasure and convenience, entered upon the
defendant's premises, and strolled around
thereon without the express permission of the
defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant
which he found on its premises, and had he
not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the
caps and applied a match to its contents.
Children are actuated by similar
childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by
curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of
youth, boys here as well as there will usually
be found whenever the public is permitted to
congregate. The movement of machinery, and
indeed anything which arouses the attention of
the young and inquiring mind, will draw them
to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the
magnet draw the iron which comes within the
range of its magnetic influence. The owners of
premises, therefore, whereon things attractive
to children are exposed, or upon which the
public are expressly or impliedly permitted to
enter or upon which the owner knows or ought
to know children are likely to roam about for
pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this,
and take precautions accordingly." In such
cases the owner of the premises can not be
heard to say that because the child has
entered upon his premises without his express
permission he is a trespasser to whom the
owner owes no duty or obligation whatever.
The owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions to prevent the child from entering
his premises at a place where he knows or
ought to know that children are accustomed to
roam about of to which their childish instincts
and impulses are likely to attract them is at
least equivalent to an implied license to enter,
and where the child does enter under such
conditions the owner's failure to take
reasonable precautions to guard the child
against injury from unknown or unseen
dangers, placed upon such premises by the
owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible,
if the child is actually injured, without other
fault on its part than that it had entered on the
premises of a stranger without his express

invitation or permission. To hold otherwise

would be expose all the children in the
community to unknown perils and unnecessary
danger at the whim of the owners or
occupants of land upon which they might
naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
But while we hold that the entry of the
plaintiff upon defendant's property without
defendant's express invitation or permission
would not have relieved defendant from
responsibility for injuries incurred there by
plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such
injury were attributable to the negligence of
the defendant, we are of opinion that under all
the circumstances of this case the negligence
of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises was not the proximate cause of
the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore
was
not,
properly
speaking,
"attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open
the detonating cap and putting match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
therefore is not civilly responsible for the
injuries thus incurred.
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs.
Stout, "While it is the general rule in regard to
an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault
or negligence of another he must himself have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in
regard to an infant of tender years. The care
and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to
be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case." In the case at bar,
plaintiff at the time of the accident was a wellgrown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his
age. The evidence of record leaves no room for
doubt that, despite his denials on the witness
stand, he well knew the explosive character of
the cap with which he was amusing himself.
The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion admit of no
other explanation. His attempt to discharge
the cap by the use of electricity, followed by
his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his
endeavors brought about by the application of
a match to the contents of the caps, show
clearly that he knew what he was about.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this
case had sufficient capacity and understanding
to be sensible of the danger to which he
exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the

sense that his age and his experience qualified

him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury
which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be
held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so
that while it may be true that these injuries
would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and
principal cause of the accident which inflicted
the injury.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS,

Petitioner,
vs.
ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M.
GARCIA, Respondents

FACTS:
1. Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent
Ethel Brunty and an American citizen,
came to the Philippines for a visit
sometime in January 1980.
2. Prior to her departure, she, together
with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M.
Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board
a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by
Rodolfo L. Mercelita.
3. It was about 12:00 midnight, January
25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71,
driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way
to Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left
the La Union station at 11:00 p.m.,
January 24, 1980.
4. By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia
and Mercelita were already approaching
the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal,
Moncada, Tarlac.
5. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70
km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of
the railroad track up ahead and that

they were about to collide with PNR

Train No. T-71.
6. Mercelita was instantly killed when the
Mercedes Benz smashed into the train;
the two other passengers suffered
serious physical injuries.
7. A certain James Harrow brought Rhonda
Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctors
Hospital in Tarlac, where she was
pronounced dead after ten minutes
from arrival.
8. Garcia, who had suffered severe head
injuries, was brought via ambulance to
the same hospital. He was transferred
to the Manila Doctors Hospital, and
later to the Makati Medical Center for
further treatment.
9. PNR insisted among others that the
sole and proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence and
recklessness of Garcia and Mercelita. It
insisted that it had provided adequate
warning signals at the railroad crossing
and had exercised due care in the
selection and supervision of its
employees.
ISSUE#1: W/N the contention of PNR as to the
proximate cause correct?
HELD: NO.
RATIO: In determining whether or not there is
negligence on the part of the parties in a given
situation, jurisprudence has laid down the
following test: Did defendant, in doing the
alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation?
If not, the person is guilty of negligence.
Petitioner was found negligent because of its
failure to provide the necessary safety device
to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing
the railroad track. As such, it is liable for
damages for violating the provisions of Article
2176 of the New Civil Code
It was clearly established that plaintiffsappellees (respondents herein) sustained
damage or injury as a result of the collision.
That there was negligence on the part of PNR
is, likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the
fatal accident, the alleged safety measures
installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is

not only inadequate but does not satisfy wellsettled safety standards in transportation.
Pictures presented in evidence revealed that:
1) there were no flagbars or safety railroad
bars;2) warning signals were inadequate; 3)
the place was not properly lighted such that
even if a flagman was stationed at the site, it
would be impossible to know or see a railroad
track ahead.
A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would
have difficulty in knowing that there is an
approaching train because of the slight curve,
more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus,
it is imperative on the part of the PNR to
provide adequate safety equipment in the
area.
Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of
exercising a reasonable degree of care to
avoid injury to persons and property at railroad
crossings, which duties pertain both in the
operation of trains and in the maintenance of
the crossings.
Moreover, every corporation constructing or
operating a railway shall make and construct
at all points where such railway crosses any
public road, good, sufficient, and safe
crossings and erect at such points, at a
sufficient elevation from such road as to admit
a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign
with large and distinct letters placed thereon,
to give notice of the proximity of the railway,
and warn persons of the necessity of looking
out for trains.
Note:
In a long line of cases, the Court held that in
order to sustain a claim based on quasidelict, the following requisites must concur:
(1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act
or omission, of which defendant, or some
person for whose acts he must respond was
guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and damage.
Applying the foregoing requisites, the CA
correctly made the following conclusions:
It was clearly established that plaintiffsappellees (respondents herein) sustained
damage or injury as a result of the collision.
That there was negligence on the part of PNR
is, likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the
fatal accident, the alleged safety measures

installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is

not only inadequate but does not satisfy wellsettled safety standards in transportation. x x
x

ISSUE#2: W/N there was a

negligence on Merceditas part?

contributory

HELD: YES.
RATIO: Contributory negligence is conduct on
the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. To
hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed
an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warning or signs of an impending
danger to health and body.
To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although
not proximate, between the negligence of the
party and the succeeding injury. In a legal
sense, negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not
simply a condition for its occurrence.
Mercelita was not familiar with the road.
Yet, it was also established that Mercelita was
then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of
70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle
a few yards before reaching the railroad track.
Mercelita should not have driven the car the
way he did.
However, while his acts contributed to the
collision, they nevertheless do not negate
petitioners liability.
Pursuant to Article 2179 of the New Civil Code,
the only effect such contributory negligence
could have is to mitigate liability, which,
however, is not applicable in this case since
the relationship between Mercelita, the driver,
and Rhonda Brunty was not alleged.
DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE:
Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. In Corliss v.
Manila Railroad Company, this Court held that
negligence is want of the care required by the

circumstances. It is a relative or comparative,

not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and
the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances
reasonably
require.
In
determining whether or not there is negligence
on the part of the parties in a given situation,
jurisprudence has laid down the following
test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged
negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not,
the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in
effect, adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law.

