II PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT OF SALE

longer necessary. Rodriguez vs. Mactal, 60 Phil. 13, No. 39720

April 4, 1934

1. Rodriguez vs Mactal
2. Rubias vs Batiller
- The appellants insist the administratrix bought indirectly, through
the mediation of S. Ch., the land sold by her to the latter, and that
both sales should be annulled under the provisions of article 1459 of
the Civil Code. The proofs do not substantiate such claim. In order
to bring the sale within the provisions of the above cited article it is
essential that the proof submitted establish some agreement
between the purchaser and the administratrix to the effect that said
purchaser should buy the property for the benefit of the
administratrix. Without said agreement the sale could not be set
aside, and the evidence does not establish such agreement.
- After the amendment of section 714 of the Code of Civil
Procedure by Act No. 3882, the court, under the circumstances
therein mentioned, on application of the executor or administrator,
and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and other persons
interested, may grant him a license to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estate f or the payment of debts. The consent and
approbation, in writing, of the heirs, devisees, and legatees, are no

- The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established

plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal
of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in
question was predicated on the sale thereof made in 1956 by his
father-in-law in his favor at a time when the latter's application for
registration thereof had already been dismissed by the land
registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
With the appellate court's 1958 final judgment affirming the
dismissal of the vendor's application for registration, the lack of any
rightful claim or title of the said vendor to the land was
conclusively and decisively judicially determined. Hence, there was
no right or title to the land that could be transferred or sold by the
vendor's purported sale in 1956 in favor of the plaintiff. Manifestly
then, plaintiff's complaint against defendant, to be declared absolute
owner of the land and to be restored to possession thereof with
damages was bereft of any factual or legal basis.

- Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (like Article 1459
of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain
persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control
either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial
auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators;
(4) public officers and employees; (5) judicial officers and
employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others
specially disqualified by law.
- Castan's rationale for his conclusion that fundamental
considerations of public policy render void and inexistent such
expressly prohibited purchases (e.g. by public officers and
employees of government property intrusted to them and by
justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in
litigation submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491,
paragraphs (4) and (5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines) has
been adopted in a new article of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent
and void from the beginning."

policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or

ratification.
- The permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and
lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases
of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code),
as to whose transactions, its has been opined, may be "ratified" by
means of and "in the form of a new contract, in which case its
validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time of
execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have
ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus,
the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may
have already become lawful at the time of ratification or second
contract; or the service which was impossible may have become
possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have
been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract
would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact
to the date of the first contract.
3. Miguel vs Catalino

- The nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent

and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public

- Rules of Court; Appeal; Effect of direct appeal to Supreme Court

upon findings of fact of trial court.In case of a direct appeal from

the trial court to the Supreme Court and the value of the property
involved in the controversy does not exceed P200,000.00, only
issues of law are reviewable by the Supreme Court, the findings of
fact of the trial court being conceded by the appellant (Jacinto v.
Jacinto, 105 Phil. 1218; Del Castillo v. Guerro, L-11994, 25 July
1960; Abuyo et al. v. De Suazo, L-21202, 29 Oct. 1966; 18 SCRA
600, 601).
- The decision of a barrio council, respecting the settlement of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, is ultra vires because
barrio councils, which are not courts, have 110 judicial powers (Sec.
1, Art. VIII, Constitution. Sec Sec. 12 Rep. Act 2370 otherwise
known as the Barrio Charter). Therefore, said decision, if
introduced as an exhibit, is not admissible in a judicial proceeding
as evidence for ascertaining the truth respecting the fact of
ownership and possession (See. 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court).
- As in De Lucas v. Gamponia. 100 Phil. 277, the four elements of
laches are present in the case at bar, namely: (a) conduct on the part
of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving- rise to
the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (b) delay in asserting the complainant's
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the

defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to

institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to
be barred. In the case at bar, Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the
sale is void for lack of the governor's approval. The vendor, and
also his heirs after him, could have instituted an action to annul the
sale from that time, since they knew of the invalidity of the sale,
which is a matter of law; they did not have to wait for 34 years to
institute suit. The defendant was made to feel secure in the belief
that no action would be filed against him by such passivity, and also
because he "bought" again the land in 1949 from Grace Ventura
who alone tried to question his ownership; so that the defendant will
be plainly prejudiced in the event the present action is not held to be
barred (See Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622; De Lucas v.
Gamponia, supra).
- The defense of laches applies independently of prescription.
Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is
concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with
the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be

enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the

condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription
is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time,
laches is not (30 C.J.S., p. 522, See also Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th ed., p. 177, cited in Nielson & Co., Inc. v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17 Dec. 1966, 18
SCRA p. 1040).
- In the present case, the sale of the land in 1928 by Bacaquio (a
non-Christian inhabitant) to Catalino Agyapao, defendant's father, is
null and void ab initio, for lack of executive approval (Mangayao, et
al. v. Lasud, et al., L-19252, May 29, 1964). The laws applicable to
the said sale are: Section 145 (b) of the Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, providing that no conveyance or encumbrance
of real property shall be made in that department by any nonchristian inhabitant of the same, unless, among other requirements,
the deed shall bear indorsed upon it the approval of the provincial
governor or his representative duly authorized in writing for the
purpose; Section 146 of the same Code, declaring that every
contract or agreement made in violation of Section 145 "shall be
null and void"; and Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, extending

