G.R. No.

165748

September 14, 2011

HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely: CONRADO B.

URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B.
URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B.
URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA,
JR., namely: MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA,
EMMANUEL T. URETA, and BERNADETTE T. URETA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO
URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA,
WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F.
URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA
URETA PARADERO, namely: WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U.
PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA, EDNA
P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M.
URETA; HEIRS OF FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely: EDITA T. URETAREYES and LOLLIE T. URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M. URETA; ADELA
URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely:
BENILDA V. URETA, ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA,
and ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA; JORGE URETA;
ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U. TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165930
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO
URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA,
WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F.
URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA
URETA PARADERO, namely: WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U.
PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA, EDNA
P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M.
URETA; HEIRS OF FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely: EDITA T. URETAREYES and LOLLIE T. URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M. URETA; ADELA
URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely:
BENILDA V. URETA, ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA,
and ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA; JORGE URETA;
ANDRES
URETA,
WENEFREDA
U.
TARAN;
and
BENEDICT
URETA,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely: CONRADO B.

URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B.

URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B.
URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA,
JR., namely: MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA,
EMMANUEL T. URETA, and BERNADETTE T. URETA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assail the April 20, 2004 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), and its October 14, 2004 Resolution2 in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 71399, which affirmed with modification the April 26, 2001
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 5026.
The Facts
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children, namely,
Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio,
Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The
children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of
Alfonsos children and their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).
Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several
fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged
in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child
of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead worked on his fathers
lands.
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely,
Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of Liberato.
Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to
reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he
had sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed
four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of
Policronio,4 Liberato,5 Prudencia,6 and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela
Cruz.7 The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of
Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute
in this case.

Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary
consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the
lands and their produce.

On April 26, 2001, the RTC dismissed the Complaint of the Heirs of
Policronio and ruled in favor of the Heirs of Alfonso in a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the

administrator of his fathers estate. He was later succeeded by his sister
Prudencia, and then by her daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a
portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio were
tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the
produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and,
later, to the administrators of his estate.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in

favor of the defendants, hence the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.

Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel
5, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition,8 which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4)
deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronios eldest son, representing the Heirs of
Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his coheirs.
After their fathers death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in
his name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained
a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in
favor of Policronio.
Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned
about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonsos estate when it
was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as
such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of
Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso.
Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of
Documents, Partition, and Damages9 against the Heirs of Alfonso before
the RTC on November 17, 1995 where the following issues were submitted:
(1) whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; (2) whether or not the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid; and (3) who between the parties was
entitled to damages.
The Ruling of the RTC

The counterclaims are likewise DISMISSED.

With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that the Heirs of Alfonso clearly established that the Deed of
Sale was null and void. It held that the Heirs of Policronio failed to rebut the
evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso, which proved that the Deed of Sale in the
possession of the former was one of the four (4) Deeds of Sale executed by
Alfonso in favor of his 3 children and second wife for taxation purposes;
that although tax declarations were issued in the name of Policronio, he or
his heirs never took possession of the subject lands except a portion of
parcel 5; and that all the produce were turned over by the tenants to
Alfonso and the administrators of his estate and never to Policronio or his
heirs.
The RTC further found that there was no money involved in the sale. Even
granting that there was, as claimed by the Heirs of Policronio, 2,000.00
for six parcels of land, the amount was grossly inadequate. It was also
noted that the aggregate area of the subject lands was more than double
the average share adjudicated to each of the other children in the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition; that the siblings of Policronio were the ones who
shared in the produce of the land; and that the Heirs of Policronio only paid
real estate taxes in 1996 and 1997. The RTC opined that Policronio must
have been aware that the transfer was merely for taxation purposes
because he did not subsequently take possession of the properties even
after the death of his father.
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, on the other hand, was declared valid
by the RTC as all the heirs of Alfonso were represented and received equal
shares and all the requirements of a valid extra-judicial partition were met.
The RTC considered Conrados claim that he did not understand the full
significance of his signature when he signed in behalf of his co-heirs, as a
gratutitous assertion. The RTC was of the view that when he admitted to

have signed all the pages and personally appeared before the notary
public, he was presumed to have understood their contents.
Lastly, neither party was entitled to damages. The Heirs of Alfonso failed to
present testimony to serve as factual basis for moral damages, no
document was presented to prove actual damages, and the Heirs of
Policronio were found to have filed the case in good faith.
The Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the Heirs of Policronio appealed before the CA, which rendered
a decision on April 20, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision,
dated 26 April 2001, rendered by Hon. Judge Dean R. Telan of the Regional
Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION:
1.) The Deed of Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta, Sr., dated 25 October
1969, covering six (6) parcels of land is hereby declared VOID for being
ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED;
2.) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated 19 April 1989, is ANNULLED;
3.) The claim for actual and exemplary damages are DISMISSED for lack of
factual and legal basis.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper partition
of ALFONSO URETAS Estate in accordance with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. No costs at this instance.

Policronio, on the other hand, never exercised any rights pertaining to an

owner over the subject lands from the time they were sold to him up until
his death. He never took or attempted to take possession of the land even
after his fathers death, never demanded delivery of the produce from the
tenants, and never paid realty taxes on the properties. It was also noted
that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his
children, as they were, in fact, surprised to discover its existence. The CA,
thus, concluded that Policronio must have been aware that the transfer
was only made for taxation purposes.
The testimony of Amparo Castillo, as to the circumstances surrounding the
actual arrangement and agreement between the parties prior to the
execution of the four (4) Deeds of Sale, was found by the CA to be
unrebutted. The RTCs assessment of the credibility of her testimony was
accorded respect, and the intention of the parties was given the primary
consideration in determining the true nature of the contract.
Contrary to the finding of the RTC though, the CA annulled the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition due to the incapacity of one of the parties to give
his consent to the contract. It held that before Conrado could validly bind
his co-heirs to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, it was necessary that he
be clothed with the proper authority. The CA ruled that a special power of
attorney was required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code.
Without a special power of attorney, it was held that Conrado lacked the
legal capactiy to give the consent of his co-heirs, thus, rendering the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code.
As a consequence, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for
the proper partition of the estate, with the option that the parties may still
voluntarily effect the partition by executing another agreement or by
adopting the assailed Deed of Partition with the RTCs approval in either
case. Otherwise, the RTC may proceed with the compulsory partition of the
estate in accordance with the Rules.

SO ORDERED.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the Deed of Sale was void. It
found the Deed of Sale to be absolutely simulated as the parties did not
intend to be legally bound by it. As such, it produced no legal effects and
did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The CA also noted that
Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the
execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he remained in
possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed their produce until
his death.

With regard to the claim for damages, the CA agreed with the RTC and
dismissed the claim for actual and compensatory damages for lack of
factual and legal basis.
Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were
denied by the CA for lack of merit in a Resolution dated October 14, 2004.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, the Heirs of Policronio argued that the
RTC violated the best evidence rule in giving credence to the testimony of

Amparo Castillo with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale, and that
prescription had set in precluding any question on the validity of the
contract.

collateral attack on the validity of the deed of absolute sale

executed 21 years earlier?
III.

The CA held that the oral testimony was admissible under Rule 130,
Section 9 (b) and (c), which provides that evidence aliunde may be allowed
to explain the terms of the written agreement if the same failed to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto, or when the validity
of the written agreement was put in issue. Furthermore, the CA found that
the Heirs of Policronio waived their right to object to evidence aliunde
having failed to do so during trial and for raising such only for the first time
on appeal. With regard to prescription, the CA ruled that the action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract did not
prescribe under Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Alfonso argued that the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition should not have been annulled, and instead the preterited
heirs should be given their share. The CA reiterated that Conrados lack of
capacity to give his co-heirs consent to the extra-judicial settlement
rendered the same voidable.
Hence, the present Petitions for Review on Certiorari.

The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Alfonso in G.R.

No. 165930 are as follows:
I.

Whether or not grave error was committed by the Trial

Court and Court of Appeals in declaring the Deed of Sale of
subject properties as absolutely simulated and null and
void thru parol evidence based on their factual findings as
to its fictitious nature, and there being waiver of any
objection based on violation of the parol evidence rule.

II.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in holding

that Conrado Uretas lack of capacity to give his co-heirs
consent to the Extra-Judicial Partition rendered the same
voidable.

III.

Granting arguendo that Conrado Ureta was not authorized

to represent his co-heirs and there was no ratification,
whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct
in
ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court
for partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta.

The Issues
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Policronio in G.R. No.
165748 are as follows:
I.

Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the

Deed of Absolute Sale of 25 October 1969 is void for being
absolutely fictitious and in relation therewith, may parol
evidence be entertained to thwart its binding effect after
the parties have both died?
Assuming that indeed the said document is simulated,
whether or not the parties thereto including their
successors in interest are estopped to question its validity,
they being bound by Articles 1412 and 1421 of the Civil
Code?

II.

Whether prescription applies to bar any question

respecting the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
25 October 1969? Whether prescription applies to bar any

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in nullifying

the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition because Conrado Ureta
signed the same without the written authority from his
siblings in contravention of Article 1878 in relation to
Article 1390 of the Civil Code and in relation therewith,
whether the defense of ratification and/or preterition
raised for the first time on appeal may be entertained?

IV. Since the sale in favor of Policronio Ureta Sr. was null and void
ab initio, the properties covered therein formed part of the estate
of the late Alfonso Ureta and was correctly included in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition even if no prior action for nullification of the
sale was filed by the heirs of Liberato Ureta.
IV.

Whether or not the heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. can claim

that estoppel based on Article 1412 of the Civil Code as
well as the issue of prescription can still be raised on
appeal.

These various contentions revolve around two major issues, to wit: (1)
whether the Deed of Sale is valid, and (2) whether the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition is valid. Thus, the assigned errors shall be discussed
jointly and in seriatim.

argue that it was an error on the part of the CA to conclude that ownership
by Policronio was not established by his failure to possess the properties
sold. Instead, emphasis should be made on the fact that the tax
declarations, being indicia of possession, were in Policronios name.

The Ruling of the Court

They further argued that the Heirs of Alfonso failed to appreciate that the
Deed of Sale was clear enough to convey the subject parcels of land. Citing
jurisprudence, they contend that there is a presumption that an instrument
sets out the true agreement of the parties thereto and that it was executed
for valuable consideration,11 and where there is no doubt as to the
intention of the parties to a contract, the literal meaning of the stipulation
shall control.12 Nowhere in the Deed of Sale is it indicated that the transfer
was only for taxation purposes. On the contrary, the document clearly
indicates that the lands were sold. Therefore, they averred that the literal
meaning of the stipulation should control.

Validity of the Deed of Sale

Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale:
(1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it
was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold,
these presumptions infer prima facie the transactions validity, except that
it must yield to the evidence adduced.10
As will be discussed
presumptions.

below,

the

evidence

overcomes

these

two

Absolute Simulation
First, the Deed of Sale was not the result of a fair and regular private
transaction because it was absolutely simulated.
The Heirs of Policronio argued that the land had been validly sold to
Policronio as the Deed of Sale contained all the essential elements of a
valid contract of sale, by virtue of which, the subject properties were
transferred in his name as evidenced by the tax declaration. There being
no invalidation prior to the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,
the probity and integrity of the Deed of Sale should remain undiminished
and accorded respect as it was a duly notarized public instrument.
The Heirs of Policronio posited that his loyal services to his father and his
being the eldest among Alfonsos children, might have prompted the old
man to sell the subject lands to him at a very low price as an advance
inheritance. They explained that Policronios failure to take possession of
the subject lands and to claim their produce manifests a Filipino family
practice wherein a child would take possession and enjoy the fruits of the
land sold by a parent only after the latters death. Policronio simply treated
the lands the same way his father Alfonso treated them - where his
children enjoyed usufructuary rights over the properties, as opposed to
appropriating them exclusively to himself. They contended that Policronios
failure to take actual possession of the lands did not prove that he was not
the owner as he was merely exercising his right to dispose of them. They

The Court disagrees.

The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the CA that
the Deed of Sale is null and void for being absolutely simulated. The Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former
takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter,
when the parties conceal their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative
simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended
for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
Valerio v. Refresca13 is instructive on the matter of simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance
as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic
of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired
or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation
of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is
void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have
given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the
contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively
simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence,
where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation

refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is

absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest.

A: I was near them in fact I heard everything they were talking [about]

Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is

essential to a valid and enforceable contract. 14 Thus, where a person, in
order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a
transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his
title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a
sham.15 Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio
purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer ownership over
the subject lands.

Q: Were there documents of sale executed by Alfonso Ureta in furtherance

of their verbal agreement?

The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is

the intention of the parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene
the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention
is determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but also
from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. 16 The true
intention of the parties in this case was sufficiently proven by the Heirs of
Alfonso.
The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence 17 that the
Deed of Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely simulated Deeds of Sale
which involved no actual monetary consideration, executed by Alfonso in
favor of his children, Policronio, Liberato, and Prudencia, and his second
wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes.
Amparo Castillo, the daughter of Liberato, testified, to wit:
Q: Now sometime in the year 1969 can you recall if your grandfather and
his children [met] in your house?
A: Yes sir, that was sometime in October 1969 when they [met] in our
house, my grandfather, my late uncle Policronio Ureta, my late uncle
Liberato Ureta, my uncle Francisco Ureta, and then my auntie Prudencia
Ureta they talk[ed] about, that idea came from my uncle Francisco Ureta to
[sell] some parcels of land to his children to lessen the inheritance tax
whatever happened to my grandfather, actually no money involved in this
sale.
Q: Now you said there was that agreement, verbal agreement. [W]here
were you when this Alfonso Ureta and his children gather[ed] in your
house?

xxx

A: Yes sir.
Q: To whom in particular did your grandfather Alfonso Ureta execute this
deed of sale without money consideration according to you?
A: To my uncle Policronio Ureta and to Prudencia Ureta Panadero.
Q: And who else?
A: To Valeriana dela Cruz.
Q: How about your father?
A: He has.18
The other Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his children
Prudencia and Liberato, and second wife Valeriana, all bearing the same
date of execution, were duly presented in evidence by the Heirs of Alfonso,
and were uncontested by the Heirs of Policronio. The lands which were the
subject of these Deeds of Sale were in fact included in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition executed by all the heirs of Alfonso, where it was
expressly stipulated:
That the above-named Amparo U. Castillo, Prudencia U. Paradero, Conrado
B. Ureta and Merlinda U. Rivera do hereby recognize and acknowledge as a
fact that the properties presently declared in their respective names or in
the names of their respective parents and are included in the foregoing
instrument are actually the properties of the deceased Alfonso Ureta and
were transferred only for the purpose of effective administration and
development and convenience in the payment of taxes and, therefore, all
instruments conveying or affecting the transfer of said properties are null
and void from the beginning.19
As found by the CA, Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner
even after the execution of the Deeds of Sale. It was undisputed that
Alfonso remained in possession of the subject lands and enjoyed their

produce until his death. No credence can be given to the contention of the
Heirs of Policrionio that their father did not take possession of the subject
lands or enjoyed the fruits thereof in deference to a Filipino family practice.
Had this been true, Policronio should have taken possession of the subject
lands after his father died. On the contrary, it was admitted that neither
Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands from the
time they were sold to him, and even after the death of both Alfonso and
Policronio.
It was also admitted by the Heirs of Policronio that the tenants of the
subject lands never turned over the produce of the properties to Policronio
or his heirs but only to Alfonso and the administrators of his estate. Neither
was there a demand for their delivery to Policronio or his heirs. Neither did
Policronio ever pay real estate taxes on the properties, the only payment
on record being those made by his heirs in 1996 and 1997 ten years after
his death. In sum, Policronio never exercised any rights pertaining to an
owner over the subject lands.
The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete
absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the ostensible buyer
to assert rights of ownership over the subject properties. Policronios failure
to take exclusive possession of the subject properties or, in the alternative,
to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a
clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. 20
It is further telling that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed
of Sale to his children. This, coupled with Policronios failure to exercise any
rights pertaining to an owner of the subject lands, leads to the conclusion
that he was aware that the transfer was only made for taxation purposes
and never intended to bind the parties thereto.
As the above factual circumstances remain unrebutted by the Heirs of
Policronio, the factual findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA,
remain binding and conclusive upon this Court.21
It is clear that the parties did not intend to be bound at all, and as such,
the Deed of Sale produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical
situation of the parties. The Deed of Sale is, therefore, void for being
absolutely simulated pursuant to Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the
beginning:

xxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
xxx
For guidance, the following are the most fundamental characteristics of
void or inexistent contracts:
1) As a general rule, they produce no legal effects whatsoever in
accordance with the principle "quod nullum est nullum producit effectum."
2) They are not susceptible of ratification.
3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot
be waived or renounced.
4) The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute
nullity is imprescriptible.
5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a
person whose interests are not directly affected.22
Since the Deed of Sale is void, the subject properties were properly
included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso.
Absence and Inadequacy of Consideration
The second presumption is rebutted by the lack of consideration for the
Deed of Sale.
In their Answer,23 the Heirs of Alfonso initially argued that the Deed of Sale
was void for lack of consideration, and even granting that there was
consideration, such was inadequate. The Heirs of Policronio counter that
the defenses of absence or inadequacy of consideration are not grounds to
render a contract void.
The Heirs of Policronio contended that under Article 1470 of the Civil Code,
gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except as
it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a
donation or some other act or contract. Citing jurisprudence, they argued
that inadequacy of monetary consideration does not render a conveyance

inexistent as liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract, whereas

fraud or bad faith may render it either rescissible or voidable, although
valid until annulled.24 Thus, they argued that if the contract suffers from
inadequate consideration, it remains valid until annulled, and the remedy
of rescission calls for judicial intervention, which remedy the Heirs of
Alfonso failed to take.
It is further argued that even granting that the sale of the subject lands for
a consideration of 2,000.00 was inadequate, absent any evidence of the
fair market value of the land at the time of its sale, it cannot be concluded
that the price at which it was sold was inadequate. 25 As there is nothing in
the records to show that the Heirs of Alfonso supplied the true value of the
land in 1969, the amount of 2,000.00 must thus stand as its saleable
value.
On this issue, the Court finds for the Heirs of Alfonso.
For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void.
It states that Policronio paid, and Alfonso received, the 2,000.00 purchase
price on the date of the signing of the contract:
That I, ALFONSO F. URETA, x x x for and in consideration of the sum of TWO
THOUSAND (2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to me in hand paid by
POLICRONIO M. URETA, x x x, do hereby CEDE, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, by
way of absolute sale, x x x six (6) parcels of land x x x. 26 [Emphasis ours]
Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by
valuable consideration, the RTC found that there was no money involved in
the sale.27 This finding was affirmed by the CA in ruling that the sale is void
for being absolutely simulated. Considering that there is no cogent reason
to deviate from such factual findings, they are binding on this Court.
It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states that
the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed
of sale is null and void for lack of consideration. 28 Thus, although the
contract states that the purchase price of 2,000.00 was paid by Policronio
to Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been proven that such was
never in fact paid as there was no money involved. It must, therefore,
follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of consideration.
Given that the Deed of Sale is void, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue
on the inadequacy of consideration.

Parol Evidence and Hearsay

The Heirs of Policronio aver that the rules on parol evidence and hearsay
were violated by the CA in ruling that the Deed of Sale was void.
They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso
and, specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a position to prove the terms
outside of the contract because they were not parties nor successors-ininterest in the Deed of Sale in question. Thus, it is argued that the
testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence rule.
Stemming from the presumption that the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties
to the contract, it is also argued that the parol evidence rule may not be
properly invoked by either party in the litigation against the other, where
at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to
the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.29
Their arguments are untenable.
The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the
proper time, as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent,
and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived. In the case
of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the
objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer. 30
In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object to the testimony
of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have waived the benefit
of the parol evidence rule.
Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the testimony of
Amparo Castillo, their argument would still fail.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the

terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. [Emphasis ours]
Paragraphs (b) and (c) are applicable in the case at bench.
The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties was clearly put in issue in the Answer 31 of the Heirs of Alfonso
to the Complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to
lessen the payment of estate and inheritance taxes and not meant to
transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the
court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is
clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears to be on its face. 32
As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it now
prevails over what appears on the Deed of Sale.
The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and
was precisely one of the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution. 33 The
operation of the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid
written agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the
validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract
may be void for lack of consideration. 34 Considering that the Deed of Sale
has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for lack of
consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement.
The Heirs of Policronio must be in a state of confusion in arguing that the
Heirs of Alfonso may not question the Deed of Sale for not being parties or
successors-in-interest therein on the basis that the parol evidence rule may
not be properly invoked in a proceeding or litigation where at least one of
the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written

instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or

assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established
thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then the Heirs of Policronio
would themselves be precluded from invoking the parol evidence rule to
exclude the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso.
Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires that the case
be between parties and their successors-in-interest. 35 In this case, both the
Heirs of Alfonso and the Heirs of Policronio are successors-in-interest of the
parties to the Deed of Sale as they claim rights under Alfonso and
Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding evidence
aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under
two exceptions to the rule, as discussed above.
With respect to hearsay, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the rule on
hearsay was violated when the testimony of Amparo Castillo was given
weight in proving that the subject lands were only sold for taxation
purposes as she was a person alien to the contract. Even granting that
they did not object to her testimony during trial, they argued that it should
not have been appreciated by the CA because it had no probative value
whatsoever.36
The Court disagrees.
It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
cannot be given credence for having no probative value. 37 This principle,
however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to
object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces
of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to
support the fact in issue. In Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED S.A., 38
this Court held:
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an
injunction suit (Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but, when no objection is made
thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves. (Smith v. Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph &
Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should warn of the undesirability of
issuing judgments solely on the basis of the affidavits submitted, where as
here, said affidavits are overwhelming, uncontroverted by competent
evidence and not inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the
allegations of the respondents regarding the multifarious violations of the
contracts made by the petitioner.

In the case at bench, there were other prevailing circumstances which

corroborate the testimony of Amparo Castillo. First, the other Deeds of Sale
which were executed in favor of Liberato, Prudencia, and Valeriana on the
same day as that of Policronios were all presented in evidence. Second, all
the properties subject therein were included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Third, Policronio, during his lifetime,
never exercised acts of ownership over the subject properties (as he never
demanded or took possession of them, never demanded or received the
produce thereof, and never paid real estate taxes thereon). Fourth,
Policronio never informed his children of the sale.
As the Heirs of Policronio failed to controvert the evidence presented, and
to timely object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, both the RTC and the
CA correctly accorded probative weight to her testimony.
Prior Action Unnecessary
The Heirs of Policronio averred that the Heirs of Alfonso should have filed
an action to declare the sale void prior to executing the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition. They argued that the sale should enjoy the presumption
of regularity, and until overturned by a court, the Heirs of Alfonso had no
authority to include the land in the inventory of properties of Alfonsos
estate. By doing so, they arrogated upon themselves the power of
invalidating the Deed of Sale which is exclusively vested in a court of law
which, in turn, can rule only upon the observance of due process. Thus,
they contended that prescription, laches, or estoppel have set in to militate
against assailing the validity of the sale.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.
A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is,
therefore, null and void; in such case, no independent action to rescind or
annul the contract is necessary, and it may be treated as non-existent for
all purposes.39 A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and
effect from the beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and which
cannot be validated either by time or ratification. A void contract produces
no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; it does not
create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers. 40
Therefore, it was not necessary for the Heirs of Alfonso to first file an action
to declare the nullity of the Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition.
Personality to Question Sale

The Heirs of Policronio contended that the Heirs of Alfonso are not parties,
heirs, or successors-in-interest under the contemplation of law to clothe
them with the personality to question the Deed of Sale. They argued that
under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs. Thus, the genuine character of a contract
which personally binds the parties cannot be put in issue by a person who
is not a party thereto. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso were not
parties to the contract; neither did they appear to be beneficiaries by way
of assignment or inheritance. Unlike themselves who are direct heirs of
Policronio, the Heirs of Alfonso are not Alfonsos direct heirs. For the Heirs
of Alfonso to qualify as parties, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, they
must first prove that they are either heirs or assignees. Being neither, they
have no legal standing to question the Deed of Sale.
They further argued that the sale cannot be assailed for being barred
under Article 1421 of the Civil Code which provides that the defense of
illegality of a contract is not available to third persons whose interests are
not directly affected.
Again, the Court disagrees.
Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, x x x
Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third
persons whose interests are not directly affected.
The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not
limited to the parties, as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it
is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract.
Thus, where a contract is absolutely simulated, even third persons who
may be prejudiced thereby may set up its inexistence. 41 The Heirs of
Alfonso are the children of Alfonso, with his deceased children represented
by their children (Alfonsos grandchildren). The Heirs of Alfonso are clearly
his heirs and successors-in-interest and, as such, their interests are directly
affected, thereby giving them the right to question the legality of the Deed
of Sale.
Inapplicability of Article 842

The Heirs of Policronio further argued that even assuming that the Heirs of
Alfonso have an interest in the Deed of Sale, they would still be precluded
from questioning its validity. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso must
first prove that the sale of Alfonsos properties to Policronio substantially
diminished their successional rights or that their legitimes would be unduly
prejudiced, considering that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who
has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided that he does not
contravene the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of
said heirs. Having failed to do so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso
should be precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale.
Still, the Court disagrees.
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

Article 1412 of the Civil Code is as follows:

Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does
not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may
recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
performance of the others undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover
what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of
what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand
the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his
promise.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of
said heirs.

Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because

they refer to contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter. 42 This article
presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious or
simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent. 43 As it has been
determined that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision
cannot apply to it.

This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is

involved in the case at bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of
Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition
substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their
legitimes.

Granting that the Deed of Sale was not simulated, the provision would still
not apply. Since the subject properties were included as properties of
Alfonso in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, they are covered by
corresponding inheritance and estate taxes. Therefore, tax evasion, if at all
present, would not arise, and Article 1412 would again be inapplicable.

Inapplicability of Article 1412

Prescription

The Heirs of Policronio contended that even assuming that the contract
was simulated, the Heirs of Alfonso would still be barred from recovering
the properties by reason of Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which provides
that if the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause does not constitute
a criminal offense, and the fault is both on the contracting parties, neither
may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract or demand the
performance of the others undertaking. As the Heirs of Alfonso alleged
that the purpose of the sale was to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes,
they cannot take from the Heirs of Policronio what had been given to their
father.

From the position that the Deed of Sale is valid and not void, the Heirs of
Policronio argued that any question regarding its validity should have been
initiated through judicial process within 10 years from its notarization in
accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Since 21 years had already
elapsed when the Heirs of Alfonso assailed the validity of the Deed of Sale
in 1996, prescription had set in. Furthermore, since the Heirs of Alfonso did
not seek to nullify the tax declarations of Policronio, they had impliedly
acquiesced and given due recognition to the Heirs of Policronio as the
rightful inheritors and should, thus, be barred from laying claim on the
land.

On this point, the Court again disagrees.

The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.

Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe.
This is one of the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent
contracts.44
As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its
nullity, even if filed 21 years after its execution, cannot be barred by
prescription for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the
defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced. 45
Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from setting up the
defense of its inexistence.
Validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
The Court now resolves the issue of the validity of the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition.
Unenforceability
The Heirs of Alfonso argued that the CA was mistaken in annulling the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition due to the incapacity of Conrado to give the
consent of his co-heirs for lack of a special power of attorney. They
contended that what was involved was not the capacity to give consent in
behalf of the co-heirs but the authority to represent them. They argue that
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not a voidable or an annullable
contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, but rather, it is an
unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under
Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the Civil Code. As such, the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition should not be annulled but only be rendered
unenforceable against the siblings of Conrado.
They further argued that under Article 1317 of the Civil Code, when the
persons represented without authority have ratified the unauthorized acts,
the contract becomes enforceable and binding. They contended that the
Heirs of Policronio ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition when
Conrado took possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him
and his siblings, and when another parcel was used as collateral for a loan
entered into by some of the Heirs of Policronio. The Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition having been ratified and its benefits accepted, the same thus
became enforceable and binding upon them.

The Heirs of Alfonso averred that granting arguendo that Conrado was not
authorized to represent his co-heirs and there was no ratification, the CA
should not have remanded the case to the RTC for partition of Alfonsos
estate. They argued that the CA should not have applied the Civil Code
general provision on contracts, but the special provisions dealing with
succession and partition. They contended that contrary to the ruling of the
CA, the extra-judicial parition was not an act of strict dominion, as it has
been ruled that partition of inherited land is not a conveyance but a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to the land. 46 Therefore, the law
requiring a special power of attorney should not be applied to partitions.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Policronio insisted that the CA
pronouncement on the invalidity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
should not be disturbed because the subject properties should not have
been included in the estate of Alfonso, and because Conrado lacked the
written authority to represent his siblings. They argued with the CA in
ruling that a special power of attorney was required before Conrado could
sign in behalf of his co-heirs.
The Heirs of Policronio denied that they ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition. They claimed that there is nothing on record that establishes that
they ratified the partition. Far from doing so, they precisely questioned its
execution by filing a complaint. They further argued that under Article
1409 (3) of the Civil Code, ratification cannot be invoked to validate the
illegal act of including in the partition those properties which do not belong
to the estate as it provides another mode of acquiring ownership not
sanctioned by law.
Furthermore, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the defenses of
unenforceability, ratification, and preterition are being raised for the first
time on appeal by the Heirs of Alfonso. For having failed to raise them
during the trial, the Heirs of Alfonso should be deemed to have waived
their right to do so.
The Court agrees in part with the Heirs of Alfonso.
To begin, although the defenses of unenforceability, ratification and
preterition were raised by the Heirs of Alfonso for the first time on appeal,
they are concomitant matters which may be taken up. As long as the
questioned items bear relevance and close relation to those specifically
raised, the interest of justice would dictate that they, too, must be
considered and resolved. The rule that only theories raised in the initial
proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should refer to

independent, not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of

action.47
In the RTC, the Heirs of Policronio alleged that Conrados consent was
vitiated by mistake and undue influence, and that he signed the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition without the authority or consent of his co-heirs.
The RTC found that Conrados credibility had faltered, and his claims were
rejected by the RTC as gratuitous assertions. On the basis of such, the RTC
ruled that Conrado duly represented his siblings in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition.
On the other hand, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code, holding that a special power of
attorney was lacking as required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil
Code. These articles are as follows:
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
xxx
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is
transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration;
xxx
(15) Any other act of strict dominion.
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though
there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a
contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in
court. They are susceptible of ratification.
This Court finds that Article 1878 (5) and (15) is inapplicable to the case at
bench. It has been held in several cases 48 that partition among heirs is not

legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of

ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but rather,
it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is
renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which
belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore,
be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of
attorney is not necessary.
In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if
no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum
under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the
heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is
not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely
a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. 49
Neither is Article 1390 (1) applicable. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the
incapacity of a party to give consent to a contract. What is involved in the
case at bench though is not Conrados incapacity to give consent to the
contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403
(1), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code find application to the circumstances
prevailing in this case. They are as follows:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
Art. 1404. Unauthorized contracts are governed by Article 1317 and the
principles of agency in Title X of this Book.
Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers,
shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the
person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party.
Such was similarly held in the case of Badillo v. Ferrer:

The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an

annullable contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390
renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent to the contract or if the contracting partys consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. x x x
The deed of extrajudicial parition and sale is an unenforceable or, more
specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403(1) and 1317 of
the New Civil Code.50
Therefore, Conrados failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his
incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but
rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrados
co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.
A closer review of the evidence on record, however, will show that the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not unenforceable but, in fact, valid,
binding and enforceable against all the Heirs of Policronio for having given
their consent to the contract. Their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.
Regarding his alleged vitiated consent due to mistake and undue influence
to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado testified, to wit:
Q: Mr. Ureta you remember having signed a document entitled deed of
extra judicial partition consisting of 11 pages and which have previously
[been] marked as Exhibit I for the plaintiffs?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Can you recall where did you sign this document?
A: The way I remember I signed that in our house.
Q: And who requested or required you to sign this document?
A: My aunties.
Q: Who in particular if you can recall?
A: Nay Pruding Panadero.

Q: You mean that this document that you signed was brought to your
house by your Auntie Pruding Pa[r]adero [who] requested you to sign that
document?
A: When she first brought that document I did not sign that said document
because I [did] no[t] know the contents of that document.
Q: How many times did she bring this document to you [until] you finally
signed the document?
A: Perhaps 3 times.
Q: Can you tell the court why you finally signed it?
A: Because the way she explained it to me that the land of my grandfather
will be partitioned.
Q: When you signed this document were your brothers and sisters who are
your co-plaintiffs in this case aware of your act to sign this document?
A: They do not know.
xxx
Q: After you have signed this document did you inform your brothers and
sisters that you have signed this document?
No I did not.

51

xxx
Q: Now you read the document when it was allegedly brought to your
house by your aunt Pruding Pa[r]adero?
A: I did not read it because as I told her I still want to ask the advise of my
brothers and sisters.
Q: So do I get from you that you have never read the document itself or
any part thereof?
A: I have read the heading.

xxx
Q: And why is it that you did not read all the pages of this document
because I understand that you know also how to read in English?
A: Because the way Nay Pruding explained to me is that the property of my
grandfather will be partitioned that is why I am so happy.
xxx
Q: You mean to say that after you signed this deed of extra judicial
partition up to the present you never informed them?
A: Perhaps they know already that I have signed and they read already the
document and they have read the document.
Q: My question is different, did you inform them?
A: The document sir? I did not tell them.
Q: Even until now?
A: Until now I did not inform them.52
This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the finding of the RTC that
Conrados explanations were mere gratuitous assertions not entitled to any
probative weight. The RTC found Conrados credibility to have faltered
when he testified that perhaps his siblings were already aware of the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition. The RTC was in the best position to judge the
credibility of the witness testimony. The CA also recognized that Conrados
consent was not vitiated by mistake and undue influence as it required a
special power of attorney in order to bind his co-heirs and, as such, the CA
thereby recognized that his signature was binding to him but not with
respect to his co-heirs. Findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the CA, are binding to this Court.53
Furthermore, this Court notes other peculiarities in Conrados testimony.
Despite claims of undue influence, there is no indication that Conrado was
forced to sign by his aunt, Prudencia Paradero. In fact, he testified that he
was happy to sign because his grandfathers estate would be partitioned.
Conrado, thus, clearly understood the document he signed. It is also worth
noting that despite the document being brought to him on three separate
occasions and indicating his intention to inform his siblings about it,

Conrado failed to do so, and still neglected to inform them even after he
had signed the partition. All these circumstances negate his claim of
vitiated consent. Having duly signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,
Conrado is bound to it. Thus, it is enforceable against him.
Although Conrados co-heirs claimed that they did not authorize Conrado
to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf, several
circumstances militate against their contention.
First, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was executed on April 19, 1989,
and the Heirs of Policronio claim that they only came to know of its
existence on July 30, 1995 through an issue of the Aklan Reporter. It is
difficult to believe that Conrado did not inform his siblings about the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition or at least broach its subject with them for more
than five years from the time he signed it, especially after indicating in his
testimony that he had intended to do so.
Second, Conrado retained possession of one of the parcels of land
adjudicated to him and his co-heirs in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Third, after the execution of the partition on April 19, 1989 and more than
a year before they claimed to have discovered the existence of the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition on July 30, 1995, some of the Heirs of Policronio,
namely, Rita Solano, Macario Ureta, Lilia Tayco, and Venancio Ureta
executed on June 1, 1994, a Special Power of Attorney 54 in favor of their
sister Gloria Gonzales, authorizing her to obtain a loan from a bank and to
mortgage one of the parcels of land adjudicated to them in the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition to secure payment of the loan. They were able to
obtain the loan using the land as collateral, over which a Real Estate
Mortgage55 was constituted. Both the Special Power of Attorney and the
Real Estate Mortgage were presented in evidence in the RTC, and were not
controverted or denied by the Heirs of Policronio.
Fourth, in the letter dated August 15, 1995, sent by the counsel of the
Heirs of Policronio to the Heirs of Alfonso requesting for amicable
settlement, there was no mention that Conrados consent to the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition was vitiated by mistake and undue influence or that
they had never authorized Conrado to represent them or sign the
document on their behalf. It is questionable for such a pertinent detail to
have been omitted. The body of said letter is reproduced hereunder as
follows:
Greetings:

Your nephews and nieces, children of your deceased brother Policronio

Ureta, has referred to me for appropriate legal action the property they
inherited from their father consisting of six (6) parcels of land which is
covered by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 25, 1969. These
properties ha[ve] already been transferred to the name of their deceased
father immediately after the sale, machine copy of the said Deed of Sale is
hereto attached for your ready reference.
Lately, however, there was published an Extra-judicial Partition of the
estate of Alfonso Ureta, which to the surprise of my clients included the
properties already sold to their father before the death of said Alfonso
Ureta. This inclusion of their property is erroneous and illegal because
these properties were covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
their father Policronio Ureta no longer form part of the estate of Alfonso
Ureta. Since Policronio Ureta has [sic] died in 1974 yet, these properties
have passed by hereditary succession to his children who are now the true
and lawful owners of the said properties.
My clients are still entitled to a share in the estate of Alfonso Ureta who is
also their grandfather as they have stepped into the shoes of their
deceased father Policronio Ureta. But this estate of Alfonso Ureta should
already exclude the six (6) parcels of land covered by the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta.
My clients cannot understand why the properties of their late father
[should] be included in the estate of their grandfather and be divided
among his brothers and sisters when said properties should only be divided
among themselves as children of Policronio Ureta.
Since this matter involves very close members of the same family, I have
counseled my clients that an earnest effort towards a compromise or
amicable settlement be first explored before resort to judicial remedy is
pursued. And a compromise or amicable settlement can only be reached if
all the parties meet and discuss the problem with an open mind. To this
end, I am suggesting a meeting of the parties on September 16, 1995 at
2:00 P.M. at B Place Restaurant at C. Laserna St., Kalibo, Aklan. It would be
best if the parties can come or be represented by their duly designated
attorney-in-fact together with their lawyers if they so desire so that the
problem can be discussed unemotionally and intelligently.
I would, however, interpret the failure to come to the said meeting as an
indication that the parties are not willing to or interested in amicable
settlement of this matter and as a go signal for me to resort to legal and/or
judicial remedies to protest the rights of my clients.