person Reynaldo Reyes. Castro deposited a

worthless Bank of America check with the
same amount as that issued by Ford. While
being routed to the Central Bank for clearing,
the worthless check was replaced by the
genuine one from Ford.
The trial court absolved PCIB and held Citibank
liable, which decision was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals.
PCIB v. CA
Facts:
This case is composed of three
consolidated
petitions
involving
several
checks, payable to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, but was embezzled allegedly by an
organized syndicate.
I. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479
On October 19, 1977, plaintiff Ford
issued a Citibank check amounting to
P4,746,114.41 in favor of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue for the payment of
manufacturers
taxes.
The
check
was
deposited with defendant IBAA (now PCIB),
subsequently cleared the the Central Bank,
and paid by Citibank to IBAA. The proceeds
never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled
to make a second payment. Defendant refused
to reimburse plaintiff, and so the latter filed a
complaint. An investigation revealed that the
check was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the
general ledger accountant of Ford, and was
replaced by a managers check. Alleged
members of a syndicate deposited the two
managers checks with Pacific Banking
Corporation. Ford filed a third party complaint
against Rivera and PBC. The case against PBC
was dismissed. The case against Rivera was
likewise dismissed because summons could
not be served. The trial court held Citibank and
PCIB jointly and severally liable to Ford, but
the Court of Appeals only held PCIB liable.
II. G. R. No. 128604
Ford drew two checks in favor of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, amounting
to P5,851,706.37 and P6,311,591.73. Both are
crossed checks payable to payees account
only. The checks never reached BIR, so plaintiff
was compelled to make second payments.
Plaintiff instituted an action for recovery
against PCIB and Citibank.
On investigation of NBI, the modus
operandi was discovered. Gorofredo Rivera
made the checks but instead of delivering
them to BIR, passed it to Castro, who was the
manager of PCIB San Andres. Castro opened a
checking account in the name of a fictitious

Issues:
(1) Whether there is contributory negligence
on the part of Ford
(2) Has petitioner Ford the right to recover
from the collecting bank (PCIBank) and the
drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks
intended as payment to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue?
Held:

(1) The general rule is that if the

master is injured by the negligence of a third
person and by the concuring contributory
negligence of his own servant or agent, the
latter's negligence is imputed to his superior
and will defeat the superior's action against
the third person, asuming, of course that the
contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is
made. As defined, proximate cause is that
which, in the natural and continuous
sequence,
unbroken
by
any
efficient,
intervening cause produces the injury and
without the result would not have occurred. It
appears that although the employees of Ford
initiated the transactions attributable to an
organized syndicate, in our view, their actions
were not the proximate cause of encashing the
checks payable to the CIR. The degree of
Ford's negligence, if any, could not be
characterized as the proximate cause of the
injury to the parties. The mere fact that the
forgery was committed by a drawer-payor's
confidential employee or agent, who by virtue
of his position had unusual facilities for
perpertrating the fraud and imposing the
forged paper upon the bank, does notentitle
the bank toshift the loss to the drawer-payor,
in the absence of some circumstance raising
estoppel against the drawer. This rule likewise
applies to the checks fraudulently negotiated
or diverted by the confidential employees who
hold them in their possession.
(2) We have to scrutinize, separately,
PCIBank's share of negligence when the
syndicate achieved its ultimate agenda of
stealing the proceeds of these checks.
a. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479

On record, PCIBank failed to verify the

authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks.
The neglect of PCIBank employees to verify
whether his letter requesting for the
replacement of the Citibank Check No. SN04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of
care
and
prudence
required
in
the
circumstances. Furthermore, it was admitted
that PCIBank is authorized to collect the
payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As
an agent of BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to
consult its principal regarding the unwarranted
instructions given by the payor or its agent. It
is a well-settled rule that the relationship
between the payee or holder of commercial
paper and the bank to which it is sent for
collection is, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, that of principal and agent. A
bank which receives such paper for collection
is the agent of the payee or holder.
Indeed, the crossing of the check with the
phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning
that the check should be deposited only in the
account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the
collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the
check be deposited in payee's account only.
Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank)
which is bound to scrutinize the check and to
know its depositors before it could make the
clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements
and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed".
Lastly, banking business requires that the
one who first cashes and negotiates the check
must take some precautions to learn whether
or not it is genuine. And if the one cashing the
check
through
indifference
or
other
circumstance assists the forger in committing
the fraud, he should not be permitted to retain
the proceeds of the check from the drawee
whose sole fault was that it did not discover
the forgery or the defect in the title of the
person negotiating the instrument before
paying the check. For this reason, a bank
which cashes a check drawn upon another
bank, without requiring proof as to the identity
of persons presenting it, or making inquiries
with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds
against the drawee when the proceeds of the
checks were afterwards diverted to the hands
of a third party. In such cases the drawee bank
has a right to believe that the cashing bank (or
the collecting bank) had, by the usual proper
investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity
of the negotiation of the checks. Thus, one
who encashed a check which had been forged
or diverted and in turn received payment
thereon from the drawee, is guilty of
negligence which proximately contributed to
the success of the fraud practiced on the

drawee bank. The latter may recover from the

holder the money paid on the check.
b. G. R. No. 128604
In this case, there was no evidence
presented
confirming
the
conscious
participation of PCIBank in the embezzlement.
As a general rule, however, a banking
corporation is liable for the wrongful or
tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or
agents within the course and scope of their
employment. A bank will be held liable for the
negligence of its officers or agents when
acting within the course and scope of their
employment. It may be liable for the tortuous
acts of its officers even as regards that species
of tort of which malice is an essential element.
In this case, we find a situation where the
PCIBank appears also to be the victim of the
scheme hatched by a syndicate in which its
own management employees had participated.
But in this case, responsibility for negligence
does not lie on PCIBank's shoulders alone.
Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence
of the clearing stamps. For this reason,
Citibank had indeed failed to perform what
was incumbent upon it, which is to ensure that
the amount of the checks should be paid only
to its designated payee. The point is that as a
business affected with public interest and
because of the nature of its functions, the
bank is under obligation to treat the accounts
of its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. Thus, invoking the doctrine of
comparative negligence, we are of the view
that both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their
respective obligations and both were negligent
in the selection and supervision of their
employees resulting in the encashment of
Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 AND 16508.
Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally
liable for the loss of the proceeds of said
checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs.
BALANDAN, et al.- Attractive Nuisance
Doctrine

Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not

applicable to bodies of water, artificial (e.g.
water tanks) as well as natural, in the absence
of some unusual condition or artificial feature
other than the mere water and its location.

FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is
claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the
death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the
owner of an Ice plant, who had in their
premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep.
The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress
was easily made because the gates were
always open and there was no guard assigned
in the said gate. Also the tanks didnt have any
barricade or fence. One day when Mario was
playing with his friend, they saw the tank
inside the factory and began playing and
swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank
to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out
later, already as a cadaver, having died of
asphyxia secondary to drowning. The lower
decided in the favor of the parents saying that
the petitioner is liable for damages due to the
doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of

attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District

MR. & MRS. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN
WATER DISTRICT (govt-owned corp.)
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA
ANGELO,
J.:
Facts:
Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from
defendant, damages, funeral expenses and
attorneys fees for the death of their son,
Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools
of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the
complaint for it found the action of the
plaintiffs-appellants
untenable.
Issues:
(1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the
fault/negligence of the defendants so as to
make it liable for the damages sought;
(2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
applies
in
the
case
at
bench.
Ruling:
Judgment

RULING:
NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance
states that One who maintains on his
premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a
child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a trespasser in
the premises. American Jurisprudence shows
us that the attractive nuisance doctrine
generally is not applicable to bodies of water,
artificial as well as natural, in the absence of
some unusual condition or artificial feature
other than the mere water and its location. In
the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall
under such doctrine thus the petitioners
cannot be held liable for Marios death.

affirmed.

(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have

the burden of proving that the damages is
caused by the fault/negligence of the person
from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs
failed to overcome the burden. Defendant
employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male
nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards
to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons.
The swimming pools are provided with ring
buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also,
conspicuously displayed in the pool area the
rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it
appears that defendant has taken all the
necessary
precautions
to
avoid/prevent
danger/accidents which may cause injury to or
even
death
of
its
patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means
that, a person who has the last clear chance
to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in
law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident. Since minor Ong has went to
the big swimming pool w/o any companion in
violation of the rules and regulations of the
defendant as regards the use of pools, and it
appearing that the lifeguard responded to the

call for help as soon as his attention was called

to it, applying all efforts into play in order to
bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that
there is no room for the application of the
Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor
Ongs fault/negligence is the proximate and
only cause of his death.

