Constitutional Law 2 Cases

DEANS CIRCLE 2016
Editors: Tricia Lacuesta

Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
CONSTITUTION
AL LAW 2
First Sem Cases
POLITICAL LAW CASE SYLLABUS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
DUE PROCESS
10
EQUAL PROTECTION
20
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
29
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE
46
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

50
FREEDOM OF RELIGION76
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
82
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
87
EMINENT DOMAIN
90
CONTRACT CLAUSE
97
79
POVERTY AND LEGAL PROTECTION 99

RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS 100
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
110
Criminal Due Process

110
Bail 111
Presumption of Innocence
Right to be Informed
Public Trial
114
116
117
Right of Confrontation
Trials in Absentia
118
119
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS and WRIT OF AMPARO

SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
125
131
EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER

CITIZENSHIP
120
135
140
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
JAMES MIRASOL, RICHARD SANTIAGO, and LUZON MOTORCYCLISTS
FEDERATION, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD
G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, Carpio, J.
The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most essential, insistent and
illimitable" of all government powers.
Facts:
The petitioners sought to declare the nullity of certain administrative issuances for
being inconsistent with RA 2000. Pursuant to its mandate under RA 2000, DPWH issued DO
215 declaring the Coastal Road as limited access area. The petitioners sought to prevent the
enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South
Luzon Expressways and the Coastal Road.
Issue:
1. Whether the administrative issuances are unconstitutional.
2. Whether the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways deprives the
petitioners their
right to travel.
Ruling:
1. NO. Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law. They benefit from
the same presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two
precepts place a heavy burden upon any party assailing governmental regulations. The
burden of proving unconstitutionality rests on such party. The burden becomes heavier when
the police power is at issue.
The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise
of the police power of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most
essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government powers. The tendency is to extend
rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is
reasonableness. What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact definition or scientific
formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness exists, for its determination rests upon
human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
The court finds AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines
several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were
designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access
facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by a certain vehicle,
to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of certain types of vehicles is but one of these.
None of these rules violates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behind them
are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose for which a toll way
is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and
operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain
rights are restricted does not invalidate the rules.
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Neither does the court find AO 1 oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of
their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest
of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon
petitioners right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and
any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. Several
cheap, accessible and practical alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There
is nothing oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of ones scooter,
bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way.
2. NO. The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing
a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.
Petitioners can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public fourwheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along
the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can.
The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a
subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their
complaint is that these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is
true, it hardly qualifies as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel.
The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most
convenient route to his destination. The obstructions found in normal streets, which
petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are not
suffered by them alone.
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented

by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN,
represented by HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE,
WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER,
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY
FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE,
and JOHN and JANE DOES
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
The government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
Facts:
Boracay West Cove applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government
of Malay, Aklan. The application sought the issuance of a building permit for the construction
of a hotel over a parcel of land covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes issued by the DENR in favor of Boracay West Cove. The Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied the petition on the ground that the proposed site was within the no
build zone demarcated by Muinicipal Ordinance 2000-131. Boracay West Cove appealed the
denial to the Office of the Mayor but no action was taken by the mayor. A Notice of
Assessment was sent to Baracy Cove for it to settle its unpaid taxes and other liabilities and
recommended for its closure. Boracay Cove was willing to settle its obligation however, the
municipal treasurer refused to accept the payment. Boracay Cove continued with the
construction, expansion and operation of the hotel. The municipal government enjoined the
expansion of the resort and the Office of the Mayor issued EO 10 ordering the closure and
demolition of the hotel. Boracay Coves president, Aquino, filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the CA arguing that judicial proceedings should be conducted first before the mayor could
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order the demolition. He claimed that since it was granted a FlagT, it is the DENR that has
primary jurisdiction over the area. The CA dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners right to due process was violated when the mayor ordered
the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel without first conducting judicial
proceedings.
Ruling:
NO. Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated,
the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under
existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the
executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution
thereon.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY v. HON.
JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.
G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983, Gutierrez Jr., J.
Police power being the most active power of the government and the due process
clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power
of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
Facts:
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 was promulgated in Quezon City which approved the
regulation of establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. It is stated in the ordinance
that 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial.
Himlayang Pilipino contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of
all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of
police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and
not for the benefit of the public. The RTC declared the Ordinance null and void.
Issue:
Whether setting aside 6% of the total area of a memorial park for charity burial is a
valid exercise of police power
Ruling:
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NO. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the
promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property
with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as
opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of
1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives
a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which
empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population
of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of
general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177(q) that a sangguniang panlungsod may
"provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law, and
practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to homeowners.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL v. AYALA LAND INCORPORATED,

ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM
PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.,
GR No. 177056 September 18, 2009, Chico-Nazario, J.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent
domain.
Facts:
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights
conducted a joint investigation to inquire on the legality of the parking fees charged by
Ayala Land Corp., Robinsons Land Corp., Shangri-La Plaza Corp., and SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
(respondents) and to find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates. More
importantly, to determine the legality of the policy of the shopping malls denying liability in
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cases of theft, robbery or carnapping by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the
parking tickets. The Senate Committees concluded that the collection of parking fee is
contrary to the National Building Code as it states that parking spaces are for free; thus, the
Committee recommended that the OSG should institute the necessary action to enjoin the
collection of parking fees. Civil cases for the recommendation arose in the RTC of Makati.
The court ruled that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces that are
free of charge, compelling them to do so would be an unlawful taking of property right
without just compensation.
Issue:
Whether the respondents are obliged to provide free parking spaces to their
customers or the public.
Ruling:
NO. Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to
justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials,
of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such
facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in
totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the
mall parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power. When
there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer
exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain.
Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use
upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner
of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither
acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases
where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine
whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable
taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes
a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to
permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation
that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts
to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the
public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their
properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters
properties for use as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access
to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property
rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their
properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just
recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required
parking facilities.
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JOSE J. FERRER, JR. v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF
QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, and CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON
CITY
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015, Peralta, J.
If the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax.
Facts:
Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance (SP-2095, S-2011) for Socialized Housing
Taxes of Quezon City. Later on, another ordinance (SP-2235, S-2013) approved by the QC
mayor was enacted. It states that the proceeds collected from garbage fees shall be
deposited solely and exclusively in a special account under the general fund to be utilized
for garbage collections. Ferrer then sought to have these two ordinances declared null and
void.
Issue:
1. Whether ordinance SP-2095, s-2011 is valid.
2. Whether ordinance SP-2235, s-2013 violates the rule on double taxation.
Ruling:
1. YES. Cities are allowedxm to exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among others, programs
and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to
its socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power
or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued
with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as
well. The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying
the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of
life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business
products.
2. YES. The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a
charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. In Progressive Development Corporation v.
Quezon City, the Court declared that if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose
and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a
tax. In a U.S. case, the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than a tax
as it was actually a fee for a service given by the city which had previously been provided at
no cost to its citizens. Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under
Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL
DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU v. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, Fernando, J.
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Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
Facts:
The Manila Municipal Board enacted Ordinance 4760 which was approved by then
acting mayor Astorga. It sought to regulate hotels and motels in Manila classifying them into
1st class with an annual tax of P6,000 and 2nd class with an annual tax of P4,500. The same
ordinance requires the hotels and motels to get the demographics of who checks in to their
rooms. It commands the hotels and motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal
the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that
such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the
appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance 4670 is valid.
Ruling:
YES. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The
challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and
by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any
attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed
to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the
great public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence
to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare. Negatively
put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, Bidin, J.
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
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Facts:
Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders with 4 wrapped packages. Marti informed the proprietress
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. The proprietress then
asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. Martin refused but he assures her that
the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves. Before the box was brought to the
Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, the proprietor, following the SOP, opened the boxes
for final inspection. An odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried leaves.
He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The
dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
Issue:
Whether the evidence of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
Martis constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication.
Ruling:
NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure,
the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition
that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the
forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed
that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
DUE PROCESS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008, Quisumbing, J.
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In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on a person
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences.
Facts:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Birth Certificate. During her
childhood, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her
ovarian structures had minimized. She had no breast or menstruation. She was diagnosed
of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, a condition where a person suffering from such
possesses secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones.
According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her
Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be
changed to Jeff.
Issue:
Whether Cagandahan can change her gender to male and change her name to Jeff.
Ruling:
YES. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has
already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a
female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much
less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to
CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent
to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of
action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling the Court does no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus helps make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case. As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, the Court
has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
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JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001, Bellosillo, J.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application.
Facts:
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is assailing the constitutionality of RA 7080
also known as An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder because the assailed law
is said to be vague, it dispenses the reasonable doubt standards in criminal prosecution
and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code
which he claims to be violative of the due process clause of our Constitution.
Issue:
Whether RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague.
Ruling:
NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do
we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects
- it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But
the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those
that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first
may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance
as in all other statutes
12 | P a g e
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ
G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, Melo, J.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.
Facts:
The Philippines and USA signed in Manila an extradition treaty between the two
countries. The Department of Justice recieved from the DFA a request for the extradition of
Mark Jimenez to the United States. On the same day, the petitioner designated authorized
lawyers to handle the case. Pending the evaluation of the request, Mark Jimenez wrote a
letter to the Secretary of Justice to be furnished copies of the extradition request and he be
given ample time to comment on the same. The Secretary of Justice denied the request
stating that Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty where it states that the Philippines must
present the interests of the US in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
Issue:
Whether a citizens basic right to due process must prevail over the governments
duties on honoring a treaty.
Ruling:
YES. In the absence of a law or principle of law, the rules of fair play must be applied.
An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against
the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes
these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures
on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as
explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition
documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied
the same becomes a demandable right
We have ruled time and again that the Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since
private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty,
are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the
land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised. Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of
13 | P a g e

liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm,
lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which

requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of
notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent
tribunal. True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and
hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings
as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are
entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they
may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the
opposing parties.
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military

Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own
behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF
THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB)
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015, Peralta, J.
The PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied.
Facts:
Cudia was given a demerits by his tactical officer because he was claimed to have
lied after being late for his English class. He did not agree with such and appealed to the
Senior Tactical Officer. The STO sustained the TOs decision. He was then reported to the
PMAs honor Commitee for a violation in the Honor Code for his alleged lying. The PMA found
him guilty of his infraction and was placed inside PMAs holding center. Cudia and his family
sent letters to various military officers for a reinvestigation for alleged irregularities done in
the investigation of his issue. His case was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeal Board of
the PMA. Cudias family brought the case to the CHR averring that his sham investigation
violated his rights to due process, education and communication. The CRAB ruled against
Cudia but the CHR held in favor of him however the PMA claimed that its findings are merely
recommendatory.
Issue:
Whether a cadet of the PMA can raise due process when punished.
Ruling:
14 | P a g e

YES. Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his
private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one
that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. In fact, the Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training environment,
the Cadet Corps is a society which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is
good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the
surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good of the group."
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted
by Andrews, that a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that
reason, the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied. Likewise, the
cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction
which he or she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of probably being
forever denied that career.
GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO v. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE

LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO, REV. FR. JOSE RHOMMEL HERNANDEZ, ALBERT
ROSARDA and MA. TERESA SURATOS
G.R. No. 169391, October 10, 2012, Brion, J.
What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the
form in which the notice is given. The essence of due process, it bears repeating, is simply
the opportunity to be heard.
Facts:
There were reports that fraternities in Letran were recruiting members among
Letrans high school students and that a list of the alleged involved students was given to
Mr. George Isleta. A medical examination was conducted and it was found that 6 students
were injured in their thighs thus Rosarda asked for the explanations of such students in
where four of them admitted they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity and included
the names of who joined in the hazing rights including Kim who was a fourth year student
back then. Mr. Rosarda informed Kims mother about his membership in a fraternity but she
expressed her disbelief in such. He then asked Kim to explain his side and he denied he was
a member of the said frat. However, the school found out that he was inded part of fraternity
based on the neophytes statements so they were recommended to be dismissed from
Letran. The Gos contented to such and went to the RTC to file for damages which the RTC
affirmed but was reversed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether Kim or his parents were accorded due process.
Ruling:
15 | P a g e

On Kims Parents
YES. Since disciplinary proceedings may be summary, the insistence that a "formal
inquiry" on the accusation against Kim should have been conducted lacks legal basis. It has
no factual basis as well. While the petitioners state that Mr. and Mrs. Go were "never given
an opportunity to assist Kim,"the records show that the respondents gave them two notices,
dated December 19, 2001 and January 8, 2002, for conferences on January 8, 2002 and
January 15, 2002. The records also show that, without any explanation, both parents failed
to attend the January 8, 2002 conference while Mr. Go did not bother to go to the January 15,
2002 conference. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot thereafter complain of deprivation of due
process."
Through the notices, the respondents duly informed the petitioners in writing that
Kim had a disciplinary charge for fraternity membership. At the earlier November 23, 2001
Parents-Teachers Conference, Mr. Rosarda also informed Mrs. Go that the charge stemmed
from the fraternity neophytes positive identification of Kim as a member; thus the
petitioners fully knew of the nature of the evidence that stood against Kim.
On Kims Written Notice
YES. Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in the strict judicial sense. The very nature of due process negates
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.
Thus, the Court is hard pressed to believe that Kims denial of his fraternity membership
before formal notice was given worked against his interest in the disciplinary case. What
matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which
the notice is given.
The raison detre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary
charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense. The records show that
as early as November 23, 2001, it was already made plain to the petitioners that the subject
matter of the case against Kim was his alleged fraternity membership. Thus, by the time Mr.
Rosarda spoke to Kim and asked for his written explanation in December 2001, Kim has had
enough time to prepare his response to this plain charge. The Court also notes that the
information in the notice the respondents subsequently sent is no different from the
information that they had earlier conveyed, albeit orally, to the petitioners: the simple
unadorned statement that Kim stood accused of fraternity membership. Given these
circumstances, the Court is not convinced that Kims right to explain his side as exercised in
his written denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of due process, it bears
repeating, is simply the opportunity to be heard.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,

COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, Reyes, J.
16 | P a g e

As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding
force and effect.
Facts:
Villanueva was appointed Judge of MCTC Compostella Valley. A year after, he applied
for a vacant position of Presiding Judge in three different RTCs. His application was denied by
the JBC due to its long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to incumbent
judges who have served for at least five years. Villanueva assailed five-year requirement of
the JBC for being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses.
He argued that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for lack of
publication and non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will
affect all applying judges, thus, the said policy should have been published
Issue:
Whether the policy of JBC violated procedural due process.
Ruling:
YES. The assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been
published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication,
such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a
qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant.
It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers
who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential
applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be
able to prepare for and comply with them.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the
petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to
be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used
to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.
ELENA P. DYCAICO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SOCIAL SECURITY

COMMISSION
17 | P a g e

G.R. No. 161357, November 30, 2005, Callejo Sr., J.
An "irrebuttable presumption" and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable
presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause.
Facts:
When Elena Dycaicos husband, Bonifacio, died, she filed with the SSS an application
for survivors pension. Her application was denied on the ground that they were not living
under the benefits of marraige when Bonifacio became a member of the SSS using Section
12-B(d) of RA 8282 as basis. The RTC ruled in favor of the SSS, so does the CA.
Issue:
Whether the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, violates due process.
Ruling:
YES. The proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses
whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters
retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such
surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages

to SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement, the proviso "as of the date of
his retirement" qualifying the term "primary beneficiaries" for the purpose of entitlement to
survivors pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the
retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits
under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said
surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit
purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because
it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true.
In this case, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she
was Bonifacios bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being
considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivors
benefits, a property interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity to
be heard. Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present
evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his
bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death. Hence,
the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) which deprives the petitioner
18 | P a g e

and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members this opportunity to
be heard must be struck down.
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY
G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008, Chico-Nazario, J.
The Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of
criminal statutes is not appropriate.
Facts:
Spouses Romualdez allegedly made false representations in their sworn applications
for Voters Registration. They indicated that they are residents of Leyte, when in truth and in
fact, they were residents of Quezon City. Garay charged them with violations of Omnibus
Election Code and Voters Registraion Act. The Comelec recommended the filing of
information against the Spouses Romualdez for violation of Voters Registration Act.
Spouses Romualdez argued that they were not accorded due process of law when the
elections offenses for which they are charged by Garay are different from the resolution of
the Comelec.
The Spouses argue that Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act is vague on the
ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular,
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of
which would constitute an election offense.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration is vague.
Ruling:
NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
However, the Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the
challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. The Court has declared that facial invalidation or
an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The Court has
similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
19 | P a g e

As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election
offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a
violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The
language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other
interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. The Court does
not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import
or meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan, where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular words
in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the SOUTHSOUTH NETWORK (SSN) FOR NON-STATE ARMED GROUP ENGAGEMENT, and ATTY.
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010, Carpio Morales, J.
Statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as
applied' to a particular defendant.
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007
for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism,
such that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving
law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find
no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and
that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
Issue:
Whether the void-for-vagueness
applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
and
overbreadth
doctrines
are
equally
Ruling:
YES. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the
operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner,
finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law on its face and in its entirety. It
stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only
'as applied' to a particular defendant.
20 | P a g e

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least
three cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing
the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal
statute, unlike in the present case.
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, Mendoza, J.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ
as to its application.
Facts:
R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Shortly
thereafter, the court has been presented with 14 petitions and two 2 petitions- inintervention to resolve on the ground that the RH Law is unconstitutional. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause
of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service
provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private
health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only
makes reference to a "private health care institution."
Issue:
Whether the RH Law is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates due process.
Ruling:
NO. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words
must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other
parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care
service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a
"public health service provider. Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public
21 | P a g e

health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care
professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midwife; (3) public health worker
engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has
undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who
voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been
accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law,
instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the
obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and VICENTE ANGELES
G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, Ynares-Santiago, J.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.
Facts:
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. [Riviera Home] is engaged in
the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed
Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992
until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Virgilio and
Jenny then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on
December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal
and ordered Riviera Home to pay the monetary claims.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal was proper and in compliance with due process.
Ruling:
YES. In cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and
to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on
the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.
It must be stressed that in the present case, that Virgilio and Jenny committed a
grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements of due process were complied
with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal.
An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be
protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term
suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice.
22 | P a g e

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory
due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled
in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be
stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which the Court sought
to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or
penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the
gravity of the due process violation of the employer.
EQUAL PROTECTION
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.
Facts:
Two consolidated cases were filed before the court both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 entitled Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) of 2010 which was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere
branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not
a quasi-judicial body; it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in
disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and assess evidences gathered
and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Issue:
Whether Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
YES. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations.
23 | P a g e

It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The equal protection of the laws only works "against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."
Facts:
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration
system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list
of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
RA 10367 likewise directs that registered voters whose biometrics have not been
captured shall submit themselves for validation." "Voters who fail to submit for validation on
or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
Elections shall be deactivated x x x."
Issue:
Whether RA 10367 is violative of the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
NO. RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration" as
"the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified
voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including
the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the [ERB]." As stated in Section
2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to systematize the present method of registration in
order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters."
The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation" which refers to the removal of
the registration record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters
for failure to comply with the validation process as required by [RA 10367]." Section 7
states:
Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before
the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May
2016 elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act.
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation,
neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the law creates artificial class
of voters is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an "obedient group." If
anything, non-compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully results into prescribed
consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the
24 | P a g e

laws, which only works "against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."
JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON et al.