Thank you very much.56

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the allegation of
Conrados vitiated consent and lack of authority to sign in behalf of his coheirs was a mere afterthought on the part of the Heirs of Policronio. It
appears that the Heirs of Policronio were not only aware of the existence of
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition prior to June 30, 1995 but had, in fact,
given Conrado authority to sign in their behalf. They are now estopped
from questioning its legality, and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is
valid, binding, and enforceable against them.
In view of the foregoing, there is no longer a need to discuss the issue of
ratification.
Preterition
The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence of the Heirs of
Policronio in the partition or the lack of authority of their representative
results, at the very least, in their preterition and not in the invalidity of the
entire deed of partition. Assuming there was actual preterition, it did not
render the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable. Citing Article 1104 of
the Civil Code, they aver that a partition made with preterition of any of
the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, but the heirs shall be
proportionately obliged to pay the share of the person omitted. Thus, the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not have been annulled by the CA.
Instead, it should have ordered the share of the heirs omitted to be given
to them.
The Heirs of Alfonso also argued that all that remains to be adjudged is the
right of the preterited heirs to represent their father, Policronio, and be
declared entitled to his share. They contend that remand to the RTC is no
longer necessary as the issue is purely legal and can be resolved by the
provisions of the Civil Code for there is no dispute that each of Alfonsos
heirs received their rightful share. Conrado, who received Policronios
share, should then fully account for what he had received to his other coheirs and be directed to deliver their share in the inheritance.
These arguments cannot be given credence.
Their posited theory on preterition is no longer viable. It has already been
determined that the Heirs of Policronio gave their consent to the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and they have not been excluded from it.
Nonetheless, even granting that the Heirs of Policronio were denied their

lawful participation in the partition, the argument of the Heirs of Alfonso

would still fail.

instruments conveying or effecting the transfer of said properties are null

and void from the beginning (Exhs. 1-4, 7-d).58

Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code is as follows:

Considering that the Deed of Sale has been found void and the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition valid, with the consent of all the Heirs of Policronio
duly given, there is no need to remand the case to the court of origin for
partition.1vvph!1

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir
from the inheritance.1wphi1 It consists in the silence of the testator with
regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not
mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in
the will in the latter case. 57 Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary
succession and requires a will. In the case at bench, there is no will
involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.
Remand Unnecessary
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is in itself valid for complying with all
the legal requisites, as found by the RTC, to wit:
A persual of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition would reveal that all the
heirs and children of Alfonso Ureta were represented therein; that nobody
was left out; that all of them received as much as the others as their
shares; that it distributed all the properties of Alfonso Ureta except a
portion of parcel 29 containing an area of 14,000 square meters, more or
less, which was expressly reserved; that Alfonso Ureta, at the time of his
death, left no debts; that the heirs of Policronio Ureta, Sr. were represented
by Conrado B. Ureta; all the parties signed the document, was witnessed
and duly acknowledged before Notary Public Adolfo M. Iligan of Kalibo,
Aklan; that the document expressly stipulated that the heirs to whom some
of the properties were transferred before for taxation purposes or their
children, expressly recognize and acknowledge as a fact that the properties
were transferred only for the purpose of effective administration and
development convenience in the payment of taxes and, therefore, all

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition in

G.R. No. 165930 is GRANTED. The assailed April 20, 2004 Decision and
October 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71399, are hereby MODIFIED in this wise:
(1) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989, is VALID, and
(2) The order to remand the case to the court of origin is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased's estate, the

trial court approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance
with the provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid under the
law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval, and
this Court, on January 31, 1963, reversed the same on the ground that the
validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law,
and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition
be made as provided by said law (G.R. No. L-16749).

G.R. No. L-24365

June 30, 1966

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.

CHRISTENSEN, deceased.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
J. Salonga and L. M. Abellera for oppositor and appellee.
Carlos Dominguez, Jr. for executor-appellee.
M. R. Sotelo for appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the
Philippines, died leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was
admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision
of February 28, 1954. In that same decision the court declared that Maria
Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a
natural child of the deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court,
and was affirmed in its decision of February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484).

On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order
approving the project of partition submitted by the executor, dated June
30, 1964, wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally
between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan),
whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter
(natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after
his death. The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen
Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir
was annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the
deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of
certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the
lower court and distributed to the legatees.
The case is once more before us on appeal, this time by Lucy Duncan, on
the sole question of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies,
should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the
inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced to
the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to
1/4 of the entire estate.
The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others, the following
clauses which are pertinent to the issue in this case:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants
except
my
above-named
daughter,
MARIA
LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now

married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and
paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which
may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
xxx

xxx

xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter,

the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now
residing, as aforesaid, at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of
my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime; Provided, however, that should the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY at anytime prior to her decease having living issue,
then and in that event, the life interest herein given shall terminate, and if
so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY the rest, remainder and residue of my
property with the same force and effect as if I had originally so given,
devised and bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that should the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without living issue, then, and
in that event, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder and
residue of my property one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs.
CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124, Twentieth Street,
Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-half (1/2) to the children of my
deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs. Carol F.
Ruggaver, of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and Joseph Raymond
Christensen, of Manhattan Beach, California, U.S.A., share and share alike,
the share of any of the three above named who may predecease me, to go
in equal parts to the descendants of the deceased; and, provided further,
that should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise C. Borton die before my own
decease, then, and in that event, the share of my estate devised to her
herein I give, devise and bequeath to her children, Elizabeth Borton de
Trevio, of Mexico City Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips, of Bakersfield,
California, U.S.A., and Richard Borton, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., or

to the heirs of any of them who may die before my own decease, share
and share alike.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been
preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in
the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition,
but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which says: "Any
compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied."
Appellant also suggests that considering the provisions of the will whereby
the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to
her a legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime,
she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918,
which reads:
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause
the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of
those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it
may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devices and legacies and
other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not
impair the legitimate.
Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and 918, Helen Garcia
is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that
of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.
Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil Code; and
Article 906 of Article 815. Commenting on Article 815, Manresa explains:
Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede presumirse ignorancia
o falta de memoria en el testador; en el de dejar algo al heredero forzoso
no. Este no se encuentra plivado totalmente de su legitima: ha recibido por
cualquir titulo una porcion de los bienes hereditarios, porcion que no
alcanza a completar la legitima, pero que influeye poderosamente en el

animo del legislador para decidirle a adoptar una solucion bien diferente
de la sealada para el caso de pretericion.
El testador no ha olvidado por completo al heredero forzoso; le ha dejado
bienes; pero haciendo un calculo equivocado, ha repartido en favor de
extraos o en favor de otros legitimarios por via de legado donacion o
mejora mayor cantidad de la que la ley de consentia disponer. El heredero
forzoso no puede perder su legitima, pero tampoco puede pedir mas que la
misma. De aqui su derecho a reclamar solamente lo que le falta; al
complemento de la porcion que forzosamente la corresponde.
... Dejar el testador por cualquier titulo, equivale a disponer en testamento
por titulo de herencia legado o mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de
alguna cantidad o porcion de bienes menos que la legitima o igual a la
misma. Tal sentido, que es el mas proprio en al articulo 815, no pugna
tampoco con la doctrina de la ley. Cuando en el testamento se deja algo al
heredero forzoso, la pretericion es incompleta: es mas formularia que real.
Cuando en el testamento nada se deja el legitimario, hay verdadera
pretericion. (6 Manresa, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 437.)
On the difference between preterition of a compulsory heir and the right to
ask for completion of his legitime, Sanchez Roman says:
La desheredacion, como expresa, es siempre voluntaria; la pretericion
puede serlo pero se presume involuntaria la omision en que consiste en
cuanto olvida o no atiende el testador en su testamento a la satisfaccion
del derecho a la legitima del heredero forzoso preterido, prescindiendo
absoluta y totalmente de el y no mencionandole en ninguna de sus
disposiciones testamentarias, o no instituyendole en parte alguna de la
herencia, ni por titulo de heredero ni por el de legatar o aunque le
mencionara o nombrara sin dejarle mas o menos bienes. Si le dejara
algunos, por pocos que sean e insuficientes para cubrir su legitima, ya no
seria caso de pretericion, sino de complemento de aquella. El primer
supuesto o de pretericion se regula por el articulo 814, y produce accion de
nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo, o de complemento de
legitima por el 815 y solo original la accion ad suplementum, para
completar la legitima. (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2, p. 1131.)
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by
not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not
instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to
him some part of the properties. Manresa continues:

Se necesita pues (a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso; (b)

Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.1wph1.t
xxx

xxx

xxx

B. Que la omision sea completa Esta condicion se deduce del mismo

Articulo 814 y resulta con evidencia al relacionar este articulo con el 815.
El heredero forzoso a quien el testador deja algo por cualquier titulo en su
testamento, no se halla propiamente omitido pues se le nombra y se le
reconoce participacion en los bienes hereditarios. Podria discutirse en el
Articulo 814 si era o no necesario que se reconociese el derecho del
heredero como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvanece esta duda.
Aquel se ocupa de privacion completa o total, tacita este, de la privacion
parcial. Los efectos deben ser y son, como veremos completamente
distintos (6 Manresa, p. 428.)
La privacion de la legitima puede ser total o parcial.
Privar totalmente de la legitima es negarla en absoluto al legitimario,
despojarle de ella por completo. A este caso se refiere el articulo 814.
Privar parcialmente de la legitima, es menguarla o reducirla dejar al
legitimario una porcion, menor que la que le corresponde. A este caso se
refiere el articulo 815. El 813 sienta, pues, una regla general, y las
consecuencias del que brantamiento de esta regla se determina en los
articulos 814 y 815. (6 Manresa p. 418.)
Again Sanchez Roman:
QUE LA OMISSION SEA TOTAL. Aunque el articulo 814 no consigna de
modo expreso esta circunstancia de que la pretericion o falta de mencion e
institucion o disposicion testamentaria a su favor, sea total, completa y
absoluta, asi se deduce de no hacer distincion o salvedad alguna
empleandola en terminos generales; pero sirve a confirmarlo de un modo
indudable el siguiente articulo 815, al decir que el heredero forzoso a quien
el testador haya dejado por cualquier titulo, menos de la legitima que la
corresponda, podria pedir el complemento de la misma, lo cual ya no son
el caso ni los efectos de la pretericion, que anula la institucion, sino
simplemente los del suplemento necesario para cubrir su legitima.
(Sanchez Roman Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 1133.)
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may be
limited only to the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of

the institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to him in the
will "by any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir,
that is, a titulo de heredero? In other words, should he be recognized or
referred to in the will as heir? This question is pertinent because in the will
of the deceased Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as
an heir indeed her status as such is denied but is given a legacy of
P3,600.00.
While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave an affirmative
answer to the question, according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd.
436) and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 937), that view was
changed by Article 645 of the "Proyecto de Codigo de 1851," later on
copied in Article 906 of our own Code. Sanchez Roman, in the citation
given above, comments as follows:
RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO DE LA LEGITIMA. Se inspira el Codigo en
esta materia en la doctrina clasica del Derecho romano y patrio (2); pero
con alguna racional modificacion. Concedian aquellos precedentes legales
al heredero forzoso, a quien no se le dejaba por titulo de tal el completo de
su legitima, la accion para invalidar la institucion hecha en el testamento y
reclamar y obtener aquella mediante el ejercicio de la querella de
inoficioso, y aun cuando resultara favorecido como donotario, por otro
titulo que no fuera el de heredero, sino al honor de que se le privaba no
dandole este caracter, y solo cuando era instituido heredero en parte o
cantidad inferior a lo que le correspondiera por legitima, era cuando
bastaba el ejercicio de la accion ad suplementum para completarla, sin
necesidad de anular las otras instituciones de heredero o demas
disposiciones contenidas en el testamento.
El Articulo 851 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se ajusta a la unica
necesidad que le inspira cual es la de que se complete la legitima del
heredero forzoso, a quien por cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo
que le corresponda, y se le otorga tan solo el derecho de pedir el
complemento de la misma sin necesidad de que se anulen las
disposiciones testamentarias, que se reduciran en lo que sean inoficiosas
conforme al articulo 817, cuya interpretacion y sentido tienen ya en su
apoyo la sancion de la jurisprudencia (3); siendo condicion precisa que lo
que se hubiere dejado de menos de la legitima al heredero forzoso, lo haya
sido en el testamento, o sea por disposicion del testador, segun lo revela el
texto del articulo, "el heredero forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado,
etc., esto es por titulo de legado o donacion mortis causa en el testamento
y, no fuera de al. (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 937.)

Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain

dated January 16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In
each one of those cases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a
legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as
an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other
persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask
that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime
be completed. (6 Manresa, pp. 438, 441.)
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed
wishes of the testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly
from the provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as
his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The
fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is
no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his
lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any
change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy
Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185, is cited by
appellees in support of their theory of preterition. That decision is not here
applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left all his
property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and
(that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he
left nothing to them or, at least, some of them." In the case at bar the
testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a
legacy of P3,600.00.
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399
shares of stocks in the Christensen Plantation Company and a certain
amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia
as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of the
moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is
entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof
subsequently accruing. These include the stock dividends on the corporate
holdings. The contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to
her according to the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would in
effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her
legitime.
One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has
been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of
substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she
should die without living issue. This substitution results in effect from the

fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income
from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living issue,
in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property
will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will. Without
deciding this, point, since it is not one of the issues raised before us, we
might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind of
substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden the
legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the legitime must descend
to the heir concerned in fee simple.
Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving
the project of partition as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set
aside; and the case is remanded with instructions to partition the
hereditary estate anew as indicated in this decision, that is, by giving to
oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no more than the
portion corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of
the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges, which shall
not include those imposed in the will of the decedent, in accordance with
Article 908 of the Civil Code. Costs against appellees in this instance.
Concepcion, C.J., J.B.L. Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, J.P. Bengzon,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
July 30, 1967
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Oppositor-appellant has filed an ex-parte petition dated July 11, 1966,
making reference to an alleged oversight and asking for the corresponding
correction, in the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our decision,
which reads as follows:
One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has
been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of
substituted heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event
she should die without living issue. This substitution results in effect from
the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the
income from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living
issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the
property will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will.
Without deciding this point, since it is not one of the issues raised before

us, we might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind
of substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden the
legitime (Art. 864, Civil Code), which means that the legitime must
descend to the heir concerned in fee simple. (Decision, June 30, 1966,
pages 14-15; emphasis ours).
Oppositor-appellant points out that the matter of substitution of heirs was
taken up and discussed in her brief particularly in pages 28 and 32 thereof.
This is indeed quite true, but the reference to and discussion of the rights
of the substitute heirs (called American heirs in the brief) appears to be
merely for the purpose of refuting the theory advanced by appellees and
not for the purpose of having the rights of said heirs defined in so far as,
under the terms of the will, they may affect the legitime of oppositorappellant. This point of course was not and could hardly have been
squarely raised as an issue inasmuch as the substitute heirs are not parties
in this case. We have nevertheless called attention "to the limitations
imposed by law upon this kind of substitution," because in the brief for
oppositor-appellant, at page 45, she makes the conclusion "that the Last
Will and Testament of Edward E. Christensen are valid under Philippine Law
and must be given full force and effect;" and to give them full force and
effect would precisely affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant.
Wherefore, the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our decision
quoted above is amended by eliminating the following phrase in the first
sentence: "although no reference to it has been made in the brief for
oppositor-appellant."
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez,
JJ.,
concur.
Regala and Castro, JJ., took no part.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the
legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by
the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the
direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence
the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate
and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion
to dismiss.1wph1.t
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to
this Court on appeal.
G.R. No. L-23445

June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962,
single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were
her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6)
brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963,
Instance of Rizal a
on November 17,
prayed that said
administration with

petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First

holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid
1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner
will be admitted to probate and that letters of
the will annexed be issued to her.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The
case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to
an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The
due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the
questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said
court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy therein.1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them,
the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here
on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a
nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of

probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or
nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief
that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. 3 After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the
conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a
study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory,
having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and
bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved
sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In
witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the
law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le
nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le
instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte
alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho
a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por
su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b)
Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear
perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition
of the word annul:

(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code
which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a
reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is
similarly herein copied, thus
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A.

342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony
provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to
nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs.
Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132. 7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va.
283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left
no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus
received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of

preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la

institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento
referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The
one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir
nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It
is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario
Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de
existir, en todo o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el
articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero
en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues,
entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como
especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura
de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que
comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo
universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion
se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814,
al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la
institucion de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no
escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the
entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the
nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854
offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive
meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point,
Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme,
correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of
interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en
algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no
significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha
realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y

consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es

obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que
llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos
sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal
cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado
la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la
voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que
constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo,
reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con
pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues
aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no
autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que
informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en
el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en
regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo
que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that,
annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit
consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will.
Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir
in a will void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted a
share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in
addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him
bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of
heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814,
now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir
"totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and
bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no
se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o
donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the
institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null
and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws
the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This

argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and

disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la
legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by
stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the
other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance
should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the
will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be
labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced
heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally
different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the
Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment
is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions
in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article
918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution
of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited",
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated
yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's
expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in
the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the
other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados,
solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are
entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not
invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to
the extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in
favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated as legado
and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely
reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of
Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs
may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing
the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely
meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining
provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious
legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be
absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be
destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a
failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and
a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is
the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be
observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing
separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate
and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in
said article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of
heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined.
Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special
title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete
nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution
of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for
the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result
is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under
review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17818

January 25, 1967

TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and

Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.
Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in
its Civil Case No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes
and ordering the same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros
Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea by his deceasea wife under the
terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila,
Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as
follows:
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the
barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the share of
plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow of
plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors."
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their
lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila,
Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991,
57403 and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he
left his share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of
plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as
legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew
an nieces The usufruct o the fishpon situate i barrio Sa Roque
Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his
widow, Maria Gerardo I the meantime Maria Gerardo was appointe
administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which
was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros

Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First

Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate
and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a
consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and
secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance
of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any
irregularity in the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria
Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she
had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and
Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she
revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto
alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting
the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud
Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the
decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same. 1
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a
legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant
of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct
to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half
portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of
ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir,
and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby
directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud
acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did
not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire any
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court
declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely
voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs
(now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and
Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the

basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as
follows: .
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so,
has been included, shall be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that
since Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate
under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee
Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that,
as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was
entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and
successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view
of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines
establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its
acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the
beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint but ordered them to return the properties received under the
project of partition previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant
Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied defendant's prayer for
damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil
Code has been misapplied to the present case by the court below. The
reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the
late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant
Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such
had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one,
and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article
1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that
Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her
being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano
Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to
whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on
the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share
smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since
there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. For this
reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all
applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or omission of
children of the testator's former marriage.

Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise

on the civil status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code.
This view is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of
a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of
1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the
condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while
untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the
testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while
a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a
settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a
claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name
implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court
may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the
estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which
each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750;
Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that
judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees.
If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament,
the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had
become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem,
unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of
distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of
the estate of the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of
partition executed by Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who
signed for herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto), and
since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor were any
findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have no greater
validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being
in the nature of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise.
Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of the proposition.
That case is authority for the proposition that a judgment by compromise
may be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in
due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise
agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In the
case before us, however, the agreement of partition was not only ratified
by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so much
so that the titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new

certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before the decree was
attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not apply.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were
shown that the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of
partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could stand, since it
was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the
provisions whereof no objection had been made. In fact it was the court's
duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939, provided: .
SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. When a will is thus allowed, the
court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the
will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall
extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such
estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate
upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law
in cases of estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court
distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said
court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing
upon a like issue, this Court ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports,
pp. 741 and 742:
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally
intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings,
not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well.
As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding
for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction
over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice
prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein
is binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.
156.) "A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests
the title to the land of the estate in the distributees". (Santos vs. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by
analogy, these salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate
proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice

to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which,
if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to
throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in
Reyes vs. Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157),
that:
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed
the partition, and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed
guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the
minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere statement in the
project of partion that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia
Milagros Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean that the
guardian had not yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship
proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a guardianship
proceedings begin with the appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must
have been already appointed when she signed the project of partition.
There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the project of
partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows
that Maria Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project of
partition as guardian of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and,
consequently, no ground for the contention that the order approving the
project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked
collaterally in these proceedings.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only
made a party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the
proceedings through her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the
jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her father's
estate.
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria
Gerardo) could not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her
child, the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and
distribution was a fraud on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the
first place, there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto
was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim
Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was
committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible,
and neither Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held
liable therefor. In the second placegranting that there was such fraud, relief

therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the
record shows that this period had elapsed long ago.
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years
old (Exhibit 24), she became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year,
her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court
decree distributing her father's estate and the four-year period of limitation
started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding
that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946 (Appellee's Brief,
p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action
was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim in
this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced
evidence that appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action
by verbally promising to reconvey the properties received by his deceased
wife, Salud. There is no reliable evidence of the alleged promise, which
rests exclusively on the oral assertions of Milagros herself and her counsel.
In fact, the trial court made no mention of such promise in the decision
under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise was made,
the same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the
real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being
an act of disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards,
being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court
(Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros
Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano
Barretto duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in
its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being contrary to either Article
1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action
to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the statute
of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a
possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the
properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable.
It follows that the plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in
the complaint should have been given due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under
appeal is reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to
reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in
said decision, and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any right of
said appellee to accounting. Let the records be returned to the court of
origin, with instructions to proceed with the action for partition of the

fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the
fruits thereof, as prayed for in the complaint No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez
and Castro, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 4359

September 24, 1908

EMILIO ESCUIN Y BATAC, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO ESCUIN, ET AL., defendants.
JULIA BATAC, appellant.
Rosado, Sanz & Opisso for appellant.
Kincaid & Hurd for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos executed
a will before a notary public of Sevilla, Spain, stating therein that he was a
native of Cavite, the son Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, the
latter being deceased; that he was married about six months previously to
Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and that he had no lawful descendants; the
testator, however, stated in clause three of his will, that in case he has a
duly registered successor, his child would be his sole and universal heir;
but that if, as would probably be the case, there should be no such heir,
then in clause four he named his said father Francisco Escuin, and his wife
Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon and his universal heirs, they to divide the
estate in equal shares between them.
The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899, as certified to by the
Municipal court of Magdalena, Sevilla, on the 20th of March, 1990.

Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners were

appointed to consider claims against the estate, and, according to a report
presented to the Court of First Instance on the 20th of June, 1907, one
claim was allowed amounting to 3,696.50 pesetas.
On the 10th and 12th of July 1907, the attorney for the widow, Ponce de
Leon, and the attorneys who represented the guardian to the minor, Emilio
Escuin y Batac, appealed to the Court of First Instance from the findings of
the aforesaid commissioners.
Matters stood thus, and without there appearing any decision of the court
as to appeals, the attorney for the administrator, by a writing dated the 3d
of September, following, moved for the approval of the proposed partition
of the estate provided for by the court; by the first additional request
(otrosi) he asked that the remuneration for the services of the
administrator of the estate be fixed, and that he be authorized to draw
such amount from the funds of the estate; and by a second additional
request he asked that the accounts made up on the 31st of August,
previous, be approved.
It appears in the proposed partition of the 3d of September, 1906, that,
according to the opinion of the administrator by whom it was signed in the
result of the proceedings, the property left by the estator, in accordance
with
the
accounts
passed
upon
by
the
court,
amounted
to .......................................................... P8,268.02
From said sum the following must be deducted:

The credit above

commissioners

alluded

to

admitted

by

10 per cent renumeration due to the administrator

All legal expenses paid and approved

the

Deducting this amount from the funds of the estate,

there remains a balance of

5,014.81

That the said credit of P1,321.40, equivalent to 3,696.50 pesetas, allowed

by the commissioners, is the claim presented within the legal term against
the estate; that Francisco Escuin, the father of the testator, his wife or
widow, Teresa Ponce de Leon, and his natural child, the minor Emilio Escuin
y Batac, represented by his mother and guardian Julia Batac, are entitled to
the succession; that, by setting aside one-third of the estate in favor of the
natural son, recognized in accordance with article 842 of the Civil Code,
there only remains the question as to how the remaining two-thirds of the
inheritance shall be bestowed, taking into account the directions of the
testator in his will; that the same does not disclose that he had left any
child by his wife; that the latter, as the widow of the testator, besides being
a designated heir entitled to one-half of the hereditary funds, is entitled to
the usufruct of the portion fixed by the law, and that the funds to be
apportioned are composed wholly of cash or ready money.
On these grounds the partition and adjudication was proceeded with of the
sum of P5,014.81 into three shares of P1,671.60 to each one of the parties
in interest, that is, the natural son, Emilio Escuin y Batac, in full control as
general heir; the widow, Teresa Ponce de Leon, as legatee of one-half of
the two-thirds of the funds of free disposition; and the said widow the
usufruct of the other half of the aforesaid two-thirds of free disposition, the
bare ownership of the last third held in usufruct by the widow being
adjudicated to Francisco Escuin, as legatee taking into account the
provisions of article 817 of the Civil Code upon making the division.

P1,321.40

826.80

1,105.01

3,253.21

On the 12th of September, 1906, the representative of the minor natural

child of the testator objected in writing to the partition proposed by the
administrator, and for the reasons he set forth asked that the same be
disapproved, and that in lieu thereof the entire estate be adjudicated to
Emilio Escuin y Batac, the said minor.
Upon a hearing for the approval of the said proposed partition, the
representative of the minor presented as evidence a certified copy of the
complaint, the answer, and the final judgment rendered in civil case No.
3240 of the Court of First Instance.
It appears from the said certified proceedings that the representative of
the minor, as plaintiff therein, asked on the 12th of January, 1905, that an
allowance be granted to him for subsistence for account of the estate of
the late testator, Emilio Escuin de los Santos, and that the same be paid
him monthly in advance; that judgment be entered declaring that the
minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is a natural child of the testator; that the said
minor, as the only natural son of the same is his general heir; that it be

held that the said testator had died without either lawful ascendants or
descendants; that the designation of heirs made under his abovementioned will be declared null and void; and that the defendants be
sentenced to pay the costs in case they did not conform to the complaint,
with any further remedy that the court might consider just and equitable.
The administrator, Ricardo Summers, in answer to the complaint denied all
and every one of the facts alleged in all and every one of its paragraphs.
On the 30th of September, 1905, the court below found that Escuin y Batac
was the recognized natural child of the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos,
had by Julia Batac; that the testator was also the natural son of the
defendant Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, and was recognized
by his father; and that the plaintiff minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is one of
the heirs of the late testator.
By an order of the lower court dated the 30th of October, 1906, and view
of the accounts and proposal of partition presented by the administrator of
the estate, the judge below expressed an opinion that a natural child is
only entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary property, the clause in the will
being annulled only in so far as the amount to be divided should be
reduced, taking into account the share due to the natural son and the right
of the father and the widow of the testator, each to one-half of the
remainder of the property of the estate. The court approved the account
presented, but disapproved the project of partition of the hereditary
property that was objected to by one of the parties and interest. Counsel
for the minor Emilio Escuin y Batac excepted to the above resolution; a
copy of the proceedings was submitted to this court together with the
appeal that was interposed.
On the 10th of July, 1907, the representatives of the administrator, and of
the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, respectively, stated in writing to the
lower court that, in view of the fact that the order of October 30, 1906, did
not constitute a final judgment of partition (since the said proposal having
been rejected, another partition should be effected by commissioners) the
court was requested to appoint commissioners to present a new project of
partition in substitution for the one presented by the administrator, the
new proposal to be submitted to the court for approval.
On the 22nd of August, the attorney for the administrator filed a written
request for the appointment of said commissioners as stated above, and
further requested that the renumeration of the petitioner for his services as
administrator be fixed by the court, and that he be authorized to draw from
the funds of the estate such as sum as might thus be assigned to him.
On the 24th day of said month of August, the court below issued an order
with respect to the forgoing requests and held that, for the reasons stated
in the order, the appointment of commissioners for the mere purpose of
determining what each one of the heirs should receive in accordance with

the order of the 30th of October, 1906, was not necessary, inasmuch as
the property of the estate consisted of ready money, and the administrator
was thereby authorized to distribute the funds among the heirs in the
amount stated in the said order. From this decision the representative of
the minor Emilio Escuin y Batac took exception, and to this effect
presented a bill of errors together with the copy of the proceedings for
review of appeal.
While the appeals interposed against the report and resolution of the
commissioners were still pending in the lower court, the partition of the
hereditary funds could not be ordered, notwithstanding the fact that the
same consisted of ready money, because the amount of the estate subject
to division had not yet been determined in order to comply with the law in
the will of the testator.
Until all the known creditors in the legatees have been paid, it shall be
understood that the estate is under administration, says article 1026 of the
Civil Code, and in conformity with this legal provision the supreme tribunal
has established the doctrine that "only after payment of all obligations of
the estate can the net amount divisible among the heirs be known."
(Decision of March 2, 1896.)
Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure confirms of the provision of the
Civil Code and the legal doctrine mentioned above, inasmuch as it provides
that, after payment of the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of the
administration, and the allowances for the expense of maintenance of the
family of the deceased the court shall assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same, naming the persons and proportions or
parts to which each is entitled, etc.
As to the aforesaid appeals from the resolution of the commissioners,
section 776 of the Code of the Civil Procedure provides that:
Upon the lodging of such appeal with the clerk, the disputed claim shall
stand for trial in the same manner as any other action in the Court of First
Instance, the creditor being deemed to be the plaintiff, and the estate the
defendant, and pleadings as in other actions shall be filed.
So that by reason of the claims made by the creditor of the estate of Emilio
Escuin de los Santos and by her natural son, duly recognize by his father,
an ordinary action should have been brought before the Court of First
Instance, from whose judgement appeal maybe taken to this court by
means of the corresponding bill of exception under the provisions of
section 777 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and while the ultimate decision
in the matter of the said claims against the resolution of the
commissioners has not become final, and until all the obligations of the
estate have been paid, there can really be no inheritance, nor it can be
distributed among the persons interested therein according to the will of
the testator, or under the provisions of the law.

The foregoing refers to the first assigned in the certified copy of the
proceedings and in the brief of the representative of the minor Escuin y
Batac, and also to the questions of the form of procedure.
With respect to the questions which form the basis of this litigation and
refer to the second assignment of errors, it should be noted that the late
testator did not leave a recognized natural child, the appellant minor, and
a widow; that the said minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is the general heir of
his natural father, the said testator who recognized him while living (art.
807, Civil Code), and in the present case is entitled to one-third of his
estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural child (art.
842 of the said code); and for the reason that the minor was ignored by his
natural father in his will, the designation of heirs made therein was, as
matter of fact annulled by force of law, in so far as legal portion of the said
minor was thereby impaired. Legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so
far as they are not illegal, for the reason that a testator can not deprive the
heirs of their legal portions, except in the cases expressly indicated by law
(Arts. 763, 813, 814, Civil Code).
As has been seen, the testator wish to disposed his property in his will,
designating has heirs his natural father, Francisco Escuin, and his wife,
Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, all together ignoring his recognized natural
child who is general heir. In view thereof, and for the reason that he
exceeded his rights, the said designation of heirs became void and so far
as it impaired the right of his general heir and deprived him of his legal
portions; the will, however, is valid with respect to the two-thirds of the
property which the testator freely disposed of. (Arts. 763, 764, 806, 813,
842, Civil Code.)
Notwithstanding the fact that the said designation of heirs annulled and
that the law recognizes the title of the minor, Escuin y Batac, to one-third
of the property of his natural father, as his lawful and general heir, it is not
proper to assert that the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate in
order to establish the conclusion that his said natural recognized child is
entitled to succeed to the entire estate under the provisions of article 939
of the Civil Code, inasmuch in accordance with the law a citizen may die
partly testate and partly intestate (art. 764, Civil Code). It is clear and
unquestionable that it was the wish of the testator to favor his natural
father and his wife with certain portions of his property which, under the
law, he had the right to dispose of by will, as he has done, provided the
legal portion of his general heir was not thereby impaired, the two former
persons being considered as legatees under the will.
The above-mentioned will neither null, void, nor illegal in so far as the
testator leaves two-thirds of his property to his father and wife;
testamentary provisions impairing the legal portion of a general heir shall
be reduced in so far as they are illegal or excessive. (Art. 817, Civil Code.)
The partition of the property of the said testator shall be proceeded within
accordance with the foregoing legal bases.

The record does not show the decision of the commissioners became final
or was consented to by the parties interest, or that this point was alleged
and discussed in the first instance; therefore, such circumstance as alleged
by the appellee can not now be considered.
By virtue of the foregoing considerations it is our opinion that the orders of
the court below, of October 30, 1906, and August 24, 1907, should be
reversed, and upon receipt of a certify copy of this decision the court below
shall take action in accordance with the law and the terms herein
contained with respect to the claims and appeals from the resolution of the
commissioners pending judicial decision. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob,

Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27,
1973 for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970
which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that
she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b)
that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited
from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties
should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties
(Par. IV).

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria
Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN,
respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death
(he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the
conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided
and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised
and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She
disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.
*
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on
the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition
of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The
oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties
which he had received from the testatrix.

Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the
will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into
an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding
notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal
are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12,
1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her
husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an

affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his
opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in
its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument
captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary
Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he
"waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their
six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which
he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal
properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the
affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court
in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing
the probate of the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk
of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.

Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of
June 18, 1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that
she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she
could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine
lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo
Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its order of
October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaa,
Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of
record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for
"leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and
requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that
motion Montaa claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but
also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and
Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaa in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned
the conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes.
He prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the
proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of
the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be
issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in
their comments dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with
the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the
will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be
declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaa, assumed that the
issuance of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed
on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaa and Guyo that the will
was void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for
the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the
intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did
not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice
to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16
in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its
publication be held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified
motion dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower

court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaa had no
authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to
the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty.
Montaa and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaa's
services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the
probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their
repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to
them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for
reconsideration. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29,
1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own
independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty.
Montaa's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity,
and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with
the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing
upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135,
December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 693).1wph1.t
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974
that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18,
1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and
to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his
one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a
will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to
be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792,

Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others
invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the
invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with
the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"
(95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the
conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner
thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code;
Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That
illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept
intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article
1080 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural,
industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the
right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other
children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate
among her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights
and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to
one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right
to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate
may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision
that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would
at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death
unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art.
1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his onehalf share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code)
but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary
rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil
Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and
752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the

widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should
be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is
intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and
partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the
meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children
and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity
to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half
conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity
had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will
without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes
of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the
making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time
of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his
intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a
thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously
believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed,
though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards
becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband
intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in
paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her
half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband,
after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become
valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the
testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will
was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the
direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the
preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the

testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted
(.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His
preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity
to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of
the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in
an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the
probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will.
Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code;
Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs.
Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported
testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has
willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided,
and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be
given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby"
(Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46
SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An
interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes
precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts.
788 and 791, Civil Code).

The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in
his will because any disposition therein is better than that which the law
can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327,
341).
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a
notice to creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been
appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A
notice to creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been
appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that
"immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of administration,
the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims
against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court"
clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular
administrator and not that of a special administrator.
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the
claims against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See.
10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).
We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's
appointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30,
Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion
that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the
decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or
devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge might find
it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should
devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a
sideline the administration of a decedent's estate.

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where

the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy
should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that
sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving
it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754,
762).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974
are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition
for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further
proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion.
Costs, against the private respondents.

As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be

followed and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld
(Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.

which was opposed by the latter, but which the Trial Court granted in its
Order dated April 15, 1970. 1
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S.
GARCIA, respondents.
Benjamin H. Aquino for petitioner.
Alfredo Kallos for respondent

MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:

A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment rendered by the former Court of First
Instance of Albay, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 3956, an action for
Recognition.
On July 7, 1969, Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS),
claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton SOLANO, filed an action
for recognition against him. In his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. On
February 3, 1970, during the pendency of the suit, SOLANO died. Petitioner
ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered substituted for the DECEDENT as the only
surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will and Testament probated on March
10, 1969, or prior to his death, in Special Proceedings No. 842 of the same
Court. ZONIA entered her formal appearance as a "substitute defendant"
on March 4, 1970 claiming additionally that she was the sole heir of her
father, SOLANO, and asking that she be allowed to assume her duties as
executrix of the probated Will with the least interference from the GARCIAS
who were "mere pretenders to be illegitimate children of SOLANO".
On April 6, 1970, the GARCIAS filed their "Reply to ZONIA's Appearance and
Supplemental Cause of Action" impugning the recognition of ZONIA as an
acknowledged natural child with the prayer that she be declared instead,
like them, as an adulterous child of the DECEDENT. ZONIA did not file any
responsive pleading and the case proceeded to trial. The GARCIAS further
moved for the impleading of the SOLANO estate in addition to ZONIA,

In the hearing of May 13, 1970, the Trial Court specified the legal issues to
be treated in the parties' respective Memoranda as: 1) the question of
recognition of the GARCIAS; 2) the correct status of ZONIA, and 3) the
hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated Will. 2
On July 14, 1970, the Trial Court, presided by Judge Ezequiel S. Grageda,
rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which decrees: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiffs
Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S. Garcia and the defendant Sonia Ana
Tuagnon as the illegitimate children of the late Dr. Meliton Solano under the
class of ADULTEROUS CHILDREN, with all the rights granted them by law.
The institution of Sonia Ana Solano as sole and universal heir of the said
deceased in the will is hereby declared null and void and the three (3)
children shall share equally the estate or one- third (1/3) each, without
prejudice to the legacy given to Trinidad Tuagnon and the right of any
creditors of the estate. No pronouncement as to costs.
Appealed to the Court of Appeals by ZONIA, said Court affirmed the
judgment in toto (CA-G.R. No. 49018).
ZONIA seeks a reversal of that affirmance in this petition, which was given
due course.
At the outset, we should state that we are bound by the findings of fact of
both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, particularly, the finding that
the GARCIAS and ZONIA are, in fact, illegitimate children of the DECEDENT.
The oral testimony and the documentary evidence of record inevitably
point to that conclusion, as may be gleaned from the following background
facts: SOLANO, a resident of Tabaco, Albay, married Pilar Riosa. The latter
died. On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly Gorand, who became
his second wife in 1928. The union was short-lived as she left him in 1929.
In the early part of 1930, SOLANO started having amorous relations with
Juana Garcia, out of which affair was born Bienvenido Garcia on March 24,
1931 (Exhibits "A" & "3"); and on November 3, 1935, Emeteria Garcia was
born (Exhibits "B " & "2"). Their birth certificates and baptismal certificates
mention only the mother's name without the father's name. The facts
establish, however, that SOLANO during his lifetime recognized the
GARCIAS as his children by acts of support and provisions for their
education.