ONG VS METROPOLITAN
104 Phil 397 Civil Law Torts and
Damages Due Diligence as a Defense
Last Clear Chance; when not applied
On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14
years old) and his two brothers went to the
swimming pool operated by Metropolitan
Water District (MWD). After paying the
entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small
pool.
The swimming pools of MWD are
provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid
medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is
painted with black colors so as to insure clear
visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous
place within the area certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools.
MWD employs six lifeguards who are all
trained as they had taken a course for that
purpose and were issued certificates of
proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule
prepared by their chief and arranged in such a
way as to have two guards at a time on duty to
look after the safety of the bathers. There is a
male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a
clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And
there are security guards who are available
always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that
hell just be going to the locker room to drink a
bottle of Coke. No one saw him returned.
Later, the elder Ong noticed someone at the
bottom of the big pool and notified the
lifeguard in attendant (Manuel Abao), who
immediately dove into the water. The body
was later identified as Dominadors. He was

attempted to be revived multiple times but of

no avail.
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring
that MWD was negligent in selecting its
employees. During trial, the elder brother of
Ong and one other testified that Abao was
reading a magazine and was chatting with a
security guard when the incident happened
and that he was called a third time before he
responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even
assuming that there was no negligence on the
part of MWD, it is still liable under the doctrine
of Last Clear Chance for having the last
opportunity to save the Dominador, its
employees failed to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the

death of Dominador Ong.

HELD:
No. As established by the facts, MWD
was not negligent in selecting its employees as
all of them were duly certified. MWD was not
negligent in managing the pools as there were
proper
safety
measures
and
precautions/regulations that were placed all
over the pools. Hence, due diligence is
appreciated as a complete and proper defense
in this case. Further, the testimony in court by
the elder Ong and the other witness was
belied by the statements they have given to
the investigators when they said that the
lifeguard immediately dove into the water
when he was called about the boy at the
bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is
of no application here. It was not established
as to how Dominador was able to go to the big
pool. He went to the locker and thereafter no
one saw him returned not until his body was
retrieved from the bottom of the big pool. The
last clear chance doctrine can never apply
where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously (how can the lifeguard act
instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from

going to the big pool if he did not see him go

there), and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the
peril is or should have been discovered; at
least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be
said to have contributed to the injury.

LADECO vs Angala
G.R. No. 153076
June 21, 2007
Facts:
A Datsun crewcab, driven by Apolonio
Deocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a 1958
Chevy pick-up owned by Michael Raymond
Angala (respondent) and driven by Bernulfo
Borres (Borres). Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (LADECO) owned
the crewcab which was assigned to its
manager
Manuel
Mendez
(Mendez).
Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict,
Damages, and Attorneys Fees against
LADECO, its administrative officer Henry
Berenguel (Berenguel) and Deocampo. The
trial court ruled that LADECO and De Ocampoy
are solidarily liable. CA affirmed trial courts
decision.
Issue:

WON petitioners are liable

Held:
Since both parties are at fault in this
case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that
where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than
that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do
so is chargeable with the loss. In this case,
Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid
the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the
rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation
since he was in a position to observe the
vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle
in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much
slower
speed
to
avoid
skidding
and
overturning, compared to running straight
ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the
vehicle if he was not driving very fast while
following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only
driving fast, he also admitted that he did not

step on the brakes even upon seeing the pickup. He only stepped on the brakes after the
collision.

Canlas vs CA
G.R. No. 112160 February 28, 2000
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts
and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 1173
FACTS:
August,
1982: Osmundo
S.
Canlas executed a Special Power of
Attorney
authorizing Vicente
Maosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land
situated in BF Homes Paranaque in the
name of his wife Angelina Canlas.
Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed
to sell the lands to Maosca for P850K,
P500K payable within 1 week, and the
balance serves as his investment in the
business.
Maosca
issued
2
checks P40K and P460K. The P460K
lacked sufficient funds.
September 3, 1982: Maosca mortgage
to Atty. Manuel Magno the parcels of
lands for P100K with the help of
impostors
who
misrepresented
themselves as the Spouses Canlas.
September 29, 1982: Maosca was
granted a loan by the respondent Asian
Savings Bank (ASB) for P500K with
the parcels of land as security and with
the help of the same impostors. The
loan was left unpaid resulting in
a extrajudicially foreclosure on the lots.
January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter
informing ASB that the mortgage was
without their authority.
He also
requested the sheriff Contreras to hold
or cancel the auction. Both parties
refused.
The spouses Canlas filed a case for
annulment of deed of real estate
mortgage with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction
RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing
a Certificate of Sheriffs Sale and
annulled the mortgage
CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped
for coming to the bank with Maosca
and letting himself be introduced
as Leonardo Rey
ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to
the doctrine of last clear chance
HELD:
YES. Petition is GRANTED
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of
the obligor consist in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the
nature
of
the
obligation
and

corresponds with the circumstances of

the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply
The degree of diligence required of
banks is more than that of a good
father of a family
o not even a single identification
card was exhibited by the said
impostors to show their true
identity
o acted simply on the basis of the
residence certificates bearing
signatures which tended to
match the signatures affixed on
a previous deed of mortgage to
Atty. Magno
previous
deed
of
mortgage did not bear the
tax account number of the
spouses as well as the
Community Tax Certificate of
Angelina Canlas
doctrine of last clear chance
o where both parties are negligent
but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time
than that of the other, or where
it is impossible to determine
whose
fault
or
negligence
brought about the occurrence of
the incident, the one who had
the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm but
failed to do so, is chargeable
with the consequences arising
therefrom
o the antecedent negligence of a
person
does
not
preclude
recovery of damages caused by
the supervening negligence of
the latter, who had the last fair
chance
to
prevent
the
impending harm by the exercise
of due diligence
Antecedent
Negligence:
Osmundo
Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente
Maosca the opportunity to perpetrate
the fraud, by entrusting him the
owner's copy of the transfer certificates
of title of subject parcels of land
Supervening Negligence: Failing to
perform the simple expedient of
faithfully
complying
with
the
requirements for banks to ascertain the
identity of the persons transacting with
them - ASB bears the loss

Canlas went to ASB with Maosca and

he was introduced as Leonardo Rey. He
didn't correct Maosca. However, he
did not know that the lots were being
used as a security for he was there to
make sure that Maosca pays his debt
so
he
cannot
be
estopped
from assailing the validity of the
mortgage
But being negligent in believing the
misrepresentation by Maosca that he
had other lots and that the lot were not
to be used as a security, Canlas was
negligent and undeserving of Attorney's
fees.
the contract of mortgage sued upon
was entered into and signed by
impostors
who
misrepresented
themselves as the spouses Osmundo
Canlas and Angelina Canlas = complete
nullity
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA
(1997)
G.R. No. 97626 March 14, 1997
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts
and
Damages)

but the name of the account

holder was left blank
After validation, Yabut would then fill up
the name of RMC in the space left blank
in the duplicate copy and change the
account number to RMC's account
number
This went on in a span of more than 1
year without private respondent's
knowledge
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds,
RMC demanded from PBC the return of
its money and later on filed in the RTC
RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly
and severally liable
CA:
affirmed
with
modification
deleting awards of exemplary damages
and attorney's fees

ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's
teller is negligent for failing to avoid the injury
by not exercising the proper validation
procedure-YES
2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by
RMC - YES
HELD:

FACTS:
May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo
Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC
funds in the form of cash totalling
P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene
Yabut, for the purpose of depositing
said funds in the current accounts of
RMC with Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC)
o They were not credited to RMC's
account
but
were
instead
deposited to Account No. 5301734-7 of Yabut's husband,
Bienvenido Cotas
Romeo Lipana never checked their
monthly
statements
of
account
reposing complete trust and confidence
on PBC
Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to
furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon
and both are always validated and
stamped
by
the
teller Azucena
Mabayad :
o original showed the name of her
husband as depositor and his
current
account
number
retained by the bank
o duplicate copy was written the
account number of her husband

