G.R. No.

L-9989

March 13, 1918

EDUARDO CUAYCONG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.RAMONA BENEDICTO, ET

AL., defendants-appellants.
FISHER, J.:
Facts:

Eduardo Cuaycong, et al are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between

the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality
of Seravia, and that the Silverio Ginoo et al. are the lessees of part of said haciendas; that
more than twenty years the Cuaycong and their predecessors in interest have made use of
the Nanca-Victorias road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and
continiously, with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda, for the purpose of
conveying the products of their haciendas to the town of Victorias by means of carts,
carabaos, and other usual means of transportation. Considering there is no outlet to a
public road from the hacienda occupied by Cuaycong et al. On November15, 1912, the
defendants closed the road in question at the point at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno,
and refused to permit Cuaycong, et al.to continue using it. The lower court ruled that NancaVictorias road which crosses the Hacienda Toreno is a public road. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the Nanca-Victorias road which traverses the Hacienda Toreno
is a public highway .
2.) Whether or not Cuaycong, et a.l have acquired an easement of way over the
Hacienda Toreno , in case it would be held the road in question is not a public
highway.
Resolution:
1.)No, the Nanca-Victorias road which traverses the Hacienda Toreno is not a public
highway.There is admittedly no evidence to show that the land occupied by the road in
question was any time conveyed to the general government or any of its political
subdivisions by the present or any of the former owners of the Hacienda Toreno. There is
no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed prior to the time when
the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private
ownership. The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the
Government has at any time asserted any right or title in or to the land occupied by the
road, or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep or construction. The Civil
Code defines as public roads those which are constructed by the State (art. 339), and as
provincial and town roads those "the expense of which is borne by such towns or
provinces." (Civil Code, art. 344.) While it is not contended that this definition is exclusive,

it does show that during the Spanish regime, under normal conditions, roads which were
public were maintained at the public expense, and that the fact that at no time was any
expense incurred by the Government with respect to the road here in question tends
strongly to support the contention of the defendants that it is private way.

2.)No, Cuaycong, et al have acquired an easement of way over the Hacienda Toreno , in case
it would be held the road in question is not a public highway. The plaintiffs have failed to
show that they have acquired by prescription a private right of passage over the lands of
defendants. The supreme court of Spain has decided that under the law in force before the
enactment of the Civil Code, the easement of way was discontinuous, and that while such
an easement might be acquired by prescription, it must be used in good faith, in the belief
of the existence of the right, and such user must have been continuous from time
immemorial. Under art. 539 of the Civil Code no discontinuous easement could be
acquired by prescription in any event. Assuming, without deciding, that this rule has been
changed by the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription,
and that since its enactment discontinuous easement may be required by prescription, it is
clear that this would not avail plaintiffs. The Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on
October 1, 1901. The term of prescription for the acquisition of rights in real estate is fixed
by the Code (sec. 41) at ten years. The evidence shows that in February, 1911, before the
expiration of the term of ten years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect,
the defendants interrupted the use of the road by the plaintiffs by constructing and
maintaining a toll gate on it and collecting toll from persons making use of it with carts and
continued to do so until they were enjoined by the granting of the preliminary injunction by
the trial court in December, 1912. The Courts conclusion is, therefore, that the plaintiffs
have not acquired by prescription a right to an easement of way over the defendant's
property; that their use of the Nanca-Victorias road across the Hacienda Toreno was due
merely to the tacit license and tolerance of the defendants and their predecessors in title;
that license was essentially revokable; and that, therefore, the defendants were within their
rights when they closed the road in 1911.