In 1935, SOLANO started living with Trinidad Tuagnon. Three children were
born out of this relation but only petitioner ZONIA Ana Tuagnon, born on
July 26, 1941, is living. In her Birth Certificate, her status was listed as
"illegitimate"; her mother as Trinidad Tuagnon; her father as "P.N.C. "
(Exhibit "V"), or "padre no conocido".
During the Japanese occupation, SOLANO obtained a divorce from Lilly
Gorand on November 29, 1943 (Exhibits "R-1" and "S-1"). On December
22, 1943, SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon executed an "Escritura de
Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural" (Exhibit "Q"; "7"), acknowledging
ZONIA as a "natural child" and giving her the right to use the name ZONIA
Ana Solano y Tuagnon. The document was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar on the same date.
On January 18, 1969, SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad y
Testamento" (Exhibit "11"), instituting ZONIA as his universal heir to all his
personal and real properties in Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in the
province of Albay, except for five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco,
Albay, which were given to Trinidad Tuagnon in usufruct Upon SOLANO's
petition (Exhibit "10"), the Will was duly probated on March 10, 1969 in
Special Proceedings No. 842 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch
II, in a Decision also rendered by Judge Ezequiel S. Grageda (Exhibit "12").
As above stated, these facts are not in question.
Petitioner maintains, however, that: t.hqw
I The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring substitute defendant Zonia Ana
Solano, now petitioner, an illegitimate child of the late Dr. Meliton Solano in
an action where private respondents, as plaintiffs in the Court below,
sought recognition as natural children of Dr. Meliton Solano.
II The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the division of the estate of Dr.
Meliton Solano between the petitioner and private respondents, when said
estate is under the jurisdiction and control of the probate Court in Special
Proceedings No. 842.
III The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring nun and void the institution of heir
in the last will and testament of Dr. Meliton Solano, which was duly

probated in special proceedings No. 842 of the Court of First Instance of

Albay, and in concluding that total intestacy resulted there from. 3
Directly challenged is the jurisdiction of the lower Court, in an action for
recognition: 1) to declare ZONIA as an illegitimate child of SOLANO; 2) to
order the division of the estate in the same action despite the pendency of
Special Proceedings No. 842; and 3) to declare null and void the institution
of heir in the Last Win and Testament of SOLANO, which was duly probated
in the same Special Proceedings No. 842, and concluding that total
intestacy resulted.
It is true that the action below was basically one for recognition. However,
upon notice of SOLANO's death, the Trial Court ordered his substitution by
ZONIA, "the only surviving heir ... as of as of now" 4 In her "Appearance of
Substitute Defendant Zonia Ana T. Solano ... Sole and Universal Heir",
ZONIA specifically prayed that she be 6 allowed to assume her duties as
executrix and administratrix of the probated will and testament of the late
Dr. Meliton Solano, under Special Proceedings No. 842, which is already
final and executory, with least interference from the plaintiffs (GARCIAS)
who may be classified for the moment as only pretenders to be illegitimate
children". In other words, ZONIA did not only rely upon SOLANO's Answer
already of record but asserted new rights in her capacity as sole and
universal heir, "executrix and administratrix, "and challenged the right of
the GARCIAS to recognition. Thus, she was not defending the case as a
mere representative of the deceased but asserted rights and defenses in
her own personal capacity. So it was that the GARCIAS filed a "Reply to
Appearance of ZONIA ... and Supplemental Cause of Action ... "vigorously
denying that ZONIA was SOLANO's sole and universal heir; that ZONIA
could not legally be considered as SOLANO's acknowledged natural child
because of a legal impediment; that the admission to probate of SOLANO's
Will was merely conclusive as to its due execution; that the supposed
recognition under a notarial instrument of ZONIA as an acknowledged
natural child was fraudulent and a product of misrepresentation; that
ZONIA's recognition in the Will as an acknowledged natural child is subject
to nullification and that at most ZONIA is, like them, an adulterous child of
SOLANO with Trinidad Tuagnon.
During the trial, the GARCIAS presented evidence to prove their allegations
not only in their main complaint but also in their "Reply to Appearance and
Supplemental Cause of Action". ZONIA presented no objection to the
presentation by the GARCIAS of their oral and documentary evidence and
even cross-examined their witnesses. ZONIA, for her part, presented her
own testimonial and documentary evidence, denied the relationship of the
GARCIAS' to SOLANO and presented the notarial recognition in her favor as

an acknowledged natural child by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon (Exhibit

"Q"). Thus, as raised by the parties in their own pleadings and pursuant to
their respective evidence during the trial, the litigation was converted into
a contest between the GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct
status as heirs and their respective rights as such. No error was committed
by either the Trial Court or the Appellate Court, therefore, in resolving the
issue of ZONIA's status.
ZONIA additionally assails the jurisdiction of the Trial Court in declaring null
and void the institution of heir in SOLANO's will; in concluding that total
intestacy resulted therefrom; and distributing the shares of the parties in
SOLANO's estate when said estate was under the jurisdiction and control of
the Probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 842.
Normally, this would be the general rule. However, a peculiar situation is
thrust upon us here. It should be recalled that SOLANO himself instituted
the petition for probate of the Will during his lifetime. That proceeding was
not one to settle the estate of a deceased person that would be deemed
terminated only upon the final distribution of the residue of the hereditary
estate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have terminated
except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO's death, continued to
file pleadings therein. Secondly, upon motion of the GARCIAS, and over the
objection of ZONIA, the Trial Court ordered the impleading of the estate of
SOLANO and proceeded on that basis. In effect, therefore, the two cases
were consolidated. The records further disclose that the action for
recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) and Spec. Procs. No. 842 were pending
before the same Branch of the Court and before the same presiding Judge.
Thirdly, it is settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as to its
due execution. 5 A probate decree is not concerned with the intrinsic
validity or legality of the provisions of the Will. 6
Thus, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to conclude
that, upon the facts, the GARCIAS and ZONIA were in the same category as
illegitimate children; that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a "natural child" in a
notarial document executed by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon on
December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at the time of her birth in
1941, SOLANO was still married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been
obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not have the legal capacity to
contract marriage at the time of ZONIA's conception, 7 that being
compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact, pretended from SOLANO's
Last' Will and Testament; and that as a result of said preterition, the
institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to
Article 854 of the Civil Code. t.hqw

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in

the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
8

As provided in the foregoing provision, the disposition in the Will giving the
usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land in
Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the Civil
Code, 9 and should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious. 10
So also did the Trial Court have jurisdiction in resolving the issue of the
hereditary shares of the GARCIAS and ZONIA. However, contrary to the
conclusions of the Courts below, holding that the entire Will is void and
intestacy ensues, the pretention of the GARCIAS should annul the
institution of ZONIA as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs
is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid subject to that limitation. 11 It is a
plain that the intention of the testator was to favor ZONIA with certain
portions of his property, which, under the law, he had a right to dispose of
by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the onehalf (1/2) portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of. 12
Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists of one half (1/2) of the
hereditary estate, 13 the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to
participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA's
hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate,
while the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the
value of the estate.
As heretofore stated, the usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the
properties indicated in the Will is valid and should be respected.
The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., 14 reiterating the ruling in Neri, et al.
vs. Akutin, et al., 15 which held that where the institution of a universal heir
is null and void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and
intestate succession ensues, is not applicable herein because in the Nuguid
case, only a one-sentence Will was involved with no other provision except
the institution of the sole and universal heir; there was no specification of
individual property; there were no specific legacies or bequests. It was
upon that factual setting that this Court declared: t.hqw
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question 'a complete
nullity. Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies 'the institution
of heir'. Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for

the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result
is the same. The entire will is null." (at p. 459)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or legacy so that
Article 854 of the Civil Code, supra, applies merely annulling the
"institution of heir".
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court was never questioned before either Court. ZONIA
herself had gone, without objection, to trial on the issues raised and as
defined by the Trial Court. Neither had ZONIA assigned lack of jurisdiction
of the Trial Court as an error before the Appellate Court. She should now be
held estopped to repudiate that jurisdiction to which she had voluntarily
submitted, after she had received an unfavorable judgment, The leading
case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 16 on this point, declared: t.hqw
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question the same jurisdiction. The question whether the court has
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties is not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication but for the reason that such practice cannot be tolerated
obviously for reasons of public policy. After voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.

The record shows that the probate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. 842) was not
one for settlement of estate of a deceased but one instituted by the
testator himself, Dr. Meliton Solano, for the allowance of the will during his
lifetime under Article 838 of the Civil Code. Such allowance was granted
and this terminated the proceeding, although as noted in the Court's
opinion, the parties continued to file some pleadings therein after Dr.
Solano's death. But the issues between the parties as to their status and
hereditary shares in view of the probated will naming petitioner as sole
heir were expressly delineated, tried and determined in the action for
recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) filed by respondents Garcias against their
father Dr. Solano who was substituted by petitioner as defendant (and sole
heir of the estate under the probated will) after his death. In effect,
therefore, the two cases (assuming that the probate proceeding could be
deemed as having continued notwithstanding its termination with the
allowance in vitam of Dr. Solano's will) which were pending before the
same judge and the same branch of the trial court could be correctly said
to have been. consolidated. Finally, petitioner is now stopped, after getting
an adverse verdict, from repudiating belatedly the jurisdiction of the trial
and appellate courts to which she had submitted without question her
cause.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in that the

hereditary share in the estate of the decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T.
Solano is hereby declared to be (1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate,
while that of private respondents, Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S.
Garcia, shall each be (1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the estate. The usufruct in
favor of Trinidad Tuagnon shall be respected. The judgment is affirmed in
all other respects. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON,
respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent.
Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985
(Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings
No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72)
denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial
Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby
ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No
special pronouncement is made as to costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:

Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of

Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984
the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de
Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner
has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a
universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower
court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently
referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court
dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).

On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the
late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29),
on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner
and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion,
Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by
Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27)
with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without
objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on
burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty.
Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition
of the testator's property, the will provided:

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents'

petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate
of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands
and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be
given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age
and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my
brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands,
houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share
shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.

Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this
present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December
18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986
(Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
(Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22,
1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on
September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).

(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon
the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to
probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code

refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not
apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct
line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that
suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the
heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct
intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will.
This is what matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to
file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio
Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore
unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have
been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not;
inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article
854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend
from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise,
even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition
even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

(Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other
respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has
not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 89). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as
if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person
a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted
and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and
the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied
that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que)
no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as
cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
[1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the
legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters
to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any
other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854
of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v.
Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will
the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to
petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the
"Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy
(Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and
devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate,
or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as
a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967).
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee
there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an
individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive
(Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in
the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person

called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of

law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when
the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority
(People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo,
117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308
[1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic
that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the
petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction
Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper
remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not
dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de
Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by
respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides,
129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206
[1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
(Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the
oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs.
On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court,
induced by practical considerations. The Court said:

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the

will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or
nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief
that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable
controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the
petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal
capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the
evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court
upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to
dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.
Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as
on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the
respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the
probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals,
supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It
was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the
reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to
be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the
merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be
intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted
as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private
respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It
would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The

trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the
extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra;
Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable,
the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in
not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and
even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to
the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may
be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and
adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on
August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result on the basic proposition that preterition in this case
was by mistake or inadvertence.
To my mind, an important distinction has to be made as to whether the
omission of a forced heir in the will of a testator is by mistake or
inadvertence, or voluntary or intentional. If by mistake or inadvertence,
there is true preterirton and total intestacy results. The reason for this is
the "inability to determine how the testator would have distributed his
estate if none of the heirs had been omitted or forgotten (An Outline of
Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. III, p. 54).
The requisites of preterition are:

1. The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);

2. The ommission is by mistake or thru an oversight.
3. The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the
will. (111 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225)
(Parenthetical addendum supplied).
On the other hand, if the omission is intentional, the effect would be a
defective disinheritance covered by Article 918 of the Civil Code in which
case the institution of heir is not wholly void but only insofar as it
prejudices the legitime of the person disinherited. Stated otherwise. the
nullity is partial unlike in true preterition where the nullity is total.
Pretention is presumed to be only an involuntary omission; that is, that if
the testator had known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time
of the execution of the will, he would have instituted such heir. On the
other hand, if the testator attempts to disinherit a compulsory heir, the
presumption of the law is that he wants such heir to receive as little as
possible from his estate. (III Tolentino, Civil Code, 1973 Edition, pp. 174175).
In the case at bar, there seems to have been mistake or in advertence in
the omission of the adopted daughter, hence, my concurrence in the result
that total intestacy ensued.

G.R. No. 6878

September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property
classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for
registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares
and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two
applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and
decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on
September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who
was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the
two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without
issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through

inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title

whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german
of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the registration,
claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if
granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in
the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application
appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of
land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be
reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly
in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two
parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration
that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano.
Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives
within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria
Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that
they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is
therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land
in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property
acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is
required by law to reserved.

The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second

assignment of error), and denies that the land which are the subject matter
of the application are required by law to be reserved a contention we
regard as indefensible.

The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed
in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance
was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882,
before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged
right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence,
prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of
their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro
Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his
ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan
had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano
Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in
the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers.
These are admitted facts.

However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be

unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her
son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held
as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of
E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his
heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the
Civil Code:

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without
a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in
article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives
nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law
also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood
relationship.

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his

ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter
acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from
a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and
belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated
that any of these lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in
her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that
demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by
operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the
transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law,
and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec.
334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have
therefore been fully complied with.

If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress
of his property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be
reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion
of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of
the hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may
unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is
established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required
by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to
the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would
not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are
the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved,
because the interested party has not proved that either of them became
her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It
must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by
his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also
presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented
by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the
man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed
to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved,
which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does
not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the
appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his
brother came to my house and said that those rice lands were mine,
because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From
the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and
must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right
required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of

article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be
delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the
right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of
action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her
recording in the property registry the right required by law to be reserved,
in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such
obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of
section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to
the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the
Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only
the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the
prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I
refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to
the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are
entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days,
for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right
of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has
prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved
has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property
registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the
record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for
requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the
Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to
be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property
has not been divested of its character of property required by law to be
reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil
Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not
by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country
by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property
which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of
property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the
Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the
country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country
since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the
Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the
right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by
operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in

the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the
right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right
itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage
the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of
the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels
of land in question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the
right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final
enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined
by this appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is,
how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the
property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the
registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the
allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an
intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in SpanishPhilippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be
out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the
amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and
consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage
Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with
the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1,
1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in
those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and consequently
of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889,
but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in
the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower
contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the
children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the
property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will,
by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable
consideration."

The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the
Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be
applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right
is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children
of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second
marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the
first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has
been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend
to secure the right required to be reserved in the property refer especially
to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby
cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because,
aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such must be
the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in
common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads
the section that deals in general with property required by law to be
reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would
consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the
common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that:
"As the supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code
fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to
which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in
article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general
nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December,
1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved
by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to
institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant
to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has
married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are:
Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal
of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the
assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly
alienated.

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14,
1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which
may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of
the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in
article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an
advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of
the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the
property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by
the person who should legally represent them. In either case the right of
the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the
right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person
obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection
with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for
the property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person
obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties
agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of action to the
guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it
is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted
that such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days
fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of
the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the
obligation of the person who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's
instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the
relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according
to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."

Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says:
"In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190
thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date
of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties
may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in
any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the
expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be reserved, but
really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time,
since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required
by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made
in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may
now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription
against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the
right of action for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly
so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the
proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of
the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place,
because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting
proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the
property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the
present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim
set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in
either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the
registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the
applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the
application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common.
(B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use,
enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these
rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the
person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the
person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The
person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the
first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee

simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief
is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to
the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the
ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is
made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for
registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with
the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible,
although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of
Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of
June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the
usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are
not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive
emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the
property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other
persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now
be maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by
article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere
usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory
has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's
wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title
perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of
ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and
recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title,
is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in
the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant
heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there
should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence
the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would
arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective.

The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant
heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of
disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it
does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in
speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again.
There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish
institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as
owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of
the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the
slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the
usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary
property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance
with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery
thereof except the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the
Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants
who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the
father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of
the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the
latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone
who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever
of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article
9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be
made by the surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be
valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the
first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage
of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether
effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death
no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved,
his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed
without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the
acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue
to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article
109 of this Law says:

The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still

pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the
right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that
right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in
whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the
alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long
as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it
might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should
outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there
would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive him,
and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be
reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but
also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid
when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is respected;
while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will
or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist,
according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference
to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs
that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to
the children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811
says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the
heading, "Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required
by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right
required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives
within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to
them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do
not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy
the things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set
forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and
usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though
conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it
in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt
arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an
opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are

applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in

the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the
relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right
reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article
975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries
with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the
Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the
condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit,
whether or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the
third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence
the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the
property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of
property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it,
the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be reserved,
but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can
give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a
limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their
turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an
expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also
within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve
the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty
required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee
simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by
the death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable,
304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the
right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has,
moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although
under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision
of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of
is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it,
because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to
it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After
the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of
the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no
way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and,
moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple
which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the
person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire
it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the
succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third
degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of
the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights
has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more
than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null
and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of
December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might
pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in
view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved
the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his
dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become
absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of
disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can
be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person
has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the
legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may
ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title
subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only
an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives
within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the property
to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the
object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by
some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained
therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving
the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose
favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be
absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the
present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land
in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is
permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is
authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and
enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the

person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the
usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an
incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits
the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive,
as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the
other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the
rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it;
and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner
and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is
reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely
because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself
alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the
persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto,
provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be
recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the
rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code,
art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same
title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of
being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed that the
alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to
himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply
with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that
is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the
sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a
point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the
same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter
with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the
vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well
from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after
a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the

purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a

right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the
law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the
reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de
retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive;
ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof
decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own
name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to
be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio
Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the
Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral
Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the
appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as
damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any
knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20,
1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale
was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no
right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further alleged
that said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth
being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession
thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense
and counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a
public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of
adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole
surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias
had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment
as follows:

G.R. No. L-12957

March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring

(1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff
spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the
reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid
title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and
must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving
relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of
December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal,
their principal contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in
holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a
reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by
Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as
reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.

DIZON, J.:
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring
null and void the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa
Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and
Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son
named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the
properties left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which does not
clearly appear of record were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to
Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern
portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result
of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275
covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco
was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him,
declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the
taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29,
1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as
his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for
and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in
question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from
Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original
Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter
refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the
cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina
Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared
the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn,
declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the
issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 &
5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the
land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by
operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death,
unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his
mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to
reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record
discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13,
1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only
on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the
reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the

ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death,
of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court
has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal
title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory
condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that
he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists,
the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the
survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso
vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore,
subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire
ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being
survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much
as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion
becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of
appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject
matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve
instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right
which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee
only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In
the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when
Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former
became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's
death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior
to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory
condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in
so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not
appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed,
with costs, and without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia
spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the
reconveyance of the property in question.

Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L., Barrera and Paredes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14856

November 15, 1919

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband
Simeon Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and
Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad
litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and
guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the
surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the
minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband,
alleging as follows:

That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de
Leon; that during the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan,
Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the
surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the
second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children,
Mercedes and Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was
survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first
above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the
following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children,
Juan, Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants or
descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the
legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the
children of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes,
Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now
deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are
the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his
universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III
and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the
paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his
children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to
Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the
letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of
silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and
other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage,
died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his
property described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon
died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal
heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir,
said daughter took possession of all the property left at the death of her
mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property,
described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited
from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property;
that, as a reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had

been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described in the
complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said
complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property
described therein, either by direct participation or by representation, in the
manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the
defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property;
that without any justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do
refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years
Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned,
360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at
four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in
the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fiftyeight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight
centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the aforementioned reservable
property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be
declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the
plaintiffs had and do have a right to the same, in the quantity and
proportion mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint;
that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to
deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay
and of the corn above mentioned, or their value; and that they be
condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000)
together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging
that the cause of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina
Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son
Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary,
it is to be presumed that the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry
after the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right
claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the
following articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that
the object of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the
transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous to the family of
the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz
de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property
which originated from his father and her husband) has all passed into the
hands of the defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of
the common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left

at the death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did
not pass after the death of his mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an
ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property having been
inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother
(Severina), article 811 of the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the
present case because, when the defendant Mercedes, by operation law,
entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully
inherited from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while in
the possession of her mother, lost the character of reservable property
there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz de Leon with the right to
succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the
law whereby said property may not passed into the possession of strangers
are void, inasmuch as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same,
as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de
Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the
plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the
death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that the
obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting the legitime;
that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty bound
to respect the legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her
obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of
the legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of these
statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911;
that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the
plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right
to succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by her
legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a better right than the
plaintiffs; and that there would be injustice if the property claimed be
adjudicated to the plaintiffs, as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones
Law which invalidates any law depriving any person of an equal protection.
Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against
the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved
the defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the
costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to
grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected
thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed,
certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the
complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend

their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules undoubtedly

believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts
constituting the cause of action, and that, as both parties were agreed as
to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in the demurrer, every
question reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the decision
of the court the said judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure
established by law, decided the case by absolving the defendants from the
complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the
instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of
answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a
demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do
not constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve
the defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing
the same, because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy
between the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer
would be the same which the defendants would allege in their answer
those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would have to
decide and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs
should insist they could do no less upon alleging the same facts as
those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were afterwards
set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against
the plaintiffs in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case
that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to bring the action stated in
their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not
necessary as in this case what has been done does not prejudice the
parties the appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according
to its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable
to the question of law in controversy so that unnecessary delay and
greater expense may be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary
proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the
manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and
conscientiously formed for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in
their favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the
same article is applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is
necessary to determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5
of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether
in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina
Faz de Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who

inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the
death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and
reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her
aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by
the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de
Leon two children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino
and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death
of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded
to the inheritance he left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III,
was given, as his share, the aforementioned property enumerated in the
complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and
was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who
inherited the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908,
instituted by will as her sole heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes
Florentino, the defendant herein, who took possession of all property left
by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said
inheritance is the property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the
death of the said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said property,
together with her own, to her only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes
Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its reservable nature
inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the litigants,
Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by
same (by operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant,
Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now
claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his
aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although
said property was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of the Civil
Code, to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives,
within the third degree, of the line from which such property came.

According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable

property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said
law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain
designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists,
(taking into consideration the nature of the line from which such property
came) acquire the ownership of said property in fact and by operation of
law in the same manner as forced heirs (because they are also such)
said property reverts to said line as long as the aforementioned persons
who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right of
reservatarios (person for whom property is reserved), and are relatives,
within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the reservable
property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there
are living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a
life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is,
however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable
property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the
Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of
the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law,
and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can
transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs.
This property has now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining
thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged
within the third degree to the line from which such property
came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code
in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third
degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore,
relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. These reservatarios have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said
deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with
article 811 of the Civil Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs
Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first
marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon,
Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that
the same have the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose
Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the
legitimate children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the
daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the
right of their aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and
Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate father Pedro
Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other children of
the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died
without issue so that this decision does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable
property left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first
marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose,
Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve children
respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage.
All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son,
Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his halfbrothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the
children of his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within
the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the
property which came from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to
Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by
inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.

In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the
trial judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that
of the defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground
that said article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as
the defendant Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from
whom the reservable property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant
Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her
forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her
mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother
Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was thereby
complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the
same line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and
that the hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to
acquire the property of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into
existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such
property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811
of the Civil Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and
that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case
would be permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced
legitimate which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
in violation of the precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides
that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the
cases expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any
burden, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the
provisions concerning the usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly
in determining whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the
character of reservable property when it was received by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint
came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio
Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same
passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with
the provision of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same
should not fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of person other than those comprehended

within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II,
the source of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the
character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon
inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the
dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary
with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such
reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree,
among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion
of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant,
therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become the
legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that
all the relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case
said reservable property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all
her own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino,
as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the
reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever
provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers
and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void,
inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the right of
usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same
to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes
Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of
law, that by operation of law all of the reservable property, received during
lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or
forms parts of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said
property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive property of
Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced heiress, the
defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and in
accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other
relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as
herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of
Mercedes Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina
Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the application of article
811 of the Code to the instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the
defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only
of the reservable property, there being no lawful or just reason which

serves as real foundation to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other

relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property
in question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an
indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why
their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be granted
equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her
daughter Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio
III lost the character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the
mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve
same for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III,
is evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has been already stated, the
reservable property, left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her
only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her
death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a
forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of
her obligation to reserve the property which she received from her
deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held
before the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista
Severina, took possession of the property in question, same did not pass
into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is
not the only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and
upon the principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers
and nephews, relatives within the third degree in accordance with the
precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of
the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the
Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles
811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant
case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held
that the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and
said article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed
rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the
reservable property belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of,
the reservista, there being relatives within the third degree of the person
from whom same came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of

the forced heiress of the deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime
of the former; and that the said forced heiress, in addition to being a
reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of said property and to
deprive the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of
certain portions thereof.
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for
damages and the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant
the first for there is no evidence of any damage which can give rise to the
obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits
produced by the land forming the principal part of the reservable property,
the defendants are undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs
six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the portions of land claimed in the
complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from
January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining
seventh part should go to the defendant Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of
decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the
aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon
from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the
plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third
degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the
defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that
the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to
the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said
portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918,
until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one thousand pesos
(P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as
to the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G. R. No. L-11960, December 27, 1958

DIONISIA PADURA, ET AL. , PETITIONERSAPPELLEES, VERSUS MELANIA
BALDOVINO, ET AL., OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in its Special Proceedings No. 4551. The facts are
simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during
his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child whom
they named Manuel Padura, and with his second, Benita Garing; he had
two children named Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura. Agustin
Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly
probated in Special Proceedings No, 664 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his children, Manuel,
Candelaria and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under
the probate proceedings, Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of land
covered under Decree No. 25960 issued In Land Registration Case No. 86
G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of this appeal.
Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having
executed a will; and not having any issue, the said parcels of land were
inheritedexclusively by her mother, Benita Garing. She applied for and
later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to
the condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property
came, in accordance with the applicable provision of law, under a decree of
the court dated August 25, 1916, in Land Registration Case No. G. L. R. O.
No. 10818. On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only
heirs, her four legitimate children, the appellants herein, Cristeta, Melania,
Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino, Six years later, on October 6,
1940, Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate children,
Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all
surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15, 1952,
appellants and appellees took possession of the reservable properties. In a
resolution, dated August 1, 1953, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in
Special Proceedings No. 4551, the legitimate children of the deceased
Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were declared to be the rightful
reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original
reserveess Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura, having predeceased the

reservista). The instant petition, dated October 22, 1956, filed by

appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned, such that
one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the
appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right of representation
from their respective parents, the original reservees. To this petition,
appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the
eleven reservees) be deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which,
they claim, each should have an equal share.
Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered judgment
declaring all the reservees (without distinction) "co-owners, pro-indiviso,
equal shares of the parcels of land subject matter of the suit.
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserve
troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista,
and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant
(prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be
apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole
blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable character of
the property under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of the Code of
1889) the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share
twice as large as that of the others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on
intestate succession.
"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together
with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a
share double that of the latter.(949)n
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed
per capita or per stripes, in accordance with the rules laid down for
brothers and sisters of the full blood, (951)
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded
that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a
special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). To this end, the Code
provides:

"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (811)"
It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent in the law
of Castile. The President of the Spanish Code Commission, D. Manuel
Alonso Martinez, explained the motives for the formulation of the reserva
troncal in the Civil Code of 1889 in his book "El Codigo Civil en sus
relaciones con las Legislaciones Forales" (Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226228, 233-235) in the following words:
"La base cuarta, ms de estar en pugna con la legislacion espaola, es
una desviacion del antiguo derecho romano y del moderno derecho
europeo, perfectamente conformes ambos con el tradicional sistema de
Castilla. En qu se fund, pues, la Comision para semejante novedad? Que
razones pudieron moverla establecer la sucesion lineal, separndose del
cuce secular?
"Lo dir en breves frases. Hay un case, no del todo raro, que subleva el
sentimiento de cuantos lo imaginan lo ven: el hijo mayor de un magnate
sucede su padre en la mitad Integra de pingues mayorazgos, tocando
sus hermanos un lote modestisimo en la division de la herencia paterna;
aquel hijo se casa y fallece al poco tiempo dejando un tierno vstago; la
viuda, todavia jven, contrae segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de
perder al hijo del primer matrimonio heredando toda su fortuna con
exclusion de la madre y los hermanos de su primer marido. No hay para
qu decir que, si hay descendientes del Segundo matrimonio, ellos se
trasmite en su dia la hereticia. Por donde resulta el irritante espectculo de
que los vstagos directos del magnate viven en la estrechez y tal vez en la
miseria, mientras gozan de su rico patrimonio personas extraas su
familia y que, por un rden natural, la son profundamente antipticas. Esta
hiptesis se puede realizar y se realize, aunque por lo general en menor
escala, entre propietarios, banqueros industriales. labradores y
comerciantes, sin necesidad de vinculaciones ni titulos nobiliarios.
"Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocup vivamente de esto,
considerando el principio de familia como superior al del afecto presumible
del difunto. A esta impresion obedecia la propuesta del Sr. Garcia Goyena,
para que los ascendientes se les diera su legitima tan slo en usufructo:
en idntica razon se apoyaba el Sr. Franco para pedir con insistencia se
declarase que, si un ascendiente tenia hecha una donacion su
descendiente, bien fuese al contraer matrinionio bien con cualquiera otro

motivo, y muriese el donatario sin sucesion, volvieran los bienes donados

al donante, sin perjuicio de la legitima que pudiera corresponderle en su
calidad de ascendiente. La Comision no se atrevi a ir tan all como estos
dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para eludir las consecuencias que las veces
produce el principio de la proximidad del parentesco y que he puesto de
relieve poco h, proclam, no sin vacilar, la doctrina de la sucesion lineal."
(pp.226227)
Y este fu el temperamento que, por indicacion mia, adopt la Comision
Codificadora, norabrando una Sub-comision que redactara las bases que
habia de sujetarse esta especie de reversion de los bienes inmuebles al
tronco de donde procedan, lo mismo en la sucesion testamentaria que en
la intestada, sin perjuicio del derecho sacratisimo de los padres al disfrute
de la herencia de sus hijos malogrados prematuramente.
"Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres. Durn y Bs y Franco como
defensores del rgimen f oral, y de los Sres. Manresa y Garcia Goyena en
representacion de la legislacion castellana, sometieron la deliberacion de
la Comision Codificadora la proposicion siguiente:
'El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrativo de_ otro ascendiente de un hermano, se
halla obligado reservar los que hubiese adquirido por ministerio de la ley
en favor de los parientes del difunto que se hallaran comprendidos dentro
del tercer grado y que lo sean por la parte de donde proceden los bienes.'
"No voy discutir ahora si esta frmula es ms mnos feliz, y si debe
aprobarse tal cual est redactada si h menester de enmienda adicion.
Aplazo este examen para cuando trate de la sucesion intestada, la cual
tiene mayor aplicacion. Por el momento me limito reconocer. primero:
que con esta base desaparece el peligro de que bienes poseidos
secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente y titulo gratuito
manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y de muertes prematuras;
segundo: que sin negar que sea una novedad esta base del derecho de
Castllla, tiene en rigor en su abono la autoridad de los Cdigos ms
niveladores y el ejemplo de las naciones ms democrticas de Europe, si
no en la extension en que lo presenta la Comision Codificadora, lo mnos
en el principio generador de la reforma. (pp.233-235)
The stated purpose o the reserva is accomplished once property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time
on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891
any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary
property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession.

In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved
that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus) , excluding those
reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentine vs. Florentine, 40 Phil.
489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
"Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there
are re1atives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code
in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of
the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such. In spite of
what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of
one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the
case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. x x x. (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) (see also Nieva and Alacala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo,
41 Phil. 915) Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic
principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood
brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of halfblood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter
se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are
made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the
whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but
within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by
the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does
not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance
that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be
limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As

expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):

crendose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino ms bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepcin mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente
contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generals y fundamentals
del Cdigo en materia de sucesin, en aquellos extremos no resueltos de
un raodo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accin de la
reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new
Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as
exemplified by the suppression of the reserve viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980).
There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the
reservistas lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of
the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this
purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of
Property even while the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar,
Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is incompatible
with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The
latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservist, but from the descendant
prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject
to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman,
Vol. VI, Torao 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274,
310)
Had the nephews of whole and half-blood succeeded the prepositus
directly, those of full-blood would undoubtedly receive a double share
compared to those of the half-blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.) Why
then should the latter receive equal shares simply because the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the
reserva? The decedent (causante) the heirs and their relationship being the
same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary. It
should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported
by distinguished commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them
Sanchez Romn (Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p. 1008) and Mucius Scaevola
(Cdigo Civil, Vol 14, p. 342). The reason given by these authors is that the
reservatarios are called by law to take the reservable property because
they belong to the line of origin; and not because of their relationship. But
the argument, if logically pursued, would lead to the conclusion that the

property should pass to any and all the reservatarios, as a class, and in
equal shares, regardless of lines and degrees. In truth, such is the thesis of
Scaevola, that later became known as the theory of reserva integral (14
Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332 et seq.). But, as we have seen, the Supreme
Courts of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and
consider that the reservable property should be succeeded by the
reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules of
intestacy. The refutation of the trial court's position is found in the
following, passage of Manresa's Commentaries (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 346):
A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el articulo 811 es un
derecho propio que nace de la mera calidad de pariente; no un derecho
que se adquiere por sucesin. Ciertamente, el derecho se concede a los
parientes lineales dentro del tercer grado; pero se lesconcede con motivo
de la muerte de un descendiente y en la sucesin de este. Ellos suceden
por la procedencia especial de los bienes despus de ser stos disfrutados
por el ascendiente; pero suceden a titulo lucrativo y por causa de muerte y
ministerio de la ley, lo cual es dificil poderlo negar. Hasta podrlan
estimarse esos parientes legitimarios o herederos forzosos, como el mismo
autor reconoce en otro lugar de su obra. De modo que este argumento no
es convincente.
All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor keeping to a
minimum the alterations introduced by the reserva in the basic rules of
succession mortis causa.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is reversed and set
aside, and the reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are
declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the
halfblood. Let the records be remanded to the court below for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. So Ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA,

petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH
V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of
the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed
the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias
Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S.
Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and
Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias
Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with
whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua
died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate
leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of
his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued
an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half
(1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias
Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor
of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of
Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons
of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register
of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as
owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la
Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time
or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of

heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito
as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the
whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966,
Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage
and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of
the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the
complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed
as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half
(1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but
which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be
declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn
was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil
Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the
complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code
provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property
came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be
impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist,
to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an
asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by
another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property
came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present.
Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second
marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his proindiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother,

Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had
relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of
the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of
reserva troncal whether the property in question was acquired by
Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In
resolving this point, the respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in
question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were
to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No.
5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not
subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as
such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the
lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New
Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with
approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything
in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be
made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it,
without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the
person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably
put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the
person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without
requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record
that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by
means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that
there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding
No. 4816 which estates in express terms;
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre,
viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad,
todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del
finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:
14483

La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota,
Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el
Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la
obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de
P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil
No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of
P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua
not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and
testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816
dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the
heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not
matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias
Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20.
This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the
property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject to
reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias
Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in
their project of partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias
Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of
Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated
was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing
mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which
is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of
the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private
respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has
ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last
Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no
need for the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among
themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the
adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition
with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone
of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952
without any issue. After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre
succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however,
subject to the condition that the property was reservable in character
under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree

of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are the
petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half
portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has
already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe
so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as
reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre,
died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to
recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time
to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set
aside. The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios
Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the
name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in
the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias
Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4
undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Mu;oz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F.
LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA
LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting,
reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal,
the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died
[Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races,
and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa
and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita,
and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were
represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19,
1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the
following: 1wph1.t

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit
balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7
interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda,
Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and
the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7
titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202,
48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of
Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of
the registry of deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No.
41862 of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements
at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila
registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of
deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the
Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds
of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit
of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter
Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her
other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical
documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited
from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro
and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:
A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito,
los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los
acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los
hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he
0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque
ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races.
1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her
six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third
share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited
in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate
of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July
30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of
her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable
properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters
and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito
F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June
20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration
that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could
not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion

of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil.
1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln
this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six
assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the
properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments
of error contend that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda
acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her
conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda
y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the
reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the
timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This
Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to
dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised
under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower
court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are
subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those
involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial
court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be
reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties
under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether
Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor
of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited
from her daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to
bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance
automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of
Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first

impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before
discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino
case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse
on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria
o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs
in descanting on the nature of reserve troncal which together with the
reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission
to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the
uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty
impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage
the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which
situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with
the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism
which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they
penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code
Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal institution which,
according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and
doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now
article 891, which reads:
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este
hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un
hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por
ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer
grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title

property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same
property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by
operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant
should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative
title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the
deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law
(intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante
de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista,
which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation)
from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within
the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the
first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan
Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one
Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan
Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his
half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are
not reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda.
de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or
sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus)
who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other
ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of
law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez,
101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not
included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes
poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito

a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or

impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia
puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan
Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino,
104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295.
ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father
Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother,
Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina.
The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of
Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the
Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable
property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her,
should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her
one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter,
Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share
was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other onehalf portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six
children. lt was held that the said one-half portion was reservable property
in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited
by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts
of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half
portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino,
40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915;
Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46
Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737;
Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89;
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G.
1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant,
or the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon
whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her
mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her
father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property.
Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa
Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within
the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote
subject to the rule of representation. But the representative should be
within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil.
1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship.
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.

illegitimate

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the

recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo
vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th
Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death,
of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property
came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property
but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the
reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The
transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor.
The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349,
353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a
pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a
resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death,
there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the
reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the
transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he predeceased
the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease the
reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he
can require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by
the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the
reservable property is illegal for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to

the natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable
property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of
them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the
descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6,
6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the
prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law, the owner of
the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable
properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor.
The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may
alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation
shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves
survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1wph1.t

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor,
could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the
reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the
exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and
three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or
cosa juzgada.