60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to

be paid by the PBC
1. YES.
The fact that the duplicate slip was not
compulsorily required by the bank in
accepting deposits should not relieve
the PBC of responsibility
The odd circumstance alone that such
duplicate copy lacked one vital
information (Name of the account
holder) should have already put Ms.
Mabayad on guard.
Negligence here lies not only on the
part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the
part of the bank itself in its lack in
selection and supervision of Ms.
Mabayad.
Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of
the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank
and now its Vice-President, to the effect
that, while he ordered the investigation
of the incident, he never came to know
that blank deposit slips were validated
in total disregard of the bank's
validation procedures until 7 years later
last
clear
chance/supervening
negligence/discovered peril
o where
both
parties
are
negligent, but the negligent act

of one is appreciably later in

time than that of the other, or
when
it
is impossible
to
determine
whose
fault
or
negligence should be attributed
to the incident, the one who had
the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with
the consequences thereof
o antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the
recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or
bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance,
could
have
avoided
the
impending harm by the exercise
of due diligence.
Here, assuming that RMC
was
negligent
in
entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, yet
it cannot be denied that
PBC bank, thru its teller,
had
the
last
clear
opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its
client, simply by faithfully
observing
their
selfimposed
validation
procedure.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the
nature
of
the
obligation
and
corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of
a good father of a family shall be
required.
In the case of banks,
however, the degree of diligence
required is more than that of a good
father of a family. Considering the
fiduciary nature of their relationship
with their depositors, banks are duty
bound to treat the accounts of their
clients with the highest degree of care

2. YES.
it cannot be denied that, indeed,
private
respondent
was
likewise
negligent in not checking its monthly
statements of account. Had it done so,

the company would have been alerted

to the series of frauds being committed
against RMC by its secretary. The
damage would definitely not have
ballooned to such an amount if only
RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had
exercised even a little vigilance in their
financial affairs. This omission by RMC
amounts to contributory negligence
which shall mitigate the damages that
may be awarded to the private
respondent
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code

When the plaintiff's own negligence was

the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence
was
only
contributory,
the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded
Pantranco North express vs Baesa
79050-51 November 14, 1989
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts
and Damages)
FACTS:
Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico
spouses and their son and 7 other
people boarded a passenger jeep
driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in
Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding
anniversary of the Baesa spouses
While they were proceeding towards
Malalam River at a speed of about 20
kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from
Aparri, on a route
to Manila,
encroached on the jeepneys lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with
it.
As a result, the entire Baesa family,
except for their daughter Maricar
Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and
the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar
Baesa, through her guardian filed
separate actions for damages arising
from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
o PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's
negligence as a proximate cause
of the accident and invoked the
defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its
driver.
CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa

ISSUE:
W/N the last clear chance applies thereby
making David Ico who had the chance to avoid
the collision negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence
HELD:
NO.
Generally, the last clear change
doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff
who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be
raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages
For the last clear chance doctrine to
apply, it is necessary to show that the
person who allegedly has the last
opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril, or
should, with exercise of due care, have
been aware of it
o there is nothing to show that the
jeepney driver David Ico knew of
the impending danger
When he saw at a
distance
that
the
approaching
bus was
encroaching on his lane,
he did not immediately
swerve the jeepney to
the dirt shoulder on his
right since he must have
assumed that the bus
driver will return the bus
to its own lane upon
seeing
the
jeepney
approaching form the
opposite direction
Even assuming that the
jeepney driver perceived
the danger a few seconds
before
the
actual
collision, he had no
opportunity to avoid it
last clear chance doctrine can never
apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if
the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been
discovered

Bustamante v. CA (1991)
G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts
and Damages)
FACTS:
April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision
occurred between a 1947 model gravel
and sand truck driven by Montesiano
and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda
passenger bus driven Susulin along the
national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite
o front
left
side
portion
(barandilla) of the body of the
truck sideswiped the left side
wall of the passenger bus,
ripping off the wall from the
driver's seat to the last rear
seat
o several passengers of the bus
were thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they
sustained:
1. Rogelio Bustamante,
40, husband of Emma
Adriano Bustamante and
father of Rossel, Gloria,
Yolanda, Ericson, and
Ederic,
all
surnamed
Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson,
16, daughter of spouses
Salvador
and
Patria
Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16,
daughter of spouses Jose
and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son
of spouses Narciso and
Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17,
son of spouses Jose and
Ma.
Commemoracion
Bersamina
o The bus was registered in the
name of Novelo but was owned
and/or operated as a passenger
bus jointly by Magtibay and
Serrado

before the collision, the cargo truck and

the passenger bus were approaching
each other, coming from the opposite
directions of the highway. While the
truck was still about 30 meters away,
Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front
wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also
observed that the truck was heading
towards his lane. Not minding this

circumstance due to his belief that the

driver of the truck was merely joking,
Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear
in order to give more power and speed
to the bus, which was ascending the
inclined part of the road, in order to
overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor
being pushed by a person along the
shoulder of the highway
RTC: liability of the two drivers for their
negligence must be solidary
CA: owner and driver of the sand and
gravel truck appealed was granted

ISSUE:
W/N the last clear chance can apply
making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the
collision and his act in proceeding to overtake
the hand tractor was the proximate cause of
the collision making him solely liable
HELD:
NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.
the doctrine of last clear chance means
that even though a person's own acts
may have placed him in a position of
peril, and an injury results, the injured
person is entitled to recovery.
o a person who has the last clear
chance
or
opportunity
of
avoiding
an
accident,
notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent or that of a
third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law
solely
responsible
for
the
consequences of the accident.
since the case at bar is not a suit
between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by
the heirs of the deceased passengers
against both owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles the court erred
in absolving the owner and driver of the
cargo truck from liability

Margarita Afialda vs Basilio Hisole et al

85 Phil 67 Civil Law Torts and Damages

Liability of possessors or users of animals
Assumption of Risk
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos
owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947,
without any fault from Afialda or any force
majeure, one of the carabaos gored him
thereby causing his death. Afialdas sister,
Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that
under the Civil Code, The possessor of an
animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable
for any damages it may cause, even if such
animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the
damage should arise fromforce majeure or
from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hisole is liable in the
case at bar as owner of the carabao which
killed Afialda.

HELD:
No.

The law uses the term possessor and

user of the animal. Afialda was the caretaker
of the animal and he was tasked and paid to
tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the

goring, is the possessor and the user of the

carabao and therefore he is the one who had
custody and control of the animal and was in a
position to prevent the animal from causing
damage. It would have been different had
Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretakers business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured
by the animal under those circumstances was
one of the risks of the occupation which he
had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take the consequences.

This action could have been more

appropriately raised in court under the
provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act
as the risk involve was one of occupational
hazards.

The Ilocos Norte Electric Company v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-53401, 06 November 1989

Complainants, heirs of deceased Isabel

Lao Juan, initiated a Complaint to recover
damages from defendant The Ilocos Norte
Electric Company. Previously, Isabel Lao Juan
was on her way to her store to check for
damage to her merchandise when she was
electrocuted while wading through waist-deep

water caused by recent typhoon Gening.

There was a dangling electric wire moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. As a defense,
the company claimed that the unfortunate
incident was a result of fortuitous event and
that the decedent assumed the risk when she
waded through the water.

HELD:
Ilocos Norte Electric was liable. The
cause of the death of the decedent was the
failure of the Company to repair the damage
brought by the typhoon. When a storm occurs
that is liable to prostate the wires, due care
requires prompt efforts to discover and repair
broken
lines.
No
assumption
of
risk
attributable to Isabel since she was responding
to an emergency to protect her property.

