G.R. No.

153974 August 7, 2006

MIGUEL BELUSO, NATIVIDAD BELUSO, PEDRO BELUSO, ANGELITA BELUSO, RAMON
BELUSO, and AMADA DANIEL, substituted by her heirs represented by TERESITA
ARROBANG, Petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ), represented by its Mayor, VICENTE B.
BERMEJO, Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with a total area of about 20,424 square meters, covered by
Free Patent Nos. 7265, 7266, 7267, 7268, 7269, and 7270.
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing the
municipal government through the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings.
A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed by the Municipality of Panay (respondent) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The trial court issued an Order appointing three persons as
Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the property.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA claiming that they were denied due
process. Petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Attached Memorandum and the Memorandum itself
where they argued that based on the Petition for Expropriation filed by respondent, such
expropriation was based only on a resolution and not on an ordinance contrary to Sec. 19 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
The CA rendered its Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
Hence, this present petition claiming that respondent is without, lacks and does not have the lawful
power to acquire any or all of the subject properties through eminent domain, it being exercised by
means of a mere resolution, and not through an ordinance as required by law and applicable
jurisprudence.
ISSUE: WON power of eminent domain may be exercised by means of a mere resolution, and not
through an ordinance as required by law and applicable jurisprudence
HELD: NO.
Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain expressly
provides:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent

domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
It is clear therefore that several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain, to wit:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution,
and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. R.A. No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose
and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice.
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property; and the reason for
this is settled:
x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not
for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would
have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In
a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.] 7160
categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. x x x
As respondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such expropriation is
clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the

court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in
contravention of the very law giving it such power.

G.R. No. 175176

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN and SPS.
JULITO QUIMCO and GLORIA CAPIN, Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation duly organized under Philippine laws
and vested with the power of eminent domain by its Charter under Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 938.
Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project (Interconnection Project), petitioner
expropriated several parcels of land in the Municipality of Carmen and City of Danao in
the Province of Cebu, which will be traversed and affected by its transmission towers and lines.
Among the lots affected by the petitioners Interconnection Project were those owned by the
respondents.
The construction of the power lines and transmission towers conducted by the petitioner on
respondents properties were completed in 1996.
Petitioners Interconnection Project affected portions of respondents properties, with a combined
area of 3,199 square meters.
Upon its completion of the construction of the power lines and transmission towers, petitioner
imposed several restrictions upon the respondents on the use of their lands, which included the
prohibition against planting or building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed
by its transmission lines as the high tension electric current passing through said lines pose danger
to life and limbs.
Additionally, respondent-Spouses Quimco, holder of a Small Scale Quarry Permit, Series of 1995,
were also prohibited from continuing their quarry business near petitioners transmission towers
because of the great possibility that the quarry might weaken the foundation of the transmission
towers.
In other words, respondents lost substantial amount of income due to the restriction imposed on their
properties by the petitioner.
Petitioner then paid respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and Spouses Quimco the amounts
of P8,015.90 and P5,350.49, respectively, for the portions of their lots affected by the Interconnection
Project.
Only later did respondents discover that received measly sums compared to what were paid by the
petitioner to the other landowners within their area.
Accordingly, respondents filed a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of
Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs, against
the petitioner before the RTC.

Petitioner, in its Answer, countered that respondents claim for compensation for the full value of their
properties traversed by its transmission lines was repugnant to Section 3-A of its Charter, according
to which, petitioner is obligated only to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value
of the land as just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements.
RTC rendered a Resolution in favor of the respondents. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The RTC issued an Order affirming its Resolution with the modification.
Petitioner appealed the Resolution and the Order of the said trial court to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court rendered a Decision affirming the Resolution, as modified by the Order. Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the appellate courts Decision, but it was denied by the same court
in a Resolution.
Hence, petitioner filed the present Petition.
ISSUE: WON the acquisition of right-of-way easement is tantamount to expropriation, and,
accordingly, the respondents are entitled to the payment of a just compensation and not merely an
easement fee.
HELD: YES.
Petitioner cannot insist that it only acquired an easement of right of way on the properties of the
respondents and that it was liable to pay respondents only an easement fee not exceeding 10% of
the fair market value of the portions of their property actually affected by the Interconnection Project,
pursuant to Section 3-A(b) of its Charter.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over
the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.
After petitioners transmission lines were fully constructed on portions of respondents lots, petitioner
imposed restrictions thereon such as the prohibition against planting or building anything higher than
three meters below the area traversed by said lines. In addition, respondent-Spouses Quimco,
holders of a Small Scale Quarry Permit, Series of 1995, were also prohibited from continuing their
quarry business near petitioners transmission towers because of the great possibility that it could
weaken the foundation thereof. Hence, the respondent-spouses Quimco suffered substantial loss of
income. It is clear then that petitioners acquisition of an easement of right of way on the lands of the
respondents amounted to an expropriation of the portions of the latters properties and perpetually
deprived the respondents of their proprietary rights thereon and for which they are entitled to a
reasonable and just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners
loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby
the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.
As the Court thoroughly explained in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, viz:
The trial courts observation shared by the appellate court show that x x x
While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it

nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as

manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said
transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore,
because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission
lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot
altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants
once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of
their property.
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview
of the power of eminent domain.
The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held that:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon
the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
Having established that petitioners acquisition of right-of-way easement over the portions of
respondents lots was definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain, petitioner then is liable
to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an easement fee.