G.R. No.

100091 October 22, 1992

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE,
REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and decision of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision the decision * of the
Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of
suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the Central Mindanao University (CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
This case originated in a complaint filed by complainants calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers
Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU, before the Department
of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.
From the records, the following facts are evident. The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by
the state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon in early 1910, in response
to the public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was
transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the provincial capital of Bukidnon.
In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus at Musuan, until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still
primarily an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to
develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future
development of that part of the Philippines. On January 16, 1958 the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P.
Garcia, "upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53,
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the
Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080
hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner under OCT Nos. 160, 161 and 162. 1
In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several
tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal
reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares
to 3,080 hectares.
In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was less than 3,000. By 1988, the student population had expanded to some
13,000 students, so that the school community has an academic population (student, faculty and non-academic staff) of almost 15,000.
To cope with the increase in its enrollment, it has expanded and improved its educational facilities partly from government appropriation
and partly by self-help measures.
True to the concept of a land grant college, the school embarked on self-help measures to carry out its educational objectives, train its
students, and maintain various activities which the government appropriation could not adequately support or sustain. In 1984, the
CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land
resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this
program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how,
practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each
group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to
establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated
that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived
as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural
technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional
income to augment their salaries. The location of the CMU at Musuan, Bukidnon, which is quite a distance from the nearest town, was
the proper setting for the adoption of such a program. Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao,
Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU
while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants who were not members of the faculty or nonacademic staff CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the participants in this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became
President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as
Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel,
among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business
project, Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17,
the re-organization law of the CMU.
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program
(CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical
training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2 among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated Development Foundation

(CMU-IDF) and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a
selda for one (1) calendar year. The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of
project proposals and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as
service fee and P1,000 per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year
would be turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or member of

their family to establish any house or live within vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for
a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.
Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still employed with the
CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impact of the
discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to
participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants.
Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Participation To the
CMU-Income Enhancement Program, 3 a former employee would be grouped with an existing selda of his choice and
provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1) calendar year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee
of P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same prohibitions as those
imposed on the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a
result of the Agreement.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not
renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to
termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be
beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact
and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the respondents DARAB and the Court of Appeals, raised the
following issues:
1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and
coverage of land under the CARP.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB.
In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the DARAB, complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are
tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU situated at Sinalayan,
Valencia, Bukidnon and Musuan, Bukidnon, consisting of about 1,200 hectares. We agree with the DARAB's finding that
Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the
livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any
share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and
land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the
agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed,
and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not share in the produce of the participants'
labor.
In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless peasants. This allegation requires
proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics
Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities
he committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment,
own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever
appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.
The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were originally authorized or given permission to
occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose to carry out certain university projects as part of the
CMU's program of activities pursuant to its avowed purpose of giving training and instruction in agricultural and other
related technologies, using the land and other resources of the institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their entry
into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written consent of the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a
specific purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay
was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of
another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with
the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter. 4 Squatters cannot enter the land of another
surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants.
Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not
qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who
knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion
of the Court.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as
beneficiaries under the CARP.

The questioned decision of the Adjudication Board, affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, segregating 400 hectares
from the CMU land is primarily based on the alleged fact that the land subject hereof is "not directly, actually and
exclusively used for school sites, because the same was leased to Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte
Philippines)".
In support of this view, the Board held that the "respondent University failed to show that it is using actually, really, truly
and in fact, the questioned area to the exclusion of others, nor did it show that the same is directly used without any
intervening agency or person", 5 and "there is no definite and concrete showing that the use of said lands are essentially
indispensable for educational purposes". 6 The reliance by the respondents Board and Appellate Tribunal on the technical
or literal definition from Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, may give the ordinary reader a
classroom meaning of the phrase "is actually directly and exclusively", but in so doing they missed the true meaning of
Section 10, R.A. 6657, as to what lands are exempted or excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
The pertinent provisions of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, are as
follows:
Sec. 4. SCOPE. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229 including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest of mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this
Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits ad determined by Congress in the
preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or
that can be raised thereon.
Sec. 10 EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to
be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm
stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research
and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic
centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands
with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied).
The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently,
actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and
academic facility overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU,
which is a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land and for future programs of
expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same manner as land grant colleges in America, a type of
educational institution which blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the
Mid-West. What we now know as Michigan State University, Penn State University and Illinois State University, started as small land
grant colleges, with meager funding to support their ever increasing educational programs. They were given extensive tracts of
agricultural and forest lands to be developed to support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural technology and
scientific research. Funds for the support of the educational programs of land grant colleges came from government appropriation,
tuition and other student fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources. 7 It was in this same spirit

that President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao
Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set up in
Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an
agricultural educational institution, to develop and train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of
the country.
In line with its avowed purpose as an agricultural and technical school, the University adopted a land utilization program to
develop and exploit its 3080-hectare land reservation as follows: 8
No. of Hectares Percentage
a. Livestock and Pasture 1,016.40 33
b. Upland Crops 616 20
c. Campus and Residential sites 462 15

d. Irrigated rice 400.40 13

e. Watershed and forest reservation 308 10
f. Fruit and Trees Crops 154 5
g. Agricultural
Experimental stations 123.20 4
3,080.00 100%

The first land use plan of the CARP was prepared in 1975 and since then it has undergone several revisions in line with changing
economic conditions, national economic policies and financial limitations and availability of resources. The CMU, through Resolution
No. 160 S. 1984, pursuant to its development plan, adopted a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program
called the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP). The objectives 9 of this program were:

1. Provide researches who shall assist in (a) preparation of proposal; (b) monitor project implementation;
and (c) collect and analyze all data and information relevant to the processes and results of project
implementation;
2. Provide the use of land within the University reservation for the purpose of establishing a lowland rice
project for the party of the Second Part for a period of one calendar year subject to discretionary renewal
by the Party of the First Part;
3. Provide practical training to the Party of the Second Part on the management and operation of their
lowland project upon request of Party of the Second Part; and
4. Provide technical assistance in the form of relevant livelihood project specialists who shall extend
expertise on scientific methods of crop production upon request by Party of the Second Part.
In return for the technical assistance extended by the CMU, the participants in a project pay a nominal amount as service fee. The selfreliance program was adjunct to the CMU's lowland rice project.
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the
CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development
Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program,
with the direct participation of faculty and students. Said contracts with the Philippine Packing Corporation and others of a similar nature
(like MM-Agraplex) were made prior to the enactment of R.A. 6657 and were directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the
CMU as an educational institution. As soon as the objectives of the agreement for the joint use of the CMU land were achieved as of
June 1988, the CMU adopted a blue print for the exclusive use and utilization of said areas to carry out its own research and
agricultural experiments.
As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to
resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was
given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter,
unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real for the land.
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress;
(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;
(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational
purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the
implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the
coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot
production centers, etc.
Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled
school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the
school to be necessary for its purposes. The CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has
questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to
establish that the fact that the DARAB had no jurisdiction, it made the adjudication now subject of review.
Whether the DARAB has the authority to order the segregation of a portion of a private property titled in the name of its lawful owner,
even if the claimant is not entitled as a beneficiary, is an issue we feel we must resolve. The quasi-judicial powers of DARAB are
provided in Executive Order No. 129-A, quoted hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:

Sec. 13. AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD There is hereby created an Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board under the office of the Secretary. . . . The Board shall assume the powers and functions with
respect to adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive Order 229 and this Executive Order . . .
Sec. 17. QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
including implementation of Agrarian Reform.
Section 50 of R.A. 6658 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. . . .
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the DARAB
has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the
same law as any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands
devoted to
agriculture. 10
In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the
"segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and
directed the DAR Regional Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute
for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants or
leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority. w do not believe that the quasijudicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by
the complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not
entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private
property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregation 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the
complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted
under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the
relief prayed the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic
programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao
outside the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them,
can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for
distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and
research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are
the main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and
development of this country.
It is the opinion of this Court, in the light of the foregoing analysis and for the reasons indicated, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain
a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. We hereby declare the decision of
the DARAB dated September 4, 1989 and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the
quasi-judicial body, as null and void and hereby order that they be set aside, with costs against the private respondents.

G.R. No. L-29381

September 30, 1969

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and PANTALEON BINGABING, petitioners,

vs.
HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations and
PAMPILO DOLTZ, respondents
Marcelino B. Bermudez for petitioners.
Nostratis and Estrada for respondent Judge V. A. Del Valle.
Abelardo Flores for respondent Pampilo Doltz.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The decisive issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine National Railways
(PNR) which are on both sides of its railroad track, and are part of its right of way for its railroad operations but
temporarily leased, are agricultural lands within the purview of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, such as would come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
The facts of this particular case are these:
PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30.
meters adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way running from Manila to
Legazpi. These strips of land lie within the municipalities of Oas and Polangui, Province of Albay. At the center

thereof is a track measuring ten (10) to twelve (12) meters in width where railroad ties are placed and rails built for
running locomotives. On both sides of the track, or about (2) to five (5) meters away from the embarassment of the
track, are telegraph and telephone posts office (50) meters apart from each other, which maintain communication
wires necessary in the operation of PNR trains. PNR draws earth from these sides to fill up the railroad track
whenever it is destroyed by water during rainy days; and uses them as depository of railroad materials for the repair
of destroyed lines, posts, bridges during washouts, or other damaged parts of the line occasioned by derailments or
other calamities.
The portions of these lands not actually occupied by the railroad track had been a source of trouble. People
occupied them; they reap profits therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy them cropped up. It is on the
face of all these that, with adequate provisions to safeguard railroad operations, PNR adopted temporary rules and
regulations, as follows: (a) the possession and enjoyment of the property should be awarded to interested persons
thru competitive public bidding; (b) the rental of the premises is to be determined from the amount offered by the
highest bidder; (e) the duration of the lease shall be for a limited period, not to exceed three (3) years; (d) the lessee
cannot sublease the premises; (e) the lease contract is revocable at any time upon demand by the owner, whenever
it needs the same for its own use or for a more beneficial purpose; (f) the owner can enter the leased premises
during the period of the lease to make necessary repairs; and (g) the lessee shall not use the premises in a manner
prejudicial to the operation of the trains.
Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on both sides of
the track, after a competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three (3) years and
under conditions hereinbefore set forth. A civil law lease contract in printed form was, on April 15, 1963, entered into
by and between PNR and Bingabing. That contract expressly stipulates that Bingabing was "to occupy and use the
property ...temporarily for agriculture." Consideration therefor was P130.00 per annum. Bingabing, however, failed to
take possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land, had a house thereon. Doltz claims to
be a tenant of previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.
Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the premises in
the Court of First Instance of Albay. 1 They there averred that sometime in January 1963, Doltz illegally entered the
land, constructed a house thereon occupying about fifty (50) square meters, and planted palay on the other portions
thereof. They prayed that Doltz remove his house, vacate the premises, restore possession to PNR or Bingabing,
pay PNR P160 per annum as reasonable compensation for the occupation of the premises from January 1963, and
P2,000 as expenses of litigation, pay Bingabing P500 annually from 1963, and shoulder the costs of suit.
Doltz' answer in that case averred inter alia that the had been a tenant on the property for over twenty years; that he
had been placed thereon by the deceased Pablo Gomba who leased the property from the then Manila Railroad
Company (now PNR); that he became the tenant of Demetrio de Vera, Gomba's successor; that he is the tenant of
Bingabing, having given the latter's share of 1/3 during the last two harvests; and that the case is properly
cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. Upon the court's request, Doltz and Bingabing agreed to temporarily
liquidate the harvest on a sharing ratio of 70-30 in Doltz' favor.
It has been suggested in the record that said case Civil Case 3021 was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance of Albay upon the ground that the subject matter of the action is tenancy; that petitioners have appealed.
That case, parenthetically, has not yet reached this Court.
While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered with the Court
of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 7030 of the crops, and reliquidation of past harvests. This is the present case CAR Case 692, Albay '67, Court of
Agrarian Relations, Ninth Regional District, Legazpi City, Branch II, entitled "Pampilo Doltz, Petitioner, versus
Pantaleon Bingabing, Respondent." PNR intervened in the case. Petitioners herein there maintained the position
that the premises in controversy are not an agricultural land within the contemplation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act
(Republic Act 1199) or the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844); that no tenancy relationship existed
between the parties; that CAR, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that there is a pending case
between the same parties in another court involving the same subject matter and the same cause of action.
After trial, the CAR promulgated its decision of June 10, 1968. It upheld its jurisdiction over the case, maintained
Doltz in the peaceful possession of the parcels of land as tenant on a 70-30 sharing ratio in Doltz' favor, ordered
Bingabing to pay Doltz P250 attorneys' fees and the costs, but dismissed the latter's claim for reliquidation of past
harvests for lack of substantial evidence. Petitioners' move to reconsider the said decision failed. They now come to
this Court. They specifically question CAR's jurisdiction.
1. Is the land here involved in agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code?
According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person
of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through
the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former
agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money,
or in both." 2 The term "agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code is not as broad in