Indeed, under the circumstances of

the case, [the Company] was negligent in
seeing to it that no harm is done to the
general public considering that electricity is
an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of
care required of electric companies must be
commensurate with or proportionate to the
danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to
every place where persons have a right
to be x x x. The negligence of petitioner
having been shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victims
death was solely due to a fortuitous event.
When an act of God combines or concurs with
the negligence of the defendant to produce an
injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own
negligent conduct or omission x x x

As for the defense on assumption of

risk, the same was not tenable. The doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria means that when
someone voluntarily assents to a known
danger then he must abide by the
consequences. These are the exceptions: (1)

when there is an emergency; (2) protection of

ones life and property; and (3) protection of
life and property of another. Here, the
decedent was moved to act to protect her
property.

McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:
It was the 8th of January in 1977, at
around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning,
somewhere between Angeles City and San
Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his
daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor
children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well
as Kims babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San
Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of
Angeles City (northward) in a Ford Escort.
Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by
Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by
Ruben Galang, was headed in the opposite
direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando
(southward), going to Manila. The cargo truck
was considerable in size as it was carrying 200
hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10
metric tons.
As the Escort approached one PulongPulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys
suddenly ran from the right side of the road
into the Escorts lane. As the boys were going
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all
the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He
was then forced to swerve left and into the
lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his
headlights on, applied his brakes, and
attempted to return to his lane. However, he
failed to get back into the right lane, and
collided with the cargo truck.
The collision occurred on the bridge.
The collision resulted in the deaths of
the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her
babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting.
Loida was seated in the passenger seat.
Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were
sitting in the back of the Escort, received
physical injuries from the collision.
An information was filed against Ruben
Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide, physical
injuries, and damage to property. He was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
charges in the information. The conviction was
affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after

the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial

by the SC of his Petition for Review.
Two civil cases were filed. The first one,
by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the
second one by Araceli and her husband for the
death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her
other
children.
The
respondents
were
impleaded against as the employers of Ruben
Galang Galang was not included. The cases
here are based on quasi-delict. These cases
were eventually consolidated.
The trial court dismissed the civil cases
and awarded the respondents damages and
attorneys fees. On appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed.
This was based on its finding that it was
Galangs
inattentiveness
or
reckless
imprudence that caused the accident.
However, upon filing by the respondents of an
MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and
upheld that of the trial court because the fact
that Kohs car invaded the lane of the truck
and the collision occurred while still in
Galangs lane gave rise to the presumption
that Koh was negligent.
ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their
original decision?
HELD: NO. The petition has merit.
Procedural
(not
important):
Given
the
circumstances, the cases (civil and criminal)
should have been consolidated to prevent
separate appreciation of the evidence. To be
fair, the petitioners did move to adopt the
testimonies of the witnesses in the criminal
case but the motion was denied. The nonconsolidation resulted in two conflicting
decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict of
Galang was deemed by the Court as irrelevant
to the case at bar.
On the basis of this presumed
negligence, the appellate court immediately
concluded that it was Jose Kohs negligence
that was the immediate and proximate cause
of the collision. This is an unwarranted
deduction as the evidence for the petitioners
convincingly shows that the car swerved into
the trucks lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two boys darted
across the road from the right sidewalk into
the lane of the car.
Aracelis testimony was pretty much
what was stated in the facts plus the fact that
when Jose swerved to the left, the truck was
immediately noticed. This is why he switched
his headlights on to warn the trucks driver to
slow down and let the Escort return to its lane.
When asked as to how she could tell that the

truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the

truck just kept on coming, indicating that it
didnt reduce its speed. She posited that if it
did, there wouldnt have been a collision. Her
testimony remained intact, even upon crossexamination that Joses entry into Galangs
lane was necessary to avoid what was, in his
mind at the time, a greater peril death or
injury to the two idiots. This is hardly negligent
behavior.
Her testimony was corroborated by one
Eugenio Tanhueco1, who was an impartial
eyewitness. He said that the truck, moving at
50 to 60kph, only stopped upon collision. Also,
when the police investigated the scene of the
collision, they found skidmarks under the truck
instead of behind it. This indicated that Galang
only applied the brakes moments before the
collision.
While Galang claimed that he had
stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters
of the truck but this only served to
substantiate Tanhuecos statement that he
stopped only upon collision, considering the
speed at which he was going2.
On the basis of the definition3 and the
test4 of negligence, no negligence can be
imputed to Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have tried to avoid running
over the two boys by swerving th
e car away from where they were even
if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the
natural course to take particularly where the
vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
meters away and could very well slow down,
move to the side of the road and
give way to the oncoming car.
THE
EMERGENCY
RULE:
one
who
suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been
a better method, unless the emergency
in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence. Jose Koh
adopted the best
means possible in the given situation. This
means he cannot be considered negligent.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE
WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION STILL
WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO HIM BECAUSE:
1. Proximate Cause: that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the

injury, and without which the result would not

have occurred.
Galangs negligent act of not slowing down
or stopping and allowing the Escort to return to
the right lane was the sufficient intervening
cause and the actual cause of the tragedy
(failure to take the necessary measures and
the degree of care necessary to avoid the
collision)
o The entry of the car into the lane of
the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former
to slow down and give the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper
lane. Instead of slowing down and
swerving to the far right of the road,
which was the proper precautionary
measure
under
the
given
circumstances,
the
truck
driver
continued at full speed towards the car.
The truck drivers negligence becomes
more apparent in view of the fact that
the road is 7.50 meters wide while the
car measures 1.598 meters and the
truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This
would mean that both car and truck
could pass side by side with a clearance
of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore,
the bridge has a level sidewalk, which
could have partially accommodated the
truck. Any reasonable man finding
himself in the given situation would
have tried to avoid the car instead of
meeting it head-on.
o Negligence of Galang apparent in the
records: He himself said that his truck
was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers)
per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge52 is only 30 kilometers per hour.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a
person driving a vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation.
2. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: A doctrine in
the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases,
the person who had the last clear chance to
avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof. A
person who has the last clear chance or

opportunity
of
avoiding
an
accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to
the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the
accident. The doctrine applies only in a
situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
or antecedent negligence but the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the
plaintiff.
Basically, the last clear chance was with
Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence
presented
Therefore, respondents are found, under
Article 2180, directly and primarily responsible
for the acts of their employee. Their
negligence flows from the negligence of their
employee. Such presumption is juris tantum
(rebuttable) and not juris et de jure
(conclusive). They did not present evidence
that showed that the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee5, Galang.

blamed the tragedy to the reckless and

imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by
petitioner, without prior warning to the
residents within the vicinity of the dam.
Petitioners
denied
the
allegations
and
contended that they have kept the water at a
safe level, that the opening of floodgates was
done gradually, that it exercises diligence in
the selection of its employees, and that written
warnings were sent to the residents. It further
contended that there was no direct causal
relationship between the damage and the
alleged negligence on their part, that the
residents assumed the risk by living near the
dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous
event and are of the nature of damnum
absque injuria.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable
even though the coming of the typhoon is a
fortuitous event
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
(3) Whether the damage suffered by
respondents is one of damnum absque
injuria
Held:

NPC v. CA
Facts:

At the height of the typhoon Kading,

a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat
Dam, causing deaths and destructions to
residents and their properties. Respondents