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the

descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during the
reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to
have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property. (J. J.
B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited
from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form
part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as
long as the reservees survived the reservor.

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the
ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary
right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in
the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria
de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the
reservable properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the
prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could

not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given
and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a
glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be
allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled:
1wph1.t
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of
ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of
his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful
inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance
from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives,
within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has
at the same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second
wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III.
These two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in
1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in
1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her
properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through
their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia
Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased children of his first
marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the
reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio
III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which
Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties,
could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That
theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not
form part of Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her
daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to
one-seventh of the properties. The other six sevenths portions were
adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to
follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means
that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether
those reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the
ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The
reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the
reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal
when the only relatives within the third degree are the common
descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would
be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the
ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are
not reservable properties because only relatives within the third degree
from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the
said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the
reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family
from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the
reservor willed the reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister
of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the
half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property
bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the
reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the
seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third
degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property
to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers,
nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only
one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice
why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the
reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not
dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in
favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The
said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor
but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are
the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable
character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena
Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging
to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both"
the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished
only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since
at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to
the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made
in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in
accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not
form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l,
4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is
hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de
Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and
accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces,
as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who
died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective
heirs. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.
Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.

NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the
parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the
plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are
legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho
have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the
name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister
of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of
her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.

G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and
JANUARIO
PAPA,
plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition
of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her
father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her
two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal proindiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7)

parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole

intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her
rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited
by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject
to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo
Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice,
the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by
virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino
Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also
upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths
(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which
interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or threeeights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this
case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is
entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or
whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are
reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso
share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino
Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso
share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore,
to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by
defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of
land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have
acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to
restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive
all their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest
on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem
proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be
borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco
Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven
parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as
follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the
court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco
are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action.
Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the
rentals collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. TiocoCamacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly
waived all their claims against each other for damages including attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs'
share in the rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs
entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. TiocoCamacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents received by
her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining
the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in
the rentals of the property in question. SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and
ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third
degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable
property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art.
891 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are
subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the
praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half
blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the
reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling,
and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled
to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in
accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva
troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista,
and belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant
(prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be
apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole
blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded
that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a
special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time
on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between

one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for
applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in
the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of
intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that
of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but
only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code
in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of
the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo,
41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of
half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made
to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole
blood should be likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of

relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but
within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by
the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does
not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance
that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be
limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As
expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente
contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y
fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes
no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new
Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as
exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion
legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on
intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any
right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon
(the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris 4 where Arts.
1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals
(aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the
full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more
clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately
preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954
of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse,
while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par
with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other
collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified
to succeed. ...

This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra,

that as to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the
reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate
of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are
reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter,
therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant
prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject
to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman,
Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274,
310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that
intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not
necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of
title in the name of the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal
Identifies the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's
rights as such:
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon
the assumption that the reservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the
reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is
not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property
part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely
reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the
matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the
reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in
case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of
estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of
latter. ... .

the
this
the
the
the

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there
is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the
defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no
reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the

reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby

giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of
the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set
aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffsappellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., took no part.

"Primitive Mirano, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus, Doroteo Banawa, et

al., Defendants-Appellants", the dispositive part of which is: t.hqw
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with
costs against defendants-appellants.
The judgment of the lower court which was affirmed reads as follows: t.
hqw
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the two parcels of land
described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
(b) Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the said parcels of
land to the plaintiffs;
(c) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho
and Maria Carmen Mendoza in favor of Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza, dated April 4, 1940, as evidenced by Exhibit 'E' and its
registration in the registry of deeds of Batangas, to be null and void;

G.R. No. L-24750 May 16, 1980

DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and
GLICERIA ABRENICA, petitioners,
vs.
PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA MIRANO, JUANA MIRANO and
MARCIANO MIRANO, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Recto Law Office for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on April 12, 1965 1 in CA G.R. No. 23597-R, entitled

(d) Declaring null and void the deed of donation, dated August 7, 1956,
evidenced by Exhibit 'D' executed by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and
Juliana Mendoza in favor of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria
Abrenica as well as Tax Declarations No. 26818 in the names of the
spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, and No. 26845 in the
names of the spouses Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica, and the
registration of the said deed of donation in the registry of deeds of
Batangas; and
(e) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages in the
amount of P 4,500 and attorney's fees in the amount of P500.00, and the
costs of this action. SO ORDERED. 2
The spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza both died during the
pendency of this case in the Court of Appeals. They have been substituted
by the petitioners Casiano Amponin and his wife Gliceria Abrenica, legally
adopted daughter of one of the deceased petitioners and donee of the
Carsuche property. 3

The petitioners filed on May 20, 1965, a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Said motion was denied on June 28, 1965.

Tax Declaration No. 19786 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at
P2,760.00.

As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts are: t.hqw

It appears that sometime in 1911, Maria Mirano a niece of appellant Juliana
Mendoza, and who was then about nine years old, was taken in by the
appellants-spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, in the latter's
house in Mahabang Lodlod, Taal, Batangas. Appellants spouses being
childless, treated and reared her up like their own child. They hired a
private tutor to teach her the rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic.
They supported her, gave her money, clothes and even jewelry. Maria
reciprocated their care and affection by helping with the household chores.
A few years later, the spouses opened up a store for general merchandise
in barrio Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon, from which they derived considerable
income and which enabled them to acquire several parcels of land.
On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died in Taal,
Batangas while still living with the spouses. At the time of her death she
left as her only nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs, namely Primitiva
Mirano, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all
surnamed Mirano, who are the children of a deceased brother, Martin
Mirano.
The parties do not dispute the Identity of the two parcels of land in
controversy, which are described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as
follows: t.hqw
1. A parcel of sugar land situated in the Barrio of Iba, Taal, Batangas, with
an area of 44,200 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North, by
Ravine; on the East, by the property of Leodovico Garcia; on the South by
the property of Gregorio Amponin; and on the West, by the property of
Gregorio Maria Aniversario (now Doroteo Banawa). Under Tax Declaration
No. 25994 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed at P2,210.00.
2. A parcel of sugar land situated in the barrio of Carsuche, Taal, Batangas,
with an area of 54,093 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North,
by the property of Agapito Aro and Alley; on the East, by an Alley; on the
South, by the properties of Filomeno Diomampo, Gregorio de la Rosa and
Andres Moratilla; and on the West, by the property of Agapito Aro. Under

For purposes of clearness and convenience, and since the respective

assertions and evidences adduced by the parties regarding the two parcels
of land are in sharp divergence, we shall refer to the first parcel as the Iba
Property and to the second parcel as the Carsuche property and, moreover,
we shall treat and discuss the two separately.
Parcel 1, or the Iba Property.
The parties agree that the Iba Property was originally owned by Placido
Punzalan from whom it was acquired on May 5, 1921. Plaintiffs' evidence
upon this point tends to show that the acquisition of the said parcel of land
was pursuant to a deed of sale contained in a public instrument
acknowledged before Notary Public Ramon A. Cabrera on the date
aforesaid, a photostatic copy of which was introduced in evidence as
Exhibit 'A', the same having been secured from an original copy on file with
the Division of Archives, Bureau of Libraries. The deed of sale in question
states that the Iba property consisted formerly of two parcels of land and
that they were sold for the amount of P2,000.00 in favor of Maria Mirano.
Defendant Doroteo Banawa impliedly admitted the execution of this
notarial document when he declared that in the execution of the document
concerning the purchase of the Iba property from Punzalan the notary
public charged him P20.00 and another P5.00 for stamps in the name of
Maria Mirano since 1923 (Exhs. 'A-1' to 'A-7').
By contrast, defendants' claim of ownership over the Iba property is
predicated upon their assertion that the money used in buying said land
pertained to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
Defendants contend that since 1919 Placido Punzalan borrowed money
from defendant spouses on three different occasions for the sums of
P1,200.00, P1,800.00 and P1,080.00, respectively, each of which was
evidenced by Exhs. '1', '2', and '3', respectively. Upon the failure of Placido
Punzalan to discharge said obligations in 1921, he agreed to sell the land
aforementioned to the spouses for P 3,700.00, but as the total value of the
three loans was P4,080.00, Punzalan had to reimburse to said spouses the
difference of P380.00. The document of sale stated the price to be only
P2,000.00 in view of the fact that Doroteo Banawa had only P25.00 with
him when the deed was prepared by the notary public, and the latter was
charging P10.00 for every one thousand pesos mentioned as the
consideration of the contract, Defendants likewise maintain that the sale
was made to appear in favor of Maria Mirano because said spouses being
already old, they want to leave something to Maria Mirano for her to lean

upon when they would have been gone. They, however, made Maria
understand that although the property was placed under her name, they
would continue to be the owners thereof, to administer and enjoy the fruits
of the same as long as they live, and that she would become the owner of
the land only after their death. Maria supposedly expressed her conformity
to and appreciation for the said arrangement. Maria Mirano was 19 years
old when the deed of sale was executed.
Parcel 2, or the Carsuche Property.
There is no dispute between the parties that the Carsuche property was
acquired by way of purchase from its original owners, to wit: Roman
Biscocho, his sister Paula Biscocho, and sister-in-law Carmen Mendoza. The
sale took place sometime in December, 1935. There is, however, a sharp
conflict of evidence between the parties concerning the form of the
document evidencing the same and in whose favor the sale was made at
that time. The plaintiffs claim that the sale was evidenced by a public
instrument executed before and ratified by Notary Public Vicente Ilagan of
Taal, Batangas, and that the vendee mentioned in the said document was
Maria Mirano. The defendants, on the other hand, assert that the sale was
evidenced by a private writing prepared in the handwriting of Roman
Biscocho and that it was in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and
Juliana Mendoza. Neither the public instrument allegedly ratified by Atty.
Ilagan nor the private writing supposedly prepared by Roman Biscocho was
presented before the lower court.
After laying the proper predicate for the presentation of secondary
evidence, the plaintiffs presented Atty. Vicente Ilagan and Roman Biscocho
to testify upon the execution of the aforesaid public instrument in
December, 1935. These two declared that sometime in December, 1935,
the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, Maria Mirano, Roman
Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Carmen Mendoza, accompanied by Atty.
Regino Aro, went to the office of Atty. Ilagan in Taal, Batangas; that Atty.
Aro, who was a classmate of Atty. Ilagan in the law school, asked the
latter's permission to use his typewriter on which he prepared a document
in English and which he asked Atty. Ilagan to ratify; that Atty. Ilagan
translated into Tagalog the contents of the said document to the parties
and. the witnesses, after which they all signed the same; that the
document involved the sale of the Carsuche property in favor of Maria
Mirano: that after paying him P20.00 for his services which Atty. Ilagan
would not accept at first, Doroteo Banawa asked Atty. Ilagan in Tagalog
whether the document that he ratified was 'strong enough' (Matibay) to
safeguard the rights of Maria Mirano, to which Atty. Ilagan answered in the
affirmative.

Doroteo Banawa, on the other hand, stated that on being offered the
Carsuche property by the owners thereof, they agreed on the purchase
price of P3,700.00 of which a down payment of P1,200.00 was made and,
later, an additional sum of P100.00 was given to Roman Biscocho, both
payments being evidenced by a receipt dated December 15, 1936 (Exh.
'9'). A few days later, Roman Biscocho prepared in his own handwriting a
private document selling the Carsuche property in favor of the spouses
Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza for the sum of P4,000.00, the
vendors having asked for a P300.00 increase in price. Doroteo Banawa,
thereafter brought said private document to the municipal treasurer of
Taal, Batangas, to whom he expressed the desire to have the land declared
in the name of Maria Mirano so that the latter might attend to the payment
of taxes over the land whenever he was away. This wish of Doroteo
Banawa was done by his thumb-marking an affidavit, thus accounting for
the fact that said land appears in the name of Maria Mirano in the tax
declarations covering the same from 1934 to 1956. 5
The petitioners assign the following errors: t.hqw
I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
THAT THE PLACING OF IBA PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF THE LATE MARIA
MIRANO WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DONATION INTER-VIVOS.
II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
THAT PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 632 OF THE OLD CIVIL
CODE IS TOO LITERAL AND IGNORES THE RATIONALE OF THE LEGAL
PROVISION.
III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
THAT THE 'EXCEPTIVE' CLAUSE' OF ARTICLE 1448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS
APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.
IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
THAT SECTION 5, RULE 100 OF THE OLD RULES OF COURT DOES NOT
APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE MARIA MIRANO WAS NOT LEGALLY
ADOPTED.
V THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING
WITH RESPECT TO THE CARSUCHE PROPERTY (LOT NO. 2) THAT THE DEED
OF SALE EXECUTED IN 1940 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS DOROTEO
BANAWA AND HIS WIFE JULIANA MENDOZA AND WHICH WAS DULY
REGISTERED DID NOT IMPAIR THE PRETENDED SALE TO MARIA MIRANO. 6

The first, second, third and fourth errors assigned refer to the Iba property,
parcel 1, while the fifth error assigned refers to the Carsuche property, Lot
2. 7

However, all the issues raised by the petitioners shall be passed upon
individually.
The first error assigned reads: t.hqw

As may be discerned from the assignment of errors, the basic issue is the
ownership of the two parcels of land in question. The plaintiffs appellees,
respondents herein, assert title to the lands as heirs of Maria Mirano.
Defendants-appellants, petitioners herein, claim ownership over them by
virtue of purchase from the original owners.
Considering that in the case at bar the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are not contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by
this Court of said findings is not necessary. In Tolentino vs. de Jesus, et al., 8
this Court held: t.hqw
The findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals are conclusive on
the parties and on this Court (Tamayo vs. Callejo, L- 25563, July 28, 1972,
46 SCRA 27; Nery, et al. vs. Lorenzo, et al., L-23096 & L-23376, April 27,
1972, 44 SCRA 43 1; Villacrucis vs. CA, L-29831, March 29, 1972, 44 SCRA
176; Dela Cruz, et al. vs. CA, L-24000, Nov. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 68; Naga
Dev. Corp. vs. CA, L-28175, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 105, 115; Lacson &
Basilio vs. Pineda, et al., L-28523, July 16, 1971, 40 SCRA 35; Qui;ano, et
al. vs. CA, et al., L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 227; Reyes, et al. vs. CA,
et al., L-28466, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 138, 142; Gotamco Hermanas vs.
Shotwell, et al., L-22519, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 112-117; Limjoco vs.
CA, L-20656, Feb. 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 663-669; De Garcia, et al. vs. CA, L20264, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 130, 136-137; Simeon vs. Pe;a, L-29049,
Dec. 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 611), unless (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellees [Roque vs. Buan,
L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648]; (6) the findings of facts of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents [Garcia vs. CA,
L26490, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 622] ; and (9) when the finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record [Salazar vs. Gutierrez, L-21727, May
29, 1970, 33 SCRA 243].
The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that the
placing of the Iba Properly in the name of the late Maria Mirano was in the
nature of a donation inter-vivos.
The respondents 9 correctly pointed out that neither the Court of Appeals
nor the Court of First Instance of Batangas categorically stated that the
placing of the properties in the name of Maria Mirano was in the nature of a
donation inter-vivos. In rejecting the petitioners' contention that a donation
mortis causa was executed, the Court of Appeals said that, under the facts
and circumstances narrated by the petitioners, the placing of the Iba
property in the name of Maria Mirano-if it was to be called a donation at all
- was not in the nature of a donation mortis causa, but rather it would be in
the nature of a donation inter-vivos, giving its reasons and citing the
applicable law and decisions of this Court on the matter. The Court of First
Instance made the same hypothetical conclusion. 10
The finding of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which was sustained
by the Court of Appeals is that what was donated by the spouses Doroteo
Banawa and Juliana Mendoza to Maria Mirano was the money used in the
purchase of the lands in question. This conclusion of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas was supported by the testimony of Macario B. Aro, a
nephew of the deceased Doroteo Banawa, that the money used by Maria
Mirano in the purchase of the Iba and Carsuche properties was given to her
by, Doroteo Banawa. 11
If the money used by Maria Mirano in purchasing the properties was given
to her by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, or by either of
them, then the money had belonged to her. Maria Mirano purchased and
paid for the said properties with her money. As a matter or fact, the deed
of sale, Exhibit "A", 12 recites as follows: t.hqw
Que en consideracion a la suma de Dos Mil Pesos moneda filipina
(P2,000.00) que me ha pagado Maria Mirano ... .
It is also contended by the petitioners that the deeds of sale executed by
the owners of the land in favor of Maria Mirano were simulated contracts
intended to shortcut two different transactions: (1) a sale in favor of the

spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza; and (2) a donation of lands
by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano. 13
There are two kinds of simulated contracts, namely: the absolutely
simulated contract and the relatively simulated one. In both instances,
however, their nullity is based on the want of true consent of the parties.
There is no intent to be bound or the true intent is hidden or concealed.
Such contracts are even generally regarded as fraudulent with intent of
injuring third persons. The purpose, therefore, of a simulated contract
which may be annulled is to conceal the parties' true intent, or to deceive
or defraud third persons.
From the record, there is no showing of deception or fraud, nor of
concealment of intent of the parties as to the sale of the Iba property by
the vendors in favor of Maria Mirano. The transactions which transpired
were purely: (1) donations of money or things representing or equivalent to
money by the spouses in favor of Maria Mirano which could be made and
accepted verbally; and (2) purchase of lands by Maria Mirano with the use
of that money or credits (pre-existing indebtedness in favor of the spouses)
as consideration thereof.
The petitioners' contention that "the contract of sale had been intended to
be a contract of sale between the vendors and the spouses Doroteo
Banawa and Juliana Mendoza" has no merit. The petitioners were present
when the sales were made to Maria Mirano. They were the ones who
caused the titles to the properties to be placed in the name of Maria Mirano
because they wished "that after our death Maria Mirano could have
something for her maintenance. 14 Moreover, the testimony of Vicente
Ilagan, the notary public before whom the deed of sale was executed, to
the effect that he was asked by Doroteo Banawa in Tagalog "Kung matibay
ang documenting ito para kay Maria" 15 and to which query he answered,
"Yes, Sir", 16 supports this conclusion. The conduct of the spouses at the
time of the execution of the contracts are inconsistent with those which the
petitioners, the late spouses and their successors-in interest, now assert.
Their intention to make Maria Mirano the owner of the said parcels of land
was clearly shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of the
deeds of sale which influenced the vendors to believe that Maria Mirano
was indeed the vendee in their agreement. The petitioners had full
knowledge of the facts surrounding the execution of the document of sale.
They are equitably estopped 17 to deny that the transfer of the lands in
question in favor of Maria Mirano was the actual and true intent of the
parties as embodied in the documents of sale of the Iba and Carsuche
properties. The documents are what they purport to be contracts of sale
from the vendors to the vendee, Maria Mirano.

The petitioners submit that since there was transfer of title to the land in
litigation to Maria Mirano when the purchase price was in fact actually paid
by the petitioners-spouses, an implied trust was created. The present law
on implied trust is Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal
estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the
purpose of having beneficial interest of the property. The former is the
trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However if the person to whom
the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying
the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably
presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code of the
Philippines became effective on August 30, 1950. Hence Article 1448 of
said Code is not applicable. 18
Moreover, there is no showing that Maria Mirano bought the lands in
question in trust for the petitioners.
The petitioners also claim that they have become owners of the properties
by acquisitive prescription under Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code which
provides:
Ownership and other real rights in immovable property shall prescribe by
possession in good faith and under a just title for ten years as between
persons present and for twenty years as between absentees.
The above-cited provision speaks of two essential requirements: (1)
possession for ten (10) years as between persons present and twenty (20)
years, for absentees; and (2) a just title.
As regards the Iba property (Lot No. 1), petitioners have not presented any
title, just or otherwise, to support their claim. And Article 1954 of the Old
Civil Code provides, further, that a "just title must be proven; it never can
be presumed."
Not having a just title, as required by Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code, the
petitioners cannot invoke prescription with respect to the Iba property.
The petitioners also assert ownership by acquisitive prescription over the
Iba property under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The pertinent
portion of Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads

Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the

owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly
continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise in
whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall
vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete
title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights secured by the next
section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse
possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or
through whom he claims must have been actual open, public, continuous,
under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other
claimants ...
It is a fact that while Maria Mirano was alive she possessed the property in
question as the owner thereof Hence, it is error for the petitioners to claim
ownership over the Iba property by acquisitive prescription under Article 41
of the Code of Civil Procedure for their possession of the said property
became adverse and exclusive only in July 1949 after Maria Mirano's death.
From 1949 to the date of the filing in 1957 of the present action by the
respondents only eight years had elapsed.
The second error assigned is:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that
petitioners' interpretation of Article 632 of the Old Civil Code is too literal
and ignores the rationale of the legal provision.
Article 632 of the Old Civil Code provides: "Donations of personal property
may be made verbally or in writing. Verbal donation requires the
simultaneous delivery of the gift. In the absence of this requisite the
donation shall produce no effect, unless made in writing and accepted in
the same form."
It is contended by the petitioners that oral donation of personal property
requires simultaneous delivery of the gift. As regards the Iba property, the
consideration given by Maria Mirano for the purchase of the said property
from Placido Punzalan was the pre- existing debts of the latter to the
spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.
The contention of the petitioners that there was no simultaneous delivery
of the credits to Maria Mirano is not meritorious. Delivery may be actual or
constructive.

Actual delivery consists in the giving of actual possession to the vendee or

his agent, as for example, in manually transferring the possession of a
thing from the vendor to the vendee.
Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those acts
which, although not conferring physical possession of the thing, have been
held by construction of law equivalent to acts of real delivery, as for
example, the giving of the key to the house, as constructive delivery of the
house from the vendor to the vendee.
In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of pre-existing
obligations of the vendor, Placido Punzalan, was simultaneous or
concurrent with the constructive delivery thereof to Maria Mirano when the
spouses consented to the execution of the deed of sale of the Iba property
in favor of Maria Mirano. The execution of the said deed of sale constituted
payment by the vendor, Placido Punzalan, of his outstanding obligations
due to the spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Consequently,
there was constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of
the spouses over the property in question to Maria Mirano.
It is no longer necessary to discuss the third error assigned because of the
holding that Article 1448 of the New Civil Code has no retroactive
application to the instant case.
Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioners urge that the donor
spouses are entitled to the land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100
of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:
... In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and
not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or
inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption,
which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives
who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate
estates.
The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the
contemplation and spirit of this rule of reversion adoptive. However, the
rule involved specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted
child. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the language of
the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly
what it says.
The fifth error assigned is:

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling with respect
to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) that the deed of sale executed in 1940
in favor of the petitioner Doroteo Banawa and his wife Juliana Mendoza did
not impair the pretended sale to Maria Mirano.
The Court of Appeals found that there was a sale of the Carsuche property
in 1935 in favor of Maria Mirano and that such sale was embodied in a
public instrument. However, in 1940 the same land was sold to the
petitioners. The sale was duly registered. The petitioners immediately
entered into the possession of the land as owners.
The claim of the petitioners that they have acquired by acquisitive
prescription the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) is meritorious.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Period of prescription
as to real estate An action for recovery of title to, or possession of, real
property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten years after
the cause of action accrues."
That the aforesaid Section 40 governs the instant case is clear from Article
1116 of the New Civil Code which provides that "prescriptions already
running before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, shall be governed by
the laws previously in force." The prescriptive period commenced to run
since 1940, the date the sale in favor of the Banawas was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Batangas. Hence the Code of Civil Procedure
governs.
The instant case, not having been filed within ten (10) years from the time
the cause of action accrued in 1940, prescribed under Section 40 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in 1950 because the same was filed only in 1957,
seventeen (17) years later.
The possession of the Banawas over the Carsuche property ripened into
full ownership in 1950, ten (10) years after 1940, when the possession of
the petitioner-spouses which was actual, open, public and continuous,
under a claims of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other
claim commenced. (Sec. 41, Code of Civil Procedure). The sale in favor of
the Banawas was registered in 1940 with the Register of Deeds of
Batangas. The actual and adverse possession of the petitioner-spouses was
continued by their present successors.
The alleged bad faith of the petitioners in that they knew that the land was
previously sold to Maria Mirano is of no consequence because Section 41 of

the Code of Civil Procedure provides that there is prescription "in whatever
way such occupancy may have commenced." As held in one case "... guilty
knowledge is of no moment for under the law title by prescription may be
acquired in whatever way possession may have been commenced or
continued and so long as the possessor had possessed the land openly,
publicly, continuously and under a claim of title for a period of over ten
years." 19
The trial court found that the two parcels of land in question with a
combined area of a little less than ten (10) hectares had an average annual
net yield of P 500.00. A total amount of P 4,500.00 as actual damages was
awarded in as much as Maria Mirano had been dead for nine (9) years
when the decision of the trial court was rendered. An adjustment should be
made in view of the finding of this Court that the Carsuche property, Lot 2,
belongs to the petitioners.
The Iba property, Lot 1, is about 45% of the combined area of the two
lands in question. Forty-five percent (45 %) of the annual net income of
P500.00 is equivalent to P225.00. Maria Mirano has been dead for about
thirty-one (31) years now. During all this period, the petitioners have been
in possession of the Iba property and receiving the products thereof. They
should pay as actual damages the total amount of P6,975.00 representing
the net income for the period of thirty-one (31) years on the basis of
P225.00 a year.
The respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of
P1,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to
the Iba property (Lot No. 1) but reversed as to the Carsuche property (Lot
No. 2) which was acquired by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza who could validly donate the said property to Casiano Amponin
and Gliceria Abrenica The petitioners are ordered to pay the private
respondents the total amount of Six Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Five
Pesos (P6,975.00) as actual damages and the amount of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) as attorney's fees, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
(Chairman), concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions

JJ.,

concur.Teehankee

MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

I dissent, re the Iba parcel; because there was no valid donation of the land
or of the purchase money. In addition to the views expressed by the
learned counsel for the petitioners, to which I subscribe, I wish to stress the
following:
1. The money with which to buy the property was not donated to Maria by
the spouses Juliana Mendoza and Doroteo Banawa. Said spouses would not
donate the large amount of P4,080.00 (although the deed states the
amount as P2,000.00) to Maria Mirano who was merely tutored to learn the
3 R's reading, writing and arithmetic at the expense of said spouses.
While it is true that they supported her, gave her money, clothes and even
jewelry, they did not send her to school, much less give her a college
education. It is unthinkable that the said spouses would give her P4,080.00
when they could not even give her a primary education which would cost
very much less (from 1911 to 1915). The jewelry they could have given to
her could not be better than trinkets, the cost of which was negligible but
could be a fond possession of a poor, impressionable child in the rural area
like Maria;
2. No cash actually passed to Maria from the spouses The amount of
P4,080.00 allegedly donated by the spouses to Maria represented the
various loans in the amounts of P1,200.00, P1,800.00 and P1,080.00
previously extended to Placido Punzalan who, as vendor, sold the Iba
parcel in payment of his debt. While the purchase price was P3,700.00, the
purchase price was made to appear in the document as P2,000.00 to save
on notarial fees;
3. Up to the time of her death on July 31, 1949 at the age of 48, Maria was
still living with the spouses who reared her. This fact shows that Maria was
still being supported by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza;
4. If there was a valid donation of the money to pay for the Iba sugar land
in Taal in 1921, which consists of 4.42 hectares, it would seem that Maria
would have sufficient funds derived from the produce of such a big parcel
with which to purchase for herself the Carsuche parcel for the amount of
P3,700.00 or P4,000.00. But the fact of the matter is that it was still the
spouses Juliana Mendoza and Doroteo Banawa who paid for the Carsuche
property, only that the sale was allegedly made in favor of Maria, whom
they did not legally adopt, to insure the survival of Maria long after they
would have been dead as they were then already old. Again, this goes
against the grain of human nature; because no such deep concern was

exhibited by the spouses in favor of their legally adopted daughter Gliceria

Abrenica; and
5. The spouses legally adopted petitioner Gliceria Abrenica, wife of copetitioner Casiano Amponin, but never legally adopted Maria, niece of
petitioner Juliana Mendoza. If the said spouses wanted to favor their niece
Maria for helping in their business, they could have easily adopted her
legally and thereby make her their legal heir, like petitioner Gliceria
Abrenica.
I concur re the Carsuche parcel.
There was no valid sale in favor of Maria Mirano of said lot because:
1. While a photostat copy of the earlier deed of sale of 1921 was secured
from the Division of Archives of the Bureau of Libraries and submitted in
evidence as Exhibit A; no copy of the later alleged deed of sale in 1935
was presented in evidence concerning the Carsuche parcel. If there was
such a 1935 deed of sale (14 years after the 1921 deed), a certified true
copy thereof could be more easily secured from the Division of Archives of
the Bureau of Libraries, as it was a later document (1935) than the 1921
deed of sale, which is available. The alleged sale in December, 1935 was
allegedly notarized by Atty. Vicente Ilagan. It is strange that Atty. Aro who
allegedly prepared the deed of sale, was not the one who notarized the
same;
2. In 1935, Maria was already 23 years old. Being a very important
document purportedly evidencing her title to the Carsuche sugar land also
in Taal, of 5.4093 hectares, she should have retained the original or a copy
of the alleged deed of sale, specially considering that the sum of P4,000.00
was allegedly paid for the same;
3. The cancelled tax declaration of the previous owner the vendor - or the
new tax declaration in the name of the buyer, usually states the reason for
such cancellation, like a deed of sale with its date and may include the
name of the notary public and place of execution of the document. There is
no intimation of such a statement or entry in the cancelled tax declaration
of the vendor or in the new tax declaration in the name of Maria Mirano;
and
4. There is no discussion of any exhaustive examination of the other four
possible sources of the copies of the alleged 1935 deed of sale from the

vendor, the notary public, the office of the clerk of court, and as abovestated, the alleged vendee herself.

G.R. No. L-18753

March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City
of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in
Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo,
Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar
C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures
below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page
of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and
her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she
was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free
from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the
will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and
spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor
descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her
estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of
P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named
Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her
interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in
equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said
spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed
of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the
will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing
on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all
parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a

deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child
of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on
September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the
following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the
testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the
time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or
influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after
due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her
opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as
to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who
took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered
its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but
declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to
the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a
motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the
portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.
Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a
motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees
the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to
intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that
portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied,
both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from
that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and
declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal
heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And
in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which,
stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has
oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2)
Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the
probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to

be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene

Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate,
or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as
a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand, in
Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an "interested person." An interested
party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it
is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special
proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party
thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs.
Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the
provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to
the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because
she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator,
nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because
it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee
or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will
either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any
portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she
previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had
already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor
acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She
would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but
she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an

acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the

deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even
if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of
the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is
so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article
992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in
Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or
mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession.
They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of
course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. On this,
article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumption
will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the
natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and
the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a
blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted
and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no
relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the
adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter
but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the
adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as
a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of
the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except
that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of
adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as
descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively

between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives
of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not
extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is
prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An
Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C.
Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law
1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol.
1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was
duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have
been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also
because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix
affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the
evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the
declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the
time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with her
intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation
clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it
was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as
such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the
will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that
it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that
the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the
witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on
the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be
one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the
attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses

spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental

witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and
identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively
that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and
her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided
for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is
also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the
following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof
with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion
that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged
fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for
their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the
vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after
the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have
some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce
yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix,
had she really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did
not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as
testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often
seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and
accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was
able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord
with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina
Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert
pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several
years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering
from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for
several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the
instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and
voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion
executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure
and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must
be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix
as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another
rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the
person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of

its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence
presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long
line of decisions among which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is
merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It
does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or
null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these
points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. ...

jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is

that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the
legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a
corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the
estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside
for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the
same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is
ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions
therein contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency,
or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not
impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine
that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and
must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law
or to public morals. (Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain
legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426,
428)

Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners.

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the

court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will
Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA

MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO
CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.

Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners.

De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto
Cruz.
Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the
present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate
of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to
pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz,
Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and
declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to
probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed
executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions
of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by
the petitioner Ruben Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance
that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers
to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.

questioned-document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of

the said documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the
lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for
further study. The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court
which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained
written depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the
pertinent adoption proceedings.
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to
intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to
set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by
the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meez
who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto
Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of
alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be
permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion.
Both sides subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and
finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the
petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not
disposed of in the will.
The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order,
eliciting thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963
the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of
memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.

Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor

of the estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its
order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The
Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the above-named oppositors
[Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."

Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of
June 4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting
petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the
decedent's testamentary dispositions.

In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity

or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the
respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these
documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness
of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the
results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary

The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute
over the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the
petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo,
three of a number of nephews and nieces who are concededly the nearest
surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the
respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez,
Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the

will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the
decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is
Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the
imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.
The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of
the tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters
claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed,
by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not
material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if
the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et
al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary
heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in
article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or
any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of
said heirs.
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews
and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest
which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The
petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if any, that have not been
disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take
place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the
entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the
intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will.
They have thus raised squarely the issue of whether or not such institution
of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the
adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code
which reads:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such
cause.

Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called
the attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent
portions of the will of the deceased which recite:
III Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang
aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) na
sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong
Cruz.
xxx xxx xxx
Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking
mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:
A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina
Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz,
na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en partes
iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng
aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong
asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng
Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng
testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na
nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si
Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati () ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa
Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si
Fausto Austria.
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the
inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was
legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further contend
that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not
have instituted the respondents at all the basis of the institution being
solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the
falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and
the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse
its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the
petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to
properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the
institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be

shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that
the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the
testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were
indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did
not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to
the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own
wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed
compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on
legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that
statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is
highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she
executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's
will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such
institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or
uncertain implications.
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent
instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed
that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her
adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to
ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for
the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is
satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would
not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false.
Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of
heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her
legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this
point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of
the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of
heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other
than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to
make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her
estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto

Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz,
shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more
than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this
with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her
blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the
petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of
the testate by intestacy a result which would subvert the clear wishes of
the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by
these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and
of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically
his whole estate,2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the
principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the
purpose of giving it effect. 3 A probate court has found, by final judgment,
that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary
capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or
undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full
expression to her will.4
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the
testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose,
and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.5
To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its
order of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the
records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the
first an act which the court could legally do. Every court has the inherent
power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justices. 6 That the court a quo has limited the
extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as
articulated by the Rules of Court.7
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO
and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES
and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the
late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992
ROLDOFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators
of the ESTATE OF EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO,
ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE
GUINTO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders 1 dated September 20,
1976, January 7, 1977 and January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch, IV respectively, cancelling the
notice of lis pendens filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. with the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976 filed by Celsa L.
Vda. de Kilayko, et al., and holding in abeyance the resolution of
defendants' motion to dismiss.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a
"Testamento" 2 which contains among its provisions, the following:
DECIMA Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente
en una tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14) avas partes proindivisas
de la Hda. Minuluan, que he adquirido mediante permuta de mi hermano
Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, se adjudique, como por el presente se adjudica, a mi
sobrina Eustaquia Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE, sin embargo, que en el caso
de que mi citada sobrina Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera o sin

descendientes legitimos, mi referida participacion en la Hda. Minuluan se

adjudicara a mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares que me sobrevivan.
UNDECIMA Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de todas mis
propiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones, derechos e intereses (no
dispuestos mas arriba) an las Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439, 403,
1273, 1274, 1278, 1279 y 1280 del Catastro de Talisay, Negros Occidental),
y "Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y 1287-C del Catastrado de
Talisay, Negros Occidental), situadas en el Municipio de Talisay, Provincia
de Negros Occidental, I.F., el resto de mis acciones en la Central TalisaySilay Milling Co., Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de la Financing Corporation of
the Philippines (unas 53,636 acciones), registradas a mi nombre y no
heredadas de mi difunta madre Da. Enrica A. Vda. de Lizares, mis
acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., Negros Navigation
Co. y otras Compaas Mineras, y todos los demas bienes no mencionados
en este testamento y que me pertenezcan en la fecha de mi muerte, se
adjudiquen, como por el presente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta. Eusaquia
Lizares, hija de mi difunto hermano Don Simplicio Lizares cuidados que mi
citada sobrina me ha prestado y signe prestandome hasta ahora. Ordeno,
sin embargo, a mi referida sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se
haga cargo de pagar todas las obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre
las propriedades adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi citada
sobrina que ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada ao en sufragio
de mi alma, y misas ordinarias en sufragio de las almas de mi difunto
Padre y de mi difunta Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 de Deciembre de cada
ao, respectivamente, y mande celebrar todos los aos la fiesta de San
Jose en Talisay como lo hago hasta ahora. En el caso de que mi citada
sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, falleciere sin dejar descendientes
legitimos, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una
sexta parte (1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang, con su correspondiente cuota de
azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas y hermano antes
mencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied)
On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving
said "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia
Lizares. 3 On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement
of the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 8452. 4
The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having
been made, in due course, the probate court issued an order declaring the
will probated and appointing Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of
Maria Lizares. 5

On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6 which was granted
by the probate court in an order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously,
said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries
mentioned in the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees
and usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties
repectively assigned to each and every one of them, and ordered the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and Bacolod City to effect the
corresponding transfer of the real properties to said heirs as well as the
transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends in different corporations,
companies and partnerships in the name of Maria Lizares to the heirs and
legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares. 7
Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate
proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been
omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. 8 The Court granted the
motion and correspondingly reopened the testate proceedings. It
adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund
certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or
personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any
other person in her last will and testament. 9
On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L.
Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez,
Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of
partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over Lots
Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of plan SWO-7446, and 552, all of the
Cadastral Survey of Talisay covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T65004, T-65005; T-65006, T-65007, and T-65008. 10
A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without
any descendant. 11 In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were
appointed joint administrators of Eustquia's intestate estate.
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10
and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a
simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio,
and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa
L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to
reopen once again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They
prayed among others that a substitute administrator be appointed; that
the order dated January 8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended by
declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda.
Matab-ang, both of which form an aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, after such amendment, be ordered

to register at the back of their respective certificates of title, the order of

probate and a "declaration" that movants are the heirs of said properties,
and correspondingly issue new certificates of title in their names. 12
Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely:
Socorro L. Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo,
and Aurora Lizares Wagner opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged
that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate
proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final
and that the testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and
void. 13
On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen
the testate proceedings and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an
estate is a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is binding against the
whole world. It observed that inspite of the fact that the movants knew
that the court had jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the
proceedings nor did they appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the
court concluded, even if the said order was erroneous, and since the error
was not jurisdictional, the same could have been corrected only by a
regular appeal. The period for filing a motion for reconsideration having
expired, the court opined that the movants could have sought relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but unfortunately for the
movants, the period for filing such remedy had also elapsed. 14
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of
said order. It was denied on June 17, 1974. 15 Hence, on October 14, 1974,
the said movants filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property against the joining administrators of the estate
of Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as Civil
Case No. 11639 with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
Branch IV. 16 On the same date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14,
Section
24
of
Rules
of
Court
by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental. 17
As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late
Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint
administrators for brevity), filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case; the cause
of action was barred by prior judgment, and the complaint stated no cause
of action. 18 This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs.

