El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca

Judicial Due Process Requisites

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his
debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he
owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an
instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never
returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about
their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further
orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China.
The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years
thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the
annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio
never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due
process had been met. The requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest

Facts:
1.
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving
sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed
away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share
in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners Lido
Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.
2.
2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner
Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of
Filomena, she leased her share to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986;
that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to
vacate the property despite demands therefor.
3.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of
service, he was not at home as he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since January
19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency.
Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court
with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the
complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to
complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by
the Rehabilitation Committee.]
4.
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in
default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a motion to set
aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This decision became final,
the property was sold in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief
from judgement alleging that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had
been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated December 13, 1988. Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for
certiorari before CA which was also dismissed, including his MR, hence this petition for
review.
Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner
NO. The summon was ineffective. There being no valid substituted service of summons,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In actions in
personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve
the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants dwelling house or residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendants
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
1.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only
when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be
availed of.
2.
The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service
should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service
failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must
be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service
cannot be upheld.
3.
It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted
service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since
service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be
duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional
grounds
4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown
that petitioners brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a
person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioners residence.

RURAL BANK OF BUHI vs CA

Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations

69 Phil. 635 Political Law Constitutional Law Due Process in Administrative Bodies
Remedial Law Civil Procedure Motion For New Trial; Grounds
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number
of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of
said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no
members of the rival labor union (National Workers Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims
that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained
by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but
already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound
by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6)
The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7)
The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.

Vertudes vs Bureau of Immigration

Facts:
Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to review and set aside the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding petitioner guilty
of grave misconduct and dismissing her from government service.
Private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced by petitioner into
paying the total amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa, passport
and other travel documents for Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner Security
Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the amounts of P30,000.00
and P20,000.00, respectively, and cash worth P29,000.00. However, no visa was delivered.
Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her money, to no avail.
Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
recommended her dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open with the BI, wherein Commissioner Rodriguez issued
an order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz.
Subsequently, the assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of Justice
Secretary Serafin Cuevas.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC,[32] raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of
substantial evidence, which dismissed the petitioners appeal.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising the issue: whether or
not the BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due process. the CA dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process
Held:
The petition is denied. She contends that she was denied of her right to a full hearing
when she was not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against her.
The argument is unmeritorious.
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial
litigation is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting
to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he
necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine.
The right to cross-examination being a personal right, petitioner must be deemed to have
waived this right by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and not questioning the
lack of it in the proceedings before the BI.
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. This was clearly satisfied in the case
at bar.

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO vs. JADEWELL PARKING [G.R. No. 160025. April
20, 2005]
On February 9, 2005, this Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing Baguio
City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon, his agents, representatives and/or any person or persons acting
upon his orders or in his place or stead to immediately reopen the streets and/or premises operated
and/or occupied by Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell). They were further directed to
let the said streets and premises remain open until further orders of this Court. However, Jadewell
subsequently informed this Court that, contrary to the representation of Mayor Yaranon and in
violation of the writ (of preliminary mandatory injunction), the parking spaces, roads and streets
operated and/or occupied by Jadewell remained closed. It presented pictures taken on March 1,
2005 showing the continued closure of the parking spaces at Burnham Park and the adjoining Abad
Santos Drive, Lake Drive and Harrison Road. It also submitted affidavits of pay parking customers
attesting to the fact that until now, the parking spaces and streets that Jadewell previously utilized
for pay parking has not been opened. Further, counsel for Jadewell furnished with a copy to the
court of its February 15, 2005 letter to Mayor Yaranon urging the latter to comply with the writ.
Faced with the conflicting manifestations of the parties, this Court directed Judge Iluminada CabatoCortes, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, to determine whether or not
Mayor Yaranon in fact complied with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and to submit a
report thereon.
In her report, Judge Cabato-Cortes attached the written account of Marani S. Bacolod, Sheriff IV of
RTC-Baguio City, Branch 59, which reads:
That on March 21, 2005 at around 2:25 in the afternoon, the Honorable Executive Judge instructed
the undersigned together with Gilbert Evangelista to go to Jadewell Parking Systems particularly
along Harrison and Ganza Areas to verify whether said premises are already open for business, but
it is still closed with G.I. pipe railings measuring about 74 feet at the main entrance and exit; April
4, 2005, the undersigned were again instructed by the Executive Judge to check on the premises of
Jadewell Parking Systems [Corporation], particularly located at the aforementioned areas to find out
whether there were changes in the physical set up but there was none; Judge Cabato-Cortes
personally visited the premises on April 4, 2005. She found that the account of sheriff Bacolod
accurately reflected the actual condition in the said premises. She observed that there were several
policemen posted at the parking area adjacent to Ganza Restaurant. When she interviewed some of
the policemen, they confirmed that the entrance and exit to the parking area were indeed closed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City Mayor of Baguio committed direct and indirect contempt by disobedience
and acting opposition to its authority.
HELD:
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or defiance of the court's orders but also such conduct
as tends to bring the authority of the court arid the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice. Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified
into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge. It can be punished summarily without hearing.If the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court where the proceedings are
pending, it is direct contempt. It is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a judge. Contemptuous statements made in the pleadings filed with the court constitute direct
contempt. Similarly, false or misleading allegations in a pleading or other document filed with the
court having cognizance of the case tending to frustrate the due dispensation of justice constitute
direct contempt. Candidness to the court is essential for the expeditious administration of justice.
Here, Mayor Yaranon misled this Court into believing that he had already obeyed the directive
contained in the writ. The very caption of his paper itself manifested his intention to make believe
that the writ had been fully complied with. It attempted to create the impression that the premises
and streets previously operated by Jadewell were already open pursuant to this Court's order when
in fact they were not. Indubitably, it constituted fraud on the court punishable as contempt.
His continuing refusal to carry out and implement the writ is a willful disregard of and disobedience
to this Court's lawful orders. His defiance controvertibly proves his intention to tie the hands of
justice and prevent it from taking its due course. Hence Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon is
hereby found GUILTY of (1) direct contempt for the falsehood he deliberately foisted on this Court
and (2) indirect contempt for his continued disobedience to and defiance of the writ of preliminary
injunction the court had issued.
DOCTRINE:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; NOTICE AND HEARING; NOT ESSENTIAL TOT HE VALIDITY OF
GENERAL RULES AND REGULATION TO GOVERN FUTURE CONDUCT. Previous notice and hearing as
elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property
rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be
established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise.

Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Jose Luis Alcuaz

180 SCRA 218 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities
as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite
system and ground terminal or terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides
satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later
promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC.
Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to
continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however
directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the
rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said
directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates
for public service communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were
constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the
provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers,
nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that
NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating
a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial
power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by
the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and
reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid
delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative
power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of
the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate,
its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation
of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held
that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard
may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due
process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.

Diosdado Guzman vs National University

142 SCRA 699 Political Law Bill of Rights Due Process Due Process in Educational
Institutions
In 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU)
barred them from enrolling in the said university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was
due to the students fault. It was alleged that Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass
actions within the university premises; that such mass actions were violative of school
policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades; that Guzman et
al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest
of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.
ISSUE: Whether or not National University may not admit the Diosdado Guzman et al in
the case at bar.
HELD: No. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed
which school policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they
may be expelled from. NU failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not
necessarily a trial type one) to determine Guzman et als liability or alleged participation in
the said mass actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others
to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of
disciplinary regulations. Guzman et al were being denied this right, or being disciplined,
without due process, in violation of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools which
provides that no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined
in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only
after due investigation shall have been conducted.
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed sanction upon
the students without due investigation such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process; and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance
of counsel, if desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

. CORONA VS. HARBOR PILOTS

FACTS:
Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPA through
PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92. Providing therein that "all existing regular appointments
which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992
only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1)
year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance."

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the PPA violated the respondents' right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law in
issuing PPA-AO No. 04-92, limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation.

HELD: Yes. UnconstitutionalNo due process of law.

The Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of
property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.

Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . .

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that
such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however,
a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS "requires
that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." PPA-AO No.
04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.

As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only
when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative

functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of
notice and hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.

Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license
especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with
establishment standards." A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or
do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their
compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and
undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner
revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual
cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation.
Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that
period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the
license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily
makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without
due process of law.

United States vs Luis Toribio

Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied
because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the
necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the
other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid
exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for public use, within
the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and
restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of
others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

YNOT VS. IAC

FACTS. RESTITUTO YNOT (petitioner) challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A (Oct. 25, 1980 enacted by Pres.
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power). The said EO prohibits the transportation of carabao and carabeef from one province to
another. Any violation of the said EO will amount to a confiscation of the carabao and carabeef by the government.
YNOT had transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984. The carabao was confiscated by the police station
commander, without giving YNOT any chance to be heard. It was only returned when he had given a superdedeas bond. Hence, the police
confiscated his carabaos.
YNOT argued that the EO is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef. His claim is that the
penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE. WON YNOT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS.
RULING. YES, Ynot was denied due process.
There is substantive due process, when the following requisites are complied:
1.

Lawful subject - it must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference; and

2.

Lawful means - that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

In the case at bar, EO 626-A has a lawful subject.

The carabao, as the poor mans tractor has a direct relevance to the public welfare. The EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or
breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

However, there is no reasonable relation between between the means and the end.

Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. SC believed that the
prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos cannot prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere.

Furthermore, the penalty is outright confiscation of the carabaos, usually by the police only. In relation to US v. Toribio, the statute was
sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by
the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they
are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

There are occasions when the notice and hearing may be dispensed with, such as the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case at bar, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the Ynot's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were
not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution.

To sum up then, SC held that:

1.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.

2.

Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished.

The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment
on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.

LUPANGCO VS. CA
FACTS: PRC issued a resolution directing that no examinee for the CPA Board Exam shall attend any review class, briefing,
conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned
or similars institutions during the 3 days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.
HELD:
Such resolution is unreasonable. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught
committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the
respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and
every examinee during the three days before the examination period.
Administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.
To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view . If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations, as this will infringe n the examinees right to liberty.
Such resolution also violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there.

Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila (20 SCRA 849)

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with
the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:
1. refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on
certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and
the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its
face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and
instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court
reversed and injunction lifted.
City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio
Police Power
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN
FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITAMALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and
hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light
district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they
use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance
is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise
emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local

government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance
was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.