(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon

the happening of a fortuitous event or an act
of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence,
delay or violation or contravention in any
manner of the tenor of the obligation as
provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code
which results in loss or damage. Even if there
was
no
contractual
relation
between
themselves and private respondents, they are
still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article
2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
"whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of
God or force majeure, by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is
therefore not enough that the event should not
have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed, but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle
embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly
requires that the act must be occasioned
solely by the violence of nature. Human
intervention is to be excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the mischief. When
the effect is found to be in part the result of
the participation of man, whether due to his
active intervention or neglect or failure to act,
the whole occurrence is then humanized and

removed from the rules applicable to the acts

of God. In the case at bar, although the
typhoon "Kading" was an act of God,
petitioners can not escape liability because
their negligence was the proximate cause of
the loss and damage.
(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL
CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of
serious importance, sufficient enough to set
alarm and cause people to take precautions for
their safety's sake. The notices were not
delivered, or even addressed to responsible
officials of the municipalities concerned who
could have disseminated the warning properly.
They were delivered to ordinary employees
and policemen. As it happened, the said
notices do not appear to have reached the
people concerned, which are the residents
beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this
case definitely did not receive any such
warning. Indeed, the methods by which the
defendants allegedly sent the notice or
warning was so ineffectual that they cannot
claim, as they do in their second assignment of
error, that the sending of said notice has
absolved them from liability.
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners'
third assignment of error that the damage
caused by the opening of the dam was in the
nature of damnum absque injuria, which
presupposes that although there was physical
damage, there was no legal injury in view of
the fortuitous events. There is no question that
petitioners have the right, duty and obligation
to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities
of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be
countenanced, however noble their intention
may be. The end does not justify the means,
particularly because they could have done
otherwise than simultaneously opening the
spillways to such extent. Needless to say,
petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

[G.R. No. 127934. August 23, 2000]

ACE HAULERS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
AND EDERLINDA ABIVA, respondents.
The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to
set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals1[1] affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 106, except for the
award of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
as exemplary damages, which was deleted.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff:
1. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) as actual damages;
2. the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
as moral damages;
3. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
as exemplary damages;
4. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
as attorneys fees;
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2[2]
The facts, culled from the findings of the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The case was an action for damages
arising from a vehicular mishap which took
place on June 1, 1984, involving a truck owned
by petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation and
driven by its employee, Jesus dela Cruz, and a
jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven by
Rodolfo Parma. A third vehicle, a motorcycle,
was bumped and dragged by the jeepney, and
its rider, Fidel Abiva, was run over by the truck
owned by petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation,
causing his death. Upon his untimely demise,
Fidel Abiva left behind a wife, respondent
Erderlinda Abiva and their three (3) children.
On July 27, 1984, a criminal information
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

1
2

was filed against the two drivers, Dela Cruz

and Parma, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q37248 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
103.
While the criminal action was pending,
on March 11, 1985, respondent Ederlinda
Abiva filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 93, a separate civil action
for damages against the two accused in the
criminal case, as well as against Isabelito
Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers Corp., the
owners of the vehicles involved in the accident
and employers of the accused.
In her complaint, respondent Abiva
prayed that:
1. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment be
immediately issued against the properties of
the defendants as security for the satisfaction
of any judgment that may be recovered;
2. Defendants in solidum, to pay plaintiff the
amount of P200,000.00 as actual damage;
3. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the
sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the
amount of moral and exemplary damages
which this Court may reasonably assess.
On January 31, 1986, petitioner Ace
Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz filed a
motion to dismiss bringing to the trial courts
attention the fact that a criminal action was
pending before another branch of the same
court, and that under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal
Procedure,
the
filing
of
an
independent civil action arising from a quasidelict is no longer allowed. Furthermore, said
defendants alleged that respondents private
counsel actively participated in the criminal
proceedings, showing that the respondent was
in fact pursuing the civil aspect automatically
instituted with the criminal case.
On February 21, 1986, respondent filed
an opposition to the motion arguing that she
was not pursuing the civil aspect in the
criminal case as she, in fact, manifested in
open court in the criminal proceedings that
she was filing a separate and independent civil
action for damages against the accused and
their employers, as allowed under Articles
2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
On February 28, 1986, the trial court
dismissed the action for damages on the
ground that no civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution in a
case for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Respondent Abivas motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal was

also denied by the trial court. She then

elevated the case before the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) by way of a petition for
certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. 09644.
The appellate court reversed the dismissal
order of the trial court. It was then petitioner
Ace Haulers Corporation and Jesus dela Cruzs
turn to appeal the judgment of the IAC before
the Supreme Court. On August 3, 1988, the
Supreme Court issued a resolution denying the
petition for review of Ace Haulers Corp. and
Jesus dela Cruz for failure to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in the questioned error. The
case was remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
In the meantime that the petition for
review was pending before the Supreme Court,
fire razed the portion of the Quezon City Hall
building which housed the trial courts and the
records of the case were among those that the
fire reduced to ashes. It was not until March
26, 1992 that the records of the case was
reconstituted by the trial court.
While the pre-trial proceedings in the
civil action for damages was still being set and
reset upon motion of the opposing parties, on
July 6, 1992, the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 83
rendered judgment in the criminal case,
finding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of both accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela
Cruz for the offense of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide, this Court finds them
guilty of said offense charged and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer and undergo
imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional as minimum to
FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN
(10) DAYS also of prision correccional as
maximum, and to pay the costs.
Accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela
Cruz are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased Fidel O. Abiva, jointly or pro rata, the
amount
of
FIFTY
THOUSAND
PESOS
(P50,000.00) as indemnification for his death
and the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS
(P4,000.00) by way of actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
On March 9, 1993, the pre-trial
conference of the civil case was finally set on
April 6, 1993, and notices thereof were sent to
the parties and their respective counsel. On

the
appointed
date,
however,
no
representative nor counsel for petitioner Ace
Haulers Corporation appeared. Consequently,
upon motion of respondent Abiva, the
petitioner was declared as in default.
Furthermore, defendants Jesus dela Cruz,
Isabelito Rivera and Rodolfo Parma were
discharged as defendants, and the case
against them dismissed.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court
rendered a decision, ruling against petitioner
Ace Haulers Corporation. The trial court
summarized its findings thus:
Hence, Mrs. Ederlinda Abiva as part of
plaintiffs evidence, testified that she is 43
years old, a widow and housekeeper, residing
at Cefels Subdivision, Deparo, Novaliches,
Quezon City. She told the Court that she is the
widow of Fidel Abiva, who died on June 1, 1984
after he was ran over by Isuzu Cargo Truck
Plate No. NWY-T Phil 93 owned and operated
by the defendant Ace Haulers Corporation,
then driven by Jesus dela Cruz and that
because of the death of her husband, she
suffered damages, among which, moral,
exemplary and actual damages for her
expenses and attorneys fees. She claimed that
she is lawfully married to the late Fidel Abiva
as evidenced by their Marriage Contract
(Exhibits A and A-1). Out of their wedlock, (sic)
they begot three (3) children, namely: Noel,
Gina and Argentina with ages 25, 21 and 15,
respectively. Her husband died on June 1, 1984
at around 11:45 p.m. (Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2),
because of the vehicular accident which
involved the wheeler truck of Ace Haulers
Corporation driven by Jesus dela Cruz, a
jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, then driven
by Rodolfo Parma and a motorcycle driven by
her husband. Her husband, after his death,
was autopsied, as reflected in an Autopsy
Report (Exhibit C) and by the Postmortem
Finding (Exhibit C-1). This was also covered by
a police report (Exhibit D) which shows that
Jesus dela Cruz is the driver of the defendant
(Exhibit D-1). This fact is reiterated in a sworn
statement which she executed relative to this
vehicular accident (Exhibit E) wherein the said
driver mentioned and confirmed the name of
his employer (Exhibit E-1). A criminal case was
lodged against the drivers of the two vehicles
and a Decision was rendered thereon in
Criminal Case No. Q-37248 entitled People of
the Philippines versus Jesus dela Cruz and
Rodolfo Parma finding both of them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. (Exhibits F, F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4 and F-5).
This decision has now acquired finality as no