On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the contentions that there
existed exceptional circumstances which justified the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens and that no prejudice would be caused to the
plaintiffs. 19 The latter opposed said motion. The defendants having filed a
reply thereto, the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder reiterating their arguments in
their opposition to the motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 20
On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the
motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 21 The court simultaneously
held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint.
The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.
11639. 22 Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing on
affirmative defenses. 23 Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. vigorously opposed
said motion. 24
On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion
praying for the reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976. 25
The joint administrators having filed an opposition thereto, 26 on January 7,
1977 the lower court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. 27 It
held that while a notice of lis pendens would serve as notice to strangers
that a particular property was under litigation, its annotation upon the
certificates of title to the properties involved was not necessary because
such properties, being in custodia legis, could not just be alienated without
the approval of the court. Moreover, the court added, a notice of lis
pendens would prejudice any effort of the estate to secure crop loans
which were necessary for the viable cultivation and production of sugar to
which the properties were planted.
Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in
this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on
certiorari. Docketed as G.R No. L-45425, the petition contends that the
grounds of lis pendens, namely, that the properties are in custodia legis
and the lending institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are
not the legal grounds provided for under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating
that since on September 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of
the motion to dismiss, it was also proper to suspend the resolution of the
affirmative defenses interposed by the defendants until after trial on the
merits of the case. Accordingly, the court set the date of pre-trial for March
24, 1977. 28

On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-45965. Petitioners
contend that the lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639
as it involves the interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its
implementation and/or the adjudication of her properties. They assert that
the matter had been settled in Special Proceedings No. become final and
unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had
become final and unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No.
11639 was filed, and therefore, the cause of action in the latter case was
barred by the principle of res judicata. They aver that the claim of Celsa,
Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares, over the properties left
by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from
Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's
will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of
a fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said
provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil
code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.
On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the lower court from further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No.
11639. 29 After both G.R. Nos. L-45425 and L-45965 had been given due
course and submitted for decision, on January 20, 1986, the two cases
were consolidated.
The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated. 30 The law enjoins the probate of a will
and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice
thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. 31 The authentication of a will
decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which
the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 32
Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing

upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations abovementioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza,
Encarnacion, 34 the Court said:

33

and Torres v.

. . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the entire
estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision, within the
estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in
which this power and function of the court can be exercised and performed
without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the incovenience
and litigate an entirely different action.
Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court
has the jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent
adjudication of the properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo
v. Gerona, 35 and Benedicto v. Javellana, 36 this Court said:
. . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the
authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee
or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be
acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a
separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the
administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised,
inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make
distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate,
has the power to determine the proportion or parts to which each
distributee is entitled . . .. 37 A project of partition is merely a proposal for
the distribution of the heredity estate which the court may accept or reject.

It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto. 38
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the
testate estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted
on January 8, 1971, a project of partition in which the parcels of land,
subject matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included as
property of the estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee
of Maria Lizares. In accordance with said project of partition which was
approved by the probate court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio,
Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes
Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and
Subdivision on November 28, 1972, whereby they agreed to terminate
their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and
552 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005, T65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts taken altogether show that the
Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate
court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition
or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party
cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a
partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. 39
Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no
allegation that the inclusion was affected through improper means or
without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation
on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and
jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of
the partition. 40 The question of private respondents title over the lots in
question has been concluded by the partition and became a closed matter.
The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint,
Civil Case No. 11639, that Eustaquia had been in possession of the
questioned lots since March 2, 1971 up to the time of her death indicates
that the distribution pursuant to the decree of partition has already been
carried out. Moreover, it cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al. moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of
Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such
proceedings was already final and executory, then reglementary period of
thirty (30) days having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no
timely appeal having been filed by them. Therefore, they cannot now be
permitted to question the adjudication of the properties left by will of Maria
Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of the very
same properties subject of such partition.

A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the

title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous,
it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside
for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree
of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of
the project of partition becomes irrelevant. 41
It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle
of public policy, that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object of which the courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies." 42 The only instance where
a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control
or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even
then, the better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by
proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent
action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another court or judge
to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of. 43
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is
that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been
given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should
be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate. 44
All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the
order approving the distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs
instituted in said will has become final and unappealable; the probate court
that rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties; the judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a
proceeding in rem that was directed against the whole world including
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., so that it can be said that there is a
similarity of parties in Special Proceedings No. 8452 and Civil Case No.
11639, the judicial administrators of Eustaquia being privy to Celsa L. Vda.
de Kilayko, et al.; there is identity of subject matter involved in both
actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is identity of
causes of action because in the first action there was a declaration of the
probate court in its order dated April 6, 1974 that although the testatrix

intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her

will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be
valid, had not been satisfied. 45
Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No.
11639, the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are
conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria
Lizares 46 is not meritorious. While the allegation of the joint administrators
that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament
conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil
Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a
clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko,
et al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar
or simple substitution.
It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and
provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall
succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should
then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the
Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the
testator. 47 In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the
testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for,
upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally
devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria
Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of
intestacy.
With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the
properties involved, there is no merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al., that the lower court acted contrary to law and/or gravely
abused its discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice, being a mere incident in an
action, may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction over it at any given
time. 48 Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." 49 In this
case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the
principal reason that the administrators of the properties involved are
subject to the supervision of the court and the said properties are under
custodia legis. Therefore, such notice was not necessary to protect the
rights of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this case where it turned
out that their claim to the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal
basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in L-45425 is hereby

DENIED but the petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus in
L-45965 is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order of April 26, 1977
which was issued by the Court in L-45965 is made PERMANENT. Costs
against the petitioners in L-45425. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate
estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely:
his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto
and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who
lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain.
Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11,
1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965.
Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due
time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un terreno, con sus mejoras y
edificaciones,
situadoen
la
Escolta,
Manila............................................................. P500,000.00

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos parcelas de terreno situadas en

Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34

b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada

Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:

Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones de la 'Central Azucarera de la

Carlota
a
P17.00
por
accion ................................................................................8,347.00

En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan

Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad
restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building,
Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.

Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones de la 'Central Luzon Milling

Co.',
disuelta
y
en
liquidacion
a
P0.15
por
accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta
de
Ahorros
en
el
Philippine
Trust
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garantizada con prenda de las
acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores
de edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de
su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus
respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar
reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la
finca Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios
nombrados, en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido
padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,

A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas,

las usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios,
podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado,
sin intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as
follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One
part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her
legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free
portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds
(2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that
the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with
respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because
the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the
first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first
degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a
usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski,
who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution;
and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa
Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants,
violates the testator's express win to give this property to them
Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order
dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed
to this Court.

B.Y en usufructo a saber:

1. The widow's legitime.
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da.
Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33,
Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda
de Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,

The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of

the estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions
impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If

the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to

one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the
deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could
impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)

transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid

and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the
fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of
the testator.

It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants
question and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the
usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct
in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle
who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime
and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to
have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his
dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in

respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus:
con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su
defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.

2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of
another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir
originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds
of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious,
reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to
Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really
only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the
fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil
Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which
reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute
the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him,
or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers,
shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the
testator has otherwise provided.

The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided.

The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de
Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the
estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become
moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any
usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in
connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because
Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not
predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case
for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept
the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the
vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants
are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino
as follows:

The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:

ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or
first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to

Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,

substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly
adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one

tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the

first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word
"degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this
interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one
degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates
that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the
first heir.

usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is

proscribed by the Constitution.

From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a
parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation
or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a
simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to

the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact,
the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the
naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No

special pronouncement as to costs.

3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in
favor of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition
against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the
ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law
but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the
Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be
for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a
devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda
because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby

ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta and Escolin, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino J., took no part.

Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere

usufructuary of, and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in
question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition
thereof.
After trial upon the issue thus posed, the lower court rendered judgment as
follows:
1. Declaring that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with the defendant
of the house and lot described in the complaint to the extent of each of an
undivided 1/2 portion thereof; .

G.R. No. L-13876

February 28, 1962

CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffsappellees,

vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.
Felix V. Vergara for defendant-appellant.
B. Martinez for plaintiffs-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and
Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential
lot located a Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately
193 square meters, and the improvements existing thereon, covered by
Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one-half proindiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other
half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Da. Leona
Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and
approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding
No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said
property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them
to bring action.

2. Ordering the aforesaid co-owners to execute an agreement of partition

of the said property within 30 days from receipt of this judgment unless it
be shown that the division thereof may render it unserviceable, in which
case the provisions of Art. 498 of the New Civil Code may be applied; .
1wph1.t
3. That in the event the said parties shall fail to do so, this Court will
appoint the corresponding commissioners to make the partition in
accordance with law; and .
4. Without special pronouncement as to costs." .
From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.
It is admitted that Da. Leona Singson, who died single on January 13,
1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her death.
On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted to probate
in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 3605-R. At the time of the
execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were her brothers
Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and
Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
Clause IX of her last will reads as follows: .
NOVENO. Ordeno que se de a mi nieta por parte de mi hermana mia y
que al mismo tiempo vive en mi casa, y, por tanto, bajo mi proteccion, y es
la CONSOLACION FLORENTINO:
(A). La mitad de mi casa de materials fuertes con techo de hierro
galvanizado, incluyendo la mitad de su solar, ubicado en la Poblacion de

Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Calle Plaridel, actualmente arrendada por los hermanos
Fortunato, Teofilo y Pedro del appellido Kairuz. Pero si falleciere antes o
despues que yo mi citada nieta, esta propiedad se dara por partes iguales
entre mis tres hermanos Evaristo, Manuel y Dionisio, o a sus herederos
forzosos en el caso de que alguno de ellas murieie antes ... (Exhibit F.)
The issue to be decided is whether the testamentary disposition abovequoted provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion
fideicomisaria. This issue is, we believe, controlled by the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code in force in the Philippines prior to the effectivity
of the New Civil Code, in view of the fact that the testatrix died on January
13, 1948. They are the following: .
Art. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the
heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or
should not wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it is to
apply, shall include the three mentioned in the next preceeding paragraph,
unless the testator has otherwise provided:
Art. 781. Fidei-commissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is
charged to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of the
inheritance shall be valid and effective, provided they do not go beyond
the second degree, or that they are made in favor of persons living at the
time of the death of the testator." .
Art. 785. The following shall be inoperative: .
1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving them this
name or by imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation of
delivering the property to a second heir." ....
In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the testator may
not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his death, but also
provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs do not accept or are in
no position to accept the inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him.
The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person with
the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same to another
person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a particular event (6
Manresa, p. 1112).

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration

provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that
upon the death of Consolacion Florentino whether this occurs before or
after that of the testatrix the property bequeathed to her shall be
delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's three
brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should
anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created
what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that
Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner
of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitution
fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary
rights over the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be
entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As Manresa says, if the fiduciary
did not acquire full ownership of the property bequeathed by will, but mere
usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to deliver said
property to the fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude ownership over
the property, upon the death of the testatrix, passed to and was acquired
by another person, and the person cannot be other than the fideicomisario
(6 Manresa p. 145).
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an
obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit
to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his
death or upon the happening of a particular event. For this reason, Art. 785
of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall
have no effect unless it is made expressly ("de una manera expresa")
either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first heir the
absolute obligation ("obligacion terminante") to deliver the inheritance to a
substitute or second heir. In this connection Manresa says: .
Para que la sustitucion sea fideicomisaria, es preciso segun el art. 781, que
se ordeno o encargue al primer heredero, cuando sea tal, que conserve y
transmita a una tercera persona o entidad el todo a parte de la herencia. O
lo que es lo mismo, la sustitucion fideicomisaria, como declaran las
resoluciones de 25 de Junio de 1895, 10 de Febrero de 1899 y 19 de Julio
de 1909, exige tres requisitos: .
1.o Un primer heredero llamado al goce de los bienes preferentemente.
2.o Obligacion claramente impuesta al mismo de conservar y transmitir a
un tercero el todo o parte del caudal.
3.o Un segundo heredero.

A estos requisitos anade la sentencia de 18 de Noviembre de 1918, otro

mas, el del que el fideicomisario tenga derecho a los bienes de la herencia
desde el momento de la muerte del testador, puesto que ha de suceder a
este y no al fiduciario.
Por tanto, cuando el causante se limita a instituir dos herederos, y por
fallecimiento de ambos o de cualquiera de ellos, asigna la parte del
fallecido o fallecidos, a los herederos legitimos o a otras personas, solo
existe una sustitucion vulgar, porque falta el requisito de haberse impuesto
a los primeros herederos la obligacion de conservar y transmitir los bienes,
y el articulo 789, en su parrafo primero, evige que la sustitucion sea
expresa, ya dandole el testador el nombre de sustitucion fideicomisaria, ya
imponiendo al sustituido la obligacion terminante de conservar y transmitir
los bienes a un segundo heredero.

G.R. No. L-23638

October 12, 1967

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows

that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of
the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the
effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary
rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being
vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides
that upon appellee's death whether this happens before or after that of
the testatrix her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES,

petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of
the deceased Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar,
the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to
be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it
happens before or after that of the testatrix.

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA

REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with

costs.

---------------------------------------G.R. No. L-23662

October 12, 1967

Jose D. Villena for petitioners.

Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,

Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.

The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-R)
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to probate the alleged last will
and testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to the
probate.
It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba,
now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the

probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed
on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the
petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was
set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and
Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all
surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed
oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition
were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the
proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the
major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent
in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this
Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954, in cases G.R.
Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision
of June 20, 1958, found that the will was genuine and properly executed;
but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until
such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is
opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new
trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and
resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that
proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving
unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the
opportune time."
On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as
administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate,
and this was done on February 9, 1960.
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue
whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion
of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944,
subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter
under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of
1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of
the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of
sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the
will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the

same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation;

that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal
revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because
the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance.
Oppositors then appealed to this Court.
In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main issues:
(a) whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will
to probate had become final for lack of appeal; (b) whether or not the order
of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked
by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not
the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her
execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26,
1943 and April 3, 1944.
As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing
the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to
resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their
opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is
untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montaano
vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs.
Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate order is final and
appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such
order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's
resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal,
as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher
Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1,
expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in
special proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was
not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence,
the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the
evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged
against the decree was correctly dismissed.

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of

conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed.
For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will
and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation
invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely
implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties
concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute
revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament (Trillana vs.
Crisostomo, supra.).
As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara,
98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements
of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's,
expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the
decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence
of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the
Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised
Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on
the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation
of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious
and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article
957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) . . . .
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case
the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part
thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the
testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or
devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have
been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of
the quoted provision is a presumed change of intention on the part of the
testator. As pointed out by Manresa in his Commentaries on Article 869 of
the Civil Code (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 743)
Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este, despues
de legar, se desprende de la cosa por titulo lucrativo u oneroso, hace
desaparecer su derecho sobra ella, dando lugar a la presuncion de que ha
cambiado de voluntad, y no quiere que el legado se cumpla. Mas para que
pueda presumirse esa voluntad, es necesario que medien actos del
testador que la indiquen. Si la perdida del derecho sobre la cosa ha sido
independiente de la voluntad del testador, el legado podraquedar sin
efecto, mas no en virtud del numero 2 del articulo 869, que exige siempre
actos voluntarios de enajenacion por parte del mismo testador.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or
departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930
testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself,
appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision
annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court
in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620,
promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by
respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it
even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the
testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had
ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure
therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts
below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the
conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies,
if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the
annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that
it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship,
which was the only cause for the execution of Exhs. A and B (the 1943 and
1944 conveyances). (Decision, L-5618 and L-5620).
If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage
implies, then the transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent
in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that

such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the

original legacy.
True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the
alienated property "even if it be by reason of the nullity of the contract"
does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola (Codigo Civil,
Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract" can not be taken
in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example,
that if a testator's subsequent alienation were avoided because the
testator was mentally deranged at the time, the revocatory effect ordained
by the article should still ensue. And the same thing could be said if the
alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided on account of physical or
mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue influence in no way differs
from one made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the
transferor is not expressing his real intent,3 and it can not be held that
there was in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the
anterior bequest.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and
Fernandez. So ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Bengzon, J.P., J., are on leave, took no part.

10.0 Transcurridos diez o quince aos despues de mi muerte todas

mispropiedades, muebles o inmuebles, derechos y ventajosos, pueden
proceder a la venta de todos dando preferencia a los legatarios y de su
importe total se deduciran mil pesos (P1,000) para los cuartrohijos de mi
difunto hermano Fabian, todos los gastos y reservando una cantidad
suficiente y bein calcumada para sufrugar se distriburia a las siguientes
personas que aun vuiven, o a sus descendientes legitimos:
A
Isabel
M.
de
Santiago

cincuente
por
ciento
Los hijos de Domingo Legarda treinta por ciente
Filomena
Diaz

diez
por
ciento
Nestor M. Santiago diez por ciento (10%)

G.R. No. L-14474

October 31, 1960

ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE
OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees.
E. A. Beltran for appellant.
E. P. Villar for appellees.
R. F. Aviado for Trustee Bank.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order, dated May 23, 1958 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Special Proceedings No. 9226, denying appellant's petition
therein as hereafter discussed.
Briefly, the facts and circumstances that brought about this present appeal
may be narrated as follows:
Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
9.0 En caso de muerte de alguno o de todos los legatarios nom brados
por mi, seran beneficiarios o sea parasan los legados a favor solamente de
los descendientes y ascendientes legitimos, pero no a los viudos conyuges.

(50%)
(30%)
(10%)

On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died; and the aforesaid codicil,

together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No.
894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila. The proceedings for the
administration of the estate of Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the
estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee Bank of
the Philippine Islands, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children,
Milagros Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children,
and Onesima D. Belen, single.
On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special
Proceedings No. 9226, contending that the amount that would have
appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be
divided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as
the surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other
words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera.
The court, in its order on May 23, 1958 denied, as initially pointed out
Onesima's petition. More specifically, the court said:
After due consideration of the petition filed by Onesima D. Belen on March
19, 1958, wherein it is prayed that the trustee Bank of the Philippine Island
be directed to deliver to her "one-half of whatever share is due to the
deceased Filomena Diaz as legatee in the will and codicil of the deceased
testator Benigno Diaz y Heredia, subject of trusteeship in these
proceedings," this Court of the resolution of September 28, 1959, in which
resolution the following was declared:
"That the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of the proceeds of the sale
of the properties covered in paragraph 10 of the codicil aforesaid does not

and should not from part of her estate; it pertains to her legitimate
descendants; and
"That the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz should be distributed not only
between her children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera and Onesima D. Belen,
but also among her other legitimate descendants, if any, for descendientes
include not only children but also grandchildren, etc., and in this
connection. it is not amiss to observe that one may be a descendant and
not yet not be an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a
descendant.
From this order Onesima D. Belen has appealed to this Court, insisting that
(1) the Court below was in error in holding that its former resolution of
September 16, 1955 had been affirmed by our decision of February 28,
1958 in the case of Arguelles vs. Belen de Olaguera, G.R. No. L-10164 Feb.
28, 1958; and (2) that the term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used in
the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the
degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz. In the present case, they are
her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding the
seven grandchildren of said legatee.
As to her first point, the appellant is the correct ion her view that the trial
court's interpretation of clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz
has not been affirmed in our previous decision (G.R. No. L-10164). Perusal
of that judgment will show that this Court left the issue open at the time,
contenting itself with pointing out that the then appellant Administrator of
the estate of Folimena Diaz was not the proper party to the raise the
particular issue.
As the actual meaning of the provision
El restro se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus
descendientes legitimos,
it is undeniable that but this cluase the testator ordained a simple
substitution (sustitucion vulgar) with a plurality of substitutes for each
legatee. This form of substitution authorized by the first poart of Article
860 of the Civil Code (Art. 778 of the Code of 1889):
Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for two or
more heirs.

The issue is now squarely before us : do the words "sus descendientes

legitimos" refer conjointly to all living descendant (children and
grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the descendants
nearest in degree?
Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to
mean the relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy
should be therefore divided equally between her and her sister Milagros
Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters,
grand children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in
support of her thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (reproducing ne varieter Article 751 of the Code of 1889):
A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives
shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.
The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its
application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator,
not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the
testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the
relatives closest to him, because, as Manresa observes,
la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar este
favorecer a sus parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a ligadas al mismo
(testador) por los vinculos de la sanger y de la familia (6 Manresa, Comm.,
7th Ed., p. 72).
But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are
dearest) obviously does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of
another person (the legatee) and noot of the testator . There is no logical
reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the
rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided
substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would
prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he
envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a
preferred beneficiary.
Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by anology? There are various
reasons against this. The most important one is that under this article, as
recognized by the principal commentators on the Code of 1889, the
nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does
not operate. Castan, in his monograph "El derecho de representacion y

mecanimos jurididos afines en la sucesion testamentaria" (Reus, 1942),

says on this question (Pp. 13, 14, 15):
En el subgrupo ibericio de Europia y America predomina, aunque haya ex
excepciones, cuando menos en principio, no tiene cabida en la sucesion
testamentaria. Asi, por ejemplo, lo establece la doctrina cientifica en
Portugal y en la Argentina y lo ha sancionado la jurisprudencia en Cuba.
En igual sentido, en la doctrina espaola es opinion general que el derecho
de representacion, dentro del Codigo civil, no tiene lugar mas que en la
sucesion intestada, y en la testamentaria en la parte refernte a las
legitimas. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA juzga que la reopresentacion, atraida por la
herencia legitima, es repelida por la testada, y apunta, como razon de ello,
la de que "la primera descansa en la ley de la sangre, en el parentesco con
su consiguiente atributo de linea y grado, elementos propios o
indispensabnles para la repretascion , en tanto que l asegunda se basa
exclusivamente en la voluntad del testador, elemento diverso, en la
orderen legal, al de la naturaleza o de la sandre". Y el maestro DE DIEGO,
con orientacion anologa, piensa que como el titulo de la sucesion testada
es de origen voluntario y caracter personalismo, es evidente que no hay
terminos habiles para el derecho de representacion: los llamamientos son
individuales y la premoriencia del instituido, como su incapacidad,
aniquilan la institucion.
In the second place, the history of Article 751 (of the 1889 Code) shown
that the right of representation was deliberately suppressed. Says Castan
(op. cit., 24):
En nuestra Patria opino GARCIA GOYENA que debia tener a los parientos
mas representacion aun cuando el testator llame abiertamente la voluntad
del testador, debe "observarse el orden de la sucesion legitima, al que se
presume que en todo lo demas quiso atemperase. Poe ello, el art. 562
Proyecto de 1851 quedo redactadso asi: "La disposicion hecha simple y
generalmente a favor de los parientes del testador, se entiende hecha en
favor de los mas proximos en grado ; pero habra lugar al derecho de
representacion con todos sus efectos, con arreglo al tittulo siguiento".
Con poco acierto, a nuestro juicio, los autores del vigente Codigo han
suprimido esta salvedad del Proyecto del 51, y con ello han instaurado una
norma rigida, distanciada de lo que exige la equidad y de lo que suelen
establecer los Codiogos extranjeros. Los commentaristas convienen en que
la supresion ha sido intencionada, y por consiguiente el proposito del
legaslador es que en esta clase de llamamientos no se da el derecho, de
representacion. Dice Manresa que el art. 751 "tiene por favorecidos con tal

institucion, no a los parientes de mejor derecho, sino a los mas proximos

en grado y, por lo tanto, los de primer grado excluiran a los de segundo y
asi sucesivamente, toda vez que la art. 915". La misma interpretacion dan
al articulo de referencia NAVARRO AMANDI, MUCIUS SCAEVOLA, SANCHEZ
ROMAN y VALVERDE.
The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filorema Diaz
the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited
to her children, or anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren altogether.
This could hardly be the intention of the testator who, in the selfsame
clause 10 of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto
hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de Domingo Legarda," as well as of
"descendientes legitimos" of the other legates, to us indicating clearly that
he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous
terms. Observe that, in referring to the substitutes of Filomena Diaz, Nestor
Santiago and Isabel M. de Santiago, the testator, does not even use the
description "sus hijos o descendientes," but only "descendientes".
It is suggested that "descendientes legitimos" could mean the nearest
descendant but with the right of representation in favor of the more distant
relatives. Unquestionably, the testator was at liberty to provide a series of
successive substitutions in the order of proximity of relationship to the
original legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain that the more distant
descendants should enjoy the right of representation as in intestate
succession. But to arrive at such conclusion, we must declare that the
testator had:.
(a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion among co-heirs
and co-legatees, as established for testamentary successions by Articles
10016 (old Art. 982) and 1019, and intended to replace such accretion with
representation;
ART. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a
testamentary succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance, or to the
same portion thereof, pro indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator or renounce
the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1019. The heirs to whom the petition goes by the right of accretion
take it in the same proportion that they inherit.
(b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced from Article 765 of
the Code of 1889) providing that:
Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts,
which would not obtain if the right of representation were to apply;
(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that vacancies in
the free part should be filed according to the rules of accretion or
substitution (not representation); and in default of these two, ultimately
inherited by the testator's own heirs intestate:
ART. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does
not take place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute
has been designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall
receive it with the same charges and obligations.
There is no doubt that, the testator's intention being the cardinal rule of
succession in the absence of compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have
rendered inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he had so desired. But
without any other supporting circumstances, we deem expression "o a sus
desecendientes legitimos," the testator Benigno Diaz did intend to
circumvent all the legal provisions heretofore quoted. It was incumbent
upon appellant to prove such intention on the part of the testator; yet she
has not done so.
It is interesting to note that even under the Anglo-Saxon doctrine, the
courts are divided on the question whether a bequest to "relatives" or
"issue," made in general terms, gives rise to succession per capita or per
stripes. In Wyeth, et al., vs. Crane, 174 N.E. 871, the Supreme Court of
Illinois said;

The meaning of the word "descendants", when used in a will or deed to

designate a class to take property passing by the will or deed, has been
frequently considered and decided by the Court of England and the United
States. They established rule in England from an early date was that the
word "descendants" or the word "issued" unexplained by anything in the
context of the instrument, means all persons descending lineally from
another, to the remotest degree, and includes persons descended, even
though their parents are living, and that such descendants take per capita
stripes.
The courts of this country are divided on the question of whether in case of
a gift or conveyance to "descendants" or "issue", children take
concurrently with their parents. The so- called English rule has been
adhered to in New York, New Jersey, and Tenessee. . . . On the other hand,
the courts of Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island and South Carolina have
held that, in case of a gift or conveyance to descendants or issue,
unexplained by anything in the context of instrument, children do not take
currently with their parents.
We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the
proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating
a class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per
capita, in consonance with article 846. So that the original legacy to
Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and
grandchidren.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant..
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Gutierrez, David
and Paredes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES,

petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs.
Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived
by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed
has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R.
Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix
of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of
the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated
February 4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of

the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned
Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition.
First is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-inlaw? Second are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow
from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said
widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,
and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several
heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in
equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or
their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the
same share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid
of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either

by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the

Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to
1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of
the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-inlaw, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those
in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse
in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in
Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married
to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with
respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited
does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said
Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the
deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the
mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by
Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to
succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed
his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as
she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her
husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it

unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving
spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded
to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971

GERTRUDES
DE
LOS
SANTOS,
vs.
MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.
Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.

plaintiff-appellee,

Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.
From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21,
1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance
against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging, among others, that on August 24,
1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an
extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of which was attached to the
complaint) over a certain portion of land with an area of around 20,000 sq.
m.; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the
defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the
latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate
which was the subject matter of the agreement, all expenses in connection
therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the
aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by
the co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant refused
to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the
aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to
comply with his obligation under the extrajudicial partition agreement and
to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the
extrajudicial partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that
the plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the said
agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the plaintiff
was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and
was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that
although he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him,
nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and
improve properly the subdivided estate. The answer contained a
counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise
sold her share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial
partition agreement being void insofar as the latter was concerned, he was
entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds as his share by way of
reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the
extrajudicial partition agreement be declared void with respect to the
plaintiff; and, on his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him
the sum of P2,500.00.

On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19,
1965, declaring the plaintiff in default for not having answered the
counterclaim.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following
stipulation of facts:
1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the "Extra-Judicial
Partition Agreement" dated August 24, 1963, which was marked as Exhibit
"A" for the plaintiff, and Exhibit "I" for the defendant, which partition
agreement was marked as Annex "A" in the complaint;
2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-mentioned
Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the distribution of the in
question for the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz; however the parties further
agree that several lots in the said land have been sold by some of the coheirs, and there are houses several houses constructed therein and
residents therein;
3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed Administrator
and In-charge of the development and subdivision of the land in question,
as provided for in the aforementioned extrajudicial partition agreement;
4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd
paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have been sold by the
defendant herein; and parties further agree that there are no properly
constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;
5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the deceased
Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and predecessor in
interest of the land which was the subject matter of the extra-judicial
partition agreement;
6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz;
7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October 16,
1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as Exhibit "2"
for tap defendant; and
8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece of
the said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz died on
September 22, 1935, as evidenced by Exhibit "3" for the defendant.

In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the
defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was
estopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the
decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide by the terms of the
agreement. The court ordered the defendant "to perform his obligations to
develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as described on page 2 of the
Extrajudicial Partition Agreement" (meaning, apparently, that the
defendant should develop the subdivision because said Lots 1, 2 and 3
were intended to be sold for this purpose), and to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees,
and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's counterclaim. The
defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was denied. Hence,
this appeal.
The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down
to the following:
1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition
agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and,
consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
defendant-appellant.
2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is estopped
from questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the agreement enforced.
3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual
damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting the
relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.
1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit
that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate on October 16,
1962; that defendant-appellant is a nephew of the said decedent; that
plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother,
Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz; that
plaintiff-appellee's mother died on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing
Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition
agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz.

The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a heir

of the decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being
a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the
latter by right of representation.
ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending
line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly
takes place. ... .
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y
Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905), said,
... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a
nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral
line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters
of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart,
the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz
are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant.
Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the
inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation
in the extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the
present action is concerned? They did not confer upon her the right to
institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to
divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the said
agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in
representation of her deceased mother. The pertinent portion of the
agreement is herein quoted, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, we ... and Diego de los Santos, married to Anastasia de

la Cruz; Mariano delos Santos married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos
Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila
David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota; all in
representation of our mother, MARCIANA DELA CRUZ, ..., do hereby by
these presents, mutually, voluntarily and amicably agree among ourselves
to equitably divide the property left by the deceased PELAGIA DELA CRUZ,
and adjudicate unto ourselves definite and independent portions of the
estate in the following manner ... .
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties
thereto were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was
one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such
a heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of
the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but
who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the
deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir,
when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of
the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void
(De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee
could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms
enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against
defendant-appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17
Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public
policy (Baltazar vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos.
16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 5221). In Ramiro vs. Grao, et al., 54
Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:
No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct the party sought to
be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And which there
is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is that the acts and
declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to his legal
rights will not estop him to assert the same, especially where every fact
known to the party sought to be estopped is equally well known to the
party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)

And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February
28, 1963 (7 SCRA 367), this Court said:
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise
the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow
herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these
properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also
signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the
very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the
actor must have knowledge of the facts and be apprised of his rights at the
time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without
knowledge works no estoppel. ... .
3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be
sustained in view of the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore,
actual or compensatory damages must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil
Code). Here, no proof of such damages was presented inasmuch as the
case was decided on a stipulation of facts and no evidence was adduced
before the trial court.
We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged
that plaintiff-appelee sold her share to a certain person for the price of
P10,000.00, and claims that he is entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the
proceeds by right of reversion. It will be noted that plaintiff-appellee had
been declared in default on defendant-appellant's counterclaim; but the
latter did not present any evidence to prove the material allegation therein
more specifically, the alleged sale of the former's share for the sum of
P10,000.00. That no such evidence had been adduced is understandable,
for the parties expressly submitted the case for the resolution of the court
upon their stipulation of facts which, unfortunately, did not make any
mention of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant made any offer or
move to introduce the necessary evidence to that effect for the
consideration and evaluation by the trial court.
Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's
having been declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have
admitted all the allegations in his counterclaim, so that the court a quo
should have granted the relief prayed for by him. We find no merit in this
contention.
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

SECTION 1. Judgment by default.if the defendant fails to answer within

the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the
plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default.
Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and
render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts
proven may warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to a
counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party complaint within the period
provided in this rule.
The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this
Court said:
Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment by default
against a defendant who has neither appeared nor filed his answer does
not imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting
evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the
facts and causes of action of the plaintiff, because the codal section
requires the latter to adduce his evidence in support of his allegations as
an indispensable condition before final judgment could be given in his
favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission by the defendant that
the plaintiff's causes of action find support in the law or that the latter is
entitled to the relief prayed for. ... .
Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the
parties that said plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of
the estate by virtue of the extrajudicial partition agreement dated August
24, 1963, to wit:
(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m. as described
in the Technical Description to be adjudicated to Diego delos Santos,
married to Anastacia dela Cruz; Mariano delos Santos, married to Regina
Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos
Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila
David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota, in coownership, share and share alike.
Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his
contention that the lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim
and, consequently, in not sentencing appellee to turn over to him his
corresponding share of said portion received by appellee under the void
partition. Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly received and
took possession of the property of a deceased person without any right, by
virtue of a null and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate

successor in the inheritance (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., supra). Of

course, if such share has already been disposed of by appellee to a bona
fide purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the unproven allegations of the
counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific amount to
defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such
sale for the reason that, as already stated above, this aspect of the
counterclaim has not been touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has
it been supported by evidence which appellant should have presented in
the lower court but did not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed
from is hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved
from any ability to and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's
counterclaim, appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or reconvey to him
his corresponding share of the property she has received under the
extrajudicial partition hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not already
been disposed of as alleged. Costs in both instance against plaintiffappellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti

Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2)
that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa
Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976;
6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;

Castro,

June 17, 1987 G.R. No. L-66574

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA
PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN,
respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of
First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying
among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be
issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of
the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of
an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and
B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and
Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed
"Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March
1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in
intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.

her
13,
the
the

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa
Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the

intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to
be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its
order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was
rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983
(reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which
reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts
and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered
sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner
as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositorsappellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship
in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and

December 9, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and
executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the
legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti
Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees
(petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit
from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their
father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de
Santero.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in
their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on
the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies
the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of
representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right
to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by
Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the
right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of
their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5

I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of

petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978)
and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who
is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);

Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers

solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the
legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of
Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural
grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession to the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
(943a)

III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or
relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the petitioners'
grandchildren Santero;

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the

other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero.