meaning as it is known in the constitutional sense. As interpreted in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461,
471, the phrase "agricultural land," constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither mineral nor timber
lands and embraces within it wide sweep not only lands strictly agricultural or devoted to cultivation for agricultural
purposes but also commercial, industrial, residential lands and lands for other purposes. On the other hand, by
Section 166(1) of theAgricultural Land Reform Code, " "[a]gricultural land" means land devoted to any growth
including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs
18 and 19 of this section, respectively." 3
It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land.
PNR cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in
agriculture.
Indeed, the land which adjoins the railroad track on both sides is part of PNR's right of way. That right of way is
not limited to the particular space occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also includes the portions occupied
by the telephone and telegraph posts. It extends to a width of 30 meters which reasonably gives the train locomotive
engineer a clear commanding view of the track and its switches ahead of him.
The entire width is important to PNR's railroad operations. Which should not be hampered. And, communication
lines must not be disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track. Because, it is not so easy to
prevent people from walking along the track; animals, too, may stray into the area; obstructions there could be along
the track itself which might cause derailment. All of these could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the
necessary precautions on time to avert accidents which may cause damage to the trains, injury to its passengers,
and even loss of life.
Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural
activities. The contract of lease authorizes the railroad company to enter upon the premises to make repairs, place
its materials on the land. It may even take soil from the land to fill up any part of the railroad track destroyed by
water during rainy days. What if PNR should decide to construct another parallel track on the land leased? The
occupant of the land cannot prevent or stop PNR from doing any of these. Security of tenure so important in
landlord-tenant relationship may not thus be attained.
The foregoing are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from adopting the view that the disputed land in
narrow strips is agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code. By destination, it is not agricultural.
2. Nor may Pampilo Doltz be considered as a true and lawful tenant.
To be borne in mind is the fact that PNR executed with Pantaleon Bingabing a civil law lease contract, not an
agricultural lease. This distinction is expressly recognized by the law. 4 That contract is temporary, at best for a
short term. It is revocable any time upon demand by PNR whenever it needs the same for its own use or for a more
beneficial purpose.
1awphl.nt

Even on the assumption that the land is agricultural, there is the circumstance that PNR prohibits the sublease of
the premises. PNR's lessees cannot give what they are not allowed to give. Any contract then of sublease between
Doltz, the supposed tenant, and Pablo Gomba or Demetrio de Vera, the previous awardees, or even of Pantaleon
Bingabing, the present awardee without PNR's consent cannot bind the latter. No such consent was here
given.
This ushers us to a principle shaped out by jurisprudence that the security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy law
may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. 5 In Pabustan vs. De
Guzman, L-12898, August 31, 1960, the tenant sublet the landholding to a third person without the knowledge and
consent of the landowner. In an ejectment suit brought by the landowner against said third person in the CAR, this
Court held that the CAR had no jurisdiction over the case because no tenancy relationship existed between the
parties, as the third person was, in reality, an unlawful squatter or intruder. Correlating Pabustan to the present case,
the lessee here had no power to sublet. There is also thus no legally cognizable relationship of tenancy between the
parties.
We, accordingly, rule that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the case at bar and the proceedings below are thus
null and void.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations of June 10, 1968 in its Case 692, Albay '67,
under review is hereby reversed, and said case is hereby dismissed.
Costs against private respondent Pampilo Doltz. So ordered.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B.
GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M.
SERRANO, and ROMAN OZAETA, petitioners,

vs.
PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE AVILES, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M. Serrano for themselves
and for other petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators
and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was instituted by the
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated
under Philippine laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of
the Philippines and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and
from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of
the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise
restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office
from paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the retirement of the
members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the
constitutionality of the law is centered on the following propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the
title of the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of
salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary
for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree,
while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of
service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service,
which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to further increase their compensation in
violation of the Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:
AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED
NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred eighty-six, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further amended to read as follows:
"(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has rendered at least twenty years
of service. The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal contributions plus interest and
the payment of the corresponding employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof,
without interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, based on the
highest rate received, but not to exceed twenty-four months: Provided, That the retiring officer or employee
has been in the service of the said employer or office for at least four years immediately preceding his
retirement.
"Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of Representatives and to an elective
officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in the case of a Senator or Member,
he must have served at least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a member of the House of
Representatives, and, in the case of an elective officer of either House, he must have served the
government for at least twelve years, not less than four years of which must have been rendered as such
elective officer: Provided, That the gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of the House of
Representatives, or elective officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four
years of service in the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be
neither liable to attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.