appeal was taken by the accused. It is

established, however, that prior to the filing of
the instant case, Mrs. Abiva pleaded to Ace
Haulers to compensate her for the death of her
husband. But her plea went (sic) to deaf ears.
She was thus constrained to file this case for
damages.
Further testimony of Mrs. Abiva
revealed that before the death of her husband,
he was employed with Philippine Airlines (PAL)
earning P4,600.00.00 a month, as evidenced
by the Pay Statement covering the period of 415-84 in the amount of P2,065.00 (Exhibits G,
G-1, G-2 and G-3); that when he died, he was
only 40 years old and healthy, and that based
on the life history and pedigree of his family
where some of its members lived up to 100
years, she expects her husband to live for no
less than 15 years more and could have
earned no less than P828,000.00 for the
family. But this, her family was deprived,
because his life was snatched away by this
accident while her husband was riding in a
motorcycle which he bought for P11,850.00
(Exhibits H and H-1) which was also totally
wrecked.
Resulting from her husbands death,
Mrs. Abiva told the Court that she incurred
expenses for his burial and funeral in the total
amount of no less than P30,000.00 and for his
wake of six days, in the amount of about
P40,600.00 (Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and
J-6). She also spent around P80,000.00 as
litigation expenses, in her quest for justice
since she has to engage the services of four
(4) counsels from the time of the filing of this
case before the Hon. Miriam DefensorSantiago, then Presiding Judge of this Court
who once dismissed this case, and which led
eventually to an appeal by certiorari which
was later elevated up to the Supreme Court.
(Exhibits K, K-1, K-2, K-3, K-4, K-5 and K-6).
Blaming the defendant, Mrs. Abiva claimed
that had Ace Haulers exercised diligence, care
and prudence in the selection and supervision
of its employees, her husband would have
been spared from this accident. Hence, her
prayer for the award of P200,000.00 for the
death of her husband, who by now, could have
risen in the promotional ladder to a senior
Executive of PAL and could be earning about
P30,000.00 salary per month by now. She
further prays for award of moral damages in
the amount of P200,000.00 exemplary
damages of P100,000.00, attorneys fees of
P50,000.00
and
litigation
expenses
of
P50,000.00.

After the testimony of Mrs. Abiva as the

lone witness for the plaintiff, counsel formally
offered his exhibits and rested his case.
Gathered from the evidence presented,
testimonial and documentary, the Court finds
enough legal and factual basis to grant the
claim for damages by the plaintiff. The
insinuations of negligence on the part of
defendants driver is amply shown as one, who
drove his vehicle fast, impervious to the safety
of life and property of others, his utter lack of
care and caution and his unmitigated
imprudence, rolled into one, all these
predicated the occurrence of this accident
which took away a precious human life.
Whoever by act or omission causes
damages to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x (Article
2176, New Civil Code).
Corollary to this, is the civil law concept that:
The obligations imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those persons
for whom one is responsible (Art. 2180, 1st
paragraph, New Civil Code)
xxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, x x x (Article 2180
paragraph 5, New Civil Code).

WHEREFORE, except for the award of thirty

thousand (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages,
which is hereby set aside, the Decision
appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respect.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.5[5]
The issues raised are whether or not in
an action for damages arising from a vehicular
accident plaintiff may recover damages
against the employer of the accused driver
both in the criminal case (delict) and the civil
case for damages based on quasi delict, but
not recover twice for the same act; (2)
whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
lifting the order declaring petitioner as in
default for failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference; and (3) whether the damages
awarded in the civil case were excessive,
much more than the previous award in the
criminal case.
In Padua v. Robles,5 we held that Civil
liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In
negligence cases, the offended party (or his
heirs) has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for recovery of damages
based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. x x x Article 2177 of the Civil
Code,
however,
precludes
recovery
of
damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission.6

Taken in their appropriate context, and

predicated on the evidence adduced which has
not been evidentiarily traversed by the
defendant, this Court is left to (sic) no other
recourse but to grant the remedies and reliefs
which in her complaint plaintiff prays for, all of
them having been by her adduced evidence,
preponderantly shown and established and out
of which, she has shown herself to be
completely deserving.3[3]
On September 13, 1993, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals.4[4]
On January 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

Consequently, a separate civil action

for damages lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.7

Hence, in this case, respondent Abiva

shall have the choice which of the awards to
take, naturally expecting that she would opt to
recover the greater amount. It has not been
shown that she has recovered on the award in
the criminal case, consequently, she can
unquestionably recover from petitioner in the
civil case.
As to the second issue raised, we find
that petitioner was rightly declared as in
default for its failure to appear during the pretrial conference despite due notice. This is a
factual question resolved by the Court of
Appeals which we cannot review.8
As to the third issue regarding the
award of damages to respondent Abiva, we
find the award of actual damages to be
supported by preponderant evidence. Basic is
the rule that to recover actual damages, the
amount of loss must not only be capable of
proof but must actually be proven with
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or best evidence obtainable
of the actual amount thereof.9 However, there
is no basis for the award of moral damages,
which is hereby deleted. The person claiming
moral damages must prove the existence of
bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for
the law always presumes good faith. It is not
enough that one merely suffered sleepless
nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the
result of the actuations of the other party.
Invariably such action must be shown to have
been willfully done in bad faith or with ill
motive.10
The attorney's fees awarded is reduced to
P20,000.00 which is ten (10%) percent of the
amount of actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the
petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS
the decision of the Court of Appeals, 11 with
modification. The Court deletes the award of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral

7
8
9
10
11

damages, and reduces the attorney fees to

twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
No costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000]

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING

CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for
herself and on behalf of the minors Maria
Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and
Francis Rafael, all surnamed
Dy), Respondents.

FACTS:
The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of transporting beer products
for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short)
from the latters San Fernando, Pampanga
plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon.
Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the
white truck trailer driven by Romeo Dunca y
Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside from the
Corporations memorandum to all its drivers
and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles
before each trip, the SMCs Traffic InvestigatorInspector certified the roadworthiness of this
White Truck trailer. In addition to a professional
drivers license, it also conducts a rigid

examination of all driver applicants before

they are hired.
In the early morning of June 20, 1989,
the White Truck driven by Dunca left
Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando,
Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty
beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right
seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his
truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At
around 4:00 oclock that same morning while
the truck was descending at a slight
downgrade along the national road at Tagaran,
Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged
portion of the road covering the full width of
the trucks right lane going south and about six
meters in length. These made the surface of
the road uneven because the potholes were
about five to six inches deep. The left lane
parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As
narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before
approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw
the Nissan with its headlights on coming from
the opposite direction. They used to evade this
damaged road by taking the left lance but at
that particular moment, because of the
incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This
caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost
control of the wheels and the truck swerved to
the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a
result, Duncas vehicle rammed the incoming
Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the
road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder
where it finally stopped. The Nissan was
severely damaged and its two passengers,
namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr.
died instantly from external and internal
hemorrhage and multiple fractures.
For the funeral expenses of Francisco
Dy, Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00. At the
time of his death he was 45 years old. He was
the President and Chairman of the Board of the
Dynamic Wood Products and Development
Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing
establishment, from which he was receiving an
income of P10,000.00 a month. In the Articles
of Incorporation of the DWPC, the spouses
Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy appear
to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each with
par value of P100.00 per share out of its
outstanding and subscribed capital stock of

60,000 shares valued at P6,000,000.00. Under

its 1988 Income Tax Returns the DWPC had a
taxable net income of P78,499.30. Francisco
Dy, Jr. was a La Salle University graduate in
Business Administration, past president of the
Pasay
Jaycees,
National
Treasurer
and
President of the Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and
1976, respectively, and World Vice-President of
Jaycees International in 1979. He was also the
recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader.
His children were all studying in prestigious
schools and spent about P180,000.00 for their
education in 1988 alone.
The trial court rendered a joint decision
finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Double
Homicide
through
Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in
his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the Court
sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate
penalties of four months and one day of
arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six
months and twenty days as maximum; to
indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the
amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory
damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages,
and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;
Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19424 to pay the defendant therein actual
damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and
Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil
Case No. Br. 19-424.
Petitioner and the accused filed a notice of
appeal from the joint decision. On the other
hand,
private
respondents
moved
for
amendment of the dispositive portion of the
joint decision so as to hold petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to
the private respondents in the event of
insolvency of the accused.
The trial court rendered a supplemental
decision ordering the defendant Reyes
Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all
the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco
Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the

accused but deducting therefrom the damages

of P84,000.00 awarded to said defendant.
Petitioner filed with the trial court a
supplemental notice of appeal from the
supplemental decision. During the pendency of
the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled
to a foreign country. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal of the accused in the
criminal case and rendered an amended
decision affirming that of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the amended decision. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for
review.
ISSUES:
1. May petitioner as owner of the truck
involved in the accident be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the
offended parties in the criminal action against
the truck driver despite the filing of a separate
civil action by the offended parties against the
employer of the truck driver?