Costs against the oppositors-appellees.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners
herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated
February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the
following:

IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who
is a niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her
direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are
the applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of
said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by

the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in
turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the
succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the
Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are
reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted
only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code
prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows
the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992
prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him
in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make
a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the
right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The
first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis
illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession,
JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976,
Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of
the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of
this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein
are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to
be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court

erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976
and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without
merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held
that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and
hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of
the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976,
which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion
for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long
became final and executory are already removed from the power of
jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by
the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to
order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling
that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa
Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and
executory, hence null and void. "
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan
(Chairman),
Gutierrez,
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., took no part.

Jr.,

and

Cortes,

JJ.,

concur.

G.R. No. L-19382

August 31, 1965

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA

FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE
VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law,
from a resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitionerappellant herein, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary
settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris, Special Proceeding No. 2177-R
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as well as from the
order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to reconsider said
resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she
transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there
continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960
of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been
heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years
having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was
declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and
distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3)
share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or
less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of
the same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant,

ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives,
namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita,
and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the
children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who predeceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the
nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia
Ferraris.

(Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that
nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e.,
per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as
provided expressly by Article 975:

The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the
contending parties to said Melodia Ferraris:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals
(aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily
apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that provided as follows:

Note: Picture
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the
intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by
collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who
predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children
of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded
by the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only
predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitionerappellant) of the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer
in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed
by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees
distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded
by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in
accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present
appeal that she is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the
oppositors appellees, three degrees removed from the decedent; and that
under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of representation could
take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur
with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed
in their own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far
distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the
collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted
by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir

ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive
with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in
equal portions.

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the
full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more
clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately
preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954
of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving

spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the

entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse,
while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par
with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other
collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009
of the present Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a
rule of preference. Which is true as to "other collaterals," since preference
among them is according to their proximity to the decedent, as established
by Article 962, paragraph 1.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly
takes place.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other
collaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his
commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants
had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly states:
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives
within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any
affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore,
relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for
successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article
should be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest

relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in

equal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed without
distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole
blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified
to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby
affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar,
JJ.,
concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R.
Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS,
RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD
ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventyseven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of
probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73
Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives
were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the
wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L.
Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana
(Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died
in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona
Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael
Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of
whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated
November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees
named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of
Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be
declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also
opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro
Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty.
Cruz appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in
conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate.
should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed
"que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y
negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los raismos y

que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la

declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del
difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project
of partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended
to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his
death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen
malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator
intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would
be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay
motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco
sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites
article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus
(deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476).
Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and
31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise
agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees
agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the
heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant
Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of
Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar
compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final
and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment
were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt
dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the
Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in
full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with
Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the
settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court
approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was
pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the
Yangco's estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed
share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the

dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation

rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949
partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be
distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the
grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of
Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in
Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the
testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution
dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this
Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand
pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act
No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in
holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had
been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata
and laches.
In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether
Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas
Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved
by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal
heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's
supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The
trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y
Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre
natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that
Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate
child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated
June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his
acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, Hamados
Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos
(Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).

That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus
and Florencio Gonzales Diez
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco,
Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20,
as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He
contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy
found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the
statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that
Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin
implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the
mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael
Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in
the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable.
The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are
presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place
between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is
disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that
a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed
and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb]
and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was
illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose
Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus
has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of
his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita
Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did
not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el
legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes
legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural
ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis
causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman,
Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279,
287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...

Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child,

he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the
distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).

The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle,
a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38
Phil. 29).

The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.

That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds
of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged
natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or
acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall
succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they
shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants,
natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural
brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the
Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate
under the rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the
legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
(Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman
vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose
Table the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her
father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil.
128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural
father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent
(Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322;
Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).

SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and
RURAL BANK OF PARAAQUE, INC., respondents.
Porfirio C. David for petitioner.
Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor of petitioner:
(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir
of deceased FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate of
said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;
(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties
of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and
James Bracewen
(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria
Cailles in so far as the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision,
of the properties subject of this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles
and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share alike;
(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days
from the finality of this decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the
properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo
his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;

(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally
plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;

the appellate court, this petition for review was filed of the following
assignment of errors:

(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and

I RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN QUESTION

ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim.

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July
12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles
and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles
who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles
died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the
son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of
properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the
deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said
deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles,
(2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the
complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to
have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the
time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have
been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted
exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner
is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For
his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed
that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale
which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These
properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of
Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.

II RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT

ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
III RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE
GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO
INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the
exclusive properties of the private respondents.
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately,
as each has its own distinct factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by
Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which describes it as follows:
. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los
limites y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de
Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba
citada por la espalda la via ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle
Desposorio
After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting
from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell,
left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the
realty tax of the land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and
declared the same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to
run after this property, erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of
Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same.

After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted, finding
the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove ownership of
the properties in suit.

The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in
1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. '3') which describes the property as
follows:

From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals

which, as already stated, reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby
dismissing petitioner's complaint, reconsideration having been denied by

. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por

Norte con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de
Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y
Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una
extension superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.

After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in
1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and
her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija,
Francisco Reyes administered the property and like in the first case,
declared in 1949 the property in her own name. Thinking that the property
is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint,
claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share of
his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff
principally because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the
2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as the
properties sought by the plaintiff.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge
misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in
question.
To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the
land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal which
was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time,
including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del
Railroad Co.')
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the
description fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property
is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the
property described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and the
same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several
decades have already passed between the deed and the declaration and
'during that period, many changes of abode would likely have occurred.
Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio
St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914
up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this property is
the same, if not Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now
being sought after by the plaintiff.

With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from
Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar boundaries to
be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her name,
Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until
1948. (Reference to Exhibits omitted.) 2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of
fact, forgetting that since the present petition is one for review on
certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-established rule
laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the
Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The
exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3
None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence,
there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the
following findings:
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero
Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes.
He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and
that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca
Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes
by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth
certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro
Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of
this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that
vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca
Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence
to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is
not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on
September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his

bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that
the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he
himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further
details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation
which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be
an heir in the inheritance in question. 4
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition
for review in the absence of a clear showing that said finding is not
supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is
the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes
considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born
outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet
married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in
this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur with the observation that I would have dismissed the petition by
minute resolution for lack of merit.

(c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case
for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all,
the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified
for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within
sixty days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the
deceased Pedro Santillon.

G.R. No. L-19281

June 30, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON,

CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO
CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitionerappellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein
in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug,
Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta
Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land
located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow
Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales
on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition
were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to
be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two
documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the
properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario;

On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective
rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted
that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share
of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and
3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides
her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of
Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and
ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon,
the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share
and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro
Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the
conjugal properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two
questions of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is appealable. And
the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall the
estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors
are the spouse and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and,
therefore, appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from
an order of the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled."

The Second Issue: Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate
on Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the
widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary
estate. ... .
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the
other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of
the children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and
unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that
of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4
and the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996
should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision
on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child,
inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes
the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary
Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or
Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot
rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892
merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the
legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent
of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should
get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares
that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because
if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall
apply, i.e., Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's
contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm
the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter
on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our

colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as

having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow
survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal
parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:
One child Surviving. If there is only one legitimate child surviving with
the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the
child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law
refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that
the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this
case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these
propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply
when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should
be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996
is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is
assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.
A. Children. It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural
include the singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) :
"If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving
spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to
apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in
"children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will
not include "child" in the following articles:
ART. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and
descendants ... .
ART. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists
of one-half of the hereditary estate ... .
ART. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to onefourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem
to be inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate
succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, onefourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets
one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if
"children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given
to Art. 996.

B. Unfairness of Art. 996. Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In

testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child
gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if
Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower
one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the
widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half if
the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses
to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than
his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the
circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from
which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or
widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire
to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain and this we
are not called upon to discuss but it is the clear mandate of the statute,
which we are bound to enforce.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
and
Zaldivar,
JJ.,
concur.
Bautista
Angelo,
J.,
took
no
part.
Barrera, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977

GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA,
defendant-appellant.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.
Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct
application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a
legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and
San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh.
"D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua
Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit
H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E").
Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J)
and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime in 1901.
Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff
Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19,
1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria
Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.

Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her
heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome
Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14,
1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the
other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta
Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July
23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the
defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father
Geronimo Almanza.

The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the
one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5)
parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra
Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38
fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the
N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by Bernardino
Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12713 for the
year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed
at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m.
Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and
German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano
Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of
defendant Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11,739
sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and
Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the S. by Rosendo
Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto
Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of
Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the name
of defendant Geronimo Almanza;

D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo,

with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro
Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro; and
on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year 1948
in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452, assessed at P610.00
in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria,
Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990 sq. m.
Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by Julian
Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan River.
Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely:
(a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children
of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the
defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of
their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on
to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same.
Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the partition of
their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta
Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness
and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer
the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again
sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request
as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died
without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving
the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are
hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the
five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio Manese and the
heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are represented in the
instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required
to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until
the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land are
delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from the time this decision

shall have become final. With costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the
substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and
execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession,
that is, those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the
subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-half undivided
portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A, B
and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his
possession. 2
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of
Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court
in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura
Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of
the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to
admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died
on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa
succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the
New Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be brothers
and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he
concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of
Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the
subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the
stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. 3
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly
established in the trial court and that the only issue left for determination
is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case
to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil
Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles
provide:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive
with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in
equal portions."
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together
with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a
share double that of the latter.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed
per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for
brothers and sisters of the full blood.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It
appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of
full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half
blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are
entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. FerrarisBorromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that
"nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is
per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to
whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and
without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by
whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not
exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006
of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole
niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half
blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the
deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie
Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065
(unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
610).

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by

Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and
nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous
for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa
Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died
on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and
jurisprudence. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
affirmed. No costs.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Martin and Fernandez, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 194366

October 10, 2012

NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERICHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA
D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.

Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they

acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square
meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285, (P-14608) P-51536 and P-20551 (P8348)7issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967,
respectively.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique,
in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa
and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale 8 on July
7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties,
and thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and
Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment
of saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later
substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28,
assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited
period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas
additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their
legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage.

DECISION

In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that

the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance
of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victorias exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject
properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The RTC Ruling

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar (Alicia),
Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas
D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia), and Victoria D. IllutPiala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the April 27, 2010 Decision 2
and October 18, 2010 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 01031-MIN which annulled the October 25, 2004 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del Norte and instead,
entered a new one dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment of sale,
damages and attorneys feesagainst herein respondents heirs of spouses
Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).

On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others,
the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were
deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial
authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.

The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children,
two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely:
Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique
Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.

Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by

spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years,
holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April
27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held
that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound

by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale

considering spouses Uys possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia
and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years
fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather
died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their
legitimes from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent
saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding
that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares
as they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be
minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey
failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches
to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF
EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM
OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE
SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR
INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate
children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo
and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from
her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code
which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents
and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages.
xxx

ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her
children and Enrique acquired their respective inheritances, 9 entitling them
to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate, as follows:
Enrique

9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)

Eutropia

1/16

Victoria

1/16

Napoleon

1/16

Alicia

1/16

Visminda

1/16

Rosa

1/16

Douglas

1/16

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with

Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas
were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and
binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
(Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further
elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was
invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated

therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the
subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his children,
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but only
with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that
these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of
Anunciacion from the moment of her death 11and that, as owners thereof,
they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate. 12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father,
Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the
laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in
the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the childs
property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules
of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the childs
property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules,
and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons,
the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the
receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the

patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. 13 Thus, a father or

mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority,
does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter.
Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards
property and even then only with courts prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court. 14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his
minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them
upon reaching the age of majority, 15 is unenforceable in accordance with
Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers,
shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the
person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and
gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary
choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was
theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so
making the ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when
the person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed
from all its defects from the moment it was constituted, 17 as it has a
retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement
of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosas
Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique
Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and
brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse
Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was

voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was
absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are
concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we
do not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity
of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement
of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects
existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of
Rosas 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same,
however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing
ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and
therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares
ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead
properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person
can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a
consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally transfer." 20
On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso
co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were
deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas
under an implied constructive trust for the latters benefit, conformably
with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that
the amount paid for their shares equivalent to P 5,000.0021 each or a total
of P 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the
present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the

extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the
prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no
application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were
deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an
"action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10
years from the time the cause of action accrues, 22 which is from the time of
actual notice in case of unregistered deed. 23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy
failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the
prescriptive period of 10 years.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010
Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri
NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji
Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of the
late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. NeriChambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D.
Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERS of the 3/16 portions of the subject
homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998)
P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri,
Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan
to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid
corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the
total amount of P 15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum
computed from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12%
per annum thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA,
ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY
PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian,
CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. Nos. 54492-R and 54493-R which reversed the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Albay allowing the probate of the win of Don Jesus
Alsua in Special Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case 3068 after declaring the two deeds of sale executed by Don Jesus
Alsua legal and valid. The respondent court 1 denied the probate of the will,
declared null and void the two sales subject of the complaint and ordered
the defendants, petitioners herein, to pay damages to the plaintiffs, now
the private respondents, the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to
render an accounting of the properties in their possession and to reimburse
the latter the net gain in the proportion that appertains to them in the
properties from the date of the firing of the complaint up to complete
restoration plus Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees and
costs.
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated
actions are the following.
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a Florentina
Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca
Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde
Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized
agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then
present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a
Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential

features of which are stated in private respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29, to wit:
t.hqw
(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the properties of the
Alsua spouses, which inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them signed by
the spouses and all the above named heirs in the left margin of every page
(parafo primers).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties described in
the inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties with the exception of five
parcels of land Identified with the figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San
Miguel Brewery stock which are paraphernal properties of the late Do;a
Tinay (segundo parafo).
(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine children
but five of them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code
(old) to avoid Possible misunderstanding among their children concerning
the inheritance they are entitled to in the event of death of one of them
they have decided to effectuate an extrajudicial partition of all the
properties described in Annex "A" thereto under the following terms and
conditions: (Parafo quinto):
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all
the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described
from pages 1-12 of said inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a total land
area of 5,720,364 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of
P69,740.00.
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the
real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from
pages 12-20 of said inventory or, 26 parcels of land with a total land area
of 5,679,262 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P55,940.00.
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all
the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described
from pages 20-33 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land
area of 6,639,810 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of
P89,300.00.
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned
all the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described

from pages 33-47 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land
area of 5,630,715 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of
P58,830.00. t.hqw
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and admit
that the totality of the properties allotted and adjudicated to the heirs as
described in the preceding paragraph, constitute one half of the properties
described in Annex "A", including any amount of cash deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties
assigned to them as their hereditary portion represent one-half not only of
the conjugal properties but includes the paraphernal properties waiving
now and forever any complaint or claim they have or they may have
concerning the amount, value, extension and location of the properties
that are allotted to each and everyone. They also waive any claim they
have or they may have over the remaining portion of the properties, which
spouses reserved for themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone of the
heirs acknowledge that the properties which are left in the possession of
the surviving spouse, including any amount in cash, are even less than the
one- half that should correspond in absolute ownership as his legitimate
participation in the conjugal properties. In consequence they waive any
claim that they have or may have over said portion of said properties or
any amount in cash during the lifetime of the surviving spouse, including
any right or claim they have or they may have over the paraphernal
properties of Do;a Tinay in the event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them, the
surviving spouse waives any claim he or she may have over the properties
assigned or adjudicated to the heirs under and by virtue of this deed. The
properties which were reserved for them (the spouses) should be
considered as his or her legitimate participation in the conjugal properties
and the fair compensation of his or her usufruct on the properties that the
surviving spouse reserved for himself or herself which shag be distributed
in equal shares among the heirs upon his or her death unless said
properties of some of them have been disposed of during the lifetime of
the surviving spouse.
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy of the
provision contained herein shall be under obligation to pay to the other
heirs, in the concept of damages and prejudice, the sum of P5,000.00 plus
attorney's fees.

(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties assigned or
adjudicated to each and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as his
share or participation in the estate or as his inheritance left by the
deceased and each heir shall become the absolute owner of the properties
adjudicated to him under this deed.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina, also known as Do;a
Tinay separately executed their respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and
7-B), the provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of
the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills
similarly provided for the institution of the other to his or her share in the
conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been
partitioned to constitute their legitime among their four living children in
the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in the event
of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half thereof
would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided
equally among the four children. The holographic will of Do;a Tinay
written in Spanish reads, as translated: t.hqw

Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the following- my

spouse Don Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and personal,
and the other half, to my children Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O.
Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson, and
Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to be
understood, however, that the other half that corresponds as legitime to
my above named children have already been given to them, pursuant to a
document dated November 25, 1949 and ratified on the same day, month
and year before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15;
Lib. 11; Series of 1949) enjoining each and everyone of them to respect
and faithfully comply with each and every clause contained in the said
document.
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of this
testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above
named children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same
proportion that is, one-half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my
children in equal parts.
Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua without
having to post any bond.

TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to Don Jesus
Alsua, resident of and with postal address in the Municipality of Ligao,
Province of Albay, Philippines, being in the full possession of my mental
and physical faculties freely and spontaneously execute this my last will
and testament in my handwriting and signed by me and expressed in the
Spanish language which I speak, write and understand, this 5th day of
January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which I
ordain and provide:
First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband Don
Jesus Alsua and begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of whom are still
living and they are Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and
Amparo Alsua. The other five (5) died during their minority, single and
without children.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and during
our conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts and industry, we were
able to acquire conjugal properties consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao
lands and urban lands registered in the office of the Registry of Property of
the Province of Albay and in the City of Manila.

IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting this testament

on this 5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of
Albay, Philippines.
(SGD.) FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar
holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms
and conditions as the above will of his wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay filed before the
Court of First Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of
their respective holographic wins which were docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No.
485 (Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua, Petitioner).
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay executed their
mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their
respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged

and provided that one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal
and paraphernal, had been disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned
among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November
25, 1949, but that they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus
and Do;a Tinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said
legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they
mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation
therein as well as in all properties which might be acquired subsequently.
Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the surviving spouse,
whatever belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would be
divided equally among the four children. It was also declared in both
codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse
was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator
of all the properties reserved for themselves.
The codicil executed by Do;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as
translated: t.hqw
CODICIL
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That my
spouse and I have agreed to divide the properties which we have acquired
into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would correspond to me covers all the properties
that I have partitioned among my children in the Document of Partition
dated November 25, 1949 before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores, Jr. (Doc.
No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11; Series of 1949) (and) even as the
properties which by reason of this testament I leave to my husband as his
share and the other half that corresponds to my husband constitutes an
the properties that up to now have not been disposed of, particularly the
urban lands situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of Albay and
in the City of Manila, with the exception of that portion that I bequeath to
my husband as his inheritance and his legitimate.
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don Jesus
Alsua and my children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and
Amparo Alsua. I leave to my aforecited children all the properties described
in the above mentioned Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949
which correspond to each one of them and in the profits (fruits) expressed
in the same, and in the event that the properties granted to one or any of
my children should exceed in quantity or value those corresponding to
another or others, I hereby declare that it is my will that the same be
divided among my children as their inheritance from the free portion of my
property.

I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws inheritance

the part of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated
in favor of my children in the Document of Partition aforecited and that
which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to
him as above stated, including all those properties which we shall acquire
after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare
that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that pertain to me or
would pertain to me, which have not been disposed of pursuant to the
partition, should be divided equally among my above-mentioned heirs after
my death. Ligao, Albay, Philippines, August 14,1956.
(SGD.) FLORENTINA RALLA DE ALSUA
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus
executed also a separate but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and
conditions as the above codicil of his wife. Also on the same day of August
14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay both filed their
respective supplemental petitions for the probate of their respective
codicils in the probate proceedings earlier filed. On February 19, 1957,
their respective holographic wins and the codicils thereto were duly
admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named
executor to serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on
October 13, 1959. Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of Don
Jesus, he took his oath of office and performed his duties as such until July
1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his
holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban
P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining
properties with their corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio
imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed
by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms
home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will and testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus
executed on November 14, 1959 had three essential features: (a) it
expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus'
holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it
provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living

children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and

that such properties be taken into account in the partition of his estate
among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as legatees/devisees
of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the properties and
whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death,
were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as executrix to
serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Do;a
Tinay had been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the
probate court for approval a deed of partition executed on December 19,
1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and which essentially confirmed the provisions of the
partition of 1949, the holographic will and codicil of Do;a Tinay. On July 6,
1960, the court approved the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961
declared the termination of the proceedings on the estate of Do;a Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix
named in the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of
said new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the Court of First Instance of Albay
and was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions thereto
were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian
Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of
sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of the alleged will;
(b) that the will was executed under duress or influence of fear or threats;
or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the main beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with
them, or the signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud; (c) that
the will was not executed according to the formal requirements of the law;
and (d) that the alleged will subject of probate contravened the
Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon by him, his deceased spouse,
Do;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando
thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also contravened Don Jesus'
own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively,
essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949 which
had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the
partition of the estate of Do;a Tinay in December, 1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated
November 14, 1959, the Probate Court appointed her Administratrix of the
estate of her late father, Don Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the Probate
Court an inventory of the properties of the estate which, according to the
oppositors therein (the private respondents now) did not include some

properties appearing in the agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the

inventory attached thereto as Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion"
of December 19, 1959 as belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus.
According to the oppositors, these properties consist of thirty- three (33)
premium agricultural lots with a total land area of 1,187,970 square
meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a total assessed value of
P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of P238,000.00 at only
P2,000.00 per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots Ideally located
in the business section of Legazpi City including the lot and the building
presently occupied by the well-known "Mayon Hotel" with an assessed
value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market value at the time
of P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will that these properties were
bequeathed to Pablo Alsua and Francisco Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3 parcels
of the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to Francisco, the
oppositors also raised in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the
inventory of the estate of their late father. In answer, Francisco claimed
ownership over the same, alleging that she bought the properties from
their father and presenting the two Deeds of Sale now being assailed, one
dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show the sale of the 33 parcels of
agricultural land to Francisco by their father for the price of P70,000.00 and
the other dated November 26, 1962 evidencing the sale of the four urban
lots for the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the oppositors
filed Civil Case No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two
deeds of sale, with damages, which upon agreement of the parties was
then jointly heard and tried with Special Proceedings No. 699 for probate of
the Last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First
Instance of Albay promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973, the
dispositive portion of which states: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, to
wit:
1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and ALLOWS
the Will executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on November 14,
1959, which had been marked as Exhibit A, consisting of nine (9) pages,
and orders that the same be made the basis for division and distribution of
the estate of said testator;
2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint and holds
that the sale on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale on November 26,
1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and valid sales and accordingly conveyed title to
the VENDEE thereof. The Plaintiffs in Civil Case 3068. are ordered jointly

and severally to pay to the defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for
attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
and to pay the costs.
On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court
reversed the appealed decision in a judgment rendered on April 4, 1977,
the dispositive portion of which states, as translated, thus
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to set
aside as it hereby sets aside the decision appealed from in the following
manner: (1) in Special Proceedings 699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is
hereby denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068, Exhs. U and W and the titles
issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null and void, ordering the
appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to pay to the plaintiffs in the
concept of fixed damages, the sum of P5,000.00 and to render an
accounting of properties in their possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs
the net gain, in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties
subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of this
complaint, up to the complete restoration of the properties pertaining to
(plaintiffs) pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, paragraph 11,
ordering them in addition to pay to the plaintiffs and oppositors the sum of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs.

incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to execute his will cannot be determined

by acts of the herein private respondents as oppositors to the will in
formally agreeing in writing jointly with the petitioner Francisca Alsua de
Betts that their father, Don Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the court executor
of the will of their mother in Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of
Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court
not to require Don Jesus Alsua to file any accounting as executor in the
proceedings, which petitioners claim and was upheld by the trial court as
constituting estoppel on the part of the private respondents from
questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling
laid down in the case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol
Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an eminent and recognized authority on Civil Law when
he was still in the Court of Appeals, and We quote: t.hqw
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application
therein of the rile of estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment of the
truth as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament,
would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of private
parties is that of the state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried
out if, and only if, executed conformably to law.

Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four
assigned errors, to wit:

The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's Will, 300 N.Y.S.,
502:

I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the findings of the
probate court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that private respondents,
oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to question the
competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.

'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of

the right of any living person, but to determine whether or not the
decedent has performed the acts specified by the pertinent statutes, which
are the essential prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of
devolution of his property on death. There is no legal but merely a moral
duty resting upon a proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the
departed, and he may and frequently does receive no personal benefit
from the performance of the act.

II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that testator
Don Jesus Alsua cannot revoke his previous will.
III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures resulting in a gross misapprehension of facts.
IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of August 26,
1961 (Exh. U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).
On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold
that the same is of no moment. The controversy as to the competency or

One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is the

duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with the
public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased person (Matter of
Watson's Wilt 262 N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E., 787; Matter of Marriman's
Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208, N.Y.S., 672; Foley, S., affirmed 217 app.
Div., 733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S., Matter of Draske's Estate, 160
Misc. 587, 593, 290, N.Y.S., 581). To that end, the court is, in effect, an
additional party to every litigation affecting the disposal of the assets of

the deceased. Matter of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc. 295, 298,
N.Y.S., 219.'
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent
court erred in not allowing the probate of the last will and testament of Don
Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim that the disallowance was based on
speculations, surmises or conjectures, disregarding the facts as found by
the trial court. The Civil Court is very clear and explicit in providing the
cases where a will may be disallowed under Article 839 which provides as
follows: t.hqw
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a
wilt at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of
fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on
the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the
respondent court itself when it accepted the findings of the trial court on
the due execution of the questioned will and testament of Don Jesus,
declaring:
... and going back to the previous question, whether the questioned will
and testament of November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in accordance
with Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil Code, this Tribunal from the very
beginning accepts the findings of the inferior court concerning the
question, t.hqw
On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at Ligao, Albay. About 2 weeks
after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make a new will,
thereby revoking and cancelling his previous holographic will which he

made on January 5, 1955 and also its codicil dated August 14, 1956. In the
presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, he crossed
out in ink each and every page of said page he wrote on each page the
word "cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon (Exh V-5, V-6,
consecutively up to and including Exh. V-14). He then instructed Ramirez to
make a list of all s properties with their corresponding descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer, Don Gregorio Imperial, Sr.
and the latter came accompanied by his son, Atty. Jorge S, Imperial, who,
incidentally, is now a judge of the Court of First Instance of Naga City,
Camarines Sur. Don Jesus informed his lawyers that he wanted to make a
new will, and accordingly gave more detailed instructions as to how he
wanted to divide his properties among his four children. He handed to
them a list and on the left he indicated the name of the child to whom the
listed properties shall pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the
instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his major
language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio are always in
Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959, Atty. Jorge S. Imperial
showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft of the will and after reading it Don
Jesus said that it was as directed by him, and after making a few minor
corrections, he instructed Atty. Jorge S. Imperial to put the win in final form.
He further told Atty, Jorge Imperial that the signing of the will should be at
his home in Ligao, in the morning of November 14, 1959, and that the
witnesses should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register of Deeds of
Albay; Mr. Jose Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya
who is a sort of employee of Don Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don Gregorio and Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial, riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi residence of Mr. Ramon
Balana, and informed the latter that Don Jesus was requesting him to be
one of the attesting witnesses to his will. Mr. Balana, having a very high
regard for Don Jesus, considered it an honor to be so asked, and gladly
went with the Imperials. They arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at
Ligao; Albay, almost ten o'clock of that morning, and they were ushered in
by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter requested them to be seated at the usual
receiving room on the ground floor while he announced their arrival to Don
Jesus who was on the second floor. Soon Don Jesus came down, carrying
with him the will to be signed placed inside a cartolina folder. He greeted
Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty. Imperial and immediately joined them in
conversation. Mr. Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose residence is
just across the road from the house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was
already informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact of signing the will
that morning, and so, on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials had
already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the residence of Don Jesus,

without much delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the coming back of
Gaya, there were now six people gathered in the living room, namely: Don
Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon
Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the witnesses who
testified for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus was in bright and lively
conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits of Frenchmade wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock, Don Gregorio made a remark that it is about
time to do what they were there for, and this was followed by a more or
less statement from Jesus, who said: t.hqw

of Albay, notarized the wilt and sealed it with his notarial seat which seal
he brought along that morning. After all the three sets were notarized, they
were all given back to Don Jesus who placed them inside the same folder.
At that moment, it was already about 12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus invited all
of them to lunch, which invitation was gladly accepted by all of then-L (pp.
474-480, Joint Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 54492-R) which findings are
supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to conclude that the same
had not complied with the requirements of Arts. 804- 806 of the New Civil
Code. ... (CA Decision, pp. 13-16, as translated).

'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a ustedes que esten presentes para

ser testigos de rni ultimo voluntad y testamento que ha sido preparado por
el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyo documento
tengo aqui conmigo y encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta
satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis instrucciones, Como saben ustedes
tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos egos.' (pp. 43-44, t.s.n., hearing of December
7, 1967, Sarte.

This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the
findings of the lower court declaring the contested will as having been
executed with all the formal requirements of a valid will, are supported by
the evidence. This finding is conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot
alter, review or revise the same. Hence, there is no further need for Us to
dwell on the matter as both the lower court and the respondent appellate
court have declared that these are the facts and such facts are fully borne
and supported by the records. We find no error in the conclusion arrived at
that the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. We rule
that the questioned last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully
complied with the formal requirements of the law.

On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table on
another part of the same sala for convenience in signing because there
were chairs all around this table. The will which consisted of nine pages,
with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid on the round table and the signing
began, with Atty. Jorge S. Imperial assisting each person signing by
indicating the proper place where the signature shall be written. Don Jesus,
as testator, signed first. After signing the original and the two other sets,
the three sets were then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed as
attesting witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed next as
another attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished signing all the
three sets, the same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who also signed as the
third attesting witness. On each of the three sets, Don Jesus signed ten
times, one on the margin of each of the nine pages, and at the end of
the instrument proper. Each of the three attesting witnesses (Balana,
Madarieta and Gaya) signed eleven times on each set, one on the
margin of each of the nine pages, one at the end of the instrument proper
and one below the attestation clause. The original will was marked as Exh.
A (or set A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K) and the triplicate of Don
Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were Identified by Mr.
Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge) imperial. It was also clearly
established that when Don Jesus signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta,
and Mr. Gaya were present and witnessed said signing, and that when each
of these three witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and the two other
attesting witnesses were present and Witnessing said Signing. The signing
by the testator and the attesting witnesses having been completed, Atty.
Jorge S. Imperial as Notary Public with commission for the entire province

Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain
details which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course
of things and of life." First was the fact that the spouses Don Jesus and
Do;a Tinay together with their four children Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and
Fernando had executed the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949
(Exh. A) which divided the conjugal properties of the spouses between the
spouses themselves and the children under the terms and conditions and
dispositions herein before stated and to implement its provisions, Don
Jesus and Do;a Tinay subsequently executed separately their respective
holographic wigs both dated January 5, 1955 and codicils dated August 14,
1956 with the same terms and conditions as reproduced herein earlier.
Both holographic wills and codicils having been probated thereafter and
upon the death of Do;a Tinay, Don Jesus was appointed executor of the
will and in due time the partition of the properties or estate of Do;a Tinay
was approved by the probate court on July 6, 1960.
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25,
1949 was an enforceable contract which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as
the surviving spouse, barring him from violating said partition agreement,
barring him from revoking his holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his
codicil of August 14, 1956, and further barring him from executing his new

will and testament of November 14, 1959, now the subject of the probate
proceedings elevated to this Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the
Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article
1056 in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code which are applicable
hereto. These Articles provide as follows: t.hqw
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act
inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the
commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division inter
vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subjectmatter of contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear
intent of the law may be deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's
estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only to one who has made a prior will
or testament. In other words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be
given a wider scope as to include in the exception any person whether he
has made a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old
and new Civil Code, a person who executes a will is permitted at the same
time or a little thereafter or even before as long as he mentions this fact in
the will, to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article
1056 of the old Civil Code. The court further added that jurisprudence is to
the effect that the partition presupposes the execution of the will that it
ratifies or effectuates, citing the case of Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776.
Finally, respondent court held the opinion that the extrajudicial partition of
November 14, 1949 was ratified in the holographic will executed by Don
Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the codicil of August 14, 1956.

Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto
vs. Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity
of a prior will before the testator can partition his properties among his
heirs, and We quote the pertinent portions of the decision: t.hqw
The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the partition
made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants
and appellants herein, was valid and enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act
inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid
down the following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to
mean that a person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred
to in the section wherein said article is found, without the authority of a
testament containing an expression of his last will, or the authority of law,
for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will
in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter
referring to testaments, and especially, to the forms thereof, which is
entirely different from the legal consequences of a free disposition made
by parents during their lifetime, whereby they give to their children the
whole or a part of their property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes
reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be
entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object of
which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with
article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the
conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a
testamentary or legal succession and should be made in conformity with
the fundamental rules thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the
estate, because neither of the two provisions could be given a wider
meaning or scope than that they simply provide for the division of the
estate during the lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be
done upon the death of the testator in order to carry into effect the
partition of the estate among the persons interested.

Manresa comments on the same article as follows:

A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its
division; and the provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator to
dispose of his property by acts inter vivos or by last will, must be
understood in accordance with this distinction. The Idea is to divide the
estate among the heirs designated by the testator. This designation
constitutes the disposition of the properties to take effect after his death,
and said act must necessarily appear in the testament because it is the
expression of the testator's last will and must be surrounded by
appropriate formalities. Then comes the second part, to wit, the division in
conformity with that disposition, and the testator may make this division in
the same will or in another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words,
the law, in article 1056 as well as in article 1057, which we shall hereafter
examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of making the partition
and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for purposes of partition
the formal solemnities which must accompany every testament or last will
are not necessary. Neither is it necessary to observe the special for.
realities required in case of donations, because it is not a matter of
disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing those which already
have been legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and
authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by
an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with
all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for
without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of
the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily
refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who
disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a
donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to
distinguish between one who freely donates his property in life and one
who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code
was expressly prohibited as against public policy had been validly ratified
by the holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his
codicil of August 14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that a
person who executes a will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant
to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even before executing
his will as long as he mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted under
the ruling of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa as
quoted above. We rule, therefore, that the respondent court erred in

denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it erred
in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949
was contractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not
revoke his participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new
will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the socalled extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition;
neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future
inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific
properties to the heirs made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25,
1949, contained specific designation of properties allotted to each child,
We rule that there was substantial compliance with the rules on donations
inter vivos under the old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there
could have been no valid donation to the children of the other half
reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay which, as stated
in the deed, was to be divided equally among the children for the simple
reason that the property or properties were not specifically described in
the public instrument, an essential requirement under Article 633 which
provides as follows: t.hqw
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be made
by public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described and in the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the
donee expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public
writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the
donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice
thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the
spouses which may be disposed of in such manner that either of the
spouses would like in regards to his or her share in such portion,
unencumbered by the provision enjoining the last surviving spouse to give
equally to the children what belongs or-would pertain to him or her. The
end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay, in the Deed of
1949, made to their children valid donations of only one-half of their
combined properties which must be charged against their legitime and
cannot anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half remained

entirely at the free disposal of the spouses with regards to their respective
shares.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free
portion was distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated
January 25, 1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be
stressed here that the distribution of her properties was subject to her
holographic win and codicil, independently of the holographic will and
codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on the same date. This is fundamental
because otherwise, to consider both wills and codicils jointly would be to
circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on joint wills (Art. 818) and
secondly because upon the death of Do;a Tinay, only her estate was
being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and
codicil of Do;a Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that Do;a
Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children
as heirs to her free portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her
holographic will, mention of her children as heirs was made in the fourth
clause but it only provided that, to wit: t.hqw
Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de otorgado
este mi testamento seran las mismas repartados entre mi esposo o hijos
arriba mencionada en el parrafo tercero su la misma proporcion o sea: la
mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra mitad (1/2) para mis hijos en partes
iguales.
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that
"Should I acquire new properties after the execution of this testament, the
same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or
the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion, that is, onehalf (1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in equal parts."
From the above-quoted provision, the children would only inherit together
with Don Jesus whatever new properties Do;a Tinay would acquire after
the execution of her will.
Likewise, the codicil of Do;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to
her share in the free portion of the conjugal assets, and We quote that part
of the codicil: t.hqw
Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia que se
sacara de ni cuenta de libre disposicion todos aquellos bienes de los que
no he dispuesto aun en favor de mis hijos en la escritura de reparticion

precitada y que excedieran de la mitad de gananciales que le corresponds

tal como arriba declare, incluyendo todos aquenos bienes que se
adquiriesen por nosotros despues de otorgado por mi este testamento.
Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo sobreviviera a mi esposo
declaro que es mi voluntad que todas las propiedades de todo genero que
me pertenecen y me pudieran pertenecer, no dispuestas aun en la
reparticion, se dividan por igual entre mis herederos mencionados despues
de mi muerte.
Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion states:
t.hqw
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his inheritance
the part of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated
in favor of my children in the Document of Partition aforecited and that
which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to
him as above stated, including all those properties which we shall acquire
after the execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare
that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that pertains to me or
would pertain to me, which have not been disposed of pursuant to the
partition, should be divided equally among my above-mentioned heirs after
my death.
The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining
estate of Do;a Tinay in the event that she should be the surviving spouse.
To stress the point, Do;a Tinay did not oblige her husband to give equally
to the children, upon his death, all such properties she was bequeathing
him.
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed
on November 14, 1959 in view of Our holding that Do;a Tinay's wig and
codicil did not stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow the properties equally to
the children, it follows that all the properties of Do;a Tinay bequeathed to
Don Jesus under her holographic win and codicil became part of Don Jesus'
estate unburdened by any condition obligation or proviso.
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition
of November 25, 1949 and had in fact conformed to said Partition by
making a holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as
those of Do;a Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We rule, however,

that Don Jesus was not forever bound thereby for his previous holographic
will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828
of the new Civil Code is clear: "A win may be revoked by the testator at any
time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void." There
can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke
his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true
even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been probated
(Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first place, probate only
authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the
dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the succession are
transmitted only from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article
777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained the liberty of disposing of
his property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the
legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not herein claimed
for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate is
being contested.
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir
instituted to the remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in her holographic will
and codicil resulting in all such properties becoming the properties of Don
Jesus alone, and after clearly pointing out that Don Jesus can, in law,
revoke his previous holographic will and codicil, by making another win
expressly cancelling and revoking the former, the next issue for the Court's
resolution is the validity of the provisions of the contested will. Though the
law and jurisprudence are clear that only questions about the extrinsic
validity of the will may be entertained by the probate court, the Court had,
on more than one occasion, passed upon the intrinsic validity of a will even
before it had been authenticated. Thus We declared in Nuguid v. Nuguid,
17 SCRA 499:
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed to probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity
of the wilt Normally this comes only after the court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. ...
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation win be protracted and for ought that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will
probability exists that the case win come up once again before us on the
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the wilt Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce us to a behalf that we might as well meet head-on the time of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. ...