"This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the
necessary appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or savings in its
appropriations or saving in its appropriations.
"Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection shall be entitled to the
commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they may
have to their credit at the time of retirement."
SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 22, 1963.
The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the respondent, filed its answer on September 8, 1964, and
contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the
petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section 21, Article VI, of the
Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
3. The law in question does not constitute legislation.
4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected officers of Congress who are authorized to approve
vouchers for payments for funds under the law in question, and the claimants to the vouchers to be
presented for payment under said items, were not included in the petition.
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature
of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to
increase their salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by Congressmen Marcial R.
Pimentel of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same
date, it was referred to the Committee on Civil Service. which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No.
3129, recommending approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as
filed representing the number of years that a senator or member must serve in Congress to entitle him to
retirement under the bill must be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted,
namely, "AND THE SAME (referring to gratuity) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL
NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF REINSTATEMENT OR
REELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the proposed amendments was approved on
second reading. It was passed on third reading on May 13, 1963, and on the same day was sent to the Senate,
which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it without amendment. The bill was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As
explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others
The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of C.A. 186, as amended, will enable
them to retire voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a minimum of twenty years as a Member of
Congress. This gratuity will insure the security of the family of the retiring member of Congress with the latter
engaging in other activities which may detract from his exalted position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is
expected that with this assurance of security for his loved ones, deserving and well-intentioned but poor men
will be attracted to serve their people in Congress.
As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a Senator or a Member of
the House of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire regardless of age. To be
eligible for retirement, he must have served for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the
House of Representatives. For an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least
twelve years, of which not less than four years must have been rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity
payable by the employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the
government. Said gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable in case
of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
First legal point personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.
The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute this action. This Court has
not hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter. This Court has repeatedly held that when the
petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests,
they are allowed to bring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v.
Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 [1963]).

The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks of
life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated, among other things,
that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of the
taxpayers."1 This legislation (Republic Act 3836) involves the disbursement of public funds.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
ofMassachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that:
... the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very different. His interest in
the moneys of the Treasury partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources is shared with
millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of any
payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of equity.
The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the American Jurisprudence, thus
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis
supplied.)
As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the Solicitor General is untenable.
Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section
14 of the Constitution.
The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution,
which reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in
the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case
of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos (emphasis supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some limitations and prohibitions
upon the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without forfeiting their respective
seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civil office which may have
been created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased while they were members of Congress;
(Section 16, Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and
6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of the Government is
accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to
have any special interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution
authored by them during their term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these limitations and
prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical demonstration or application of the principle of the and

balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We
conclude that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members, without
violating the provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the
compensation act including other emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at
P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional
amendment, when the unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two
bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the
salary for the Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each.
Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention first determined the
compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies
a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such
increase." In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to
increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the
members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the
Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187)
This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding against the
temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the original strict prohibition was modified
by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were approved in 1940 2
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other
emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefits as
provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the profit arising from office or
employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office,
as salary, fees and perquisites.3
In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to the possession of office, as salary, fees and
perquisites; advantage, gain, public or private." The gain, profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition
or significance of the word "emolument" as applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit,
or advantage which is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d.
897, 90l.: 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767)
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391, affirmed 234 N.Y. 548,
138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement allowances are part of compensation of public
officials; otherwise their payment would be unconstitutional.
In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N.W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in Article 4, section 9, of
the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or Representative shall hold any office, the emoluments of
which have been increased during the session of the Legislature of which he was a member, until after the
expiration of his term of office in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary alone, but
includes fees and compensation as the incumbent of the office is by law entitled to receive because he holds such
office and performed some service required of the occupant thereof."
From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument,
because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits
were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point Whether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are
patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)
In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as the governors of
provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered
cities.

The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully explained by Us in the case
ofPeople v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the classification to be reasonable must be based upon
substantial distinctions which make real differences and must be germane to the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p. 1937, the principle of the
requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly situated. Why limit the application of the
benefits of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members of Congress? We feel that the classification here is not
reasonable. (See also Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law [193862], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits after serving twelve
years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and employees are given retirement benefits
after serving for at least twenty years. In fact, the original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.
In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their
length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits
or equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been retired and reappointed is
suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic
Act 3836.
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the
Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws
have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System. 4
The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of Congress
are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each House, such as the Secretaries and the
Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the
benefits of retirement without having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the
Government.
Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed
in the act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complies with the requirement of
paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional
provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the
public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of
Congress. It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer
of the House, testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and
he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the
fiscal year 1964-65, Republic Act No. 4164, provides:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3836: PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all
approved claims shall have been paid P210,000.00.
In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the
House of Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 P300,000.00
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under
Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives
under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,300,000.00.
In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appears in the appropriations for
the Senate:

13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
1616: PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all
approved claims shall have been paid P100,000.00.
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to implement
Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the
House Of Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,200,000.00.
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under
Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives
under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,700,000.00.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to
members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service
regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective
officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In
other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers,
such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of
Commonwealth Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both
retirement and insurance benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed
in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., Vol. 1, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their contents is
satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be
a complete index of the content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably
construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a
practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject.
(Sumulong v. The Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained in Central
Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as
the Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also
extended to agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the
public domain as indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this
provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative
procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not
conforming to this constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
pp. 162-164;5 See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836 is
void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase
in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title
of a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared null and void, in so
far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional.
The restraining order issued in our resolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.

