Pascual vs.

Pascual
[G.R. No. 84240. March
25, 1992]Ponente: PARAS, J.

also dismissed. In this petition for review

on certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not fall
squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized (and acknowledged) natural
children as their illegitimacy is not due to the

FACTS:

subsistence of a prior marriage when such children

Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12,

were under conception.

1973) without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged

ISSUE:

natural, adopted or spurious children. Petitioners

Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the

Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the

Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized

acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio

natural children from the inheritance of the

Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the

deceased.

decedent Don Andres Pascual. Petitioners filed their

Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the

HELD:

Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate

NO. Petition is devoid of merit.

Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial Court, presided

over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order,

RATIO:

the dispositive portion of which resolved to deny this

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to

motion reiterating their hereditary rights. Their motion

rest in Diaz v. IAC, where this Court ruled that

for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioners

under Art.992 of the Civil Code, there exists a barrier

appealed their case to the Court of Appeals, but like

or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a

the ruling of CA, their motion for reconsideration was

succession ab intestado between the illegitimate

child and the legitimate children and relatives of the

father or mother of said legitimate child.
[T]he interpretation of the law desired by the
petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what is says.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are
his illegitimate children and the term illegitimate
refers to both natural and spurious. It may be said
that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA
LEX SED LEX).

Morata vs Go
Posted on June 21, 2013

Spouses Morata vs Spouses Go

125 SCRA 444
GR No. L-62339

FACTS:
On August 25, 1982, the spouses Go filed a
complaint eagainst petitioners Morata for recovery
of a sum of money plus damages amounting to
P49,400.
On the basis of the allegation that the partieslitigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss citing as grounds the
failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by
the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process
required by PD 1508, as well as the absence of
certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that
no conciliation/settlement has been reached by the
parties.
The motion to dismiss was denied on September 2,
1982. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration
was also denied on October 3, 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether the conciliation process at the barangay
level, prescribed by PD 1508 as a precondition for
filing a complaint in court, is also compulsory for
actions cognizable by the RTC.
HELD:
Yes. Sec.6, PD 1508 provides that the
confrontation of the parties and conciliation before
the Lupon is a precondition for filing a complaint,
except when:

1.
2.

The accused is under detention;

A person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for *habeas corpus*
proceedings;
3. Actions coupled with privisional remedies; and
4. Where the action may be barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
Sec.2 provides additional exceptions, such as when:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

One party is the government, or any

subdivision or instrumentality;
One party is a public officer/employee and the
dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;
Offenses punishable by imprisonment
exceeding 30 days or a fine exceeding P200;
Where there is no private offended party; and
Such other classes of disputes which the
Prime Minister may, in the inetrest of justice,
determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local
Government.

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in Secs. 2

and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to
settle amicably all types of disputes involving
parties who actually reside in the same city or
municipality.
The law makes no distinction whatsoever with
respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be
compromised at the barangay level. Where the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.

By compelling the disputants to settle their

differences through the intervention of the
barangay leader and other respected members of
the barangay, the animosity generated by
protracted court litigations between members of the
same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity
and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in
mind that the conciliation process at the barangay
level is also designed to discourage indiscriminate
filing of cases in court in order to decongest its
clogged dockets and enhance the quality of justice
dispensed by it.
The law obviously intended to grant the Lupon as
broad and comprehensive authority as possible as
would bring about the optimum realization of the
aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be
half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority
is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any
interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer
cases, has always been vested in the Courts of First
Instance.
The authority of the Lupon is clearly established in
Sec.2 of the law; whereas Secs. 11, 12 and 14 deal
with the nullification or execution of the settlement
or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay
level. These sections conferred upon the city &
municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and
resolve petitions or actions for nullification or

enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued

by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or
the nature of the original dispute. But there is
nothing in the context of said sections to justify the
thesis that the mandated conciliation process in
other types of cases applies excluisively to said
inferior courts.
Therefore, the conciliation process at the

barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a precondition for filing a complaint in court, is
compulsory not only for cases falling under
the exclusive competence of the metropolitan
and municipal trial courts, but for actions
cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.