2. May the Court award damages to the

offended parties in the criminal case despite
the filing of a civil action against the employer
of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding
that alleged in the information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage
to property?

RULING:
1. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of the accused who has been
adjudged guilty in the criminal case for
reckless imprudence, can not be held
subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the
separate
civil
action
based
on quasi
delict against it. In view of the reservation to
file, and the subsequent filing of the civil
action for recovery of civil liability, the same
was not instituted with the criminal action.
Such separate civil action was for recovery of
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
arising from the same act or omission of the

accused. In negligence cases, the aggrieved

party has the choice between (1) an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
a separate action for quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Once the choice is made, the injured
party can not avail himself of any other
remedy because he may not recover damages
twice for the same negligent act or omission of
the accused. This is the rule against double
recovery.In other words, "the same act or
omission can create two kinds of liability on
the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either
of which "may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the offended party can not
recover damages under both types of liability."
In the instant case, the offended parties
elected to file a separate civil action for
damages against petitioner as employer of the
accused, based on quasi delict, under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael
Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer
of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the
fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law,
this vicarious liability of the employer is
founded on at least two specific provisions of
law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which
would allow an action predicated on quasidelict to be instituted by the injured party
against the employer for an act or omission of
the employee and would necessitate only a
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here,
the liability of the employer for the negligent
conduct of the subordinate is direct and
primary, subject to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee. The enforcement of the
judgment against the employer in an action
based on Article 2176 does not require the
employee to be insolvent since the nature of
the liability of the employer with that of the
employee, the two being statutorily considered
joint tortfeasors, is solidary. The second,
predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal

Code, provides that an employer may be held

subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed
by his employee in the discharge of his duty.
This liability attaches when the employee is
convicted of a crime done in the performance
of his work and is found to be insolvent that
renders him unable to properly respond to the
civil liability adjudged. Pursuant to the
provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when
private respondents, as complainants in the
criminal action, reserved the right to file the
separate civil action, they waived other
available civil actions predicated on the same
act or omission of the accused-driver. Such
civil action includes the recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. The intention of
private respondents to proceed primarily and
directly against petitioner as employer of
accused truck driver became clearer when
they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil
action against the latter based on quasi delict.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and
the trial court erred in holding the accused
civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the
accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising
from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action
as the offended parties in fact filed a separate
civil action against the employer based
on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the
civil action ex delicto.It might be argued that
private respondents as complainants in the
criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a
civil action against the driver (accused) and
manifested that they would pursue the civil
liability of the driver in the criminal action.
However, the withdrawal is ineffective to
reverse the effect of the reservation earlier
made because private respondents did not
withdraw the civil action against petitioner
based on quasi delict.
In such a case, the provision of Rule
111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure is clear that the
reservation to file or the filing of a separate
civil action results in a waiver of other
available civil actions arising from the same

act or omission of the accused. Rule 111,

Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are
the civil actions deemed waived upon such
reservation or filing, and one of which is the
civil indemnity under the Revised Penal Code.
Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically
provides: "A waiver of any of the civil actions
extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of said
civil actions separately waives the others."The
rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of
multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the
offender. The restrictive phraseology of the
section under consideration is meant to cover
all kinds of civil actions, regardless of their
source in law, provided that the action has for
its basis the same act or omission of the
offender. However, petitioner as defendant in
the separate civil action for damages filed
against it, based on quasi delict, may be held
liable thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously
erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint.
And the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial courts decision. Unfortunately private
respondents did not appeal from such
dismissal and could not be granted affirmative
relief.
The Court, however, in exceptional
cases has relaxed the rules "in order to
promote their objectives and assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination
of
every
action
or
proceeding" or exempted "a particular case
from the operation of the rules." Invoking this
principle, we rule that the trial court erred in
awarding civil damages in the criminal case
and in dismissing the civil action. Apparently
satisfied with such award, private respondent
did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil
case. However, petitioner did appeal. Hence,
this case should be remanded to the trial court
so that it may render decision in the civil case
awarding damages as may be warranted by
the evidence.

2. The award of damages in the criminal case

was improper because the civil action for the

recovery of civil liability was waived in the

criminal action by the filing of a separate civil
action against the employer. As enunciated
in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is not
part of the penalty for the crime committed."
The only issue brought before the trial court in
the criminal action is whether accused Romeo
Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage
to property. The action for recovery of civil
liability is not included therein, but is covered
by the separate civil action filed against the
petitioner as employer of the accused truckdriver. In this case, accused-driver jumped bail
pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus,
the judgment convicting the accused became
final and executory, but only insofar as the
penalty in the criminal action is concerned.
The damages awarded in the criminal action
was invalid because of its effective waiver. The
pronouncement was void because the action
for recovery of the civil liability arising from
the crime has been waived in said criminal
action. With respect to the issue that the
award of damages in the criminal action
exceeded the amount of damages alleged in
the amended information, the issue is de
minimis. At any rate, the trial court erred in
awarding damages in the criminal case
because by virtue of the reservation of the
right to bring a separate civil action or the
filing thereof, "there would be no possibility
that the employer would be held liable
because in such a case there would be no
pronouncement as to the civil liability of the
accused. As a final note, the Court reiterate
that "the policy against double recovery
requires that only one action be maintained for
the same act or omission whether the action is
brought against the employee or against his
employer. The injured party must choose
which of the available causes of action for
damages he will bring.

MANSION BISCUIT CORPORATION,

respresented by its president, ANG CHO
HONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
TY TECK SUAN substituted by his heirs,
ROSENDA TY, ELIZABETH TY KOH,
EDWARD TY, EDMUND TY, EDGAR TY,
EVELYN T. LIM, EDWIN TY and EDISON TY,
and SIY GUI, respondents.
G.R. No. 94713 November 23, 1995

FACTS: Sometime in 1981, Ty Teck Suan, as

president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation,
ordered numerous canons of nutria-wafer
biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation,
before the delivery of the goods on November
12, 1981, Ty Teck Suan issued to Ang Cho
Hong, president of Mansion Biscuit Corp., four
postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 as
payment for the nutria-wafer biscuits. Four
other postdated checks in the amount of
P100,000.00 each were issued by Ty Teck Suan
with Siy Gui as Co-signor in December of the
same year. Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corp.
delivered the goods. When the first four
checks were deposited, they were all
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Ang
Cho Hong informed Ty Teck Suan of the
dishonor and requested him to replace the
checks with good cash or good checks. Ty Teck
Suan
failed
to
heed
said
request.
Subsequently, Ty Teck Suan delivered a total of
1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion
Biscuits plus cash advance by Suan and the
amount paid was applied as payment for the
first postdated check. Hong sent Suan a formal
demand letter requesting the latter to make
good the value of the remaining dishonored
checks within five days from the receipt
thereof. Thereafter, the second batch of checks
were issued by Suan and Gui but were all
dishonored again. Mansion Biscuit Corporation
filed a case against Suan and Gui for violation
of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing
Checks
Law)
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Ty
Teck Suan that the subject checks were issued
merely to guarantee or secure fulfillment of
the
agreement
with
the
complaint.
HELD: The court concludes of the abovementioned checks by the accused subject to
these two criminal cases, and their subsequent
dishonor, cannot be considered in violation of
the Batasang Pambansa Blg.22 because one
important element of the offense is missing:
that the check is made or drawn and issued to
apply on account or for value and because
these were issued to guarantee the fulfillment
of an agreement to deliver biscuits by
complaint when accused Suan would place
orders. Accused are hereby declared not guilty
of the offense charged.