G.R. No. L-4191

July 18, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
LOUIS A. DOWDELL, JR., AND WILSON W. HARN, defendants and appellants.
Southworth and Ingersoll, for appellants.
Attorney-General Araneta, for appellee.
TRACEY, J.:
This is an appeal from a conviction for malversation of public moneys. The accused were all officers of the
Philippines Constabulary, Dowdell having been supply officer for the Province of Samar and Harn his subordinate,
while McIlvane was a friend visiting Harn during the occurrence in question.
On January 12, 1907, Dowdell, who had been relieved of his charge and ordered to turn over the property in his
hands to his successor, announced to Major Murphy, the senior inspector of Constabulary for Samar, that the safe
had disappeared from his office, containing some P6,000 in paper and three or four thousand in coin. Some days
later, at the instance of McIlvane, the safe was fished out of the bay, containing only two coins of the value of 40
centavos; but the sum of P9,971.26, in paper and silver, was found hidden in various places on the premises
occupied by Harn and was turned over to the Government.
After separate trials the accused were found guilty and the two supply officers were sentenced to terms of
imprisonment of six years and one day, and their visitor, as an accomplice, to imprisonment for four months, each of
them to pay one-third of the costs.
From the testimony of McIlvane it appears that during the week preceding January 12, the three men had been
shooting and drinking together, consuming a great quantity of beer, but it is apparent that at the time of the taking of
the money they all were clear-headed enough to know that they were about and to follow out a concerted and
intelligent plan of operations. During the early period of their convivialities it was suggested by Dowdell that it would
be well if his "safe and accounts were in the bay." On the next day when he appeared, he brought with him a bundle
of bank bills wrapped in a newspaper, but the following day returned them to the office. On the succeeding day,
however, the silver was brought to Harn's house, boxed in two oil cases, and the paper money appears to have
been carried back again to the house by Dowdell that same evening. After dinner, at about 8 o'clock, the three men
proceeded to the Constabulary, where Harn left Dowdell and McIlvane, who together lowered the safe into
a baroto in which it was taken out into the bay and there thrown into the water.
In an elaborate brief, the counsel for the defense attacked the procedure in the Court of First Instance, chiefly on the
points that the record failed to disclose that the accused had been present throughout the trial or that they had ever
been arraigned, or had pleaded; and at one stage of the case in this court the Attorney-General made a motion,
which was denied, that the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance for a new trial on account of these
defects thus disclosed. Upon an examination of the papers before us, after final argument, this court required a
return by the clerk of the Court of First Instance, in full, of the proceedings in the court below, from which it now fully
appears by entries in the minutes that each of the defendants was present throughout his trial and that they were all
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the constitutional questions discussed in
the briefs, based on the omissions from the imperfect record.
It is contended that the malversation in this case is qualified by the fact that the moneys taken were recovered by
the Government. This incident is of no practical importance for two reasons, first, the money was not returned or
made good by the accused, so as to entitle them to the benefits of the provisions of article 392 of the Penal Code,
had that article been properly applicable, but was, on the contrary, recovered by the Government through its own
efforts and in spite of their endeavor to the contrary, and, second, because their offense does not fall under the said
article 392, as appropriation to their own use of public moneys which they were able to make good, but rather under
article 390 of the Penal Code, as appropriation of public moneys to their own use with the intent of keeping it. The
distinction between these two offenses, resting in the intention of the official to restore or not to restore the money, is
clearly pointed out in the case of The United States vs. Coates (4 Phil. Rep., 581). Every fact in the present case
points to the deliberate and permanent misappropriation of the fund.
In sentencing the two principal offenders, the trial judge took their drunkenness into consideration as an extenuating
circumstance. The facts above recited, as we read them in the record, did not justify him in doing so. There was no
such drunkenness as decreases their responsibility for their acts.
On the other hand, the Attorney-General asks for an increase of the penalty on the ground that the offense was
committed by night. It is impossible to accede to this request, as, although the safe was disposed of after nightfall,
the moneys, the taking of which constitutes the statutory offense, were withdrawn from the treasury during daylight.
Our conclusion is that the defendants, Dowdell and Harn, who alone have appealed, are guilty of malversation of
public funds under article 390 of the Penal Code, without any extenuating or aggravating circumstance. The penalty
imposed is that of presidio mayor, in its medium degree, with imprisonment for eight years and one day, one-half of

the costs in this instance to be paid by each of the appellants, the judgment of the court below in other respects
being affirmed. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-34586 April 2, 1984
HOSPICIO NILO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ALMARIO GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36625 April 2, 1984
FORTUNATO CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN CASTRO, respondent.
Lavides Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

+.wph!1

Under Section 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code, a landowner may eject an
agricultural lessee or tenant on the ground that the owner shall personally cultivate the land himself. On September
10, 1971, Republic Act No. 6389, in amending Republic Act No. 3844, eliminated personal cultivation as a ground
for the ejectment of the tenant or leaseholder. The issue in these cases is whether or not the amendment in R.A.
6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover cases that were filed during the effectivity of the repealed provision.
G.R. NO. L-34586 This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision ruling that Republic
Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect.
Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of riceland at Barrio San Roque, San Rafael, Bulacan with
an area of two (2) hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-76791 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the agricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65.
On February 22, 1967, petitioner filed a petition in C.A.R. Case No. 1676 with the Court of Agrarian Relations
electing the leasehold system. On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian flied an ejectment suit against petitioner on the ground
of personal cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 which provides:
t.hqw

SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding, Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to the

period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes ...
Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the ejectment suit was but an act of reprisal and retaliation because
he elected the leasehold system,
The two cases were heard jointly since they involved Identical landholding and parties. The Court of Agrarian
Relations found that there was a bona fide intention to cultivate the land personally. The petitioner appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The Court found no
justification to unduly interfere with the desire of Gatchalian to personally cultivate his own land.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that "personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an
agricultural lessee has been eliminated under Republic Act No. 6389". The latter law which took effect on
September 10, 1971 now provides:
t.hqw

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes ....
The respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive
application.