the application of the above provisions to Mountain Province and

Nueva Viscaya.
Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio remained, in
law, the owner of the land until his death in 1943, when his title
passed on, by the law on succession, to his heirs, the plaintiffsappellant's.
Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision,
we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of defendantappellee Florendo Catalino must be sustained. For despite the
invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of defendantappellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess
and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943,
when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding
the deceased, also remained inactive without taking any step to
reivindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was
commenced in court. Even granting appellant's proposition that no
prescription lies against their father's recorded title, their passivity
and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the
defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in
his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must
be considered barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts

cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and
inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and
expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making
improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from
ambush and claim title when the possessor's 'efforts and the rise of
land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense
(De Lucas v. Gamponia, supra).
4. Estate of Serra Serra vs Heirs of Hernaez
- Other than citing general exceptions to the rule requiring a motion
for reconsideration as a pre-condition to instituting a petition for
certiorari, the petitioners did not offer valid reason why their
particular case fall under any of the specified exceptions. The
settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non
condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari. The purpose is to
grant an opportunity to public respondent to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. Petitioners failure to file a
motion for reconsideration deprived the trial court of the
opportunity to rectify an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate
itself of an act unfairly imputed. Besides, a motion for

reconsideration under the present circumstances is the plain, speedy

and adequate remedy to the adverse judgment of the trial court.
- Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners
are Spanish citizens and as such, disqualified from acquiring lands
in the Philippines. As a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire
private lands in the Philippines and the only instances when a
foreigner can own private lands are by hereditary succession and if
he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship. The records are bereft of any showing that
petitioners derived their title by any mode which would qualify
them to acquire private lands in the country. Petitioners bare
allegation that they acquired the subject lots from Salvador Serra
Serra has no probative value lacking sufficient proof that the latter
is not disqualified to own or hold private property and was able to
legally transmit to petitioners title thereto.
- Petitioners alleged possession of TCTs and actual possession of
the subject lands, although strong proof of ownership, are not
necessarily conclusive where the assertion of proprietary rights is
founded on dubious claim of ownership. They claimed that their
title over the subject properties emanated from Salvador Serra
Serra; yet they failed to present in evidence the OCT in the name of

the latter. Since petitioners impugn the proprietary claim of Hernaez

over the properties, the burden rests on them to establish their
superior right over the latter. To recall, the trial court found that the
evidence they presented have not established superior proprietary
rights over the respondents on the subject lots. It held that the nonpresentation of the OCTs cast doubt on the veracity of their claim.
He who asserts must prove.
- It is axiomatic that factual findings of trial courts, when adopted
and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive
and will not be disturbed on appeal. This Court is not a trier of facts.
It is not its function to examine and determine the weight of the
evidence supporting the assailed decision. Moreover, well
entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence that only errors of law
and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
applies with greater force to the petition under consideration
because the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are in full
agreement with what the trial court found.

5. Mapalo vs Mapalo
- When the consent to a contract was fraudulently obtained, the
contract is voidable.
- The rule under the Civil Code, be it the old or the new, is that
contracts without a cause or consideration produce no effect
whatsoever. (Art. 1275, Old Civil Code; Art. 1352, New Civil
Code.) Nonetheless, under the Old Civil Code, the statement of a
false consideration renders the contract voidable, unless it is proven
that it is supported by another real and licit consideration. (Art.
1276, Old Civil Code.)
- The action for annulment of a contract on the ground of falsity of
consideration shall last four years, the term to run from the date of
the consummation of the contract. (Art. 1301, Old Civil Code.)
- A contract that states a false consideration is one that has in fact a
real consideration but the same is not the one stated in the
document. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, Tomo VIII, Vol. II, p. 354.)

- Where there was in fact no consideration, the statement of one in

the deed will not suffice to bring it under the rule of Article 1276 of
the Old Civil Code as stating a false consideration.
- A contract of purchase and sale is void and produces no effect
whatsoever where the same is without cause or consideration in that
the purchase price, which appears thereon as paid, has in fact never
been paid by the purchaser to the vendor.
- The inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable and
cannot be the subject of prescription.
- Purchasers in bad faith of a parcel of land who brought an action
for its recovery from the true owner were held liable to pay
attorneys fees to the latter on his counterclaim.

III SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT OF

SALE
1. Martinez vs CA
- Land registration; Court may not adjudge title over nonregisterable land.The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction

over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers

which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge
the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the
Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of
petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive
period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.
- The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public
properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable of
private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
(Republic vs. Ramona Ruiz, et al., L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23
SCRA 348; Republic vs. Ramos, L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7
SCRA 47.)
- When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications under Republic Act
2056 to order the removal of obstruction to navigation along a
public and navigable creek or river included therein, has been
definitely settled and is no longer open to question. (Lovina vs.
Moreno, L-17821, Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon vs.

Secretary of Public Works & Communications, L-24281, May 16,

1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74.)
- Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the
appellants who were the vendees did not know exactly the condition
of the land that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions
thereon that may be put up by the government in connection with
their project of converting Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond.
Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks
attendant to the sale of said lot. One who buys something with
knowledge of defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that
he acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co., et
al., 37 Phil. 664).

2. Melliza vs City of Iloilo

- The appeal before the Supreme Court calls for the interpretation of
a contract, a public instrument dated November 15, 1932.
Interpretation of such contract involves a question of law since the
contract is in the nature of law as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest.
- The requirement of the law is that a sale must have for its object a
determinate thing and this requirement is fulfilled as long as, at the
time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of
being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further
agreement between the parties (Art. 1273, old Civil Code; Art.
1460, new Civil Code).