The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959
contained an express revocation of his holographic wig of January 5, 1955
and the codicil of August 14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of his
properties donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and
taken into account in the partition of his estate; the institution of all his
children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a
statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be
acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a
statement naming Francesca as executrix without bond.
Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the
properties distributed to the children under the Deed of 1949 and those
distributed under the contested will of Don Jesus does not show that the
former had in fact been included in the latter. This being so, it must be
presumed that the intention of Don Jesus in his last win was not to revoke
the donations already made in the Deed of 1949 but only to redistribute his
remaining estate, or that portion of the conjugal assets totally left to his
free disposal and that which he received as his inheritance from Do;a
Tinay. The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not
one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that
were disposed of in the contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's
free portion and may be diamond of by him to whomsoever he may
choose.
If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or
Pablo as in fact he was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the
motives and sentiments of Don Jesus in doing so. We have clearly laid
down this rule in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to wit:
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its own
Idea of a just distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of
disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix in the latter will. ...
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will in
order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable division of the
estate of a deceased person. The only functions of the courts in these
cases is to carry out the intention of the deceased as manifested in the
wig. Once that intention has been determined through a careful reading of
the will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been violated, it
is beyond the place of judicial cognizance to inquire into the fairness or
unfairness of any devise or bequeast. The court should not sit in judgment
upon the motives and sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as already
stated, nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of her property in
any manner she desired, and secondly, because there are no adequate

means of ascertaining the inward process of her conscience. She was the
sole judge of her own attitude toward those who expected her bounty. ...
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which
allegedly benefited and favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the other
heirs who would have been entitled to an equal share under the
extrajudicial partition of 1949, faced two alternatives-one, to consider Don
Jesus as a man of culture and honor and would not snow himself to violate
the previous agreement, and the other as one whose mental faculties or
his possession of the same had been diminished considering that when the
will was executed, he was already 84 years of age and in view of his
weakness and advanced age, the actual administration of his properties
had been left to his assistant Madarieta who, for his part received
instructions from Francisco and her husband, Joseph Betts. According to
the court, the better explanation is the latter, which is not legally tenable.
Under Article 799 of the New Civil Code which provides as follows:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will
to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of
his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act,
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win.
Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from
age-does not render a person incapable of making a will. t.hqw
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees
of mental aberration generally known as insanity or Idiocy, there are
numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one
hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility
from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will,
provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his
property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that
the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound
mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163).

The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will,
it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution, and under Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind in the absence of proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the
acceptance by the respondent court of the findings of fact of the trial court
on the due execution of the last win and testament of Don Jesus has
foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the will was not executed
in accordance with the requirements of the law. But more than that,
gleaned from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described
behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a mentally incapacitated person nor
one suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by private respondents.
From these accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who
gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he wanted to divide his
properties among his children by means of a list of his properties should
pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his lawyer
w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will
at his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading
in the conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits of
French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his
attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the
purpose of their meeting or gathering, to wit:
Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten presentes para
ser testigos de mi ultima voluntad y testamento que ha sido preparado por
el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyo documents
tengo aqui con migo y encuentro que, despues de lo he leido, esta
satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes
tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos ellos.
Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun
implications thereof.
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other
details which, in the words of the decision "are a little bit difficult to
reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of fife" such as the fact
that Don Jesus had sought the probate of his will of January 5, 1955 and his
codicil of August 14, 1956 during his lifetime but insofar as the will of
November 14, 1959 is concerned, he had no intention of seeking the
probate thereof during his lifetime, the alleged redundant and unnecessary
proceedings undertaken by Don Jesus in the properties under question to
petitioner Franciso Alsua-Betts when the same properties had already been
bequeathed to her in the will of November 14, 1959 and that "nothing,
absolutely nothing, could be made the basis for finding that Don Jesus
Alsua had regarded his other children with less favor, and that he was

more sympathetic to Francisca so as to or forget the former depriving them

of benefits already given to them and rewarding the latter with
disproportionate advantages or benefits, to such an extreme as to violate
his previous disposition consecrated in the previous extrajudicial partition,
Exh. 8."
We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court
found difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life are
mere conjectures, surmises or speculations which, however, do not warrant
or justify disallowance of the probate of the win of Don Jesus. The fact that
Don Jesus did not cause his will to be probated during his lifetime while his
previous holographic win and codicil were duly probated when he was still
alive is a mere speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don
Jesus as the testator. The law does not require that a will be probated
during the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so there cannot arise
any favorable or unfavorable consequence therefrom. The parties cannot
correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator and neither can the
courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is no valid and legal ground
to reject allowance or disallowance of the wig. The same thing can be said
as to whatever reason Don Jesus had for selling the properties to his
daughter Francisca when he had already assigned the same properties to
her in his will. While We can speculate that Don Jesus desired to have
possession of the properties transferred to Francisca after the sale instead
of waiting for his death may be a reasonable explanation or speculation for
the act of the testator and yet there is no certainty that such was actually
the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents may offer or as
difficult to accept which respondent court believes. A conjecture is always
a conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for
annulment of the two Deeds of Sale executed by and between Don Jesus
and petitioner Francisco is their validity or nullity. Private respondents
mainly contend that the sales were fictitious or simulated, there having
been no actual consideration paid. They further insist that the issue raised
is a question of fact and, therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari
proceeding before the Supreme Court. On the other hand, petitioners
herein maintain that it was error for the respondent court to set aside on
appeal the factual findings of the trial court that the two sales were valid.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from
the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive; and this same principle
applies even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower
court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent reversal of its

findings of fact. But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants
alike is the more basic principle that the "findings of fact" described as
"final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which are
based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the
Supreme Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the findings
of fact made by the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to the general
rule, where We have reviewed and revised the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that findings of fact by the
Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257);
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible
(Luna vs. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G.
2927);
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs.
Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590,
April 30, 1957); and
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139,
April 23, 1958; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289).
In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's
conclusion as to the nullity of the contested sales was not supported by the
evidence on record and adduced during the trial.
Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1)
Exhibit U, a deed of sale over agricultural lands executed on August 26,
1961 by Don Jesus in favor of Francisca for the consideration of Seventy
Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00), which document bears the signature of Don
Jesus, not assailed as a forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an
instrumental witness, again not assailed as a forgery nor alleged as done
thru fraud, force or threat. (2) Exhibit "W", a deed of sale over urban lots
executed on November 16, 1962 for the consideration of Eighty Thousand
Pesos (P80,000.00), which document also bears the signature of Don Jesus,

also admittedly not a forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a document dated August 26,
1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo Alsua as witness, acknowledging
receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No. 0252 in the amount of
Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of
agricultural land to Francisco under the same date; again, Pablo did not
deny the genuineness of his signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the
Philippine Islands Check No. D-6979 dated November 26, 1962, in the
amount of P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca, payable to Don
Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X-1", a second Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D6980) also dated November 26, 1962 in the amount of ?47,355.29, drawn
by Francisco and payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-5 ",
endorsements on the back of the last two checks by Don Jesus, again, his
signatures thereon were not assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in the annulment
case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue Receipt (No. 2347260) dated
November 29, 1962 with a notation acknowledging the receipt of BPI Check
No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from Don Jesus Alsua in payment
of Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We are
convinced and satisfied from this array of documentary evidence that in
fact, Don Jesus sold the subject properties to his daughter, Francisca for
the total consideration of P150,000.00.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void
for being without cause or consideration is as weak and flimsy as the
ground upon which the respondent court upheld said claim on the basis
that there was no need for funds in Don Jesus' old age aside from the
speculation that there was nothing in the evidence that showed what
motivated Don Jesus to change his mind as to favor Francesca and
discriminate against the other children. The two contracts of same
executed by Don Jesus in favor of Francesca are evidenced by Exhibits "U"
and "W", the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any time
during this long drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing. That the
consideration stated in the contracts were paid is also sufficiently proved
as the receipts thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the
private respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny
the payment of the consideration And even of he now allege that in fact no
transfer of money was involved, We find his allegation belied by Exhibits
"X-3 " and "X-5 ", which show that the checks of Francisco made payable to
Don Jesus. were in fact given to Don Jesus as he endorsed them on the
back thereof, and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the annulment case,
which proved that Don Jesus actually used Exhibit "XI " to complete
payment on the estate and inheritance tax on the estate of his wife to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of
the inadequacy of the given price. Inadequacy of consideration does not
vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not, that
there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil
Code). We do not find the stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the
court's conscience, considering that the price paid was much higher than
the assessed value of the subject properties and considering that the sales
were effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be
taken into account.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside. The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in
Special Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case No. 3068 is hereby reinstated,
with costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar and Fernandez, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
De Castro, J., took no part.
Melencio Herrera, J., concur in the result.

Spouses RAMON DOROMAL, SR., and ROSARIO SALAS, and

Spouses RAMON DOROMAL, JR., and GAUDELIA VEGA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENA JAVELLANA, respondents.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Parlade and Associates and Marvin J. Mirasol for
petitioners. Arturo H. Villanueva, Jr. for private respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
47945-R entitled Filomena Javellana vs. Spouses Ramon Doromal, Sr., et al.
which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo that had
in turn dismissed herein private respondent Filomena Javellana's action for
redemption of a certain property sold by her co-owners to herein
petitioners for having been made out of time.
The factual background found by the Court of Appeals and which is binding
on this Court, the same not being assailed by petitioners as being
capricious, is as follows:
IT RESULTING: That the facts are quite simple; Lot 3504 of the cadastral
survey of Iloilo, situated in the poblacion of La Paz, one of its districts, with
an area of a little more than 2- hectares was originally decreed in the
name of the late Justice Antonio Horilleno, in 1916, under Original
Certificate of Title No. 1314, Exh. A; but before he died, on a date not
particularized in the record, he executed a last will and testament attesting
to the fact that it was a co-ownership between himself and his brothers
and sisters, Exh. C; so that the truth was that the owners or better stated,
the co-owners were; beside Justice Horilleno,
"Luis, Soledad, Fe, Rosita, Carlos and Esperanza,"

G.R. No. L-36083 September 5, 1975

all surnamed Horilleno, and since Esperanza had already died, she was
succeeded by her only daughter and heir herein plaintiff. Filomena
Javellana, in the proportion of 1/7 undivided ownership each; now then,
even though their right had not as yet been annotated in the title, the coowners led by Carlos, and as to deceased Justice Antonio Horilleno, his
daughter Mary, sometime since early 1967, had wanted to sell their
shares, or if possible if Filomena Javellana were agreeable, to sell the entire
property, and they hired an acquaintance Cresencia Harder, to look for
buyers, and the latter came to interest defendants, the father and son,
named Ramon Doromal, Sr. and Jr., and in preparation for the execution of

the sale, since the brothers and sisters Horilleno were scattered in various
parts of the country, Carlos in Ilocos Sur, Mary in Baguio, Soledad and Fe,
in Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Rosita in Basilan City, they all executed various
powers of attorney in favor of their niece, Mary H. Jimenez Exh. 1-8, they
also caused preparation of a power of attorney of identical tenor for
signature by plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, Exh. M, and sent it with a letter
of Carlos, Exh. 7 dated 18 January, 1968 unto her thru Mrs. Harder, and
here, Carlos informed her that the price was P4.00 a square meter,
although it now turns out according to Exh. 3 that as early as 22 October,
1967, Carlos had received in check as earnest money from defendant
Ramon Doromal, Jr., the sum of P5,000.00 and the price therein agreed
upon was five (P5.00) pesos a square meter as indeed in another letter
also of Carlos to Plaintiff in 5 November, 1967, Exh. 6, he had told her that
the Doromals had given the earnest money of P5,000.00 at P5.00 a square
meter, at any rate, plaintiff not being agreeable, did not sign the power
of attorney, and the rest of the co-owners went ahead with their sale of
their 6/7, Carlos first seeing to it that the deed of sale by their common
attorney in fact, Mary H. Jimenez be signed and ratified as it was signed
and ratified in Candon, Ilocos Sur, on 15 January, 1968, Exh. 2, then
brought to Iloilo by Carlos in the same month, and because the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo refused to register right away, since the original registered
owner, Justice Antonio Horilleno was already dead, Carlos had to ask as he
did, hire Atty. Teotimo Arandela to file a petition within the cadastral case,
on 26 February, 1968, for the purpose, Exh. C, after which Carlos returned
to Luzon, and after compliance with the requisites of publication, hearing
and notice, the petition was approved, and we now see that on 29 April,
1968, Carlos already back in Iloilo went to the Register of Deeds and
caused the registration of the order of the cadastral court approving the
issuance of a new title in the name of the co-owners, as well as of the deed
of sale to the Doromals, as a result of which on that same date, a new title
was issued TCT No. 23152, in the name of the Horillenos to 6/7 and plaintiff
Filomena Javellana to 1/7, Exh. D, only to be cancelled on the same day
under TCT No. 23153, Exh. 2, already in the names of the vendees
Doromals for 6/7 and to herein plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, 1/7, and the
next day 30 April, 1968, the Doromals paid unto Carlos by check, the sum
of P97,000.00 Exh. 1, of Chartered Bank which was later substituted by
check of Phil. National Bank, because there was no Chartered Bank Branch
in Ilocos Sur, but besides this amount paid in check, the Doromals
according to their evidence still paid an additional amount in cash of
P18,250.00 since the agreed price was P5.00 a square meter; and thus was
consummated the transaction, but it is here where complications set in,

On 10 June, 1968, there came to the residence of the Doromals in

Dumangas, Iloilo, plaintiff's lawyer, Atty. Arturo H. Villanueva, bringing with
him her letter of that date, reading,
Mr. & Mrs. Ramon Doromal, Sr.
and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Doromal, Jr.
"Dumangas Iloilo
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Doromal:
The bearer of this letter is my nephew, Atty. Arturo H. Villanueva, Jr., of this
City. Through him, I am making a formal offer to repurchase or redeem
from you the 6/7 undivided share in Lot No. 3504, of the Iloilo Cadastre,
which you bought from my erstwhile co-owners, the Horillenos, for the sum
of P30,000.00, Atty. Villanueva has with him the sum of P30,000.00 in cash,
which he will deliver to you as soon as you execute the contract of sale in
my favor. Thank you very much for whatever favorable consideration you
can give this request.
p. 26, Exh. "J", Manual of Exhibits.
and then and there said lawyer manifested to the Doromals that he had
the P30,000.00 with him in cash, and tendered it to them, for the exercise
of the legal redemption, the Doromals were aghast, and refused. and the
very next day as has been said. 11 June, 1968, plaintiff filed this case, and
in the trial, thru oral and documentary proofs sought to show that as coowner, she had the right to redeem at the price stated in the deed of sale,
Exh. 2, namely P30,000.00 of the but defendants in answer, and in their
evidence, oral and documentary sought to show that plaintiff had no more
right to redeem and that if ever she should have, that it should be at the
true and real price by them paid, namely, the total sum of P115,250.00,
and trial judge, after hearing the evidence, believed defendants, that
plaintiff had no more right, to redeem, because,
"Plaintiff was informed of the intended sale of the 6/7 share belonging to
the Horillenos."
and that,
"The plaintiff have every reason to be grateful to Atty. Carlos Horilleno
because in the petition for declaration of heirs of her late uncle Antonio
Horilleno in whose name only the Original Certificate of Title covering the

Lot in question was issued, her uncle Atty. Carlos Horilleno included her as
one of the heirs of said Antonio Horilleno. Instead, she filed this case to
redeem the 6/7 share sold to the Doromals for the simple reason that the
consideration in the deed of sale is the sum of P30,000.00 only instead of
P115,250.00 approximately which was actually paid by the defendants to
her co-owners, thus she wants to enrich herself at the expense of her own
blood relatives who are her aunts, uncles and cousins. The consideration of
P30,000.00 only was placed in the deed of sale to minimize the payment of
the registration fees, stamps, and sales tax. pp. 77-78, R.A.,
and dismiss and further condemned plaintiff to pay attorney's fees, and
moral and exemplary damages as set forth in few pages back, it is because
of this that plaintiff has come here and contends, that Lower Court erred:
"I. ... in denying plaintiff-appellant, as a co-owner of Lot No. 3504, of the
Iloilo Cadastre, the right of legal redemption under Art. 1620, of the Civil
Code:
"II. ... as a consequence of the above error, in refusing to order the
defendants-appellees, the vendees of a portion of the aforesaid Lot No.
3504 which they bought from the co-owners of the plaintiff-appellant, to
reconvey the portion they purchased to the herein plaintiff-appellant..

petitioners on even date. The intermediate court further held that the
redemption price to be paid by respondent should be that stated in the
deed of sale which is P30,000 notwithstanding that the preponderance of
the evidence proves that the actual price paid by petitioners was
P115,250. Thus, in their brief, petitioners assign the following alleged
errors:
I IT IS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THAT THE NOTICE IN
WRITING OF THE SALE CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 1623 OF THE CIVIL
CODE REFERS TO A NOTICE IN WRITING AFTER THE EXECUTION AND
REGISTRATION OF THE INSTRUMENT OF SALE, HENCE, OF THE DOCUMENT
OF SALE.
II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INSCRIPTION
OF THE SALE IN THE REGISTRY OF PROPERTY TAKES EFFECT AS AGAINST
THIRD PERSONS INCLUDING CLAIMS OF POSSIBLE REDEMPTIONERS.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS THE RIGHT TO
REDEEM, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REDEMPTION PRICE SHOULD BE THAT STATED IN THE DEED OF SALE. (Pp.
1-2, Brief for Petitioner, page 74-Rec.)
We cannot agree with petitioners.

"III. ... in admitting extrinsic evidence in the determination of the

consideration of the sale, instead of simply adhering to the purchase price
of P30,000.00, set forth in the pertinent Deed of Sale executed by the
vendors and owners of the plaintiff-appellant in favor of the defendantsappellees.
"IV. ... in dismissing the complaint filed in this case." pp. 1-3, Appellant's
Brief,.
which can be reduced to the simple question of whether or not on tile basis
of the evidence and the law, the judgment appealed from should be
maintained; (Pp. 16-22, Record.) .
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision
and held that although respondent Javellana was informed of her coowners' proposal to sell the land in question to petitioners she was,
however, "never notified ... least of all, in writing", of the actual execution
and registration of the corresponding deed of sale, hence, said
respondent's right to redeem had not yet expired at the time she made her
offer for that purpose thru her letter of June 10, 1968 delivered to

Petitioners do not question respondent's right to redeem, she being

admittedly a 1/7 co-owner of the property in dispute. The thrust of their
first assignment of error is that for purposes of Article 1623 of the Civil
Code which provides that:
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
the letters sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent and dated January 18,
1968, Exhibit 7, and November 5, 1967, Exhibit 6, constituted the required
notice in writing from which the 30-day period fixed in said provision
should be computed. But to start with, there is no showing that said letters
were in fact received by respondent and when they were actually received.

Besides, petitioners do not pinpoint which of these two letters, their dates
being more than two months apart, is the required notice. In any event, as
found by the appellate court, neither of said letters referred to a
consummated sale. As may be observed, it was Carlos Horilleno alone who
signed them, and as of January 18, 1968, powers of attorney from the
various co-owners were still to be secured. Indeed, the later letter of
January 18, 1968 mentioned that the price was P4.00 per square meter
whereas in the earlier letter of November 5, 1967 it was P5.00, as in fact,
on that basis, as early as October 27, 1967, Carlos had already received
P5,000 from petitioners supposedly as earnest money, of which, however,
mention was made by him to his niece only in the later letter of January 18,
1968, the explanation being that "at later negotiation it was increased to
P5.00 per square meter." (p. 4 of petitioners' brief as appellees in the Court
of Appeals quoting from the decision of the trial court.) In other words,
while the letters relied upon by petitioners could convey the idea that more
or less some kind of consensus had been arrived at among the other coowners to sell the property in dispute to petitioners, it cannot be said
definitely that such a sale had even been actually perfected. The fact alone
that in the later letter of January 18, 1968 the price indicated was P4.00
per square meter while in that of November 5, 1967, what was stated was
P5.00 per square meter negatives the possibility that a "price definite" had
already been agreed upon. While P5,000 might have indeed been paid to
Carlos in October, 1967, there is nothing to show that the same was in the
concept of the earnest money contemplated in Article 1482 of the Civil
Code, invoked by petitioner, as signifying perfection of the sale. Viewed in
the backdrop of the factual milieu thereof extant in the record, We are
more inclined to believe that the said P5,000 were paid in the concept of
earnest money as the term was understood under the Old Civil Code, that
is, as a guarantee that the buyer would not back out, considering that it is
not clear that there was already a definite agreement as to the price then
and that petitioners were decided to buy 6/7 only of the property should
respondent Javellana refuse to agree to part with her 1/7 share.
In the light of these considerations, it cannot be said that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the letters aforementioned sufficed to comply
with the requirement of notice of a sale by co-owners under Article 1623 of
the Civil Code. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that for
purposes of the co-owner's right of redemption granted by Article 1620 of
the Civil Code, the notice in writing which Article 1623 requires to be made
to the other co-owners and from receipt of which the 30-day period to
redeem should be counted is a notice not only of a perfected sale but of
the actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale. This is implied from
the latter portion of Article 1623 which requires that before a register of
deeds can record a sale by a co-owner, there must be presented to him, an

affidavit to the effect that the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to
the other co-owners. A sale may not be presented to the register of deeds
for registration unless it be in the form of a duly executed public
instrument. Moreover, the law prefers that all the terms and conditions of
the sale should be definite and in writing. As aptly observed by Justice
Gatmaitan in the decision under review, Article 1619 of the Civil Code
bestows unto a co-owner the right to redeem and "to be subrogated under
the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract", and to avoid
any controversy as to the terms and conditions under which the right to
redeem may be exercised, it is best that the period therefor should not be
deemed to have commenced unless the notice of the disposition is made
after the formal deed of disposal has been duly executed. And it being
beyond dispute that respondent herein has never been notified in writing
of the execution of the deed of sale by which petitioners acquired the
subject property, it necessarily follows that her tender to redeem the same
made on June 10, 1968 was well within the period prescribed by law.
Indeed, it is immaterial when she might have actually come to know about
said deed, it appearing she has never been shown a copy thereof through
a written communication by either any of the petitioners-purchasers or any
of her co-owners-vendees. (Cornejo et al. vs. CA et al., 16 SCRA 775.)
The only other pivotal issue raised by petitioners relates to the price which
respondent offered for the redemption in question. In this connection, from
the decision of the Court of Appeals, We gather that there is "decisive
preponderance of evidence" establishing "that the price paid by
defendants was not that stated in the document, Exhibit 2, of P30,000 but
much more, at least P97,000, according to the check, Exhibit 1, if not a
total of P115,250.00 because another amount in cash of P18,250 was paid
afterwards."
It is, therefore, the contention of petitioners here that considering said
finding of fact of the intermediate court, it erred in holding nevertheless
that "the redemption price should be that stated in the deed of sale."
Again, petitioners' contention cannot be sustained. As stated in the
decision under review, the trial court found that "the consideration of
P30,000 only was placed in the deed of sale to minimize the payment of
the registration fees, stamps and sales tax." With this undisputed fact in
mind, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to sanction petitioners'
pragmatic but immoral posture. Being patently violative of public policy
and injurious to public interest, the seemingly wide practice of
understating considerations of transactions for the purpose of evading
taxes and fees due to the government must be condemned and all parties
guilty thereof must be made to suffer the consequences of their ill-advised

agreement to defraud the state. Verily, the trial court fell short of its
devotion and loyalty to the Republic in officially giving its stamp of
approval to the stand of petitioners and even berating respondent
Javellana as wanting to enrich herself "at the expense of her own blood
relatives who are her aunts, uncles and cousins." On the contrary, said
"blood relatives" should have been sternly told, as We here hold, that they
are in pari-delicto with petitioners in committing tax evasion and should
not receive any consideration from any court in respect to the money paid
for the sale in dispute. Their situation is similar to that of parties to an
illegal contract. 1
Of course, the Court of Appeals was also eminently correct in its
considerations supporting the conclusion that the redemption in
controversy should be only for the price stipulated in the deed, regardless
of what might have been actually paid by petitioners that style inimitable
and all his own, Justice Gatmaitan states those considerations thus:
CONSIDERING: As to this that the evidence has established with decisive
preponderance that the price paid by defendants was not that stated in the
document, Exh. 2 of P30,000.00 but much more, at least P97,000.00
according to the check, Exh. 1 if not a total of P115,250.00 because
another amount in cash of P18,250.00 was paid afterwards, perhaps it
would be neither correct nor just that plaintiff should be permitted to
redeem at only P30,000.00, that at first glance would practically enrich her
by the difference, on the other hand, after some reflection, this Court can
not but have to bear in mind certain definite points.
1st According to Art. 1619
"Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a
thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction
whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title." pp. 471-472, New Civil
Code,
and note that redemptioner right is to be subrogated
"upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract."
and here, the stipulation in the public evidence of the contract, made
public by both vendors and vendees is that the price was P30,000.00;
2nd According to Art. 1620,

"A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
share of all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person.
If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall
pay only a reasonable one. p. 472, New Civil Code, .
from which it is seen that if the price paid is 'grossly excessive'
redemptioner is required to pay only a reasonable one; not that actually
paid by the vendee, going to show that the law seeks to protect
redemptioner and converts his position into one not that of a contractually
but of a legally subrogated creditor as to the right of redemption, if the
price is not 'grossly excessive', what the law had intended redemptioner to
pay can be read in Art. 1623.
The right of a legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty (30) days from the notice in writing by the prospective
vendor, or by the vendor as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of
the vendor that he has given written notice thereof of all possible
redemptioners.' p. 473, New Civil Code,
if that be so that affidavit must have been intended by the lawmakers for a
definite purpose, to argue that this affidavit has no purpose is to go against
all canons of statutory construction, no law mandatory in character and
worse, prohibitive should be understood to have no purpose at all, that
would be an absurdity, that purpose could not but have been to give a
clear and unmistakable guide to redemptioner, on how much he should
pay and when he should redeem; from this must follow that that notice
must have been intended to state the truth and if vendor and vendee
should have instead, decided to state an untruth therein, it is they who
should bear the consequences of having thereby misled the redemptioner
who had the right to rely and act thereon and on nothing else; stated
otherwise, all the elements of equitable estoppel are here since the
requirement of the law is to submit the affidavit of notice to all possible
redemptioners, that affidavit to be a condition precedent to registration of
the sale therefore, the law must have intended that it be by the parties
understood that they were there asking a solemn representation to all
possible redemptioners, who upon faith of that are thus induced to act, and
here worse for the parties to the sale, they sought to avoid compliance
with the law and certainly refusal to comply cannot be rewarded with
exception and acceptance of the plea that they cannot be now estopped by
their own representation, and this Court notes that in the trial and to this
appeal, plaintiff earnestly insisted and insists on their estoppel;

3rd If therefore, here vendors had only attempted to comply with the
law, they would have been obligated to send a copy of the deed of sale
unto Filomena Javellana and from that copy, Filomena would have been
notified that she should if she had wanted to redeem, offered no more, no
less, that P30,000.00, within 30 days, it would have been impossible for
vendors and vendees to have inserted in the affidavit that the price was
truly P97,000.00 plus P18,250.00 or a total of P115,250.00; in other words,
if defendants had only complied with the law, they would have been
obligated to accept the redemption money of only P30,000.00;
4th If it be argued that foregoing solution would mean unjust enrichment
for plaintiff, it need only be remembered that plaintiff's right is not
contractual, but a mere legal one, the exercise of a right granted by the
law, and the law is definite that she can subrogate herself in place of the
buyer,
"upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract," in the
words of Art. 1619, and here the price "stipulated in the contract"
was P30,000.00, in other words, if this be possible enrichment on the part
of Filomena, it was not unjust but just enrichment because permitted by
the law; if it still be argued that plaintiff would thus be enabled to abuse
her right, the answer simply is that what she is seeking to enforce is not an
abuse but a mere exercise of a right; if it be stated that just the same, the
effect of sustaining plaintiff would be to promote not justice but injustice,
the answer again simply is that this solution is not unjust because it only
binds the parties to make good their solemn representation to possible
redemptioners on the price of the sale, to what they had solemnly averred
in a public document required by the law to be the only basis for that
exercise of redemption; (Pp. 24-27, Record.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs
against petitioners..
Fernando, Makasiar, Esguerra, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, CJ., took no part.
Muoz Palma, J., took no part.
Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

The legal (and moral) right of private respondent Filomena Javellana as

(1/7) pro-indiviso co-owner to exercise the right granted her by the Civil
Code of legal redemption of the pro-indiviso 6/7 share of the property
which was sold by her erstwhile co-owners to the Doromals as interested
third persons for the stipulated contractual price of P30,000.00 is
unassailable.
It is admitted in the record (from the Doromals' own evidence and the trial
court's factual findings) that the Doromals (buyers) and the co-owners
(sellers) had criminally understated and falsified the contractual price in
the deed of sale as registered with the Register of Deeds to be P30,000.00
instead of P115,250.00 as "actually paid" by the Doromals, admittedly for
the illegal and criminal purpose "to minimize the payment of the
registration fees, stamps and sales tax. 1 (It may be added that such gross
understatement of the actual price was resorted to obviously to minimize
the resultant tax liability of the co-owners for income tax or capital gains
from the sale of the property as well as to minimize, if not conceal, the
sources and assets of the Doromals as buyers and make it falsely appear
that their capital outlay for the purchase was only one-fourth () of the
actual price which is a device notoriously availed of by tax evaders to
willfully and criminally evade the payment of taxes justly due to the
government).
This criminal and illegal conduct in no way entitles the Doromals to claim
callously as against respondent redemptioner who is merely exercising her
legal right of redemption "to be subrogated, upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of the Doromals as thirdperson buyers [Articles 1619 and 1620, Civil Code] that she may only
redeem the property from them by paying the larger amount of
P115,250.00 that they had actually paid the co-owners for their 6/7 share
of the property. Such criminal-tax evasion can in no way be abated if the
courts and the law would yet pay heed to the plea of the tax evaders that
they had falsely understated the contract price and that the courts should
order the redemptioner to pay them not the contract price but the
larger amount they had actually paid but illegally understated in order to
evade the taxes justly due to the Government. A party to an illegal
contract cannot come to court and ask it to help carry out his illegal
objects. 2
For the tax evaders to invoke in court their very act of tax evasion and to
ask the courts to sanction the same by declaring that the understated
stipulated price was only for purposes of tax evasion but that for the
exercise of the legal right of redemption, respondent must be ordered by
the courts to pay them the larger amount they had actually paid but falsely

understated in the deed would be to put a premium on criminal conduct

and frank cynicism in gross derogation of the law, morals, good customs
and public policy.
When the Doromals falsely understated the contractual price of their
purchase from respondent's co-owners, they did so at their own risk and
with full knowledge of respondent's right to redeem the property for the
price stated in the contract.
By virtue of the rule of in pari delicto, they cannot even seek recourse
against the co-owners to refund to them the difference between the
redemption price (of P30,000.00) and the much larger amount (of
P115,250.00) that they actually paid the co-owners.
If, say, there were no question of redemption but that they had a valid
cause for rescission of their purchase and brought suit therefor, (so that
the case were strictly one between the Doromals and their sellers), the
courts would order the return of only the price as officially stated in the
deed and not the larger amount (of P115,250.00) that they had actually
paid (but understated for tax evasion purposes) since the law will not
aid either party in pari delicto but will leave the parties where it finds them,
or more accurately where they have placed themselves. Manifestly the law
will not aid the Doromals as against respondent-redemptioner who had no
part in their illegal and criminal conduct.
Finally, if such notorious tax evasion is to be effectively curbed, and the
facts of record in the case at bar are duly established in the appropriate
proceedings, the Doromals and the co-owners-sellers should be criminally
charged for falsification of public documents besides being held liable by
the proper authorities for the full amount of taxes, income and capital
gains, documentary stamps, registration fees, etc., that they had
admittedly willfully evaded by the false understatement of the real and
actual price in the deed of sale executed between them.

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious

conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply
the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the
law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither
because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with
justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic.
This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of
land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No.
10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his
undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of
absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his
sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said
sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the
portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a
fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife
built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to
redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen . 5 On May 27,
1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the
right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice
of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was
held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly
denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot,
which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to
the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying
in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption
petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were
close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10

It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales
and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the
petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the
circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that
the area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the
other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the
permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done
without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation
and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by
both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the
Civil Code, providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the
notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice
would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v.
Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held
that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need
for written notice although no particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court,
furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property
subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So
long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing
of the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for
redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the
same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by
the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement
under Article 1623, reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied

by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining
owners.
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623
deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice
must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the
vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day
period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum
that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue
against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the
vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can
lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30
day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in
1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in
fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond

them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have

the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the
legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there,
we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the
spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction,
hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is
within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter
thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of
the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of
such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption.
Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general
rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any
problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of
redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in
1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen
years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The
delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming
of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period
of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be
written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was
a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be any question
that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the
complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their
brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their
palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over
its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other

brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of
such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those
years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the
other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the
30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have
happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the
co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other
words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had
already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already
expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion
of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the
facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as
should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were
readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be
chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the
spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of
the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This
definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee.
This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to
ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen
years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then
it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from
the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably
applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly
as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in
the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we
ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What
we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although
no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the
30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without
the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the
justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court
is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. No. 79958 October 28, 1988

EMILIANA BAUTISTA, as Heir of the late MANUEL BAUTISTA and
EVANGELINE BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUSTICES CAROLINA C. GRINO-AQUINO, MANUEL T. REYES,
AND JAIME M. LANTIN in their capacity as Justices of the Special
First Division of the Court of Appeals, HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City, MANOLITO BAUTISTA, BENJAMIN DE
GUZMAN, BETTY N. BAUTISTA alias BEATRIZ BAUTISTA, NELIA N.
BAUTISTA, GLORIA N. BAUTISTA, CLARITA N. BAUTISTA and
ROSALINA BAUTISTA, respondents.
Roberto M. Mendoza for petitioners.
Florante R. Mendoza for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Can the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an
extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife? This is the
singular issue in this petition.
In Civil Case No. 4033-P, petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to declare the deed of extrajudicial partition, deed of
absolute sale, Transfer Certificates Title Nos. 14182, 14186 and 15665 all
of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and
void.
On January 6,1976, the parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts
dated December 15, 1975:
1. That both parties admit that the land in question was registered in the
name of petitioner Manuel Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter
inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista;
2. Both petitioners and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22, 1966, a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were
signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista

was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel

Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition;

Petitioner now seeks a review of said decision alleging the following errors
committed by the respondent court-

3. Both parties admit that upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial

Partition, T.C.T. No. 2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182
was issued;

A. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ARE MANIFESTLY

ABSURD AND MISTAKEN;

4. The parties admit that the private respondents, with the exception of
Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito
Bautista of that property;
5. Upon registration of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and
in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista;
6. On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
the other private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T.
C.T. Nos. T-1 5665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T-15671,
were issued to private respondents;
7. Parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife
Emiliana Tamayo;
8. Parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana
Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949;
9. That the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial
partition of property on December 22,1966, among the heirs of the late
Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista;
10. Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of
Property;
11. On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the
questioned signature of Manuel Bautista;
12. That the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.
(Pp. 37-38, rollo; pp. 2-3 of decision of respondent court)
In a decision of January 14, 1983, the trial court dismissed the complaint
with costs against plaintiffs. On appeal, a decision was rendered in due
course by the Court of Appeals on August 3, 1987, affirming the decision of
the trial court. 1

B. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AUTHORIZED THE EXTRA- JUDICIAL PARTITION OF

FUTURE INHERITANCE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1347 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE:
C. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AUTHORIZED THE PRETERITION OF PETITIONER
EVANGELINE BAUTISTA IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW ON SUCCESSIO. (P. 7,
petition for review; p. 8, rollo)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate
Court that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as examined by the NBI, can no longer
be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting that the
signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of
Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted
and proven facts renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial
partition was supposed to be a partition without court intervention of the
estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista,
constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista
appears to have waived his right or share in the property in favor of private
respondents.
However, the property subject matter of said extrajudicial partition does
not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera. It is the exclusive property of
Manuel Bautista who inherited the same from his father Mariano Bautista,
which was registered in his name under T.C.T. No. 2210.
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement
of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died
without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the
property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot
be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera,
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To

include in an extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the

estate of the deceased would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his
property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of the
decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject
matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously
prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of
Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of
the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel
Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter
Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied
signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew
Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The
court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said
partition must be rescinded. 2
The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition
and issuance of the title in their names, private respondents except
Manolito Bautista in turn executed a deed of absolute sale of the property
in favor of the latter in whose name the title was also issued. And yet soon
thereafter another deed of sale was executed this time by Manolito
Bautista selling back the same property to private respondents in whose
names the respective titles were thus subsequently issued. This series of
transactions between and among private respondents is an indication of a
clever scheme to place the property beyond the reach of those lawfully
entitled thereto.
Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the
property during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista. Partition of
future inheritance is prohibited by law. 3
As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property
belonging exclusively to petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void ab
initio it follows that all subsequent transactions involving the same
property between and among the private respondents are also null and
void.

Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to sue

their co-owners for partition of the property is imprescriptible. 4 And even
assuming that the present action may prescribe as ruled by the respondent
court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline Bautista who are not
parties to the said instrument asserted that they discovered the same only
soon before they filed the complaint in court. Certainly the action has not
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision
dated August 3, 1987, of respondent Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No.
03631 and the Resolution of September 11, 1987, in the same case, are
hereby reversed and set aside; and a new one is rendered declaring the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, as null and void
ab initio, nullifying and cancelling T.C.T. Nos. T-14182, T-14186, T-15665, T15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T-15670, T-15671, and Tax Declaration
No. 5147, restoring and reviving T.C.T. No. 2210, in the name of Manuel
Bautista, with costs against private respondents. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished to the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City for implementation.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND
ALEJANDRO LOPEZ respondents .
Filemon Cajator for petitioner.
Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Alejandro Lopez.

MAKASIAR, J.:
It appears from the records that Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua,
Pampanga was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no
children.
On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro
as her sole heir and executor (pp. 20-21, rec.).
In a Resolution dated October 26, 1953 in Sp. Proc. No. 894 entitled "En el
Asunto de la Adopcion de la Menor Juanita Lopez y Limson" (pp. 92-94,
103, rec.), herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to
Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of
the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner
Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doa Jacinta did not execute another will or
codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the
aforementioned will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband,
Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond by the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes "A" and "B", pp. 18-23, rec.).
Accordingly, Alejandro took his oath of office as executor (Annex "C", p. 24,
rec.).
Nevertheless, in a project of partition dated March 19, 1960 executed by
both Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to
inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 (Jacinta's
paraphernal property), described and embraced in Original Certificate of
Title No. 13092, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga Lot 3368 with an
area of 68,141 square meters and Lot 3441 with an area of 163,231 square

meters, then assessed respectively at P3,070.00 and P5,800.00 (Annex

"D", pp. 27-36, rec.) were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her
share free from all liens, encumbrances and charges, with the executor
Alejandro Lopez, binding himself to free the said two parcels from such
liens, encumbrances and charges. The rest of the estate of the deceased
consisting of 28 other parcels of lands with a total assessed valuation of
P69,020.00 and a combined area of 743,924.67 square meters, as well as
personal properties including a 1953 Buick car valued at P2,500.00 were
allotted to Don Alejandro who assumed all the mortgage liens on the
estate (Annex "D", pp. 25-37, rec.).
In an order dated April 23, 1960, the lower court approved the said project
of partition and directed that the records of the case be sent to the
archives, upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes (Annex "E", p.
38, rec.). Upon ex-parte petition of the adjudicatees Alejandro Lopez and
Juanita Lopez-Guilas dated August 25, 1961 (Annex "F", pp. 39-40, rec.),
the lower court in an order dated August 28, 1961, approved the correction
of clerical errors appearing in the project of partition (Annex "G", p. 41,
rec.).
On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate
ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition, which case
was docketed as Civil Case 2539 entitled "Juanita Lopez-Guilas vs.
Alejandro Lopez" in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on the ground
of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be
ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver
immediately to Juanita lots nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre,
which were allocated to her under the project of partition (p. 132, rec.).
Meanwhile, in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition dated
July 20, 1964 praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the
actual possession of said lots nos. 3368 and 3441 as well as the 1,216
caverns of palay that he collected from the ten (10) tenants or lessees of
the said two lots (Annex "H", pp. 42-44, rec.).
In his opposition dated August 5, 1964 to the said petition, Alejandro Lopez
claims that, by virtue of the order dated April 23, 1960 which approved the
project of partition submitted by both Alejandro and Juanita and directed
that the records of the case be archived upon payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes, and the order of December 15, 1960 which "ordered
closed and terminated the present case", the testate proceedings had
already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence
to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is
guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her

share 4 years after such closure of the estate, when she could have filed a
petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60) days from December 15,
1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court (Annex "I") citing A. Austria
vs. Heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, L-100808, Sept. 18, 1956 (pp. 45-48, rec.).
In her reply dated November 17, 1965 to said opposition, Juanita contends
that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the
heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the
proceedings, determines the termination of the probate proceedings (citing
Intestate estate of the deceased Mercedes Cano, Timbol vs. Cano, 59 O.G.
No. 30, pp. 46-73, April 29, 1961, where it was ruled that "the probate
court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the taxes, and after the remaining estate is delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same"); that the executor Alejandro is
estopped from opposing her petition because he was the one who
prepared, filed and secured court approval of, the aforesaid project of
partition, which she seeks to be implemented; that she is not guilty of
laches, because when she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for he
delivery of her share allocated to her under the project of partition, less
than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the amended project
of partition was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the
execution of judgment by motion (Annex "J", pp. 49-52, rec.).
In its order dated October 2, 1964, the lower court after a "pre-trial" stated
that because the civil action for the annulment of the project of partition
was filed on April 13, 1964, before the filing on July 2, 1964 of the petition
for delivery of the shares of Juanita Lopez, "the parties have agreed to
suspend action or resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of
shares until; after the civil action aforementioned has been finally settled
and decided", and forthwith set the civil action for annulment for trial on
November 25, and December 2, 1964 (Annex "K", pp. 53-54, rec.).
On June 11, 1965, Juanita filed an amended complaint in Civil Case 2539
(pp. 78-110, rec.), where she acknowledges the partial legality and validity
of the project of partition insofar as the allocation in her favor of the Lots
Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is seeking (pp. 106-107,
rec.).
In her motion dated November 17, 1965, Juanita sought the setting aside
of the order dated October 2, 1964 on the ground that while the said order
considered her action for annulment of the project of partition as a
prejudicial question, her filing an amended complaint on June 11, 1965 in
civil case No. 2539 wherein she admitted the partial legality and validity of
the project of partition with respect to the adjudication to her of the two

lots as her share, rendered said civil case No. 2539 no longer a prejudicial
question to her petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery of her share
(Annex "L", pp. 55-59, rec.).
Alejandro filed his opposition dated December 1, 1965 to the aforesaid
motion of Juanita to set aside the order dated October 2, 1964 (Annex "M",
pp. 60-61, rec.), to which Juanita filed her rejoinder dated December 6,
1965 wherein she stated among others that pursuant to the project of
partition, executor Alejandro secured the cancellation of OCT. No. 13093
covering the two parcels of land adjudicated to her under the project of
partition and the issuance in his exclusive name on August 4, 1961 TCT No.
26638-R covering the said Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor
Cadastre (Annex "N", pp. 62-71, rec.).
In an order dated April 27, 1966, the lower court denied Juanita's motion to
set aside the order of October 2, 1964 on the ground that the parties
themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of
her shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of
partition has been finally settled and decided (Annex "O", p. 72, rec.).
Juanita filed a motion dated May 9, 1966 for the reconsideration of the
order dated April 27, 1966 (Annex "P" pp. 73-77, rec.), to which Alejandro
filed an opposition dated June 8, 1966 (Annex "Q", pp. 112-113, rec.).
Subsequently, Alejandro filed a motion dated July 25, 1966 praying that the
palay deposited with Fericsons and Ideal Rice Mill by the ten (10) tenants
of the two parcels in question be delivered to him (Annex "R", pp. 114-116,
rec.),to which Juanita filed an opposition dated July 26, 1966 (Annex "S",
pp. 117-121, rec.). In an order dated September 8, 1966, the lower court
denied the motion for reconsideration of the order dated April 27, 1966,
and directed Fericsons Inc. and the Ideal Rice Mills to deliver to Alejandro
or his representative the 229 cavans and 46 kilos and 325 and 1/2 cavans
and 23 kilos of palay respectively deposited with the said rice mills upon
the filing by Alejandro of a bond in the amount of P12,000.00 duly
approved by the court (Annex "T", pp. 122-127, rec.). Hence, this petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
The position of petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas should be sustained and the
writs prayed for granted.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to
the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the

project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate

proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961;
Siguiong vs. Tecson, 89 Phil., pp. 28-30). As long as the order of the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong vs. Tecson,
supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137).
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share,
is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through
an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge
which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil., 730, 741-742;
Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil.,
455, 460-461).
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded,
which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited
doctrines.
The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not control
the present controversy; because the motion filed therein for the removal
of the administratrix and the appointment of a new administrator in her
place was rejected by the court on the ground of laches as it was filed after
the lapse of about 38 years from October 5, 1910 when the court issued an
order settling and deciding the issues raised by the motion (L-10018,
September 19, 1956, 99 Phil., 1069-1070). In the case at bar, the motion
filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964,
which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended
project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960
when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to
claim the two lots allocated to her under the project of partition had not
yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of
Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated
December 15, 1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the
probate case did not legally terminate the testate proceedings, for her
share under the project of partition has not been delivered to her.

While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of the
parties suspended resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares
until after the decision in the civil action for the annulment of the project of
partition (Civil Case 2539) she filed on April 10, 1964; the said order lost its
validity and efficacy when the herein petitioner filed on June 11, 1965 an
amended complaint in said Civil Case 2539 wherein she recognized the
partial legality and validity of the said project of partition insofar as the
allocation in her favor of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 in the delivery of which
she has been insisting all along (pp. 106-107, rec.).
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Granting the writs prayed for;
2. Setting aside the orders of the respondent court dated October 2, 1964
and April 27, 1966, as null and void; and, without prejudice to the
continuance of Civil Case No. 2539, which, by reason of this decision,
involves no longer Lots 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, .
3. Directing.
(a) the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT No. 26638-R covering
the aforesaid lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre and to issue
anew Transfer Certificate of Title covering the said two lots in the name of
herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas; and
(b) the respondent Alejandro Lopez
(1) to deliver to herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas the possession of
lots Nos. 3368 and 3441;
(2) to deliver and/or pay to herein, petitioner all the rents, crops or income
collected by him from said lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 from April 23, 1960
until the possession of the two aforementioned lots is actually delivered to
her, or their value based on the current market price; and
(3) to pay the costs.
So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-612

April 3, 1948

JOSEFA AGUSTINES, ENCARNACION AGUSTINES, JOSE AGUSTINES,

LOURDES AGUSTINES, ESTELA AGUSTINES, and ABELARDO
AGUSTINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, SEVERO
VALENZUELA, and THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA,
respondents.
Arturo Agustines for petitioners.
La O and Feria and Ignacio Lugtu for respondent Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila.
Procopio S. Espiritu for other respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
A nine-hectare land in Marilao, Bulacan, is the subject of a three-cornered
dispute between Severo Valenzuela on one side and the relatives of his
deceased wife Generosa Agustines of the other, with the Archbishop of
Manila as intervenor.
The main facts are unquestioned:
In August, 1934, Generosa Agustines died leaving a will which was
subsequently submitted for probate in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan in special proceedings No. 4944. Having no children, she named
her surviving husband Severo Valenzuela the universal heir, but she
specified some be quests. There was opposition to the approval of the will;
however, after some negotiations, the sister (Josefa) and the nephews and
nieces of the decedent (the other petitioners in this special civil action)
executed on February 8, 1935, an extrajudicial partition with the
respondent Severo Valenzuela, expressing conformity with the probate of
the testament and dividing the properties of the deceased. They promised
specifically to respect the wishes of the testatrix, one of which was this:

Sexto Encargo a mi marido que, despues de que haya percibido todos

los bienes recayentes en mi herencia done ... a la
xxx

xxx

xxx

Iglesia Catolica de Polo otra porcion que no exceda de nueve hectareas, a

discrecion tambien de mi marido, del mismo terreno palayero e inculto, en
el sitio de Quiririt, para que su producto se invierta en misas en sufragio de
mi alma.
Giving effect to the above direction, the extrajudicial partition stipulated
that "Quinta base. Que el solicitante de este expediente Sr. Severo
Valenzuela, instituido heredero universal en el testamento obrante en
autos y marcado como Exhibit "A", por su parte renuncia a favorde los
opositores, todo derecho que tenga o pudiera tener en la parcela de
terreno, descrito y deslindado en el inventario de los bienes propios de la
finada y designado con el numero cuatro (4) de dicho inventario, con
excepcion de, y, despues de descontar aquella procion de nueve (9)
hectareas, cuyo producto, la finada ha destinado, para misas en sufragio
de sum alma, a discrecion de su esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela, por
disposicion testamentaria y otras tres hecateras mas, de esta misma
parcela de terreno que se agjudican y resan para el Sr. Severo Valenzuela.
Entiendose, que en la secregacion de estos 12 hectareas, 9 de los cuales
cuyo producto se destina en sufragio del alma de la finada y los otros tres
hectareas que perteneceran al Sr. Severo Valenzuela deben colindarse con,
estar muy contiguos, a la pesquera designada y decrita en el inventario de
los bienes propios de la finada, e indicadas con el numero tres (3)."
Other items of the estate were apportioned among the signers of the deed
of partition, which, submitted for approval, was confirmed by the probate
court on October 31, 1936, in an order directing the administrator to
deliver the respective shares to the heirs of the legatees after paying the
corresponding inheritance taxes. No appeal was ever taken from such
order.
Years passed. Severo Valenzuela failed to transmit the lot or part thereof to
the parish church of Polo or to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
Wherefore, in May 1944, the Agustines connections, petitioners herein,
filed a complaint against Severo Valenzuela (civil case No, 158) seeking the
return to them of that nine-hectare lot in Quiririt, alleging his breach of
trust, plus renunciation on the part of the church of Polo that had
reportedly neglected to demand compliance with the beneficial legacy.
Advised of this move, the surviving husband Severo Valenzuela hastened
to submit in September, 1944, in the testamentary proceeding No. 4944, a
motion in which he represented that under the will he had discretion to
determine the area of land to be conveyed to the Polo church and that,
exercising such discretion, he elected to assign that tract actually
cultivated by the tenant named Benito Salazar in Quiririt (admittedly one

hectare more or less). He asked that this assignment be declared full

compliance with the testamentary directions. The other parties to the
testementary proceeding were not given due notice of this petition. It was
approved on December 2, 1944.
After the liberation and after they had become aware of Valenzuela's act
that tended to frustrate their civil action No. 158, the petitioners herein
submitted motions for reconsideration, the main theme of which was that
the said last order amended the decree of distribution of October 31, 1936,
which had become final long ago. All was to no avail. Hence they started
this special civil action to annul the order of December 2, 1944, on the
concrete proposition that the court had no jurisdiction to issue it, the order
of October 31, 1936, having become final and executory eight years
before. They contend, first, that under the will, and in accordance with the
partition approved by the court in 1936, the Polo church was entitled to
nine hectares in the Quiririt farm of Generosa. They argue next that when
the church repudiated the nine-hectare lot, it again became part of the
whole Quiririt property which, under the partition, had been adjudicated to
them.
On the other hand, Severo Valenzuela's position is that the whole ninehectare realty was awarded to him, subject to his obligation to donate to
the Polo church such portion thereof as he may designate in his discretion.
The intervenor, the Archbishop of Manila, representing the Polo church,
shares the petitioner's opinion that a nine-hectare lot had been granted to
said church. He maintains, however, that no voluntary renunciation of the
legacy ever took place.
The questions at issue are these:
(a) What was the share of the church of Polo under the will and the
extrajudicial partition?
(b) If it was a nine-hectare piece, is the order of December 2, 1944 in
special proceeding No. 4944 valid?
(c) If invalid, is certiorari the proper remedy?
I. It will be recalled that the will of Generosa Agustines contained a
provision directing her husband to donate a portion of her Quiririt farm not
exceeding nine hectares to the Polo church.
It will also be recalled that the extra-judicial partition, containing the
promise of all parties to respect all her testamentary directions, provided
that all the land in Quiririt belonging to Generosa would be adjudicated to
the herein petitioners excepting "con excepcion de, y, despues de
descontar aquella porcion de nueve (9) hectareas, cuyo producto, la finada

ha destinado, para misas en sufragio de su alma, a discrecion de su

esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela, por disposicion testamentaria y otros tres
hectareas mas, de esta misma parcela de terreno que se adjudican y seran
para el Sr. Severo Valenzuela. Entendiendose, que en la segregacion de
estos 12 hectareas, 9 de los cuales cuyo producto se diestina en sufragio
del alma de la finada y los otros tres hectareas que perteneceran al Sr.
Severo Valenzuela deben colindarse con, estar muy contiguos, a la
pesquera designada y descrita en el inventario de los bienes propios de la
finada, e indicadas con el numero tres (3)".
After examining and analyzing the circumstances of this litigation, we
reach the conclusion that, as contended by petitioners and the intervenor,
the extrajudicial partition definitely alloted a nine-hectare parcel to the
Polo church. Supposing, that under the will Valenzuela's discretion included
the determination of the area to be transferred and not merely the
selection of the site where the nine-hectare portion is to be segregated
still it seems clear that in the partition he elected or agreed that a ninehectare portion shall be conveyed to the Polo church for masses.
While it is true, as pointed out by Valnzuela's counsel, that in the
paragraph hereinabove quoted from the extrajudicial partition the phrase
"a discrecion de su esposo" appears, still it must be admitted that it could
not have implied a future choice by such husband, because immediately
thereafter the document speaks of nine hectares, "cuyo producto se
destina en sufragio delalma de la finada" without any discretionary
reservations. It is obvious that "a discrecion de su esposo" meant "segun
discrecion que hoy ejercita su esposo". It might also have referred to the
particular location of the parcel to be separated.
It is markworthy that, in addition to the nine-hectare portion, the deed
mentions another parcel of three hectares exclusively given to Valenzuela.
If the parties had not contemplated a nine-hectare donation to the Polo
church, but empowered Valenzuela to fix the area subsequently, they
would have assigned him 12 hectares, with the provision that he will
separate therefrom such portion as he may desire to convey to the parish
of Polo. They did not say so. Instead they clearly stipulated that nine
hectares were destined for "misas" (to the church), and that three hectares
would be reserved for him.
It is quite probable that if Generosa's kin had known, in the course of the
bargaining, that Valenzuela would not deliver all the nine hectares to the
Polo church but would retain eight hectares thereof, they would not have
ceded to him an additional lot of three hectares.
Proof positive that he had no choice as to the number of hectares is the
fact that for eight years he never exercised it, keeping for himself in breach
of trust the fruits of all the land. He might have ideas repugnant to the
religious beliefs his wife in regard to the celebration of masses for the
dead. But as a man of honor, as the surviving partner, he had no excuse to

set his own notions against those of his departed spouse, special on a
subject that concerned the disposition of her own properties. The will of the
testatrix is law1. And his action in fixing one hectare, when his wife
bequeathed a portion not exceeding nine hectares is surely such abuse of
discretion (if he had any) that will not easily commend itself to judicial
approbation.
To make ourselves clear, we must state at the risk of repetition that
although under the provisions of the will Severo Valenzuela might have
elected to transfer to the Polo church a portion less than nine hectares,
however, in the deed of partition he agreed exercising his discretion
to assign nine hectares for masses (to the Polo church). It must be
emphasized that in the distribution of the decedent's assets, we must face
the deed of partition which bear's the court's fiat. The last will becomes
secondary in value. Important to bear this distinction in mind, because
both in Valenzuela's motion and in the court's order approving the
assignment of one hectare, only the will was quoted, and not the
extrajudicial partition. Valenzuela's motion invoking the will exclusively
induced the court into error.
A third reason to hold that the document of partition deeded nine hectares
to the Polo church is the fact the court and the parties considered it a final
settlement of all the rights of all concerned, the court approving it in toto
and ordering the administrator to deliver to the beneficiaries their
respective portions or legacies. The court's order even wrote finis to the
expediente. And the parties, including Severo Valenzuela regarded it as
final for eight years, until he found it necessary, for his own interests to
make another move indirectly amending the final settlement of October
1936. Now then, if that partition avowedly settled the estate and
accomplished its distribution, the implication is unavoidable that it left
nothing to future judicial action or determination. Consequently it did not
contemplate any subsequent fixing by Valenzuela, and approval by the
court, of the portion to be transmitted to the Church of Polo. The parties
deemed it final because the rights of all beneficiaries were therein
defined with certainty. Therefore, the attempt by the surviving husband to
modify it eight years thereafter was completely beyond the pale of the law.
This should be the logical place to discuss the effects of the nondelivery of
the landed legacy for so many years. But in the interest of orderly
procedure that matter should be left open to debate and decision in Civil
Case No. 158 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
II. Having found in the preceding exposition that under the partition the
Polo church (or the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila) was entitled to a
nine-hectare lot, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the order of
December 2, 1944, attempted to modify the final order of October, 1936.
Which of course may not be done in this jurisdiction.

III. And certiorari may be interposed and granted under the circumstances,
the order of December 2, 1944, being an absolute nullity. 2

Respondent Valenzuela alleges that he had discretion to fix the area of the
land bequeathed under paragraph (6) of the will which reads as follows:

Wherefore, the order of the Bulacan court of December 2, 1944 is declared

null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

SEXTO. Encargo a mi marido que, despues de que haya percibido todos

los bienes recayantes en mi herencia, done ... a la Iglesia Catolica de Polo
otra porcion que no exceda de nueve hectareas, a discrecion tambien de
mi marido, del mismo terreno palayero inculto, en el sitio de Quiririt, para
que su producto se invierta en misas en sufragio de mi alma . . . .

Petition granted with costs against respondent Severo Valenzuela.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Petitioners pray for the annulment of the order of respondent court issued
on December 2, 1944, in special proceedings No. 4944, concerning the
estate of the deceased Generosa Agustines.
On February 8, 1935, an extra-judicial agreement of distribution of the
estate was executed and the same was duly approved on October 31,
1936. The order or approval adjudicates to the heirs their respective shares
and directs the administrator to make delivery of said shares within ten
days.
On November 1, 1943, petitioners commenced civil case No. 158, seeking
to recover from the executor Severo Valenzuela, husband of the testatrix, 9
hectares of land.
On September 7, 1944, Severo Valenzuela filed a motion in the testate
proceedings, asking authority to assign and deliver to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, in full payment of its rights under the will of the
Generosa Agustines, a definite parcel of land of one hectare. On December
2, 1944, the lower court issued an order granting the authority prayed for.
Petitioners gained knowledge of the order on December 6, 1944, and they
filed a motion to vacate the order. The motion was denied on October 5,
1945.
Motion for reconsideration was filed on October 10, 1945. It was denied by
resolution dated May 20, 1946..
Petitioner impugn the jurisdiction of the lower court to issue the order of
December 2, 1944, alleging that the agreement of distribution approved on
October 31, 1936, has become final and that it fixed at 9 hectares the land
adjudicated to the Roman catholic Archbishop of Manila.

The pertinent portion of the extra-judicial agreement is as follows:

QUINTA BASE. Que el solicitante de este expediente Sr. Severo Valenzuela,
instituido heredero universal en el testamento obrante en autos y marcado
como Exhibit "A", por su parte renuncia a favor de los opositores, todo
derecho que tenga o pudiera tener en la parcela de terreno, descrito y
deslindado en el inventario de los bienes propios de la finada y designado
con el numero cuatro (4) de dicho inventario, con excepcion de, y despues
de descontar aquella porcion de nueve (9) hectareas, cuyo producto, la
finada ha destinado, para misas en sufragio de su alma, a discrecion de su
esposo, Sr. Severo Valenzuela, por disposicion testamentaria y otros tres
hectareas mas, de esta misma parcela de terreno que se adjudican y seran
para el Sr. Severo Valenzuela. Entendiendose, que en la segregacion de
estos 12 hectareas, 9 de los cuales cuyo producto se destina en sufragio
del alma de la finada y los otros tres hecatreas que perteneceran al Sr.
Severo Valenzuela deban colindarse con, o, estar muy contiguos, a la
pesquera designada y descrita en el inventario de los bienes propios de la
finada, e indicadas con el numero tres (3); y el resto pasara a ser de la
exclusiva propiedad, la primera mitad sera de la Sra. Josefa Agustines y la
otra mitad, hacia al Norte, sera de los hermanos Encarnacion Agustines,
Dr. Jose Agustines, Lourdes Agustines, Estela Agustines y Abelardo
Agustines; y para la Sra. Asuncion Agustines se entiende adjudicada a su
favor la cuarta parte del solar y casa descrita y deslindada en el inventario
de los bienes propios de la finada, e indicada como el numero dos (2) en el
mencionado inventario y aquella otra cuarta parte del solar y el camarin
ruinoso, tambien descrito y delindada en el referido inventario, como
bienes propios, de la finada y marcado como el numero uno (1), en el
mencionado inventario.
Under the terms of the will and of the extrajudicial agreement of
distribution, there should not be any doubt that until Severo Valenzuela
had decided to fix the area of the land in question at one hectare in his
motion dated September 7, 1944, he had discretion to determine said
area.
The will instructs him to donate a parcel of land to the Catholic Church of
Polo.
According to article 618 of the Civil Code, "a donation is an act of liberality
by which a person disposes gratuitously of a thing in favor of another who

accepts it," As no one can be compelled to perform an act of liberality, it is

evident that, under the wordings of the will, Valenzuela was free to donate
the land or not. If he elected to make a donation, he was subject to only
one limitation, that is, that the maximum area that he could donate would
not exceed 9 hectares. Within said limitation, he had full discretion.
The extra-judicial agreement of distribution has not in any way modified
the terms of the will. Therein the parties made the following commitment:
"Respetaran todas y cada una de las disposiciones del testamento." And it
repeated that Valenzuela had discretion regarding the land to be donated
so that its products may be used for masses.
Valenzuela exercised his discretion on September 7, 1944, and he fixed the
area of the land he decided to donate at one hectare. No one has the
power or right to compel him to donate more than said area.
Having exercised his right to make the donation only on September 7,
1944, after the Constitution of the Philippines had already taken effect, a
constitutional question arises. Is the Catholic Church of Polo or the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, designated interchangeably by the parties
as meaning the same personality, entitled to acquire the land in question?
The provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution, especially section 5
thereof, have been definitely interpreted by the supreme Court in the wellknown Krivenko case in the sense that the right to acquire any kind of land
in the Philippines is reversed exclusively to Filipino citizens or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens "save in cases of hereditary succession."
Here there is no hereditary succession for two reasons: 1. The Catholic
Church of Polo is not an heir of the deceased Generosa Valenzuela, and 2.
The acquisition of the property her in question is by donation.
Was the Catholic Church of Polo or the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila a Filipino citizen at the time the donation was made by Valenzuela
on September 7, 1944? Article IV of the Constitution deals with Filipino
citizenship and in all its provisions only individual persons are
contemplated, never an abstract entity such as the Catholic Church of Polo
or the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, which is a unipersonal
corporation or as alleged in the petition, "a corporation sole."

There is absolutely no showing that the Catholic Church of Polo is a

corporation or association at least sixty per centum is owned by Filipino
citizens. There is no showing that the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
is such a corporation or association. Upon the statement made at the
hearing of this case, it appears that the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila is only a branch of a universal church ruled by the Pope, with
permanent residence in Rome, Italy. Neither the Catholic Church of Polo nor
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila appears to possess the conditions
which, according to express provisions of the Constitution, will entitle to
acquire the one hectare of land donated by Severo Valenzuela.
For all the foregoing, the donation made by Severo Valenzuela in favor of
the Catholic Church of Polo and the order of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan dated December 2, 1944, approving said donation, are declared
null and void on constitutional grounds.

BRIONES, M., dissenting:

Hay en este asunto una cuestion procesal importante. En la misma
decision de la mayoria se admite que se halla pendiente ante al Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Bulacan el asunto civil No. 158, entre las mismas
partes, en que precisamente se plantea de modo directo y categorico el
punto principal discutido, a saber; si la extension de terreno a que tiene
derecho la Iglesia Catolica de Polo es 9 hecatreas, o puede ser menos, a
discrecion del viudo de la donante, Severo Valenzuela. Con esta admision
no alcanzo a comprender por que le mayoria estima el presente recurso de
certiorari, anticipandose a enjuinciar y decidir practicamente la cuestion
que se litiga en el referido asunto civil No, 158. No cabe duda de que esto
es impropio y antijuridico. En el recurso especial que nos ocupa no
tenemos elementos de juicio suficientes para resolver la controversia. En el
mencionado asunto civil es donde los derechos de las partes debieran
determinarse y resolverse, sobre todo los derechos de la iglesia. Es
elemental que el certiorari solo procede cuando no hay otro remedio
expedito y adecuado. Aqui hay otro remedio no solo mas expedito, sino
mas adecuado, y es la tramitacion del referido asunto civil No. 158.
La decision de la mayoria es puramente academica, no resuelve nada
como no sea anticipando el juicio sobre un asunto que todavia no ha
llegado a esta Corte Suprema. Asi que estimo innecesario expresar mi
opinion sobre el fondo de la cuestion, esto es, si el viudo tiene o no
derecho a donar a la iglesia menos 9 hectareas, de acuerdo con la
discrecion que en el testamento le concede su difunta esposa. Expresare
mi opinion cuando llegue el momento oportuno.

1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila
predeceased his adoptive mother. 4 Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
Abarte Vda. de Manungas.

G.R. No. 193161

August 22, 2011

DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,

vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREO,
Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of
the April 30, 2009 Decision1 and July 21, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto
and Florencia Avila Parreo v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting Presiding
Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado Salinas (Manungas). The
CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated November 4, 2002 3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao del Norte,
in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate
of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas, Diosdado Manungas,
petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of respondent
Florencia Avila Parreo (Parreo) as the special administrator of the estate
of Engracia Manungas and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas
Manungas (Diosdado) in her stead.
The Facts
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no
children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12,

Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on

March 31, 1980 in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There, she stated that
there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas
except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged
as the natural son of Florentino Manungas.5 Meanwhile, Avilas widow
executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on October 29, 1980,
renouncing her rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of
Engracia Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in
the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the
properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving
heirs.6
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreo,
the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties
and person of her incompetent aunt.7
Engracia Manungas, through Parreo, then instituted Civil Case No. 519696 against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico
for illegal detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in
Panabo City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is
the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed
beyond the reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus,
the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas,
ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to
Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to
the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the
MTC.8 On appeal to this Court, defendants petition was denied for having
been filed out of time in a Resolution which became final on April 20,
1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas
(Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City,
Davao. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. 10 The petition was opposed by
Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreo alleging that Diosdado was
incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that
he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he
was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in

fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas
for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil Case No.
5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order appointing Parreo as
the administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreo is hereby
appointed as Special Administrator of the property of the late Engracia N.
Vda. de Manungas. The Special Administrator is hereby directed to post a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.11
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.12 In his motion, Diosdado
argued that Parreos appointment as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but
which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas death, concluding that her
appointment as special administrator was without basis. He added that
Parreo was not fit to become a special administrator having already been
fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia
Manungas property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that
Parreo is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while
he is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and
ordering the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreo as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the
Special Administrator.13
Parreo and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued
its assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreo as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead.
The CA further reinstated Parreo as the special administrator of the
estate. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order

dated November 4, 2002 setting aside the appointment of Florencia
Parreo as special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de
Manungas, and denying the property bond posted by Florencia Parreo [is]
hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by
Public Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City,
Davao del Norte with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.14
Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 15, 200915 which the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.
The Issues
Diosdado raises the following issues:
The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari
cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available. 16
The Court a Quo in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration grossly
violated the rule that once a decision or order is final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable.17
The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the
appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator
and reinstating the appointment of Florencia Parreo as special
administrator.18
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to oppositors petition
that is flawed.19
The Courts Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order

The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of
whether the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari
cannot be the substitute for a lost appeal, Parreo should have appealed
the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 to the CA through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado contends
that the Order dated November 4, 2002 became final and executory,
Parreo having failed to file the petition within the reglementary period;
thus, the Order cannot be the subject of review even by this Court.
However, Diosdados position assumes that the RTC Order dated November
4, 2002 is a final order instead of an interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, 20 the Court stated what an
interlocutory order is:
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not
end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
"interlocutory", e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules x x x. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as
above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the
final judgment rendered in the case.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an
interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters
of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v.
Ocampo,21 the Court succinctly held, "The appointment or removal of
special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may
be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court."
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4,
2002 is clearly an interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the
subject of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as argued by
petitioner. The proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. Thus, Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.

An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely

disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65.
Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the
petition well within the prescribed period under this rule.
There was no necessity to file a motion for reconsideration
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is required before a decision may be appealed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as
a motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Thus, petitioner argues that respondents failure to move for the
reconsideration of the Order dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal
from it. Such general rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained in
Delos Reyes v. Flores:22
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of
certiorari and mandamus are available only when there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a
motion for reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another
adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. x x x However,
there are several exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without
the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
xxxx

i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved. (Emphasis supplied.)
The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination
of the issues raised by respondents in appealing the Order dated
November 4, 2002, reveals that the issues are only questions of law. Ergo,
there is no need for a motion for reconsideration.
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari
despite the existence of an appeal or other appropriate remedy in several
instances, including when the court a quo acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order.23
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still
prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both
petitioner and oppositors, this Court finds merit in the contention of
petitioner. In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the
Supreme Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral
relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas
inherits the latters property by operation of law;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing Florencia
Parreo as special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de
Manungas is ordered set aside.

Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator

lies within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo
v. Lacuata-Gabriel,24 it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred
right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section
1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of
an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section
2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special
administrator. x x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as
special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the
judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed,
discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to
reason, justice or equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled
that:
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this
is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been
settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules
at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the
issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference
under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular
administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without
grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles,
interference by higher courts is unwarranted.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason,
guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may,
therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator
is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As
stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:

Such reasoning is a non sequitur.

The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does
not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas.

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. Such special

administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such

perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special

administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless
so ordered by the court.1avvphi1
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore,
be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving
the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would
ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would
effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion
and depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint
a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the
deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4,
2002 Order, acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado
as the special administrator of Engracia Manungas estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia
Avila Parreo as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in
Diosdados contention that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino
Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to
the late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latters
estate. On the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of
Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is
interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt
Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise
administration of the decedents estate. Hence, the Order of the lower
court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as special
administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the
instant case, the lower court exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or
capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of
Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino
Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long
been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. 27 With the termination of the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an
illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia
Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no

interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its

special administrator. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the
trial court, reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as
the special administrator of Engracia Manungas estate, the May 15, 2002
Order is necessarily reinstated and Parreos appointment as special
administrator is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CAs April 30, 2009
Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN
declaring as null and void the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in
Special Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Order dated
May 15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreo
is REINSTATED as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia
Manungas.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183053

June 16, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA

AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI1 who, faced with the impasse between Spain and
Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately,
the riches of the New World by issuing the Inter Caetera, 2 we are
confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family
imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.3
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
74949,4 reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. 5
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),
married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their
only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and
Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband,
Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they
begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel
Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by
two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was
a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and
was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged

natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses

Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was
annulled.6 Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio
II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from
their father and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for
visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and
Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon
City granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation
monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped
because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her
sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III
and Nenita.71avvphi1
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an
estate of real and personal properties, with a probable gross value of
P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of the surviving
heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving
spouse and a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old,
legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita CojuangcoSuntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; and
(4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a
resident of x x x; and that as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent left
no debts or obligation at the time of her death.8
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent
Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging,
among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her
estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as
part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be
accorded legal preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her

family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty
(30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as
it did not mention the other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and
Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect the integrity of the
estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the
one who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the
estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that
Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers
is untrue.9
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings
amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating
his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on his
behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to
the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to
Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed
his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in
his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio
III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the
estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own
qualifications that: "[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking;
he was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in
the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in
1979 in memory of her grandmothers father; the significant work
experiences outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae;
he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college
with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x
x x."10
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence
on their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a
decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed

administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who
shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees,
and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration
be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration
issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in
SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of
administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing
of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.12
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals
by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER
SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992
OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS

REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER
ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM
BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE. 13
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated,
thus:

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate

child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in
the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole,
the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by Federico,
and which nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as
administrator of the decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the
administrator of the decedents estate for the following reasons: 15

Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial

and documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the
estate of the decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor,
Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed administrator of the estate in the
above-entitled special proceedings.

1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e.,

Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the
surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before his
appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his nomination
of Emilio III inoperative;

Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondents

immediate] family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The
root cause of which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right
time and the proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is
the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate
and bitter estrangement.

2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate

offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred,
being the "next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an
heir;

The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against
the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home
in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of
the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as
administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is
accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules
of Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the
appointment of the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his
grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and
justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly
ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to
give effect to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the
viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically
meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as
well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared,
academically and by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of
the position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not unqualified,
it is clear to the court that when it comes to management of real estate
and the processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with
an established track record as a manager has a decided edge and
therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of the estate. 14

3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 16 of the Civil Code
bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred
from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent
in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as
Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses
none of the disqualifications specified in Section 1, 17 Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and
respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents
estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in
the administration of the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA
glosses over several undisputed facts and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give
preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid
and effective will;

2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain
bar rule,18 is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for
the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate
relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the
decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains
during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with
that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal
partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico,
not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio
III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted
son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this
Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would
have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are
puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs
nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative
by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving

husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent

and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case. 19 Jurisprudence has long
held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of
the trial court.20 In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this
case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent
and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals, 21 we upheld the appointment by the
trial court of a co-administration between the decedents son and the
decedents brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate.
In the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian22 that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference
does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains
here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other
putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and
Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and
the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all,
considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the
unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part
of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction,
i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992
of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and
illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where
facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her
husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in
their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband,
the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna
in the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil
Code, beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted
only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code
prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced
Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows
the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992
prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him
in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make
a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the
right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The
first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis--vis
illegitimate children.23
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased
Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads
sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants,
and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those
of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done
so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone called to
succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in
accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable
or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of
humanity.24

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina,
did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The
peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel
for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil
Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to
refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico,
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata 25 on the same issue remains good
law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although
the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased.
The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not
as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come
after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel

Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is
likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the

subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent

Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.