G.R. NO. L-36625 This is an appeal raised by petitioner Fortunato Castro to the Court of Appeals from the
decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing his complaint for the ejectment of his tenant, respondent Juan
Castro, on the ground of personal cultivation. The landowner wants to personally cultivate the land owned by him
located in Pulilan, Bulacan with an area of 6,941 square meters. Petitioner Fortunato Castro questioned the
constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844. The
Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court on the ground that the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 6389 fails squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The complaint in this case was filed by the petitioner with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The petitioner asked for
the ejectment of his tenant Juan Castro. The latter in his answer alleged that the petitioner was not the owner of the
landholding in question and that assuming the petitioner was the owner, he is nevertheless not qualified and fit to
personally cultivate said landholding as he spends most of his time in mahjong sessions and in cockpits.
After the enactment of Republic Act No. 6389 on September 10, 1971, the respondent moved for the dismissal of
petitioner's complaint on the ground that the new law eliminated personal cultivation by the landowmer as a ground
for the ejectment of an agricultural tenant. The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the complaint. A motion for
reconsideration was denied. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that: (1) the trial court erred in
considering that Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844 has a
retroactive effect on an cases for ejectment of an agricultural lessee 'from his landholding on the ground of personal
cultivation even if the said cases were filed long before the approval of the said Act; and (2) the trial court erred in
not considering that Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 is unconstitutional which point was raised by appellant in his
opposition to appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint and his motion for reconsideration of the order dated
December 17, 1971.
Since both cases involve the same issue of retroactivity, we shall resolve them together.
The issue of whether or not Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Section 36 (1) of Republic Act No.
3844, repealing as a consequence "personal cultivation" as a cause for dispossession, should be given retroactive
effect has spawned controversy. In Arambulo v. Conicon (CA-G.R. No. 46727-R, January 6, 1972) and Palpalatoc v.
Pescador (CA-G.R. No. SP-00089-R, February 22, 1972), the Court of Appeals held that the deletion of personal
cultivation as a cause for ejectment has retroactive application affecting even those cases pending in courts. The
Arambulo case was elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari but was denied in a minute resolution "for lack of
merit" (G.R. No. L-34816, March 14, 1972).
In other cases, however, the Court of Appeals held that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive effect. In Lorenzo
v. Lorenzo (CA-G.R. No. 46842-R, September 4, 1971), the Court made a categorical statement that Republic Act
No. 6389 has no retroactive effect. There are other cases where the appellate court split into two camps.
In resolving the controversy, we first apply established rules of statutory construction.
Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive
effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive
effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be
understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established
to guide our actions with no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to
future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997).
As early as 1913, this Court with Justice Moreland as ponente announced:

t.hqw

The Act contains, as is seen, no express words giving it a retrospective or retroactive effect, nor is
there anything found therein which indicates an intention to give it such an effect. Its effect is, rather,
by clear intendment, prospective.
It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the
doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect. The cases supporting this rule are almost
without number.
In the case of Reynold v. M'Arthur (2 Pet., 416, 434), it was said that
It is a principle which has always been held sacred in the United States, that laws by which human
action is to be regulated, look forward not backward; and are never to be construed retrospectively,
unless the language of the Act shall render such construction indispensable.
In the case of Leate v. St. Louis State Bank (115 Mo., 184), it was held that

In construing statutes in regard to whether their action is to be prospective or retrospective, all the
adjudicated cases and all the text-writers with unbroken uniformity unite in declaring 'that they are to
operate prospectively and not otherwise unless the intent that they are to operate in such an unusual
way, to wit, retrospectively, is manifested on the face of the statute in a manner altogether free from
ambiguity.
The case of Berdan v. Van Riper (16 N.J.L., 7) holds that where a statute is susceptible of
construction as both prospective and retrospective, the former construction will be adopted, but
especially if the retrospective operation will work injustice to anyone. ... (de Montilla v. La
Corporacion de PP. Agustinos; Ancajas v. Jakosalem, 24 Phil. 220).
The doctrine of non-retroactivity was reiterated in the case of Segovia v. Noel (47 Phil. 543). Thus

t.hqw

A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express
terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme
Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act
retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can
be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court
will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. ... (Farrel v. Pingree (1888),
5 Utah, 443; 16 Pac., 843; Greer v. City of Asheville [1894], 114 N. C., 495; United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co. [1907], 209 U.S., 306;)
An earlier opinion to the same effect is In re Will of Riosa (39 Phil. 23). This is still the rule and it has stood the test
of time (Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Llanes, 49 Phil. 466; De Mesa v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Phil. 342;
Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741; China Insurance & Surety Co. v. Judge of lst Inst. of Manila, 63 Phil. 320; La Paz
Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. v. Bordman and Iloilo Commercial & Ice Co., 65 Phil. 401; The Manila Trading &
Supply Co. v. Santos, 66 Phil. 237; La Previsora Filipina v. Ledda, 66 Phil. 573; Tolentino v. Alzate, 98 Phil. 781;
Tolentino v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309; Tamayo v. Manila Hotel Co., 101 Phil. 810; Valencia v. Hon. Jose T. Surtida, 2
SCRA 622; Buyco v. PNB, 2 SCRA 682; Billiones v. Court of Industrial Relations and Villardo v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 14 SCRA 676; Lazaro v. Commissioner of Customs, 17 SCRA 36; Universal Corn Products, Inc. v. Rice
and Corn Board, 20 SCRA 1048; Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 25 SCRA 789).
A restatement of the doctrine was made in the case of Espiritu v. Cipriano (55 SCRA 533.) Thus

t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

... Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which
do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that
statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending
proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessary implied from the
language of the enactment. ... (Jones v. Summers, 105 Cal. App. 51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. v. Whyel
28 F (2d) 30.)
The general rule therefore, is that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein (Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172). To exemplify this doctrine, in Salcedo v. Court of
Appeals (81 SCRA 408), we held that Republic Act No. 2260 or the Civil Service Act of 1959 has no retroactive
effect. In Padasas v. Court of Appeals (82 SCRA 250), we held that the Agricultural Land Reform Code or Republic
Act No. 3844 must be enforced prospectively and not retroactively and therefore, the rights created, granted, or
recognized therein such as the right of redemption accrued upon the enactment of said legislation and may be
exercised thereafter in appropriate cases. In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals (87 SCRA 263) reiterated in Castro v. Court
of Appeals (99 SCRA 722) and in Baltazar v. Court of Appeals (104 SCRA 619), we held that Presidential Decrees
Nos. 27, 316, and 946 cannot be applied retroactively.
More important than resort to statutory construction in determining the issue of retroactivity is the ascertainment of
the objectives sought to be realized by the Code of Agrarian Reforms.
In the declaration of policy in Republic Act No. 6389, the applicable objectives are:

t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the sman farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints
and practices;
xxx xxx xxx
(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a source
of genuine strength in our democratic society.

It is the legislature which determines the policy objectives of reform legislation.