G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
Facts:
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e,
husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom the woman has a common child. The law provides for protection orders from the
barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines
the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court
personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in
responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
Prior to the present petition, private respondent Rosalie filed before the RTC of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband,
Garcia, pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse, emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of Garcia,
with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. Consequently,
this petition was filed by Garcia before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
as being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation
of judicial power to barangay officials.
Issue:
Whether RA 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
NO. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, the Court ruled that the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by
a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
25 | P a g e

A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children. The application of R.A.
9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS

G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004, Carpio, J.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The law may treat and regulate one class
differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
Facts:
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas), a 72-year old widower
was married to Milagros Orbiso (Milagros), 43 years old. On January 4, 1985, Nicolas filed
with GSIS an application for retirement benefits effective February 18, 1985 under
Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (PD
1146). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole
beneficiary. Subsequently, Nicolas died on April 22, 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for
survivorship pension under PD 1146. On June 8, 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under
Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the
surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983,
less than one year from his date of retirement on February 17, 1984.
Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief
questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension. The trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension. GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the proviso in PD 1146 is violative of the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
YES. A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
26 | P a g e

purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one
class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the
dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners
death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage
took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a
prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not
see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified
for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on
substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily
for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason
Congress deleted the proviso in RA 8291 otherwise known as the Government Service
Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the
implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member immediately
before the members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS
proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit. Thus,
the present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving
spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the members
retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted
the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no
longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving
spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation
TERESITA TABLARIN v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987, Feliciano, J.
Classifying the cutoff scores based on the yearly changes in the conditions of
different schools constitutes no infringement of the equal protection clause. It is a measure
of flexibility needed to meet the circumstances as they change. A permanent and
immutable cutoff score may even result in unreasonable rigidity.
Facts:
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated August 23, 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of
eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school
year 1986-1987. Tablarin et al. sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the
school year 1987-1988. However, Tablarin et al. either did not take or did not successfully
take the NMAT required by the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
27 | P a g e

Tablarin et al. assailed the constitutionality of RA 2382 otherwise known as the
Medical Act of 1959 and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. More specifically, petitioners assert
that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that the cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the Board
of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges
infringes the equal protection clause.
Issue:
Whether students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988,
when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an earlier school year,
are discriminated against, thus, violating the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
NO. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing
conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year
may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff
score established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools
during the current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of
difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent
and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may
then result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from
being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of
flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change.
Moreover, the legislative and administrative provisions being impugned constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. The regulation of the practice of medicine in
all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes
the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Thus,
legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first
to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW

NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, Austria-Martinez, J.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity. Such rights are not absolute but
subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of
classification into its legislation.
Facts:
Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. [Gallant Inc.] and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief
Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7
days paid vacation leave per month. On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained
to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Gallant, Inc. did not
deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as
28 | P a g e

second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and 7 days,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was
declared illegal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA
8042. Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042: xxx
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
Issue:
Whether the subject clause violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity. Such rights are not absolute but subject
to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification
into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these
requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of
the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must
show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial
scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory
intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels: First, OFWs with employment
contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or
more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and Third,
OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment; The subject clause singles out
one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. Thus, the subject
clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of Serrano
and other OFWs to equal protection.
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, et al. v. HON. PETE PRADO, et al.

G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, Cruz, J.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on
all persons or things without distinction. What the clause requires is equality among equals
29 | P a g e

as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.
Facts:
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
Issue:
Whether RA 7354 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently,
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal
protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
In the Courts view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege
was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver
of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and the people.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege,
the remedy, it seems to the Court, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice,
the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem.
The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress
the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with
lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest
appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted
for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if
they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their
judicial functions.
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.

v. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
30 | P a g e

G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, Puno, J.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow
invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly.
Facts:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the
old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight
years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of
the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A.
No. 7653 is violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter
GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file
personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Issue:
Whether the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures
power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file
employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. The subsequent
charters of the seven other GFIs share the common proviso of a blanket exemption of all
their employees from the coverage of the SSL. The rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were
granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. The policy
determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file
and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP
rank-and-file and other GFIs who are similarly situated. The challenge to the constitutionality
of the law is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress
in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee
that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws includes the prohibition
against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has
the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is
unconstitutional. It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-andfile from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the
coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP
rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

AAA v. HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON
G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, Ynares-Santiago, J.
Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution does not mandatorily require the judge to
personally examine the complainant and her witnesses.
31 | P a g e

Facts:
AAA worked as a secretary in Arzadon Automotive Car Service Center. As she was on
her way out the office, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He
told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and
forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail because there was
nobody else in the premises.
AAA filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon. After an exchange of pleadings and
motions between AAA and Arzadon before the trial court, Judge Carbonell dismissed the
criminal case for lack of probable cause on the ground that the complainant and her
witnesses failed to take the witness stand. He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Issue:
Whether Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution mandatorily requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and her witnesses.
Ruling:
NO. Instead, the judge may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed the criminal case without taking
into consideration the three resolutions, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause
against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof. In the
case of Webb v. De Leon, the Court held that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so,
judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They
just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court found that there is sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the
accused of the private complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. AAA has categorically stated that Arzadon raped
her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the preliminary investigations. Taken with the
other evidence presented before the investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for
purposes of establishing probable cause. It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable
cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require
that the evidence would justify conviction.
HARRY S. STONEHILL, et al. v. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO

G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967, Concepcion, C.J.
32 | P a g e

Two points must be stressed in connection with Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution,
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
Facts:
A total of 42 search warrants were issued against Diokno et al. and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search the persons listed and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
indicated personal properties.
Diokno et al. filed this present petition assailing the validity of the search warrants.
They contended that the search warrants violate the Constitution because (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money,
not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4)
the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers
and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
Issue:
Whether the search warrants are general warrants and thus violate the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence,
it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party
against
whom
it
is
sought
has
performed particular acts,
or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. To uphold the
validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009, Nachura, J.
A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the
person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
33 | P a g e

Facts:
Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children located at
Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed
men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the room. The
raiding team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went
back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the
room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!". Disuanco informed Valeroso
that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed
with a search warrant. The RTC convicted Valeroso. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Valeroso was denied. Hence, this LetterAppeal.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted by the arrested officers was illegal.
Ruling:
YES. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the
right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of
the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach. Otherwise stated, a
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The arresting officers served the
warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. Under the circumstances, there was
no comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other
closed or concealed areas in the room. The search was made in the locked cabinet which
cannot be said to have been within Valerosos immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded
the bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest. Nor can the
warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine." The doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
In this case, the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm
and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso. Clearly, the search
made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence
against him. Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.
RODEL LUZ y ONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G. R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, Sereno, J.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence. Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Facts:
34 | P a g e

PO2 Alteza saw Luz driving a motorcycle without a helmet; this prompted him to flag
down Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet while driving said motor vehicle. He invited Luz to come inside their sub-station;
while he and SPO1 Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket;
he told Luz to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it. Luz obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket, one
of which was a nickel-like tin or metal container; PO2 Alteza asked Luz to open it, the latter
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four plastic
sachets, the two of which were empty while the other two contained suspected shabu.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search was illegal.
Ruling:
YES. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii)
search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a
stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this
case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside
Luzs pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. Neither was there a
consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by
clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that Luz acceded to
the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and
intelligent consent. Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence
obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
RAMON MARTINEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 198691, February 13, 2013, Perlas Bernabe, J.
Evidence seized from an invalid warrantless arrest shall be inadmissible.

Facts:
PO2 Roberto Soque, et al. while conducting a routine foot patrol along Balingkit
Street, Malate, Manila, heard a man shouting Putangina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?. For
purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila which
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punishes breaches peace, the man, later identified as Ramon, was apprehended and asked
to empty his pockets.
In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3),
Article II of RA 9165.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.
Ruling:
NO. Article III, section 2 of the Constitution Commonly known as the exclusionary
rules, proscription is not, however, an absolute and rigid one. As found in jurisprudence, one
of the traditional exceptions, among others, is searches incidental to a lawful arrest which is
of particular significance to this case and thus, necessitates further disquisition.
Based on the records in the case at bar, PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly
violating Section 844 (breaches of peace) of the Manila City Ordinance. Evidently, the
gravamen of these offenses is the disruption of communal tranquility. Thus, to justify a
warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be established that the apprehension was
effected after a reasonable assessment by the police officer that a public disturbance is
being committed. However, PO2 Soques testimony surrounding circumstances leading to
Ramons warrantless warrant clearly negates the presence of probable cause when the police
officers conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly populated place,
with many people conversing with each other on the street, would constitute any of the acts
punishable under Section 844 of the said ordinance. The words he allegedly shouted
"Putangina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" are not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and
thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time
of the incident, Balingkit Street was still teeming with people and alive with activity. Further,
no one present at the place of arrest ever complained that Ramons shouting disturbed the
public.
Consequently, since it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested, the
warrantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly
seized from Ramon is inadmissible evidence.
RUDY CABALLES v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002, Puno, J.
The mere mobility of moving vehicles does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of
the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Facts:
Police officers while on a routine patrol spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered
with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two
police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant Caballes. When
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asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous. With
Caballes alleged consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles
of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NPC).
Based on the above, the RTC and CA convicted Caballes.
Issue:
Whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the
appellant.
Ruling:
NO. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police
officers in the case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant.
On the basis of search of moving vehicle searches without warrant of automobiles is
also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws,
provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near
the boundary lines of the State. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give
the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all,
the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search,
which must still be present in such a case.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to
the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes
a light therein without opening the car's doors (4) where the occupants are not subjected to
a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police
officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's
vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check. Further, In the case of United States v. Pierre, the Court held that the physical
intrusion of a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected
by the Fourth Amendment
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such
to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to
have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying
stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a
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sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none
exists in this case.
On the basis of Plain View It is clear from the records of this case that the cable
wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered with
leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to the police
authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As
a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it
has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of
the articles without further search.
On the basis of Consented Search In case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a
waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police
officers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves
much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached
petitioner and told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive." The Court is hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers
were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein
petitioner that they will search his vehicle.
The "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEILA JOHNSON

Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs,
and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
Facts:
Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure
area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked
Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States, she felt something hard on the
latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty
girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not
satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo
Embile. She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest womens room for inspection. Inside
the womens room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her
stomach was and the former gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then
asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Johnson brought out three plastic packs,
which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the womens room.
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of
580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be
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methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Now, Leila Johnson claims that her constitutional
right was violated due to the intrusive search.
Issue:
Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Ruling:
NO. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant. The
methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition
is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to
board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest
the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a
valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Corollary, her
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected
upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE

DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Random drug testing of persons running for national and local elective post as well
as those accused of crimes is unconstitutional. Meanwhile, random drug testing of
secondary and tertiary students as well as private and public employees is constitutional.
Facts:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in
issue.
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Issues:
1. Whether the mandatory drug testing to national and local elective post is
constitutional.
2. Whether the random drug testing to secondary and tertiary students is
constitutional.
3. Whether the random drug testing to private and public employees is constitutional.
4. Whether the mandatory drug testing to persons accused of crimes is
constitutional.
Ruling:
1. NO. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is clear as to
the only requirements to be qualified as a candidate of an elective office such as in this case
which is for senator.
2. YES. Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so
holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to
fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
3. YES. As in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but
random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and
private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The reduced expectation
of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the
search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under
the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also
labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and
other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are
required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
4. NO. Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds
no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCA

G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, Nachura, J.
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Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made
before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Facts:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that
he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in
Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioners certificate of live birth;
(b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he
graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the
University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from
different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on
the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father. Acting on Jesus Motion for
Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case
of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A
new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by
Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet
taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it
noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity
action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner
has failed to establish a prima facie case.
Issue:
Whether a prima facie showing of legitimacy is necessary before a court can issue a
DNA testing.
Ruling:
YES. But it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of
the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; Although a paternity action is
civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures
is
still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
41 | P a g e

particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind
of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally
found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases
in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a
blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a
court order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA
testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NAZARENO VILLAREAL

G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not
suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest.
Facts:
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3
de Leon) was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant
from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet
of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant
whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended
with the help of a tricycle driver. Despite appellants attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon
was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu
in his possession.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.
Ruling:
NO. The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably
perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about
8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule
amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by
appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is
insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellants hands was
indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt
act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de
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Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in ones
hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been
exhibiting unusual or strange acts or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would
not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear
that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latters
previous charge for the same offense.
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will
not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order
to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. Personal knowledge of the arresting officer that a
crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret personal knowledge as
referring to a persons reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous
precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a persons previous criminal infractions,
rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.
Furthermore, appellants act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him
should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must
not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt
without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons
for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as
witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellants
attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily
have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU
TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING v. THE DEPORTATION
BOARD
G.R. No. L-10280, September 30, 1963, Barrera, J.
The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. Only a judge can determine the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants.
Facts:
Qua Chee Gan et al. were charged before the Deportation Board, having purchased
U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central
Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and
petitioners. Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said
aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety
bond for P10, 000.00 and cash bond for P10, 000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were
provisionally set at liberty. Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges
presented against them in the Deportation Board for the reason, among others, that the
same do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said
Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges and the consequent issuance of arrest
warrant.
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The lower court sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of
arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges
against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the
arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether the deportation boards issuance of an arrest warrant was valid.
Ruling:
NO. Our Constitution provides that the probable cause, upon which a warrant of
arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc.,
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement "to be
determined by the judge" is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the
existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be
authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant
of arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether
the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the
purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation.
The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to
carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is
already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President
obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the
investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true
before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the
appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of
President Roxas. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority
was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or
limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must
be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the
Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it
is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights
and freedom cannot be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.
BRICCIO RICKY A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID

G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.
Government employees constitutional protection to privacy as to the computers
they used in the work place may vary on a case-to-case basis. In cases that there is reduced
privacy expectation, search incidental to work-related investigations must comply with the
reasonableness and scope test.
Facts:
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Pollo is a government employee whose computer was searched pursuant to the
anonymous letter complaint to the Office of Chairperson David. The government employer
used Pollos personal files stored in the computer as evidence of misconduct. Thereafter,
Pollo was charged administratively and dismissed from service. Pollo now assails the validity
of the search and resulting evidence thereby being the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal
files without his knowledge and consent was reasonable.
Ruling:
YES. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the
invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments
need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. To the Courts
view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would
impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee
misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be
translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agencys work, and ultimately
to the public interest
Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for no investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as
for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the
inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two-fold inquiry: first, one
must consider whether the action was justified at its inception, x x x; second, one must
determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Ordinarily, a search of an
employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of
work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory workrelated purpose such as to retrieve a needed file x x x. The search will be permissible in its
scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.
This test was found to be fulfilled in the case at bar, considering the damaging nature
of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible
adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a
search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these
furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the
computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence.
Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be
destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to
impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the
purpose of the work-related investigation.
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,

CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO,
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RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER
and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, Puno, J.
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from
these guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees in our
Constitution and laws create zones of privacy.
Facts:
Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System on the
following grounds: 1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a
law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the
congress to make laws, and 2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizens constitutional right of
privacy.
Issue:
Whether the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy.
Ruling:
YES, because its scope is too broad and vague that will put peoples right to privacy
in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks proper safeguards
for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and
other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individuals liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against selfincrimination; it may pave the way for fishing expeditions by government authorities and
evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy
when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of
privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers,
social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to
perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the wellworded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened
by an inerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of
its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."
KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006, Carpio, J.
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The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities.
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 that directs a
unified ID system among government agencies and Government owned and controlled
corporations in order to have a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno
and other respondents assailed this executive order for being a usurpation of legislative
powers by the president and that it infringes the citizens right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.
Ruling:
NO. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities
have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have
been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their
right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities
in the collection and recording of personal identification data.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature
and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420,
government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3
of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these
specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities
prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification
data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following
safeguards are instituted.
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data
collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d)
of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right to
information on matters of public concern. The data treated as strictly confidential under EO
420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released
to the public or the press.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners
cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420
narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards.
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and
issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant
such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In
contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National
Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior
47 | P a g e

to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation
because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none
existed before.
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN

G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012, Sereno, C.J.
In case of conflict between the right to privacy and compelling state interest, a
balancing act is required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
Facts:
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. ABS CBN Broadcasting reported this list and several newspapers show
this as well. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned
and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
Issue:
Whether the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right
to privacy is invoked as opposed to the States interest in preserving the right to life, liberty
or security.
Ruling:
NO. Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. The state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful
mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
48 | P a g e

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even
warranting reproach but it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that
respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other
reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort
to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection
and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA v. ST.
THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, Velasco, J.
A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery.
Facts:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne
Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported
said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and
downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for
appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and banned them
from marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. Subsequently,
Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data against the school. They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender
and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data
be declared illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy.
Issue:
Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Ruling:
NO. The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he
explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;
(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the
case at bar is the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of individuals to
control information about themselves.
Facebook provides privacy features. Without these privacy settings, respondents
contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context,
49 | P a g e

be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools
that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they
grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networking
(OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,
manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the users invocation of his or her
right to informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny
access to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right
which necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a
feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at Only Me or a custom
list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public
by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos visibility and accessibility. Such
position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also
disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines
of his or her private space.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this safety measures were not utilized. Moreover,
the school gathered the pictures through a third person via another student. The fact that
these pictures were easily gathered by these students in the schools computer laboratory
negates the claim of employing privacy measures. Had it been proved that the access to the
pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the Me Only privacy setting,
or that the users contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
Custom setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all
the users friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994, Padilla, J.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under R.A. No.
4200.
Facts:
Respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with
damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on grounds of lack of marriage license
and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private
respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons. CA dismissed the petition stating that the tape
recordings are not inadmissible per se.
Issue:
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Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
NO. R.A. No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping andOther
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, respondents trial court and
Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is mandatory under R.A. No. 4200.
FELIPE NAVARRO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999, Mendoza, J.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications.
Facts:
At around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike
Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario
Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers.
After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer
appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres,
Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. At that point, the floor manager, Dante
Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why
he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job. Sioco
pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him. When
Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his
companions. Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter.
Three of the policemen on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of
the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena
declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin
and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle. There was a heated argument between petitioner and
Lingan and as Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of
his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He
tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored
him. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange
between petitioner and the deceased.
Issue:
Whether the tape recording is admissible in evidence in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.
Ruling:
YES. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not
private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly
authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he
personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he
51 | P a g e

recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to
belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording;
that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape
were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
CECILIA ZULUETA v. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996, Mendoza, J.
The only exception to the constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable is if there is a lawful order from a court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether the documents seized may be used against the respondent in the case filed
by his wife.
Ruling:
NO. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making
it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither one may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO,
PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG
ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO v. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ
G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005, Carpio, J.
A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.
However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison
officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents
without violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer. The inspection of
privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.
Facts:
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained
junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
(Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City.
The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its
immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
several cabinet members. This is known as the Oakwoood Mutiny.
While in prison, Trillanes and Maestrecampo handed letters to the petitioners for
mailing. These are personal letters of both Trillanes and Maestrecampo. These were then
confiscated and read by the prison officials and authorities. Hence, the present controversy.
The Court of Appeals declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter
is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which
is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is a violation of his right to
privacy of communication.
Ruling:
NO. American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees nonprivileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. Hence, when a detainee places his
letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to
possible inspection by jail officials. A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of
privacy for his incoming mail. However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys
limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but
could not read the contents without violating the inmates right to correspond with his
lawyer.
The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal
contraband. The opening and reading of the detainees letters in the present case did not
violate the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed
envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged
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to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes
and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their
counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were
not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the
ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not
read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rightsis
a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained
or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as
well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of
their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, Puno, C.J.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule
applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Facts:
On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was
planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was
audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of
Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable
under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia.
He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was
committed or was being committed in their presence. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued a
press release giving fair warning to radio and television owners/operators to observe antiwiretapping law and pertinent circulars on program standards.
The acts of respondents are alleged to be violations of the freedom on expression
and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Respondents denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioners
legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the
fair warning issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional
guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTCs
mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.
Issue:
Whether the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005
warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and
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other personalities constitute unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press.
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court applied the Content-based restriction test and ruled that
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. With
respect to content-based restrictions, the government must show the type of harm the
speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence
of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech
based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by showing a
substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground. As
formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule
applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. This outlines the procedural
map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the
presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the
quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents
who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the
press failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which
government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the antiwiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the
various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press
Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the
other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the
hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different
versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related
and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.
For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present
danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.
ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, et al.

