AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275,
Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims
that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and
Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it
was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to
the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her
father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00
and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to
prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his

death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement
of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In addition
to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases
for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration
to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition
was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the
approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings
of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived
together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on
the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC
OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the
time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile
in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in
Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be
settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence
at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves
as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent

with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the
courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in
Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners submission
that the lower courts findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has
taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the
ruling in Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing
void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be
the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even
after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage

issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas
de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage
and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is
not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion
is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown
any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings,
the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest
in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
6.Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204029

June 4, 2014

AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R.

Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY
ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision1 and
Resolution2 dated March 30, 2012 and September 25, 2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals

(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035, which reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 20,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 10407.
The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:
On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco
(Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 2002 before the court a
quo. In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio)
and Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife
Victoria, six legitimate children, and one illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina AbarientosRebusquillo, petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the mother of petitioner
Salvador; (3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5) Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham
Abarientos; and (7) Carlos Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30,
1983.
On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City consisting of two
thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869) square meters, more or less, which was covered by Tax
Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.
In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her daughter Emelinda
Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents
in this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It
was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.
As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them, Avelina sought the
intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two (2) documents in order to reinstate
TD0141 and so correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.
In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of the subject property. Paragraph 9 of their
Answer reads:
Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the other heirs of Eulalio
Abarientos brought out the idea to [respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the
property described in paragraph 8 of the complaint registered under the Torrens System of
Registration. To facilitate the titling of the property, so that the same could be attractive to
prospective buyers, it was agreed that the propertys tax declaration could be transferred to
[respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez and Domingo Gualvez who will spend all the cost
of titling subject to reimbursement by all other heirs in case the property is sold; That it was
agreed that all the heirs will be given their corresponding shares on the property; That pursuant
to said purpose Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the other
heirs signed and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact, [petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of

FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses and all the delinquent taxes
paid by [respondents].3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with
regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not
therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina
did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to facilitate the
titling of such property. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the Deceased Spouses
Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal, dated December 4, 2001 as well as the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale, notarized on February 6, 2002, covering the property described in
par. 8 of the Amended Complaint are hereby ordered ANNULLED;
2. That defendant City Assessors Officer of Legazpi City is hereby ordered to CANCEL
the Tax Declaration in the name of private [respondents] spouses Gualvez under ARP No.
4143 and to REINSTATE the Tax Declaration under ARP No. 0141 in the name of
Eulalio Abarientos;
3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo is hereby ordered to
return or refund to [respondents] spouses Domingo Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez,
the P50,000.00 given by the latter spouses to the former.4
Assailing the trial courts decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the CA arguing that the
Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public document that has for its object the creation and
transmission of real rights over the immovable subject property. The fact that Avelinas testimony
was not offered in evidence, so respondents argued, the signature on the adverted deed remains
as concrete proof of her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents contended that the Complaint
filed by petitioners Avelina and Salvador before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by
law for those compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.
Pending the resolution of respondents appeal, Avelina died intestate on September 1, 2009
leaving behind several living heirs5 including respondent Emelinda.
In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal and reversed and set
aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication simply on petitioners allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio,
considering that issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not
in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale
cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of
regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

Aggrieved by the CAs Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her heirs except respondent
Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are now before this Court ascribing reversible error on the part
of the appellate court.
We find merit in the instant petition.
It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding,
not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to
administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and
compelling reason for such recourse.6 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule
requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon
the issues it defined during the pre-trial.7 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,8 this Court held:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under
the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an
exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to
name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no
doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal
is the Caloocan parcel of land to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners
as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil
case - subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status
as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed
by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal
teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of
petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses
Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir
of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the

subject land. As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have
thereby admitted the veracity of the following facts during the pre-trial:
IV UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the Pre-Trial Order)
A. x x x
B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the following facts:
1. Identity of the parties;
2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and be sued;
3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only surviving heir of deceased
spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;
4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion of the subject
property;
5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;
6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of [petitioner] Avelina A.
Rebusquillo;
7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;
8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the Deceased and Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo on the subject
property.9 (emphasis supplied)
In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a resort to
special proceeding will be but an unnecessary superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had
properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when
the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court is patently clear that self-adjudication is only warranted when there is only one
heir:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. x x x If there is only one heir,
he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by
respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of representation of his mother.
Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is "the
only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA

VILLAREAL."10 The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the
inheritance left by her father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelinas prayer
to declare the affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong she has committed.
In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents was
correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not in the right position to sell and
transfer the absolute ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole
heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject
to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only
an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership of
such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of this
case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the
property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated
contract.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the
parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
(emphasis supplied)
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta,11 this Court explained the concept of
the simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no
intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent
contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical
situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the
parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if
the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is
relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the
essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms
of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
is immediately apparent from respondents very own Answer to petitioners Complaint. As
respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of the Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to
"facilitate the titling of the [subject] property," not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them.
Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property
and that there is no indication that respondents ever took possession of the subject property after
its supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the

alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership and is a
clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.12
Contrary to the appellate courts opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale was
reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise
provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of a contract does not make an otherwise
simulated and invalid act valid. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. x x x
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)
The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the
contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present case. Again, respondents themselves
admit in their Answer that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were
only executed to facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the
exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true intent of the
parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document. That said, considering that the Deed
of Absolute Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not
precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement.13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 30, 2012 and the
Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No.
10407 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.