This Court would be thwarting and not promoting the objectives of Congress if we rule against the small landowners
in this case. The national goal of having independent and self reliant farmers tilling their own small landholdings
would not be achieved if persons who own only two hectares or 6,941 square meters of land as in the instant cases
cannot be allowed to work their land themselves but must be compelled to perpetuate a lessor-lessee relationship.
The desire of Congress to achieve a "dignified existence for the small farmers" is not served if two families one
landowner and one tenant must share the measly produce from 6,941 square meters of land. Land reform and
agrarian reform were intended to equalize opportunities for land ownership, to enable a diffusion and sharing of
wealth and not a sharing of poverty or a fragmentation of tenanted farms into non-economic sizes.
We are aware of the deliberations and debates in Congress on Republic Act No. 6389. We stated in Aisporna v.
Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 481).
t.hqw

That it was the intention of the legislature in amending paragraph (1), sec. 36 of R.A. 3844 to deprive
the landowner of the right to eject his tenant on the ground that the former would personally cultivate
the land and also to abate cases brought by the landowner to eject the tenant on the same grounds
which were still pending at the time of the passage of the amendatory act, is clear and evident from
the deliberations and debate of Congress when Republic Act 6389 was being deliberated, as
published in the Senate Journal ....
This Aisporna case is, however, notably distinct from the two cases now before us. In Aisporna, the court ordered
the petitioner tenant ejected on the ground of personal cultivation by the landowner. The court order became final
and executory. One year after his ejectment, Aisporna availed himself of his remedies under the law and filed a case
for reinstatement with damages alleging that the owner failed to cultivate the land himself. The trial court ruled in
favor of Aisporna. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that during the pendency
of the action for reinstatement, the law was amended and personal cultivation as a ground to eject a tenant was
removed. The appellate court opined that with the abolition of personal cultivation as a basis for ejectment, the
corollary proviso on reinstatement:
t.hqw

... Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall
be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of
the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession.
was also eliminated.
The issue in Aisporna was the right of the tenant to recover his status vis-a-vis the landholding from whence he was
ejected. To sustain the appellate decision would have resulted in a plain case of injustice to the tenant and a
condonation of bad faith. Our pronouncements on retroactivity dealt with this issue alone and to the extent that
theAisporna decision may be interpreted as covering factual situations similar to the two cases now before us, to
that extent we make it clear that it does not do so.
It is true that during the debates on the bill which was later enacted into Republic Act No. 3844, there were
statements on the floor that "the owner will lose the right to eject after the enactment of this measure" even in cases
where the owner has not really succeeded yet in ejecting the tenants (Senate Journal, Nos. 43 and 44, March 30
and 31, 1971, 2nd Regular Session 7th Congress). Nonetheless and inspite of these remarks, Congress failed to
express an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive and to cover ejectment cases on the ground of
personal cultivation then pending adjudication by the courts.
t.hqw

... In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute, unlike in the interpretation of an
ordinary written document, it is not enough to obtain information as to the intention or meaning of the
author or authors, but also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a
way as to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what
the author meant by the language he used, but also to see that the language used sufficiently
expresses that meaning. The legal act, so to speak, is made up of two elements-an internal and an
external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat
the former. (59 C.J.S. 1017; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board, 107 Phil.
151).
In the case of Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusements Board, supra, we held that legislative debates
are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not always safe guides and, hence, may not
be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with
certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by
resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who
did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 499-501; Ramos vs.
Alverez, 97 Phil. 844).

There have been cases in the past where we adhered to this doctrine. Thus, we held that individual statements
made by Senators on the floor of the Senate do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (Casco Phil. Chem. Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347; Resins,
Inc. v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754). Accordingly, they are not controlling in the interpretation of the law in
question (Phil. Assn. of Government Retirees, Inc. v. GSIS, 14 SCRA 610). Some statements may be deemed to be
a mere personal opinion of the legislator (Mayon Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Com. of Internal Revenue, 1 SCRA 918).
The interpretation of statutes is for the courts. And the courts are not necessarily bound by one legislator's opinion,
expressed in Congressional debates, concerning the apPlication of existing laws (Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs.
Central Bank of the Phils., 102 Phil. 477).
The petitioner-tenant in G.R. No. L-34586 contends that since Republic Act No. 6389 is a social legislation and
passed under the police power of the State, it should be liberally interpreted in favor of the tenants.
We agree with the petitioner-tenant that the law in question is social legislation. But social justice is not for tenants
alone. The disputed land in L-36625 is only 6,941 square meters. The area of the land in L-34586 is slightly bigger,
about two (2) hectares. A person with only one or two hectares of land to his name is equally deserving of social
justice.
A majority of the landowners affected by the appeal of personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant
own small landholdings. The records of Senate Bill No. 478 which eventually became Republic Act No. 6389 reveal
that the repeal has affected an estimated 75% of landowners in the country who own tenanted lands of less than 3
hectares, 40% of those who own 5 hectares or less and 96% of landowners who own an area of less than 10
hectares each.
Many of these landowners who filed actions for ejectment on this ground are retirees who have opted to leave the
stresses and strains of city life and to return to their home towns to personally cultivate their small landholdings.
They are teachers, clerks, nurses, and other hardworking and frugal people who in a lifetime of sacrifice gathered
their pitiful little savings and purchased small farms to supplement the inadequate pensions from the Government
Service Insurance System or the Social Security System. The owners of the lots in these cases had the bona
fide intention to personally cultivate their lands as proven and found by the trial courts. To hold that they can no
longer eject their tenants because of Republic Act No. 6389 would deprive them of their right to enjoy their property
which they had already asserted before the statute was passed. Precisely, the legislators, in providing "personal
cultivation" as a ground to eject tenants intended to encourage and attract the landowners to go to their respective
provinces and till their own lands. Unfortunately, the ground of "personal cultivation" was abused and used as a
pretext to eject the tenant and this led to the amendatory law.
This unfortunate consequence should not work an injustice upon those small landowners proven to have the bona
fideintention to personally cultivate their lands. In Gonzales v. GSIS (107 SCRA 492), we held that:
t.hqw