G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in utterances on a generalpatronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.
Facts:
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On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo;
sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang
babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o
di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan.
Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of
August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20
days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the
MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. On September 27,
2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision suspending him from hosting
Ang Dating Daan for three months. Petitioner moves for the striking down of the decision
suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the main ground that the
decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution. Petitioner asserts that his utterance in
question is a protected form of speech.
Issue:
Whether the utterance in question is a protected form of speech.
Ruling:
NO. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value
expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national
security. Even if we concede that petitioners remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional
protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to
children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected
speech. Petitioners offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast,
without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed
children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children
and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a
substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterances in TV
broadcast as provided in PD 1986. The suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was,
in one perspective, permissible restriction. This disposition was made against the backdrop
of the following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a
pervasive medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, easily reaches every
home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of the
programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there
was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered
his speech on a G or for general patronage rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of
the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is [s]uitable for all ages, meaning that
the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain anything
unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or
supervision. The words petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for
children. Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a
general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.
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DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT v. RODRIGO L. ARANJUEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015, Perez, J.
A citizen who accepts public employment must accept certain limitations on his or
her freedom. But there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they
cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment.
Facts:
As early as 16 May 2007, the members and officers of NAMADACWAD have been
staging pickets in front of the DCWD Office during their lunch breaks to air their grievances
about the non-payment of their Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) incentives and their
opposition to DCWDs privatization and proposed One Hundred Million Peso Loan. Came the
anniversary of DCWD, officers and members sported t-shirts with inscriptions CNA Incentive
Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na! at the beginning of the Fun Run at Victoria Plaza at
around 6:30 in the morning and continued to wear the same inside the premises of the
DCWD office during the office hours. Also, one of the members of the Board of Directors of
NAMADACWAD Gregorio S. Cagula (Cagula), with the help of some of its members, attached
similar inscriptions and posters of employees grievances to a post in the motor pool area,
an area not among the officially designated places for posting of grievances as prescribed by
DCWDs Office Memorandum dated 8 February 1996 and pursuant to CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 33 Series of 1994 (MC No. 33).
DCWD argues that since the concerted or mass action was done within government
office hours, such act was not permissible, therefore prohibited. Otherwise stated, a
concerted activity done within the regular government office hours is automatically a
violation of Section 6 of Resolution No. 021316. On the other hand, Aranjuez, et. al. argued
that the act staged was covered by their constitutional rights to assemble and petition for
redress of grievances.
Issue:
Whether the act was covered by the constitutional rights to assemble and petition for
redress of grievances.
Ruling:
YES. It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with
inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As
pointed out by the respondents, they followed the advice of GM Gamboa to be there at the
fun run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire that
they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government employees would be deprived of
their constitutional right to freedom of expression. This, then, being the fact, the Supreme
Court ruled against the findings of both the CSC and Court of Appeals that the wearing of tshirts with grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations. It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected
to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not
tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise
enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts
public employment must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom. But there are
some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in
a contract for public employment. It is the Courts responsibility to ensure that citizens are
not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.
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GMA NETWORK, INC. (formerly known as "REPUBLIC BROADCASTING
SYSTEM, INC.") and REY VIDAL v. JESUS G. BUSTOS, M.D., TEODORA R. OCAMPO,
M.D., VICTOR V. BUENCAMINO, M.D., CESAR F. VILLAFUERTE, M.D., ARTEMIO T.
ORDINARIO, M.D., and VIRGILIO C. BASILIO, M.D.
G.R. No. 146848, October 17, 2006, Garcia, J.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are
not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. On the other hand, in qualifiedly
or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise
defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact.
Facts:
In August 1987, the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) conducted the physicians licensure examinations. Out of the total two thousand eight
hundred thirty-five (2,835) examinees who took the examinations, nine hundred forty-one
(941) failed. On February 10, 1988, a certain Abello and over two hundred other
unsuccessful examinees filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel
the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. As
alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to
test questions vitiated the results of the examinations. As news writer and reporter of
petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, its
co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of
the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the news coverage for the ten oclock evening
news edition of GMAs Channel 7 Headline News.
Stung by what they claim to be a false, malicious and one-sided report filed and
narrated by a remorseless reporter, the herein respondents instituted with the RTC of Makati
City a damage suit against Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then known as the Republic
Broadcasting System, Inc. In their complaint, the respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, alleged,
among other things, that then defendants Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard
for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on GMA
Network, Inc.s Channel 7. They added that, as a measure to make a forceful impact on their
audience, the defendants made use of an unrelated and old footage (showing physicians
wearing black armbands) to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and
sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the
video footage in question actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by doctors and
personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute
with hospital management.
Issue:
Whether the subject report by GMA 7 is covered by the freedom of the press and thus
not libelous.
Ruling:
YES. Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters
are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged
communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion
provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these are speeches or debates made by
Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its committees. On the other hand, in
qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an
otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice
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in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit
or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in
fact. To this genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code.
To be sure, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of
conditional privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the
speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters
of public interest.
In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind
of privileged matter, the same being the product of a simple narration of the allegations set
forth in the mandamus petition of examinees Abello, et al., devoid of any comment or
remark.
As regards the issue on the airing of the unrelated video footage, the Court ruled that
nothing in the report would indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create another
news story beyond what was reported.
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, FOR AND INBEHALF OF HIS MINOR DAUGHTER, JOANNA* MARIE
BIANCA S. BINAY v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GENIVI V. FACTAO AND VICENTE G.
TIROL
G.R. NO. 170643, September 08, 2006, Ynares-Santiago, J.
To qualify under the category of a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged
communication, the following elements must be fulfilled: (1) the person who made the
communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least,
had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is
made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and
(3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
Facts:
An article entitled "ALYAS ERAP JR." was published on Pinoy Times Special Edition.
Paragraph 25 of the article reads: Si Joanne Marie Bianca, ang sinasabing ampong anak ng
mga Binay, ay bumibili ng panty na nagkakahalaga ng P1,000 ang isa, ayon sa isang writer
ni Binay. Magarbo ang pamumuhay ng batang ito dahil naspoiled umano ng kanyang ama.
Based on this article, Jejomar Binay, father of the minor Joanna Marie Bianca, filed a
complaint for libel against Vicente G. Tirol as publisher, and Genivi V. Factao as writer of the
article. In their defense, Tirol and Factao argued that the matter at hand is within the realm
of public interest given that Jejomar is an aspirant to a public office while his wife is an
incumbent public official.
Issue:
Whether the article is covered by the protection of the freedom of expression.
Ruling:
NO. The article does not qualify as an absolute or a conditional or qualified privileged
communication. It is neither a private communication made by any person to another in the
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performance of any legal, moral or social duty, nor a fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of a confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
To qualify under the category of a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication, the
following elements must be fulfilled: (1) the person who made the communication had a
legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to
protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the
communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or
duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the
statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
In the case at bar, the article serves no legal, moral, or social purpose regarding
Mayor Binay's adopted daughter buying extravagant lingerie in publishing Joanna's status as
an adopted daughter. Neither is there any public interest respecting her purchases of
panties worth P1,000.00. With this backdrop, it is obvious that the only motive in inserting
paragraph 25 in the subject article is to embarrass Joanna before the reading public.
Accordingly, the article is not protected by the freedom of expression.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., et al. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et al.

G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014, Abad, J.
The government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain
and punish wrongdoings.
Facts:
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. And
because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the illmotivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations.
The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to
pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the
government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the following provisions of the Cybercrime
Law:
1. Section 4(a)(1) which punishes Illegal Access- The access to the whole or any part
of a computer system without right. Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the
strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the
people and should thus be struck down.
2. Section 4(a)(3) which punishes Data Interference. The intentional or reckless
alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
3. Section 4(a)(6) which punishes Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name
over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others
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from registering the same, if such a domain name is: (i) Similar, identical, or confusingly
similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at the
time of the domain name registration; (ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a
person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and (iii) Acquired without right
or with intellectual property interests in it. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cybersquatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will
cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take
the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
4. Section 4(b)(3) punishes Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional
acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying
information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if
no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
5. Section 4(c)(1) punishes Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control,
or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration. Petitioners claim that
the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. They express fear
that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting
adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as
crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes
"gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love
(as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces
socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the
bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
6. Section 4(c)(2) punishes Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts
defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009,
committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be
(1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775. Petitioners point out
that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct,
manufacture or create any form of child pornography"clearly relates to the prosecution of
persons who aid and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to punish. Petitioners are wary
that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is
not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his
laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies
to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.
7. Section 4(c)(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of
commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable
way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (optout) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the
message.
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The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited
commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network
capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology,
and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams
amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the
recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech
enjoys less protection in law.
8. Section 4(c)(4) punishes Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined
in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer
system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. Petitioners dispute
the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel. Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the
penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the
requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it
with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that
inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article
354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
9. Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense: (a)
Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids
in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable. (b)
Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit
any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or
aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as
cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
protected expression.
10. Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided
for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.
Issue:
Whether the questioned provisions are constitutional.
Ruling:
1. YES. The Court found nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the
strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing
what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of another without
right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
2. YES. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling
effect, an in terrorem effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of
citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the
State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the
state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling
effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil
that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of ones
constitutional rights.
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3. YES. It is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The
law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6)
on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
4. YES. The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his
citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name
of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or
use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply
fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right
to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law. Also, the charge of
invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the
specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly,
what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of
personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers
personal data.
5. YES. The deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act give a proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations
show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x between and among two private
persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some." The understanding of
those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is
necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber
prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes
interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
6. YES. The provision merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the
government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child pornography
already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
7. NO. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right
to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is
a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
8. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally
protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals
from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation
to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel. But the
Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the
libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when
the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media
is distinct from that of print.
9. Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the
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freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the
actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out,
formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand
scrutiny. But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5
should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses
borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression. That Section 5 penalizes aiding or
abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL
only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System.
10. Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a
qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial
distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications
technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in
question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or
cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
cybercrimes.
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ v. CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, et al.

G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985, Fernando, C.J.
Where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so
because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches
every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of
the programs therein shown.
Facts:
The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For Adults Only." The
main objection was the classification of the film as "For Adults Only." For petitioners, such
classification is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of
artistic expression. The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which
the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a
whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for
its classification. All that petitioners assail as arbitrary on the part of the Board's action are
the deletions ordered in the film.
Issue:
Whether the Board acted with grave abuse of discretion in classifying the film as For
Adults Only.
Ruling:
YES. The test to determine whether freedom of excession may be limited is the clear
and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to
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prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that
what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must
be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time
element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the
require of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate, wherefore, as noted earlier, is
that where the movies, theatrical productions radio scripts, television programs, and other
such media of expression are concerned included as they are in freedom of expression
censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest.
This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or not there
was a grave abuse of discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board
is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa
Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover its
perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. The Court
concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough
votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does
not lie. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of
obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of the Court that where
television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because
unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every
home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the
programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it
is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It
cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an
attitude of caring for the welfare of the young. The Supreme Court dismissed petition for
certiorari solely on the ground that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a
grave abuse of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as "For-Adults-Only."
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB) v.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA
G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
There has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom
of expression and of the press has a preferred status.
Facts:
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired Prostituition, an episode of the television (TV) program The Inside Story produced and hosted by
respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them
to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps,
customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Womens University
(PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU
Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The
showing of The Inside Story caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman,
Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed
letter-complaints with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode
besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female
students. Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal
complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that
respondents (1) did not submit The Inside Story to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited
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the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 7 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1986 and Section 3, Chapter III and Section 7,Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations. In their answer, respondents explained that the The Inside Story is a public
affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, the airing of which is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press.
Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior
restraint upon respondents. Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press.
Issues:
Whether the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the constitutional provision
on freedom of speech and of the press.
Ruling:
NO. The task is not Herculean because it merely resurrects this Court En Bancs
ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals. Here, respondents sought exemption from the
coverage of the term television programs on the ground that the The Inside Story is a public
affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial protected under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution. Albeit, respondents basis is not freedom of religion, as in
Iglesia ni Cristo, but freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo
applies squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, the
Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers
of our fundamental laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x. Yet despite the
fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not
exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no
declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the
press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious
programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason,
there is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the
press, a freedom bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of
review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P.D. No. 1986, such as (1) television
programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and
agencies, and (2) newsreels.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. v. JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Regional

Trial Court, Branch 104, Quezon City
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1049
No question of prior restraint or violation of the guarantee of free speech arises when
what an individual did was to initiate an inquiry into the source and basis of the derogatory
news report.
Facts:
In June 17, 1993 issue of the Manila Standard; an article titled Judiciary worse than
PNP, was published which reported that the results of the latest opinion polls conducted by
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petitioner SWS showed the Judiciary to have an even lower satisfaction rating than the
Philippine National Police. Said report prompted Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, motu proprio,
to initiate on the same date, proceedings ordering the President of the SWS to explain why
he should not be held in contempt for distributing to the general public without prior
permission from any court, its (SWS) findings that the people have more confidence with the
police than with judges thereby tending directly or indirectly to degrade the administration
of justice.
On June 21, 1993, Prof. Mahar Mangahas through Atty. Antonio M. Abad, Jr. submitted
his comment and explanation stating that said survey was privately given to Pres. Ramos
and the cabinet and was not intended for publication nor for public consumption and that if
ever it reaches the media, he had not authorized anyone to do so. The hearing was
scheduled on June 23, 1993, after which Judge Asuncion promulgated an Order dated July 2,
1993, finding Professor Mangahas explanation satisfactory and dismissing the contempt
charge against him.
Thereafter, Professor Mangahas addressed a letter to the Chief Justice intended as a
formal complaint against Honorable Maximiano C. Asuncion for grave abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law, in connection with his issuance of an Order dated 17 June 1993.
Issue:
Whether the Order dated 17 June 1993 is violative of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and freedom from prior restraint.
Ruling:
NO. What was clearly implicit in the newspaper report about the results of the SWS
poll - in the words of Judge Asuncion, that the people have more confidence with the police
than with the judges in light of the fact, of which judicial notice is taken, that said report
came out at a time when there already was widespread publicity adverse to the judiciary,
there can be no doubt of its clear tendency to degrade the administration of justice. Thus,
Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted for what, at a minimum, he must have felt duty-bound
to do in the circumstances.
No question of prior restraint or violation of the guarantee of free speech arises here,
what he did being, in essence, merely to initiate an inquiry into the source and basis of the
derogatory news report. And he forthwith abated the proceedings upon receiving an
explanation he deemed satisfactory.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN v. PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA

OQUENDO, DENNIS AYON, NENITA OQUENDO, ESMAEL MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA,
MELINDA QUINTOS DE JESUS, REYNALDO HULOG, REDMOND BATARIO, MALOU
MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA NETWORK, INC. THROUGH ITS NEWS EDITORS
RAFFY JIMENEZ AND VICTOR SOLLORANO, SOPHIA DEDACE, ABS-CBN
CORPORATION THROUGH THE HEAD OF ITS NEWS GROUP, MARIA RESSA, CECILIA
VICTORIA OREA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC. REPRESENTED BY ITS
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF LETTY JIMENEZ MAGSANOC, TETCH TORRES, PHILIPPINE STAR
REPRESENTED BY ITS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF ISAAC BELMONTE, AND EDU PUNAY
G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013, Carpio, J.
If there is a legitimate public interest, the media is not prohibited from making a fair,
true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint under freedom of the press.
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However, in the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members
of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its
pendency.
Facts:
Atty. Fortun, the lawyer of Ampatuan in the Maguindanao Massacre case, filed a
petition for contempt against respondents Atty. Quinsayas and others. Atty. Fortun alleged
that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint
against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. The filing of the disbarment complaint had been published and was
the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent media groups and personalities. He
further alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him exposed
this Court and its investigators to outside influence and public interference. On the other
hand, the respondents argued that the news article is covered by the protection of the
freedom of expression, speech, and of the press under the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the publication of the disbarment complaint is covered by the protection of
the freedom of speech.
Ruling:
YES. As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their
final resolution and the final decision of the Court. In this case, however, since petitioner is a
public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of public
concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against
petitioner is a matter of public concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the
disbarment case as legitimate news. It would have been different if the disbarment case
against petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to respect
the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings. Since the disbarment complaint is a
matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to publish such fact under freedom of
the press.
BLO UMPAR ADIONG v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether
public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself unduly
infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution
since there is no public interest substantial enough to warrant this kind of restriction.
Facts:
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other
election laws. The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight
and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place,
including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the
COMELEC. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such
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prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of
Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio,
television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and
stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the
petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received
any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the
supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."
Issue:
Whether the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free
speech enshrined in the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is
null and void on constitutional grounds. First the prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III).
There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in
this case. All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but the Court
has accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. Second the questioned
prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places
like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest.
There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of
the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present
danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
writing instrument to be stilled. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The
regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by
a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990, Medialdea, J.
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the COMELEC has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods.
Facts:
On October 23, 1989, R.A. No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said
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law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act
originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990
by virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.
The Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Section 19 thereof provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.
During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall
use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC maintains that the questioned provision
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to
supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article
IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the subject provision is violative of the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that COMELEC has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167
has no statutory basis.
What was granted to the Comelec under Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision
is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason
why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any
elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign
period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or
commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice
of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
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G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000, Panganiban, J.
The absolute ban on conducting exit surveys imposed by the Comelec cannot be
justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the
type of information obtained through exit polling.
Facts:
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21, 1998 which reads:
"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same."
The Resolution was issued by the COMELEC allegedly upon "information from [a]
reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to
conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President,
results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of
the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had not authorized
or deputized petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of when it approved the issuance of a
restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives
from conducting exit polls during the May 11 elections.
Ruling:
YES. COMELECS arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by
the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that
the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment
or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace
or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling
group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data
gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the
exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those
of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can
only be indicative of the other.
In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the
purposes of which was to prevent the broadcasting of early returns, was unconstitutional
because such purpose was impermissible, and the statute was neither narrowly tailored to
advance a state interest nor the least restrictive alternative. Furthermore, the general
interest of the State in insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to justify
speech regulation. Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper editorials for
the reason that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is impermissible, so is
regulating speech via an exit poll restriction. The absolute ban imposed by the COMELEC
cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of
communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other
hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the COMELEC end of
avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
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GMA NETWORK, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014, Peralta, J.
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the
Fundamental Law. It must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state
interest.
Facts:
Petitioners allege the constitutionality of Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for
national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and
one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's
right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to
choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.
Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in
accordance with R.A. No. 9006 as this would truly give life to the constitutional objective to
equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling
the playing field between candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those
without much. Moreover, the COMELEC's issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to
Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution which vests on the COMELEC the power to
supervise and regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as
well as mass media.
Issue:
Whether Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits goes against
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
Ruling:
YES. Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the
Fundamental Law. It must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state
interest.
The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary
as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
"aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time
limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so
many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens
across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of
the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message
through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily
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understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly
hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself - a form of suppression of his
political speech.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, Leonen, J.
Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and
must be protected. Every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection. Thus, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made
by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must
consider during elections is unconstitutional. A political speech enjoys preferred protection
within our constitutional order.
Facts:
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted tarpaulins on the front walls of San Sebastian
Cathedral within public view. One of the tarpaulins contains the heading Conscience Vote
and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team
Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on
the adoption of the RH Law. Subsequently, the COMELEC sent a letter to Bishop Navarra
ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin because its size was in violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 which sets the sizes of election propaganda materials.
Consequently, Bishop Navarra filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the order of COMELEC
for being in violation of the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.
Issue:
Whether prohibiting the subject tarpaulin constitutes a violation of the freedom of
speech.
Ruling:
YES. Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression
and must be protected. Every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection. Thus, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made
by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must
consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the
guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate
including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for
the choice of a candidate.
In this case, the principal message in the tarpaulin consists of a social advocacy.
While it tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. Furthermore, the tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group. It may therefore be considered as a political speech which enjoys preferred
protection within our constitutional order.
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1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 206020, April 14, 2015, Reyes, J.
Prohibition on posting any election campaign materials in public utility vehicles and
within the premises of public transport terminals restricts the rught to free expression.
n
Facts:
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 prohibits the posting,
displaying or exhibiting any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places such as public utility vehicles and within the premises
of public transport terminals. Violation of which shall be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service
and/or terminal liable for an election offense. Petitioner requested COMELEC to reconsider
the implementation of the said provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
Issue:
Whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 restricts the
right to free expression.
Ruling:
YES. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs
and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Meanwhile, the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and liability of
election offense constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences
under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or
permit to operate.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations
since they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted.
However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of
the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are
not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C
of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING

CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, Mendoza, J.
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Under OBrien test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.
Facts:
The COMELEC sought to enforce 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7)
days before an election.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act). Petitioners argue that the restriction
on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim
that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the
1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without
causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the
voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is
imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media
from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election.
Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access
to the results of election surveys which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
Issue:
Whether 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of speech, expression, and the press.
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The Supreme
Court applied the OBrien Test in the case at bar. Under this test, even if a law furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even
if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be
invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve
the governmental purpose in question.
Thus, using the aforementioned test, the Supreme Court ruled that 5.4 is invalid
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by 5.4
cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental.
The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is
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direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech
and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately
before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. and PULSE ASIA, INC. v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015, Leonen, J.
Resolution No. 9674 serves a constitutional purpose and works well within the
bounds of the Constitution and of statute. Therefore, it does not constitute prior restraint.
Facts:
Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia are social research firms. Among
their activities is the conduct of pre-election surveys. SWS conducted a pre-election survey
on voters' preferences for senatorial candidates. Thereafter, it published its findings.
Representative Tobias M. Tiangco (Tiangco) asked COMELEC to compel SWS to either comply
with the Fair Election Act and COMELEC Resolution which required the submission of the
names of the subscribers who paid for the pre-election survey conducted. As basis for
Resolution No. 9674, COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution and
Sections 5.1 to 5.3 of the Fair Election Act.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC can prosecute petitioners for violation of Resolution No. 9674.
Ruling:
NO. Nonetheless, Resolution No. 9674 is valid. The names of those who pay for
election surveys must be disclosed pursuant to the Fair Election Act. This requirement is a
valid regulation in the exercise of police power and effects the constitutional policy of
"guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service". The requirement neither
curtails free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment
of contracts. The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated by the Fair
Election Act is a recognition that publishing surveys is a means to shape the preference of
voters, inform the strategy of campaign machineries, and affect the outcome of elections.
They have a similar nature as election propaganda: they are expensive, normally paid for by
those interested in the outcome of elections, and have tremendous consequences on
election results. Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it
reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of
a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech
that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
While it does regulate expression, it does not go so far as to suppress desired
expression. All Resolution No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards the manner of
publication, that is, that the disclosure of those who commissioned and/or paid for, including
those subscribed to, published election surveys must be made. Resolution No. 9674 serves a
constitutional purpose and works well within the bounds of the Constitution and of statute.
Therefore, it does not constitute prior restraint.
However, the resolution was promulgated in violation of the period set by the Fair
Election Act. Petitioners were not served a copy of Resolution No. 9674 with which they were
asked to comply. They were neither shown nor served copies of the criminal complaint.
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Petitioners' right to due process was violated. COMELECs failure to serve copies of
Resolution No. 9674 on petitioners prevented this three-day period from even commencing.
Not having been served with copies of Resolution No. 9674 itself, petitioners are right in
construing the three-day period for compliance as not having begun to run. There was no
basis for considering petitioners to have committed an election offense arising from this
alleged violation.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR.
ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, &
DR. JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE,
DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO
G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, Austria-Martinez, J.
Trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Public
interest must be upheld over business interests.
Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino. One of
the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11
of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by
the World Health Assembly (WHA). The WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported. The Philippines ratified the International Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that society is informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. The DOH issued the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) of Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) which provides for classes and
seminars for women and children; the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training;
and the giving of donations. Petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of
breastmilk substitutes, filed the present petition alleging that the said order would
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes.
Issue:
trade.
Whether RIRR is unconstitutional for having provisions which unreasonably restrains
Ruling:
NO. The framers of the Constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to
some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business
interests. Despite the fact that our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy,
it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to
promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not call for removal of protective
regulations.
In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers
participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and
children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32);
and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk
substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to
the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned
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provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade.
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),

GABRIELA, FR. JOSE DIZON, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., FROYEL YANEZA, and
FAHIMA TAJAR v. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila
City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National Police, Gen. ARTURO M.
LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District
Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, Azcuna, J.
B.P. No. 880 is constitutional; it does not unduly restrict freedoms but merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
Facts:
Bayan, et al. allege that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al. allege that they conduct peaceful
mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as
citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880
and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 (BP 880), some of them in toto and
others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR). They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit,
no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
Issue:
Whether CPR and BP 880 violate the right of the people to peaceably assemble.
Ruling:
As regards CPR: YES. In view of the maximum tolerance mandated by BP 880, CPR
serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
means something else. What is to be followed is that mandated by the law itself, namely,
maximum tolerance, which specifically means the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly
or in the dispersal of the same.
As regards BP 880: NO. BP 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. A fair and
impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting"
and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to
any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from
the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is
for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.
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Respondents are directed to comply with Section 15 of BP 880 through the
establishment of at least one suitable freedom park in every city and municipality of the
country. CPR, insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is
null and void and respondents are enjoined to refrain from using it and to strictly observe
the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are dismissed in all other respects,
and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is sustained.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National President, JOSE

ANSELMO I. CADIZ, HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN v. HONORABLE
MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA
G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, Carpio-Morales, J.
The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances is the
danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
Facts:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through its then National President Jose
Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for a
permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge. Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza issued a
permit allowing the IBP to rally on given date but indicated Plaza Miranda as the venue,
instead of Mendiola Bridge. IBP filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari.
The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari which assailed the CAs refusal to resolve the
petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. The Manila Police District (MPD)
instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a
rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit.
Issue:
Whether Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the venue
in IBPs rally permit.
Ruling:
YES. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is not to be limited except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to
the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
In modifying the permit outright, Mayor Atienza gravely abused his discretion when
he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing
of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the
applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent
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failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable
condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would, when granted
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion
in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may
possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is
that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. Notably, respondent failed to
indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and
caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for
a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have found
such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory provision, not to have modified
the permit "in terms satisfactory to the applicant.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER

BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI
RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN AND GERALD GARY RENACIDO
G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000, Kapunan, J.
The right of the students to free speech in school premises is not absolute. The
school can suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has
written when such articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others.
Facts:
A story entitled Kaskas, written in Tagalog was published in Miriam College
Foundations school paper. The story treats of the experience of a group of young men who,
one evening, after their performance went to see a bold show. Following the publication, the
student members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school paper
were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of
complaint were filed before the Board alleging that the story contains obscene, vulgar, and
sexually explicit contents. After investigation, the Committee found the students guilty and
imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. So, the students filed a petition for prohibition,
invoking their freedom of speech.
Issue:
Whether the school can impose disciplinary action on the basis of the subject story
without violating the freedom of expression.
Ruling:
YES. Students, like the rest of the citizens, enjoy the freedom to express their views
and communicate their thoughts. However, the right of the students to free speech in school
premises is not absolute. Their right to free speech must always be applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the right of the students to
free expression in this case must be upheld, disciplinary action by the school for conduct by
the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or
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type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others cannot be ruled out. This finds basis on section 7 of the Campus
Journalism Act and in jurisprudence.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, October 19, 2010, Villarama, Jr., J.
The right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society. The court must be able to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice.
Facts:
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R.
Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino
comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department to espouse their
claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses
committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. The allegations of
plagiarism centered on Justice Del Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and
erga omnes. Members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law
published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism relative to the Courts decision in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by
its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face
of allegations of plagiarism in his work.
While the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations
of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an
established fact, but a truth. Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks
which raise concern for the Court. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the
supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.
Issue:
Whether or not the statements on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation relative to the SCs decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary made by
members of the faculty of UP College of Law are proper.
Ruling:
NO. The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding
the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally
unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. While most agree that the
right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is
also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
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potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice.
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than
objective comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration.
As if the case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty
would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. Their actions likewise constitute violations of Canons 10, 11,
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, Del Castillo, J.
What our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious
matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of persons who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad applied for
registration with the COMELEC. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership. Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for
registration with the COMELEC. Petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized
and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated in
jurisprudence. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. After
admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on
moral grounds.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC violated the non-establishment clause of the Constitution in
dismissing the petition.
Ruling:
YES. COMELEC mistakenly opines that the Courts ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections (412 Phil. 308, 2001) stands for the proposition that
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only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements
for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation
of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found that Ang Ladlad is
not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
The Court found that it was a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for
its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must
act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.) v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD

OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA
S. MENDEZ
G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, Puno, J.
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect: freedom to
believe and freedom to act on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
FACTS:
Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. (INC), has a television program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo
aired every Sunday. The program presents INCs religious beliefs, often in comparative
studies with other religions. INC submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Motion
Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program. The Board classified the series as X
or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend other religions. INC pursued two
courses of action against the Board. It appealed to the Office of the President the
classification of its TV Series. The Office of the President reversed the decision of the Board.
Forthwith, the Board allowed the series to be publicly telecast. INC also filed against the
Board a civil case with the RTC. INC alleged that the Board acted with grave abuse of
discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating
them. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court and held that the Board did not
abuse its discretion when it denied the permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of
Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another
religion. It also found the series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.
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Issue:
Whether the Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of INCs
religious program.
RULING:
YES. Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity. It is
the burden of the Board to overthrow this presumption. It failed to do this in the case at bar.
An examination of the evidence show that the attacks are mere criticisms of the tenets of
other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the CA yet they were considered as
indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing.
This clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion.
The Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms however unclean they may be. Under our
Constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it
against an attack by another religion. Religious beliefs are often at war and to preserve
peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of
religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Neutrality alone is its fixed and
immovable stance. In fine, the board cannot squelch the speech of INC simply because it
attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the
reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The
bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging
the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech,
the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear
and present danger rule. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on
freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. It is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
extent necessary to avoid the danger.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P), June 22, 2006, Puno, J.
To validly override a free exercise of religion claim, the compelling state interest test
must be satisfied. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest, which must
be compelling, involved in preventing the free exercise of religion. It has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary. Otherwise, the exercise of the freedom of
religion must be respected.
Facts:
Soledad Escritor was charged with immoral conduct for living with a man not her
husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. She admitted living with
another man without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband
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was still alive but living with another woman. However, as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovah's Witnesses, she asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, she
was able to secure a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," which allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations, and
thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world.
In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about
the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and her common-law-husband.
Issue:
Whether Escritors conjugal arrangement is not immoral in light of the freedom of
religion.
Ruling:
YES. In this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor's
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be
enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will
also protect the freedom. In addition, it must also be shown that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than
necessary. Accordingly, in the absence of a showing that a compelling state interest exists
and the least intrusive means is employed, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
In this case, the state has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against Escritor or her partner as it has never sought to
prosecute Escritor nor her partner. It cannot therefore assert that unbending application of a
criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact,
attempt to enforce that prohibition. Thus, the State's asserted interest, in this case, is only
abstract. Nonetheless, even assuming that there is a compelling state interest, the state
failed to show that it used the least intrusive means possible. The records are bereft of even
a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means the state adopted in
pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE
M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO
E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA v. HONORABLE
RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, Cortes, J.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty
of abode and the right to travel. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
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addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare.
Facts:
President Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
people power revolution and forced into exile in Hawaii. Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die but Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. The petitioners contend that
the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a
court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law. Respondents argue for the primacy of
the right of the State to national security over individual rights.
Issue:
Whether former President Aquino acted whimsically in denying the Marcoss return in
the country.
Ruling:
NO. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is
not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement
in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity
of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented
history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier
narrated in the ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time
would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate
more chaos.
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As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The
military establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by
particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove
to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her,
the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest
and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI and LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN v.

LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE CARPIOMORALES, ARMED FORCES OF THE CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO
AZCUNA, JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL TINGA, INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE
CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL GARCIA, and OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, Tinga, J.
Mobility of travel is another necessary restriction on members of the military. A
soldier cannot leave his/her post without the consent of the commanding officer.
Facts:
The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines tasked
with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections. Senator Rodolfo Biazon
invited them to appear at a public hearing before the Senate. The hearing was scheduled
after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye,
particularly allegations of massive cheating.
However, an instruction from the President barred them from attending the hearing.
Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and
they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections. They were then charged with a
violation of Article of War on wilfully disobeying a superior officer.
Issue:
Whether petitioners right to travel may be impaired.
Ruling:
YES. The principle that mobility of travel is another necessary restriction on
members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post without the consent of the
commanding officer. The reasons are self-evident. The commanding officer has to be aware
at all times of the location of the troops under command, so as to be able to appropriately
respond to any exigencies. For the same reason, commanding officers have to be able to
restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment, their presence at place
of call of duty is necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful consequences,
such as a soldier being denied permission to witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend
the funeral of a parent. Yet again, military life calls for considerable personal sacrifices
during the period of conscription, wherein the higher duty is not to self but to country.
Petitioners seek to be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the
Senate to testify before the Senate Committee against the express orders of Gen. Senga, the
AFP Chief of Staff. If petitioners position is affirmed, a considerable exception would be
carved from the unimpeachable right of military officers to restrict the speech and
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movement of their juniors. The ruinous consequences to the chain of command and military
discipline simply cannot warrant the Courts imprimatur on petitioners position.
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.

JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del
Norte
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012, Brion, J.
The Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be
provided by law.
Facts:
A circular was issued by Office of the Court Administrator requiring all foreign travels
of judges to be with prior permission from the Court. When Judge Ignacio Macarine
requested for authority to travel to Hongkong, he did not submit the complete requirements.
He proceeded with his travel abroad without the approval of OCA. He was informed by OCA
that his leave of absence had been disapproved; hence, the absences shall be deducted
from his salary.
Issue:
Whether the circular issued is violative of the right to travel guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Ruling:
NO. The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of
such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on
ones right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means
be construed as limiting the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over lower
courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to
travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to
regulate is to govern or direct according to rule.
To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration
of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit,
together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his
Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the
OCA. The said certification shall state the condition of his docket based on his Certificate of
Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission,
pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT

ADMINISTRATOR (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR) v. HEUSDENS
A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011, Mendoza, J.
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Regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court
personnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations,
there could be a disruption in the administration of justice.
Facts:
Heusdens, a staff clerk of MTC Tagum, left abroad without waiting for the results of
her leave application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor. Heusdens
explained that it was not her intention to violate the rules (OCA Circular) as her leave was
approved by her superior judge.
Issue:
Whether the circular issued by the OCA can restrict a citizens right to travel as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. The exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to
another, as assured by the Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory
and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety
or public health, as may be provided by law.
With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
As earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of the Judiciary, the Court
issued OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity.
Such regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court
personnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations,
there could be a disruption in the administration of justice. A situation where the employees
go on mass leave and travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are
urgently needed, could possibly arise. For said reason, members and employees of the
Judiciary cannot just invoke and demand their right to travel.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS

FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI] v. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing
G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, Escolin, J.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law.
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Facts:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.
The respondents argued that petitioners have no legal standing to bring the petition
in the absence of any showing that petitioners are prejudiced by the alleged non-publication
of the presidential issuances. Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of
a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner may file a petition for mandamus as against the the
respondents to compel them to publish the unpublished laws on the basis of their right to be
informed on matters of public concern.
Ruling:
YES. The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such
as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
its contents.
IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE ATTENDANCE

OF COURT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES UNDER THE SUBPOENAS OF
FEBRUARY 10, 2012 AND THE VARIOUS LETTERS FOR THE IMPEACHMENT
PROSECUTION PANEL DATED JANUARY 19 AND 25, 2012
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February 14, 2012, Per Curiam
As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials involved in all proceedings
are duty-bound to observe the privileged communication and confidentiality rules if the
integrity of the administration of justice were to be preserved.
Facts:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution
Panel manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses and almost a
thousand documents, to be secured from both private and public offices. The list of proposed
witnesses included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will
testify on matters, many of which are, internal to the Court.
Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the Supreme Court, brought to SCs attention the Subpoena Ad
Testificandum et Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum she received, commanding
her to appear at 10:00 in the morning of the 13 th of February 2012 with the original and
certified true copies of the documents listed above, and to likewise appear in the afternoon
at 2:00 of the same day and everyday thereafter, to produce the listed documents and to
testify. In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court ruling and based on the
Constitution, the pertinent laws and of the Court's rules and policies, there should be a
determination of how the Court will comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the
Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
Issue:
What is the policy of the Court with regard to the access to its records?
Ruling:
In line with the public's constitutional right to information, the Court has adopted a
policy of transparency with respect to documents in its possession or custody, necessary to
maintain the integrity of its sworn duty to adjudicate justiciable disputes.
The Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about information they
acquired in the performance of their official function of adjudication, such as information on
how deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the justices used in decisionmaking, because the end-result would be the disclosure of confidential information that
could subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial privilege (or the
equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the constitutional mandate
of adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be subject to any compulsory
process in relation to the performance of their adjudicatory functions.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules on confidentiality that
apply to justices and judges apply to them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of
the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of
the Court's session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and
matters pending before it. They are subject as well to the disqualification by reason of
privileged communication and the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules extend to
documents and other communications which cannot be disclosed.
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These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and are for the Supreme Court
(as the representative and entity speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the individual
justice, judge, or court official or employees to waive. Thus, every proposed waiver must be
referred to the Supreme Court for its consideration and approval.
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on
matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions of the Court, in the exercise of their
adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation where the
testimony is on a matter which is external to their adjudicatory functions and duties.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET
WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
JUDICIARY
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012, Mendoza, J.
The information disclosed in the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN) is a matter of public concern and interest. The right to information goes hand-inhand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service.
Facts:
The Research Director and researcher-writer of Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism (PCIJ) sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)
of the SC Justices for the year 2008 for the purpose of updating their database of
information on government officials. Meanwhile, several requests for copies of SALN and
other personal documents of SC, CA and Sandiganbayan Justices were also filed. The
requests were made for different purposes. Although no direct opposition to the disclosure of
SALN and other personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform position of the said
magistrates and the various judges associations that the disclosure must be made in accord
with the guidelines set by the Court and under such circumstances that would not
undermine the independence of the Judiciary.
Issue:
Whether the SALNs of the Justices have to be disclosed for being matters of public
concern and interest.
Ruling:
YES. Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a
matter of public concern and interest. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. The public
has the right to know the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests of
public officials and employees including those of their spouses and of unmarried children 18
years of age living in their households.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its
companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for
that right, the Constitution also provides that the peoples right. Jurisprudence has provided
the following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence
information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4) other
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confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to
public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public
as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions
of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official
records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-New

Bataan, Compostela Valley Province v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, Reyes, J.
The qualification standard by which the JBC shalldetermine proven competence of an
applicant is not an internal regulation; hence, its publication is indispensable. It is but a
natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of therequirements to the
judicial positions, so that they would be able to preparefor and comply with them.
Facts:
Petitioner Ferdinand Villanueva was appointed as the Judge of Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Compostela New Bataan. After more than one year of service, he applied for the
vacant position of Presiding Judge in three branches of RTC (in Tagum City, Davao City, and
Agusan Del Sur). Consequently he was not included by the JBC in the list of considered
applicants since he failed to meet the 5-year service requirement, as he has been a judge
only for more than a year. The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural
dueprocess for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of thePhilippines
Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register(ONAR). The petitioner said that the
assailed policy will affect all applyingjudges, thus, the said policy should have been
published.
Issue:
Whether the 5-year service qualification should have been published.
Ruling:
YES. The assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been
published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including
force and effect. However, this publication requirement admits of some exceptions.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrativerules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. Theassailed policy involves a
qualification standard by which the JBC shalldetermine proven competence of an applicant.
It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
membersof the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call tolawyers
who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing toserve in the Judiciary to
apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but anatural consequence thereof that potential
applicants be informed of therequirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be
able to preparefor and comply with them.
Nonetheless, the JBCs failure to publish the assailed policy has notprejudiced the
petitioners private interest. The petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of
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nominees forjudicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legallydemand that ones
name be included in the list of candidates for a judicialvacancy. Ones inclusion in the
shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.
HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v. ABELARDO T. DOMONDON, JOSE A. GANGAN, and

VIOLETA J. JOSEF
G.R. Nos. 165036 and 175705, July 5, 2010, Del Castillo, J.
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The
peoples right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
Facts:
Petitioner Hazel Ma. C. Antolin took the 1997 CPA Board Examinations but did not
make it. Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent
Domondon Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy for her to be furnished a copy of
her answer sheets and the questionnaires of the seven subjects she took together with their
answer keys. She was given only the copy of her answer sheet and nothing else. The
respondent contended that Section 36 of Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
Resolution No. 332 and Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338 preclude the Board
from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer sheet) and that the same
constituted a valid limitation on petitioners right to information and access to government
documents.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Antolin has the right to demand access to the Examination Papers
in view of her right to information as enshrined in the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
The peoples right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Similarly, the States policy of full
disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law. The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms
public interest and public concern. The SC has also recognized the need to preserve a
measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as national security, trade secrets and
banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters.
SC conceded that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are
matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in
order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as
with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of
assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and
science of accounting. On the other hand, there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere
convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the
preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice
exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited
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duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They have not been given
an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification
for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications
of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in
order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the SC deemed it best to remand the cases
to the RTC for further proceedings.
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC,
BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY
G.R. Nos. 85279, July 28, 1989, Cortes, J.
In recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to strike.
Facts:
The Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the
SSS failed to act on the unions demands. The strike was reported to the Public Sector LaborManagement Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work. However, the strikers
refused to return to work prompting the SSS to file before RTC a complaint for damages with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. SSS contended that its
employees are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code,
therefore they do not have the right to strike.
Issue:
Whether SSS employees have the right to strike.
Ruling:
NO. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not abridged (Art. III, Sec. 8). While there is no question that the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to
whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize,
the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise
of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular
No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. Employees of the SSS are part of the civil service and
are covered by the Civil Service Commissions Memorandum prohibiting strikes.
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL
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A. EDILLON (IBP ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. MDD-1)
AC-1928, August 3, 1978, Castro, C.J.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate.
Facts:
Respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
A resolution was adopted by Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters
constitution notwithstanding due notice. Respondent contended that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
alleged that Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate.
Issue:
Whether Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for violating ones freedom to
associate.
Ruling:
NO. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the welldefined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in
its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of
the police power of the State.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTERFEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK
G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
When certain employees are obliged to join a particular union as a requisite for
continued employment, as in the case of Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid
restriction of the freedom or right not to join any labor organization because it is in favor of
unionism.
Facts:
Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger between BPI and FEBTC, all the assets and
liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation.
FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country, were hired by
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petitioner as its own employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and
benefits maintained.
The union and BPI entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a close shop
agreement. Despite notice to this kind of agreement, the employees still refused to join the
union. After two months of management inaction, on request, respondent informed
petitioner of its decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop Clause of
the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However, the issue remained unresolved at this level
and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties. Voluntary
Arbitrator ruled against the Union and concluded that the former FEBTC employees could not
be compelled to join the Union, as it was their constitutional right to join or not to join any
organization. Respondent Union filed a motion for reconsideration, but the voluntary
arbitrator denied the same. It appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the voluntary arbitrator. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether the union shop clauses in a CBA violate ones freedom or right not to join
any labor organization and hence, invalid.
Ruling:
NO. When certain employees are obliged to join a particular union as a requisite for
continued employment, as in the case of Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid
restriction of the freedom or right not to join any labor organization because it is in favor of
unionism. The Supreme Court, on occasion, has even held that a union security clause in a
CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
Moreover, a closed shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to
hire only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good
standing to keep their jobs. It is the most prized achievement of unionism. It adds
membership and compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise of
employment in the closed shop, it wields group solidarity.
The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they
impinge upon the individual employees right or freedom of association, is not to protect the
union for the unions sake. Laws and jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain
protections to the certified bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong and
effective union presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining unit since such a union
would be in a better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work from the
employer. This is the rationale behind the State policy to promote unionism declared in the
Constitution.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Executive Judge and Presiding
Judge of Branch I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, and the PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555, October 26, 1983, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use.
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Facts:
Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and
Babag, Cebu City for purposes of developing into integrated resort complexes of selected
and welldefined geographic areas with potential tourism value. A sports complex will be
constructed on the said area. The development plan also includes the establishment of
electric power grid, deep wells, and complex sewerage and drainage system for the benefit
of the community and the tourists. Complimentary and support facilities for the project will
also be constructed ill create and offer employment opportunities to residents of the
community and further generate income for the whole of Cebu City.
Petitioners challenged that the taking is not for public use under the Constitution for
there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for
tourism purposes; hence, unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether the public use requirement under the power of eminent domain is satisfied.
Ruling:
YES. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as
elsewhere the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has
been discarded.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. Before the requirement is that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be
for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power
of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE
GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA
G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
Taking does not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the
Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and
approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme.
Facts:
In its July 5, 2011 Decision, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review filed by
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) and affirmed the assailed Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) Resolutions with the modification that the original 6,296 qualified farmworkerbeneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of
HLI.
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Upon separate motions of the parties for reconsideration, the Court, by Resolution
dated November 22, 2011, recalled and set aside the option thus granted to the original
FWBs to remain as stockholders of HLI, while maintaining that all the benefits and homelots
received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them. HLI
filed a Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 dated December
16, 2011 contending among others, that since the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) is a modality
which the agrarian reform law gives the landowner as alternative to compulsory coverage,
then the FWBs cannot be considered as owners and possessors of the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita at the time the SDP was approved by PARC on November 21, 1989. It
further claims that the approval of the SDP is not akin to a Notice of Coverage in compulsory
coverage situations because stock distribution option and compulsory acquisition are two (2)
different modalities with independent and separate rules and mechanisms. Concomitantly,
HLI maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very least,
be considered as the date of taking as this was the only time that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform
certain obligations under the SDP.
Issue:
Whether the Court erred in ruling that the time of taking was on November 21,
1989 and not January 2, 2006.
Ruling:
NO. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, 631 SCRA 86 (2010), the Court held
that the time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit
of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic. It should be noted,
however, that taking does not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name
of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and
approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the
instant case. Thus, HLIs submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part
that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the
PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of taking as it was only
during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his

capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, LapuLapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function.
Facts:
The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) filed a complaint for expropriation
against San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio) to expropriate 4 parcels of land
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owned and registered in the name of San Antonio pursuant to P.D. No. 66 in relation to
Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
The respondent judge issued an order declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to
take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the filing of the complaint. He also issued a second order appointing
certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation
for the properties sought to be expropriated. Petitioner contended that under Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be the
fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Hence, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the court has the power to appoint commissioners to determine just
compensation in expropriation cases.
Ruling:
YES. The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decree
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the
Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute,
decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of
the decreed compensation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE

EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO
BELOTINDOS v. VICENTE G. LIM
G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owners of the land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time
from its taking.
Facts:
The Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu
City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said
lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots the Denzons, successors-in-interest,
Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with
damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property. The CFI
promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the
owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to
pay the amount adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, the petition.
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Issue:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of the property despite its failure to pay
respondents predecessors-in-interest the amount adjudged for expropriation.
Ruling:
NO. The Republic disregarded the Section 9, Article III of our Constitution when it
failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for
Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment
demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. More than half of a
century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained emptyhanded. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as
fair.
Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owners of the land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. The Republics failure to pay just compensation for 57 years cannot but be
construed as a deliberate refusal to pay which makes the recovery of possession in order.
While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owner concerned shall have the right to
recover possession of his property.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and AIR TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE v. BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., et al.
G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010, Nachura, J.
If the particular public purpose or intent for which an expropriation was sought is not
initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if
they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount
of just compensation received. Should the expropriator commit to use the property for a
purpose other than that stated in the petition for expropriation filed, then it should file
another petition for the new purpose.
Facts:
Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Lahug,
Cebu City. The said lot was expropriated by the Republic in connection with its program for
the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport. The projected expansion and
improvement of the Airport, however, did not materialize because the general aviation
operations at the Lahug Airport were transferred to the Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority. Subsequently, Lozada sought to repurchase his property from the Republic.
Issue:
Whether Lozada may repurchase the disputed property after the purpose for which
the same was expropriated has been abandoned.
Ruling:
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YES. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power
of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to
enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. For this reason, the taking of
private property, consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain,
is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose
for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at
all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may
seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper
for lack of the required factual justification.
In sum, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose
stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for
the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015, Bersamin, J.
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained
throughout the proceedings for expropriation. To continue with the expropriation
proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result
in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the
essential element of public use.
Facts:
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) filed a complaint for expropriation seeking
the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property. The
respondents maintained that NAPOCOR should compensate them for the entire property
since even if the area being expropriated only covered the portion directly affected by the
transmission lines, the remaining portion of the property was also affected because the
transmission line passed through the center of the land, thereby dividing the land into three
lots and that the presence of the high tension transmission line had rendered the entire
property inutile for any future use and capabilities. RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the
respondents just compensation for the whole area. The case was appealed before CA which
affirmed with modification the ruling of RTC. The case was then elevated to SC. Pending
appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings,
contending that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public
purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the
respondents property and that because the public purpose for which such property would
be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer
continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners.
Issue:
Whether the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed by
reason of the fact that the public purpose of the expropriation ceased to exist.
Ruling:
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YES. It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained
throughout the proceedings for expropriation. Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the
expropriation proceedings on the ground that the transmission lines constructed on the
respondents property had already been retired. Verily, the retirement of the transmission
lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To
continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public
purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the
expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the
property to the respondents, there is no need to pay just compensation to them because
their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property,
therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the
possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR G. MARUHOM,

ELIAS G. MARUHOM, BUCAY G. MARUHOM, FAROUK G. MARUHOM, HIDJARA G.
MARUHOM, ROCANIA G. MARUHOM, POTRISAM G. MARUHOM, LUMBA G.
MARUHOM, SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G. MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM,
MOHAMAD M. IBRAHIM, and CAIRONESA M. IBRAHIM
G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007, Azcuna, J.
Where the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of the propertys
normal beneficial use, notwithstanding the fact that the expropriator only occupies the subterrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land.
Facts:
Respondent Ibrahim and his co-heirs filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for recovery
of possession of land and damages before the RTC of Lanao del Sur alleging that they were
the owners of several parcels of land and that NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and
without respondents knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area
of said lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was
only discovered sometime in July 1992 by respondents. The tunnels were apparently being
used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCORs
Agus Projects. The RTC ordered defendant NAPOCOR to pay to plaintiffs the fair market value
of said 70,000 square meters of land. Hence, the present petition. NAPOCOR contended that
respondents were not denied the beneficial use of their subject properties to entitle them to
just compensation by way of damages.
Issue:
Whether the respondents are entitled to just compensation.
Ruling:
YES. Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an
easement upon the property of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or
possession. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates
the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and
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did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time,
validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents
property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and
possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere
burden upon the owner of the condemned property. Significantly, though, landowners cannot
be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in
court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of
just compensation and that there is due process of law.
Where the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of the propertys
normal beneficial use, notwithstanding the fact that the expropriator only occupies the subterrain portion as in this case, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the
full compensation for land. In determining the just compensation, the valuation of the
property should be based on the value on the date when the landowners discovered the
presence of the huge underground tunnels beneath their lands, not the value on the date on
which the latter constructed the tunnels.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely:

CEBU, BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA, EDGAR, PUTRI, MONGKOY and
AMIR, all surnamed MACABANGKIT
G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011, Bersamin, J.
It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable,
need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.
Facts:
Respondents were the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters situated
in Ditucalan, Iligan City who sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the
property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged
that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted
the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project traversed their
land and that it had been constructed without their knowledge and consent. As a
consequence of which, the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land. They also contended that their land had become an
unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the
tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to
safer grounds. NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation
under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their
land was established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation,
already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of
the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such
easement prescribed in five years.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered NPC to pay them just
compensation. NPC appealed before CA which affirmed the RTCs decision. Thus, the present
petition where NPC contended that it is not liable to pay the respondents just compensation.
Issues:
1. Whether the respondents are entitled to just compensation.
2. Whether the five-year prescription period applies in this case.
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Ruling:
1. YES. Here, like in National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, NPC constructed a tunnel
underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation
proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of
the construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the owners rights and interests
because the subterranean intervention by NPC prevented them from introducing any
developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by
sale or mortgage.
There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not
completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for
public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation.
Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or
occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property,
nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any
respect changes hands. As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land.
2. NO. Prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is
applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just
compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of
Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency
differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has
the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant,
even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss.
CONTRACT CLAUSE
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-NUBE v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS
BANK
G.R. NO. 67125, G.R. NO. 82337, August 24, 1990, Cruz, J.
The non-impairment clause yields to the police power of the State.
Facts:
The Philippine Veterans Bank (the Bank) was ordered to be liquidated by the Central
Bank to which Simeon Medalla et al. in their own right and on behalf of the remaining
510,000 World War II veterans or their heirs objected, arguing that as the Bank was created
by a special law, a contractual relationship now exists between the Government and the
stockholders of the Bank that cannot be disturbed without violation of the impairment
clause. They also argued that their acceptance of the benefits of that law by the petitioners
had conferred a vested right on them that cannot now be withdrawn without their consent
as this would constitute a deprivation of their property without due process of law.
Issue:
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Whether Central Bank has the power to liquidate the Philippine Veterans Bank.
Ruling:
YES. The law charges the Central Bank with the responsibility of maintaining the
stability of the banking and monetary systems of the country, to take the necessary steps
against any banking institution whose continued operation may cause prejudice to its
depositors and creditors, and the general public as well. Even if it be conceded that the
charter of the Rank constitutes a contract between the Government and the stockholders of
the Bank, it would not follow that the relationship cannot be altered without violating the
impairment clause. This is a too simplistic conclusion that loses sight of the vulnerability of
this "precious little clause," as it is called, to the inherent powers of the State when the
public interest demands their exercise. The clause, according to Corwin, "is lately of
negligible importance, and might well be stricken from the Constitution. For most practical
purposes, in fact, it has been."
Every contract involving the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity, and that is
its susceptibility to change whenever required by the public interest. The police power can
be validly asserted to make that change to meet any one of the several great public needs,
such as, in that case, regulation of the value of money.
The petitioners' argument that by accepting the stocks granted to them by the law,
the same have become their inalienable and irrevocable property is clearly untenable. These
stockholdings do not enjoy any special immunity over and above shares of stock in any
other corporation, which are always subject to the vicissitudes of business. Their value may
appreciate or decline or the stocks may become worthless altogether. Like any other
property, they do not have a fixed but a fluctuating price. Certainly, the mere acceptance of
these shares of stock by the petitioners did not create any legal assurance from the
Government that their original value would be preserved and that the owners could not be
deprived of such property under any circumstance no matter how justified.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v. WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD.,

WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.
G.R. No. 162331, November 20, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time
or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is a law
which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.
Facts:
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In 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines executed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (denominated as Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large
scale exploration, development, and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in
the provinces South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in
accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63,
Series of 1991. The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under
various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation,
Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the Tampakan
Companies), in accordance with the Tampakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC
Philippines and the Tampakan Companies for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in
Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Option Agreement, among other things, provides for the
grant of the right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires
to dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims covering the area subject of the
agreement.
WMC Philippines sold its interests over the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius
Mines, Inc. This sale was approved by the DENR Secretary. Aggrieved by the sale, Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co, appealed the DENR Secretarys decision to the Office of the
President. Lepanto invoked Sec. 40 of the Philippine Mining Act, which requires approval of
the President with respect to assignment or transfers of FTAAs.
Issue:
Whether the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 can be given retroactive application to the
Columbio FTAA (Note: The Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government
and WMC Philippines on 22 March 1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 took effect on 14 April 1995).
Ruling:
NO. It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the

impairment of the obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in existing laws, and
to fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing
contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 requiring the approval of the President with respect to assignment or transfer of FTAAs,
if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be tantamount to an
impairment of the obligations under said contract as it would effectively restrict the right of
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the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA. By imposing a new
condition apart from those already contained in the agreement, before the parties to the
Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its rights and interest in the said agreement, Section
40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, will
effectively modify the terms of the original contract and thus impair the obligations of the
parties thereto and restrict the exercise of their vested rights under the original agreement.
Such modification to the Columbio FTAA, particularly in the conditions imposed for its valid
transfer is equivalent to an impairment of said contract violative of the Constitution.
POVERTY AND LEGAL PROTECTION

RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND
FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
A. M. NO. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009, Bersamin, J.
The free access clause of the Constitution applies only to a natural person who
suffers from poverty.
Facts:
In his letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of
the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., questioned OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court of the Philippines that reserve the privilege of exemption from docket and
filing fees to indigent persons. He questioned why the rules excluded foundations or
associations that work with and for the most indigent persons, as in the case of the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. which had been reaching out since 1985 to the poorest among
the poor, the newly born and abandoned babies, children who never saw the smile of their
mother, old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, broken
families who returned to a normal life, whom the Philippine Government and the Filipino
society could not reach to or had rejected or abandoned.
Issue:
Whether Good Shepherd Foundation is exempted from payment of legal fees granted
to indigent litigants.
Ruling:
NO. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause,
embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that free access to the
courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme
Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141,
Rules of Court. The Court held that the clear intent and precise language of the provisions
indicated that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical
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personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. As a juridical
person, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent
litigants. The Court added that extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground
that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the
imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities
bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees and that the scrutiny of compliance
with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the
courts.
RIGHTS OF SUSPECTS
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, et al., JAIME JOSE Y
GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and
ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA
G.R. No. L-28232, February 6, 1971, Per Curiam
The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he
so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation and after the
arrest.
Facts:
An information was filed charging Jaime Jose Y Gomez, Basilio Pineda, Jr., Eduardo
Aquino Y Payumo And Rogelio Caal Y Sevilla as principals, Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio
Guanzon Y Romero and Jessie Guion Y Envoltario as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible
Abduction with rape committed against Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva. Upon arraignment,
Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty. However, the court reserved judgment "until such time as
the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating
circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went
to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its
decision finding the defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the petition. The
admissibility of his extrajudicial statements was questioned by Jose on the other ground that
he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs.
Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
Issue:
Whether Jose was denied of his right to counsel under Art. III Sec. 1, par. 17 of the
1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
NO. While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United
States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in
U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the
Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings
before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the
second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest
(Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to
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in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in
interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the meaning attached thereto at the time of the
adoption thereof should be considered.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO GALIT

G.R. No. L-51770, March 20, 1985, Concepcion, Jr., J.
A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements
of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Facts:
Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house
located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon
different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. More than two weeks thereafter, police
authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary
construction worker living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. Accordingly, the
herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI
Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who
allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the following day, Galit voluntarily
executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. As a result, he
was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Trial was held, and the court rendered
a decision finding the accused guilty.
It is the contention of the accused that the Salaysay cannot be admitted in evidence
because it was made in violation of the accuseds right to be informed of his Constitutional
rights. The confession was merely procured by asking the accused a long question with the
accused answering a monosyllabic answer which is Opo.
Issue:
Whether the Salaysay may be admitted in evidence without violating the accuseds
constitutional rights.
Ruling:
NO. In informing an accused of his rights, there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the
person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives
did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two
weeks after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His
statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again, accused was
not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights. The
alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as
evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, ALLAN TAN, alias
"Allan Yao,"
PETER DOE, PAUL DOE and TOM DOE
G.R. No. 108494, September 20, 1994, Regalado, J.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into
custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the rule (Sec. 12, Article III of the Constitution) begins to
operate.
Facts:
Samuel Marra was identified as the man who shot a person and was approached by
responding policemen while he was eating at an eatery shortly after the shooting. After a
series of questions, the police learned that he was Samuel Marra who was a security guard,
that his tour of duty was from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00 A.M. the following day,
that he was still on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of March 7, 1992, and that the
firearm issued to him was in his house. Upon their request to see the firearm, they
proceeded to Marra's residence at Interior Nueva Street. When they arrived, Marra took a .38
caliber revolver from inside an aparador and handed it to De Vera. De Vera also found five
live bullets and one spent shell. Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of the gun, De Vera
asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter denied ever having done so. Abruptly,
De Vera asked him point-blank why he shot Tandoc. Marra at first denied the accusation but
when informed that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in self-defense, firing at
the victim only once. Marra was then taken to the police station.
During trial, Marra invoked Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "(a)ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice
Issue:
Whether Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but
invoked self-defense.
Ruling:
NO. Mara was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission. There
was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make the statements he said. He could have
refused to answer questions from the very start. The police inquiry had not yet reached a
level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. Thus, there was no violation of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution or the constitutional procedure on custodial
investigation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., et al.

G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005, Ynares-Santiago, J.
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The right of the accused to counsel begins to be available only when the person is
already in custody.
Facts:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the NPC intended for the purchase of
US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., et al. were
indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation through
Falsification of Commercial Documents. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty to the
charge. After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Uy and found the other
accused guilty as charged. Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that he should
be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn statement, transcript of
stenographic notes which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn statement
was taken without the benefit of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section
12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether there was a violation of the invoked constitutional right.
Ruling:
NO. The rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accusedappellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. Neither does
the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
the accused orally admits having committed the crime, nor to a person undergoing an audit
examination because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer. Thus, the flaw in
appellants argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis--vis the foregoing
legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during the administrative
investigation of NPCs audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest
was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no
specific suspect.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA

and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO,
G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009, Chico-Nazario, J.
A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he

does not raise any objection to the counsels appointment during the course of the
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before
the swearing officer.
Facts:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging appellants with the special complex
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision
convicting appellants. Hence, the petition. Appellants claim that the written extra-judicial
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confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because they were obtained in violation of their
constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial
investigation. Morover, Flores insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited
through force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the appellants.
Ruling:
NO. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused is
entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The
phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a
lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent
and independent attorneys from handling the defense. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to
the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. Appellants
Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their
lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and
Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous,
respectively.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over
Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS
G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989, Narvasa, J.
Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after

a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its
Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane
tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. The findings of the Audit team were given to
him and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets. Two months after, a crime of estafa
was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution
contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge
did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was
denied. Hence, this appeal.
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Issue:
Whether the respondent judge is correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.
Ruling:
NO. It is clear that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation,
as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.
The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the
inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on
the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded. The answer to the questions posed to him was a free and even spontaneous act on
his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had
not been accorded to Ramos.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN, EFREN CANAPE y

BAYOT, ELISEO SARITA @ TOTO, EDUARDO SARINOS and SANTIAGO CID
G.R. No. 98252, February 7, 1997, Panganiban, J.
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than
"competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice."
Facts:
An Information was filed against accused-appellants charging them with violation of
Anti-Carnapping Law. Appellants Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty. Atty. Saunar testified that Atty. Vela and Atty. Toribio introduced him to appellants
and told him that the three appellants had verbally confessed to participation in a crime and
that they needed his assistance as they were about to execute their sworn statements.
Saunar agreed to assist the three suspects and allegedly explained to them the
consequences of their confession. He also supposedly told them individually and in Tagalog,
their constitutional rights, like their rights to be silent and to counsel and that whatever they
would say could be used against them. After trial on the merits, Januario and Canape was
found guilty as charged. Cid was on the other hand, acquitted. It is alleged that the
appellants right to a compentent and independent counsel was violated because Saunar
cannot be deemed as an independent counsel.
Issue:
Whether the appellants right to counsel under the Constitution was violated.
Ruling:
YES. Under the circumstances described by the prosecution, Saunar could not have
been the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our Constitution. He was an applicant
for a position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the
confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. As regards
appellant Januario, Saunar might have really been around to properly apprise appellant of
his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself.
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The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were
one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and
independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused,
as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, the Court
stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
'contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if
the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the
latter's relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon
proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition.
Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY DENIEGA y MACOY, and HOYLE DIAZ y URNILLO
G.R. No. 103499, December 29, 1995, Kapunan, J.
The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as

reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were
one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and
independent.
Facts:
The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on a heap of garbage in Mt. Carmel
Church in New Manila, Quezon City. Police authorities arrested Rey Daniega. Following the
latter's arrest, and on the basis of a confession obtained by police authorities from him
during custodial investigation (where he allegedly admitted raping and killing Canoy),
appellant Hoyle Diaz was invited by the investigators for questioning. A second sworn
statement, substantially similar and corroborating many of the details of Daniega's sworn
affidavit, was later extracted from Diaz. Armed with the said extra-judicial confessions, an
Information was filed charging petitioners with the crime of Rape with Homicide.
Consequently, after hearing the appellants' testimonies, the lower court rendered its
Decision convicting the accused-appellants. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
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Whether the extrajudicial confessions of the appellants were voluntarily and duly
executed.
Ruling:
NO. The actual custodial investigation was conducted at the police headquarters in
the absence of counsel. A thorough reading of the transcripts of the testimonies of the two
lawyers, Atty. Sansano and Atty. Rous, indicates that they appeared less as agents of the
accused during the alleged investigation than they were agents of the police authorities. In
the case before us, it was the police authorities who brought the accused, handcuffed, to the
IBP headquarters where the services of the lawyers were supposedly "engaged." No details
of the actual assistance rendered during the interrogation process were furnished or alleged
during the entire testimony of the lawyers in open court. The bulk of the lawyers' oral
testimonies merely gave the trial court assurance that they supposedly explained to the
appellants their constitutional rights, that the signatures present were their signatures and
those of the accused, and that the accused agreed to having the lawyers assist them during
the process of custodial investigation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TEODORO BASAY @ "DORO" and JAIME RAMIREZ @

"NEBOY"
G.R. No. 86941, March 3, 1993, Davide, Jr., J.
Statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible
require a clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to
questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or appointed.
Facts:
Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder and Frustrated
Murder with Arson in a criminal complaint for having allegedly killed the spouses Zosimo and
Beatrice Toting and their six-year old daughter, Bombie, and for having burned the said
spouses house to conceal the crime; as a consequence of such fire, the spouses other
daughter, Manolita, was burned to death. After both accused entered a not guilty plea, trial
on the merits ensued. The trial court promulgated its Decision acquitting accused Teodoro
Basay but convicting accused Jaime Ramirez. Hence, the appeal. Appellant contends that his
so-called extra-judicial confession was executed in blatant disregard of his constitutional
right to counsel and to remain silent during custodial investigation. It is therefore
inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, it is maintained by the People that the
appellant executed the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and without duress; in signing
such confession, he was accompanied by a certain Mr. Catacutan, a non-lawyer, inside the
chambers of Judge Calumpang "an environment . . . other than vindictive and oppressive
which the courts desired to guard against in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436."
Issue:
Whether Art. III, Sec. 12, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution was violated.
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Ruling:
YES. The interrogation was conducted and the confession was written in English, a
language the appellant, a farmer in a remote barangay of Pamplona, cannot speak and does
not understand; he only finished Grade II. There is no evidence to show that the interrogator,
who was not even presented as a witness and remains unidentified, translated the questions
and the answers into a dialect known and fairly understood by the appellant. Appellant was
not told that he could retain a counsel of choice and that if he cannot afford to do so, he
could be provided with one. He did not sign any waiver of his right to remain silent and to
counsel. He was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation. Furthermore, Elpedio
Calumpang is not a lawyer; according to the trial court, he is "a barister (sic)." There is no
showing that the so-called extra-judicial confession, which is in English, was correctly
explained and translated to the appellant by Judge Calumpang. Although the latter claimed
in his testimony on direct examination that he translated the same in the local dialect to the
appellant before the latter affixed his signature thereto, Elpedio Catacutan categorically
declared that it was the interpreter, one Pedro Rodriguez, who translated it to the appellant.
Finally, the kind of "advice" proffered by the unidentified interrogator belongs to that
stereotyped class a long question by the investigator informing the appellant of his right
followed by a monosyllabic answer which the Court has condemned for being
unsatisfactory. The investigator gave his advice perfunctorily or in a pro-forma manner,
obviously to pay mere lip service to the prescribed norms.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY

G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997, Per Curiam
It has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the
crime.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Andan was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. A police
team led by Mayor traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol
jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Subsequently,
a physical examination was conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer. By
this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor arrived and proceeded to the
investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a
request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police
and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth.
I am the one who killed AAA." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and
media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist
appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed AAA
and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness
from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings
against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic
magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. His confession was captured on videotape
and covered by the media nationwide. The next two days, more newspaper, radio and
television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to
117 | P a g e

the mayor and reenacted the crime. On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of
"not guilty." After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted appellant. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether the confessions of appellant before the Mayor and the media were
admissible.
Ruling:
YES. It cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor
is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control"
over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's
confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact,
the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to
the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess
his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional
rights. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent
him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Appellant's confessions to the media were
likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWARD ENDINO and GERRY GALGARIN

G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001, Bellosillo, J.
It should never be presumed that all media confessions described as voluntary have
been freely given.
Facts:
Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the
presence of a lady whose love they once shared. Gerry Galgarin was arrested and on their
way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin
was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin
admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. His
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. Later on, accusedappellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was
induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped
confession was constitutionally infirm and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided
in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court however admitted the video footages on
the strength of the testimony of the police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted
on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his confession was made before a group of
newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of hostility towards him.
Issue:
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Whether the court a quos admission of accused-appellants videotaped confession
was proper.
Ruling:
YES. Because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent
that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting
similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous
media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place
them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused
and thus imperil our criminal justice system.
The Court does not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by
an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is
a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp
judgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or
psychological atmosphere. It should never be presumed that all media confessions described
as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and
therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions
is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO

G.R. NO. 170470, September 26, 2006, Chico-Nazario, J.
It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having
committed the offense.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Edna was charged of Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson
resulting to the death of six (6) people. Her uncouncelled confessions to having committed
the crime were used as evidence against her. Accused-appellant questions the admissibility
of her uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to prosecution witnesses, namely Remigio
Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to the media. She contends that being uncounselled
extrajudicial confession, her admissions to having committed the crime charged should have
been excluded in evidence against her for being violative of Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the inadmissibility of the uncounselled extrajudicial confession only applies
through questioning by the police or their agents.
Ruling:
NO. Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
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Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. For this reason, the confession of
accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter
found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were
obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
However, it should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having
committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having
started the fire in the Separas house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said
admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is
not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the
Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the
State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another private individual as both accused-appellant and prosecution
witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show
that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accusedappellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by
the RTC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIASTERIO

G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010, Perez, J.
The constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those
not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents. The specific scope of duties
and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct
a custodial investigation, has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as
the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights are concerned.
Facts:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape. While his daughter AAA was left alone
at home, AAAs father (the appellant) successfully raped her against her will. AAA recounted
the incident to her brother and they sought help. Moises Boy Banting invited appellant to the
police station, to which appellant obliged. At the bantay bayan, he admitted to him that he
raped AAA because he was unable to control himself. Later on, appellant contend the
admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a bantay bayan.
Issue:
Whether his extrajudicial confession was in violation of his constitutional right.
Ruling:
YES. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the
case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific
scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a staterelated function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
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rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
GALMAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986, Teehankee, C.J.
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
Facts:
Petitioners Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and
twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, filed the present action alleging that respondents
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted
that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert
genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary
evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced
and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the
sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination."
Issue:
Whether there was violation of due process in this case.
Ruling:
YES. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is that where there
is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot
be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be
regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head"
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial. They would have no reason to
exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to
subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are
sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. The Court is constrained to declare the
sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
BAIL
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GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION v. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR., G.R. NO. 153675, April 19, 2007, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Facts:
The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, presided by
Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case, a petition
for bail which was opposed by petitioner. Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and
that private respondent is a high "flight risk." The case was raffled to respondent judge.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order allowing private respondent to post
bail. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in
the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
Issue:
Whether a potential extraditee has a right to bail.
Ruling:
YES. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it should
not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt
of the person detained is not in issue.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases
nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,
this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence."
ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 213847, August 18, 2015, Bersamin, J.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion. Such discretion may be exercised only after the
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hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty.
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile respectively
filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. Enrile has averred in
his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.
Issue:
Whether Juan Ponce Enrile may be granted bail.
Ruling:
YES. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process,
and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the
court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.
The general rule is that any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable. The exception is when such person is charged with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Thus, denial
of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the
court.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion. Such discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable. The
hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong.
In addition, Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail. The Supreme Court
took note of the Philippines responsibility to the international community arising from its
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Court therefore has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty.
CYRIL CA LP ITO QUI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 196161, September 26, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J.
Pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating
conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those
circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
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Facts:
Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act. Petitioner filed before the appellate court an Urgent
Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal which respondent People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed. The OSG urged for the denial of
the bail application on the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law and that she is
a flight-risk, as she in fact failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the
issuance of three warrants for her arrest. CA issued the first assailed Resolution denying
petitioners application for bail pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether petitioner should be granted bail.
Ruling:
NO. Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction
by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
as here. The The Court held: Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy,
the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial
court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail
is prohibited. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with
laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has
been in fact convicted by the trial court.
Petitioners plea for bail pending appeal is bereft of merit. Indeed, the undisputed fact
that petitioner did not attend the hearings before the RTC, which compelled the trial court to
issue warrants for her arrest, is undeniably indicative of petitioners propensity to trifle with
court processes. This fact alone should weigh heavily against a grant of bail pending appeal.
Petitioners argument that she has the constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of
guilt against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court,
the presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Re: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 121, CALOOCAN CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR
CHILD ABUSE
A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008, Nachura, J.
It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of
the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless
the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt
is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
Facts:
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The RTC rendered a Decision convicting respondent of violation of Republic Act No.
7610. Pending appeal, Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the Department of
Justice wrote a letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban inquiring whether it is
possible for the Supreme Court, in the public interest, motu proprio to order the immediate
suspension of the respondent in view of the aforementioned RTC Decision. In a
Resolution dated, the Supreme Court's Second Division approved all of the
recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial functions while
awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases or until further orders from this Court.
Respondent claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without
affording her the opportunity to be heard. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two
criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained
finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and her
suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt.
Issue:
Whether the respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Ruling:
YES. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondents conviction by the RTC does not
necessarily warrant her suspension. The Court agrees with the respondent's argument that
since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the
same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of
the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt
is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, Corona, J.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion.
Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide. He
appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Citing
well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
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Issue:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for
bail of Leviste.
Ruling:
NO. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates
and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was
in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by
a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history
and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused
should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may
destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending
appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate
review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence
and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release
conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and timewasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
NOE S. ANDAYA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, Ynares-Santiago, J.
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in
the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
Facts:
An Information for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document was filed
against petitioner. Petitioner denied all the charges against him. The trial court ruled that all
the elements of falsification of private document were present. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
in toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration;
hence, the instant petition challenging the validity of his conviction for the crime of
falsification of private document. Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
contradicted the ruling of the trial court. He claims that the Court of Appeals stated in
certain portions of its decision that petitioner was guilty of estafa through falsification of
commercial document whereas in the trial courts decision petitioner was convicted of
falsification of private document.
Issue:
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Whether the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated.
Ruling:
YES. It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in
the information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out
in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The
allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and an
accuseds right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information
cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be,
an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on
which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged
while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof
adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the
accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.
In view of the foregoing, it was an error to convict petitioner for acts which
purportedly constituted the third essential element of the crime but which were entirely
different from the acts alleged in the information because it violates in no uncertain terms
petitioners constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA

G.R. No. 174473, August 17, 2007, Tinga, J.
An accused may not be convicted of an offense different from the offense as alleged
in the information.
Facts:
In one information, the accused was charged of rape through carnal knowledge.
However during the trial, it was proved that the crime the accused committed is rape by
sexual assault. Hence, the accused was convicted of rape by sexual assault. It is the
contention of the accused that such conviction constitutes a violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Issue:
Whether the accused may be convicted of an offense different from the offense as
alleged in the information.
Ruling:
NO. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353), otherwise known
as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the concept of rape was revolutionized with the new
recognition that the crime should include sexual violence on the womans sex-related orifices
other than her organ, and be expanded as well to cover gender-free rape. The
transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons
and the introduction of rape by sexual assault as differentiated from the traditional rape
through carnal knowledge or rape through sexual intercourse. In view of the material
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differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the
second, and vice-versa.
Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape
through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault
although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
PUBLIC TRIAL
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER
CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN
A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011, Carpio Morales, J.
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court
doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
Facts:
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of
court proceedings. Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has
attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the
accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being
frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under
strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media
practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media
institution.
Issue:
Whether the Court should grant the petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial
court proceedings.
Ruling:
YES. The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of
the trial court proceedings. One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre
cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to
the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the
courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court
doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public who may observe
the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already
necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the
families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere
curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial
participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed
more than 200 witnesses each.
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The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will
accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of
the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of
the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. Law and
technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved,
within the contours of defined guidelines.
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO and JANE GO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., et al.
G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's
right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its
witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly
involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively
deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.
Facts:
Petitioners were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for the
crime of Other Deceits under the Revised Penal Code. The private prosecutor filed with the
MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, the prosecutions witness alleging
that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos,
Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the
Philippines by reason of ill health. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted
the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate
of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting
petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC. The RTC granted the petition and
declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking
of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is
a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of
prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face. The
prosecution elevated the case to the CA. The CA promulgated the assailed Decision which
held that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the
deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping.
Issue:
Whether the Order allowing the accused to merely take the depositions of its witness
violated the petitioners right of confrontation.
Ruling:
YES. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.
This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his
right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement
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is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to
test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not
without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court
testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional
examination of witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place
than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders
granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular
official in Laos, Cambodia.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA and ANTONIO G. HABALO v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HEIRS OF
COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG and AVELINO MANGUERA
G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015, Sereno, C.J.
When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, they lost the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule
121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
Facts:
During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayans judgment, none of the accused
appeared despite notice. The court promulgated the decision in absentia, and the judgment
was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the accused were cancelled, and
warrants for their arrest issued. The counsel for the accused filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision. The Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and
ordered the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted accused. The
court ruled that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed
without any of the accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the
promulgation. Under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo
have lost the remedies available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayans judgment of
conviction, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners may still avail of their remedies despite nonappearance during the promulgation of the judgment.
Ruling:
NO. The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused
despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the
criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or
through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is for
conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable
cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the
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judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the
judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioners. While the motion was filed on 30 April 2007,
it did not operate to regain the standing of petitioners in court. For one, it is not an act of
surrender that is contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
nowhere in the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was it indicated that petitioners were
asking for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, or that there
were valid reasons for their absence at the promulgation.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, Puno, C.J.
The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners
behind secret walls.
Facts:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to
the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped. Ten days after their escape, they
filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic
rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to
treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. The CA ordered the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and
the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos custody,
confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and
produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody.
The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the respondents should be granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling:
YES. The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they
were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, more so
now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their
own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared.
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Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The
threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or
activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their
abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-toface intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the
circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support
a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and
this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. Hence, the respondents right to security
as freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of
person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these
rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The
writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret
walls.
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., et al. v. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS

G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009, Brion, J.
The purpose of Writ of Amparo is to address uncertainity. The framers of the Amparo
Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victims rights
Facts:
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in
Jolo, Sulu. Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station.
More than a month later, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, the wife of Morced, filed a Petition for
the Writ of Amparo with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. The
petition was directed against the petitioners. In the petition, Tagitis alleged her husband was
forcibly taken by men believed to be police intelligence operatives and despite efforts to
locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis, he was nowhere to be found. According to reliable
information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence
operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI. She further averred that she has exhausted
all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, she
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her
husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects human and constitutional
rights, except the issuance of a Writ of Amparo.
In their verified Return, the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of
Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete
and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative;
and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they
132 | P a g e

exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and
locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.
Issue:
Tagitis.
Whether the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced
Ruling:
YES. The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced
disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies. There was no direct
evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only
shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the
hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however,
from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is
that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every
detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other
initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the
cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely
be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to
require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to
read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for
violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated
component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the
State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or
security are present.
Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the
resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting
affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct testimony. This
requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the
dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently
detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit
represents is essentially fulfilled. The failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured
when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings
held to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the
petition cannot be faulted.
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY

DIRECTOR REYNALDO O. ESMERALDA v. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA,
G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013, Leonen, J.
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The "Decision" under Section 19 of the Rule on Writ of Amparo pertains to the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
Facts:
Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. The
Amparo was directed against Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas
and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation. Instead
of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De
Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing. During that hearing, counsel
for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.
In an Order, Judge Pampilo insisted that "since no writ has been issued, return is not
the required pleading but answer". The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
applied and thus required an Answer. Judge Pampilo then proceeded to conduct a hearing
on the main case. Later, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo. It further denied the motion for reconsideration filed by De Lima, et al. De Lima
then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 as enunciated in Section 19 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Issues:
1. Whether the appeal is proper.

2. Whether the insistence of the judge to file an answer is appropriate.
3. Whether the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ
and the filing of
Return is proper.
Ruling:
1. NO. It is the Courts view that the "Decision" granting the writ of Amparo is not the
judgment or final order contemplated under Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule
45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
The "Decision" assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order
that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the
tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision. This "Decision" pertained to the issuance
of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under
Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that
temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the
decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that
may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.
2. NO. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of
the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are
134 | P a g e

violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
It is clear from Section 1 of the 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that
summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could
possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special
proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular
fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
3. NO. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined. The
procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in
elevating the matter to this Court. The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail
the interlocutory order denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012.
Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY
CARAM v. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA,
and CELIA C. YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014, Villarama, Jr., J.
The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof.
Facts:
Ma. Christina Yusay Caram had a child with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III as a
result of their amorous relationship. Later, the child was given up for adoption without the
knowledge of Marcelino. Due to the death of Marcelino, Christina disclosed to Marcelinos
family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption. Thereafter, the
family vowed to help her recover and raise the baby. In the meantime, the DSWD, through
Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available
for Adoption." Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina.
Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD
asking for the suspension of Baby Julians adoption proceedings. The request was denied
due to prescription and Christina was advised that should she wish to reacquire her parental
authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the
regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had already
lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523.
Due to this, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the
RTC of Quezon City. The RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo and held
that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian.
Issue:
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Whether a Petition for a Writ of Amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child.
Ruling:
NO. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the coverage of the Writ
and when it should be availed. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. In the case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the
Supreme Court explicitly declared that the Writ of Amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child
and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary
legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching
for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody
over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN DIO, and ANDREW BUISING v. VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and
in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO
G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, Del Castillo, J.
In an Amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise

essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.
Facts:
Due to a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis that Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur
Pardico (Ben) were involved in removing a lamp from a post in Grand Royale Subdivision,
they were invited to the office of the security department of Asian Land by Ruben Dio and
Andrew Buising (petitioners), who both work as security guards at the Asian Land security
department. After such investigation, Ben was never seen again. Petitioners denied having
custody of Ben. As a proof, they presented their logbook stating that Ben was released the
night he was invited and such logbook was signed by Ben, Bong and Lolita M. Lapore. Due to
the continued disappearance of Ben, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the
RTC of Malolos City which issued an Order directing, among others, the issuance of a Writ of
Amparo and the production of the body of Ben. Later, the RTC granted the petition for Writ of
Amparo. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper.
Ruling:
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NO. For the protective Writ of Amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the person
subject thereof is missing are not enough. The petitioner in an Amparo case has the burden
of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. It
is essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of
State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of
State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or
any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or
employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons.
Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a Writ of Amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an
Amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security
guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the
Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been
presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental
operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to
RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This
hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an
ordinary case of a missing person.
SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
FRANCISCO BELTRAN v. FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and
FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela
G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929, Romualdez, J.
The act of writing for the purpose of comparing a persons handwriting constitutes
evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the right against selfincrimination.
Facts:
Petitioner Beltran complains that respondent Judge Samson ordered him to appear
before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order
was given upon petition of Fiscal Jose for the purpose of comparing the Beltran's handwriting
and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified.
Issue:
Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting constitutes evidence against himself within the scope
and meaning of the right against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
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YES. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a
means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal
clearly states.
The Court ruled that purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish
a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means
of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the
falsifier.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MINOR MARTIN JOSE

PROLLAMANTE, represented by his mother/guardian FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005, Corona, J.
The kernel of the right against self-incrimination is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Facts:
Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father,
Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 106. For his part, Agustin denied being the father of the child. Later,
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel
opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The trial
court ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of
the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be considered as a violation of the constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
NO. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
138 | P a g e

SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN v. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN, et al.
G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985, Cuevas, Jr., J.
and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.
G.R. Nos. 71212-13, August 30, 1985, Cuevas, Jr., J.
The individual testimonies of respondents in a case cannot be admitted against them
in all criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional
privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity by law.
Facts:
Due to the death of Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman, P.D.
1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board (Agrava Board) which is tasked
to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and conduct exhaustive
investigation of all aspects of the tragedy.
Upon the termination of the investigation, private respondents were charged as
accessories. In the course of the trial, the Prosecution marked and offered as part of its
evidence, the individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. Private
respondents objected to the admission of said exhibits contending that its admission will be
in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the
immunity granted by P.D. 1886. For their part, TANODBAYAN contended that the immunity
relied upon by the private respondents in support of their motions to exclude their
respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their
right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board.
Issue:
Whether the testimonies given by private respondents who did not invoke their rights
against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board are admissible.
Ruling:
NO. Their continued testifying may be construed as a waiver of their rights to remain
silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves if they have the option to
do so. But in the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome
contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, the Court
is not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights
not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to remain
silent. Furthermore, the privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a
witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were
involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor
of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation
before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be
given by him, hang on the balance.
Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to
the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava
Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case for it is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.
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PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO VERGARA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, Puno, J.
Immunity statues, in effect, compels a person to disclose information which such

person may otherwise refuse to disclose on the ground of his right against self-incrimination.
Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it the surrender of their
precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against selfincrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection.
Facts:
To insure the conviction of the Marcoses for the violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), the prosecution solicited the testimonies of witnesses.
Among these witnesses were petitioners Vergara and Mapa who were then facing charges
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) with the Sandiganbayan.
Later, the Philippine Government, through the PCGG, and the petitioners agreed in
writing to make themselves available as a witness in exchange of immunity from
investigation, prosecution and punishment for any offense with reference to which their
testimony and information are given, including any offense and commission of which any
information, directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information is used
as basis thereof, except a prosecution for perjury and/or giving false testimony. Likewise, the
agreement states that cases both civil and criminal which the Republic filed or intends to file
against Mapa and Vergara shall be dismissed or they shall be exclude as party defendant or
respondent. The petitioners complied with their respective undertaking. But despite their
availability and willingness to testify, the US prosecutors decided not to call them to the
witness stand. As a result, the case against Marcos was dismissed. Later, petitioners moved
to dismiss the cases against them before the Sandiganbayan however it was denied. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss.
Ruling:
YES. Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, the failure of petitioners to
testify in the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York cannot nullify their immunity.
They have satisfied the requirements both of the law and the parties' implementing
agreements. Under section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, their duty was to give information
to the prosecution, and they did. Under their Memorandum of Agreement, they promised to
make themselves available as witnesses in the said RICO cases, and they did. Their failure
to testify was not of their own making. It was brought about by the decision of the US
prosecutors who may have thought that their evidence was enough to convict the Marcoses.
Since petitioners' failure to testify was not of their own choosing nor was it due to any fault
of their own, justice and equity forbid that they be penalized by the withdrawal of their
immunity.
140 | P a g e

The right against self-incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity
statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness
to testify despite his plea of the right against self-incrimination. To insulate these statutes
from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as
transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are
not a bonanza from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for
it the surrender of their precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that
the right against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater
respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must
necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a
right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.
JESUS T. TANCHANCO AND ROMEO R. LACSON v. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 141675-96, November 25, 2005, Tinga, J.
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution is a deliberate renunciation of the
right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime to
obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals, who, otherwise, will probably elude the
long arm of the law.
Facts:
Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos.
Tanchanco and the PCGG entered into a Cooperation Agreement, occasioned by the desire of
Tanchanco to cooperate with the government in the location and pursuit of government
properties purloined by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, their agents and others. The
Agreement provides that Tanchanco shall provide complete truthful disclosures to any
inquiries in connection with the investigations. In exchange, the Philippines shall not bring
any civil or criminal charges against Tanchanco arising from (a) Service in or for the Marcos
government; (b) any other actions revealed by Tanchanco pursuant to his cooperation.
However, 22 Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tanchanco. Tanchanco
filed a Motion to Quash all 22 cases since he was granted immunity based on the
Cooperation Agreement. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion declaring that the charges
could not be considered as falling within the immunity granted to Tanchanco as the offenses
were not related or connected to the testimony or information furnished by Tanchanco in a
proceeding concerning the recovery of the purported ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
dismiss the charges despite its lack of jurisdiction due to the Cooperation Agreement.
Ruling:
YES. The undertakings expressed by the Philippine government through the PCGG in
the Cooperation Agreement are quite clear-cut, even if broad in scope. It seemingly
encompasses three classes of actions committed by Tanchanco: those committed while he
was in the service of the Marcos government; those committed in behalf of the Marcos
government; and any other act revealed by him in the course of his cooperation with the
PCGG.
141 | P a g e

The Sandiganbayan had not given a careful consideration to the Cooperation
Agreement when it ruled on the motion to dismiss. It resorted to generalizations such as
the offenses are not related to or connected with the testimony or information furnished by
Tanchanco or the subject matter of the informations are NFA funds and the records do not
indicate that they have any relation whatsoever to the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses or
their cronies.
Yet from the results of the investigations that led to the institution of the charges, it is
clear that the cases against Tanchanco arose from the following acts or irregularities: (1) the
transfer of NFA funds either to Tanchanco's personal account, the account of "Oplan WagWag", or a private institution; (2) the failure to account for several classes of funds received
by Tanchanco, including discretionary funds, amounts contributed to the Food Production
and Nutrition Fund, and other donations. It is clear that the PCGG had precisely investigated
the anomalous transfer of NFA funds during the Marcos Administration, particularly the use
of discretionary or intelligence funds of the NFA, and that Tanchanco had given information
relating to such investigation. The scope of the Cooperation Agreement itself precludes the
prosecution of Tanchanco under the subject charges. The Cooperation Agreement, validly
undertaken between the PCGG and Tanchanco as it was, precludes the prosecution of
Tanchanco under the subject charges. The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to dismiss the charges despite its lack of jurisdiction to continue
hearing the cases against Tanchanco.
JESUS P. DISINI v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES as represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010, Abad, J.
The objective of PCGGs granting immunity from civil or criminal prosecution has
been to encourage individuals to divulge their knowledge of the unlawful acquisition of
Government property without fear of self-incrimination.
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines and Jesus P. Disini entered into an Immunity
Agreement under which Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers
with the information, affidavits, and documents they needed in its case against
Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and
in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed
against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration.
Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T. Disini (Herminio), as an executive in
the latters companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse
contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of
Herminios companies, had been attended by anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the
Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it would not compel
Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against
Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the Republics
application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to testify
and produce documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed against
Herminio. Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The
Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify
before it. Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as
it prohibited the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the
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Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the
matter to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the
Immunity Agreement.
Ruling:
NO. The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in
determining the extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant
appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his
relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this
case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in
the Governments honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain.
Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should hold the
Republic on to its promise. If Disini refuses to testify in those other cases as ordered by
Sandiganbayan, it was certain to result in prosecution for criminal contempt (a conduct
directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect), punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both. In criminal contempt, the
proceedings are regarded as criminal and the rules of criminal procedure apply. The grant,
therefore, of immunity to Disini against being compelled to testify was ultimately a grant of
immunity from criminal prosecution, something that fell within the express coverage of the
immunity given him. The questioned immunity did not contravene the states public policy
respecting the recovery of illegally acquired wealth under the regime of former President
Marcos.
The objective of PCGGs granting immunity from civil or criminal prosecution has
been to encourage individuals to divulge their knowledge of the unlawful acquisition of
Government property without fear of self-incrimination, in order to enable the Government
to recover illegally acquired assets as soon as possible.
The Court should not allow the Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross Disini. The
Immunity Agreement was the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each
party trying to get the best concessions out of it. The Republic did not have to enter into that
agreement; it was free not to. But when it did, it needed to fulfill its obligations honorably as
Disini did. More than any one, the government should be fair.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO
G.R. No. 164185, July 23, 2008, Quisumbing, J.
A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void,
does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal on the
basis of double jeopardy.
Facts:
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Notwithstanding the one-year prohibition rule, Mayor Alejandro A. Villapando
appointed Orlando M. Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente,
Palawan. As such, Villapando was charged for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The Sandiganbayan acquitted
Villapando on the basis of the demurer to evidence it filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether the order granting the demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and
any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy.
Ruling:
NO. Although the Court held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No.
140633) that once a court grants the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy, the Court held in the same case that such ruling on the
matter shall not be observed when there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
court rendering the judgment.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of
statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Notably, a judgment rendered
with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does not exist in legal
contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the

Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO GALVEZ
G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, Bellosillo, J.
In cases where the accused was acquitted by the trial court for insufficiency of
evidence without grave abuse of discretion on its part, the same case cannot be elevated
via petition for certiorari without violating the rule against double jeopardy.
Facts:
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal
employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor were charged with murder and frustrated
murder before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. The trial court found the accused
Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double
frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to
insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm
upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law. Hence, this present Petition for
Certiorari.
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It is the submission of the people that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all
criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the elevation of the criminal case despite
constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.
acquittal
violates
the
Ruling:
YES. The prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in
favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that
right. The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that
the prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and
that his constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon.
Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy
Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for
the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse
of discretion.
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge
acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and
evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned
decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at trial. These
consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis--vis
the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion
of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have resulted
in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that
the evidence was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the
writs limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper
object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari.
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of

the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, Carpio, J.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of
its various resulting acts.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
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Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler
moved to quash the Information in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
Later, MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide.
Ruling:
YES. The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in criminal
case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Slight Physical Injuries was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge.
Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and property are
material only to determine the penalty. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the
same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his

capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second
Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA
G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987, Feliciano, J.
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The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts
which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the
same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
Facts:
Opulencia was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974 due to the
unauthorized installation of electric devices and contraptions that were "designed purposely
to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the
electric ice and cold storage plant owned by him. Later, Opulencia filed a motion to dismiss
the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed. The
City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.
Fourteen days later, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft
of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised
Penal Code.
However, before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to
Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second
information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy. The respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the
case dismissed. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the
respondent Judge. Hence, this present petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the filing of the second information violates accuseds right against double
jeopardy.
Ruling:
YES. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act
or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the
prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
The first sentence of Clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that
"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The second
sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
147 | P a g e

Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act
provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not
included in or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence
applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two
charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or
the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said
offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if
there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER

ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK v. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,
EPIFANIO VILLEGAS, ARTURO XAVIER, PONCIANO FERNANDO, ROSENDO DOMINGO
and LEONARDO LUCENA
G.R. No. L-19328, December 22, 1989, Narvasa, J.
and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K.
KATIGBAK
G.R. No. L-19329, December 22, 1989, NARVASA, J.
The penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to

acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision
condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder.
Facts:
The proceedings at bar originated from two actions filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The first, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes
Katigbak praying that R.A. No. 1379 be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes
forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval. The second action commenced by
petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife,
Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture in favor of the State of the
properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance with R.A.
No. 1379.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim filed by Sps Katigbak and as
regards the petition filed by the Republic, it ordered "that from the properties of Katigbak
enumerated in its decision as acquired in 1953, 1954 and 1955, shall be enforced as a lien in
favor of the Government. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Appeal was taken from this
verdict of the Court of Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal was certified to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
148 | P a g e

Whether R.A. No. 1379 operates as an ex-post facto law.
Ruling:
YES. Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of
the learned Trial Judge in 1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in
1962 clearly and categorically pronounced by this Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.
The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of
a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal
an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes
such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that
penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made
prior to its passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post
facto laws or bills of attainder. But this is precisely what has been done in the case of the
Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be
illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a
lien thereon "in favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is,
quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, for and in behalf of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding

Committee on Behest Loans v. PLACIDO MAPA, JR., RAFAEL SISON, ROLANDO
ZOSA, CESAR ZALAMEA, BENJAMIN BAROT, CASIMIRO TAENDO, J.V. DE OCAMPO,
ALICIA REYES, BIENVENIDO TANTOCO, JR., BIENVENIDO TANTOCO, SR., FRANCIS
BANES, ERNESTO CARINGAL, ROMEO JACINTO, and MANUEL TANGLAO
G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007, Nachura, J.
laws.
The rule on ex post facto law does not apply when the laws involved are not penal
Facts:
Former President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and Memorandum Order No.
16, wherein the functions of the Committee were subsequently expanded. Several loan
accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan transactions
between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Committee determined that they bore the
characteristics of behest loans, as the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies
of then President Ferdinand Marcos; that the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was
undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted. Atty. Orlando Salvador, Consultant of the
Committee, and representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violations of R.A. No. 3019, or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents. It is contended that the
administrative orders issued by the President are ex post facto laws and therefore should be
striken down.
Issue:
149 | P a g e

Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex-post
facto laws.
Ruling:
NO. An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes
such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. This Court added two (2) more
to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that
which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and memorandum
orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13
creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its
composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest
loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the
Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post
facto.
SP. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008, Reyes, J.
By way of exception, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual
criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.
Facts:
Valeroso was charged and convicted for illegal possession of firearms under the first
paragraph of P.D. No. 1866. During the pendency of the case, PD 1866 was amended by RA
8294 which lowered the penalty of illegal possession of firearms from reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua to merely prision correctional in its maximum
period.
Issue:
Whether Valeroso can benefit from the enactment of RA 8294 which lowered the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
150 | P a g e

YES. The Prosecution was able to establish that Valeroso was indeed guilty of illegal
possession of firearms. However, Valeroso was charged under the first paragraph of Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended, providing that the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was
the governing law at the time Valeroso committed the offense. However, R.A. No. 8294
amended P.D. No. 1866, during the pendency of the case with the RTC, which now provides
that the penalty of prision correctional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
P15,000 shall be imposed.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the
law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is not as a
right of the offender, but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to
punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception
based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is
still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision
correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISISON ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) v. THE HONORABLE

OMBUDSMAN Conchita Carpio-Morales, GREGORIO S. LICAROS, GAUDENCIO
BEDUYA, JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., JOSE S. ESTEVES, PLACIDO T. MAP A, JR., JULIO V.
MACUJA, VICENTE PATERNO, RAFAEL A. SISON, ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, ALICIA LL.
REYES, Former Members of the Board of Governors of the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), RODOLFO M. CUENCA, EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, JOSE Y.
VILLONGCO, RODOLFO B. SANTIAGO, AURELIO Y. BAUTISTA, GENOVEVA L. BUENO,
BIENVENIDO D. CRUZ, ROMEO R. ECHAUZ, JORGE W. JOSE, LEONILO M. OCAMPO,
ANTONIO P. SAN JUAN, JR., CLARENCIO S. YUJIOCO, All Officers of Resorts Hotels
Corporation
G.R. No. 206537, November 12, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
If the day when the violation was committed be not known, then it shall begin to run
from the discovery of said violation and the institution of judicial proceedings for
investigation and punishment.
Facts:
Former President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating a

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans and subsequently issued
Memorandum Order No. 61 prescribing certain criteria to be used by the Committee as a
guide in investigating and studying loans granted by government financing institutions that
amount to behest loan. One of the loan accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for
investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC). The Committee found that RHC
account qualifies as behest in character. The Committee, represented by the PCGG, filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, against the directors and officers of
RHC and that of DPB for violation of RA 3109, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. PCGG moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied on the ground of prescription.
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Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription.
Ruling:
NO. Based on jurisprudence, the following guidelines in the determination of the

reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz: 1). As a general
rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense; 2). If the
date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the date of
discovery thereof; 3). In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that
should apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to
the crime should first be determined. If the necessary information, data, or records based on
which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule
applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime.
Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the
violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the
period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which the SC has
recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by
the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies. The SC
counts the running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on January
4, 1993, when the Committee reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent
RHCs loans. This being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman on January 6,2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of
discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to
institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the Ombudsman to dismiss
petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its

National President (BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan v.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law RA 9335. The law intends
to encourage Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Customs officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions. It covers all
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officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, Bureau of
Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) filed a petition before the SC and averred that the
BOC started to disseminate Collection District Performance Contracts for the lower ranking
officials and rank-and-file employees to sign. Such Performance Contracts provide that
officials and employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target shall be removed
for the service. BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to
economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were forced to sign the
Performance Contract, but majority of them did not sign. BOCEA officers were summoned
and required to sign the Performance Contracts but they also refused.
The petition was filed directly with the SC. BOCEA asserted the unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC
officials and employees. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC
employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required
quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of
tenure, and at their and their respective families prejudice. They seek to declare the said
law unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.
Issue:
Whether R.A. 9335 is a bill of attainder; hence, unconstitutional because it inflicts
punishment through legislative fiat upon a particular group or class of officials and
employees without trial.
Ruling:
NO. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment,
penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the
elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or
employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still
followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.
CITIZENSHIP
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR v. VICENTE D. CHING

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999, Kapunan, J.
The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made within 3 years from reaching the age of majority.
However, this period may be extended under certain circumstances, but such extension is
not definite.
Facts:
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Vicente Ching, legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, was born in
Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In
1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course, filed an application to take
the 1998 Bar Examinations. The SC allowed Ching to take the Bar Examinations subject to
the condition that he must submit to the Court of his proof of his Philippine Citizenship. In
compliance therewith, he submitted a certification that he is certified public accountant, a
voter certification that he is a registered voter in La Union, and a certification the he was
elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union. In 1999, Ching passed
the Bar Examinations, however, he was not allowed to take his oath because of the
questionable status of his citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment stating that Ching was a Chinese citizen and continued to
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship. The OSG
adds that what he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he
could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." It explains that the clause
"upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be
three (3) years. OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship
and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the
OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Ching then filed a Manifestation, attaching his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance.
Issue:
Whether Ching has elected Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time.
Ruling:
NO. The governing charter when Ching was born was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the said Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625 which was
enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV, prescribes the procedure that should be
followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority," which was
21 years of age back then. Based on jurisprudence, the phrase reasonable time has been
interpreted to mean that the elections should be made within 3 years from reaching the age
of majority. However, this period may be extended under certain circumstances, but such
extension is not definite.
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five
(35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or
over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
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Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election. Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot
constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS andTHE LEAGUE OF

MUNICIPLAITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, herein represented by its President,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE
G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, Cruz, J.
Mere filing of certificate of candidacy does not effectively operate to recover
Philippine citizenship.
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon and
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by
its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation
on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States
on January 20, 1983. In his answer, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United
States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he
said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to
the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also
argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto
petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance
with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper
party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
The Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As
an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure
this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local
Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as
provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Ruling:
NO. Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution states that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective
office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under the Constitution.
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To disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63, as
amended, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims
he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws are of no concern. The alleged
forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious
that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and
could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he
had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
ANTONIO BENGSON III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and

TEODORO C. CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, Kapunan, J.
The act of repatriation allows one to recover, or return to, his original status before
he/she lost his/her Philippine citizenship.
Facts:
Teodoro Cruz was natural-born citizen of the Philippines; born in San, Clement, Tarlac
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. He then lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 163 a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship, by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country. In 1990, he was then naturalized as a US citizen. In 1994, he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA No. 2630. He ran for and
was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over Antonio Bengson III. Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam, with House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), claiming that Cruz was
not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a naturalborn citizen as required under the Constitution. HRET dismissed the petition and declared
Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan.
Issue:
Whether Cruz can still be considered a natural-born citizen upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Ruling:
YES. Repatriation, as one of the modes of reacquiring Philippine citizenship, may be
had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service
in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman
to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy
process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
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place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in
the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
US. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA No. 2630. Having
thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry in accordance with RA No. 2630, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. The act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO,

ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE,
TEREISTA A. CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHIFT, MERCEDES VS. OPENA,
CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, and EVELYN NATIVIDAD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006, Garcia, J.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to
vote.
Facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before
the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as
"overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States
that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003,
they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence
requirement prescribed by the Constitution. Faced with the prospect of not being able to
vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the
National Registry of Absentee Voters, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus. COMELEC then filed a comment praying for the denial of the petition. The OSG
pointed out that the holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot
and academic but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is
concerned.
Issue:
Whether petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under
R.A. 9189.
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in
implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section
5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot
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be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter
under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Considering the unison intent of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of
R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage
thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y

CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, Sereno, C.J.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship.
Facts:
Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen. He lost his Filipino citizenship as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States. He then
applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. An Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor. Arnado then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections. Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his COC. He contended that Arnado is not a
resident of Kauswagan and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification from
Bureau of Immigration indicating the nationality of Arnado as USA-American and a
computer-generated travel record indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport for
four (4) times in entering and departing the Philippines. Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed the winning candidate of Mayor of
Kauswagan. Arnado then submitted his Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.
The COMELEC First Division ruled that although Arnado appears to have substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, his act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation,
since he had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship.
Issue:
Whether the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.
Ruling:
YES. Arnado, after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for
eligibility to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open
to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. While the act of using a foreign
passport is not one of the acts enumerated in CA No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of
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Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to
be qualified to run for a local elective position.
The SC agreed with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport
does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US
passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is
fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to
run for an elective local position.
RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015, Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts:
Renato David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and
bought a lot where they constructed their residential house. However, they came to know
that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
David then filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application over the subject land with the DENR at
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), and indicated therein
that he is a Filipino citizen. Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that David,
a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against David. Meanwhile, David re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. David contended that at the time he filed his application, he
had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by the
CENRO that he could declare himself as a Filipino. CENRO then rejected Davids application
on the ground that Davids subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure
the defect in his application which was void ab initio.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Prosecutor, affirmed by the DOJ, found probable cause in
the complaint. Consequently, an information was filed before the MTC. David filed an Urgent
Motion for the Re-Determination of Probable Cause in the MTC. MTC denied said motion
holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign citizens
during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment
when the governing law was CA No. 63. A petition for certiorari was filed before the RTC
contending that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another
country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed
not to have been lost on account of said naturalization. RTC denied said petition.
Issue:
Whether by re-acquiring the Philippine citizenship status under R.A. 9225, David was
by legal fiction, deemed not to have lost it (natural-born status) at the time of his
naturalization.
Ruling:
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NO. While Section 2 of R.A. 9225 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays
down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and
second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The
taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens
who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, reacquired for the first group, and retain for the second group. R.A. 9225 thus makes a
distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and
after the effectivity the said law.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his
MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of
such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already
lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural- born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the
policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of
which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new laws effectivity. Falsification
of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements
of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of
his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) that the falsification was co mmitted in a public, official or
commercial document. David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document,
that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was
then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized
as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated
act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public
document.
EDISON SO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007, Callejo, Sr., J.
R.A. 9139 and C.A. 473 are separate and distinct laws. R.A. 9139 covers native-born
aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any country, and all
along thought that they were Filipinos. On the other hand, C.A. 473 covers all aliens
regardless of class.
Facts:
Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under C.A. No. 473, or the
Revised Naturalization Law. He alleged that he was born on February 17, 1982 in Manila, and
he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in Binondo since birth; that he studied in a school
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recognized by the Government and that he is a person of good moral character; that he has
all the qualifications provided under Sec. 2 and none of the disqualifications under Sec.4 of
C.A. No. 473. He attached to the petition a Joint Affidavit of Atty. Adasa, Jr. and Mark Salcedo
as his character witnesses. RTC granted such petition. However, the OSG appealed to CA
arguing that these 2 character witnesses have not qualified as character witnesses and that
So is not qualified to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines. So, on the other hand, averred
that he graduated cum laude from UST with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy
and was in his second year as a medical student in UST. He averred that requirements for
naturalization under C.A. 473, as amended, had been relaxed after the Philippine
government entered into diplomatic relations with China and further relaxed by R.A. No.
9139. CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed Sos petition for naturalization.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act.
Ruling:
NO. Naturalization is an act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of
a nation by clothing him/her with the privileges of a citizen, There are three (3) ways by
which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (1) administrative, under R.A. 9139;
(2) judicial, under C.A. 473; and (3) legislative, in the form of law enacted by Congress
bestowing citizenship to an alien. There are different qualifications in R.A. 9139 and C.A.
473. R.A. 9139 is intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical and more encouraging. Under this law, degree holders, by reason of
lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession in the Philippines.
The SC ruled that C.A. 473 shall apply. First, R.A. 9139 and C.A. 473 are separate and
distinct laws. R.A. 9139 covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any country, and all along thought that they were Filipinos. On the
other hand, C.A. 473 covers all aliens regardless of class. A native-born alien then has the
choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization. Since So applied by judicial act,
then C.A. 473 shall govern. Second, R.A. 9139 only applies to aliens who were born in the
Philippines and who have been residing here. Third, applying the provisions of R.A. 9139 to
judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the
naturalization procedure. R.A. 9139 does not amend nor repeal C.A. 473.
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP OF CHAN TECK LAO, CHAN TECK
LAO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L25300, January 4, 1974, Fernando, J.
No retroactive effect is to be given to a judicial pronouncement that would impose on
a party proceeded against in a denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in existence
at a time that his application was heard and favorably acted on.
Facts:
Chan Teck Lao filed an application for naturalization but the same was denied. In
1950, upon appeal, the SC reversed the decision. In 1962, the Office of the Solicitor General
then caused the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization because there was no
showing or proof that the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province
of Tarlac, where the petitioner then resided. This is because a subsequent ruling in a petition
for cancellation of naturalization case was made by the Court which states that there is a
161 | P a g e

necessity to show that the newspaper where the publication is made is indeed a newspaper
of general circulation.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the Solicitor General is correct in canceling the naturalization of
Chan Teck Lao on the ground that he failed to follow the publication requirement.
Ruling:
NO. The Court makes it manifest that no retroactive effect is to be given to a judicial
pronouncement that would impose on a party proceeded against in a denaturalization
proceeding a requirement not in existence at a time that his application was heard and
favorably acted on. There would be manifest unfairness in setting aside a decision that had
subsequently become final and did lead to the grant of the coveted boon citizenship.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORMA FE SAGUN

G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012, Villarama, Jr. J.
The law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by
election. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Facts:
Respondent is the legitimate child of a Chinese man and Filipino woman. She was
born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. At the age of 33, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. The document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. In 2005, she applied for a Philippine passport but was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth
certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar
of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
Issues:
1. Whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
authorized by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
2. Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
Ruling:
1. YES. However, it should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or
procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts. Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the
intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed
to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
2. NO. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply
with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election
162 | P a g e

exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.
163 | P a g e

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DEANS CIRCLE 2016

Editors: Tricia Lacuesta

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PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, RIGHT TO ASSEMBLY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

POVERTY AND LEGAL PROTECTION 99

Criminal Due Process

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS and WRIT OF AMPARO

EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER

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