It should also be borne in mind that Republic Act No. 3844, then known as the Agricultural land
Reform Code, is a social legislation whose implementation has been made more imperative by
Section 6, Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution. It is designed to promote economic and social Stability.
It must be interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent. This liberality in
interpretation, however, should not accrue solely in favor of actual tillers of the land, the tenantfarmers, but should extend to landowners as well, especially those owning ,"small landholdings", by
which is meant landholdings of 24 hectares and less than 24 hectares. These landowners constitute
part of the economic Middle class which the Government is trying to build. They deserve as much
consideration as the tenants themselves in order not to create an economic dislocation, were
tenants solely favored but this particular group of landowners impoverished. (See "Whereas",
clauses of LOI No. 143).
In Cabatan v. Court of Appeals (95 SCRA 323), we similarly held that:

t.hqw

... the reliance by the tenants-lessees on"social justice"as a reason to support the continuance of an
unjust and inequitable rental rate is not only improper but would countenance and perpetuate an
injustice against the landholder-lessor. This, the constitutional precept of "social justice" was never
meant to do.
xxx xxx xxx
Social justice as thus defined and in its true meaning is not meant to countenance, much less
perpetuate, an injustice against any group-not even as against landholders. For the landholders as a
component unit or element in our agro-industrial society are entitled to 'equal justice under law'
which our courts are, above everything else, under mandate of the Constitution to dispense fairly,
without fear nor favor.
xxx xxx xxx

... A cursory study of the long line of decisions on social justice will readily reveal, however, that the
concept has been fleshed out-the principle, conceptualized as Justice Laurel enjoined in the
celebrated case of Calalang vs. Williams not thru mistaken sympathy for or misplaced antipathy
against any group whether labor or capital, landlord or tenant but evenhandedly and fairly, thru
the observance of the principle of "equal justice under law," for all and each and every element of the
body politic." (Eg. Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940) cited, supra; Guido vs. Rural Progress
Administration, 47 O.G. 1848, (1949) 84 Phil. 847, a reconciliation between conflicting claims of
social justice and protection to property and rights; Militona Estate Inc. vs. De Guzman, et al., No. L11912 (1959), 105 Phil. 1296 (unreported).
In Dequito v. Llamas, (66 SCRA 504) we ruled that the petitioner-tenant ought to know that if he has rights to
protection as a tenant, the landowner has also rights under the law. The protective mantle of social justice cannot be
utilized as an instrument to hoodwink courts of justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the plea of
helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner.
Our decision to deny retroactive effect to the amendatory provision gains added strength from later developments.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it is even more emphasized that property ownership is impressed with a social
function. This means that the owner has the obligation to use his property not only to benefit himself but society as
well. Hence, the Constitution provides under Section 6 of Article II that in the promotion of social justice, the State
"shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits." The Constitution also ensures that the worker shall have a just and living wage
which should assure for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a
better life (Sections 7 and 9, Article II) (Alfanta vs, Noe, 53 SCRA 76; Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194).
In line with the above mandates, this Court upheld the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, which decrees
the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferred to them the ownership of the land they till,
inGonzales v. Estrella (91 SCRA 294). We noted the imperative need for such a decree in Chavez v. Zobel (55
SCRA 26). We held in the latter case that "on this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what
for some is a radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent. Presidential Decree No.
27 was thus conceived. ... There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What
is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the present Constitution."
Significantly, P.D. No. 27, which decrees the emancipation of the tenant from the bondage of the soil, transfers to
him the ownership of the land he tills, and provides instruments and mechanisms therefor, has recognized personal
cultivation as a ground for retention and, therefore, exemption from the land transfer decree. Personal cultivation
cannot be effected unless the tenant gives up the land to the owner.
Presidential Decree No. 27 provides:

t.hqw

In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such
landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.
The redistribution of land, restructuring of property ownership, democratization of political power, and
implementation of social justice do not require that a landowner should be deprived of everything he owns and that
even small parcels as in these two cases now before us may not be worked by the owner himself. The evil sought to
be remedied by agrarian reform is the ancient anachronism where one person owns the land while another works
on it. The evil is not present in cases of personal cultivation by the owner.
Taking over by the landowner is subject to strict requirements. In addition to proof of ownership and the required
notices to the tenant, the bona-fide intention to cultivate must be proved to the satisfaction of the court. And as
earlier stated, the tenant is Protected in case the owner fails to cultivate the land within one year or to work the land
himself for three years.
The seven hectares retention under P.D. No. 27 is applicable only to landowners who do not own other agricultural
lands containing an aggregate of more than seven hectares or lands used for residential commercial industry or
other urban purposes where they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. (Letter of
Instruction No. 472 dated October 21, 1976).
To Support his petition, Fortunate Castro in L-36625 asserts that Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 is
unconstitutional
The amended provision reads:

t.hqw

xxx xxx xxx

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon rommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential commercial industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shag be entitled to disturbance compensation

equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years.
. There appears to be nothing unconstitutional in the above provision. If Mr. Castro is challenging agrarian reform
itself, then his challenge is puerile if not hopeless. We ruled in Vda, de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations (22
SCRA 792) that the Agricultural Land Reform Code is valid and justified. In Paulo v. Court of Appeals (54 SCRA 253)
we ruled:
t.hqw

... Land Reform which is now transforming the rural existence of the farmers, has become more
imperative in view of the provisions of the New Constitution. Thus Section 6, Article II thereof directs
that 'the State shag promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare and security of all the
people,' and for the attainment of this end, directs that 'the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment, and diffuse of private property, and equitably diffuse ownership and
profits.' Section 6, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions provides that the implementation of
declared agrarian reforms' shall be given priority. There is no question that the massive overhaul of
the system of land ownership by the transfer to the tenants of the ownership of the land they till and
the grant to them of the instruments and mechanisms to increase their land's productivity will
decisively improve the people's livelihood and promote political and social stability.
And, of course, Section 12 of Article XIV specifically mandates that "the State shad formulate and implement an
agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals
enunciated in this Constitution." At any rate, there is no need to pass upon the constitutional issue for the purpose of
resolving the narrow question of retroactivity of the questioned provision.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. L-34586 is denied for lack of merit and the questioned decision of the Court
of Appeals is aimed. In G.R. No. L-36625, the questioned order of the lower court is set aside and the case is
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for trial on the merits.